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ORIENTATION TO OBJECTIVES

Another minority did not clearly understand U.S. objectives in South Vietnam:

23. Do you feel that you had a clear understanding of basic U.S. objectives in the host country (N = 583)?

Yes (88.9%)

No. (11.1%)

Most of the advisors in the sample considered MAP to be important. However, more than one-third of the sample thought that the military assistance program was no more than Moderately important for U.S. policy in South Vietnam (item 21):

24. How important do you consider MAP in the furtherance of U.S. policy in the host country (N = 582)?

Highly	Moderately	Slightly	Not at all
63.4%	25.4%	7.6%	3.2%

Another problem was said to be that there were too many advisors going in too many different directions. It was realized that, in order to make real progress, a collective effort with realistic and attainable goals was necessary, but there were too many goals from higher headquarters. Other advisors complained that there were too many "nuts and bolts" requirements, all with the same "number one" priority. Consequently, there really were no priorities.

EVALUATION OF MAP

Table 71 shows that there was general agreement (72%) that the Military Assistance Plan (MAP) supports the interests of both the United States and South Vietnam about equally (item 31). It was pointed out, however, that the program was changed frequently. Problems of implementation also were involved. Both conditions made the program difficult to assess. It is possible that, at times, the program was detrimental to both countries. About one-fifth of the advisors who responded said that they believed that MAP unduly favored the United States (item 30).

On the other hand, almost 40% of the sample who made a judgment believed that MAP unduly favored the Republic of Vietnam (item 29). Some advisors believed that the policy

Table 71

Biases of MAP Support

Item No.	Evaluation of Support Biases	N	Percent	
			Yes	No
Do you feel that the Military Assistance Program:				
29	Unduly favors host-country interests?	468	38.7	61.3
30	Unduly favors U.S. interests?	435	18.9	81.2
31	Supports the interests of both countries about equally?	519	71.7	28.9

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of MAP provided too much assistance and not enough advice and instruction. Others pointed out that the United States did not retain control over equipment after it was delivered to ARVN. Possibly as a result of the above considerations, some advisors were of the opinion that MAP unduly favored the Republic of Vietnam, to the point where some Vietnamese personnel took an unfair advantage of the United States and its advisors.

Table 72 contains two questions concerning how well MAP fits the needs and capabilities of the units advised. The advisors in general (84%) thought that MAP was tailored to their units' need at least moderately well (item 32). When it came to how well MAP suited the capabilities of their units, however, only about three-fourths of the respondents gave high ratings to MAP (item 33). Of particular interest is the fact that only about one-fourth of the sample gave ratings of "Very well tailored" to either item.

Several possible reasons for the dearth of high ratings were stated. For example, respondents said that the military and civic action programs were limited in scope to the larger, more populated areas, and that very little was done to assist the outlying areas. There also was a lack of supplies and support from both United States and Vietnamese sources for such purposes. Another viewpoint, however, saw such effort as premature, the respondents noting that MAP could have been tailored down for the outlying districts. The reason given was that the Vietnamese were not oriented toward what we were telling them to do (especially with respect to pacification). A third explanation for low ratings of MAP effectiveness is a belief that MAP was too sophisticated (it needs people who will do the actual work, in order to teach by example). Further, it was said that MAP teaches luxurious living, and that the program preaches culture and understanding, and then disregards both.

Table 72

Suitability of MAP for ARVN

Item No.	Evaluation of MAP Suitability	N	Percent			
			Very Well	Moderately Well	Barely Satisfactorily	Poorly
	How well tailored is MAP to:					
32	The needs of the host-country unit(s) you advise(d)?	584	24.0	59.4	11.7	5.0
33	The capabilities of the host-country unit(s) you advise(d);	582	20.3	56.0	18.6	5.2

The administration of the MACV-CORDS program was perceived by some as in conflict with its purposes. Some advisors commented that support of U.S. advisors often consumed too much time, command attention, and resources in comparison to the results achieved (particularly with MAPs).

Thirty-four percent of the advisors felt that shortages of MAP funds or equipment presented a hindrance to their effectiveness of at least Moderate proportions:

106. How much of a hindrance to your effectiveness as an advisor (were) shortages of MAP funds or equipment (N = 499)?

<u>None</u>	<u>Slight</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Serious</u>
29.5%	36.9%	21.9%	11.8%

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There were 91% who said that their counterparts viewed MAP favorably, but almost 9% did not agree:

274. Does your counterpart view MAP as being in the best interests of his country (N = 538)?

Yes (91.3%)

No (8.7%)

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Chapter 13

LANGUAGE PROBLEMS

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND JOB EFFECTIVENESS

The relationship between an advisor's proficiency in the host-country language and his job effectiveness was explored. In general, responses to the questions reflect the wide variety of situations that confronted the advisors. The need for language proficiency ranges from one extreme to the other, depending upon such factors as the counterpart's ability to speak English, availability of interpreters, type of information to be communicated, urgency of the situation, and degree of difference in the cultural backgrounds of advisor and counterpart. Some advisors believe that proficiency is essential, and that all advisors should have language training. Others said that language proficiency was not important, or that they could get by with simple words and phrases.

Whereas two-thirds of the advisors said that confusion from being unable to communicate in the host-country language hindered their effectiveness only Slightly (or not at all), almost 34% said it was at least a Moderate hindrance.

436. Confusion from being unable to communicate in host country language (N = 555):

Hindrance to effectiveness.

<u>Great</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Slight</u>	<u>None</u>
10.8%	23.1%	45.1%	21.1%

When asked about how much knowledge of the language helped an advisor, 59% said either Considerably or Greatly:

166. How much do you think that your knowledge of the host country language has helped you as an advisor (N = 496)?

<u>Greatly</u>	<u>Considerably</u>	<u>A little bit</u>	<u>Not at all</u>
22.6%	36.5%	35.5%	5.5%

The fact that 41% answered no more than "A little bit" illustrates the problem involved in understanding the function of language in advisory situations.

It is possible for those who cannot speak the host-country language to delude themselves into thinking that they know what is going on, whereas counterparts can be operating under a different set of rules than the advisors. For the most part, advisors learn only what counterparts want them to know. About 57% of the respondents answered either Moderately or Seriously when asked to what degree lack of language capability would detract from duty performance:

167. If an advisor on your job could not speak the host country language, how would it detract from his duty performance (N = 592)?

<u>Seriously</u>	<u>Moderately</u>	<u>Slightly</u>	<u>No effect</u>
25.3%	32.1%	31.8%	10.8%

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Even if the advisor has an English-speaking counterpart, problems can arise when they go into the field, or if the counterpart becomes a casualty.

USE OF THE HOST-COUNTRY LANGUAGE

In item 162, the advisors were asked "About what percent of the time do you speak the host-country language (check to nearest 10%)." Most advisors spent relatively little time on the job speaking the host-country language. From Figure 4, it can be determined that only 18% used the host-country language during more than 30% of their duty time. About 19% did not use the host-country language at all, and about half used Vietnamese less than 20% of their duty time.

Advisors' Use of Vietnamese Language




Figure 4

If usage of a host country's language is dependent upon the advisor's proficiency in the language, then the distribution of responses to the question concerning the amount of time on the job spent speaking the language is consistent with responses showing ability to speak the Vietnamese language (item 160). Over half the advisors (56%) were only able to communicate in the Vietnamese language with simple words and phrases. About one-third handled conversation at least moderately well.

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160. What is your ability to speak the host country language
(N = 589)?

Fluent in writing and speaking	0.5%
Converse with ease	2.4%
Moderate conversation	30.4%
Simple words and phrases	56.4%
None	10.4%

Naturally, the counterpart's ability to speak English is one of the most important factors in the language situation. Two-thirds of the advisors rated their counterpart's ability to speak English at the level of Moderate conversation or higher:

161. What is your counterpart's ability to speak English
(N = 581)?

Fluent in writing and speaking	7.9%
Converses with ease	21.5%
Moderate conversation	37.7%
Simple words and phrases	26.1%
None	6.7%

From the above information, and the results of item 52 (p. 84), it appears that, with relatively little effort directed at matching language capabilities, at least moderately effective communication between advisor and counterpart could be ensured. For example, with respect to items 160 and 161, advisors who are fluent in Vietnamese could be assigned to counterparts who speak little or no English, and *vice versa*. One peripheral reason for this suggestion is that comments indicated that counterparts who speak English want to practice their English.

JOB VALUE OF HOST-COUNTRY LANGUAGE CAPABILITY

Table 73 describes the effects on an advisor's job of a moderate ability to converse in the host-country language. Most advisors agreed that this ability does affect their jobs (item 181). There was almost unanimous agreement (95%) that such ability enhanced rapport between advisor and host-country military (item 178). In fact, ability to speak Vietnamese might help to establish immediate rapport that would otherwise take months to develop. In a cross-cultural situation, rapport cannot be developed without some degree of reciprocal cultural awareness. About 90% of the respondents agreed that moderate language ability in Vietnamese improves mutual cultural awareness on the part of both advisor and counterpart (item 177).

Large majorities of advisors (between 80 and 90%) also agreed that moderate capability in the Vietnamese language facilitates constructive discussion, speeds and clarifies exchanges of ideas, permits advisors to follow discussions among host-country military, and avoids confusion and misunderstanding (Table 73, items 174, 175, 176, and 179). About 57% of the respondents said that it eliminates the need for a full-time interpreter (item 173). One of the most important objectives of the U.S. advisory program is to transfuse U.S. military technology to ARVN. Almost three-fourths (73%) of the advisors agreed that a moderate ability to converse in Vietnamese speeds this process (item 180).

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Table 73

Effect of Moderate Ability to Converse in Host-Country Language on Advisory Job

Item No.	Effect of Language Ability	N	Percent	
			Agree	Disagree
173	Eliminates the need for a full-time interpreter	589	56.9	43.1
174	Avoids confusion and misunderstanding	590	78.8	21.2
175	Facilitates constructive discussion	587	84.5	15.5
176	Speeds and clarifies exchanges of ideas	587	86.9	13.1
177	Improves cultural awareness of advisor and counterpart	590	90.9	9.2
178	Enhances rapport between advisor and host-country military	589	95.1	4.9
179	Permits advisor to follow discussions among host-country military	589	90.5	9.5
180	Speeds transfusion of U.S. military technology into host-country military	589	72.8	27.2
181	Does not affect the advisor's job in any important way	586	15.2	84.8

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

The responses in Table 74 indicate that the English language and interpreters are the most important means of communication in Vietnam between advisors and their ARVN counterparts. Thus, 81% of the respondents said that interpreters were either Highly or Moderately important (item 171). Virtually the same percentage gave the same favorable responses for English as a means of communicating with ARVN counterparts (item 168). The host-country language was rated either Highly or Moderately important by 61% of the advisors, but less than a third said that it was Highly important (item 169).

Table 74

Importance of Means of Communication Between Advisor and Counterpart

Item No.	Means of Communication	N	Mean Rating	Percent			
				4 Highly	3 Moderately	2 Slightly	1 Not Important
168	English	589	3.3	48.2	32.8	15.5	3.6
169	Host-country language	586	2.8	28.8	31.9	31.1	8.2
170	Other language	569	1.5	3.7	9.1	19.9	67.3
171	Interpreter	580	3.3	56.2	22.5	10.2	9.2
172	Signs and gestures	582	2.3	13.6	28.0	26.8	21.7

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Signs and gestures also were either Highly or Moderately important to about 41% of the respondents. Signs and gestures can be divided into two categories—those that are improvised in a specific situation, usually to complement verbal communication, and those that have been standardized (e.g., infantry arm and hand signals).

Other, or third-country, languages (usually French) were rated as either Highly or Moderately important by 13% of the advisors (item 170).

Regardless of the language or method used, how well do advisors and counterparts in Vietnam communicate? Eighty-three percent said they communicated either Fluently, or With only occasional misunderstandings:

165. How well can you and your counterpart communicate (regardless of the language or method used) (N = 590)?

Fluently	28.0%
With occasional misunderstandings	55.1%
Simple conversations only	14.4%
With great difficulty	2.6%

Thus, there were only about 17% of the advisors whose effectiveness may have been handicapped by limited ability to communicate with their counterparts.

USE OF INTERPRETERS

Although most advisors rely greatly on interpreters as a means of communication, there are a number of disadvantages to doing so. About 45% said that being dependent upon interpreters was either a Great or Moderate hindrance to effectiveness.

425. Being dependent upon interpreters (N = 557):

Hindrance to effectiveness.

<u>Great</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Slight</u>	<u>None</u>
20.1%	25.3%	36.3%	18.0%

But they considered interpreters to be important, nevertheless (Table 74, item 171).

Two-thirds of the advisors rated their interpreters as either Good or Excellent; only about 7% considered their interpreters to be truly poor:

163. If you use an interpreter, how do you rate his ability (N = 537)?

<u>Excellent</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Poor</u>
33.7%	34.5%	25.0%	6.9%

Although most advisors (84%) thought that the meaning of communications between them and their advisors was being only slightly distorted by the interpreters, a minority of 16% felt that communications were seriously distorted:

164. To what extent does your interpreter distort the meanings of communications between you and your counterpart (N = 532)?

Does not distort at all	17.3%
Slightly distorts	66.5%
Seriously distorts	10.3%
Very seriously distorts	6.0%

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It is evident from advisors' comments that many interpreters translated only what they wanted said, or what they thought the counterpart wanted to hear. Most Vietnamese interpreters were NCOs who were reluctant to tell a Vietnamese officer anything bad or critical that was said by an advisor. Also, many interpreters followed a counterpart's instructions to translate to the advisor only what the counterpart wanted him to know. Several advisors noted that some knowledge of Vietnamese was very helpful for monitoring conversations among the Vietnamese.

LANGUAGE PROBLEMS WHILE UNDER FIRE

Language problems of advisors when under fire can be divided into two categories: those concerning the advisor's personal safety, and those affecting his performance of duty. In a situation where there were no interpreters and the counterpart spoke no English, almost two-thirds of the advisors said a proficiency level of Moderate Conversation, or greater, was necessary to maximize personal safety under fire (Table 75, item 367), and about 72% said that at least Moderate conversational ability was necessary to perform effectively as an advisor under fire (item 368).

Table 75

Minimum Level of Language Proficiency Needed Under Fire

Item No.	Language Proficiency Needed	N	Percent				
			None	Simple Words and Phrases	Moderate Conversation	Converse With Ease	Fluency
Assuming that there are no interpreters, and counterpart speaks no English, what is the minimum level of proficiency in the host country language needed:							
367	To maximize the personal safety of an advisor <i>under fire?</i>	528	1.7	33.9	40.0	19.9	4.6
368	To perform effectively as an advisor <i>under fire?</i>	550	0.7	27.5	44.6	23.5	3.8

Regarding the adequacy of their own proficiency in Vietnamese with respect to personal safety under fire, a majority of the respondents apparently did not feel very secure. More than 41% said their proficiency in Vietnamese maximized their personal safety only Sometimes or Seldom, with another one-fourth saying Never (Table 76, item 369). The responses were similar with respect to performance as an advisor under fire (item 370).

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Table 76

Effects of Language Proficiency Under Fire

Item No	Effects of Language Proficiency	N	Percent				
			Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
	How frequently was your host-country language proficiency sufficient to maximize:						
369	Your personal safety under fire?	574	11.9	20.0	23.7	17.6	26.8
370	Your performance as an advisor under fire?	572	8.2	25.2	24.7	16.3	25.7

Advisors were asked how well various statements described language problems under fire. When under fire, can an advisor function effectively without any language proficiency, as long as he has a good interpreter? Evidently, most of them can (70%), since they indicated that the description fitted advisors under fire moderately well. (Table 77, item 371). A larger percentage (80%) indicated that by depending upon an interpreter (or an English-speaking counterpart) an advisor can understand what is going on under fire at least moderately well, but will miss some important things (item 375).

If the counterpart speaks English, will he have the opportunity to translate for his advisor while under fire? Probably not, since almost two-thirds of the advisors said that their counterparts could be described at least moderately well as being too busy to translate while under fire (item 372).

Can an advisor be effective under fire even though he knows only a few words of the host-country language? There were 59% who said that an advisor can make himself understood well enough to be effective while under fire (item 371).

There was substantial disagreement with the statement that an advisor would be only a bystander when under fire, unless he was able to understand the host-country language. Although 45% said the statement was at least moderately descriptive of an advisor's situation in these circumstances, about one-third said it did not fit at all (item 373).

LANGUAGE TRAINING

The opinions of advisors concerning language training provide additional data with which to evaluate the importance of language proficiency with respect to job effectiveness. About 90% of the respondents said that training in the host-country language is of either High or Moderate importance to job effectiveness.

239. Host country language (N = 590):

Importance of training and orientation to job effectiveness.

High	Moderate	Slight	None
60.2%	28.8%	10.5%	0.5%

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Table 77

Language Problems of Advisors Under Fire

Item No.	Language Problems	N	Percent			
			Very Well	Moderately Well	Poorly	Not at All
How well do the following statements describe language problems of an advisor under fire?						
371	An advisor can function effectively when under fire without any language proficiency, as long as he has a good interpreter.	568	25.9	44.6	23.6	6.0
372	Even if your counterpart speaks English, he will be too busy to translate for you while under fire.	564	18.3	45.9	21.1	14.7
373	Without being able to understand the host-country language, an advisor will be only a bystander when under fire.	567	18.0	27.0	23.6	31.4
374	Even though he knows only a few words of the host-country language, an advisor can make himself understood well enough to be effective when under fire.	568	17.4	41.2	34.9	6.5
375	By depending on an interpreter or an English-speaking counterpart, you can understand what is going on under fire, but you miss some important things.	567	30.3	49.4	11.7	8.7

Language courses of two schools, the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), received either Essential or Very helpful ratings from 83 and 85%, respectively, of those who attended each course. (Table 78, items 188 and 189). College language courses were rated less highly by those who took them. Half the advisors said these were either Essential or Very helpful, with another one-third rating them Somewhat helpful. In all probability, the college language courses were taken years prior to advisory assignments, without being related specifically to advisory duty. It is noteworthy, therefore, that about 80% of those who responded found them to be at least Somewhat helpful (item 205).

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Table 78
Value of Language Courses

Item No.	Course	N	Percent				
			Essential	Very Helpful	Somewhat Helpful	Of No Value	Detrimental
188	Defense Language Institute (DLI)	129	48.1	34.9	12.4	3.1	1.6
189	Foreign Service Institute (FSI)-Language	46	50.0	34.8	6.5	4.4	4.4
205	Language (college)	190	19.5	30.0	31.6	18.4	0.5

Some advisors said that their DLI training in Vietnamese gave them sufficient vocabulary, but they could not use it effectively in sentences. Other advisors said that they were taught basic sentence structure, but, while in Vietnam, they did not use the phrases and words that they were taught.

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Chapter 14

A SUMMARY OF ADVISORY PROBLEMS WITH POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Many problem areas were defined by the results of the survey of military advisors who served in hostile environments. This chapter lists the problems suggested by the data and presents possible solutions; these problems and possible solutions are divided into two categories. Section I, Implementation, presents those problems and possible solutions that can best be handled through normal military operational channels and methods. Section II, Research, presents problems and possible solutions that appear to need further development in terms of acquisition of more complete and dependable information, or else development and testing of new research methodology or investigation techniques. Each of these sections is subdivided into categories of problems as follows: General Problems, Training, Screening, Language, and MAAG Management.

The solutions are conceived with respect to the state of affairs that prevailed when the data were collected. It is possible, therefore, that some solutions have already been considered and either rejected or implemented prior to publication of this report.

A management study such as this draws heavily upon the methodology of public opinion surveying, in which the usual practice is to emphasize consensus, primarily among the majority of the members of a sample. If the study had been limited to analysis of majority opinions, however, many of the problems listed below would have been overlooked, and maximum utilization and value would not have been obtained from the data. Therefore, the problems presented in this chapter are not necessarily only those that a majority of advisors reported. A possible problem was considered to exist if, for example, 25% or more of the advisors reported the condition it concerns. A few problems were based upon comments volunteered by advisors rather than on item responses. Such problems were included in this chapter if they involved conditions that, despite relatively infrequent occurrence, could have a detrimental effect on the advisory effort.

The problem areas identified evolved from analysis of tabulations of responses of all advisors in the sample. No attempt was made to differentiate between various subgroups of advisors in accordance with their responses to the items. The results obtained, thus far, strongly suggest that further analysis of the data in depth would yield valuable insights into the fundamental nature and sources of problems, and information related to other possible solutions. Examples of groups that might be compared profitably are

- (1) Volunteers and non-volunteers.
- (2) NCOs, junior officers, and senior officers.
- (3) Combat arms officers and support branch officers.
- (4) Various MOS categories (e.g., combat, administrative, technical staff, chiefs).
- (5) Those who liked advisory work and those who did not.
- (6) Those with long experience as advisors and those with short experience.
- (7) Those who had friendly counterparts and those who did not.
- (8) Those who had difficulty communicating with their counterparts and those who did not.

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- (9) Those who claimed to have been malassigned and those who were well assigned.
- (10) Those with at least a moderate ability to speak the host-country language and those with little or no such ability.

Knowing which levels of advisors, which types of environments, and which types of duty they performed, would provide a factual base for implementation of solutions to the problems enumerated; the outcomes would be contributions to improve training, personnel management, and utilization of military assistance officers assigned to field advisory positions.

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Section I. IMPLEMENTATION

Problem

Possible Solution

GENERAL

About 13% of the advisors said that they considered their advisory assignments to be no more than slightly important to the Military Assistance Plan (item 34, p. 72).

Although most advisors do things on the job that they can do best more than 50% of their duty time, almost one-third do not (item 28, p. 72).

Some 31% of the respondents said that advisory duty caused them to fall behind in their MOSs (Table 63, item 66; p. 77), and 18% said that their MAAG assignments were of no value to their military careers, or even detrimental (Table 64, item 72; p. 78).

Knowledge about U.S. objectives in the host country were said to be highly important to job effectiveness by a majority of advisors (Table 30, item 240; p. 36), but a minority disagreed that they had a clear understanding of these objectives (item 23, p. 86).

Very high importance ratings were assigned to study of host country military organization, operations, limitations, and relationships between counterparts and their superiors (Table 30, items 248 and 251; p. 36).

There is evidence of a need for detailed information about the host country internal defense and internal development (ID/ID) programs and the advisor's role in them (Table 30, items 246, 249, and 250; p. 36).

Study the cases of those who said that their duties were not important to MAP and determine their reasons for holding such opinions.

Study the kinds of situations that cause advisors to spend considerable time doing things other than what they can do best. Compare those who claim to have been malassigned with those who were well assigned.

Study the reasons why certain respondents answered in terms of negative career influences, and develop programs for updating the training of returning advisors as needed.

Identify those who claimed not to have a clear understanding of U.S. objectives in Vietnam. Determine why the condition existed, and its relationship to advisors' training and duty assignments.

Develop information summaries designed to inform future advisors of the structure, functioning, and development needs of the host-country army to which they will be assigned.

Develop information summaries that describe the ID/ID programs for each host country, and the advisor's role in them.

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TRAINING

Problem

Most advisors reported discussing U.S. military policies, techniques, and doctrines (Table 6, item 214; p. 14), but a number commented that they did not feel that they had sufficient information to communicate effectively to their counterparts on these topics.

More than half the advisors reported that learning MAAG policies and programs was important, but most advisors rated their MAAG orientation low (Table 10, item 229; p. 16).

Some hindrances to the job effectiveness of advisors are the result of influences deriving from the nature of the host-country military system. (Item 99, p. 54; Table 44, items 310 and 292; p. 53).

Many advisors said that their counterparts circumvented their efforts to improve the host-country army. (Table 44, item 293; p. 53).

Almost half the advisors reported that their counterparts lacked trust in them (Item 321, p. 54).

About 29% of the respondents said that having insufficient information about MAAG policies, plans and objectives was at least a Moderate hindrance to their effectiveness as advisors (Table 68, item 84; p. 83; item 23, p. 86).

About 37% of the respondents said that conflicts occurred between meeting MAAG requirements and maintaining good advisor-counterpart relations. About 47% of the advisors reported that conflicts seem to be due to differences between advisors' orders from MAAG and counterparts' orders from ARVN (Table 68, items 87 and 96; p. 83).

Over one-third of the advisors said that their jobs provided little to show for their efforts (Table 59, item 67; p. 72).

Possible Solution

Provide a primer, suitable for advisors in general, that covers U.S. military policies, techniques and doctrines, with source references.

Study the quality of orientation provided in-country. Determine if there is a need to centralize the information used to introduce new advisors to their host countries, and to the conditions that prevail within them.

In training, emphasize how to get along with the host-country system, as well as how to get along with counterparts who are controlled by that system.

Determine how advisors are circumvented and prepare advisors in training to deal with hindering activities on the part of certain counterparts.

Determine the basis for lack of trust of advisors by counterparts. Introduce the information into the advisor training program.

Develop a centralized advisor orientation (development and review) system to ensure that advisors are properly informed about the policies, plans, and objectives of their respective MAAGs.

Study the kinds of discrepancies reported by the respondents as occurring between MAAG and ARVN orders. Introduce information concerning the sources of conflicting orders and the importance of close coordination at all levels of Command when training senior MAAG commanders.

Emphasize realistic expectations of advisory accomplishment in advisor training courses.

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TRAINING (Continued)

<u>Problem</u>	<u>Possible Solution</u>
A majority of advisors emphasized that, when under fire, not being able to identify the enemy, and not being able to take direct aggressive action were important hindrances to effectiveness (Table 62, item 120, 435; p. 76). Other problems related to effectiveness when under fire also were mentioned by large minorities of advisors (Table 62, remainder).	In the training of advisors for hostile environment assignments, provide instruction about the kinds of problems that are to be expected when under fire, but would not occur with U.S. units.
The MATA courses were said to be at least Very Helpful by about 75% of those who took them. Criticism was offered of general and superficial treatment of topics, and it was said that the topics were too numerous (Table 39, item 183; p. 45).	Identify the topics that experienced advisors feel are most useful in the field, and determine which course content and which teaching methods are most effective for these topics.
Ability to quickly gain full understanding of the combat situation is of Great importance in the performance of field advisors, and the problem of rapid assessment is complicated by many factors (Table 38, items 332 and 333; p. 43).	Identify factors that confuse and delay understanding of combat situations involving counterparts. Train advisors to cope with such factors.
Over 35% of the advisors contended that they had insufficient training for advisory work, which produced at least a moderate hindrance to their effectiveness as advisors (Table 36, item 82; p. 40).	Identify the advisors who claimed to have had insufficient training for advisory work. Determine the nature of the insufficiencies as a basis for improving current training programs for advisors.
More than 25% of the advisors who had combat training courses (thought to be related to duty in hostile environments) consider such techniques to be no more than barely effective (Table 37, items 438, 439, 442, and 445; p. 41).	Identify the advisors who consider apparently relevant combat training to be ineffective. Determine the reasons why the techniques are considered ineffective, and relate conclusions to improvement of current training methods.
Some of the advisors who had survival and Ranger training found this training to be no more than barely effective (Table 37, items 440 and 441; p. 41).	Study the actual benefits of Ranger and survival training for advisors in hostile environments, and apply the information gained to improve current training.
Command and support relations between U.S. and host-country units, and organization and functioning of host-country command structures were areas of concern to most advisors in the field (Table 21, items 386 and 405; p. 27).	Develop training information for selected advisors on particular host country's command organization, and identify problems of inter-army command and support relations.

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TRAINING (Continued)

Problem

Possible Solution

Personnel from support branches who were assigned to combat-related advisory positions were said to lack the knowledge needed to serve effectively under combat conditions (according to advisors' comments).

Provide advanced infantry and insurgency training for support branch personnel who are to be assigned as District Advisors, and so forth.

Field advisors reported difficulty with problems of counter-insurgency tactics (intelligence leaks, local security) (Table 12, p. 19).

Identify the particular cases and apply results as examples to enhance the realism of combat training manuals, and so forth.

High emphasis in training generally was recommended for combat fire support and coordination topics (Table 13; p. 20).

Increase training time devoted to integration of defense, fire support, and reaction plans; and to directing air strikes, naval gunfire, and so forth.

SCREENING

A number of advisors said that they would prefer non-advisory assignments within a MAAG if ordered to another tour of MAAG duty (item 27, p. 71).

Identify personnel who cannot willingly serve as field advisors and assign them to MAAG duties that do not require dealing with a counterpart (e.g., programmer). Compare the performances of volunteers for advisory duty with that of non-volunteers.

There were 91% of the advisors who agreed that language-qualified personnel should be used more effectively (Table 69, item 52; p. 84).

Greater care should be taken in the assignment of language-qualified personnel. For example, host country language proficiency of the advisor could be matched inversely with the English proficiency of the counterpart.

Some personnel were assigned as advisors despite serious prejudice against host country people (Comments, p. 80).

Implement screening procedures to detect such prejudices, and eliminate prejudiced individuals from consideration for advisory assignments in the cultures concerned.

MAAG MANAGEMENT

Duties and activities that involve direct assistance to counterparts have very high mean ratings of importance and relatively large numbers of hours per month are spent at them (Table 2, items 222, 215, 221, 230, and 210; p. 10); but advisors said that they spent an average of almost half their time at duties other than advising (item 25, p. 16).

Review job descriptions and work loads of advisory positions. Reduce advisors' programming, information acquisition, and reporting loads by assigning such duties to specialists in those activities.

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MAAG MANAGEMENT (Continued)

<u>Problem</u>	<u>Possible Solution</u>
Advising on storage, repairs, and maintenance, and assisting with the delivery of MAP supplies and equipment is considered to be important to the jobs of many advisors (Table 2, items 210 and 224, p. 10 & 11), but only a few appear to have had training related to such matters.	Institute assignment policies that ensure that relevant specialists are available as consultants when needed. Increase on-the-job training for non-specialists in areas of storage, repairs, and maintenance of supplies and equipment.
Shortages of equipment were considered by many advisors to be hindrances to advisory effectiveness (Table 19, items 89, 95, and 431; p. 25).	Study the shortages involved and determine the types of materials and equipment that were lacking.
Inadequate military communications and transportation were considered by many advisors to be hindrances to advisory effectiveness (Table 19, items 83, 86, 97, and 107; p. 25; Table 60, item 123, p. 74).	Study the kinds of communications and transportation that field advisors need, and the causes of reported insufficiencies.
Almost half the advisors agreed that obtaining training literature and training devices for host-country military units was an important part of their jobs. (Table 5, item 223; p. 13). Comments indicated that CONUS sources were said to be inadequate. Shortages of instructional materials were considered to be hindrances to advisory effectiveness by 45% of the respondents (Table 19, item 85; p. 25).	Improve availability of literature on U.S. equipment supplied to other countries, and training devices required. Monitor technical translations into Vietnamese for technical accuracy, through a central technical information clearinghouse, in which all branches are represented by technical specialists and consulting personnel who know the equipment.
Assignment of advisors to duties for which they were not professionally/technically qualified appears to have been quite common, since 75% of the advisors said that it hurt the programs. (Table 69, items 57, 68 and 69; p. 84, item 26, p. 85; Table 70, item 92; p. 85; item 59, p. 85).	Study the respondents' observations of duty assignment problems and identify those that can be avoided or corrected by changes in assignment policies.

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Section II. RESEARCH

Problem

Possible Solution

GENERAL

Advisors reported that they spent an average of 25% of their work time on tasks unrelated to advising or planning/programming (item 25, p. 16).

A substantial fraction of the advisors said that their counterparts accepted their advice on combat matters only Occasionally or Never, when under fire (Table 1, item 341; p. 9).

Almost two-thirds of the advisors said that at least occasionally, when under fire, they were left out until the decisions were made. Similarly, almost half said that occasionally they did not have very much to do. About 75% said that at least occasionally they could not get enough information to understand the situation (Table 1, items 337, 340, and 344; p. 9).

Most advisors rate knowledge of how counterparts view their advisors as highly important to their job effectiveness, but such information has been systematically collected for only one country (Republic of Korea) (Table 30, item 247; p. 36).

A need exists to improve MAAG-host country relationships in terms of cooperation with the MAAG effort and acceptance of change and innovation (Table 8, items 124 and 140; p. 15).

Over 40% of the advisors said that their advisory assignments required compromise of both professional and personal standards (Table 59, items 63 and 64; p. 72).

A number of advisors claimed that their jobs called for excessive participation in social activities (Table 59, item 65; p. 72).

Compare the responses of those who spent most of their duty time advising with those who spent only small portions of time advising.

Compare the responses of advisors who had friendly counterparts with those who did not. Compare advisors who had difficulty communicating with their counterparts with those who had no communications problems.

Initiate further research to determine the reasons for such reports, especially in those instances where the situation was said to prevail often, very often, or always. Ascertain to what degree the findings apply to NCOs, junior officers, or senior officers. Compare combat arms officers with support branch officers.

Conduct research for particular host countries that have disparate cultures from the United States. Study the perceptions of counterparts and their understanding and interpretation of the ways of U.S. advisory personnel.

Determine principle relating to the kinds of situations that are involved in breakdowns of cooperation, and those which encourage acceptance and implementation of advice.

Study the kinds of problems that cause advisors to compromise professional and personal standards. Develop suitable doctrine concerning how advisors are expected to deal with such problems.

Study the kinds of assignments that involve heavy commitments of time to social activities. Identify the kinds of personalities that can best tolerate and profit from such commitments.

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SCREENING

Problem

About 90% of the respondents agreed that greater care is needed in screening advisor candidates for professional competence, personal stability, and tact and patience in dealing with foreign personnel. (Table 66, items 44, 45, and 46; p. 80).

Possible Solution

Conduct research that compares the more successful with the less successful advisors. Determine the professional and personal characteristics that are needed for success. Develop suitable criteria of advisor performance, and means of identifying advisor candidates who have a high probability of performing successfully. Develop the criteria for groups of advisors who have particular grade levels and types of MOSs.

LANGUAGE

The counterpart's English language capability was rated as an important means of communicating with counterparts by a large majority of advisors (Table 74, item 168; p. 92).

Compare counterparts' English language capabilities, and develop new ways of increasing their fluency. Compare the responses of advisors and their counterparts who have difficulty communicating with those who do not.

About 13% of the advisors rated a third-country language (e.g., French) as an important means of communicating with their counterparts (Table 74, item 170; p. 92).

Study situations in which third-country language capabilities are used effectively, and study the possibility of capitalizing on such capabilities by design rather than by accident.

About 41% of the respondents indicated that signs and gestures were at least moderately important as a means of communicating with their counterparts (Table 74, item 172; p. 92).

Conduct research to determine the kinds of signs and gestures that were used, their universality and utility, and the kinds of situations in which they were most useful.

Large majorities of advisors said that interpreters were important as a means of communicating with their counterparts (Table 74, item 171; p. 92).

Determine the kinds of needs advisors have for interpreters, their efficient utilization, their degrees of ability, their nationalities, and sources of their English language training.

The influence of foreign language capability on the personal safety and performance effectiveness of advisors when under fire was said to be small by more than 40% of the respondents (Table 76, items 369 and 370; p. 95).

Study the nature of the influence of language capabilities on general performance effectiveness, including combat situations. Determine the types of advisors (by grade and MOS) who needed and profited most from having language fluency.

College language courses were rated as being at least somewhat helpful to advisors in Vietnam by more than 80% of those who responded (Table 78, item 205; p. 97).

Determine which languages and types of courses are most helpful, and how utility was manifested.

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LANGUAGE (Continued)

Problem

Possible Solution

There is disagreement on the value and function of host-country language proficiency as regards job effectiveness (item 436, p. 89; items 166, p. 89 and 167, p. 89).

Further research, especially cross-tabulation of DEBRIEF data, and detailed studies of individual situations, is needed. Determine the degrees of host-country language proficiency that maximize advisors' effectiveness in various job circumstances.

TRAINING

Field advisors experience difficulty in getting host-country people interested in their own defense and government, in inducing indigenous personnel to operate at night, and in dealing with graft and corruption (Table 21, items 382, 384, 380, and 381; p. 27).

Identify cases concerning the problems of motivating host-country personnel. Identify means of changing attitudes and standards of conduct of host country people. Develop additional training on problems and methods of influencing indigenous peoples.

Most advisors said that they felt that they had the responsibilities of command, but not the authority. Almost half said that occasionally they were forced to make decisions that their counterparts should have made. Some also said that they were expected to handle all problems resulting from enemy contact (including coordination of assets). (Table 1, items 338, 342, and 343; p. 9).

Study the experiences of advisors who reported counterpart command relationship problems. Ascertain to whom the findings apply (e.g., by grade, MOS), and to what degree. Introduce findings into training doctrine.

Wide variability among ratings of particular advisory procedures suggests that there is consensus, but by no means unanimity among advisors concerning the degrees of training emphasis that each procedure should receive (Table 41, p. 48).

Define the sources of differences between advisors' ratings of particular advisory procedures. Compare the responses of those who advocated Heavy emphasis in training for each procedure, with those who advocated Slight or None.

Almost all advisors who had Special Forces or Special Warfare-CI training found it to be helpful, although many of them served in positions other than as advisors to the ARVN Special Forces. A minority, however, said that such training was either of no value, or actually was detrimental to advisory efforts. (Table 39, items 191 and 192; p. 45).

Identify and study the experiences of Special Forces trained advisors who served in non-Special Forces assignments. Determine which aspects of their training were either valuable or detrimental in various assignments. Revise training and assignment procedures as required.

The Civil Affairs and PSYOPS courses were designed for specialized assignments, but 29%, or more, of the graduates rated the courses as no more than Somewhat helpful (Table 39, items 195 and 196; p. 45).

Identify the critical experiences of graduates of the Civil Affairs and PSYOPS courses who assigned low value ratings. Determine the causes of their low ratings, and use as a basis for revision of the curricula.

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TRAINING (Continued)

<u>Problem</u>	<u>Possible Solution</u>
Certain college courses were said to be very helpful to advisors who had taken them, especially courses such as Personality, Social Psychology, and International Relations (Table 40, items 198, 199 and 207; p. 46).	Determine which aspects of college background courses were of particular value to those who cited them as being helpful. Introduce the new materials into advisor training.

MAAG MANAGEMENT

Over 70% of the respondents believed that performance evaluations made by their superiors often were based upon insufficient observation, that satisfactory criteria were lacking, and that greater recognition of advisors' initiative and extra efforts were needed (Table 65, items 53, 54, and 56; p. 79).	Conduct research aimed at developing suitable advisor evaluation criteria, and means of measuring such criteria. Provide training in the techniques of observation and evaluation thus developed.
Shortness of tours was seen as a hindrance to effectiveness as an advisor by about 31% of the respondents (item 100; p. 82). A variety of "optimum" tour lengths were recommended (Table 67, items 8a and 8b; p. 82).	Compare specific job situations to determine appropriate tour lengths for each one. Obtain advisors' recommendations in establishing tour lengths. Combine factors such as having families live in safe areas near advisory assignments, special leave allocations, and tour length.
Hindrances to effectiveness because of insufficient understanding of advisors' problems at higher MAAG levels were reported by about 45% of the respondents (item 105; p. 78). Over one-third said that insufficient support from MAAG was at least a Moderate hindrance to their effectiveness (Table 68, item 104; p. 83).	Study the kinds of problems that were reported. Determine if restructuring of command, control, and support procedures within large MAAGs is needed.

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) A management survey of 607 military advisors who had served in Vietnam was conducted in an effort to learn more about the influence of hostile conditions on advisory activities and behaviors. Using the 311-item Military Advisor Debriefing Questionnaire, the survey covered advisor training, screening, problems of advising, interaction with counterparts, and problems of living in the host country. Another 135 items that concentrate (Continued)														

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20. (Continued)

on hostile environments and their effects on the behaviors, activities, and problems of advisors were added to the original questionnaire. The new items were based on structured interviews with 53 advisors who had served in Vietnam. Voluntary comments are reported in support of explanations of the statistical results for each item. Problems uncovered are discussed, along with possible solutions relating to improvement of Army personnel, utilization, training, and Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) procedures.

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