

**THE VIETNAM-CAMBODIA EMERGENCY, 1975**  
**Part IV—Cambodia Evacuation: Testimony of**  
**Ambassador John Gunther Dean**

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**HEARING**  
**BEFORE THE**  
**SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS**  
**OF THE**  
**COMMITTEE ON**  
**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**  
**NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS**  
**SECOND SESSION**

**MAY 5, 1976**

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AMBASSADOR JOHN GUNTHER DEAN

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has mandated that subcommittee. I believe closely to the work in Indochina. One year ago we held a series of hearings dealing with the last-minute requests for additional economic and military aid for Vietnam and Cambodia and with the deteriorating political and military situations in those two states. Those hearings were overtake by events, and now the Congress was dealing with evacuation and resettlement.

Some early 1975, we have been waiting for an opportunity to hold hearings on the final days of the former Vietnamese and Cambodian regimes and our operations from those states. In late January, General Martin, former U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, testified. Today, we are happy to have with us John Gunther Dean, former U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia. Ambassador Dean is now serving as U.S. Ambassador to Denmark.

We would like to discuss two principal matters with Ambassador Dean. First, we would like to learn more about the fall of the Lon Nol government, the U.S. role in Cambodia and the U.S. evacuation from Cambodia. Second, we would like to map back a little in order to evaluate and try to consider about both our assistance to war operations by Cambodia and the current agency which the Cambodian people are governing.

Ambassador Dean, we welcome you to face the subcommittee. There will be many questions here today and several other questions will be presented to you for answer in writing. I realize that you have been strained from Indochina issues but several over the next few I hope you will be able to grapple with a series of specific and general and philosophical questions.

## CAMBODIAN EVACUATION: TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR JOHN GUNTHER DEAN

WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 1976

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met at 2:10 p.m. in room H-236, the Capitol, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The meeting of the subcommittee will come to order.

Today, the Special Subcommittee on Investigations completes its inquiry into the events which occurred in Indochina in March and April 1975, when the American-supported governments in Cambodia and South Vietnam collapsed.

In early 1975 the chairman of the Committee on International Relations mandated this subcommittee to follow closely developments in Indochina. One year ago we held a series of hearings dealing with the last-minute requests for additional economic and military aid for Vietnam and Cambodia and with the deteriorating political and military situations in those two states. Those sessions were overtaken by events, and soon the Congress was dealing with evacuation and resettlement issues.

Since early 1975, we have been waiting for an opportunity to hold inquiries on the final days of the former Vietnamese and Cambodian regimes and our evacuations from those states. In late January, Graham Martin, former U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, testified. Today, we are happy to have with us John Gunther Dean, former U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia. Ambassador Dean is now serving as U.S. Ambassador to Denmark.

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Ambassador Dean, we welcome you before the subcommittee. There will be many questions here today and several other questions will be submitted to you for answer in writing. I realize that you have been removed from Indochina issues for several months now, but I hope you will be able to grapple with a series of specific queries and general and philosophical questions.

You may wish to make some brief remarks before we turn to questions.

We are delighted to have you with us. You may proceed.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GUNTHER DEAN, U.S. AMBASSADOR  
TO THE FORMER REPUBLIC OF CAMBODIA**

Ambassador DEAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do not have a formal statement. As you know, Mr. Chairman, during the 13 months I was in Cambodia I came voluntarily to you to report on the developments of the situation. The first time was in September 1974 when I was called back by the Secretary and then again after the fall of Cambodia I came and discussed events there with you briefly.

I have always made a point of working closely with the committee of the House as well as the committee of the Senate.

I am here to answer your questions, particularly those for which I am qualified to speak, which is the period of March 1974 until our departure on April 12, 1975. I am at your disposal.

**NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE**

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Let me begin with the article that appeared in the New York Times just the other day which perhaps caught your eye. In that article Mr. Lewis wrote these words, and I quote him :

Mr. Nixon and Henry Kissinger gave assurances that the 1970 Cambodian operation would be limited in purpose and means and time. It was none of those things. It began 5 years of wanton, cruel, useless destruction, the destruction of a civilization.

If there is a reckoning in this life or another, some Americans will bear a heavy burden for what they did to Cambodia.

That is the end of the quote. I would like you to comment on that observation, if you would, whether you think it is a fair appraisal of our involvement in Cambodia.

**A NONMILITARY SOLUTION**

Ambassador DEAN. The involvement in 1970, Mr. Chairman, occurred when I was a fellow at Harvard University at the Center for International Affairs I was not at the time active in the Government.

I do believe this particular article—which I glanced at because it was written while I was traveling from Denmark back to the United States—indicates that efforts were not made to try to find a nonmilitary solution. If I may, I would like to address myself to this question.

From the day I arrived in Cambodia, at the end of March until I left, I tried very hard to search for a nonmilitary solution. As a matter of fact, when I saw you in September 1974, Mr. Chairman, I was back in Washington working with the leaders in the administration and trying to map out alternative possibilities which could be used to find a negotiated, nonmilitary solution. We can discuss this at length further, but efforts were made at that time to try to find a nonmilitary solution. Unfortunately, it did not lead to any result.

## TIME WAS AGAINST US

Mr. HAMILTON. When did you have the feeling that the collapse of the U.S.-backed Lon Nol government was inevitable?

Ambassador DEAN. Mr. Chairman, I felt from the day I left that time was not on our side.

Mr. HAMILTON. You arrived on what day?

Ambassador DEAN. March 31, 1974.

I made this view known and it was accepted by the Government that time was not on our side, therefore some other solution had to be found. As I said, in the late summer of 1974, a series of plans were devised of options of how to find a nonmilitary solution to Cambodia. International conferences was one of the possibilities raised and explored. Others were discussions with some of the leading world powers in order to get their support for some kind of nonmilitary solution, efforts to enlist the neutralist countries, and efforts to have a direct link with the Khmer Rouge. Unfortunately, all of those efforts, which were taking place during September, October, November, December, and January 1974-75, did not lead to any concrete results.

## IN RETROSPECT

Mr. HAMILTON. As you look back over your experience there, do you have any feeling that there were some things we should have done that we did not do?

Ambassador DEAN. I think during my tenure we emphasized trying to get a dialog going with the other side. It is now hindsight and hindsight is a little easier than foresight. However, I am not convinced, with the little we know about the present regime today, how negotiation-oriented this regime ever was. But I believe that on the basis of my analysis, which was followed by the administration, that time was not on our side so we had to try to find another solution that had to be pursued vigorously.

## A LACK OF MONEY

Mr. HAMILTON. You have used the phrase "time was not on our side" several times. Are you suggesting by that that events there were really kind of inevitable and there was not much the United States could do in terms of policy to change the result, the eventual take-over by the—

Ambassador DEAN. No, sir, I think there were a number of factors and one of them I would say was—in making my analysis I was also keeping in mind the mood of the country back home—that there was a certain weariness of continuing to provide the large amounts of money which were needed. I made this point very clearly in my cables and it was accepted that large amounts of money were needed in order to keep Cambodia afloat. There was the possibility that large amounts of money would not be available for an extended period of time.

The other factor was a weariness that was clear on the Cambodian side. The war had lasted for a number of years. It could not continue without external support. I believe that in the long run a solution had to be found to put an end to the conflict.

## AN OPEN EXCHANGE WITH WASHINGTON

Mr. HAMILTON. Did you, throughout your period there, have good communications with Washington and with the Secretary of State?

Ambassador DEAN. Sir, I had excellent communications. As an Ambassador, I have always felt it is my job to speak up openly and I did. We sometimes had exchanges which really differed, but I must say it was an open exchange. When I was called back, I saw the Secretary and we explored together what steps should be taken to try to find a nonmilitary solution.

In this, I must say, when Mr. Habib became Assistant Secretary of State, I had excellent daily communications with the very top, sir. I felt the number of cables I received personally from the Secretary was amazing. I addressed my cables to him very often and I got an answer back from him. It said, "From the Secretary for the Ambassador," or vice versa.

I think it is the role of an Ambassador to be honest and not always say what is popular but we did have a close and constant exchange of cables, including conversations when I was called back.

## THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC

Mr. HAMILTON. When did you communicate to Washington that the Republic was going to fall?

Ambassador DEAN. I believe in the beginning of 1975 I was saying that unless some nonmilitary solution could be found, I was afraid that we might have to leave, especially because the debate on aid was going on back home without a decision being taken.

I would like to make a point. I don't mind saying things sometimes which are unpopular. In Cambodia we were running out of ammunition. It was a different situation from what existed in Vietnam. We could give you exact dates when ammunition was going to run out. People don't fight until the last bullet.

In January, February, and March, the debate continued in the United States. When it became apparent that aid would not be forthcoming, this debate was one of the factors that had an adverse effect on the Cambodian's fighting spirit and also on their leadership. I am not saying it was the only factor, but in Cambodia it was a question of funds to continue fighting, not funds for next year.

I can give you our estimates as to when certain commodities would be running out. According to our estimate, it was April 25. We left on April 12 and the Republic collapsed on the 17th.

## REACTION FROM WASHINGTON

Mr. HAMILTON. We would be interested in those dates, Mr. Ambassador. You need not give them to us at the moment but for the record we would like to have them, please.

[The following was submitted for the record:]

## ESTIMATED DATES CERTAIN COMMODITIES WOULD DECLINE

April 6—Ammo stocks at depots in-country will decline to an average of 15 days of supply (6,000 short tons).

April 11—All airdrops to enclaves must terminate due to lack of funds for further aerial delivery equipment.

April 20—Expanded Bird air delivery of MAP supplies will terminate owing to lack of funds.

April 25—Ammø stocks on hand in Cambodia will reach zero, report zero balance.

Mr. HAMILTON. What was the reaction in Washington when you indicated that all was lost so far as the Government was concerned? Did they accept your analysis?

Ambassador DEAN. I think my analysis was accepted at all times. I started very early. I have sitting here in back of me my deputy who was in charge of planning our evacuation. We did not wait until the last moment. We were running always two things at the same time: (i) Assist the Khmers to defend themselves and (ii) if we had to leave, plan our departure. We accepted the possibility that things may not work out. So as early as when I came in March 1974, we at least drew up plans for how we could leave under the best possible circumstances.

#### AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL

Mr. HAMILTON. Would you identify your deputy for the record?

Ambassador DEAN. Mr. Robert Keeley.

Mr. HAMILTON. What was his position?

Ambassador DEAN. Deputy Chief of Mission.

When we realized that the Mekong was closed to shipping, which was one of the main reasons for the collapse also, an interagency group met at the Embassy and worked out—practically once a week, then it became daily—ways of planning for an orderly withdrawal. They were working not only in Phnom Penh, but also closely with the people in Washington. We received excellent support from our people in Washington on determining who should go and when. We also received excellent support from Adm. Noel Gayler, who was responsible in the last moments for people and equipment to take us out.

#### CONTACTING CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS

Mr. HAMILTON. Describe for us your final contacts with the Cambodian Government officials. Did they, for example, feel that they had been deserted by the United States? What was their attitude toward you, and toward this country?

Ambassador DEAN. Obviously, the date of our departure had to be kept quiet; otherwise we would have had panic. So we had set up a special procedure to ascertain that only when the day of departure had arrived, everybody would know that we were leaving and they could leave with us. As a pretext I said that the telephone system had broken down and I asked the Acting President, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and Sirik Matak, the latter being one of the key Cambodians, to send their orderlies to come and see me every morning at 6 o'clock. The arrangement had been put in force about a week earlier. If I wanted to see any of these leaders, I could say I wanted to see him at 2 or 4 o'clock. This way I had a reliable channel of communication to them when I wanted to give them the word that I was leaving.

## EVACUATION PROCEDURES

Determining who was going to go was a very important decision. I felt my responsibility in the first place was toward all Americans, official and nonofficial. We had a lot of nonofficial Americans—press, voluntary agency people, for example, CARE Catholic Relief Service, so forth private citizens—second those Cambodians who had worked for us in any position. I felt anybody who was working for us, whether he was an intellectual doing economic analysis or whether he was a truck driver, if he had been tainted as a result of his association with us, we had some responsibility for him. I could not make distinctions on the basis of whether the employee was an intellectual or provided manual services. If the employee had put his trust in us, I felt responsible for him.

The third category were those Khmers who had been in positions of power and whose lives might be in danger because of that.

Now, I didn't wish to play God and decide who went. I, therefore, decided to let the Cambodians themselves decide who they felt should go out with us.

Prior to this last day I had taken out quietly, by fixed wing aircraft some of the officials' wives and children and most of our employees that worked for us. Quietly they had been sent over to Thailand.

## THE LAST DAY

On the last day, on the 12th, in the morning, the representatives of the four key Khmer leaders I have mentioned earlier, came to me and I gave them a letter—I have this letter here and if you would like to hear it—it basically says—

Mr. HAMILTON. We would like it to be made part of the record Mr. Ambassador.

[The following letter was submitted for the record:]

## APRIL 12, 1975 LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR DEAN TO CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS

I have received instructions from the Secretary of State in Washington to arrange the immediate departure of all the American citizens remaining in Phnom Penh and of those of our Khmer employees who wish to depart with us because their lives might be in danger if they remained behind.

As I explained to you recently, we will have a certain number of places on our aircraft for the key members of your government who wish to depart the country now. As I stated to you, the decision as to whom this offer should be made is up to you, and I am depending on you to notify the people in question. Those who decide to go should bring only their immediate family members with them (wife and children) as there will not be space for large numbers of people. Please notify the people you think should go and would want to go just as fast as possible, as the time for departure is very short.

Those who wish to go should come to the American embassy chancery (the building where we have our offices) immediately. Each person should bring with him as hand baggage only one small satchel or bag which can be carried on the lap. The deadline for departure from our embassy compound is 0930 hours this morning. Anyone arriving after that time will have missed his chance to leave with us. I cannot stress too strongly that the deadline is 0930, two and a half hours from now. Sincerely, John Gunther Dean, American Ambassador.

Ambassador DEAN. Basically it says, Mr. Chairman, I have been instructed to leave and I would like to take all those to safety whom I can. My space is limited but you have from this time to this time to come to the Embassy and I will take you to safety. And you Mr.

President, you Mr. Prime Minister, you Mr. Foreign Minister, you Mr. Sirik Matak, you decide who you feel needs to come with us because he is in danger.

When the Acting President showed up and none of the others did, we sent some of our own people to meet with the Cambodians to make them aware of the problems they were facing. I personally went to see the Prime Minister and got him out of bed at 7 o'clock. Later, my political counselor went to a Cabinet meeting because the reaction of the Cambodians was that first they would have to meet together to discuss the proposition. The Khmer leaders at that meeting declined the offer to go with us.

My deputy also went to see some other people in order to be sure they knew that this was their moment to make up their minds and leave.

#### SIRIK MATAK LETTER

I would like to read for the record, though, take this 1 minute, because the night before I left I was afraid that one of the key people in Cambodia, Mr. Sirik Matak might be left behind. So I went to see him personally and I said, "You know, the situation isn't very good, you have a wife, you have children. I may have to leave"—I could not tell him I was leaving—"but I would like to be sure you have someone standing by. Send somebody to see me in the morning."

He also received my departure letter at 7 o'clock on April 12. His reply was a very short letter and I would like to read it. It is in French. I will read the translation of the original.

I received his letter at 9 o'clock. At 10:30 we were airborne leaving for the aircraft carrier.

PHNOM PENH, April 12, 1975.

Dear Excellency and Friend: I thank you very sincerely for your letter and for your offer to transport me towards freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion.

As for you and in particular for your great country, I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people which has chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection and we can do nothing about it. You leave and my wish is that you and your country will find happiness under the sky.

But mark it well that, if I shall die here on the spot and in my country that I love, it is too bad because we all are born and must die one day. I have only committed this mistake of believing in you, the Americans.

Please accept, Excellency, my dear friend, my faithful and friendly sentiments.

SIRIK MATAK.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think he expresses generally the opinions of most top government officials in Cambodia?

Ambassador DEAN. I would say he represents the views of many people, they felt they were let down.

#### THE FATE OF TOP OFFICIALS

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you know what happened to him?

Ambassador DEAN. To the best of my knowledge, shortly after the arrival of the Khmer Rouge he was executed.

Mr. HAMILTON. How do you know that?

Ambassador DEAN. I have read reports, that is all I know, that evidently there was a blood puddle at the Cercle Sportif, on the ten-

nis court where evidently the report allegedly says he was killed. It happened within 3 or 4 days after the Khmer Rouge takeover.

Mr. HAMILTON. What was his position?

Ambassador DEAN. He was the senior advisor to the last government; previously he had been the Prime Minister and one of the prime movers in the establishment of the Republic.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did the other top officials meet a similar fate, to your knowledge?

Ambassador DEAN. To the best of my knowledge, those who could not leave the country did. I understand that the Prime Minister, with whom I was working very closely, was trying to get out in the last moment. He was on a helicopter, their own helicopter. When we left the Cambodians fought on for 5 more days. When some of the leaders were trying to get out, he was on one of the helicopters, waiting for his wife and youngsters, very young children. He saw his wife's car coming, and stepped out of the helicopter to help his wife. At that point there were shots by the Khmer Rouge and the helicopter left for Thailand. He was left behind and, as I understand it, also has been killed.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Winn.

#### DEAN'S INFLUENCE

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Dean, Philip A. McCombs of the Washington Post reported June 6, 1974, and I quote him:

The Government of Lon Nol and Prime Minister Long Boret make no major decisions without consulting Dean.

Is that a fairly true statement?

Ambassador DEAN. When you give total aid of \$700 million, I think you have a pretty good voice. To say that they made no decisions without me, I think is completely erroneous. On a number of issues I did get myself involved.

For example, I was trying very hard to move the Khmer Government toward a more open position toward negotiations.

This Washington Post article you are referring to was written in June. I think McCombs may be thinking in terms of the speech made by President Lon Nol in which he offered unconditional negotiations, to be held at any place, at any date to put an end to the conflict. Lon Nol used the words that "it is not a question of personality" in finding a solution which means that members of the Government were expendable if some kind of negotiated solution could come about. At that time, some journalists credited me as being the father of this thought. I agree that on these matters I did have a lot of contact with key Khmer leaders.

When it came to the question of trying to ascertain that the funds the American taxpayer had put at the disposal of Cambodia were spent as well as they should be, I did have contacts with the Khmers and I tried to be as firm as I could be on the subject.

On the questions of using ammunition judiciously, eliminating phantom soldiers, the perennial charge of corruption—all these matters, I did talk with the President in an effort to help.

## ACHIEVING NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. WINN. With all of these meetings and all of this advice, I gather from your opening comments and some of your answers to Mr. Hamilton, that there was a reticence on the part of Lon Nol to open negotiations with the other side?

Ambassador DEAN. I don't think it was a reticence. I think he needed a certain amount of explanation. I always tried to explain to him the need of keeping American support and he was fully aware of this. I felt at the time that putting forward a negotiating posture, being willing to negotiate, would help to maintain support in the United States.

The people in this room who visited me out there, they know the great attention and emphasis I placed on trying to get the Khmer Government to be in a posture of negotiating and thereby continuing to get the support of the American Government.

## 1974 MILITARY POSITION

Mr. WINN. When you arrived in Phnom Penh in March of 1974, what was your assessment of the military position and the prospects of the Khmer Republic forces at that time?

Ambassador DEAN. When I arrived they were very much embattled. There were very serious battles in the southern part of Cambodia where the city of Kampot was under siege. It was a nip-and-tuck battle and the forces of the Republic were able to hold and repel the attack.

From March until June, I would say, the situation on the ground improved militarily. That is why I also felt it was a good time to move toward a nonmilitary solution.

But when I first came there it was the end of the dry season. The dry season was always the time when the enemy would make its major push. The friendly forces got through the dry season, improved their position and by July the rains had come.

## IMPROVING THE MILITARY POSTURE

Mr. WINN. Did you make any recommendations when you first got there to either the Government or the State Department on steps to improve the military posture or capabilities of the Khmer Armed Forces?

Ambassador DEAN. I did make an assessment in June of 1974 which was a very lengthy one in which I concluded what I had said before, that time was against the Republic, therefore steps must be taken to find a way which would be, as I could see it, a compromise settlement.

Mr. WINN. You didn't make any strictly military recommendation?

Ambassador DEAN. No, but I did stress very heavily that it takes lots of money to keep a place going and that this was a basic assumption.

Now, those who know me a little better, realize that I came to Cambodia from Laos where I was able to play a major role in bringing about the tripartite compromise solution and it had been my goal to find some kind of a nonmilitary solution in Cambodia. This accounts

also for Cambodia moving in this direction. I would like to stress the efforts made in October, November, December, January, to find some kind of nonmilitary solution. They were not made by me; you can't do them in Phnom Penh. They were undertaken by the Government here in Washington.

#### THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT

Mr. WINN. This is kind of a toughy, I guess, but how would you assess the degree to which the Lon Nol government is responsible for the fall of Cambodia?

Ambassador DEAN. I think the government of Lon Nol had many, many drawbacks, there is no doubt. It had been in power for a long time, to some extent it abused some of its powers. Above all there was a certain war weariness setting in and it was impossible, after Lon Nol had his stroke, to turn this around very drastically.

There were also the charges of Khmer mismanagement. Some of them I would say, to be very frank, were a result of the war. The war resulted in the enclaves, where there was very little production but many more consumers. The people who had been taken from the land who used to farm, went by the hundreds of thousands of find refuge and became consumers and not producers. That required additional rice to feed them. More and more as time went on the government found itself dependent on foreign assistance.

#### THE CAMBODIAN SOLDIER

Mr. WINN. Were the stories we read about at that stage of the game, I think we asked this before, but I forgot your answer, about the soldiers who worked, say, for 7 or 8 hours a day and then they would not attempt to continue at their guard positions, a labor shift or something like that?

Ambassador DEAN. I found that the Cambodian soldiers, like others in Southeast Asia, usually moved with their families. They would fight and also look after their family, their wives or children. The Cambodians had proven by the casualties that they had taken as late as January or February that they would fight. I would like to stress that even after we evacuated, the Cambodians continued to fight for another 5 days.

Mr. WINN. Was their morale getting worse and worse? Were they then joining their families and fleeing?

Ambassador DEAN. I think at that point they were just waiting for the enemy to come in. By April 17, they laid down their arms. By that time it must be realized they were running out of ammunition. They were short of ammunition.

Mr. WINN. That obviously affected their morale?

Ambassador DEAN. That certainly does, having been a soldier, it certainly does.

#### LIMITED SUPPLIES

Mr. WINN. How about food, were the soldiers eating?

Ambassador DEAN. One of the problems was that the lower Mekong was cut so the conveys could not come up by river and hence we had

to fly it in by air. We were able to fly in ammunition and rice but not in the quantities which we would have liked to.

There was a problem of the airfield being rocketed so that the amount of cargo we could bring in was never more than 1,000 tons a day.

#### KHMER INTERNAL POLITICS

Mr. WINN. I asked you about the military side of it. Now, when you arrived in 1974 what was your assessment of the internal politics of the Khmer Government?

Ambassador DEAN. When I arrived, whatever shortcomings Lon Nol had, I did not see anybody else on the horizon who had any more power. Lon Nol did have some control over the military. The military would carry out his orders.

Unfortunately, among the Khmers one of the drawbacks was that they were too divided among themselves.

Even at that time and even until the very end, there was some bickering among themselves, among the political parties and this was unfortunate.

#### LACK OF UNITY

Mr. WINN. Did you make any recommendations to the Lon Nol government or the Khmer Government or did you make any recommendations to the State Department on steps to improve the function of the political popularity?

Ambassador DEAN. I made the recommendation to the people involved, if you don't hang together, you are going to hang separately. Those are the words I used. I cannot form governments but I can tell people as an observer the time has come for you people to do something together. This is the message I did carry to the people when I was there that they had to pull themselves together.

Mr. WINN. Do you think they accepted any of your recommendations?

Ambassador DEAN. It is hard to tell.

#### FULL SUPPORT

Mr. WINN. Did the State Department give you any help in your recommendations?

Ambassador DEAN. I have never had any problem with the State Department not backing me up. I did get good support. When I made a certain pitch, I checked it out first with the State Department and would get full support.

Mr. WINN. Did the State Department make any recommendations to you after you reported back to them the political status of the Lon Nol government? Did they make any suggestions that you might talk to the Khmer Government about bringing them together?

Ambassador DEAN. I had the usual kind of instructions you get. I would do this, for example, when someone was notoriously ill-fitted for the job, I would get instructions, "See why you can't have someone more efficient do the job." But certainly the contact between the Embassy and Washington was constant and there was a flow of recommendations and instructions back to me.

## AN OVERWHELMING JOB

Mr. WINN. One last question and I hope the chairman can come back to me.

When you got there in 1974, did you feel it was almost an impossibility at that time when you saw what you were faced with?

Ambassador DEAN. No; it was an overwhelming job and I have never had one like it. People serving with me will probably bear me out. It was an overwhelming job, with the amounts of money we had, trying to find a solution that would somehow guarantee some of the basic values for which the Khmers were fighting. I don't think at that point the game was up. It was on a declining slope and time was against us, but certainly at all times our mission was backed up by my superiors in Washington in trying to find something.

Mr. WINN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bonker.

## MONEY AND TIME

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, over a year ago we had requests from the administration for \$222 million supplemental aid to Cambodia. What would be your scenario had that request been honored and the money forthcoming? How would that have changed events in Cambodia?

Ambassador DEAN. Mr. Bonker, I had the privilege of receiving the first week of March a delegation from Congress. My major pitch then, I have it here and won't bore you by reading it, but I will stand by it. What I said then was with money there was a possibility of finding some kind of controlled solution, without money it would be an uncontrolled solution like we had not seen since 1948. These are the words and I have them here. I, therefore, asked for money and time. It was unlike in another area; in Cambodia it was money to keep the bullets coming so they could defend themselves; this I said on March 1.

Mr. WINN. Will the gentleman yield?

May we have that letter?

Ambassador DEAN. It was a telegram of which I spoke.

Mr. HAMILTON. Without objection, it will be made part of the record.

[The following telegram to Secretary Kissinger was submitted for the record:]

[Telegram]

## MARCH 1975 REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR DEAN TO CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION

Subject: Ambassador's remarks to codel.

1. Following is text of outline notes on which ambassador based his introductory remarks to codel which visited here March 1. This session was first event on their program, just prior to call on Marshal Lon Nol.

2. Begin text.

A. Is Cambodian Government worthy of American assistance?

1. Cambodia is a relatively democratic regime; civilian Government; non-authoritarian, which is its strength and its weakness.

2. Relatively free press; International Press can file as it pleases; no political prisoners.

3. Government has repeatedly offered unconditional negotiations; anywhere, any time, with anyone mandated to speak for the other side.

4. Chief of State, Lon Nol, has indicated he is no obstacle to a compromise settlement. This is what his phrase "We are not fighting for one man or one group of people, but survival of certain values" means.

5. Above all, the urgency of the need for additional American funds. Without these additional resources, this side will collapse within several weeks.

B. What can be achieved with additional funds?

1. Cambodians are indicating their determination and will to resist a Communist takeover. The number of soldiers killed on this side during the last 20 months speaks for itself. During January 2,400 soldiers were killed. From 1 February to the 20th of February, 1,857 soldiers were killed. For a population of five million on this side, it is a staggering statistic.

2. Despite the suffering on this side, the Cambodians continue to seek refuge on the Government side by the thousands. More than 60,000 refugees were generated in January alone. There are now a total of 1,327,000 refugees registered on this side. Other refugees have been taken in by their families. Out of a population of 5 million, this is an appalling figure. They do not go over to the other side. The number of Cambodians who have chosen to go over to the KC is just a trickle.

3. The Communists have committed many atrocities against the civilian population. The American press and television have covered them extensively. We have a fact sheet on the subject.

4. With the additional funds we can buy time. Time for what? For the Cambodians to stabilize the military situation which may, later in the year, after they have proven their ability to withstand the Communist onslaught, led to a political settlement.

5. Humanitarian aid without military assistance is not feasible. The military aid is needed for this side to stand so that those innocent civilians who have suffered can receive the humanitarian assistance.

6. How much aid? This depends clearly on the level of fighting. On the basis of continued intensive fighting, \$222 million is the best estimate we have. Any drastic reduction from this figure would mean curtailing ammunition to the Cambodian military in the effort to defend themselves and having the pipeline dry up so that in June or July we will be in the same position as we are now.

C. Can the Cambodians on this side get through the dry season, i.e. until end of this fiscal year?

1. With supplemental funds, they have a good chance of making it.

2. They have done a relatively effective job in containing the enemy around the Phnom Penh perimeter. They are trying to reestablish positions on the Mekong. In the latter they have not been as successful as they had hoped, but they are continuing to work on this problem. Convoys go daily down the Mekong from Phnom Penh to a point halfway between here and the Vietnam border to resupply near Luong.

3. All combat intervention brigades are massed on the two lifelines of this nation: around Phnom Penh and along the Mekong. This means that some of the outlying districts have been denuded of effective combat forces and this has led to some setbacks in the provinces.

4. While no one can with certainty predict the military outcome, with sufficient additional funds I think the Cambodians will be able to get through the dry season, probably seriously weakened, but so will be the enemy, perhaps more so.

D. Objective

1. Try to stabilize the military situation.

2. If the Cambodians can achieve this objective, then perhaps conditions will be more propitious for a political solution later this year.

3. Under the present conditions the communists do not appear to be interested in any kind of a settlement other than a military takeover.

E. Effect of no supplemental U.S. assistance on the local scene.

1. Let there be no doubt that this will lead to the early collapse of this side.

2. It will be an uncontrolled solution in which the U.S. will not be able to have a part in protecting those who have fought the Communists.

3. All indications are that an uncontrolled solution will lead to an effort by the Communists to impose their will rapidly, with brutality, in order to establish a new system in Cambodia. This is the way they have been operating in the zones which they presently control.

4. As Chief of Mission I will have to order the evacuation of those for whom we are responsible. We must be prepared for the eventuality that those Cambodians who have placed their trust in the U.S. will vent their anger against their former friends. I cannot take any chances of risking the lives of those for whom I am responsible. It means an early evacuation of all American personnel and those others for whom we are responsible.

5. It will be the first time since 1948 in China that an uncontrolled collapse will occur, except that in this case, unlike China, there is not even a Formosa to which those who have been fighting the Communists can escape.

#### NEGOTIATING A "CONTROLLED SOLUTION"

Mr. BONKER. How much money and how much time, Mr. Ambassador, would have been necessary to negotiate a "controlled solution?"

Ambassador DEAN. I don't know but I knew without money—and I said this in this piece of paper—I could not last and in view of my responsibility towards the Americans present, I would have to leave. I thought at the time the \$222 million was a very realistic figure, to assure something was in the pipeline. I talked to Congressman McCloskey—he was one of the Congressmen who visited Phnom Penh in March—after I got back and others. I was asking for money to gain time, not just to pick up and leave, money that would carry us over hopefully so that some kind of a solution could be worked out.

Mr. BONKER. Could you apply that same kind of rationale for \$800 million to Vietnam that with a little more time and a little more money we could have had a controlled solution?

Ambassador DEAN. I don't want to talk about Vietnam, it was not my jurisdiction. I had a question of running out of ammunition. I was not talking about the next fiscal year. I was talking about the next month, I was talking about getting through the fiscal year in order to have the time to work something out. I was not talking about the distant future, I was talking about getting a specific amount of money to carry me through to the end of the fiscal year so that something should be left standing to work out a settlement. I felt that just picking up and leaving was not worthy of the United States.

#### TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO MILLION DOLLARS

Mr. BONKER. If you could not have given us more specific information about how much money and how much time, it is extremely difficult for us to make the right decisions from here.

Ambassador DEAN. I think we justified the exact amount of \$222 million. It was broken down into very much detail. The time period we were talking about was money for the end of the fiscal year.

Mr. BONKER. After the fiscal year?

Ambassador DEAN. At that point I was not facing that, I was facing on a day-to-day basis trying to keep the country together.

Mr. BONKER. No further questions.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

#### CAMBODIA TODAY

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, why is it so difficult for all of the nations of the world to communicate with the Cambodians? Members of the international community say that the Cambodians have withdrawn somewhat into their own shell. What is your analysis of that situation?

Ambassador DEAN. I think, Mr. Gilman, when I left on April 12, I became an observer; so I would like to preface this by saying that I do not have any insight into the situation any more than anybody else, only what I have read in the newspapers.

I do believe it was not coincidental that the present regime has isolated itself. When in the closing days of the Republic, the very last day, April 16, I was in Bangkok, I received a telephone call from the Cambodian Prime Minister in Phnom Penh. He read to me in French over the telephone, I took notes of the conversation, that he asked the representative of the Red Cross in Peking to work out the surrender, meaning some international force to be present when the surrender takes place in order to assure the simple humanities, if you like. It was turned down.

When I was in Bangkok after having left Phnom Penh on April 12, my own team had contact with the International Red Cross. We had lots of rice in the area at the time. I felt that feeding the hungry was very much in the American spirit. We approached the International Red Cross to find out whether the Cambodians would be interested; there was no answer.

The exodus which followed has been explained on the basis that there was no food. The offers to help certainly were there.

#### REMOLDING CAMBODIAN SOCIETY

After we left on the 12th, the French left by a truck convoy and by the 8th of May all foreigners were out. That includes not only the French—I see a member of the Russian Embassy here—the Russians were out, the East Germans, Bulgarians, the International Red Cross, the United Nations, all were out. Nobody was left behind and the only way I can explain this, Mr. Gilman, I would say is that seen from their point of view, they feel that they have to remodel the Cambodian society in a new image. What they are trying to change is not only the 5 years of the American presence in Cambodia or 100 years of the French presence, but it probably goes back much further. They are trying to remodel society according to their ideas and in order to do this they felt they wanted to do it with nobody present. That is the only way I can explain what has been going on.

#### THE FUTURE OF CAMBODIA

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador, based upon your experience and deep involvement in both Laos and Cambodia, what is your prognosis with regard to the future of Southeast Asia?

Ambassador DEAN. I don't have a crystal ball. I would say in Cambodia there will be a highly nationalistic Marxist regime. Since I was Ambassador in Cambodia, I have limited my comments to Cambodia but I think that is what I foresee for Cambodia. The nationalism has been exemplified, as I understand it, by even sending back the Vietnamese community of several hundred thousand who used to live in Cambodia to Vietnam so they won't be among Cambodians.

#### PRISONERS AND MISSING IN ACTION

Mr. GILMAN. One of our select committees has been pursuing the missing in action in Cambodia. Of course, it is difficult to communicate with Cambodia. While you were serving as Ambassador in Cambodia, did you see any communications with regard to the prisoners of war and the missing in action?

Ambassador DEAN. No; we had also a request from Mr. Cronkite. We tried to follow it up but didn't get any information. I understand since that time, from the time I left, the 12th, there were 10 Americans who had been individually warned, offered seats out, 5 of them were newspaper people and they decided to stay. One of them I know just won the Pulitzer Prize for his reporting. These five did get out with the French.

There were also four pilots. Of the four pilots, three of them got out. Then there was one pilot, I understand, who did not make it. There was one other person who didn't make it. This person and the one pilot are the only two who stayed. I believe that they are probably dead. There has been an effort made in New York, if I am not mistaken, last year with the United Nations, with the Khmer delegation to the United Nations to find out whether there are any missing Americans in Cambodia and to the best of my knowledge, the answer is negative.

#### SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

Mr. GILMAN. Cambodia's relationship with some of the other powerful nations has been rearranged somewhat. As a result of this rearrangement, what sphere of influence do you see Cambodia seeking since it established its own nationalism? Will it be the Vietnamese, the Soviets, or the Chinese?

Ambassador DEAN. I think to some extent one has to look at this from the historic point of view. The recent movement of Vietnamese from Cambodia into Vietnam would indicate to me that the new masters of Cambodia would like to have a homogeneous Cambodian state as in the history of their past. The first annals of history where Cambodia was first mentioned was Chinese, when the Chinese Ambassador reported on the marvels of Angkor Wat. I am inclined to believe Cambodia, having no immediate border with China, would be looking to China for some support and technical know-how.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### A "CONTROLLED SOLUTION"

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Ambassador, I want to explore with you a little this phrase "controlled solution" that we remember very well here on Capitol Hill and you have used it a couple of times this afternoon.

What do you really mean by the phrase "controlled solution" in this context?

Ambassador DEAN. A nonmilitary solution which would take into account the realities.

#### U.S. PROPOSAL

Mr. HAMILTON. What was the nature of our proposal of a controlled solution?

Ambassador DEAN. I think in the last moments of the Republic an effort was made to turn the operation over to Prince Sihanouk.

Mr. HAMILTON. That involved Lon Nol's departure?

Ambassador DEAN. Lon Nol had departed by that time. He departed on April 1. Most of the efforts to get Prince Sihanouk to return were undertaken after Lon Nol's departure.

## CONDITIONS TO A SOLUTION

Mr. HAMILTON. What conditions did we attach to a controlled solution?

Ambassador DEAN. I don't think it was for us to make any conditions. I think it was the Cambodians themselves who were communicating with Peking and asking the Prince to come back.

Mr. HAMILTON. What conditions were they attaching?

Ambassador DEAN. That changed day by day because they were not uniform in this. Mr. Saukam Khoy, who was the last President of Cambodia after Lon Nol left, he was just willing to say come back, period. Other members of the Government attached other conditions such as first there must be a cease-fire, there must be respect for the individual, so there was some hassling back and forth. But in addition to the Cambodians telling the Prince in Peking about coming back and taking over, we also had contact with Sihanouk along the same lines.

Mr. HAMILTON. The United States was not attaching any conditions to a controlled solution?

Ambassador DEAN. No. I am referring to the last closing days of the Republic; it just called for Sihanouk to return.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, in effect in the last days then, it was really a controlled surrender they were proposing?

Ambassador DEAN. It was for him to return, for Sihanouk to return as head of the Khmer Rouge, as head of that movement to return to Phnom Penh.

Mr. HAMILTON. Without any other conditions?

Ambassador DEAN. No.

## NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KHMER ROUGE

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, the New York Times reported in March 1975 that in the spring of 1974 the Department of State rejected your proposal to try to establish negotiations with the Khmer Rouge leadership in Cambodia. Is that true?

Ambassador DEAN. No; this is not wholly accurate. I had heard of the possibility of some possible opening in a foreign capital and at that point I suggested that this idea be taken up; but I could see it only from my vantage point of Phnom Penh. I don't see the over-all world picture; there were later contacts with representatives of the Khmer Rouge, but not the person who was involved in the spring 1974 episode.

## CONTACTS THROUGH CAPITALS

Mr. HAMILTON. What was our communication? You have mentioned Peking several times. Did we make proposals? Did the Cambodian Government make proposals to Peking? Was that who we were negotiating with, or did we have no contact with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia?

Ambassador DEAN. The various contacts to find a negotiated solution were made through capitals and not from inside Cambodia. Unlike in Laos where we had people sitting in town where I could go

over and talk to them. This was not the case in Phnom Penh. Everything had to be done outside the country. I know the Secretary and others tried in various capitals to establish a contact to begin a dialog.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did you feel that the leaders of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia got your messages?

Ambassador DEAN. Well, I was not involved in sending any messages, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me ask the question this way. Who was calling the shots on the other side?

Ambassador DEAN. On the other side?

Mr. HAMILTON. Sihanouk or the leaders of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia?

Ambassador DEAN. We had to go to those who were the nominal leaders, people we could get to, they were living outside of Cambodia. I didn't know how to get ahold of anybody else.

Mr. HAMILTON. Who was calling the shots on the other side?

Ambassador DEAN. I think calling the shots probably would be the Khmer Rouge but—

Mr. HAMILTON. In Cambodia?

Ambassador DEAN. Yes. But, on the other hand, any message which would be given to the leaders of the Khmer Rouge in Peking also would get to the leadership in the country. Some of the leading people, who have now emerged as leading people, were outside of Cambodia.

#### LACK OF KHMER UNITY

Mr. HAMILTON. We had a lot of reports here that there was a lack of unity within the Khmer Rouge during this period. Is that your impression or not?

Ambassador DEAN. I think that we knew relatively little about the Khmer Rouge, Mr. Chairman. There were different kinds of factions and this would also explain what happened after the fall. There was a certain amount of rivalry. It wasn't a perfect organization which took over in April 1975.

#### U.S. CONTACT WITH THE KHMER ROUGE

Mr. HAMILTON. The U.S. Government had no contact with the Khmer Rouge?

Ambassador DEAN. It did have contact with the heads of the Khmer Rouge, who were Sihanouk and Penn Nouth. Sihanouk was the Chief of State and Penn Nouth was the Prime Minister of the government.

Mr. HAMILTON. So when we had a proposal to suggest we went through that route and we assumed that message got to the leaders on the ground in Cambodia?

Ambassador DEAN. We assumed that.

#### SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION

Mr. HAMILTON. The French officials are reported to have believed peaceful settlement could have been arranged in Cambodia some time in the early summer of 1974. They indicated that the Chinese hinted at that time something could be done if Lon Nol would step down.

Do you have a recollection of that and what is your recollection?

Ambassador DEAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't think at this meeting I can go into detail about every step but I can tell you that the French efforts were probed very thoroughly and unfortunately—

#### THOSE AT THE TOP

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it your impression that had Lon Nol stepped down at a much earlier date it would have facilitated a controlled solution?

Ambassador DEAN. I am not certain. As a matter of fact, if I remember correctly, the words were if eight people stepped down everything was going to be perfectly all right. But since the takeover, it hasn't been eight people who have been destroyed but many, many more people have been destroyed. So, I am not sure whether the stepping out of one person would have made that difference. Eight people were asked for.

Mr. HAMILTON. Eight people were asked for by whom?

Ambassador DEAN. By the Khmer Rouge, to step down. With the Khmer Rouge now in command, it has not been a question of punishing only eight people, but a great number of people have been punished, according to the newspapers.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it your impression that had those eight stepped down a controlled solution would have been possible?

Ambassador DEAN. That would be pure speculation. I am not at all sure this would have been the case.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did you ever recommend that those eight step down?

Ambassador DEAN. My recommendation was that all individuals are expendable in the search for a solution including those eight. That was accepted.

Mr. HAMILTON. By whom?

Ambassador DEAN. By my superiors in Washington. I made this point very clear—if a solution can be found by people stepping aside—we should not be hung up on individuals—and they listened.

#### LON NOL'S PROPOSAL

Mr. HAMILTON. Lon Nol made the recommendation, made the proposal some time in the summer of 1974, that he would negotiate with the Khmer Rouge without prior conditions?

Ambassador DEAN. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did you recommend that policy to him?

Ambassador DEAN. In all fairness, I did.

Mr. HAMILTON. What was the result of that?

Ambassador DEAN. It was rejected.

Mr. HAMILTON. By the Khmer Rouge?

Ambassador DEAN. Yes; rejected out of hand.

#### NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION

Mr. HAMILTON. Did the North Vietnamese play any role in the diplomatic maneuvers with regard to Cambodia?

Ambassador DEAN. Not as far as I know, no, sir. They did play a role in Laos where I was involved, but not in Cambodia.

## SOVIET ROLE

Mr. HAMILTON. Did the Soviet Union play any role?

Ambassador DEAN. No, sir, to the best of my knowledge, they had to leave like all the other diplomatic missions. After we left they left with the French and the other international missions, such as the U.N., Red Cross, Bulgarians, East Germans. They all left. There were no diplomats left as of May 6.

Mr. HAMILTON. During your period in Phnom Penh were the Soviets active in a diplomatic sense?

Ambassador DEAN. The Soviets did have a dormant embassy with a caretaker and they did have a TASS correspondent.

Mr. HAMILTON. They were not very active?

Ambassador DEAN. No.

## PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA INVOLVEMENT

Mr. HAMILTON. How about the People's Republic of China, did they play any role?

Ambassador DEAN. They were not represented in Phnom Penh.

Mr. HAMILTON. They were not involved in the negotiations at all, to the best of your knowledge?

Ambassador DEAN. I think some efforts to find a solution involved the People's Republic of China.

Mr. HAMILTON. Efforts were made by us through the People's Republic of China?

Ambassador DEAN. Yes, sir.

## AMBASSADOR BUSH'S REQUEST

Mr. WINN. You remarked about the final days and the request that was made for the International Red Cross to witness a turnover of the government. There were lots of rumors and several variations of stories carried that there was a request made through Peking by Ambassador Bush to the Khmer Rouge to see that the International Red Cross watched that delivery or the turnover of the government. Is that one of the things, one of the approaches that was made?

Ambassador DEAN. Mr. Winn, I am trying to recollect. At that point I was practically evacuated and trying to read the traffic 24 hours a day. I think, I am quite certain Mr. Bush was involved in delivering messages to Prince Sihanouk. The answer is yes, in the closing days.

Mr. WINN. It was my understanding that he had known Sihanouk from the past somewhere.

Ambassador DEAN. It could be.

Mr. WINN. And they had a personal relationship and that we thought that a request would receive some attention through Mr. Bush. Your statement says that we were turned down or that the Khmer Government was turned down.

Ambassador DEAN. Sihanouk did not wish to come back under those circumstances.

Mr. WINN. He did not wish to come back. He did answer?

Ambassador DEAN. Yes.

Mr. WINN. I think that clarifies one thing in my mind as we were of the opinion that we were just ignored on that.

Ambassador DEAN. No.

Mr. WINN. On the turnover of the government by the International Red Cross.

Ambassador DEAN. It was rejected and he did not wish to come.

Mr. WINN. Under those circumstances?

Ambassador DEAN. That is right.

#### FAMINE AND MALNUTRITION

Mr. WINN. During the last 3 months of the Khmer Republic there were numerous press reports which gave the impression of widespread famine, malnutrition, in Phnom Penh. A 1975 report by the Office of U.S. Inspector General of Foreign Assistance gave a similar assessment. Have you seen that report?

Ambassador DEAN. I have seen some of them; yes.

Mr. WINN. What is your impression; is it accurate?

Ambassador DEAN. We were bringing in rice for two purposes, some of it which could be sold and some of it was actually being distributed free of charge. It was Public Law 480 rice.

Now, after the Mekong River was closed and it was impossible to get supplies up by river we had to fly it in and at one point we were bringing in something like 500 to 600 tons a day maximum. The amount of rice we had was sufficient but there was indication that some Khmers were getting insufficient supplies of rice.

I would like to suggest, however, that the amount of rice which was being passed out even during the closing days of the Khmer regime was considerably more than what they received afterward when they were on the road after the Khmer Rouge takeover.

#### 1974-75 HUMANITARIAN AID

Mr. WINN. Do you have any figures that can tell us how much humanitarian aid the United States provided to the Khmer Republic in fiscal year 1974 and 1975?

Ambassador DEAN. I would be glad to give this to you in writing separately. It was roughly speaking about \$30 million for refugee aid other than rice and \$250 to \$300 million worth of rice over those 2 years. Humanitarian aid, that aid to a large extent was distributed by voluntary agencies, and these were the International Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, CARE. There were Americans involved to assure that that rice actually reached its destination.

Mr. WINN. In other words, it wasn't going to the Khmer Government, it was going to the charities, thereby to the people in the field?

Ambassador DEAN. A large part of it was handed out by the voluntary agencies directly to the population. I believe there is not a single committee in the American Congress which will criticize the way the voluntary agencies have discharged their responsibilities in Cambodia assuring that that portion which they controlled got to its destination. In the closing days it was even given out free. There was some malnutrition.

## ADMINISTRATION PRIORITIES

Mr. WINN. Well, in hindsight didn't the Embassy and the administration give enough priority to humanitarian aid to Cambodia during the last year of the war, particularly in food and medicine?

Ambassador DEAN. I think particularly in medicine we got \$2 million worth of supplemental drugs during the last few months which were used. The bulk of our program was for rice, some medicines, and the ammunition to keep the country going. There was practically no money left for anything else, for any frills. On the medical side, a big effort was made, I believe, starting in 1975, about \$2 million worth of drugs.

## CHARGES BY THE INDOCHINA RESOURCE CENTER

Mr. WINN. The Indochina Resource Center charged that at least 15,000 Cambodians died of starvation or malnutrition and related diseases in territory held by the Khmer Republic in the last months of the war or attributed to the U.S. policy of trying to sustain the Lon Nol government and the expense of the humanitarian aid. Would you care to comment on that statement? I suppose you have seen it.

Ambassador DEAN. Yes.

Mr. WINN. It was made in September 1975.

Ambassador DEAN. The staff of the voluntary agencies as well as the staff of the Embassy went all over the city, all over the enclaves to assure that there was rice. Now, there may have been isolated cases of hardship, possibly, but as far as I could see a major effort was made by very dedicated Americans going not only around Phnom Penh, but flying into the various enclaves to assure that there was enough rice. They were limited in the amount of rice, (a) by the amount of money we had at our disposal, and (b) by not trucking it but sending it by air. So by the time the rice ended up in some enclave it was pretty expensive. But, those who have visited Cambodia, those who were close to the scene, I hope, realized the very humane interest we in the Embassy took to mitigate, to the best of our ability, the sufferings which were going on.

## REFUGEE COUNT IN CONTROLLED AREAS

Mr. WINN. What was the total number of refugees to the best of your knowledge, in the government-controlled areas when you arrived in Cambodia in March 1974, and what was the total number at the end of 1974?

Ambassador DEAN. I think it probably increased. I would say, roughly speaking, 1.2 million was the figure that sticks in my mind. I can have it checked.

Mr. WINN. When you got there?

Ambassador DEAN. No; this was the total when I left. When I arrived, the number was about 900,000. During the time the offensive started, the first of January 1975, until the fall of Cambodia on April 17, another 60,000 were generated.

I would like to make this point. They were still coming even under adverse circumstances. They were still coming into the government zone to get the rice; 60,000 were generated during the period the first

of January until about the end of March. During the year of 1974 when I was there the number of people coming into government control increased.

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will stand in recess while we vote. [A short recess was taken.]

#### CONTROLLED SOLUTION

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will resume its sitting.

Let me pursue with you a little further this idea of controlled solution.

When did that phrase first come into use in Cambodia?

Ambassador DEAN. I was thinking in these terms toward the fall of 1974.

Mr. HAMILTON. And are you the author of it?

Ambassador DEAN. I don't know whether I am the author but some of the people in the press have attributed it to me. I don't know.

Mr. HAMILTON. What did the phrase mean in the fall of 1974?

Ambassador DEAN. I think it is a flexible term. It means some kind of a structural turnover and settlement, not an open-ended kind of solution.

#### CHANGE OF CONCEPT

Mr. HAMILTON. How did the term change in meaning from its first use to the end? From what you told me a few minutes ago, I would apply the words "controlled surrender," too. I don't expect you to apply those words to it. I understand you would not accept it. But that was my interpretation of what you told me a few minutes ago when we were discussing this.

What I am trying to do is get some idea of just what that term meant initially and how the concept may have changed as we moved toward the end.

Ambassador DEAN. It meant trying to find a solution in which the Khmer would end the fighting and which would permit us to disengage.

#### U.S. PROPOSALS

Mr. HAMILTON. Did we make proposals to the Cambodian Government of what we thought the contents of the controlled solution ought to be?

Ambassador DEAN. No; never.

Mr. HAMILTON. You did recommend to them that, for example, a moment ago you said your view was that any person was expendable in terms of the Government.

Ambassador DEAN. In my communications with my superiors, I said that any solution should not be held up by the seven or eight people who were found unacceptable to the other side. What was important was getting a settlement and not individual leaders.

#### AN ORDERLY TRANSFER

Mr. HAMILTON. Does controlled solution in your mind mean an orderly transfer of power to the Khmer Rouge?

Ambassador DEAN. Not necessarily to the Khmer Rouge. An orderly transfer, yes. As time went on, obviously, the terms of a controlled solution may change, but to the extent that the Khmer Republic has an Army in being, an Air Force in being, a Navy in being, you have something to offset Khmer Rouge power.

Mr. HAMILTON. But at the end of the period when it was clear that there was no aid coming from the United States, no further military aid, it must have been clear in your mind that a controlled solution at that point in time at least meant an orderly transfer of power to the Khmer Rouge.

Ambassador DEAN. It could be interpreted as such. But I was, Mr. Chairman, hoping to the very last moment that somehow funds could be found. I didn't believe it until it happened because I had hoped that your colleagues who came out to see me might also see it this way. I was in a different position in Cambodia from that next door to me. I just gave the figures on when I was going to run out of ammunition. I wanted to find some orderly solution to the conflict. I did believe that somehow we would get funds which would permit us to find a solution different from what finally happened.

#### U.S. RESPONSIBILITY TO CAMBODIA

Mr. HAMILTON. How did you perceive the responsibility of the United States in Cambodia? Did you feel that we had an obligation to do all we could to support the Cambodian Government to keep it in power?

Ambassador DEAN. No; as I could see it, it was as long as they were willing to fight, and wanted to fight, we would give them the means to fight. Also, I saw it also, as the war and the suffering continued, that all possibilities and openings would be exploited to find a nonmilitary solution.

Mr. HAMILTON. So your concept of American responsibility then was to continue to supply the Cambodian Government with the means to carry on the fight for as long as they wanted to carry it on?

Ambassador DEAN. As long as they freely wished to fight.

Mr. HAMILTON. No matter what the result of that course of action was in terms of the destruction of a nation and the casualties and whatever?

Ambassador DEAN. I think any war is highly destructive and that is why I was trying to find another solution, and was supported in Washington, rather than just continue to fight, fight, fight.

#### ALTERNATE SOLUTION

Mr. HAMILTON. What evidence did you have that there was another solution?

Ambassador DEAN. What evidence? It was the efforts made by the administration to try to find a solution. For example, to convene an international conference. What we had in mind was something like what happened in 1954 in Geneva, to throw the whole thing on the table. That was one possibility which was explored. Another was discussing the problem with the major world powers to see to what extent they could help us find a solution. Exploring through an inter-

mediary who had contact with the Khmer Rouge what could be arranged to put an end to the fighting was another.

So this was a parallel course being pursued while the fight was going on.

#### NO RESPONSE

Mr. HAMILTON. We never had any response, though, did we, from the other side with regard to our initiatives during this entire period?

Ambassador DEAN. We did, but this sometimes took time. It sometimes did take time to get the reply back. It was not turned off in a moment's notice. These exploratory efforts were made in many directions.

Mr. HAMILTON. But without any real response.

Ambassador DEAN. Sometimes a delaying response.

Mr. HAMILTON. What?

Ambassador DEAN. Sometimes a delayed response, not now, maybe later.

Mr. HAMILTON. From whom, Peking?

Ambassador DEAN. From the other side.

Mr. HAMILTON. Sihanouk?

Ambassador DEAN. Sihanouk at one point was interested and later was not—was no longer interested.

Mr. HAMILTON. Sihanouk was not in charge, though, was he?

Ambassador DEAN. Well, he was a factor. He was the Chief of State and remained Chief of State of this organization for a certain period, for a whole year.

Mr. HAMILTON. I know, but who was in charge?

Ambassador DEAN. But even with those who you said might be in charge, efforts were made to get to them through somebody else. That was also tried.

#### COMMITMENT TO CAMBODIANS

Mr. HAMILTON. How do you describe the nature of the American commitment as of, say, early 1975 in Cambodia?

Ambassador DEAN. It was to support them in their struggle as long as they wanted to fight, and also, at the same time—

Mr. HAMILTON. As the Ambassador, is that what you conveyed to the Cambodian Government? We will support you as long as you folks are willing to fight? Is that the gist of your message?

Ambassador DEAN. I kept in mind and told them what was going on in the United States. They didn't even need my telling them that because they could hear it on the radio. They did listen to the radio, and it was one of the factors, Mr. Chairman, which clearly made them realize that they were more and more on their own.

They were listening in January, February, and March. Little-by-little it dawned on them they may not have the funds to continue.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did we fulfill our commitment?

Ambassador DEAN. In what way?

Mr. HAMILTON. You have said to them as the Ambassador of the U.S. Government that we are going to continue to supply you as long as you will fight. We did not. It strikes me that, from your perspective, we did not fulfill our commitment.

Ambassador DEAN. I carried out what instructions I received; we had no further funds.

The last appeal to the United States for aid was made by the Acting President of the Khmer Republic, and there was never a no or a yes from Washington. The appeal was just being held in abeyance, which the Cambodians realized was basically an unwillingness on the part of the United States to continue the support.

Mr. HAMILTON. And the leadership of Cambodia, certainly, at the end, according to what you read to us a few minutes ago, felt that the United States did not fulfill its commitment to them as they understood that commitment?

Ambassador DEAN. They did not—they couldn't understand that they, who wanted to fight for similar freedoms as we have, would suddenly no longer get the means.

#### IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS

Mr. HAMILTON. Did you feel that the congressionally imposed restrictions on the U.S. bombing in Cambodia and the limitations of American personnel in that country were a hindrance to negotiations?

Ambassador DEAN. Mr. Chairman, the cutting off of the bombing preceded my tenure there. Therefore, I would like to limit myself to my tenure.

Mr. HAMILTON. But you could perceive the impact of that while you were there?

Ambassador DEAN. I could see that the bombing of the Cambodian Air Force was not as effective as some of the American bombing I had seen before in other countries, when I was in Vietnam, for example.

Mr. HAMILTON. But was it a hindrance to getting negotiations started in your judgment?

Ambassador DEAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't wish to address a question about which I really don't know all the circumstances. In 1973, I gave Ms. Abzug a plane to go and visit one of our bases in Thailand—I was in Laos at the time—to see the last American bombers take off; I was then in the midst of getting a negotiated settlement in Laos.

As for the second portion, the numerical limitation on our staff, in the first place, like everybody will agree, we lived up to it scrupulously. I made this a point during my entire tenure. It was never exceeded.

It did limit to some extent our activities, because sometimes we would have to do without a certain officer because we would be above the 200-man limit.

#### WILL TO FIGHT

Mr. HAMILTON. How were these restrictions imposed by the Congress viewed by the Cambodian Government, specifically, with regard to their will to fight, their will to carry on?

Ambassador DEAN. The Cambodians must have seen it as something typical to the American scene, maybe limiting the American involvement. I never heard them comment on this particular point.

Mr. HAMILTON. They never said to you, can't we get these restrictions ended?

Ambassador DEAN. Not to my knowledge; not to my knowledge.  
Mr. HAMILTON. You are the one that ought to know.

Ambassador DEAN. Not to my knowledge, sir.

We did make an exception. We asked that people coming for humanitarian reasons not be included in this number, and that actually was lifted in the legislation, if I am not mistaken.

#### LON NOL'S DEPARTURE

Mr. HAMILTON. What role did you play in the decision of Lon Nol, to leave? He left in April 1975.

Ambassador DEAN. I can tell you honestly, none. Pressures were mounting in Cambodian Government circles who knew they needed money and they couldn't keep up the fight without American assistance. There had been a number of statements made publicly in the United States that if Lon Nol would go, this would make it much easier to fund an operation. Cambodians came to President Lon Nol, various people representing the army and civilians, and they urged him that for that reason he should leave.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did they pay him?

Ambassador DEAN. In addition to internal pressures, Mr. Chairman, in addition to this, there was a very active group of diplomats, Asian diplomats, who urged that the President, Lon Nol, leave.

My instructions were, which I carried out scrupulously, to stay completely out of it and report on developments. And this, on my word of honor, is exactly what happened.

#### THE QUESTION OF FUNDS

You asked another question, that was the question of funds.

The Khmer Government had its own foreign exchange which was largely the proceeds of rubber exports. Lon Nol, as I understand it, had invested his funds in Cambodia and lived comfortably in Cambodia. He claimed to his government, to his cabinet, he didn't have any funds outside Cambodia.

In looking over and preparing myself to answer your questions, sir, I heard that the sum of a half million dollars was to be given to him, from Cambodian funds.

Mr. HAMILTON. From the Government?

Ambassador DEAN. From Cambodian Government funds, foreign exchange funds.

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, only one payment was made—it could be more—of \$200,000. He was leaving with 17 or 18 people, and he claimed he had no money outside, and that payment was made of \$200,000.

No American funds were involved. It was a Cambodian decision, after 5 years of serving in various capacities, he would have some money to live with his dependents. It was a large number of people.

Mr. HAMILTON. And to your knowledge that was \$200,000?

Ambassador DEAN. It was supposed to be paid in several installments, and I understand one of them was definitely paid. The rest I do not know.

## SAUKAM KHOY

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Saukam Khoy, who succeeded him, made the statement that they were going to pay him \$1 million.

Ambassador DEAN. \$1 million—I also heard this. I took, for Mr. Saukam Khoy, out of my own pocket, I might say, and gave him a little bit of money because he didn't have a dime. Absolutely didn't have a nickel when he came out, and he came out with 18 people, and he is settled now and I am trying to help him here and there in order to survive.

Mr. HAMILTON. Where is he?

Ambassador DEAN. He is living in Texas.

## LON NOL TODAY

Mr. HAMILTON. Lon Nol is in Hawaii?

Ambassador DEAN. Yes. Saukam Khoy was the acting President, and I can vouch for this, that he and his family left penniless. I had to give him money in order to buy rice.

Mr. HAMILTON. To your knowledge, were any U.S. Government funds used in payments to Lon Nol or any other Cambodian Government leaders who came out?

Ambassador DEAN. No, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is Mr. Lon Nol doing today?

Ambassador DEAN. I think he is retired in Hawaii.

My relationship with Mr. Lon Nol has always been a correct, professional relationship. I saw him off on April 1, 1975, and have had no contact with him since.

## CORRUPTION IN KHMER GOVERNMENT

Mr. HAMILTON. To what extent do you think corruption in the government was a factor in the defeat of the Khmer Government?

Ambassador DEAN. I think it was a factor, like I mentioned, that certainly people believed there was corruption and there obviously was some. Some of it also may have been exaggerated.

If you judge by the Cambodians who came out and the poor conditions they are living in, they couldn't have taken a heck of a lot. But undoubtedly the feeling that some of the people in top positions didn't care enough about the people in lower positions, that was a debilitating factor among the many other factors.

## DEAL'S POSITION ON CORRUPTION

Mr. HAMILTON. How did you, as Ambassador, deal with the question of corruption; what did you do about it?

Ambassador DEAN. I got myself very much involved, especially to the extent that American funds were involved.

For example, the question of payment of soldiers—that was the question of phantom soldiers. I would be rather open and energetic about it and ascertain that the lists of men on duty actually checked with the number of payments made, that you don't have dead bodies that are being paid.

When I heard and had it documented that some officials were particularly greedy, I would not hesitate calling it to the attention of the Chief of State, or the Prime Minister, because I felt they would hurt themselves with the American public if nothing was done about it and that they were giving themselves a bad image. And I felt, while this was not the ordinary Ambassador's job, I also felt it was not an ordinary situation.

I did speak up on issues such as phantom soldiers, not using too much ammunition and other related items.

#### INFLATION IN KHMER REPUBLIC

Mr. HAMILTON. How about the factor of inflation in the Khmer Republic, was that a major factor in its defeat?

Ambassador DEAN. I think it was a very important factor. I think I alluded to it slightly earlier.

It was basically the war. The productive base was shrinking more and more. At the end, 5 million people were living in small enclaves and producing very little. That made them more and more dependent on imports.

In addition, those who used to be farmers and producers had been chased away and become refugees, and instead of being producers, they became consumers.

Mr. HAMILTON. Our figures indicate they had an inflation rate at the end of 1974 of 250 percent.

Ambassador DEAN. I think that is about right.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did that continue through 1975?

Ambassador DEAN. Yes, but in the end it wasn't any more a normal economy, it was a question of feeding and bringing in the very basics in a society.

#### CONTRIBUTORS TO STABILIZATION FUND

Mr. HAMILTON. Did any countries other than the United States provide any assistance to the Khmer Republic in the final years?

Ambassador DEAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. What countries and how much, do you know?

Ambassador DEAN. Yes, sir, I do. The United Kingdom, Thailand, Japan, New Zealand, and Malaysia contributed to the Stabilization Fund, which was a fund of foreign exchange.

Mr. HAMILTON. When was that?

Ambassador DEAN. This was in 1974, until late 1974.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did Singapore help?

Ambassador DEAN. At one point they did, and then they withdrew. Malaysia also did and they withdrew.

Bilateral aid also—the Japanese had a bilateral aid program. The French also had a bilateral aid program.

Mr. HAMILTON. What was the magnitude of the aid from Southeast Asian countries?

Ambassador DEAN. From Southeast Asian countries, Asian countries, including Japan, it was less than \$10 million.

Mr. HAMILTON. Over a period of how long?

Ambassador DEAN. For 1 year.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did Indonesia provide any aid?

Ambassador DEAN. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. What was it, do you know?

Ambassador DEAN. Indonesians trained some of the troops; some of the special forces were trained by the Indonesians.

#### CAMBODIA AFTER THE FALL

Mr. HAMILTON. I would like to know what impressions you have about the events in Cambodia since the defeat of the Khmer Republic?

We have had stories about mass forced marches, a nationwide system of forced labor, mass starvation. We have seen figures very high regarding executions. One figure that has been called to our attention said that 600,000 people have died.

What information do you have, and what is the source of your information? How accurate do you think it is?

Ambassador DEAN. I do not have any information at all. I know as much, maybe less, than you do. Only what I have read in the newspapers. I am Ambassador in Denmark.

#### HUMAN RIGHTS

I do hope that these reports which are coming out will be properly probed by organizations which have the reputation of honesty, such as the U.N. Subcommission on Human Rights, which is about to meet in August. It is a U.N. organization. Or I hope that other governments take the lead in probing, exploring, what the real story is, so that human rights are respected in Cambodia.

This is only a wish and a hope I can express, because I do not know any of the facts. But I think the facts should be determined by impartial organizations which are known for this, such as the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, such as some of the other organizations which specialize—the International Jurists Committee. They would be in the best position and be impartial and would not be attacked as being partial or doing it on behalf of the United States as somebody who has an ax to grind.

#### STRONG CAMBODIA TIES

Mr. HAMILTON. Given the events that occurred in Cambodia since the fall of the Khmer Republic—looking back at it—do the events there surprise you, or are they expectable?

Were they expected by you?

Ambassador DEAN. No, I would say I was, to some extent, surprised.

The Khmers had believed, themselves—the ones I knew—that they could work things out among themselves, and that is probably also one reason why, when the offer was made for them to leave, they didn't leave and stayed behind. Because they figured the old school tie—having gone to the same high school together, having family connections, all this—would have carried them through and they would have had some kind of Cambodian solution.

When this new group of people came in, they ran the curtain down and are now trying to remold the Khmers in a completely different mold. That was a surprise.

## STRONG GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it now your impression that the government is a national Communist government with control throughout the country and very rigid control?

Ambassador DEAN. I do not speak from any knowledge, sir. The only thing I would say, Mr. Chairman, it seems to be a highly nationalistic Marxist government which plays by its own rules, which, we, with our ethics, would not consider to be the right kind of rule.

Mr. HAMILTON. One of the leaders that has been mentioned in the papers—is Khieu Samphan?

Ambassador DEAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. And Tol Saut?

Ambassador DEAN. I believe Tol Saut is a garbled version of the name Pol Pot, the new Prime Minister.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you know these gentlemen? Have you ever seen them?

Ambassador DEAN. No, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Are they known in Phnom Penh?

Ambassador DEAN. Some of them are. Khieu Samphan was a Minister in the government of Sihanouk in the sixties and afterward broke with Sihanouk and was persecuted and took to the bush. So, there are two kinds of leaders, those who were in opposition during the sixties and those who have longer, older roots in the Communist movement.

## U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SETBACK

Mr. HAMILTON. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, in February 1975, said that the potential loss of Cambodia was a foreign policy disaster for the United States. Do you agree with that observation, and if you do, how much of a disaster was it?

Ambassador DEAN. I think the setback for the United States in Cambodia was seen as such by other countries.

Mr. HAMILTON. And has that had an observable impact, do you think, on American foreign policy since the fall of the Cambodian Government?

Ambassador DEAN. This is a question on domestic policies. I don't know. I don't know to what extent what happened in Indochina affects the American public. I do not know.

I do know I was associated with a setback for American foreign policy when I took the American flag out of Phnom Penh. I was clearly aware of the fact that this was a sad day for the American effort.

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of lessons do you draw from this experience?

Ambassador DEAN. I think the lesson I would draw from that is that the foreign policy, in order to be successful, must have the support of the people.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did you draw any lessons for the United States with regard to the way we deal with Communist insurgents in Africa or Asia or any other part of the world?

Ambassador DEAN. I think everything is on a case-by-case basis.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Nixon used to say that Cambodia was the purest form of the Nixon doctrine. How does that strike you? What did he mean anyway?

You don't have to answer that, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador DEAN. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I suspect Copenhagen is more pleasant than Phnom Penh, and we are delighted that you have a good assignment. It is my impression and, I think, the impression of the Congress, that you and your colleagues received an extraordinarily difficult post and you did it with honor, and we appreciate very much that service. And we appreciate your candid testimony this afternoon.

Ambassador DEAN. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

## APPENDIX 1

### BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN GUNTHER DEAN, AMBASSADOR TO DENMARK

Mr. Dean was born on February 24, 1926 in Germany and came to this country in 1939. He was naturalized in 1944. During World War II he served in the Army in Europe attaining the rank of Lieutenant. After graduating magna cum laude from Harvard College in 1947, he attended the University of Paris from where he received his "doctorate" in 1949. In 1950 he obtained the MA degree from Harvard University.

He entered government service in 1950 serving as economist in Paris in the European headquarters of the Marshall Plan, later in Brussels and Saigon. In 1956 he was assigned for the first time to Laos where he worked for two years as political officer. In 1959 he opened the first American Mission in Togo, West Africa, where he subsequently served as Diplomatic Adviser to the President of the Republic. In 1960 he opened the American Embassy in Mali, West Africa, and stayed on as Deputy Chief of Mission. From 1961 to 1965, Mr. Dean served in the Department of State both in the African and European Bureaus. He was a member of the American delegation to the 18th United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1963. From 1965 to 1969, Mr. Dean was assigned to the Embassy in Paris where he was closely associated with the early phases of the Vietnamese peace talks. After one year (1969-1970) as a Fellow at the Harvard Center for International Affairs, Mr. Dean served as Deputy to the American Corps Commander in the First Military Region in Vietnam. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'Affaires in Laos from September 1972 to February 1974 when he was nominated as Ambassador to the Khmer Republic. He served in this capacity from March 1974 to April 1975. On September 25, 1975, President Ford nominated him as United States Ambassador to Denmark. The Senate confirmed the nomination on October 21 and Ambassador Dean was sworn in on October 29. He presented credentials to Queen Margrethe II on November 6, 1975.

Mr. Dean is an FSO-1. He has received several decorations and citations. He speaks fluent French and German.<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Dean is married to the former Martine Duphenieux. They are the parents of a daughter, Catherine, and two sons, Paul and Joseph.

<sup>1</sup> He has acquired a good working knowledge of Danish.

## APPENDIX 2

### SELECT CHRONOLOGY OF UNITED STATES-CAMBODIAN RELATIONS, MARCH 18, 1970-APRIL 17, 1975, PREPARED BY THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

(By Brenda Branaman, Foreign Affairs Analyst, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division)

1970

- March 18—Phnom Penh Radio announced that Prince Norodom Sihanouk had been overthrown as Chief of State of Cambodia while absent on a trip abroad. Power was seized by Lieutenant Lon Nol and Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak. Cheng Heng, President of the National Assembly, was designated as interim Chief of State, pending elections. Sihanouk was deposed following a unanimous *no-confidence* vote by the National Assembly.
- March 19—The U.S. State Department announced that U.S. recognition of Cambodia would continue.
- March 19—The new Cambodian government closed the port of Sihanoukville to North Vietnamese supply ships to stem the supply of food and ammunition to the Communist troops in South Vietnam.
- March 23—At a news conference, Secretary of State William Rogers said that the United States "had nothing to do, directly or indirectly" with the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk.
- March 28—It was reported that for the second day in a row, South Vietnamese troops crossed the Cambodian border in an effort to trap a Vietcong force. The operation was conducted with the cooperation of the Cambodian army.
- March 28—South Vietnamese and Cambodian military officers held an informal meeting on the border of their two countries, accompanied by an American colonel whose orders were "to encourage meetings between Vietnamese and Cambodians."
- April 1—The Cambodian government reported that several thousand Vietnamese Communist troops had fought Cambodian troops near the Vietnam border.
- April 2—Secretary of State Rogers told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session that the Nixon Administration was striving to maintain the neutrality of Cambodia and to avoid becoming entangled in an all-Indochina war.
- April 2—The Cambodian government denied that the United States had the right to pursue enemy forces into Cambodia.
- April 5—Two South Vietnamese battalions moved against North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. The operation penetrated more than ten miles into Cambodia.
- April 11—Senators Frank Church and John Sherman Cooper announced that they were planning to sponsor an amendment to the military appropriations bill to forbid the use of funds to finance the use of American ground forces in Cambodia, Thailand, or Laos.
- April 14—Cambodian Premier Lon Nol, in a broadcast from Phnom Penh, issued an appeal for aid from any country. The announcement asked for arms only and no other form of assistance.
- April 16—State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey said that the United States had received a specific request from Cambodia for arms and military supplies but not for American troops.
- April 18—Secretary of State Rogers said that tensions in Laos and Cambodia had increased "in the last few weeks . . . (because) the neutrality of each has been threatened by North Vietnam in direct violation of its solemn pledges" in signing the 1962 and 1954 Geneva Agreements. He said that the objective of the Nixon Administration was to avoid "widening" the war or lengthening the American involvement.

- April 21—In a third major offensive in a week, South Vietnamese troops again crossed the Cambodian border in force to strike at enemy sanctuaries.
- April 22—The Nixon Administration disclosed that Saigon and the United States had agreed to supply Cambodia with about 6,000 automatic rifles of Soviet and Chinese manufacture.
- April 22—In a letter to the United Nations Security Council, the Cambodian government appealed to all countries to help Cambodia fight North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces.
- April 27—Testifying in closed session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Rogers said that the President had the authority to extend limited aid without Congressional approval. He reportedly emphasized that the Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia were the locations "from where war is being conducted," and he said the South Vietnamese had made several successful cross-border attacks.
- April 30—In an address to the nation, President Nixon announced that American troops were attacking North Vietnamese and Vietcong sanctuaries in Cambodia; and in addition, the United States was sending small arms assistance to the Cambodian government in response to its request for aid. He said that the action had been taken "to protect our men in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization program."
- April 30—White House officials said that several thousand American ground troops were probably involved in the operation against Communist COSVN headquarters in Cambodia which was expected to be completed in six to eight weeks. They said the President took the action under his authority as Commander-in-Chief.
- May 1—Premier Lon Nol stated that Cambodia was not consulted in advance about the American and South Vietnamese military operations and that the operation was a violation of Cambodian territorial integrity.
- May 1—The Vietnam Moratorium Committee, which had been recently disbanded, called for "immediate massive protests" against the Cambodian operation. Demonstrations were held at many universities protesting the Cambodian decision.
- May 2—Premier Lon Nol said that the American action represented a positive response to Cambodia's appeal for help; but the Premier said he was asking for assistance in arms and equipment, not for troops from other countries.
- May 2—Senators Hatfield, McGovern, Hughes, and Goodell announced at a news conference that they would offer an amendment to cut off funds for continued military activities in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia unless there was a declaration of war. This would be attached to the pending military procurement authorization bill.
- May 2—White House communications director Herbert Klein cited a private poll which supported the President's Cambodian decision three to one. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee announced that the 1,650 telegrams they received ran 8 to 1 against the President's decision.
- May 2—Demonstrations protesting the President's decision to intervene in Cambodia, were held on several university campuses in the United States.
- May 3—Vice President Agnew stated in a television interview that since Prince Sihanouk's overthrow, the Communists had expanded their Communist sanctuaries and access to supplies until the United States felt that "the security of American forces is seriously threatened." He said, however, that the United States had "no responsibility to the Cambodians" and had not agreed to defend the Lon Nol government.
- Democratic National Chairman Lawrence O'Brien criticized Agnew's statement and accused the Administration of "a major escalation of the war in Indochina."
- May 4—The Cambodian government released a statement which expressed gratitude to the sentiments of President Nixon for Cambodia's neutrality in his message of April 30, 1970. The statement indicated Cambodia would not accept unconditionally any help from friendly countries in all forms (economic, military or diplomatic).
- May 5—President Nixon met with Congressional committees to explain U.S. involvement in Cambodia. He assured them that American troops would be withdrawn in three to six weeks, that American troops would not penetrate more than 21 miles into Cambodia without Congressional approval, and that some of the American forces were already being withdrawn.
- May 5—In Peking, Prince Sihanouk announced establishment of a government-in-exile.

- May 6—The State Department announced that the "first deliveries" of American rifles and carbines to the government of Cambodia had been made over the past few days.
- May 8—The President in a televised news conference stated that the decision to intervene in Cambodia was made because the Communist action to expand sanctuaries there would present a threat to U.S. forces left in Vietnam after the withdrawal of the 150,000 soldiers scheduled to leave within a year.
- May 8—Cambodian officials indicated approval of a large-scale effort by South Vietnamese Navy up the Mekong River to evacuate Vietnamese residents of Phnom Penh and other areas. President Thieu stated that he and Premier Lon Nol had worked out agreements in principle for South Vietnamese troops to conduct continuing operations into eastern Cambodia. Thieu indicated that South Vietnamese troops would not be bound by the restrictions President Nixon has placed on U.S. forces operating in Cambodia.
- May 9—The U.S. command in Vietnam announced that 30 American gunboats had joined with 60 South Vietnamese gunboats in a push up the Mekong River.
- May 9—Between 75,000 and 100,000 people gathered in Washington to protest U.S. operations in Cambodia.
- May 10—The commander of the South Vietnamese gunboats moving up the Mekong revealed that he would travel up the river past Phnom Penh to Kompong Chan, Cambodia's second largest city. The American gunboats did not sail beyond the limit of 21.7 miles from the South Vietnamese border set by the President.
- May 12—Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam announced that allied vessels, including ships of the U.S. Navy, had begun a blockade along a 100-mile stretch of Cambodian coastline (extending from Kompong Com to the South Vietnamese border) to prevent enemy forces from resupplying their troops by sea.
- May 13—Secretary Rogers made his first detailed public remarks on the operations in Cambodia. He said that the bombing of Cambodian enemy bases and supply routes and the patrolling of international waters could be continued after the President's deadline and that the United States would not supply the Cambodian government with U.S. troops or air support but that some "military assistance by way of supplies or otherwise" would be provided.
- May 15—The White House said it could not accept the language of the Cooper-Church amendment. Ronald Ziegler stated that it would restrain the President from performing his constitutional responsibility of protecting U.S. troops in the field under Article II of the Constitution.
- May 15—State Department spokesman, Carl Barteck, indicated that the United States was encouraging South Vietnam and Cambodia to produce a joint plan for the defense of the Lon Nol regime from Communist attacks; he confirmed that the United States has provided 7,200 M-2 carbines to the Cambodian government.
- May 16—In a briefing held for reporters by the White House, Administration officials expressed hope that the allied military operations in Cambodia would demonstrate to the enemy the wisdom of bargaining seriously at the Paris peace talks. They said that the United States was prepared to undertake international agreements to guarantee the neutrality of Cambodia.
- May 22—Secretary Laird, appearing on the "Today" program, said that there would be "no American advisers in Cambodia after June 31."
- May 22—The State Department sent Senator Fulbright a letter informing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Administration had decided to give \$7.5 million worth of arms to Cambodia on the grounds that such assistance was important to the security of U.S. forces.
- May 25—The Republican National Chairman, Representative Rogers Morton, released a poll showing 53 percent of the people surveyed by telephone supported the President's decision on Cambodia, 32 percent against and 15 percent had no opinion. The Louis Harris Survey released findings of a poll which showed 50 percent believed the President was right in his action on Cambodia and 43 percent had "serious doubts" about the move.
- May 27—The foreign ministers of South Vietnam and Cambodia signed documents re-establishing diplomatic relations which provided for South Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia for as long as necessary.
- May 28—In a statement before the Hammarskjöld Forum of the New York Bar Association, John Stevenson, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, outlined the legal rationale for U.S. operations in Cambodia. He said the "cur-

- rent actions in Cambodia should be viewed as part of the President's effort to withdraw U.S. forces from combat in Southeast Asia." Stevenson cited historical examples in international law where one belligerent was forced to take action because the neutral had allowed the other belligerent to violate its territory.
- June 2—The State Department announced that the United States would provide \$7.9 million in arms and equipment to supply the ethnic Cambodians who were being sent by the government of Thailand to fight in Cambodia.
- June 11—Cambodian Ambassador Sonn Voeunsai presented credentials to President Nixon. Cambodia and the United States had earlier decided to raise the level of their diplomatic delegations.
- June 21—The New York Times reported that U.S. fighter-bombers and gunships for nearly two months had been flying much deeper into northeast Cambodia than the 21.7 mile restriction in support of ground raids on new enemy supply routes. Officials said the purpose of the raids was to make it difficult for the North Vietnamese to establish a new supply line deeper inside Cambodia.
- June 26—Secretary Laird reaffirmed that the Administration planned to continue bombing raids inside Cambodia after June 30. He said that the raids' "primary emphasis" would be the elimination of routes for enemy troops and supplies, but he did not rule out the use of air support for Cambodian combat ground operations.
- June 26—The Senate approved 73 to 0 an amendment proposed by Senator Javits to the Cooper-Church amendment which made a general statement of the warmaking powers of Congress. It stated that nothing in the proposed Cooper-Church amendment "shall be deemed to impugn the Constitutional powers of Congress, including the power to declare war and to make rules for the Government and regulation of the armed forces of the United States."
- June 30—President Nixon reported to the nation the "successful" completion of American operations in Cambodia, said that future U.S. policy called for no ground personnel in Cambodia, and suggested that the country's defense would be largely left to the Cambodians and their Asian allies.
- July 14—The Senate Armed Services Committee reported the military procurement authorization bill for fiscal year 1971 (H.R. 17123). It included a committee limitation of \$2.5 billion on American aid to Southeast Asian allies (conference committee changed this to \$2.8 billion). Senator Fulbright offered an amendment which was approved prohibiting funding of allied military operations in support of the Cambodian or Laotian governments. The House adopted the conference report on September 29 and the Senate on October 1. The bill became Public Law 91-441.
- July 15—In a memorandum from the State and Defense Departments to the members of the conference committee on the foreign military sales bill, the Administration urged Congress to drop the Cooper-Church amendment restricting military action in Cambodia because it would "affect the President's exercise of his lawful responsibilities as Commander in Chief of the armed forces."
- August 3—The Cambodian deputy commander of Kompong Speu province said that the United States was conducting air strikes against enemy forces in that area.
- August 4—Ronald Ziegler, the White House press secretary, said that U.S. aircraft were flying only "interdiction" missions against enemy forces in Cambodia. Pentagon spokesmen said that American commanders in South Vietnam had wide latitude in determining what an "interdiction mission" might be.
- August 10—The U.S. command in South Vietnam confirmed for the first time that Cambodians were flying aboard observation planes piloted by Americans to help spot targets for bombing strikes in Cambodia. A U.S. spokesman said that the Cambodian observers were flying with Americans "when their knowledge of the terrain is helpful to the mission."
- August 25—In an interview published in *Le Monde* in Paris, Prince Norodom Sihanouk said that two-thirds of Cambodia was in the hands of his supporters.
- September 7—The Cambodian army, supported by American aircraft, began its first major offensive against the army. Among the forces moving north of Phnom Penh along route 6 were units trained in South Vietnam. The gov-

- ernment offensive was reported to have been halted by the enemy on September 14.
- September 12—Emory Swang, the new U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, arrived in Phnom Penh. Mr. Swank was the first American ambassador to Cambodia since diplomatic relations were broken in 1965.
- October 7—In a report to the nation on Indochina, President Nixon made a new five-point proposal to end the war in Vietnam. The President proposed a cease-fire in place "in all of Indochina" to be the "subject for immediate negotiation" and a new international conference on Indochina.
- October 8—American delegate David Bruce formally presented President Nixon's five-point peace plan in Paris, but the plan was rejected by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese delegations.
- October 14—Cambodian officials explained that their government's support of President Nixon's latest peace plan for Indochina was based on his affirmation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 as a basis for settlement. They said a stand-still cease-fire could have only limited application in ending the war in Cambodia. They added that they were not seeking a military settlement of the war, but rather a political settlement that would include the withdrawal of all foreign forces.
- November 18—In a special message to Congress, President Nixon asked for \$1.035 billion in supplemental foreign aid for fiscal year 1971, of which \$255 million would be earmarked for Cambodia. The \$255 million figure included \$48.9 million in military assistance to Cambodia previously announced, but did not include \$30 million in Public Law 480 funds. President Nixon said that the funds were necessary to the success of the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization.
- December 8—Secretaries Rogers and Laird testified before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee in support of the Administration's supplemental foreign aid request. Secretary Rogers said that the aid for Cambodia contained in the bill was the first installment of a continuing military and economic aid program for that country, but he said "the idea that this is a repetition of Vietnam is fallacious."
- December 16—Senator J. W. Fulbright inserted in the Congressional Record a report written by two Foreign Relations Committee staff members based on a visit to Cambodia and South Vietnam in late November and early December. The report said that in order to survive, Lon Nol's government would require a long-term American aid commitment. It also noted that the Lon Nol government appeared to have "considerable support" among civil servants, members of the Senate and Assembly, the youth, and intellectuals.

## 1971

- January 5—The Supplementary Foreign Assistance Authorization Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-652, H.R. 19911) was enacted, including the prohibition against the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops into Cambodia and against U.S. advisers to Cambodian military forces (Cooper-Church amendment).
- January 20—Secretary of Defense Laird said at a news conference the United States had conducted and would continue to conduct air operations against enemy forces in Cambodia, and the United States was giving air and logistic support to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in Cambodia.
- January 25—A Pentagon spokesman said that U.S. Special Forces were training Cambodian cadres at bases in Thailand and South Vietnam. UPI, citing U.S. military sources, reported from Saigon that the Green Berets were training 2,100 Cambodian in guerrilla tactics in Thailand, South Vietnam, and Laos for use against Communist supply lines in Northeast Cambodia.
- March 2—The United States signed an agreement with Cambodia to provide that country with \$18.5 million in imports. The agreement was the first of a total \$70 million of economic aid voted to Cambodia by Congress.
- April 20—Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol and his 18-member cabinet resigned. Lon Nol was asked to form a new cabinet by chief of state Cheng Heng.
- May 6—The Cambodian National Assembly gave an overwhelming vote of confidence to the new Cabinet headed by General Lon Nol and Sisowath Sirik Matak.

- August 10—In a White House conference with President Nixon, Cambodian Acting Premier Sirik Matak thanked President Nixon for military and economic aid and said that Cambodia could not survive against Communist attack without continued U.S. assistance. The Administration had requested \$321 million in military aid for Cambodia fiscal year 1972, the largest sum sought for any country other than Vietnam.
- August 16—Cambodian Acting Premier Sirik Matak said that his government would ask South Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia by June 1972 because of the Cambodian Army's growing ability to defend itself and the reports of burning and looting attributed to the South Vietnamese troops.
- September 7—An attempted assassination of U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia Emory Swank, in Phnom Penh, failed when the explosive failed to go off.
- October 18—The Cambodian government announced a decree stripping the parliament of its law-making powers and changing it into a Constituent Assembly, charged with writing a new constitution.
- October 20—Cambodian Premier Lon Nol declared a state of emergency and appointed a new government to rule by ordinance rather than constitutional law, adding that he would no longer "play the game of democracy and freedom" since it stood in the way of wartime victory.
- November 9—Cambodia's new Constituent Assembly met for the first time and elected In Tam, former First Vice Premier and a leading critic of the Lon Nol government, as its president.

## 1972

- January 28—White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler confirmed that President Nixon had in 1971 secretly offered North Vietnam \$2.5 billion as part of a \$7.5 billion package for Indochina reconstruction (\$5 billion of which was earmarked for South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia).
- February 5—Senator Edward Kennedy released a report prepared by the General Accounting Office for use of his subcommittee on refugees which estimated that 2 million Cambodians, or one-third of the population, had been left homeless by the Indochina war since March 1970.
- February 7—Substitute Foreign Military and Related Assistance Authorization (Public Law 92-226, S. 2819) was enacted. The act limited assistance for Cambodia to \$341 million and set the maximum number of U.S. employees that could serve in Cambodia at 200.
- March 1—A staff report of Senator Stuart Symington's subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee stated that fighting in Laos and Cambodia was increasing under "deteriorating" conditions as the war was winding down in South Vietnam, and that as a result the United States was relying heavily on Thailand "as a base for continuing war" in Indochina. The report questioned the extent of the Executive Branch's compliance with legislative restrictions on the level of warfare in Laos and Cambodia.
- March 12—After dissolving the National Assembly, which had been working on a new constitution, and taking over from Cheng Heng as chief of state, Marshal Lon Nol declared himself President of Cambodia, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and President of the Council of Ministers.
- March 21—President Lon Nol announced the formation of a new Cambodian government.
- June 7—According to unofficial figures released by the Cambodian Information Ministry, Marshal Lon Nol won the presidential election held on June 4 with slightly less than 55 percent of the vote. Less than half the number of eligible voters participated in the election.
- October 26—At a news conference, Kissinger confirmed a Radio Hanoi broadcast which announced that a breakthrough had been achieved at the Paris peace talks on October 8.
- November 8—Cambodian Foreign Minister Long Boret, after consultation with Secretary of State Rogers on the progress of negotiations toward an Indochina settlement, expressed reservations about North Vietnamese compliance with the terms of a possible peace agreement and also questioned the efficiency of the supervisory arrangements.

## 1973

- January 23—In a televised address, President Nixon announced that Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had initialed an agreement on ending the war in

- Vietnam, to be formally signed and to take effect on January 27. The agreement included the return of American POWs within 60 days, an internationally supervised cease-fire, and withdrawal of remaining U.S. forces within 60 days.
- January 28—William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said that the terms of the Vietnam cease-fire did not prohibit bombing in Laos or Cambodia.
- February 1—The North Vietnamese government issued a statement expressing support for Prince Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia as the "sole legitimate . . . government of the Cambodian people."
- March 2—In a news conference, President Nixon said that the "key thing" in evaluating prospects for a successful cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia is the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from those countries.
- March 2—In Paris, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and nine other nations signed a cease-fire agreement on Vietnam. The parties were called upon to respect the "independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos," as stipulated in the Vietnam agreement.
- March 28—Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson, appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserted that the President had constitutional authority to continue bombing Cambodia, and that the bombing would not have to stop once all American troops left Vietnam. Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green testified before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that the bombing was "related to our desire to see a cease-fire brought about in Cambodia . . ."
- April 10—Defense Secretary Richardson, after testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in closed session, said that the amount of Soviet and Chinese arms shipped to North Vietnamese would largely determine how long fighting would go on in Cambodia.
- April 16—At a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, Robert H. Nooter, assistant administrator of the AID, announced that the United States had for the first time committed funds—a total of \$1.5 million—for humanitarian assistance to refugees in Cambodia.
- April 23—The State Department claimed that Khmer Rouge insurgents were being "trained, supplied and supported by the North Vietnamese army and also perhaps the VC, . . ."
- April 30—General Lon Non, brother of President Lon Nol, left Cambodia on what was widely seen as an enforced exile trip to Paris and the United States. General Lon Non denied that his departure was in any way the result of American pressure.
- April 30—Secretary of State Rogers appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and delivered a legal memorandum prepared by State Department advisors justifying the President's authority to bomb Cambodia.
- May 8—Defense Secretary Richardson, appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that U.S. bombing of Cambodia was motivated solely by a desire to maintain an independent government that could keep the country from falling into North Vietnamese hands.
- May 9—The Pentagon supplied details on U.S. bombing of Laos and Cambodia between January 27 and April 30. In Cambodia, U.S. planes dropped 82,837 tons of bombs on 12,136 strikes at a cost of \$159 million.
- May 14—The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ordered favorably reported S. 1248—State Department authorizations—with a committee amendment prohibiting expenditures for U.S. military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia, unless specifically authorized by Congress.
- May 16—White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler read a message from President Nixon accusing Congress of "action that could severely undermine" the restoration of peace in Indochina. He said that congressional action to halt bombing of Cambodia was harmful because it came "on the very eve of negotiations to achieve compliance" with the Paris agreement. A four-man council, composed of President Lon Nol and three members of what had been his opposition, was formally instituted to govern Cambodia. Cheng Heng, In Tam, and Sirik Matak announced that the President accepted the conditions they had set for their participation: equal sharing of power and suspension of the National Assembly. "Senior government officials" had formerly reported that the new coalition government was instituted to comply with

- U.S. pressure conveyed during the visit of President Nixon's emissary, General Alexander Haig.
- May 21—Cambodia Information Minister Sum Chhum told a news conference in Phnom Penh that his government was taking steps toward talks with insurgent elements.
- May 29—At a news conference in Morocco, Prince Sihanouk offered to discuss "peace with honor" with President Nixon and immediately reestablish normal diplomatic ties with the United States, but he rejected the idea of talks with President Lon Nol.
- June 11—A State Department spokesman said that the United States had rejected Prince Sihanouk's offer of direct negotiations with Washington to bring about a Cambodian peace agreement. "The United States believes the Cambodian people themselves should negotiate to resolve their differences without outside interference," the spokesman said.
- June 13—Henry Kissinger held a news conference to report on the results of his talks with Le Duc Tho on implementation of the cease-fire agreement and the resulting joint communique. He said the major points of concern of the United States had reached a "satisfactory conclusion." Among these points were violations of Article 20 pertaining to withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia and Laos.
- July 1—The second Supplemental Appropriations Act fiscal year 1973 (Public Law 93-59, H.R. 9055) and the Continuing Appropriations Act fiscal year 1974 (Public Law 93-52, H.J. Res. 636) were enacted. The legislation prohibited the use of funds to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by U.S. forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia after August 15, 1973. H.R. 9055 was a revision of 7447, which was passed by the House on June 25 and by the Senate on June 26 and was vetoed by the President on June 27.
- July 6—Cambodia Foreign Minister Long Boret made a proposal for an immediate cease-fire and negotiations to end the fighting. He asked that Prince Sihanouk be regarded as spokesman for the Cambodian insurgents rather than the legitimate head of government. In addition, Boret said that prior withdrawal of 40,000 North Vietnamese from Cambodia would not be a condition for his cease-fire proposal.
- July 8—Cambodian Premier In Tam said in an interview that his government was not involved in any negotiations and that the major powers were doing whatever negotiating was going on, without consulting with the Cambodian government.
- July 9—State Department spokesman Paul J. Hare endorsed the Cambodian government's call for a cease-fire and negotiations.
- July 14—The Senate Armed Services Committee, in closed hearings, presented accusations made by former Air Force Major Hal M. Knight that he had been ordered, prior to the invasion of Cambodia in May 1970, to participate in a falsified system of target reporting designed to make it appear that bombing attacks occurred in South Vietnam. The Pentagon subsequently admitted that secret bombing had been ordered since March 1969, concurrent with the first withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.
- July 24—Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, appearing before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, said that the bombing of Cambodia in the 14 months prior to May 1970 was "authorized at the highest level," and that there was "no usurpation of civilian authority."
- July 25—The Senate Committee on Armed Services in closed session heard testimony on certain bombing operations in Cambodia.
- August 7—The Senate Armed Services Committee heard testimony from former servicemen which revealed that U.S. ground troops were operating in Cambodia and Laos as early as 1966 and that U.S. bombers were striking deeper within neutral Cambodia in 1970 than official reports had indicated.
- August 11—Prince Sihanouk, in a cable to Senator Mike Mansfield sent from Pyongyang, North Korea, said that he would be willing to establish diplomatic relations with the United States, if the latter would withdraw all support from the Lon Nol government.
- August 15—President Nixon released a statement on the end of U.S. bombing of Cambodia. He pledged continued U.S. support of Cambodia, short of direct combat intervention, and he warned that he would seek congressional authority to resume the air raids "if North Vietnam mounts an offensive that

jeopardizes stability in Indochina . . ." He also charged that the bombing cutoff legislation had "eroded the structure of peace in Indochina" and had cast doubt upon "the resolve and the capacity of the U.S. to stand by its international agreements."

- September 6-30—Khmer Rouge insurgents and Cambodian government forces waged a major campaign for control of the provincial capital of Kompong Cham. Government forces gained control of the city September 12, and the last rebel resistance ended on September 30.
- September 29—In Phnom Penh the United States and Cambodia signed an agreement providing for an increase of \$5 million in economic aid to Cambodia. According to the Washington Post the United States had supplied \$37 million in economic aid to Cambodia since January 30 and projected aid for the fiscal year was expected to total more than \$90 million.
- October 27—The Los Angeles Times reported that a U.S. officer was slightly wounded while accompanying a Cambodian military operation about 10 miles from Phnom Penh.

## 1974

- January 12—Son Sann, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Cambodia proposed that Lon Nol leave Cambodia.
- March 13—The Washington Post reported that an American officer was acting in an advisory capacity to Cambodian forces defending the city of Kampot. The officer denied that he had acted in an advisory capacity.
- March 30—John Gunther Dean arrives in Cambodia to assume post of Ambassador.
- March 31—Cambodian Premier Lon Nol dissolved the High National Council, the four-man ruling body established in April 1973 in part because of pressure from the United States.
- June 13—Cambodian Premier Long Boret resigned after mounting dissention within his coalition Cabinet and President Lon Nol immediately named him -- to form a new government.
- July 9—In conjunction with the recapture of the former royal capital of Oudong (held by the Khmer Communists since March 18), Cambodian President Lon Nol offered to begin peace negotiations with the insurgents "without prior conditions."
- July 9—Prince Sihanouk said in Peking that there could be no negotiations between Cambodian insurgent forces and the Lon Nol government.
- July 9—State Department spokesman John F. King said that the United States welcomed President Lon Nol's offer of unconditional negotiations with the Communist insurgents.
- July 29—The House Judiciary Committee released data on the bombing of Cambodia which reported that between March 1969 and August 1970 the United States had carried out 170,000 bombing sorties and dropped 540,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia.
- August 15—President Lon Nol of Cambodia repeated his proposal to the Cambodian insurgents for "immediate negotiations without prior conditions".
- August 24—Prince Sihanouk called on the United States to end all economic and military aid to the Lon Nol government, and he rejected Lon Nol's proposal for negotiations without preconditions.
- November 25—In response to an article in the Washington Post, a Defense Department spokesman stated that U.S. intelligence information on possible targets in Communist-controlled areas of Cambodia was passed to the Cambodia armed forces.
- November 28—After two days of debate, the U.N. General Assembly voted 56-54 to postpone action on the question whether Cambodia's U.N. seat should be occupied by the Lon Nol government or by Prince Sihanouk's exile government in Peking.
- December 30—The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-539, S. 3394) was enacted, with assistance for Cambodia limited to \$337 million, consisting of \$200 million in military aid, \$77 million under Public Law 480, and \$100 million in economic aid. In addition, the act authorized emergency assistance through the drawdown of Defense Department stocks subject to a limit of \$75 million. The President criticized congressional reduction of funds and undermining efforts to negotiate an end to the fighting in Cambodia.