1975

January 12—Communist insurgents attacked the Mekong River town of Neak Luong in Cambodia in an apparent attempt to cut the Mekong supply line to Phnom Penh.

January 12—Pentagon spokesman William Beecher stated that U.S. aircraft were carrying out unarmed reconnaissance flights over South Vietnam and Cambodia.

January 14—U.S. Air Force C–130's from Thailand, flown by American civilians, began airlifting supplies, including military equipment and ammunition, into Phnom Penh.

January 28—President Ford formally asked Congress for a supplementary military assistance appropriation of $300 million for South Vietnam and $222 million for Cambodia.

February 11—The Defense Department disclosed plans to double from 10 to 20 the number of daily flights of essential supplies to Phnom Penh by Bird Air, a private contracting firm.

February 17—Cambodia government troops gave up their attempt to reopen the Mekong River supply line to Phnom Penh.

February 23—Administration officials, including President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, warned that the Cambodian government would fall to the Communist insurgents if Congress did not provide the $222 million in additional military aid.

February 27—Secretary Schlesinger told the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee that with additional U.S. military aid, the Cambodian government probably could survive until the beginning of the Cambodian rainy season in July and thus increase the possibility of a negotiated settlement of war.

March 1—Members of the Congressional delegation visiting Vietnam and Cambodia quoted U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia John Gunther Dean as saying President Lon Nol would step aside if such action would improve the chances of a peaceful settlement of war.

March 2—Lon Nol stated that he would do "whatever is possible and necessary" to achieve peace.

March 3—The New York Times reported that State Department officials said they doubted that President Lon Nol would step down since the Communist insurgents had shown no willingness to negotiate.

March 5—Khmer Rouge insurgents used artillery for the first time in shelling the Phnom Penh airport, slightly damaging an American DC–8 that had brought rice in from South Vietnam.

March 5—Secretary Schlesinger said that the United States would have to reassess its airlift of military and economic supplies into Cambodia if the Cambodian government was unable to provide adequate protection for Phnom Penh airport.

March 6—President Ford stated in a news conference that Cambodia needed additional military and economic aid within 10 days to 2 weeks, and that U.S. troops would not be sent back into Indochina.

March 15—Cambodian forces captured the town of Toul Leap northwest of Phnom Penh from which Communist insurgents had been shelling and rocketing the Phnom Penh airport.

March 17—The Department of Defense announced that due to an accounting error in the military aid program to Cambodia in fiscal year 1974, there was an extra $21.5 million in military aid available, which would provide enough ammunition to Cambodia until the end of April. (The figure was later revised to $16.9 million.)

March 17—President Ford said at a news conference that the survival of non-Communist government in Cambodia was vital to U.S. security in Southeast Asia. (He noted that doubts over the U.S. commitment to the Cambodian government had caused Thailand to request the withdrawal of U.S. troops and had promoted the Philippines to undertake a review of its relations with the United States.)

March 18—Republican Congressmen reported that President Ford had rejected proposed legislation in Congress that would have provided $82.5 million in military aid to Cambodia but would have ended all military aid after June 30, 1975.

March 23—The Philadelphia Bulletin quoted Secretary Schlesinger as saying that the loss of South Vietnam and Cambodia to the Communists would not significantly shift the world balance of power against the United States but would have psychological effects in terms of perceptions of American will and determination.

March 23—Following the rocketing of two supply planes on March 22, the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh announced that the airlift of supplies would be suspended until the military situation near the airport improved.

March 25—The United States resumed the airlift of supplies into Phnom Penh airport even though Communist insurgents made gains in the area northwest of the airport from which they mounted their artillery and rocket attacks.

April 1—Cambodian Communist insurgents captured Neak Luong, the last remaining government position on the Mekong River east of Phnom Penh.

April 1—President Lon Nol left Phnom Penh for Indonesia.

April 2—State Department announces decision to begin evacuation of American personnel from Cambodia.

April 12—U.S. Marine Corps helicopters, guarded by 386 armed Marines and U.S. warplanes, flew into Phnom Penh and evacuated the entire Embassy staff as well as some Cambodians, Europeans, and Taiwanese. The evacuees were transported to the aircraft carrier U.S.S. *Okinawa* and then to Thailand.

April 12—Press Secretary Ron Nessen announced that the proposal for aid to Cambodia was still emphatically supported by the President.

April 12—Prince Sihanouk announced that George Bush, head of the U.S. Liaison office in Peking, had given him a note inviting him to return to Phnom Penh and help establish a cease-fire. Sihanouk refused, stating that the Khmer Rouge handled governmental responsibilities.

April 17—Phnom Penh surrendered to the Communist insurgents.

APPENDIX 3

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN HAMILTON TO AMBASSADOR DEAN AND HIS REPLIES

MAY 6, 1976.

Hon. JOHN GUNTHER DEAN,
The Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR AMBASSADOR DEAN: Members of the Subcommittee join me in thanking you for your testimony May 5 on United States-Cambodian relations and the April 1975 American evacuation from Cambodia. Your testimony was helpful to us in our inquiry.

I enclose for you a list of questions which we would like answered for the record. The subject matter of very few of these queries was discussed in the May 5 hearing, and we would appreciate as detailed as possible responses to the questions asked.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

LEE H. HAMILTON,
Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Investigations.

Enclosure.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Copenhagen, August 20, 1976.

Hon. LEE H. HAMILTON,
Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN HAMILTON: I am returning herewith the testimony I gave on May 5 as well as answers to the 22 pages of questions which were submitted to me after my appearance before your Subcommittee.

I took the liberty of making some changes in the testimony. None of these changes alter the thrust of my testimony. Quite to the contrary, they are primarily resigned to provide additional details. Other changes were made to improve the grammar or make the testimony more readable.

As for the answers to the list of questions, I tried to summarize my thoughts in brief replies. Some of the questions posed would require my writing a long article or perhaps even a book to do justice to them. In answering the questions submitted by the Subcommittee, I pursued the same course I did in the public testimony: I felt I was not qualified to speak authoritatively on events which occurred prior to my arrival in Phnom Penh on March 30, 1974, nor on what happened after my departure on April 12, 1975.

As I said in my testimony, and as I hope you gleaned from our personal contacts, I have always tried to be forthcoming with members of Congress. I would like to believe this is particularly reflected in my testimony and, to the extent this was feasible, also in replying to the many detailed questions submitted by the Subcommittee.

I would also like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee and for the kind words you expressed at the end of the testimony on May 5 regarding the performance of my Mission in Cambodia. All of us, from the top to the last man in my 200-man Mission, tried to do our best under most difficult circumstances and we tried to give some dignity and honor to one of the sadder pages in our recent history.

With best personal regards, I remain

Sincerely,

JOHN GUNTHER DEAN, *Ambassador.*

Enclosure: Answers to questions submitted by the subcommittee subsequent to the hearing.

THE FALL OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC

Question 1. Do you think the United States had the responsibility to defend the Republic of Cambodia against all odds?

—What was the nature of the American commitment to Cambodia in early 1975?

—Did we fulfill the commitment?

Answer. We had no formal commitment to Cambodia in early 1975, but I think we had a moral obligation to support the Cambodians in their struggle by supplying them with the means to fight while at the same time encouraging efforts to find a non-military solution. I kept them informed as to what was going on in the United States with regard to such support for them. As you know, no further funds were made available in 1975 for their military struggle, and this obviously had a serious effect first on the morale of the Khmer leadership and then on the outcome.

Question 2. In 1970, there were approximately 2,000 to 3,000 insurgents in Cambodia. In 1975, there were over 60,000 and they were fighting without active combat support of the North Vietnamese.

—To what would you attribute the great rise in the strength of the insurgents for the five years?

Answer. I was not present in Cambodia in 1970. However, I have been told that North Vietnamese forces in the border area in March 1970 attacked the Khmer Republic forces and penetrated deeper into the country, thus buying time for the insurgents to build their forces. Communist countries also supplied military assistance to the insurgents. In addition, the ruthless and disciplined dedication of Khmer Communist Party leaders to their goal was an important factor in the growth of the insurgency.

THE EVACUATION FROM CAMBODIA

Question 1. Did the Embassy have a contingency plan for evacuation?

—If so, would you describe it?

—Was it carried out fully in April 1975?

Answer. The Embassy had a detailed evacuation plan which was examined by the Country Team in Phnom Penh periodically—first monthly, then weekly, and finally, daily. This plan set forth the categories of people to be evacuated, how they were to be informed, and the possible options regarding modes of evacuation and the use of military forces. Most of those who left the country under our auspices went out by fixed-wing aircraft prior to the final evacuation on April 12 which was by helicopter. I personally insisted on a helicopter lift for the final evacuation in order to avoid driving evacuees from the embassy to the airport which is located several kilometers from town. Some of the personnel who had been evacuated earlier by fixed-wing aircraft had encountered difficulties in gaining access to the airfield. Also the field had been under daily accurate rocket attack prior to April 12. These factors, plus the reports of the Danang evacuation, made me decide to stage the final evacuation as close to the embassy chancery as possible, thereby limiting the exposure of the evacuees to enemy fire and avoiding sowing panic among the Khmers which in turn would endanger the success of the operation. Admiral Gayler, CINCPAC, and I had discussed this alteration to the original plan both personally in Phnom Penh and by secure telephone, and he concurred in my assessment.

Limited American military forces were deployed on April 12 to guard the landing zone for the evacuation and to protect the chancery compound which served as the assembly point for the evacuees. The evacuation proceeded unopposed. As the last helicopter took off, two enemy rockets exploded in the middle of the landing zone. Surprise and speed in carrying out the evacuation had prevented enemy interference with it.

Question 2. Did U.S. contingency plans for evacuation all call for the use of Marines in the last stage of evacuation, or did some of the plans rely solely on military and commercial airlines?

Answer. See the answer to question 1.

Question 3. Did you agree with the State Department's decision, announced on April 2, 1975, to begin the evacuation of American personnel from Cambodia?

Answer. Even before April 2, 1975, I had reduced the number of Americans and other nationals for whom I had responsibility, by flying them to Thailand. I would like to emphasize that I carried out each step of the reduction in staff and the evacuation in close coordination with Washington and received excellent support both from our civilian and military authorities.

Question 4. What effect did Congress' refusal to vote additional military aid to the Khmer Republic have on the decision, announced April 2, 1975, to begin evacuating American personnel from Cambodia?

Answer. The failure of Congress and the Administration to agree on the allocation of supplemental funds for Cambodia—a debate that lasted some three months—undoubtedly undermined the morale of the Khmer leaders, both military and civilian. The actual timing of the evacuation of Phnom Penh by the American Mission was linked to the deterioration of the military situation and our inability to provide sufficient ammunition to the Khmer forces to continue the struggle.

Question 5. What was the psychological impact of the decision to evacuate on the morale of the Cambodian government and army, or was it too late anyway?

Answer. After we notified the Cambodian authorities that we intended to evacuate, they convened a cabinet meeting to discuss an orderly transfer of power to the other side. The Khmer Rouge refused such a dialogue. Cambodian military forces continued to fight. The government surrendered to the insurgents on April 17, 1975.

Question 6. What was the number of Cambodian employees of the U.S. Embassy at the time of evacuation?

—What was the number of their dependents?

—Of the total, how many did the United States evacuate? (The number of employees reportedly was 300.)

Answer. Some 200 Cambodians with about 650 dependents were employed by the Embassy, not including a larger number employed by contractors rendering services to the Embassy. All but about 12 and their dependents, who did not want to go, were evacuated.

Question 7. Did the Embassy, at the time of evacuation, have a list of former Cambodian employees of the Embassy who, with their dependents, might be endangered by a Communist victory? If so, how many people were on the list, and how many did the United States evacuate?

Answer. The Embassy had been in operation only since 1970 and because of the economic situation in Phnom Penh we had a negligible turnover of employees. We did not keep a list of former employees and felt we had no obligation to those few who had voluntarily terminated their association with the Embassy. I do know, however, that some former mission employees, who had left the Embassy to work for one of the Voluntary Agencies, were evacuated during the last week of our presence in Cambodia.

Question 8. Of the seven Khmer Republic leaders marked for execution by the Khmer Rouge, how many were evacuated, how many stayed in Cambodia, and how many have been executed?

Answer.

1. Lon Nol—Departed on official visit to the United States, now in Hawaii.
2. Cheng Heng—Departed for France, now in U.S.
3. Long Boret—Stayed in Cambodia, believed to be executed.
4. Sirik Matak—Stayed in Cambodia, believed to be executed.
5. Son Ngoc Thanh—Last believed to be out of country, whereabouts now unknown.
6. Sosthene Fernandez—Left for Thailand, now in France.
7. In Tam—Left for Thailand, now in France.

Question 9. Did the Embassy, at the time of evacuation, have a list of Cambodian officials who, with their dependents, might be endangered by a Communist victory? If so, how many people were on the list, and how many did the United States evacuate?

Answer. The Embassy did not maintain a specific list of Cambodian officials who might be endangered. We were well aware of the seven who had been publicly designated for retribution as indicated in question eight. As explained in my testimony, I did not wish to "play God" by deciding who should be evacuated and who should remain behind. I therefore left this decision largely to the Cambodian leadership (see text of letter dated April 12, 1975, reproduced in my testimony).[1] In this letter I said: "We have a certain number of places on our aircraft for the key members of your government who wish to depart the country now. As I stated to you, the decision as to whom this offer should be made is up to you, and I am depending on you to notify the people in question." Many officials did not want to go because they thought they could deal with the Khmer Rouge. Many changed their minds after the government fell to the Khmer Rouge on April 17 five days after we evacuated. In addition to the small number of officials we evacuated, several thousand fled to Thailand on their own.

[1] See page 626.

U.S. POLICY PRIOR TO AMBASSADOR DEAN'S ARRIVAL

Question 1. Could you give us your opinion as to what effect the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in the spring of 1970 had on the incipient insurgency in Cambodia?

—Did the U.S., in fact, widen the war by its action?

—How did the Lon Nol government interpret this action?

—Was the escalation of the war in Cambodia a direct result of the U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion?

Answer. In the spring of 1970, I was a Fellow at the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. Therefore, I was not in Cambodia at the time of the incursion by U.S. forces. I understand that this action was directed at North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory to support their war effort in South Vietnam. The Cambodian authorities agreed to this action. I also understand that North Vietnamese forces attacked the Khmer government forces. It was their presence on Cambodian soil and their attacks on the government forces which contributed to the widening of the war.

AMBASSADOR DEAN'S RELATIONS WITH AND GENERAL VIEWS OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC

Question 1. When you arrived in Phnom Penh what was your assessment of the Khmer civil service or bureaucracy?

—Did you make recommendations to either the Khmer Government or to the State Department on steps to improve the functioning of the bureaucracy, especially in distributing essential services to the Cambodian people including those financed by U.S. A.I.D.?

—If so, what did you recommend?

—Were your recommendations accepted?

Answer: When I arrived in Phnom Penh in the spring of 1974, I found the Khmer civil service making a determined, but often undermanned and insufficiently coordinated effort to deal with the problems of a wartime economy. The Khmer bureaucracy had the virtues and vices of a colonial heritage, where top leaders did not delegate authority and responsibility in the way we try to do in the Western democracies. The problems of dealing with a million refugees, with food and oil shortages, with spiraling prices would have been very difficult for any civil service—let alone one which had to move so swiftly from tranquility to war, and which had to compete, understandably, with the military for scarce resources.

My AID staff and I made a number of recommendations aimed at curbing Cambodia's inflation. We stressed the need to adjust the exchange rate to meet the exigencies of the situation. We continually urged greater coordination and central control of GKR budget expenditures as well as decreases and/or reductions in subsidies for certain commodities. Civil service morale itself suffered greatly because government employees saw their real income cut by more than one-half during the year I was in Phnom Penh. Despite this decrease in morale, GKR officials did, I must say, make serious efforts to adjust exchange rates, establish price controls and to place restrictions on imports and credit. But Cambodia's performance in managing the economy was mixed and, ultimately, could not overcome the severe limitations imposed by the rapidly deteriorating military situation.

Question 2. What role did you play in the decision of Lon Nol to leave Cambodia on April 1, 1975? What effect did the Embassy and the State Department expect his departure to have on (1) the Khmer Rouge's opposition to negotiations and (2) the reluctance of the Congress to vote additional military aid for the Khmer Republic?

Answer. As I said in my testimony, I did not play any role in Lon Nol's departure from Cambodia. Pressures were mounting in circles of the Cambodian government because they needed American assistance to continue fighting. There had been a number of statements made publicly in the United States that if he would go, this would make it easier to fund the GKR. Various Cambodians representing the Army and civilians urged him to leave for that reason. In addition, an active group of Asian diplomats urged him to leave. The possible effect of Lon Nol's departure on Congressional approval of the administration's request for additional assistance was unclear. With regard to the effect of his stepping down on negotiations, I had always recommended to Washington that individuals were expendable if they stood in the way of a solution, but it was not clear that

the Khmer Rouge would have negotiated if Lon Nol had left earlier. They were also demanding our withdrawal and were publicly opposing negotiations. Press reports since April 1975 indicate that the Khmer Rouge took retribution against more officials than the few at the top of the GKR.

Question 3. After Lon Nol left the country on April 1, 1975, did the political situation in Cambodia improve at all?

—What were your relations with Saukham Khoy and Long Boret after Lon Nol's departure?

—If he had stepped down earlier, would chances for a negotiated settlement have been improved?

Answer. The simple fact of Lon Nol's departure obviously did not resolve the many serious problems facing the Khmer Republic. My relations with Saukham Khoy and Long Boret were somewhat more candid and cordial than those I had maintained with Lon Nol. We encouraged them and tried to be helpful in their effort to work out a solution acceptable to them but left to them the essential decision of the type of solution they should strive for and the conditions under which it would be acceptable. As indicated in answering question 2, it was not clear what effect an earlier departure by Lon Nol would have had on the prospects for negotiations.

Question 4. Prior to your post in Cambodia, you had been in Laos where you were involved in U.S. efforts to form a coalition government in 1973. Did your selection to head the Embassy in Cambodia result from your previous experience and signify a U.S. desire to negotiate a similar arrangement in Cambodia?

Answer. I do not know whether my performance in Laos was the reason for which I was selected to be Ambassador to Cambodia. I came to Cambodia from Laos where I was able to play a major role in bringing about the tripartite solution, and it was my goal to find some kind of a nonmilitary solution in Cambodia. There were numerous efforts to find some kind of nonmilitary solution to the conflict, but they were not made by me since Phnom Penh offered no occasion for direct or indirect contacts with the Khmer Rouge.

Question 5. Do you consider that you were at all effective in influencing the government of Lon Nol to implement any reforms that might make his government more capable of eliciting popular Cambodian support or of combating the communist insurgents? In what way?

Answer. See answer to question 1.

Embassy Operations

Question 1. How would you evaluate the effects of the Congressionally-imposed ceiling of 200 U.S. Government personnel in Cambodia?

—Did this affect the Embassy's ability to carry out its functions, especially the monitoring of U.S. aid?

—What specific functions could the Embassy have performed with additional personnel?

Answer. I did not fight the Congressional-imposed personnel ceiling on the number of Americans in my mission, because I interpreted it to be the reflection of a more deeply rooted Congressional intent: to limit the extent of American involvement in Cambodia. I therefore worked with this limitation rather than fighting it. I did feel, however, that American personnel working on humanitarian relief should be exempted from this ceiling and Congress interpreted it this way in fiscal year 1975.

The limitations on personnel levels meant that my staff expanded their work hours and increased the intensity of their efforts in order to do what was necessary. We probably could have carried out a more thorough monitoring of U.S. aid or, for that matter, fulfilled a number of our responsibilities in greater depth—i.e., economic and financial analysis, distribution of foodstuffs, etc.—with additional personnel.

Question 2. Did you, as the Ambassador, have adequate authority over the various U.S. agencies operating in Cambodia such as AID, the CIA, and the Defense Attaches?

—Did you have any kind of mechanism to insure coordination of U.S. programs operated by separate agencies?

—In countries where the United States has substantial and varied programs, should the Ambassador have stricter control over them than he now apparently has, or should the various agencies act with autonomy subject only to general guidelines set by the Ambassador?

Answer. I had, as Ambassador, authority over all U.S. agencies in Cambodia and insured coordination by working together with the senior representatives of these agencies. Of course major decisions were checked with Washington. I believe that strong Ambassadorial authority over operations of other U.S. agency operations is necessary for effective coordination.

Question 3. During your tenure, what was the Embassy's policy concerning allowing the press to travel on U.S. aircraft under the Embassy's jurisdiction?

—What were the reasons for restrictions?

Answer. The press were normally not allowed to travel on aircraft under the Embassy's jurisdiction because air transportation was limited and the space available was needed to carry official passengers and cargo. It was relatively easy for press personnel to travel on Cambodian military aircraft, and I understand that they frequently made use of this means. Exceptions were made on a case by case basis when Cambodian transport was not available. Also, if an individual was sick or wounded we provided air transportation to the nearest medical facility. I remember authorizing special night flights with medical attendants to transport a wounded American photographer from a northern enclave to an American hospital in Vietnam. This was not an isolated case. On the whole, under my tenure we tried to facilitate the work of the press. It goes without saying that in the closing weeks of our presence in Cambodia, we were the principal source of air transportation for the press corps, both into and out of Cambodia, including the evacuation on April 12 to the U.S. aircraft carrier.

Role of U.S. Military Assistance and Advisers in the Khmer Republic

Question 1. Following the overthrow of Sihanouk, the United States attempted, through various forms of assistance, to make the Khmer Republic a viable political and military entity, while North Vietnam worked to create an indigenous communist insurgency capable to overthrowing the Khmer Republic.

—Why did North Vietnam succeed and the United States fail?

Answer. I was not present in Cambodia for the first four years when we rendered assistance. I understand that there was a considerable improvement in the Khmer armed forces as a result of our assistance. We did encourage the Cambodians to get together, but whether or not they could be a viable political entity was a matter that only they could determine. The outcome of the conflict was due to a variety of factors, including war weariness and disunity in the GKR compared to relative discipline among the opposition as well as the reduced level and final termination of U.S. assistance.

Question 2. You were quoted in a press conference of February 26, 1975, as having stated: "Let there be no doubt in anybody's mind that if these funds are not forthcoming, the Cambodians here would not be able to continue their struggle. Not because they despair, not because they lack the will—because we Americans will deprive them of the means to continue."

—Looking back, do you still consider Congress' unwillingness to vote additional military aid as the primary reason for the defeat of the Khmer Republic?

Answer. The difficulties faced by the Khmer Republic was due to a variety of factors. Our lengthy debate whether or not to provide assistance undoubtedly undermined their morale. The Cambodians felt abandoned. Our failure to provide them with the needed supplemental assistance was the immediate cause of their defeat. They did not surrender until they were on the verge of running out of ammunition.

Question 3. What role did you play in the Administration's decision to request from Congress (in late January 1975) $222 million in additional military aid for the Khmer Republic?

—Was the request really based on the belief that the Khmer Republic could survive with additional aid, or was it based on the view that the collapse of the Khmer Republic was inevitable, but that it should not appear to be the result of a denial of U.S. military aid?

Answer. The Administration request for additional assistance to the Khmer Republic was based on information provided by my mission. We had no doubt that additional assistance was necessary for the GKR to continue fighting, and we expected that if requested assistance were provided in time that they could probably continue to fight until at least the end of the fiscal year. I thought that with additional funds we could buy time. Time for what? For the Cambodians to stabilize the military situation, which might have led, later in 1975 after they

had proven their ability to withstand the communist attack, to a political settlement.

Question 4. If Congress had acted in March to approve the Administration's request for additional military aid to Cambodia, would this have changed the course of events in April?

—Do you believe it would have increased the possibility of negotiations?

Answer. Continued assistance could have kept open the possibility for negotiations. Without it, negotiations were not possible.

Question 5. During the first three months of 1975, did the Khmer Republic forces face severe shortages of ammunition, fuel, or military equipment?

—If so, what kind of shortages developed?

Answer. There were no severe shortages of ammunition, fuel or military equipment during this period because the U.S. undertook extraordinary means to maintain survival margins of especially ammunition, fuel and rice. To insure these minimum margins the entire military assistance program had to be mortgaged to pay for the high cost of air transport. As I have stated earlier, Cambodian consumption rates were carefully calculated to the point that forecasts could accurately be made as to when stocks would be exhausted. Additional assistance was therefore clearly necessary.

Question 6. Did the Congressional prohibition on U.S. military advisers with Khmer forces adversely affect the military effectiveness of the Khmer forces?

—Would U.S. advisers have ameliorated the substantial corruption in the Khmer army, especially the problem of thousands of "phantom soldiers" listed on the payroll?

—Should U.S. advisers have been attached to Cambodian army units in the field?

Answer. In the early days of the conflict, the military effectiveness of the Khmer armed forces might have benefited from the presence of advisers. After my arrival, the presence of U.S. advisers would probably have had little discernible effect. The presence of U.S. advisers might have helped to reduce the incidence of phantoms but the total eradication of the problem would have been extremely difficult.

Question 7. What role did you personally play in advising and making recommendations to Cambodian military commanders?

Answer. In view of the critical nature of the military situation and our extensive military assistance program, I frequently exchanged views on military matters with senior members of the Khmer government.

Question 8. What part did the Embassy play in directing Cambodian air strikes against communist targets?

—How would you reply to the charge made by Senator Stuart Symington on March 17, 1975, that "Within the last year they've (the Embassy) been controlling it (the bombing)."

Answer. I understand that prior to the August 1973 bombing halt because of its excellent communications channels with the headquarters controlling airstrikes and the need to check requests against existing U.S. policy, the Embassy acted as a conduit for such requests. The choice of targets to be struck remained a matter to be determined by the Cambodian Government. Since the bombing halt continued while I was in Phnom Penh, the Embassy was not engaged in such activity. See also the answer to question 11.

Question 9. A General Accounting Office report, issued in October 1973, said that members of the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT) in Cambodia "operated much the same as a Military Assistance Advisory Group does in any other country" with the exception of not assigning advisers to specific field units. According to the study, MEDT personnel recommended changes in the force structure of the Cambodian armed forces, advised on contingency planning and military organization, and provided technical assistance on logistics and MAP-furnished material.

—Did MEDT continue such functions during your tenure? In your view, were such functions a violation of the Congressional ban on U.S. advisers in Cambodia?

—What type of activities would have violated the ban? Did you consider the GAO report in supervising the MEDT?

Answer. An important aspect of our military assistance program to Cambodia which received little consideration was the detailed and accurate information required in justifying and explaining the large expenditures which were

made on behalf of Cambodia. To insure that the program was tailored to real requirements, to insure that equipment was received by personnel trained in their use and to insure that material provided under MAP had reasonable expectancy of maintenance support, items such as force structure, military organization, technical assistance and logistics became matters that came under the purview of the MEDTC. To have closed our eyes to these aspects in my view, would have ignored congressional concerns regarding efficient management. I did not consider these functions a violation of the congressional intent in banning advisors and these functions continued during my tenure. In my belief the ban would have been violated had personnel been assigned to military units or activities on an around-the-clock basis and involved themselves in most of the matters affecting their units or activity. In prescribing the limits of our assistance, the views of the GAO report were useful in guiding our judgment.

Question 10. During your tenure as Ambassador, did any U.S. Military Attachés serve with Khmer military units in the field?

—What regulations did the U.S. Embassy have to govern the activities of U.S. Military Attaches and the Military Equipment Delivery Team?

—Were any changes in the regulations made after the incident at Kampot involving Major Lawrence Ondecker in March 1974?

Answer. No U.S. military served with Khmer military units in the field. U.S. personnel from both the Defense Attache Office and the Office of the Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia routinely visited and reported the military status of Cambodian military units as part of their duties; however, U.S. personnel did not remain with units in the manner which U.S. advisors did in South Vietnam. U.S. personnel were extensively briefed upon arrival regarding the Congressional restrictions against advisers to the Cambodian military. The Kampot incident occurred prior to my arrival in Cambodia. Shortly after my arrival in Phnom Penh, I received the instructions in effect and determined that they were adequate. I did, however, personally impress upon my military staff, on several occasions, the need to abide scrupulously by these instructions and to avoid situations which might be interpreted as infringements of their prescribed duties.

Question 11. In November 1974, the *Washington Post* reported and the Defense Department acknowledged that data on potential bombing targets in Cambodia was gathered by American reconnaissance flights from Thailand and passed on to Cambodian military authorities.

—When d'd this practice begin?

—Did you know about it, and did you have a role in it?

—Do you consider it a violation of the Congressional ban on American advisors with Khmer Republic forces?

Answer. It would be inconceivable to me that in a situation as existed in Cambodia that military information which we had would be deliberately withheld or denied to a country to which we were providing enormous military and economic assistance. The information we had concerning enemy activities in Cambodia was a by-product of our own intelligence collecting effort on communist forces throughout Indochina. This information was provided to Cambodian military authorities but the decision on what action, if any, would be taken was one which the Cambodians made for themselves. The provisions of information preceded my arrival and I am not aware exactly when the practice may have begun. I was aware of the practice although I did not play a pivotal part in the process and did not consider this procedure as violating congressional restrictions on American advisors.

Question 12. Did CIA personnel in Cambodia ever act as advisers to Khmer Republic forces in a fashion similar to their activities in Laos (even if on a smaller scale)?

—Could you tell us what role China Airlines played in Cambodia and if it was in any way associated with CIA activities?

—What was the U.S. role in organizing and applying the Khmer "Middle-Range Reconnaissance Patrols" (MERPS)?

Answer. Having served both in Laos and Cambodia, and knowing the CIA operations in both countries, I can honestly say that the CIA did not act as advisers to the Khmer Republic forces in a fashion similar to their activities in Laos. China Airlines, under contract to Air America, transported supplies, not including weapons and ammunition, for U.S. agencies in Cambodia. The Middle-Range Reconnaissance Patrols received U.S. military equipment as part of the Khmer Armed Forces and also received some intelligence collection training.

Question. 13. According to press reports (*Washington Post*, April 6, 1975), the Vinnell Corporation, a U.S. government contractor, had in 1975 68 non-Cambodian employees responsible for weapons and equipment maintenance for the Cambodian armed forces.

—Can you give us some background on Vinnell's operations?

—Did Vinnell have enough personnel in Cambodia to perform this function adequately?

Answer. Vinnell was under contract to operate the logistical system which handled maintenance for military assistance items which were provided to the Government of the Khmer Republic. To the best of my knowledge, there were two contracts with Vinnell: one financed entirely by the Khmers out of their own foreign exchange earnings, and another one supported by U.S. supplied funds. Third country nationals (TCN)—primarily South Koreans and Filipinos—supervised Cambodian employees who performed most of the work. Undoubtedly, much more could have been achieved with more people in terms of the amount or quality of work. However, within the limits established by Congress these personnel performed their functions well.

Question 14. During your tenure, did Khmer Republic authorities make it a practice to commandeer American-registered planes and force American civilian pilots to fly military missions for the Khmer armed forces?

—Did the civilian pilots ever bring this to the attention of the Embassy?

—Did you act to prevent this practice?

Answer. As a general practice authorities of the Khmer Republic did not commandeer foreign-registered aircraft. To my knowledge this occurred only once (under emergency conditions) and in that instance a protest was registered by us with the government. For the most part, the GKR relied upon their own air transport for intra-country airlift.

Humanitarian and Economic Aid, Refugees and Casualities

Question 1. The Indochina Resource Center has charged that at least 15,000 Cambodians died of starvation or malnutrition—related diseases in territory held by the Khmer Republic during the last four months of the war, and the organization attributed the deaths to the U.S. policy of trying to sustain the Lon Nol Government at the expense of humanitarian aid.

—How would you respond to this charge?

—Is there any truth to that charge?

Answer. Because of staff limitations and wartime conditions, there was no way to determine whether deaths in the final months of the war were due to starvation, weakened resistance to disease caused by malnutrition, to other diseases, to war, to accident or natural causes. The number of deaths due to actual starvation is believed to be small. There was malnutrition, but our response to it was hampered by difficulty in recruiting voluntary agency staff because of security conditions, legal limitations on AID dollar levels for Cambodia, and logistical restrictions imposed by the wartime situation itself. Most notably, toward the end there was a physical limitation on the amount of rice and medicines that could be airlifted into Phnom Penh by the airport which was frequently under fire. Embassy personnel took a very humane interest in mitigating to the extent possible the suffering towards the end of the war. Even after leaving Phnom Penh we contacted the International Red Cross to find out whether or not the new regime would be interested in receiving remaining rice stocks in the area. We received no response and the Red Cross representatives were ordered out of the country a short time later.

I would also suggest that on the basis of what I have read in the newspapers, the rice ration available to the population before the fall of Phnom Penh in April 1975 was considerably higher than what the average Cambodian received after the Khmer Rouge takeover.

Question 2. In hindsight, did the Embassy and the Administration give enough priority to humanitarian aid to Cambodia during the last year of the war, partcularly food and medicine?

—What proposals did the Embassy make to Washington concerning humanitarian aid during your tenure?

—Was there any disagreement between the Embassy and the Ford Administration concerning the priority to be given humanitarian aid?

Answer. During the last year of the war, I proposed that the funding devoted to the project for relief and resettlement be increased from $14 million to $20

million—these are the funds which are provided directly to the voluntary agencies. If they seem small in relation to the total dollar amount of the program this is because commodities for such agencies are not terribly expensive compared with the cost of buying, shipping and air-lifting rice for the entire population of the city; this does not reflect a low priority accorded to humanitarian assistance. I would also like to stress that in 1975, in response to an Embassy proposal, the Voluntary Agencies were authorized to distribute U.S. supplied rice free of charge to the needy.

I cannot recall any disagreements with the Administration concerning the priority to be given humanitarian aid. We all were willing to give the humanitarian part of the program the funds it needed. On the other hand, I think it would be fair to say that we all realized that without the influx of general economic support, primarily rice, and military assistance to defend the city, the humanitarian program would have little chance of success in reaching people in Government-controlled areas. I can recall many instances in which humanitarian projects around Phnom Penh were overrun by the communists and destroyed. Priorities were intertwined; you could not give humanitarian assistance alone; you had to keep the supply lines open as well.

The humanitarian approach of the Embassy I had the honor to lead is perhaps best exemplified by our offer, through the International Red Cross, to supply the Cambodians with the remaining rice stocks in the area which had been financed by U.S. funds, even after our departure from Phnom Penh on April 12, 1975. (See answer to previous question.)

Question 3. What was the total size of the Embassy staff during your tenure?

—How many of the staff worked on refugee problems and humanitarian aid?

Answer. The total Embassy staff was less than 200 Americans, in accordance with legislative limitations. About seven of these worked full-time on refugee and humanitarian problems; an additional number devoted part of their time to these problems. It should also be born in mind that in the neighborhood of 25 Americans and third country nationals working with the voluntary agencies concentrated their efforts on refugee and humanitarian problems. In addition, both the Embassy and Voluntary agencies had Cambodian staff for support of these efforts.

Question 4. The 1975 report of the Office of the U.S. Inspector General of Foreign Assistance asserted that U.S. voluntary agencies lacked the facilities and personnel to cope with rising malnutrition and disease among Cambodian refugees.

—Was the U.S. Government mistaken in relying solely on the voluntary agencies for relief work?

—What alternatives were available?

—Did the 200-man limit on U.S. Government personnel in Cambodia restrict a more direct U.S. effort in relief and health work?

Answer. The decision to rely on voluntary agencies for relief work was carefully considered. In 1972 a team sent to formulate alternative program designs for providing refugee aid listed as constraints:

—A 200-man ceiling, which effectively ruled out any large-scale effort by U.S. direct hire personnel.

—The weakness and unproven capability of the Khmer Government, which ruled out a program in which we would turn the money directly over to the GKR.

The only alternative available, therefore, was to use a third party, such as international organizations or recognized voluntary agencies. Since efforts to use the UNDP presented some problems, we invited U.S. voluntary agencies to submit proposals.

The 200-man limit initially precluded a direct U.S. effort in relief and health work, but it was the result of a policy decision to limit our involvement in Cambodia.

Question 5. There were press reports in early April 1975 that international relief organizations and private voluntary organizations tried to reach agreement with the Communists so that they could continue helping the Cambodian refugees following a Communist victory. Can you tell us anything more about these proposals?

—Why did the Communists reject these offers?

Answer. After we evacuated Phnom Penh we asked the International Red Cross to get in touch with the new regime to see if they were interested in receiving the rice from our stocks remaining in the area. We received no response.

The Red Cross representatives were ejected from Cambodia shortly after. We do not know why the new Cambodian authorities did not respond to these offers or, to our knowledge, make any international appeal for humanitarian assistance at that time although the conditions would appear to have warranted it. I also understand that some of their radio broadcasts later claimed that they were pursuing an economic policy of "self reliance," even, apparently, if this meant greater immediate hardship for the people.

Question 6. What is your view of the provision of the commodity import program that requires the purchase of goods from U.S. sources?

—What effect did the restriction have on the commodity import program in Cambodia?

—Would you favor lifting the restriction in "exceptional" situations like Cambodia?

Answer. As events transpired and considering Cambodia's particular needs, the CIP program did not suffer in any substantial way because of restrictions on source procurement. I should point out, however, that the CIP was not limited to U.S. sources only. Khmer importers could and did purchase goods with CIP funds in nearby free world developing countries like Singapore or the Philippines. Also, petroleum products, which were an increasingly large part of the CIP, could be purchased anywhere in the non-communist world. Lastly, the GKR had available to it a significant amount of funds from the multilateral Exchange Support Fund. These funds were not limited as to source procurement. As a consequence, I would say that CIP source restrictions did not really have much impact in Cambodia. They might have, however, in some other country—and I would foresee situations where time and distance considerations might call, in an exceptional situation, for broadening these procurement restrictions.

Question 7. Should Congressionally-imposed limits on aid to countries like Cambodia cover money spent on internal administration and personnel costs of U.S. military and A.I.D. organizations within the recipient country?

—Did the inclusion of these costs in the limits on Cambodian aid seriously affect the program?

Answer. The inclusion of in-country administrative and personnel costs in the Congressionally-imposed ceiling was a bookkeeping headache but did not materially affect the program. Administrative costs were a relatively small percentage of the total. What affected the program was the level of the ceiling, not the inclusion of administrative costs in the ceiling.

Question 8. During the five-year period of open hostilities in Cambodia, is there an estimate of the number of Cambodian casualties?

Answer. I understand that we do not know what the number of casualties was, and any estimate would only be a guess.

Attempts at Negotiations Prior to April 1975

Question 1. According to a State Department paper made public on March 5, 1975, there were six U.S. initiatives for peace in Cambodia between October 1974 and February 1975. All were unsuccessful.

—Did you play any role in these efforts?

—Why were they unsuccessful?

—What type of government did we envisage coming to power through such talks?

—What political groups did we envisage participating in a new setup?

Answer. The efforts towards negotiation were primarily aimed at getting the opposing sides together to talk. I encouraged the GKR in this direction and from Washington efforts were made internationally towards this end. In my testimony I mentioned some of the initiatives taken by the U.S. between October 1974 and February 1975 to find a non-military solution. We were prepared to accept any outcome from the negotiations that the parties themselves would accept. In July 1974 the GKR offered to hold talks without conditions. This offer was repeated at lease twice by the GKR during the last half of 1974. The opposition is publicly on record, both before and after taking power, as opposing negotiations, and I believe that their attitude is one important reason these efforts failed.

Question 2. During 1973, officials of the Nixon Administration and the State Department told Members of Congress on several occasions that one problem in working out negotiations was the lack of unity within the Khmer Rouge with communists, Sihanoukists, and other elements distrustful of each other.

—Was this the Embassy's perception during your tenure?
—Was it the perception of the Lon Nol Government?
—Did the Lon Nol Government earnestly attempt to exploit this disunity?
—If so, why did it fail?

Answer. Both we and the GKR believed that the opposition, made up of disparate elements, was at least in part lacking in unity. However, it did not appear that any significant element was ready to risk losing the support of other elements by independently becoming involved in negotiations. In early 1975 I know that the GKR explored in depth the possibility of dealing with one of the key opposition elements, but without avail. There is no doubt in my mind that it was amply clear to all elements on the other side that negotiations were desired.

Question 3. Concerning U.S. diplomatic initiatives towards a political settlement, was the focus on the Sihanouk exile government in Peking or upon the communist leadership inside Cambodia?

—Did Sihanouk, in his statements opposing negotiations, accurately reflect the position of the communist leadership?

Answer. Sihanouk was the Chief of State of GRUNK and it was therefore appropriate that efforts to find a negotiated solution were directed toward him. We had made it clear that the parties involved would not, themselves, constitute obstacles of any kind to a settlement. We do not believe that Sihanouk's publicly expressed opposition to negotiations significantly varied from the attitudes of the rest of the Khmer Rouge leadership.

Question 4. According to the *Bangkok Post* of September 28, 1974, President Lon Nol stated that officials of both his government and the Khmer Rouge had made contacts outside of Cambodia and "have reached agreement in principle that some means of settlement should be reached."

—Was there a diplomatic initiative at this time?
—What countries were involved in it?
—Why did it fail?

Answer. I am not clear as to what Lon Nol might have been referring to or if the *Bangkok Post* reported him accurately. His remarks may have referred to contacts with individuals who thought they could represent the other side but did not in fact do so. There were numerous rumors about contacts, presumably encouraged by individuals who believed they could act as middlemen.

Question 5. Throughout 1973 and 1974, China strongly supported in public the Sihanouk government-in-exile's rejection of negotiations with Lon Nol?

—Was the position taken by Chinese officials in private any different to your knowledge?
—Were you aware of any attempts by the Chinese to establish contacts between Sihanouk and U.S. officials?
—During Khieu Samphan's (leader of the Khmer Rouge) visit to Peking in April 1974, did the United States make any attempt through Chinese officials to establish contact with Khieu?
—To the best of your knowledge, did the Chinese recommend to Khieu Samphan that the Khmer Rouge agree to negotiate?

Answer. To my knowledge the Chinese both publicly and privately supported Sihanouk's position on negotiations. I am not aware of any initiative by the Chinese to bring Sihanouk or Khieu Samphan and U.S. officials together. Efforts to contact the opposition through third countries or parties were handled by Washington, not by me in Phnom Penh.

Question 6. Much was made, in early 1975, prior to the fall of Cambodia of a proposal for a "controlled solution" to the Cambodian conflict.

—Could you give us a chronology of your efforts in Cambodia to achieve such a "controlled solution" and with whom these efforts were made?
—What were the conditions placed on it by the Republic when the ideas first came up in late 1974 and how did the conditions change?
—In retrospect, do you think the Cambodians held out too long for too much, thus making a "controlled solution" difficult?
—Did this type of solution involve communist participation in a coalition or a transitional government?

Answer. I contributed what I could to Washington's effort to encourage a non-military solution to the conflict and had a thorough exchange of views with Washington on this subject. I do not believe that it would be appropriate for me to set forth my individual contributions in detail, beyond what I have already mentioned in my testimony. Furthermore, I understand that the Com-

mittee already has a summary of our negotiating efforts. The GKR conditions for negotiations changed as the war situation changed. In July 1974 Lon Nol offered unconditional talks. The other side rejected these offers. In the closing days of the Khmer Republic, some Cambodian leaders, as for example the Acting Chief of State, Saukham Khoy, were willing to invite Sihanouk back in a last minute effort to end the conflict in a non-military manner. I referred to this offer in my testimony. I also explained in my testimony how the meaning of the term "controlled solution" changed as the military situation deteriorated. As seen from Phnom Penh, I could not detect any indication that the opposition was ready to compromise.

Question 7. What role did North Vietnam play in the diplomatic maneuvers in quest of negotiations? Was it true, as Sihanouk claimed in his interview with the *Manchester Guardian* of September 18, 1973, that North Vietnam wished him to reach a negotiated settlement with Lon Nol, because Hanoi did not want the Khmer Rouge to gain a quick victory and wanted U.S. reconstruction aid?

Answer. I am not aware of any Vietnamese role in diplomatic initiatives for negotiations.

Question 8. In March 1974, shortly before you arrived in Phnom Penh, the Lon Nol Government negotiated with a group of 742 "Khmer Rumdos" claiming to represent some 10,000 insurgents and their families. The group had offered to join the government side if the government allowed it to retain control of an "independent area 16" about 100 miles west of Phnom Penh and fight as a cohesive military force. The government agreed to the defection but refused to allow the insurgent group to keep control of this particular area.

—As a result of the government's refusal, did the entire 10,000 people actually come over to the government?

—Did the government's opposition to the group's control of the area reduce the possibility of similar defections?

—What advice did the Embassy give to the government on this question?

Answer. Both we and the GKR were interested in the potential defection of any large element of the opposition. There was a purported offer in 1974, and we and the GKR followed it up. But the other side did not, which suggests that they did not represent the people and area claimed. A similar "Khmer Rumdos" offer was made to one of the Cambodian military commanders southwest of Phnom Penh toward the latter part of calendar year 1974. About the same number of potential defectors was initially involved. When the Cambodian army actively pursued the "Khmer Rumdos" offer, it trickled away in the sand. Only a handful of self-styled "Khmer Rumdos" actually came over to the government side.

Question 9. How did Sihanouk and the Cambodian communist leadership react to Lon Nol's statement of March 2, 1975, that he would do "whatever is possible and necessary" to achieve peace?

Answer. I do not recall any response nor any change in the opposition's attitude towards negotiations at that time.

Khmer Republic Politics

Question 1. Please describe and evaluate the three main political parties of the Khmer Republic—the Social Republican Party, Republican Party, and Democratic Party—in terms of ideology, organization, leadership and constituency.

Answer. To give a nuanced answer to this question would practically require writing a whole book on Cambodian politics. In a nutshell, the parties in the Khmer Republic represented individual political personalities rather than ideologies and had small constituencies composed of persons loyal to the individuals or allied with them temporarily. The Social Republic Party generally supported Lon Nol, the Republican Party Sirik Matak and the Democratic Party, in the period when I was in Cambodia, had become the political vehicle of Chau Sau.

Question 2. Two months before you arrived in Phnom Penh, Son Sann, a former Prime Minister of the Khmer Republic, proposed (on January 12, 1974) that Lon Nol leave Cambodia and turn over power to a government that would seek a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. Reportedly, the proposal received support from opposition parties, teachers and students.

—Were you informed of Son Sann's proposal before you left for Cambodia?

—Did you have any discussions with Son Sann after you arrived in Phnom Penh?

—Was the subject of Lon Nol's resignation ever discussed at any other time before events became too dire for the Republican government?

—What were the alternatives, in terms of participants and organization, to a Lon Nol government?

Answer. There were a number of Cambodians at various times who thought Lon Nol's departure might help a negotiated settlement, but there was no clear indication from the opposition that this was the case. While Lon Nol's influence had waned over the years, he did retain more influence over the military than any other Khmer leader in a society which was rife with personal jealousies and ambitions. There was no indication that Son Saan represented anything more than his own thinking, and possibly that of a few others. I recall meeting with Son Sann on at least two occasions when we discussed the political situation in the Khmer Republic. In these conversations he suggested that he might be able to bring about a negotiated solution. However, these claims were deflated when the Khmer Rouge radio denounced his activities and publicly stated that he also was unacceptable to them as an intermediary or in any other capacity. (See also answers to question 2—Ambassador Dean's relations with and general views of the Khmer Republic.)

Question 3. On March 31, 1974, one day after you arrived in Phnom Penh, President Lon Nol abolished the four man High National Council composed of himself and opposition figures.

—Did this move come as a surprise to you?

—Did Lon Nol consult with the Embassy before acting?

—What effect did this move have on the government's ability to manage the country and conduct the war?

—Do you believe that Lon Nol timed his move to take advantage of the changeover of U.S. Ambassadors and thereby reduce U.S. opposition to his move?

—Did you register with Lon Nol an official U.S. protest against this abolition?

Answer. President Lon Nol abolished the High *Political* Council March 30, the day before I arrived. He did not consult with the Embassy prior to abolishing the four man High Political Council. When I presented my letters of credence within one week of the abolition of the Council. Lon Nol received me in the company of Sirik Matak and other high-ranking Khmer leaders.

During my tenure, we continually encouraged unity among the Cambodian leadership. Following the dissolution of the High Political Council, both Lon Nol and the government tried to associate various political elements with the decision making process. For example, I recall meetings with President Lon Nol in April and May 1974 regarding the need for full mobilization, which were attended by Sirik Matak and other Republican leaders.

As far as I could determine, the change appeared to have little effect on the economic and war effort.

Question 4. In June 1974, following the assassination of the Minister of Education and the resignation of six cabinet officials including Prime Minister Long Boret, did the Embassy pressure Lon Nol to retain Long Boret?

—If so, why?

—Was Long Boret the United States' "hope" for the Khmer Republic?

Answer. Although I thought that Long Boret was a capable individual, I did not request that Nol Lon retain him. He was retained as Prime Minister in the new government and I continued to work closely with him in that capacity. As stated in my testimony and in answers to other questions submitted by the Subcommittee, I considered all Cambodian leaders dispensible if they constituted an obstacle to a negotiated settlement. On the other hand, I saw no reason for the Khmer government to drop competent and dedicated men from the cabinet purely for reasons of petty internal political intrigue.

Question 5. What can you tell us about Prime Minister Long Boret's background?

—Is there any truth to the allegation that before 1970, he made a fortune selling supplies to the Vietnamese Communists?

Answer. Prime Minister Long Boret had a long career of government service including previous positions as Foreign Minister, Information Minister, Cambodia's representative to the Asian Development Bank, and Vice President of the National Assembly. I did not have any indication that Long Boret was involved in such activities as selling supplies to the Vietnamese Communists.

Question 6. During the cabinet shakeup of June and July 1974, why did the new cabinet fail to include members of the opposition Republican and Democratic parties?

—If Lon Nol had resigned and had left Cambodia, would the opposition parties have entered the cabinet? Did the Embassy consider such a formula?

Answer. The Cabinet announced in June included three Democrats. The Republicans apparently decided not to serve in the Cabinet but did participate in an enlarged Executive Council.

Question 7. In July 1974, the Phnom Penh newspaper *Nokom* [sic-Nokor] *Thom* published a series of articles in effect accusing Sirik Matak, Long Boret, and Army commander General Fernandez of involvement in the assassinations of Education Minister Keo Sang Kim and his deputy in June 1974.

—Was there any truth to the accusations?

—Did the Embassy investigate?

Answer. Despite the seriousness of the war situation in July 1974, Cambodians continued to engage in petty political squabbling. The allegation made by the newspaper appears to be of that order, i.e., an unsubstantiated accusation by grieved friends of the assassinated victims, who blamed their political opponents for the tragedy. I certainly had no confirmation of these allegations and believe they were erroneous. Furthermore, the Embassy had no jurisdiction to conduct an investigation.

Question 8. What role did the Embassy play in the return in September 1974 to Cambodia of Lon Non, Lon Nol's brother, after 16 months of exile?

—Was Lon Non viewed as a successor to Lon Nol?

—Did you personally oppose his return?

Answer. We most certainly did not view Lon Non as a successor to Lon Nol. Since Lon Non had contributed to dividing Cambodian leadership by his activities prior to his departure in 1973, and in view of his controversial image abroad, I counselled against his return to Cambodia in the fall of 1974.

Corruption in the Khmer Republic

Question 1. How would you evaluate corruption as a factor in the defeat of the Khmer Republic?

—What were the root causes of the reportedly high level of corruption in the Khmer Government?

—What steps did the Embassy propose to solve the problem? Were the proposals acted upon?

—How can an American Embassy best monitor the flow of A.I.D.-financed goods into a country like Cambodia to insure that the goods reach the proper destination?

Answer. Many people believed there was corruption, and there obviously were some reports of it, although by the time I arrived in Cambodia, it may have been exaggerated. The feeling that people at the top were providing for themselves without caring for the lower ranks was a debilitating factor. While the use of official position for gain has been customary in a number of traditional societies, and this was probably aggravated in Cambodia by war conditions, I personally took an active role from the day I arrived in Phnom Penh in limiting any abuse of which I was made aware. On several occasions I strongly urged the GKR to eliminate phantom soldiers. This was in part accomplished by checking pay lists and by simply reducing the number of soldiers on the pay rolls. We did not completely eliminate the problem, but during my tenure we reduced the size of the problem drastically. I also called the attention of the Chief of State to particularly corrupt officials which in some instances led to their dismissal. (See also answer to question 1—Ambassador Dean's relations with and general views of the Khmer Republic.)

The AID mission in Cambodia monitored the flow of goods financed by U.S. economic aid, but as with all AID programs involving goods going into private distribution channels, AID did not have the means to follow an item to its ultimate consumer. The host country government is responsible for making sure commodities get to people who need them. In a developing country, this means trying to have an adequate supply of goods and having a realistic exchange rate. Thus, supply and demand and other free market forces largely govern distribution of good. Cambodia was far from normal because its bureaucratic mechanisms were severely pressed, and the private market place was subject to many war-related distortions and uncertainties. Under our "low-profile" personnel policy which allowed for only a limited audit staff, I think we did all we could to monitor the flow of AID-financed goods.

Question 2. In March 1975, Dr. Gay Alexander, Medical Director of the Catholic Relief Services in Phnom Penh, charged that U.S. rice was being sold to the rich instead of going to the malnourished refugees.

—Is her charge an accurate description of the situation at that time?
—Did Dr. Alexander write you some time in 1974 and make similar charges?
—Did you reply to her letter?

Answer: Some of the rice was sold and some was distributed by the voluntary agencies to refugees. It was not sold to the rich per se but inflation and scarcity made it more difficult for many to afford rice. I do recall receiving a letter from Dr. Alexander and one of my assistants discussed it with our AID staff as well as with the head of the Catholic Relief Services in Cambodia, Father Gehring. I believe that those who had an overall picture of what the American Mission was doing in Cambodia were aware of our preoccupation with relieving the malnutrition problem. (See also the answer to questions 1 and 2—Humanitarian and Economic Aid. Refugees and Casualties.)

Question 3. Did the Embassy ever make an estimate during your tenure of the amount or percentage of U.S. rice under the U.S. aid program that ended up being sold on the black market?

—What was the attitude of the Phnom Penh Government toward the black market?
—Were any government officials ever prosecuted or imprisoned for illegally selling rice into black-market channels?
—What position did the Embassy take on this question?

Answer. No, we were not able to make such estimates. We certainly suspected that some officials were involved in black market transactions involving rice. We did not want to block the flow of rice and other supplies needed to keep the Khmer Government from collapsing. We were concerned about diversions and impressed on Khmer officials the need to prevent diversion of rice into the black market. We also gave careful scrutiny to requests for rice to be distributed through military channels. AID and the MEDTC reviewed estimates not only in terms of the size of Khmer military units to be fed but also of the geographical location of these forces in the field. Unfortunately, as with other areas of wartime administration, there were many gaps. The GKR understandably gave top priority to fighting the war, and was less concerned about charges of profiteering. I'm not aware of any prosecutions of government officials in this area, although some Khmer officials were moved to other positions where there was less opportunity to engage in these activities.

Question 4. What specific knowledge did you have of the number of "phantom soldiers" on Cambodian army payrolls?

—Did the Embassy know the names of Khmer officers who maintained "phantom soldiers" in order to pocket their pay?
—During your tenure, did the Lon Nol Government ever arrest and prosecute any of these officers?

Answer. We had no specific knowledge of the number of phantom soldiers, any estimates were largely speculative. The number of phantoms was reduced by the Cambodian Government at our insistence up to the time shortly before the country's collapse. The identity of the offenders were generally known to the government who responded to U.S. persistence on the subject by arresting and prosecuting the grossest violators in the lower and middle ranks and relieving and reassigning commanders of high ranks.

Question 5. During the last period of the Khmer Republic, Cambodia had 16 domestic airlines, either chartered or owned.

—How do you explain such a large number?
—Who owned these airlines?
—Were the owners also members of the Khmer Government?

Answer. As most major roads in Phnom Penh were severed and as river transport became increasingly dangerous, air flights were the primary transportation alternative. There was no GKR effort to restrict the opportunity to establish airlines to a few operators. The Cambodian leaders believed, and we agreed, that competition among the airlines would keep down prices of cargo and passengers hauled between areas under government control. The argument was also made that the larger the number of planes, the more foodstuffs could be moved from surplus areas (Battambang) to Phnom Penh.

Question 6. Is it true that in June of 1974, $310,000 worth of U.S.-financed aviation fuel disappeared in Battambang Province and that U.S. Embassy officials questioned the Governor or Battambang about this?

—If so, was the fuel ever recovered?

Answer. Shortly after my arrival in March 1974 and as a result of my direct intervention with the Prime Minister, the Khmer Republic agreed to reimburse

us $310,000 for unaccounted aviation fuel. A check for that amount was forwarded by our mission to Washington. I recall that this related to Phnom Penh where POL was received and separated for distribution, rather than to Battambang.

Question 7. How extensive was the smuggling of gasoline by Cambodian merchants to the Communists?

—Did the Embassy make any calculations on the amount smuggled?

Answer. We did not have adequate information to make meaningful calculations.

INFLATION AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE KHMER REPUBLIC

Question 1. What were the causes of the rampant inflation in the Khmer Republic during your tenure?

—How big a factor was this in the defeat of the Khmer Republic?

—Could inflation of this magnitude have been prevented? What steps should have been taken?

Answer. There were many factors causing the serious inflation which occurred in the last year of the Khmer Republic. Budget deficits continued to mount due to heavy expenditures for military operations and refugee relief activity in the face of lagging reserves. The few manufacturing plants still in production were operating well below capacity. Farmers were generally afraid to plant more than for their immediate needs, and even if they wanted to plant more, farm labor was in scarce supply because of the army's needs. The overland and river supply routes were cut. All of these problems created severe shortages of agricultural and manufactured goods with which the external aid program could not cope.

As to how this inflation figured in the GKR's defeat, one can only speculate. Certainly hyperinflation—combined with steady military losses, a burgeoning refugee population, some corruption in the military ranks, and a feeling that their allies were not going to help any more—all combined to bring about serious demoralization and eventually a feeling of helplessness.

It is doubtful that serious inflation could have been prevented in the face of the GKR's inability to break out of the military encirclement of Phnom Penh and the other urban enclaves. The traditional means of dealing with inflation—cutting expenditures, belt tightening, raising taxes—weren't very relevant to a country torn by war. If the U.S. had mounted a massive and very costly airlift program to ship in goods, there might have been some dimunition of inflation, but this was not possible under existing limitations on funds.

Question 2. What could the United States have done in 1974 to halt the rapidly rising price of rice in the Khmer Republic?

—Would increased U.S. food shipments have helped?

Answer. Although rapid increases in the price of rice were indeed a problem, particularly in urban areas, I hasten to point out that a significant drop in prices would have been counter-productive to our efforts to increase domestic rice production. The key to getting farmers to produce, particularly in the traditional rice exporting province of Battambang, was to guarantee a high enough price to persuade the farmer that he should take the great risks involved in planting his acreage.

What we really sought to do was to help the Khmers stabilize their rice prices. Our food shipments helped in this area. We believe that the total rice we had programmed for PL 480 would have been adequate to meet feeding needs. The real problem toward the end of our program, however, was not finding enough PL 480 rice to sell to Cambodia. Rather it was moving it by ship to Phnom Penh—since all the major roads were cut off—and then trying to distribute it to the hungry people thereafter.

Question 3. What policies did the Lon Nol Government adopt to bring inflation under control?

—Why did it concentrate so much on printing paper money?

—Given the severe budget deficits of the Government, was its tax collection system adequate?

Answer. Up to the last months of the war, the Cambodian Government moved forcefully—considering the strains and dislocation of the war—to fight inflation. During my tenure in Phnom Penh the GKR several times devalued its official exchange rates in an effort to make them realistic. It quadrupled, in September 1974, the official purchase price for rice paddy, and also increased domestically controlled prices of petroleum products and electricity. Other reforms included maximizing local currency generations from our aid, conserving rice in-country,

and rationing (only partially effective) to have a more efficient utilization of scarce and expensive imported commodities. Despite these measures, the Khmer Government could not avoid a huge budget deficit primarily due to the cost of its military operations. It had no other alternative to printing money to pay for combat activities. The tax collection system was not adequate. It suffered from the same bureaucratic problems that faced the rest of the sorely pressed civil service—lack of skilled manpower and increasingly demoralized employees as the war effort suffered.

Question 4. What effect did the Congressional ban (Foreign Assistance Act of 1974) on the use of PL 480 local currency funds for military purposes have in Cambodia?

—How did the Embassy monitor the use of these funds to insure compliance with the law?

—After July 1, 1974, when the provision went into effect, how were local currency funds used?

Answer. The change in the PL 480 law did not affect the course of Khmer military operations because the Cambodians simply shifted their budget funds from civilian to military activities. The end result was a serious lack of funds for the civilian budget. In the last year of the PL 480 program, with U.S. Embassy agreement, the GKR used most of the local currency proceeds in effect to subsidize the price of the rice we sold them. The price was lowered enough to make it within the reach of the average Khmer but not low enough to discourage farm production. In the early months of calendar 1975, the Embassy reviewed with the GKR other planned expenditures for the civilian side of the budget. But no approvals were given until shortly before the Government collapsed in April.

Question 5. To what extent did the Khmer Government's taxes on imported goods (mainly U.S.-financed) contribute to price inflation of these goods?

—Did these taxes prevent needed imports from being absorbed into the Cambodian economy at a speed adequate to meet the country's needs?

Answer. The GKR's tax system was unevenly administered. Taxes had little impact on imports other than petroleum. Fund restrictions and severe difficulties in moving other cargoes into Phnom Penh translated into relatively few imports other than POL and rice. Taxes imposed on petroleum were effective in raising revenue and reducing consumption, both desirable goals in my view.

Aid Flows into Cambodia

Question 1. What was the origin of military equipment supplied by North Vietnam to the Khmer Rouge? Did it come primarily from China or the Soviet Union? Was it true, as Sihanouk charged in the fall of 1973, and other reports seconded, that China and denied arms to the Khmer Rouge as a result of the U.S.-China detente; or was this a matter of Sihanouk trying to establish an "independent" position from China in order to bolster the credentials of his government-in-exile?

Answer. The equipment provided through North Vietnamese channels to the Khmer communists was primarily of Chinese origin. I was not in Cambodia in 1973 and I do not know about this but during my time in Phnom Penh the Khmer communists appeared to be receiving quite adequate assistance for their military operations.

Question 2. Can you give us details on the extent of North Vietnamese aid to the Cambodian communist insurgents—particularly the amount of arms and number of advisers?

Answer. I understand that in the early years (1970–72) North Vietnamese presence and control in the Khmer communist forces was extensive but by the time I arrived it was very minor. Most of the assistance to the Khmer communists came from the People's Republic of China via the North Vietnamese, who provided primarily logistical support.

Postwar Developments in Cambodia

Question 1. Several prominent magazines have reported that perhaps upwards of 600,000 people have died in the last year due to various forms of mistreatment by the new regime in Cambodia.

—Does this figure have some credibility?

—What estimates have you heard?

Answer. I only know what I have read in the press since I left Cambodia on April 12. During the time I was in Cambodia while the war was still in progress,

I recall similar reports on a smaller scale which also received some attention in the press. It would seem that these reports of suffering on a much more massive scale after the conflict has supposedly ended would merit an objective inquiry by international or non-governmental organizations which have traditionally concerned themselves with human rights problems independently of government influence.

Question 2. One argument that is sometimes used to justify the massive forced marches and nationwide forced labor system of the communist regime is that these measures were necessary in order to insure maximum rice planting and harvesting in order to prevent mass starvation.

—Is there any validity in this agreement?

—What in your view, has motivated the regime to adopt such harsh measures?

Answer. There were certainly alternatives to removing people from the cities. (See answer to question 5—Humanitarian Economic Aid, Refugees and Casualties.) The evacuation from the cities may also have been related to the fact that most of the population which supported the Khmer Republic was living in the cities or the surrounding areas. Therefore, evacuation of the cities would have served the political purpose of dispersing potential opposition. Also, press reports indicate that the new regime appears to be trying to rapidly remold the Khmer people into a totally new society by forceful means.

Question 3. In March 1976, the new regime in Cambodia elected a national assembly.

—How democratic do you think the elections were?

—Are all those elected members of the Khmer Communist Party?

—How much real political power do you think this national assembly will have?

Answer. I only know what I read about these elections in the press, but I doubt that they depart significantly from what is generally accepted to be the pattern of "elections" in communist countries.

Question 4. On April 5, 1975, Prince Norodom Sihanouk announced his resignation as head of state. On April 14, Khieu Samphan and Tol Saut were named Chief of State and Prime Minister of Democratic Cambodia (new name given to Cambodia by constitution), respectively. These events have been interpreted as a consolidation of the nationalist Communist faction in Cambodia. Do you agree?

—What do these events means in terms of internal and external Cambodian politics?

—What will be the anticipated role of the other two political factions, the Sihanoukists and the Hanoi-oriented group?

Answer. Since I am no longer responsible for Cambodia I cannot address these questions. The Cambodian communist party has been quite secretive, and knowledge about its leadership has been limited. I have noted that Sihanouk's retirement has been announced.

Foreign Policy of the Khmer Republic

Question 1. The major characteristic of Cambodia's foreign policy under the new regime has been isolation from foreign contacts, true to its avowed policy or neutrality and non-alignment.

—Is it in the interest of the United States to have this isolation continue?

—Should the United States offer diplomatic relations with the new government or make other overtures?

—Should the United States continue a policy of no diplomatic and economic dealings with Cambodia much as we did with Communist China in the 1950s and 1960s?

Answer. Since I am no longer responsible for Cambodia, I do not believe that it would be appropriate for me to comment on this subject. To my knowledge the new government has not indicated any interest in establishing diplomatic relations with the United States. The Secretary has indicated that we will look to the future in our relations with the Indochina states and that our attitude towards them will depend on their actions towards us.

Question 2. The new regime in Cambodia has indicated that it sides with China against the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute and that it wishes to remain independent of control from North Vietnam.

—At some point, should the United States encourage Cambodia to continue this course?

—If so, how should the United States proceed?

Answer. I am not aware of any statement by the Cambodian government that it sides with China in the Sino-Soviet dispute. I believe that the Cambodians have historically wished to remain independent of her neighbors. I am no longer responsible for Cambodia and do not believe it would be appropirate to speculate on future policy.

Question 3. What can you tell us about current relations between Cambodia and Thailand?

—Do you think Cambodia is extending any overt or covert aid to the Thai communist insurgency?

Answer. I have heard that Cambodia and Thailand have established diplomatic relations conducted through border liaison offices. Since I am no longer involved with Cambodia I do not think it would be appropirate to speculate on relations between Cambodia and Thailand.

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