

Walter Millis on

War and Revolution Today

With Special Reference to Vietnam □ Followed by a Discussion

AN OCCASIONAL PAPER ON THE FREE SOCIETY PUBLISHED BY THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS



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A tape recording of this paper (as summarized by Mr. Millis) and the discussion that follows is available from the Center. It runs approximately 1 hour and may be purchased for \$5 (3¾ speed, half-track).

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Walter Millis has been a member of the staff of the Fund and the Center since 1954, after many years as editorial writer for *The New York Herald Tribune*. He is the author of *The Martial Spirit*, *Arms and Men*, *Road to War*, *An End to Arms*, and other distinguished volumes.

A great many Americans regard the war in Vietnam not merely with dismay but with a sense of bewilderment and frustration. Few have any enthusiasm for this bloody, costly, and seemingly pointless operation; but most continue to support it because they feel they have no option and no better policies to suggest. This is a war which is somehow not a war. It was never declared by Congress, and the possible end is as obscure as the inexplicable origins. It is a war in which "victory" is avowedly not the object of the fighting, and in which military victory, even if attainable, offers no solution for the problems out of which it has arisen. Without doubt it is war; but it is certainly not the kind of war that Clausewitz studied a century ago, that military men have been writing about and preparing for ever since, and that it is still assumed to be by political leaders and publicists.

This is war—that is to say, the use of armed violence on the stage of international politics—in the post-Hiroshima age. It differs importantly from the organized and formalized wars of the past two or three hundred years. Yet we are still trying to apply to it conceptual systems about war and peace that were perhaps appropriate in, say, 1870, but simply do not seem to fit the facts of the international world as it has been developing under the influence of the nuclear stalemate.

When the Korean War ended in 1953 the nuclear stalemate was just beginning to be established, and was just beginning to exert its many unforeseen ef-

fects upon international politics. Since then we have witnessed a whole succession of wars—in Algeria, in the Congo, in Vietnam, between India and Pakistan—as well as a good deal of lesser military and revolutionary violence. But none of this accords very well with our established concepts of war, peace, or revolution. What I have been asking myself is whether there is any way in which we might arrive at a better understanding of the real nature and functions of war—that is to say, of armed violence in international politics—in the post-Hiroshima era.

For Clausewitz, writing over a century ago, war was essentially a matter of organized armies advancing to defeat and if possible destroy the organized armed forces of the enemy. The object was to occupy territory and to impose the will of the victor state upon the vanquished. This was accomplished primarily by forcing the government of the losing state to come to terms, or, failing that, by taking command of the governmental machinery—the levers of administrative and police power through which the nation was controlled. This is what war was, as soldiers and statesmen understood it, down to 1945. But the wars of the nuclear age reveal few of these characteristics.

We thought of revolution at the same time as primarily an internal affair of the people concerned. It was a mass popular uprising, generated out of intolerable conditions of want and oppression and consequently the more likely to occur as such conditions became more extreme. Success or failure of

the revolution would turn ultimately on the will of the people, and the people should have the final voice. This was the conventional view; it is one to which the Communist countries still cling (and which they assiduously promote) with their concept of "wars of national liberation." But the actual processes of revolution in the modern world conform in almost no way to this view. Revolution is generated more forcibly by nationalist ambition than by internal want and oppression; it does not well up from the mass but is incited by an elitist leadership; it is not a domestic matter for the people to decide but is inextricably entangled in international politics; if not directly fomented from abroad it is usually sustained by outside intervention or assistance and it is a counter in the power rivalries of the great (and no longer themselves revolutionary) states.

The armed violence that has continued in international politics under the nuclear stalemate is a complicated and baffling combination of war and revolution, which we are ill-equipped to understand by our established ideas as to either. The "wars" of today intricately confuse social and political revolution, economic hopes and nationalist self-assertion, conflicting propagandas and ideologies, with the power struggles of the great which, because of the stalemate, can be carried on only vicariously. In them, the older concepts of military "victory" and "defeat" have largely lost meaning. The organized army is less important than the guerrilla forces that can be raised against it; the guerrilla is less important as a combat soldier than as an infiltrator and terrorist; the course of military operations is less important than the reactions of public opinion — not only in the local area concerned but in the great, stable areas of the world — and the occupation of territory is less significant than the treatment of the people in it. The capture or control of the machinery of government is no certain assurance of the end of the war. The anatomy of this kind of conflict is simply not well understood today, and the accepted myth-systems about war and revolution are almost useless to explain it.

I am aware that neither war nor revolution, which have always been closely intertwined, has ever been as simple a phenomenon as the myth-systems suggest. Revolution has almost never in fact represented a spontaneous rising of the oppressed and deprived

mass. Wars have seldom been solely decided by military "victory" alone. Even in the great, formalized wars of the past the guerrilla, the infiltrator, and the propagandist have frequently played prominent roles; ideas and morale have often been more decisive factors than the slaughter and physical destruction. The power struggles among the great states have normally been a dominant factor in the "little" wars fought by smaller powers with each other, or by one great power against a small one. But in the pre-atomic age the myth systems framed around the older concepts of war and revolution were at least not so widely at variance with experience as to be unusable. Today, they have become so.

It is, I think, quite obvious that the conceptual system on which President Johnson has based his Vietnam policy — or on which he would have us believe that he has based it — simply has no relevance to the situation he is trying to control. Officially, we have committed our honor (not to mention our international power position) to the support of the independent people of South Vietnam against a Communist insurrection. Since the insurrection was fomented and is now massively sustained by North Vietnam, it represents an international aggression which we are bound in law and justice to help the free government of South Vietnam repel. To this end we have put many thousands of troops into South Vietnam with a triple mission: to help the Saigon government suppress and extirpate the Vietcong revolution; to interdict further North Vietnamese support of the rebels; and to bring direct pressure on Hanoi, through bombing its military installations, to cease its aggression and come to the conference table. There, since we are a democratic and peace-loving people, we are prepared to negotiate anything and everything — except, of course, the one point vital to the whole problem. That is the question of who will ultimately control in South Vietnam, a decision we insist must be left to the people through a free election.*

*This is the stated position. There are hints that the elections might be dispensed with if it ever comes to negotiation.

Now it is painfully clear that none of this makes any sense from a legal, political, or military point of view. To regard North and South Vietnam as two independent sovereignties, with each government speaking legitimately for its respective people, is to advance a pure legal fiction lacking the one virtue of legal fictions — that they are workable in the situations to which they are applied. The theory of an international “aggression” is vitiated by the fact that this is simply the current stage of a revolutionary civil war that began before the Second World War and has been going on ever since. How much the people have had to do with it, or what they now want, it is impossible to say. The “people” itself is a concept unworkable in this context. It may be allowable to speak of the Vietnamese people, since they all, North and South, have a common language and are racially homogeneous; but how can one construct a viable, independent “people” out of the truncated South, torn as it is by a cruelly savage civil war and bitterly divided besides by class and by political and religious differences? After all, since the days of Bao Dai that is what first the French and then the Americans have been desperately trying to do, with lamentably negative result. The idea that one either can or should confide the whole future of an area like this to a one-shot “free” election by the “people” is sheer political lunacy.

This is what was attempted in the 1954 agreement, when it proved a total failure. That it will work any better because of the introduction of American military power seems improbable. The military solution in itself makes no more sense than the political or the diplomatic. There is not much hope (although there may be some) that the Vietcong can ultimately be extirpated by the joint American-Saigon effort. Consequently, the military strategy has to fall back on two theories. The first is that the direct physical damage done to Ho’s communications, to his military installations, and to the Vietnamese civilians living in their vicinity will finally pressure him into abandoning the Vietcong and agreeing to some kind of non-Communist future for the South. This is not very promising. Leaders in this kind of war are rarely influenced by limited military pressures which do not imperil their own regimes and the power structures they embody, but provide them with powerful politi-

cal and psychological weapons against the enemy and, it might be added, in council with their allies.

The second and rather subtler strategic theory is that all this costly ground and air effort, with its lamentable effect upon the image of the United States as a peaceful and freedom-loving nation, is necessary, not to bring Ho to defeat but to convince him that the United States will never itself accept defeat. The object is no longer “victory,” but to win out in a kind of endurance contest — what used to be called a “war of nerves,” although this war of nerves is waged with human lives by the hundreds or thousands. Ho proclaims that he can last for twenty years, hoping to tire us out; we respond by demonstrating an equal resolution and power of endurance, hoping to convince him that he will not tire us out and that the power struggle might as well be settled. Something of the kind may ultimately come about, though it would no longer be a military solution in the old sense. Something of the sort did come about, after all, in Korea, where we fought through two fairly bloody years (after the beginning of the armistice negotiations) to convince the Chinese that they had got all the mileage out of the situation they were likely to get, and so to bring them to allow us to settle. But unless we can bring into play some new concepts as to the use of military violence in international relations, this is likely to take a long time.

Of course, our own concepts are not the only stumbling blocks. The myths of “imperialist aggression” are even more mythical, and unfortunately no less powerful, than our own myths of “Communist aggression.” Neither side sees situations of this kind with sufficient clarity and realism to make them reasonably controllable; and as we work to refine our own ideas of the true role of international violence in the post-atomic world, we can and must hope that it will encourage our adversaries to do the same. This hope is not, I think, altogether illusory; and in this connection the Indian-Pakistani war is of singular interest. It displays most of the characteristics of the new kind of warfare. It began with an aggression by armed Pakis-

tani infiltrators into Indian Kashmir in the name of a Kashmiri "war of national liberation"; the operations of the organized armies and air forces seem less important than the political, diplomatic, and psychological factors; the interests of the giant powers are involved in it behind the scenes, and it is proving as resistant to solution by the standard UN formula of cease-fire, return to the status quo, and negotiate the non-negotiable as have other conflicts. But there is one startling difference. It does not fit into the cold war. It cannot be blamed on Western "imperialist aggression" any more than it can be ascribed to Communist "liberation." Here are two revolutionary Asian nationalisms clashing directly with each other; here is a war which flouts all the claptrap Communist mythology as well as the mythology of the Western anti-Communist crusaders.

Great-power politics is still a dominant influence. But for the first time in any significant power struggle the Soviet Union has stood with the United States to produce unanimous votes in the Security Council.

The confrontation is not between the Communist and the Western powers but between the two great Communist powers; and the myths of "imperialist aggression," of "national liberation," of "people's democracy," and the tyrannies of "capitalism" are inapplicable to the situation. It seems to me not impossible that other myths and slogans which Communist ideology has used with such effect in international politics will come up for review by the Communists themselves as they see their inadequacy and inutility in meeting those fundamental issues of international politics by which Communist great powers, no less than others, see themselves divided.

I repeat the question with which I began this paper. It is simply whether anything can be done to hasten the development of new concepts both of war and of revolution, among ourselves and among others, that will be more applicable to the problem of violent struggle in the atomic age than those with which we now try — to our own bafflement and that of our statesmen — to understand our times.

A Discussion This is an edited version of the discussion that took place around the conference table of the Center after Mr. Millis presented his paper to his colleagues. Among those participating were:

W. H. Ferry

Vice-President of the Center

Robert M. Hutchins

President of the Center; chairman of the meeting

Stanley K. Sheinbaum

Economist; former faculty member of Stanford and Michigan State Universities and director of the latter's Technical Assistance Project in Vietnam

Robert K. Woetzel

Former international law professor at Fordham and New York Universities and author of two books on the Nuremberg Trials

John Wilkinson

Physicist and philosopher; former faculty member of the Universities of Chicago, Istanbul, and California

Irving F. Laucks

Center Consultant; former chemist, engineer, and manufacturer

Harrop A. Freeman

Professor of law at Cornell University on five-months' leave to the Center; author of *Peace Is the Victory* and *Road to Peace*, among other books

Raghavan N. Iyer

Former Oxford University don in philosophy and politics

Richard Lichtman

Former faculty member of Yale and the University of Kansas City

Scott Buchanan

Former Dean of St. John's College and faculty member of Harvard, C.C.N.Y., Fisk, and the University of Virginia

Vukan Kuic

Political scientist on a year's leave to the Center from the University of Alabama

Rexford G. Tugwell

Former Governor of Puerto Rico, University of Chicago faculty member, and New Deal "brain-truster"

Donald McDonald

Former Dean of Marquette University School of Journalism; editor and writer for Catholic periodicals

Jon Alexander

Center staff member for a year as a Francis Drown Foundation Scholar

FERRY: I don't quite understand your proposition. If you are asking for the development of new concepts, of new ways of resolving civil or national differences of opinion and international differences of opinion, that's one thing. But it seems to me we already have a new concept of war, and that we are seeing this new concept at work. There are all kinds of wars, in which even the large powers engage under a tacit understanding that nuclear power — the final weapon—is not going to be used. Isn't this something new?

HUTCHINS: Mr. Millis is citing the official position of the United States and, by implication at least, suggests that this is a straight Clausewitzian formula.

SHEINBAUM: I question that the U.S. official position in Vietnam reflects the new concept of counter-insurgency and pacification. This is not a

military concept. There is a tremendous effort to win over the civilian population. I think it is too late; but the enormity of the effort indicates that the war is not as simple as the Clausewitz concept.

MILLIS: What they are actually doing is no longer as simple as Clausewitz, but the way in which it is stated and the way in which most Americans seem to think about it is still in the old terms. In the first place, Americans are caught up in the idea of revolution as being a popular uprising in which the people determine their own fate. We know perfectly well that this is not an adequate description of revolution. The concept of "the people" is extraordinarily difficult to apply in a situation such as Vietnam. And to found long-run policy, at least the policy as announced by the President, on a concept of popular government — an election by the people — just seems

to me to get us deeper and deeper into trouble. You say that the attempt we are now making to win the people over is too late, and perhaps it is. If we had had a clearer concept of contemporary international conflict as it is carried on under the atomic umbrella, we would have started on the people to begin with and the troops would have been the last things we would have sent in, especially the bombing airplanes.

SHEINBAUM: Isn't part of the problem the existence of the cold war, the existence of major powers in a way that we never had to cope with before? For example, we might compare the Pakistani-Indian problem, which, as you say, is not a cold war problem, to the war in Latin America that went on in the Thirties, when there was no great-power cold war.

MILLIS: The cold war—the Soviet-American rivalry — has certainly been at the bottom of a great deal of this because it has made it so difficult for a small government or a small people to work out their own destinies. The big fellows are constantly using them as pawns in the great-power struggle. But in the Indian-Pakistani situation the Soviet Union and the United States are together, and the problem turns on the relations between the Soviet Union and China. The cold war is no longer the critical issue. But it is still a matter of power relationships, whether it's called the cold war as we have known it or a struggle between major powers.

FERRY: Could I take a crack at restating my point? There is a new concept of war, and this new concept is being exhibited around the world. We use the Clausewitzian glossary but something new is happening. The question is not, therefore, as I think you have posed it. The question is: Since we are all uncertain that there will not be a reversion and that the ultimate weapon will not be used at some time, can we think of some other way than even this new style of war to resolve international differences? Now my imagination fails at this point. I don't know what the new way might be unless it is my favorite, which is the use of non-violence. You ask, what is the alternative to violence? Well, non-violence is, the kind of non-violence that's practiced in the United States as between, say, Arizona and California.

HUTCHINS: Mr. Millis assumes continued violence. The question is: What is the difference between this new use of violence and the old use?

WOETZEL: May I suggest one thing, debunking one of the favorite concepts of my own science of international law? The idea of sovereignty, I think, is the corollary here to the whole concept of self-determination because of which we supposedly use violence in one form or another. In getting to the root of the problem we have to get away from the concept of sovereignty to some extent. This involves the question of recognition of governments. With regard to the government in Saigon, I think that we are in a really difficult situation because we do not really know what the people want. But we cling to our favorite concept; that is, that the *de facto* government represents the people. We cannot therefore get at the problem you want to get at without finding the answer to the question of the relations to the *de facto* regime.

WILKINSON: One might question whether there is a new concept of war. Was the classical concept as it appeared to von Clausewitz really as simple and straightforward as you have described it? Think back to the famous warriors of history, think of Pompey, or Caesar, or Napoleon, or Pope Julius II. I find that they and their ministers were very subtle men and I'm sure they were acquainted with the concepts of guerrilla war, of wars of national liberation, and of all the other elements that you seem to believe are parts of a new concept.

MILLIS: I have pointed out that the facts are never very different, or at least not as different as our ideas about them indicate. Revolution has never been a spontaneous arising of an oppressed mass because it is oppressed. War has always had the guerrilla element in it. After all, the two real seeds of Napoleon's defeat were the guerrilla war in Spain and also in Russia.

WILKINSON: I think of a great many wars in the past — and von Clausewitz actually describes these — which didn't involve just a simple-minded march to the enemy capital, a siege, fly the flag, everything's over, maybe a massacre, and then you go home! I don't recognize any wars in history, except Tamerlane's perhaps, that fit this description.

MILLIS: The Second World War fits it pretty well.

WILKINSON: You can't overturn my thesis that all these wars were pretty much the same by citing a couple of them that weren't.

MILLIS: What I have said is that there are two basic concepts. One is that revolution is a matter of popular uprising against unbearable tyranny, that the more unbearable the conditions the more there is going to be revolution. This concept is impossible to sustain, although we go on talking about the conditions of the people in South Vietnam and so on as if it were valid. The other basic concept is that war is essentially a conflict of organized armies and is won by capturing territory. Neither concept has ever fitted the facts completely, to be sure, but until the appearance of the atomic umbrella it seems to me they fitted the facts well enough so that one could base military policies and political policies on these two assumptions. I say that this can no longer be done.

LAUCKS: The difference you are seeing in wars today is that we have only two powers, practically, that are able to fight a real war. All the wars we have seen since 1945, or even between World War I and World War II, have resulted chiefly from the relinquishment of power by the colonial powers which had made the real wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The ex-colonial nations — that is, the ones that were held as colonies — either haven't learned how to fight yet or they haven't got the wherewithal to wage war. As a result, they're not very formal about the matter, they don't have any declarations of war; and so, as far as world history is concerned, their effect is not going to be very important. The only important fact at the present time is the existence of two powers that *do* have the ability to stage a real conflict.

FREEMAN: I experience some difficulty here because I suppose I have been as responsible as anybody around this table for saying that war is outmoded and that non-violence is the new day and so forth. The fact remains that there is a great deal of old war still left. True enough, we no longer have the sovereign-state concept—fighting the sovereign state, taking the capital, changing the government. Nevertheless, many of the things we used to do under the war system — the threat of war, lesser action, crossing boundaries, and so on — are still done. They are still used as ways to alleviate population pressures, to allow political systems to challenge each other, to provide defenses for our religions or our ideologies, to

help establish frontiers behind which the empire remains. I do not see us essentially changing the nature of war except to realize that war cannot win in the old sense of a conquering army taking over a government and a territory. We now at least recognize that if nuclear war is waged this cannot come about. But that's about all the change there has been.

HUTCHINS: That's a hell of a lot, isn't it?

FREEMAN: I see this particular guerrilla warfare, democratized warfare, or whatever you want to call it as the same struggle that man has always had in warfare. I don't see, unless the notion of non-violence comes in in one form or another as a way of achieving change, that we are going to get away from essentially the same pattern of war. Part of our difficulty is that we constantly look at war from the view of only one of the participants. It might be easy to describe the First World War or the Second World War in Clausewitz's terms, but if one looks at them from the vantage point of some of the people who were involved, they were wars of liberation or wars of other varieties, not unlike what is going on in Pakistan-India or in Vietnam. In other words, we color these wars by our own description of them.

MILLIS: Well, I want to get a better description. I want to color them in a more hopeful direction.

WOETZEL: There may be a new element in a couple of speeches President Johnson made recently, when he said that the distinction between civil war and international war is disappearing. This may not be new in history — in the nineteenth century we had this kind of thing — but I see something new in the rhetoric of the President.

IYER: The question of whether there is a change in the concept of war depends upon whether our first concept of war has been a satisfactory one. An alternative exists to the Clausewitzian theory in the theory of Sun-tsu, who has greatly influenced Mao Tse-tung. For Sun-tsu war is always a function of politics. It is connected with a whole array of non-military aims. If we ever had a purely formal theory of war it was that of conquest, and I think it would be true, as Mr. Wilkinson said, that this has only applied to a very few instances like that of Tamerlane or some great violent sweep at certain historic moments. By and large, war has been bound up with politics, as Sun-tsu saw. If we recognize this, then I think we could say

that there *is* a fundamental change in war, but it is because there has been a fundamental change in politics.

Until recently it was possible to assume that the world political system was essentially stable and, therefore, changes within specific areas (and these were essentially in Europe for a long time) could take place without the rest of the world political system being affected. This can no longer be assumed. That is why I think the Second World War is the last of a series of wars that represented the increasing impossibility of regarding the world political system as stable. On the other hand, the Korean War is the first of a new type of war that represents a fundamental change of kind in world politics.

Now, what does this mean in regard to war? I think three things: First of all, the fact that the stakes are higher. This of course is the most important fact for human beings today. But it is logically independent of the tremendous change in world politics. If nuclear weapons had not been discovered, but this fundamental change in world politics had taken place, there would still be a very different attitude to war. So, I think the other two factors are more important. One is the *impetus* to war and the other is the *impact* of war. The impetus to war in the past came essentially from small ruling classes. Now what we see — and I think the recent war between India and Pakistan is a very good instance — is that the impetus to war comes from mass popular emotion. We have a romantic theory about most people not really liking war. I think this is not true. Once certain leaders have generated certain myths and created certain expectations, they become the victims of these myths and it is impossible for them to stay in power without catering to the popular emotions that they have themselves given rise to. This is the common predicament of both Ayub in Pakistan and of Shastri in India. In the United States the fact that President Johnson is very strongly insistent that most Americans believe the war in Vietnam ought to go on is again an illustration of the same point. The popular emotion is belligerent; it is belligerent in different ways, centering around certain myths to which politicians give rise in order to get to power, and then they become the victims of the myths and discover that it is almost impossible to control them.

The emergence of explosive public opinion as a new factor in world politics brings me to the third point; namely, that the impact of wars, wherever they be, now must be world-wide because of the fear of escalation. As long as this fear is present, *all* countries, aside from the two combatants, have a vested interest in the *status quo*. They also have a vested interest in peace. The combatants also have a vested interest in peace if only they would realize it but they do not have a vested interest in the *status quo*. This leads to the question: Are there any ways of resolving disputes about changes needed in the *status quo* without involving war? There is no method that has yet been found. I think myself that there is only one method that probably in the end will work, and that is the neutralization of territories that are potentially explosive. This is a new idea that has come up in regard to Kashmir. I believe it will come up elsewhere. This means that even before we have a world authority there must be certain areas in the world the security of which is guaranteed by world bodies. Whether they actually become world territory as some world federalists have argued is open to discussion, but, at any rate, wherever there are areas over which disputes arise that cannot be solved — cannot be solved by war for reasons of dimension; cannot be solved by any other means because rational solutions will not be acceptable to the countries involved — these areas have to be policed by some kind of world authority.

It seems to me that this is what recent events have been pointing to. I think world politics has changed, and therefore war has changed. There can be no solution to the problem of war independent of a new way of preventing political disputes from creating the kind of immediate and dramatic escalation of emotion that then has to bring the cold war and the big powers into the picture.

WILKINSON: I find this statement thoroughly admirable, but in connection with the second point about popular emotion being a new element and in connection with my earlier remarks that there is nothing new, I might ask: Is even popular emotion a new factor? Mr. Iyer spoke specifically about India and Pakistan. What about the Jihad or the holy war against the non-believer, which emotionally aroused 100 per cent of the population in a manner that I

couldn't dream possible in the West? And it never died out. Nasser uses the notion of the Jihad against Israel, and so on.

MILLIS: You would have to admit that mass emotion has become more important if only because there are so many ways of arousing it now that did not formerly exist and there are so many more vocal people in any given country. There is always a certain inert mass that really doesn't have very much to say about anything, but that mass is much less than it used to be. But Mr. Wilkinson is quite right that all of the factors can be found somewhere and in some form in the past.

LICHTMAN: The idea of neutralization will work fairly well if there are two powers in conflict, but isn't it difficult to apply this to wars of national liberation? It would involve internalizing the *status quo*.

IYER: One could say that where neutralization of territory merely involves a dispute between two powers the mere pressure of world opinion could secure it, but where neutralization involves a view about the kind of ideological system that is to prevail, this is when a great effort of imagination is needed on the part of the two leading nuclear powers to allow the people in a neutralized world territory to have the kind of ideological system they want to have, on the assumption that whatever they start with, whether it be more Western or more Communist, it is in fact going to change, and probably very rapidly. But I think this requires a tremendous break with the old ideological thinking that has bedeviled world politics.

MILLIS: The idea of neutralization has been very prominent. It was prominent after the First World War and even more prominent after the Second World War, and it has never been very practical. It was originally Franklin Roosevelt's solution for the whole Vietnamese row. But nobody would accept the neutralization of the whole of Vietnam. The Vietnamese wouldn't have it, the Communists wouldn't have it, nobody would have it.

BUCHANAN: I'd like to suggest something that summarizes for me what has been said. It sounds over-simple and old-fashioned, but I think it applies. What you have been describing seems to me to be the evolution of civil wars; that is, wars that take place under an *imperium*. There is a kind of war — a long historic series of wars — that's happened this way. In

effect they very often do what Ayub has done; that is, to say to the *imperium*, "Stop us. We get into these fights and then we're helpless. Please come and stop us." This was made more explicit and simple-minded in Ayub than it usually is, but it's always implied. And this has implications about revolution. A revolution has to be understood as arising not merely from a set of economic causes but also from a strictly political set of causes where injustice is involved. Injustice is the main energy that makes a revolution go. You can have people starving, but unless they feel it is unjust they are not going to revolt.

If this is happening under an *imperium* of some kind, then there are the anomalies you are describing. The notion of civil war is a possible answer to your request for a hypothesis, for a terminology. Even if we had world government, there might still be civil wars even worse than they have been before, because of the high *imperium* that there would be and its distance from the conflict.

MILLIS: I'm a little uncomfortable with the idea of the *imperium* keeping the order.

LICHTMAN: I don't think it's necessarily a bad idea, because the two main figures in today's *imperium* — the two main atomic powers — ordinarily disagree sufficiently about what constitutes appropriate order in a country that they are not likely to be able to enforce any common decision.

BUCHANAN: In the situation at present there is another phenomenon. There are the little powers seeking an *imperium*. This seems to me half the story. If it isn't the whole story.

MILLIS: But they want their own *imperium*, don't they?

BUCHANAN: Walter Lippmann says this about Asia and Africa. He says that the great fact in the world is the breakdown of *imperiums*, with the small nations acting like children hunting for their parents.

MILLIS: It's been suggested that the Chaco War in South America ended because the two contenders sought the *imperium* of the United States and this *imperium* imposed peace upon them. This is possibly true in the case of the Chaco War, but this was thirty or forty years ago. There hasn't been another war in Latin America since that time, but certainly the political force, the military force, or even the economic force of the United States has not been the

real reason why there have been no more wars. The Communist revolution or the palace coup is quite different. It doesn't seem to me that the absence of war since the 1930's in Latin America is the result of an *imperium* imposed by the United States.

LICHTMAN: Even the solution of India and Pakistan turning to the United States for an important decision is really external at this point because it means only that they have already agreed upon the solution themselves and just want somebody to do what Mr. Iyer described best; that is, to give the leaders a way of establishing their own validity against popular forces that they themselves might have helped to foment. But it would be entirely different if India and Pakistan couldn't reach the agreement to turn to an outside force. Then why would the Soviet Union have to stand by while the United States, for example, imposed the terms of the solution? It's not difficult when the two who are involved agree beforehand and simply turn to a third party to enforce what they already both accept, but why could Russia not justifiably claim that it wasn't going to accept any unilateral imposition by the United States of the appropriate borders? This would be the difficult case. Then the question would be: What is a valid third party? It's not clear why it should be any one country rather than any other.

KUIC: I think Mr. Millis spoke rather literally in asking for a new concept of war and revolution that will help us understand what is going on. And the objection is made that there may not necessarily be any new concept and that, if new, it doesn't necessarily have to be post-atomic or post-Korean. The first step may be to distinguish between two things that I believe ought to be kept separate. What we seem to be after is an explanation of war, and introducing the Clausewitz example only confuses the issue. The two things are war understood as a continuation of policy by other means, as Clausewitz described it, and war understood as arising not merely by the will of this or that government but for some deeper causes. Outbursts of violence are part of human nature or of the nature of society. The two concepts are certainly related but they are different views of looking at war. One is continuation of political policy by other means, military means, violence, etc., but the other involves war viewed as a social

and historical phenomenon. I contend that a war, probably any war throughout human history, must have all sorts of causes, and that the Marxians are wrong, the Freudians are wrong, and the Prussian militarists are wrong in their definitions of what war is. Let us admit that war is a mystery, no matter how much a part of human experience throughout history it has been. It cannot be explained, it cannot be reduced even to several factors. It is, let us say, a problem for mankind.

If this is so, the solution may be to fall back on the Clausewitzian-concept of war as the continuation of policy by other means, to restrict, to restrain, the international use of armed violence to rationally definable purposes of national interest. It is a paradox, but we are indeed fighting in order to secure peace. As President Johnson said, we have no territorial claims in Vietnam or anywhere else for that matter; we don't want to extract gold or oil or anything; we are willing to give them a billion dollars. But we are there and we are fighting for some reason — maybe for some religion, for some secular faith. I think a good step forward would be, in the present context, to start with restraining the use of military violence to some very concrete purpose that can be rationally defined — not to “defend freedom” and such but to defend an oil refinery or even the lives of fellow-citizens if they are threatened.

MILLIS: When you start on that tack, though, you run into further difficulties because the President, if not in so many words very clearly by implication, has one very clear, definite purpose for our fighting in Vietnam, and that is to prevent South Vietnam from passing under a Communist-dominated government. Now that is a definite, specific purpose, but is it rational?

FREEMAN: Did we ever get interested in defining the term “war” until we tried to do it for the purpose of having laws of war? We laid down the law of blockade, and a whole series of technical laws surrounding the question of what war is. Are we trying to do that now? Is this the purpose of your question?

MILLIS: Well, not what war *is* so much as *how* is war, what are its processes, what are we trying to deal with?

TUGWELL: I thought that one thing we get from reading you is that war is not any one thing. It is a

whole constellation of different things and is not to be brought under one concept. There are wars going on in the world today in entirely different forms and fashions, not describable in any one way.

MILLIS: My definition of war always requires armed violence. Without armed violence I don't think it's fair to talk about war.

TUGWELL: And armed violence isn't always war.

MILLIS: Not always; it can be some other things. And since I don't think that violence, armed violence, will ever be totally eliminated from the social system, my definition goes a little farther. I consider war as *organized* violence involving armed forces with a command, with weapons, and all the rest of it.

McDONALD: If you define war as organized military violence, how do you accommodate the other types of aggression, such as subversion, stealth, pulling down governments that you don't like, without resorting to military violence?

MILLIS: The only answer I would make is that that is not war; it is perhaps the kind of substitute for war that we will ultimately come to.

ALEXANDER: The frame we're looking for is a conceptual device to help us understand the new kind of war. I think what's new is that the new wars, as far as they concern the great powers, are substitutes for the big wars they would probably carry out, in view of their strong ideological commitments, if it were not for the atomic bomb. And so the concept that I would propose to help understand brushfire wars as applied to the big powers is the idea of jousting.

This is symbolic warfare, and what these wars try to win is symbolic victories. They are not after territory, they are conducted by champions, they are supported by large powers, and what they are trying to win is really the roar of the crowd. The objective of war is the minds of the people, the thumb that goes up instead of down. There seems to be a great symbolic content to war now. This may well not be new, but it fits Mr. Iyer's point that populations are more involved today in a symbolic and emotional sense. This would seem to support the image of jousting among champions in a symbolic ceremony.

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