

SPECIAL
ELECTION ISSUE



URUGUAY

PROGRAM of the BROAD FRONT

R: P.1.

Uruguay: GOIN' DOWN the ROAD.

BRAZILIAN INVASION ??


48 | LOAN-SHARKS and Neo-Colonialism.

CAGLA, CHICAGO, NOVEMBER 1971.

NOV 28

ELECTIONS

Less than a month before the Uruguayan elections and for the first time in the history of the country, three political parties will go to the polls with remarkably even chances of winning.



In addition to the traditional actors on Uruguay's political scene (the Colorado and the National or Blanco Parties), the Broad Front, a coalition of all sectors opposed to the present government, is also running.

In spite of the caution noted in observers, they all agree that in order to win the presidency, a party must obtain at least half of the votes cast in Montevideo and at least 20% of the votes in the interior. The total number of voters in the country is around one million eight hundred thousand persons, half of whom live in Montevideo and its suburbs. Victory is expected to go to the party that

obtains at least five hundred thousand votes in all the country.

The surprise appearance of the Broad Front, which gathered one hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand persons at the meeting proclaiming its candidates on March 26, took the right-wing completely off guard.

At a time when nobody was speaking of elections and when there were rumors of a possible military coup and the postponement of elections, the presence of the Broad Front created, to a certain degree, an electoral climate.

For several months, while the right-wing groups engaged in a complicated process of negotiations and alliances, the Broad Front candidates began to tour the cities and towns in the interior. They found much distrust ("I don't want anything to do with Communists," explained one rural villager, "because I was told that if the Broad Front wins they'll take away my three chickens.") but they also found the warm support of thousands of sympathizers who offered them their homes and their militance.

The Broad front candidates spoke with peasants, with the small and medium rural producers (the most hard-hit sector in the country, according to presidential candidate Liber Seregni), with workers, students and professionals. The Front began to receive the support of the most prestigious and well-known sectors in each place they visited. Crowds never seen before in these scantily populated towns of rural Uruguay began to mill fearlessly around the Broad Front speaker's platforms.

To appreciate the importance of these events, it must be explained that the interior has no awareness of the meaning of the three years of state of siege (Emergency Security Measures) for Montevideo. Though the militance of the left and the trade unionists has led to incidents of great brutality, the repression on the whole has been less in the interior.

Many in the interior still do not understand the meaning of the struggle. Thus during the big banking strike in 1969, when 6,000 private banking employees virtually went underground to avoid the results of an illegal militarization of the sector, some merchants in the smaller towns refused to sell food to the families of the strikers.

In the interior great importance is still attached to the figure of the local "caudillo" (a party boss who does small favors for the people in his district and later demands compensation for them at the polls). Many times the voter knows that he is voting for the "caudillo" of the zone without knowing anything about the national candidate who the "caudillo" supports.

Several candidates ranging from right to ultraright were announced to compete with the Broad Front candidates. A radio and television publicity campaign was begun to combat the front, but it was impossible to compete

with the Front's massive and constant street rallies.

After August, the Front had a more or less accurate picture of the popular will which allowed it to adapt its activities to win over the still hesitant sectors.

According to the public opinion pollsters, the Broad Front will win the Montevideo municipal government; and this is the second most important post in the government since over half the country's population lives in the capital. Secondly, the Front will obtain about one third of the votes nationally in a very even contest.

In Montevideo, the Broad Front is expected to win a majority of 24%-25% with the Colorados in second place and the Blancos a distant third.

In Canelones, the second largest department in the country in terms of population and a key department for the elections, the Front has obtained favorable percentages fluctuating between 25% and 46%. There the population is irregularly distributed among small rural farmers, the lower middle class that permanently resides in the southern beach resorts of the department, and an urban proletariat which works in Montevideo, but lives in the city of Las Piedras, the second largest city in the country.

In other departments, the figures for the Broad Front vary from 15% to 25%. The lowest percentages were obtained in the department of Rocha, the home of the big cattle ranchers, where the front obtained 6%, while the Colorado Party polled 43% and the National Party 11%.

Results of polls taken in September, which undoubtedly show the effect of the Tupamaros mass prison escape, are not available at this time. However it is known that a poll taken by a local radio station (which in 1966 had predicted the election of General Gestido) indicated very favorable percentages for the Front in Montevideo (around 36%) and in the interior (around 20%) before it was stopped by the government.

The right is hurrying its pace. The Senator of the Blanco Party, Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, who had attempted to paint a centralist image by speaking of agrarian reform and nationali-

NOTES

ON THE PROGRAM OF THE BROAD FRONT:
(Numbers refer to articles of the program.)

1/ In October 1967 the Gestido government passed a series of Emergency Security Measures, a kind of fixed-date coup-d'etat tactic that the Uruguayan oligarchy uses against unions. The odd thing was that the government had even obtained the acceptance of a wage budget with ridiculous increases (less than half of the cost of living increases of that year) without the traditional union struggles and pressures--thanks to the mistaken and conservative attitude of the majority of the union leadership.

In December 1967, less than a week after assuming power after Gestido's death, Pacheco Areco closed down the newspaper EPOCA and the Socialist weekly EL SOL, and dissolved (they were considered associations to commit crime) the Socialist Party (PS), the Movimiento Revolucionario Oriental, The People's Action Movement (MAP), the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAU), and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). (from Jose Diaz, Tricontinental, Nov.-Dec. 1968).

Other publications that have been suspended by the government at one time or another in-

clude: EXTRA, DE FRENTE, YA (for "disturbing the social and economic stability of the country"), the Socialist Party weekly EL ORIENTAL (closed for two weeks for violating censorship by publishing an account of a murder by a right-wing group), and PARA TODOS magazine (closed for three months for spreading "the guerrilla struggle on a continental scale").

THE CENSORSHIP DECREES--These closings take place under the authority of Decree 269:

"... which prohibits all oral and written propaganda about work stoppages or strikes or other measures which directly or indirectly may disturb the public." Further, "all oral, written and televised media are advised that all news of union resolutions of strikes, work stoppages, factory occupations or other measures transgress the aboveset norms ..." And finally that "only the communications and written materials officially released by the Chief of Police may be published." (Marcha, August 27, 1971).

As the elections approach, the measures multiply. In June 1971, the offices of the Cuban news service Prensa Latina were closed down; on August 17th, postal censorship was instituted along with measures to limit the hours of union and political demonstrations; and in October, the Broad Front's daily newspaper, LA IDEA, was closed down.



BASES cont.

cially the peoples of Latin America.

Reaffirmation of the right of asylum in conformity with the criteria and practice traditionally observed by the Republic.

Revision and eventual rejection of all international treaties, covenants and resolutions that contradict the principles previously stated.

Restructuring of the foreign service so that it effectively serves the true interests of the country.

3 • Conduct of the Republic's international economic policy in accordance with national and popular interests.

Rejection of the policy of the International Monetary Fund and other international organizations that act from a similar orientation.

Denunciation of the false policy of integration of the Latin-American Free Trade Association which aggravates the process of Latin-American dependency. Revision and transformation so that it responds to the people's interests.

Negotiation of the reconversion of the foreign debt, postponing payments and eliminating its one-sided conditions to insure, for the period necessary, that the entire capacity of the national treasury be devoted to the economic and social ends of this program.

In case reconversion is not obtained, adoption of the unilateral measures necessary to achieve the aims stated.

Demand for the reinvestment of profits from enterprises located in national territory.

Control and restriction over sending royalties, interest and debt amortizations abroad. Adoption of measures that prevent the flight of capital.

Economic and commercial relations with all countries of the world.

Reform of the Economic and Social Structure

4 • Independent national planning of the economy, with social objectives that aim at contributing to the structural transformations necessary and to the integral development of the country. In the private sector, this will be strongly indicated.

Creation of an organization to direct planning in which trade unions, the producers, the technicians, and representatives of political power participate. University collaboration in determining the strategy of planning and development.

Nationalization policy can take the form of state industries and others, including the participation of private producers and workers, depending on which provides the greatest advantages in terms of efficiency and economic dynamism.

Defense, consolidation and development of state industrial and commercial independence: participation of the workers in the administration and control of autonomous industry, decentralized services and associations of mixed economy.

5 • Agrarian reform which promises an integral transformation of the country's agricultural structure in accord with general planning. Agrarian reform will eradicate the latifundia and the minifundia, replacing them with a just system of land tenancy and exploitation which contributes to social and economic development, raises production and productivity, increases the profits of producers and workers, and guarantees social justice so that the land becomes, for the man who works it, the base of his economic stability and well being and the guarantee of his dignity and liberty. Agrarian reform will guarantee protection to the small and middle landowner.

With priority:

a) Assistance and solutions that provide stability for the small and middle producers, tenants and middle men, assuring markets, setting prices, offering credit, education and technical aid. Elimination of the distortionist intermediary.

NOTES cont'd.

Further, Minister of the Interior De Brum is trying to enact legislation which will require all Uruguayans to register with the government and carry special identity cards at all times. This may be very similar to the Polaroid identification system now used to preserve Apartheid in the Union of South Africa. According to Marcha, Feb. 19, 1971, the 23 page law is "copied almost word-for-word from an identical law which, introduced in Germany in 1930, served as a base for the consolidation of the nazi repressive apparatus ... it is similar to one used by the North American troops in Vietnam."

3/ In 1966, 17.1 % of Uruguay's exports were absorbed by debt service and the profits of foreign investment. If payments had not been rescheduled, the figure would have jumped to 63 % in 1967. For this year, an estimated \$112 million will be due, about half of expected export revenues. (see also p. of this booklet for IMF).

The Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) was created in 1960 by the Treaty of Montevideo. Aided and promoted by the United States government, it is part of an overall strategy to rationalize capitalism in Latin America and increase U.S. domination through partnerships with the sub-imperialist powers of Argentina and Brazil.

Its 11 member nations agree to annually negotiate reduced tariffs on selected imports until each nation's tariff level has been cut 8 %. In addition, a second list is drawn up every three years, onto which each LAFTA member must put a group of products representing 25 % of the intrazonal trade for the previous three years. Items on the list will be free-traded throughout the region starting in 1973.


LAFTA has increased intraregional trade in raw materials and processed products for industry by 60 %, in fuels and lubricants by 22 %, and in consumer goods by 11 % since its inception. (For a case study of the Central American Market, which is very similar, see NACLA, vol. 3, no. 9 (January, 1970).

Of course, "free" trade between a country the size of Uruguay and one the size of Brazil is nothing of the kind. The big meat packing houses in Brazil across border from Uruguay would like nothing better than a reduction in tariffs. Already, Uruguayan beef is sold to Swift and Armour processing plants in that neighbor country for about \$700/ton. The processed product is resold for \$1600/ton, with most of the value added (and profit) accruing to the capital center of the sub-imperialist metropolis. (Marcha, August 20, 1971, p.23).

5/ The Frente Amplio is clear that the problem is a structural one: a report on structural problems begins by directly referring to the lands that will be affected by the agrarian reform--"The five and a half million hectares owned by 1,200 exploiters will be the first to undergo structural transformation." (Marcha, August 27, 1971, p.15).

6/ Meat processing and textiles are Uruguay's two basic industries; meat exports alone account for over a third of total exports. Both major industries need government subsidies to survive. Though 1970 was a record year for meat production with 170,000 tons of meat exported at a profit estimated by the government's own experts at \$11,730,000 (\$69 per ton), the government had to grant financial assistance of

3,200 million pesos in Jan, '71
2,000 million pesos in May
4,000 million pesos in July



BASES cont'd.

- b) Salaries and living and working conditions that contribute to improving social progress in the countryside.
- c) Promotion of the formation of livestock and farming cooperatives, with facilities for the construction of installations, the acquisition of machinery, seeds, fertilizer and other needs, and for the commercialization of their products.
- d) Fulfillment of the law that prohibits the existence of incorporated associations for ownership and exploitation of land.

6 ● A vigorous policy of industrialization. Maintenance and increase in the sources of existing work, undertaking--if necessary or convenient for this purpose--their nationalization. Decisive participation of the state in basic industries that are not nationalized.

Industrialization to the greatest extent possible throughout the country of raw materials and agricultural and dairy products and of national state farms. Especially, the processing of meat, wool, milk, leather and other livestock derivatives, establishing a clear public control over this process and eliminating all form of trusts or foreign penetration. Nationalization of the meat processing industry.

Investigation and intensive exploitation of energy resources and of mineral and marine riches.

Economic planning will provide a harmonious nationwide distribution of industrial activities, with development based in the interior of the Republic.

Development and coordination of passenger and cargo transportation according to national and local needs, considering them a public service. Recuperation of AFE and the creation of a national merchant marine.

7 ● Nationalization of banks, big monopolies and essential branches of foreign trade, in order to extricate them from usury and speculation, eliminate power groups, both national and foreign, and place internal taxes, credit and foreign exchange at the service of national development.


Eradication of the credit intervention practiced by the so-called parallel and collateral financial association, and any other method of the parabanking marketing of capital.

8 ● Promotion of cooperativism as an instrument designed to contribute to economic and social development both in livestock and industrial activity and in consumer goods and services. Establishment of a just fiscal and credit system and of mechanisms for integration and control that insure defense of the popular and progressive character of the system and avoid possibilities for detouring it.

9 ● Promotion of a rationally planned demographic policy (births, external and internal migration) which, on the basis of improved living and working conditions resulting from the measures proposed, provides the country with the human contingency indispensable to its development, driving out organized attempts at birth control.

10 ● Radical reform of the tax system so that it basically affects the accumulation of wealth, unproductive capital or capital with a low yield, antieconomic activities, social vices and high profits, and progressively reduces consumer taxes.

Simplification, unity and coherence of the tax system. An ordered fiscal policy not only as a basis for state resources but also as an instrument of economic activity and for a more just redistribution of profits.



NOTES cont'd.

The packers say that they needed the government assistance in addition to their profits because they have been obligated to make heavy investments in new capital equipment (imported from Europe and the U.S. and financed by foreign-controlled banks) to keep up with demand ... This technical arrangement necessitated by market demands explains many stories. The Artigas Meatpacking House constructed the installations necessary to process a type of cooked, frozen meat destined for markets in the United States. But this production did not begin due to unforeseen technical difficulties . . .

They said that these meats must be processed immediately after (and thus in the same place where) they are slaughtered. But the fact is that the Tacuarambo Packing House is exporting meat to the Armour and Swift plants in Brazil, where the meat is then processed and sent on to the U.S. (Marcha, April 30, July 2, 1971).

7/ The state of the banking system as of Dec. 31, 1970 was that 30 private banks were functioning in Uruguay: 16 national banks based in Montevideo (75.7 % of total deposits), 8 branches or agencies of foreign banks (17.4 % deposits), and 6 national banks based in the interior (6.9 % deposits).

Further, four of the Montevideo banks control 38.2 % deposits. Due to a 1965 law that prohibited the formation of new banks but allowed mergers of existing ones, concentration of financial power is continuing to increase.

The banking system is tottering as a result of being milked for profits by the oligarchy and foreign interests: four large private banks (27.3 % of all deposits) are now in government receivership. As usual, the government is nationalizing all the debts and none of the profits. (Marcha, June 11, 1971).

Take for example the case of the Mercantile Bank, the most recent bank to fall. According to Senator Ferreira Aldunate, exports financed by this bank have more than doubled since 1969 and it now finances 18 % of the country's total exports. It so happens that under the Pacheco government the Bank's president, Doctor Peirano Facio, was Minister of Commerce and Industry and later Minister of Foreign Relations, a post that controls the

Office of Foreign Commerce, which controls a great part of the country's export trade. It is no coincidence that most of Pacheco's cabinet members are bankers (see below) (From Marcha, April 23, 1971.)

PACHECO'S CABINET is the Uruguayan equivalent of the Board of Directors of Chase Manhattan. Here is a list of some of the ministers and other high appointees under his government, together with their business connections:

FOREIGN MINISTER:

Venancio Flores	Ferres' Group
Peirano Facio	Mercantile Bank
Sub-sec. Joaquin Secco Garcia	Collection Bank

MINISTER OF FINANCE:

Carlos Vegh Garzon	International Bank
Cesar Charlone	Bank of La Plata
	International Bank
	Banks Society
Sub-sec. Jorge Echeverria Leunda	Collection Bank (later director of Central Bank)

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND FARMING:

Carlos Frick Davies	Credit Bank
Jose Maria Bordaberry	Large land-owner

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS:

Walter Pintos Risso	owner of building firms
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MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE:

Horacio Abadie Santos	Banks Society
	Aldave & Martinez BK
Jorge Peirano Facio	Mercantile Bank

MINISTER OF LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY:

Enrique Vescodi	Mercantile Bank
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group leader, Jorge Sapelli

MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TOURISM:

Jose Serrato Aguirre	Ferrosalt Corp.
	Urug. Glassware SA

PLANNING OFFICE

head, Alejandro Vegh Villegas	Workers' Bank
asst. Juan Rodriguez Lopez	Bankers' Society
asst. Ramon Diaz	Mercantile Bank

Frente Amplio's plan is for the nationalization of all private banks to be accompanied by a reorganization of the entire state banking system and the creation of three new state banks: a Bank of Industrial Development ("Fomento", somewhat like CORFO and COFIDE in Peru and Chile), a Bank of Agricultural Development and a Bank of Foreign Commerce. (Marcha, July 2, 1971.)

BASES cont'd.

The wealth acquired as a result of one's own work as well as its inheritance will be handled in a special way.

Social and Educational Policy

11 ● Establishment of a new and just policy of public and private salaries, on the basis of the principle of equal work, equal remuneration and in accordance with the cost of living. This policy, as well as prices, interests and profits, will be planned with the basic participation of the sectors involved, and should lead to a just redistribution of profits in accordance with people's necessities and the requirements of investment.

With priority:

- a) Dissolution of the law of COPRIN.
- b) The effective establishment of a minimum national wage.

12 ● Creation of a rational system of norms orientated toward insuring the individual well-being and tranquility indispensable to the full development of his personality, covering his life cycle from birth to death. Extension of the system of social security to salaried workers in the interior, and to the peasantry.

With priority, we will struggle for:

- a) Fulfillment of the constitutional disposition which imposes the integration of the directorship of the Social Welfare Bank by representatives of active and passive affiliates and of the contributing enterprises. Immediate payment of the obligations that the Bank maintains with its contributors and of the debts that the state and enterprises have with it. Adoption of measures to avoid the evasion of taxes, to better equalize responsibilities and attention to services, without privileges for indebtedness or postponements. Guarantee of pensions based on salaries of active workers.
- b) Establishment of national health security which guarantees adequate attention for all the people, especially poor groups in the city and the country.

- c) Creation of nurseries and day-care centers in neighborhoods and private and public enterprises in cases where the number of women working makes it advisable.

13 ● Democratic reform of education to raise its humanistic, scientific and technical level responding to the necessities imposed by economic, social and political transformations based on this program, with special attention to rural promotion. Adoption of mechanisms which, on the basis of these transformations, facilitate public access to education.

Safeguarding and extending the autonomy of educational institutions and coordination of the educational process. Direct and majority representation of teachers in the directive councils of primary, and secondary education, workers' university education and physical education. Immediate payment of state debts and adequate attention to the educational budget.

Effective support of University efforts to assume a leadership role in scientific investigation, cultural diffusion, teaching and assistance to the entire population.

Defense, consolidation and development of national sovereign culture. Material and moral stimulus for the development of the sciences and arts. Participation of the masses in creating and enjoying culture.

Stimulus and development of physical education and collective participation in all sports.

Institutional Policy

14 ● Integral functioning of democracy with multiple political parties. Passage of an electoral law and a method by which political parties can function, guaranteeing the respect and free will of the elector. Active participation and effective control of the citizenry, expanding the use of institutions of popular initiative: the plebiscite and referendum.

15 ● Broadening and developing administrative, political and financial autonomy of municipalities and local organizations on the following general basis:

NOTES on bases of Broad Front CONT'D.

11/ COPRIN is the government production, wage and price control board.

12/ A nationwide health survey in 1962 found high levels of available, nutritious food and a high per capita consumption of protein, but also that there was a lack of industrialization in the food industry, aggravated by inadequate communications and poor transportation. The results were insufficient consumption of vitamins A and C, thiamine, niacine, riboflavin; diets that were bloated with starches and carbohydrates; chronic malnutrition of infants in lower income groups.

More recent figures show an increase in infant mortality from 40.9 per 1000 in 1949 to 50 per 1000 in 1967. The availability of meat is also declining; in 1950, 122 kilos of meat per person were available but by 1968 this figure had dropped to 97. In a similar period, production of fruits and vegetables dropped 8 0/0. The crisis hits hardest at retired persons, who in 1967 spent 97.6 0/0 of their income just for food! (Marcha March 12, 1971.)

13/ An example which indicates the extent of imperialist penetration of the Uruguayan educational system appears in Marcha, August 13, 1971. The Business School of the Universidad de Trabajo has hired an Argentine technician to teach a course on selling lighting systems for General Electric salesmen. This course teaches students, among other things, "how to create a good atmosphere for selling" and "how to adopt a relaxed but positive sales attitude," according to the course description.

18/ Since February 1970, there have been a series of government interventions and closings of high schools. A typical incident occurred at the Instituto Bauza and is summarized by a statement from the National Federation of Professors and the Montevideo Teachers' Guild which states that on March 28 bands of right-wing elements "attacked students with gunfire without police interference; when teachers denounced the occupation of the school by a fascist group of students to the police, they (the teachers) were arrested."

There have been numerous incidents in schools all over Uruguay of attacks by a fascist student organization known as JUP, Juventud Uruguaya de Pie (Arise Uruguayan Youth). Here are some sections from the JUP "instruction manual":

"The police usually collaborate with us, but not always; thus it is necessary to use prudence before engaging in certain actions. Sometimes the police have protected us and even encouraged us--although there have been cases in which they didn't understand our mission and were indifferent or even hostile, perhaps because the lower-ranking officers were not properly informed by their superiors. We can only take the risk if we are sure that they will aid us because our enemies ("Communists and crypto-communists"--trans.) outnumber us and are better organized."

After proposing the creation of a paramilitary corps, the JUP manual speaks of the recruiting of high school students. "We should use the younger ones (12 to 14 years) in the high schools who are not yet perverted by Marxist and new wave Christian literature, and who are more courageous and decisive. They will fight in the front lines and if they are injured, so much the better for the cause of the Fatherland, because they will make the communists and cryptocommunists look like street gangs and hoodlums who beat up children." (Marcha, Aug 20)



GORILLAS in

- a) Precise delimitation of municipal control to strengthen and extend its economic, social and cultural commitments.
- b) Institutionalization and development of neighborhood and work committees, both urban and rural, as organs of communal activity.
- c) Activating institutions of direct democracy and representation of workers, producers and consumers in various municipal services.
- d) Designation by popular suffrage of the members of Local Councils. Elections by departmental and local organs should be held on dates different from those for national elections.
- e) Coordination and harmonizing of subsidiary bodies.

16 ● Creation of the legal mechanisms that will prevent all forms of relationship between the discharge of public duties and private interests, such as the use of public office for personal gain.

17 ● Administrative reform. Effective application of just norms of pay, promotion, hierarchy and qualification of public servants. Modernization of state services.

18 ● Reintegration of the police with civilian and predominantly preventive responsibilities.

19 ● Accentuation of the definitely national character of the armed forces, strengthening the continuity of the tradition of Artigas, centering its basic action in special commitments to the defense of sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and honor or the Republic. Integration of the action of the armed forces in the process of national liberation and the economic, social and cultural developments of the country, elevating this institution to the highest level of professional and ethical perfection based on the national concept of the fulfillment of the preceding commitments.

(Approved by the Plenary of the Broad Front on February 17, 1971)

THREAT OF BRAZILIAN INVASION

"The cabinet of the SNI (National Information Service) has a new head. Colonel Jaime Mariath yesterday took over the post in place of Colonel Moacir Pereira, who was named military attache to the Brazilian embassy in Montivideo."

This small notice of an apparently routine bureaucratic transfer passed unnoticed in the June 8th (1971) edition of Jornal do Brasil. Nevertheless, upon closer examination the event assumes an important significance. In the political structure of the Brazilian regime the SNI has the strategic importance of a Super-Ministry, functioning as an independent power within the state. (Note that Garrastazu Medici was head of the SNI before becoming President.)

Because of this growing autonomy, the head of SNI is a key position, only occupied by those having the absolute confidence of the group in military power. The least one could say is that the transfer of a person who occupies such an important position in the political-military structure of Brazil to such a lowly post as military attache in a South American country cannot be considered routine.

What interest could the Brazilian espionage agency have which would justify the presence of a man of such confidence in the Uruguayan embassy? This question can assume disquieting implications when examined in light of the growing aggressiveness of Brazilian diplomacy and the stories carried by the international press that the Brazilian military is preparing an invasion of Uruguay.

The Uruguayan question emerged when an editorial appeared in the January 21st (1971) edition of Estado de Sao Paulo, which openly predicted the "preventative" invasion of that country, maintaining:

"What is happening in Uruguay is far from being an internal matter of this tiny country. We should not doze off, because even if relations between the governments of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil couldn't be better, the truth is that the events in Uruguay are threatening to us. They could suddenly place us in a situation exactly like that which in 1851 for-

URUGUAY: ANOTHER BOLIVIA??

ced Brazil to move its southern border to keep the Eastern Republic [Uruguay] from being absorbed and integrated into Argentina."

This "movable border" is part of the "theory of ideological frontiers" that was presented in systematized form first in 1957 in a book by Gen. Golbery Couto e Silva, entitled "Geopolitical Aspects of Brazil." This theory begins with the assumption that the Cold War has made purely physical concepts of borders obsolete and that the new limits are established along ideological lines. In the book he says:

"Because of its particular geographic position, Brazil cannot escape the North American influence. Therefore, we have no alternative but to consciously accept the role of following the policies of the United States in the South Atlantic. In exchange, the United States would recognize that the monopoly of control in that area should be exercised exclusively by Brazil."

Over the last year, Brazil has developed a detailed plan for the invasion of Uruguay which is titled "Operation 30 Hours." The Brazilians consider it necessary that the invasion be completed in this time limit to avoid having to face a worldwide diplomatic offensive which could paralyze the invasion, require conciliatory gestures, and permit the intervention of third parties, like the United Nations or even the Organization of American States.

Brazil's analysis of the success of the venture is based on various factors:

a) The Uruguayan armed forces lack the arms and manpower necessary to neutralize or defeat a Brazilian military offensive. The Citizenry, though highly politicized, are not emotionally or technically prepared for massive resistance.


b) Isolated guerilla actions may provoke some disturbances, but they could not effectively respond against an army ready for war like the Brazilian one.

c) The political options for Uruguay's future are: either the triumph of the Broad Front if elections take place, or the victory of a traditional party, which would result in increased guerilla activity. Both of these alternatives are considered dangerous and are enough, in the opinion of Brazilian authorities, to justify the invasion.

d) Given Brazil's urgent need for expansion, and taking into consideration the fact that the occupation of Uruguay would not only satisfy these necessities but also help Uruguay economically, it would be possible to consolidate the social order of the country and at the same time increase the work forces under Brazilian control.

Sources


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URUGUAY: goin' down the road...

The following is a translated and abridged version of an article by Carlos Nuñez appearing in Diez Años de Insurrección en América Latina (Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, Chile, 1971)

URUGUAY: SOCIALISTIC ANTECEDENTS



Though Uruguay gained formal independence in 1826, it was not until the second half of the 19th century that it was clearly formed as a country, and by the early 1900's it started to become known as the "Switzerland of South America." This was due to the social and institutional reforms made by José Battle y Ordoñez during his two terms as President.

The Colorado (or Red) Party has governed Uruguay without interruption from 1865 to 1958, and since Battle's time the majority within this party has called itself "Battlism" in his honor. The National Party, known as the Blanco (or White) Party, came to represent the interests of the landowners in the interior. These were the forces that supported the Blanco leader Aparicio Saravia in his uprisings in 1897 and 1904 against the Colorado government and its "Battlism," which embodied the interests of the emerging industrial and commercial oligarchy and the urban middle class.


Historians agree in considering President Battle y Ordoñez as an exceptional statesman. He was inspired by the ideas of European socialism and this, together with a political liberalism and secularism, characterized his newspaper, El Día. This newspaper which at the beginning of the century was a unique tool of ideological agitation, is today the epitome of reactionary journalism.

The ideological and political labor of Battle blended the elements that would portray Uruguay in the following decades: short working day, social security, separation of Church and State, socialization of public services (even before the Mexican revolution nationalized the petroleum industry, Uruguay placed the refining and distribution of fuel in the hands of a government monopoly), free and compulsory public education, women's suffrage, secret and universal vote, encouragement to new industries within solid government directions, etc.

All this came through a style of authoritarian paternalism which of course evidenced contradictions. It cannot be denied that the "battlista" legislation amply benefitted the working class, but it is equally true that Battle did not hesitate to use violence to repress the restless unions that eventually rebelled against his government.

It was Battle who made Uruguay into a "Switzerland": international neutrality, peaceful and institutional political life, strong influence of the middle class (Battle's social legislation made possible a high standard of living, developing a vast petit bourgeoisie), and a stable currency--there was a time when the Uruguayan peso was stronger than the dollar. Other factors make the similarity between the two countries even closer: small size, low population density (Uruguay has the lowest birth and mortality rates on the continent), and the fact that Uruguay's council of Ministers developed into a collegiate government.¹

This "welfare state" formula was possible because of the peculiar characteristics of Uruguay's geographic extension, topography, and climate, which are ideally suited for agriculture and cattle-raising; because of the ample markets that expanding capitalism offered for these basic products of Uruguay's economy; and because of the relatively benign form of British imperialism devoid of any direct military or political pressure. Further, Uruguay's natural resources--meat and wool--were in great demand in Europe due to the wars, and this prolonged



Uruguay's ideal situation beyond its natural limits.


After the First World War, Uruguay had its only governmental interruption through a coup led by President Gabriel Terra, with the support of the Colorado majority and a considerable number of the traditionally rival Blanco Party. This sudden action, based almost exclusively on the strength of the police force and firemen, became almost a humorous legend, evidencing the limited influence of the military in the country.

Political persecution, press censorship, jail and exile now for the first time befell an Uruguay already accustomed to the liberalism and freedom of "representative democracy," a Uruguay more like the "civilized" European nations than the rest of Latin America.

In 1941 Terra's dictatorship ended in elections and a new turn in politics known as the "good coup" took place--making it possible for the main political parties to share in the government. In 1952 the collegiate government was established as a government council with six representatives of the majority party and three of the minority party. Such cooperation became a substantial factor in the political life of Uruguay until 1966.

Meanwhile, many things had been changing: the socialization of public services degenerated into a congested bureaucracy, fattened by the trading of public posts for votes. Industrial expansion slowed down due to its limited and closed consumer market and encouraged the influx of the population into the cities. 70 percent of the population of Uruguay is now urban, with 45 percent living in Montevideo along. Although this growing labor force stimulated activity in such industries as construction, unemployment increased sharply.

The original measures of social welfare became electoral vote currency in the hands of politicians; the expansion of the secondary and tertiary sectors--the unproductive ones--generated the first signs of inflation. Labor unions had become stronger and fought to preserve the standard of living reached during the economy's zenith. At the same time, agricultural production began to stagnate; the landowners linked to the financial oligarchy invested their profits in speculative activities with reinvesting in the agricultural infrastructures. Professional politicians, although verbal adversaries, found a common interest in protecting and increasing their privileges and corruption became the norm.



The rise of U.S. imperialism generated deteriorating terms of trade and the country's stagnating productivity forced the government to face the demands of the producers with manipulations of the exchange system. The Colorado Party continued its pro-industry and protectionist policies through-out the Second World War and later the Korean War kept wool and meat prices relatively high. But after 1950, the "Switzerland of America" began to collapse.

1958-1966 THE BLANCO PARTY RULES

The economic and social deterioration naturally generated a repressive hardening even though it did not show during the fifties. Uruguay still preserved its respect for freedom of expression and "democratic guarantees," although the general public started to show a growing distain for the politicians as a consequence of the increased corruption. Unions continued their struggles but their orientation was still basically economist; the efforts of "yellow unionism"--supported by the North-American imperialists--made no big advances. Student unrest grew.

Occasionally the government appealed to repressive measures, such as the Emergency Security Measures, but always toning them down as much as possible since the public opinion was still strong against such tactics. Meanwhile, the Blanco Party improved its minority representation in governmental institutions and, through its dogged obstructionism, contributed to the deterioration of the majority party, which was beginning to suffer serious internal schisms.

The elections of 1958 were preceded by massive student demonstrations in favor of the Ley Orgánica Universitaria which consolidated gains in autonomy and student participation in the governing bodies of universities. The law was approved with both Blanco and Colorado votes in the Congress, but not before the government once more applied the security measures causing many confrontations between students and the repressive forces. During the November elections there was a very high turnout of independent voters and the Blanco Party won by more than 100,000 votes.

The Nationalist Party majority members entering the government were a curious mixture of "herreristas" (the national rightist faction that during World War II combined anti-imperialist efforts with open sympathy for Nazi fascism); and "ruralistas," who formed a nucleus surrounding Benito Nardone (a radio commentator who was able to mobilize large numbers in the interior, especially among the small growers in the South).

The Blanco government eliminated the monetary controls imposed by the Colorados, freed foreign exchange rates, and opened the door to inflation. These were the years of "fat cows" for the landowners, exporters and other representatives and beneficiaries of the agricultural oligarchy. The external debt grew by leaps and bounds and the country was increasingly tied to the control of the International Monetary Fund. The "ruralist" Nardone, supposed defender of the small grower, sided definitively with the big landowners and the fascist right began to develop.



The victory of the Cuban Revolution which shook the continent was also felt in Uruguay. The government repression against the unions and the left increased and anti-communism was openly practiced. Young fascists tried to take over the University and professor Arbelio Ramirez was killed in an attempt on the life of Commander Che Guevara, who had just delivered a speech in the University's assembly hall.

The middle classes that once supported the "battlism" now suffered a progressive polarization, and the general disenchantment grew. In 1962 the Blanco Party retained power but with a much narrower margin of 10,000 votes, losing strongholds such as Montevideo.

DOWN THE ROAD cont'd.

These last four years of the Blanco government can be summed up in one word: disastrous. The political inexperience of a new administration, the catastrophic consequences resulting from the constant application of the IMF formulas, the rivalry of the two traditional parties obstructing each others ability to function, and the weakening of the internal party structures all served to draw Uruguay deep into crisis. At the end of the last four years of Blanco rule, Uruguay was far from comparison with Switzerland; indeed it had the doubtful honor of a rate of inflation second only to that of South Vietnam.

During the last two years of the administration of the Blancos some armed forces officers had secret meetings which were clearly conspiratorial. During the last year Alberto Heber Usher became rotating President of the Government Council, and the intention of a military-political "putsch" could be clearly seen. This was resolved in 1966 when the illusory election machinery moved again.

1966: THE RETURN OF THE COLORADOS

In retrospect, the elections of 1966 seemed to be the decisive moment for the supposed survival of the Uruguayan "institutionality:" they were the death certificate for the liberal bourgeois democracy which grew under the wings of "battlism." The defense mechanism of the bourgeois system tried to make this death certificate appear rather as a move for change, an effort to recover the lost paradise of the fourties.

It may be useful to look over some details of this electoral process. In the first place, every time their schemes failed and it couldn't be concealed, the traditional parties began proclaiming a constitutional reform. In this instance, the frustration caused by the International Monetary Fund policies is blamed on the instability of the collegiate system, assuring it of covering a destructive obstructionism and diminishing the personal responsibility of the government leaders, transforming the executive into a deliberative body.

A great deal of these arguments should be evaluated with caution; the regime uses them to cover up its basic failures. All the publicity around the reform and the agreement finally reached by the majority groups of the two traditional parties reveals the essential identity of these groups which have long been losing their distinguishing characteristics in the process of the deterioration of the bourgeois system and their effective co-participation in power.

Unfortunately, some left-wing sectors used the excuse of not wanting to overlook the "latent reformist feelings of the popular masses," and joined the aforementioned groups. The resulting agreement of the large parties favored the return of a unipersonal regime, with a "strong" executive. At the same time, the atomization of the two parties resulted in the presentation of at least four candidates for the presidency.

In this context, the triumph of the retired general Oscar Gestido and the accomplishment of the "orange" reform seemed to provide some hope for the middle classes. After the rejection of the collegiate form of government and the defeat of the Blanco Party members who during eight years failed to find a solution to the crisis, and after having defeated the inauspicious candidacy of Jorge Battle Ibáñez within the Colorado Party, a good part of the population hoped that a "strong" government headed by "civilist" Gestido—who showed some determination to liberate Uruguay from IMF ties—would be able to guide the country back to its original and ideal conditions. This proved to be an unlikely possibility.

General Oscar Gestido ruled for nine months—becoming the last figurehead within the traditional parties—but without being able to make any progress; limited by external pressures and tied by internal conflicts in his own party, he struggled against an endless spiral. He first tried a government of "Party Unity" and then a "nationalist" outlook, seeking the support of the liberal left Colorados to extricate himself from the IMF.

After his death in December 1967, it appeared evident that Uruguay had no escape within the system.



1968: POLICE DICTATORSHIP

When Vice-President Jorge Pacheco Areco took over the presidency after Gestido's death, he was almost unknown to the electorate except for his great interest in physical fitness and his efforts to become president of the Uruguayan Boxing Federation. Pacheco became a candidate for the vice-presidency through a compromise in the negotiations of the coalition that supported Gestido.


At first there was a general feeling of shock and confusion after Gestido's death, and the people felt appeased that Pacheco's takeover seemed to have preserved the "institutional stability," at least in the beginning.

When the growing repression and "gorilla tactics" became evident, a phenomenon that must be evaluated in its context started to take place. In November 1966 the Uruguayans did not vote for a program, or even for a "government group;" they voted one color against the other for a personal image within the party that would result in a winner. The independent voters, fluctuating between the two large parties, decided the victory of the Colorados, and within that victory, Gestido's rise to the presidency . . .

As a result, the great majority of the population, even those militant in the Colorado Party, did not feel that they were represented at all by Pacheco Areco nor that he could ever have become a presidential candidate. Although the change in the presidency was due to an accidental circumstance, the Uruguayans tend to see it--subconsciously and not in a very precise manner--as a kind of coup d'etat, as a substitution of a legitimate authority with an illegitimate one, since it didn't relate to the "image" which they had elected to the presidency.

Perhaps in times of peace and prosperity this electoral process would have not been of great consequence, but it becomes relevant in the present situation, especially since Pacheco's government uses methods of repression and police control to deal with the popular masses. Therefore "coup d'etat" and "dictatorship" are everpresent concepts in the minds of Uruguayans.

This helps to explain the wide popular support for the Broad Front and the toleration, if not positive sympathy, which the masses have shown for the Tupamaros.



THE TUPAMAROS

TUPAMAROS SUPPORT THE FRONT!

"... We still maintain our differences in methods with the organizations that make up the Front and with their tactical evaluation of the immediate objective of the Front: elections. Nevertheless, we believe it is expedient for us to give our support to the BROAD FRONT.

The fact that the elections are its immediate objective does not make us forget that it constitutes an important attempt to unite the forces which fight against the oligarchy and foreign capital. The Front can constitute a popular current capable of mobilizing an important sector of the workers in the next months and after the elections. It is or can be a powerful instrument of mobilization for struggle around a national and popular program, for the liberty of political prisoners, freedom in labor unions, for restitution for workers who have been laid off, and for the lifting of the security measures in force in the country and all the decrees dictated under the authority of these measures.

Our support to the BROAD FRONT, then, is given with the understanding that its principal task should be the mobilization of the masses of workers, and that the work of the Front among the masses does not begin nor end with the elections."

THERE WILL BE A FATHERLAND FOR EVERYONE, OR
THERE WON'T BE ONE FOR ANYONE!-- Tupamaros

The following excerpts from THIRTY QUESTIONS TO A TUPAMARO originally appeared in the Chilean weekly Punto Final in 1968. The translation is by the Center for Information on Latin America in Montreal. Though it appeared over three years ago, we feel that what the Tupamaros say in it is extremely relevant for the elections.

Through their statements, which circulate in a clandestine publication called the Tupamaro Courier, and through their actions, such as the recent jailbreak where over a hundred suspected Tupamaros escaped, the Tupamaros have a profound influence in Uruguay's politics.

10. WHAT ARE THE CONCRETE TASKS, IN RELATION TO THE MASS MOVEMENT, OF A MILITANT BELONGING TO YOUR ORGANIZATION?

If it is a militant in a labor union or a popular organization, he or she should try to create a unit, whether it is a small group or the whole union, which can organize support for the actions of the armed sector and prepare for entry into this sector. Theoretical formation and practice, recruitment--these are the principal concrete tasks in this area. Moreover, propaganda for armed struggle. And whenever possible, to push the union towards more radical struggles and towards more definite stages of the class struggle.

11. WHAT ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT AT THIS STAGE?

To have an armed group, as well-prepared and equipped as possible, tested in action.
To have good relations with all popular movements who support the class struggle.
To create propaganda organs designed to radicalize the struggle and create consciousness.
To have an efficient apparatus for selection and screening of militants with possibilities for theoretical formation, and groups inside the mass movement which perform the above-mentioned functions.

12. THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE MOVEMENT GIVES TO PREPARATION FOR ARMED STRUGGLE--DOES THIS IMPLY THAT THE COMBATANT CANNOT DEPEND ON IMPROVISATION AT THE MOMENT OF COMBAT?

Armed struggle in a technical activity which requires technical knowledge, training, practice, materials, and the psychology of a combatant. Improvisation in this terrain can be paid for very dearly in lives and in failures. The spontaneity favored by those who speak vaguely of "the Revolution which the people will make" of "the masses" is either a delay tactic or is abandoning to improvisation the culminating stage of the class struggle. All vanguard movements, in order to preserve their vanguard character at the culmination of the struggle, must intervene and must have the technical know-how to channel the popular

violence against the oppression in such a way that the objective is achieved with the minimum sacrifices possible.

13. DO YOU THINK THAT THE PARTIES OF THE LEFT CAN ACCOMPLISH THIS PREPARATION FOR ARMED STRUGGLE BY MAINTAINING A SMALL SHOCK FORCE OR SELF-DEFENSE GROUP?

No party can fulfill the revolutionary principles it enunciates without seriously facing up to this preparation at all levels of the party. There is no other way to achieve the maximum possible efficiency for confronting the reaction at each stage. The lack of this efficiency can result in fatal negligence (remember Brazil and Argentina) or the loss of a revolutionary opportunity.

If they fail to focus on their specific objective, the small armed party groups can wind up transformed into a sad morass of political intrigue and manipulation. A miserable example to be remembered in this sense are the events of the demonstration on the last May First: armed groups reduced to the task of protecting the distribution of a manifesto against the attacks of other leftist groups, and armed groups reduced to impeding the repartition of manifestos by other groups.

14. WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE THINGS WHICH THE MILITANTS OF ARMED GROUPS ATTACHED TO A PARTY SHOULD BE ABLE TO DEMAND FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE LEADERSHIPS?

That their action be directed only against the class enemy, against the bourgeois system and its agents. No armed unit can fulfill its specific aim if its direction does not fulfill at least these minimum requirements:

1) to be consistent and to demonstrated in action its unfaltering adhesion to the principle of armed struggle, giving it the importance and the material means necessary for its preparation.

2) to offer the necessary conditions of security and discretion for those militants who carry out illegal tasks.

3) by its correct line and breadth of approach, to have the possibility--as immediate as possible--of moving into the leadership of the proletarian masses.

15. DON'T YOU THINK THAT AN ARMED GROUP SHOULD BE TIED TO A POLITICAL PARTY?

I think that any armed group should form part of a mass political movement or organization at a certain stage of the revolutionary process, and if such a movement or organization does not exist, should contribute to its creation. This does not mean, given the present panorama of the Left, that such a group must link itself to one of the existing political organizations, or that it should start a new one. That would be just perpetuating the mosaic or adding to it. We must combat the petty idea, currently in vogue, of The Party--identified with a head office, meetings, a newspaper, and positions on everything around it. We must combat the absurdity of hoping that somehow all the other parties of the Left will be buried under the avalanche of their own verbal outpourings, and that their bases of support and the people in general will one day flock to one's own party.

This is what we've had for 60 years in Uruguay and the results are plain to see. It must be recognized that there are genuine revolutionaries in all the parties of the Left, and many more who are not organized. A task for the Left in general is to take these elements and groups wherever they are to be found and unite them, so that one day sectarianism will be a thing of the past. This is something which does not depend on us. But the revolution can not be detained while it waits for this to happen. Each revolutionary and each revolutionary group has one sole task: to prepare themselves to make the Revolution. As Fidel said in one of his latest speeches: "...with or without a Party. The Revolution can't wait."

16. CAN YOU GIVE ME THE DETAILS OF THE STRATEGY FOR SEIZING POWER IN URUGUAY?

No, I can't give you a detailed strategy. On the other hand, I can give you some outline of the general strategy, which would be subject to modifications according to changes in the situation. That is to say, a general strategical outline, valid for the day, month, and year when it is enunciated.

17. WHY CAN'T YOU GIVE ME A DETAILED STRATEGY?

Because a strategy is developed on the basis of real happenings and the reality changes, independent of our will. To illustrate with an example--a strategy based on the reality of a strong and well-organized trade union movement has been dissipated.

18. ON WHAT CONCRETE REALITIES DOES YOUR ORGANIZATION BASE ITS GENERAL STRATEGICAL LINES AT THIS TIME?

To cite only a few of the most important:

1) The conviction that the crisis, far from resolving itself, is growing more profound day by day. The country is falling to pieces and a capitalist plan of development to increase production of exportable goods, assuming it were possible to implement, would only achieve minimal improvement and that only after some years' time. This means that for a number of years still the people will have to continue to tighten their belts. And with foreign debts totalling \$500,000,000 it is not likely that any great quantity of foreign credit will be extended to make it possible for the sectors which have lost their median standard of living to regain it. This is a basic concrete fact: there will be economic hard times and popular discontent in the years ahead.



I'D LIKE TO SEE JUST ONE OF THOSE TUPAMAROS!...

2) A second fact basic to a strategy is the high level of trade unionism of Uruguayan workers. Even if not all unions have a high degree of militancy--whether due to their composition or to their leadership--the sole fact that nearly all the fundmental service of the State (banking, industry and commerce) are organized, in itself constitutes a very positive factor, something without comparison in the rest of America. The possibility of paralyzing the services of the State has created and can create very interesting opportunities from the point of view of insurrection because, to give an example, it is not the same to attack a State which is in full command of all its forces, as it is to attack a State semi-paralyzed by strikes.

Another factor to take into account--this one negative--is the geographical factor. We do not have the impregnable zones within our territory suitable for installing a guerilla foco which could endure a long while, although we do have some places in the country which present difficult access. On the other hand we do have a large city with more than 300 km² of buildings, which permits the development of urban struggle. This means that we cannot copy the strategy of those countries which, due to their geographic conditions, can install a guerills foco in the mountains, sierras, or jungles with possibilities of becoming stable. On the contrary, we must elaborate an indiginous strategy, which meets the needs of a reality different from that of most American countries.

Moreover, in any strategical study, we must always take into account the forces of repression. Our armed forces, consisting of 12,000 men rather precariously armed and trained, constitutes one of the weakest repressive forces in America. Another important strategic factor

is that of our powerful neighbors and the U.S. always potentially disposed to intervene against any revolution on the continent. And finally, a fundamental strategical factor is the degree of preparation of the armed revolutionary group.

19. IN WHAT WAY ARE THE FACTORS OF CRISIS AND POPULAR DISCONTENT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DETERMINATION OF STRATEGY?

In the objective and subjective conditions for the revolution. It is fundamental that the majority of the population, although perhaps not ready to launch the insurrection, is neither ready on the other hand to kill for a regime which oppresses it. This, among other things, reduces the strategical calculations of the enemy's strength down to practically no more than the organized Armed Forces, and makes possible a favorable climate for the first measures of a revolutionary government.

20. AND WITH RESPECT TO THE REPRESSIVE FORCES?

They should be evaluated taking into account their degree of preparation for struggle, their means, and their distribution throughout the country. In the interior there is a military unit (composed of 200 men) approximately every 10,000 square kilometers, and a police post approximately every 1,100 square kilometers. The Armed Forces are supposed to cover all objectives which might be attacked by an insurrectional movement with 12,000 men in the Armed Forces and 22,000 police, of which half of the former and 6,000 of the latter are concentrated in the capital. Within the police force itself, only about 1,000 have been trained and armed for actual military combat.



21. COULD THE POSSIBILITY OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION BE REASON ENOUGH TO POSTPONE ALL ARMED STRUGGLE IN URUGUAY?

If that were the case, Cuba would never have made its revolution 90 miles from the United States, nor would there be guerrillas in Bolivia, a country sharing borders with Brazil and Argentina, like us. Foreign intervention could constitute an immediate military reverse, but a political advance which would, in time, develop into a military advance. Imagine the city of Montevideo occupied by foreign troops, with all the consequent insult to the national sentiment, inconvenience to the population, and on the other hand, facing this situation, an armed revolutionary group with good bases in the city. You get a fairly complete picture of the political and military significance of the dreaded foreign intervention. Moreover, in any case, our strategy is part of a continental strategy to "create many Vietnams", and those who intervene will have a big job handling such varied and diffuse fronts.

22. HOW DOES THE HIGH LEVEL OF TRADE UNIONISM FIGURE IN THE DETERMINATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY?

The unions, though without the present limitations, have involved and can involve the majority of the worker population in a frontal battle against the government, which has often resulted in the government calling out the Armed Forces. With the existence of an armed revolutionary group capable of carrying the class struggle to higher levels, we can wage a struggle under better conditions--with the

support of a large part of the population, and against a State whose fundamental services are in a state of deterioration.

23. IS OUR GEOGRAPHY COMPLETELY ADVERSE TO STRUGGLE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE?

Not strictly so. We do not have impregnable areas like other countries, but there do exist certain occasional natural retreats which could provide transitory refuge to an armed group. The latifundio is a great ally. In the latifundio zones, in other words in 2/3 of the area of the country, the population density drops to 0.6 inhabitants per square kilometer, and compare it with the farming region in our country, around Canelones and south of San José, where the density is about like Cuba.

At the same time, the cattle latifundio resolves the difficult problem of food which in other places requires a chain of supplies which can only be achieved with a large measure of complicity on the part of the population.

On the other hand, the shocking living conditions of the rural workers, some of whom are already organized into unions, has created a spontaneously rebel sector which can be very useful in the rural struggle. If our countryside does not serve to install a permanent foco, at least it can serve as a means to disperse the repressive forces.

24. AND FOR URBAN STRUGGLE, ARE THE CONDITIONS SUITABLE?

Montevideo is a city sufficiently large and polarized by social struggle to provide cover to a vast commando contingent. It presents a



much larger framework to work within than other revolutionary movements have had for urban struggle. Of course, any organization which hopes to endure in urban struggle should patiently construct its material bases and the wide support movement and cover which an armed contingent needs to operate and survive in the city.

25. HOW WOULD YOU WEIGH THE EXISTENCE OF A WELL-PREPARED ARMED GROUP IN AN OVERALL STRATEGICAL PLAN?

If there is no fairly well prepared group, then revolutionary opportunities are simply not taken advantage of or capitalized upon for the Revolution. Then we get things like the "bogatazo".

The armed group lends efficiency and cohesion to the struggle, and guides it towards its goal. Moreover, the armed group can contribute to the creation of a revolutionary opportunity or, in the words of Raul Castro, it can be the small motor which starts up the big motor of


the Revolution. The armed group creates or helps create the subjective conditions for the revolution, from the very moment that it begins to prepare itself, but above all, from the moment it begins to act.

26. WHAT ARE THE GENERAL LINES OF THE STRATEGY AT THE PRESENT TIME?

To create an armed force as quickly as possible which is capable of taking advantage of whatever favorable opportunity may arise from the crisis or other factors. To make the population aware, through armed actions and other means, that without revolution there will be no change. To strengthen the unions and radicalize their struggles, and tie them to the revolutionary movement. To lay material bases for developing the urban struggle and the rural struggle. To make ties with other revolutionary movements in Latin America for the sake of the struggle at the continental level.



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M.L.N.

URUGUAY

IMF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS YEARBOOK

	1958		PROVISIONAL 1959	
	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit
A. Current account	175.2	232.4	176.2	276.9
1. Merchandise	175.2	188.3	176.2	187.3
2. Nonmonetary gold	-	-	-	-
3. Freight and insurance	-	-	-	-
4. Other transportation	-	-	-	-
5. Travel	0.0	16.1	0.0	13.6
6. Investment income	-	-	-	-
On direct investment	-	16.1	-	13.6

LOAN-SHARKS and NEO-COLONIALISM.

The IMF and the Uruguayan Economic Crisis

From the 1929 crisis, which in Uruguayan politics was manifested by the dictatorship of Gabriel Terra (1933), through the middle of the fifties, Uruguay lived through a period of economic expansion. The boom, which was especially strong during WWII and the Korean conflict, was due to two factors: the expansion of the industrial sector and the high prices for export products, principally beef and wool.

As Alberto Curiel has so aptly put it, it was an industrialization "without horizons." Manufacturing was begun of articles which had previously been imported with no state intervention other than indiscriminate and privileged protection; with equipment and machinery imported from the metropolis countries; and with the limited prospects of a restricted domestic market of two million inhabitants.¹

FROM 1957 ON Uruguay began to suffer the consequences of deteriorating terms of trade, which was common to all Latin American countries producing raw materials and foodstuffs. Uruguay had to sell an increasing amount of wool in order to buy the same tractor.

Exports went from an annual average of \$283 million in the 1949-54 period to \$194 million during 1955-60 and \$174 million during 1962-65. 22% of this drop in foreign exchange income is directly attributable to price drops since the end of the Korean boom and 20% is due to stagnation of farm production.²

The resulting constant deficit in the balance of trade had devastating consequences for Uruguay because exports determine 90% of the country's purchasing power and, as the United Nations World Economic Survey for 1962 stated:

"... In the wake of falling export prices and export proceeds, national income tends to fall and, given the heavy dependence of most underdeveloped countries on customs duties as sources of revenue, government income also suffers. The impact on income and expenditures may result in a reduction in both consumption and investment. In the face of a decline in the purchasing power of export proceeds, moreover, governments are often forced to cut back imports. When this involves a cut-back in machinery and equipment and other strategic goods ... plans for economic development are inevitably jeopardized."

The two principle causes of Uruguay's balance of trade deficit are the drop in export prices, which is due to the foreign monopoly of the international markets, and a decline in production, which is the result of the internal property system, which redounds to the benefit of the landholding hierarchy.

URUGUAY'S 600 FAMILIES are the owners, directly or indirectly, of about half of the total arable land. On their vast unpopulated plains the rams, bulls and the rains are in charge of the spontaneous creation of wealth. Wool, meat, and wheat--produced under rudimentary conditions without the modern techniques of intensive production--are the country's main and practically only source of income. Under the present system, the destiny of Uruguay is tied to the prices of these items.³

Uruguay's reformers somehow never seem to get around to passing real and substantial agrarian reform laws. This systematic "forgetfulness" of the bourgeoisie is the key to its peaceful alliance with the landholders and explains how Uruguay's two political parties are really one.

Sharing with them the same class interests, neither party dares--or is able--to challenge the fundamental privilege of the oligarchy: their ownership of the land. Thus they sacrifice the only possible basis for Uruguay's independent and solid industrial development.

The big landowners do not invest in adopting new technology and improving production, rather they export very large fortunes to Swiss bank accounts or build luxurious Chalets on the coast of Punta del Este. It is not an accident that this fabulous resort town is worth more than the entire productive apparatus of Uruguay, nor is it an accident that it is in the same country. On the other hand, the 52,000 small land owners squeezed together on under 12% of the land, cannot afford the capital equipment necessary for modern agricultural methods, though they would like to use them.

Thus France gets almost four times Uruguay's yield per acre of wheat and the United States gets over twice the yield of sugar beets and over six times the yield of corn. To produce a ton of beef, Uruguay must have a stock of twice as many animals as France or Germany. Further, the proportion of animals is decreasing: In 1908 there were 8 head of cattle per habitant, while in 1961 there were only 3; in 1908 there were 25 sheep per habitant, while in 1961 the number had dropped to 8.⁴

The other side of the coin of the big rural estates is the disproportionate growth of the service sector, which is not the result of economic development, but rather an index of underdevelopment. Though Uruguay's per capita income is one fifth that of the U.S., their service sectors weigh approximately the same. Activity in this sector does not mobilize capital equipment and investment within the country, nor does it result in anything that can be exported; it is rather the evidence of the rechanneling of the profits from agriculture to the imperialist powers through Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, United Artists, Columbia Pictures, Readers' Digest, Diners' Club, Avis and many more.

WHY DID URUGUAY GET INVOLVED WITH THE IMF?

By the time that the Blancos took power in 1956, the process was accelerating. The Central Bank's foreign exchange reserves were eaten up, the deficit persisted, Uruguay could not meet the interest and amortization payments on its previous debts and was obliged to obtain credit from the International Monetary Fund.


EXACTLY WHAT IS THE IMF, ANYWAY?

The IMF was set up along with the World Bank at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. The World Bank would provide long and medium-term loans to member countries at conventional interest rates, while the IMF would provide a supply of short-term credits.

Today, the International Monetary Fund has become the most powerful supranational government in the world. The resources it controls and its power to interfere in the internal affairs of borrowing nations give it the authority of which United Nations advocates can only dream. Only the U.S. military establishment with its client armies can rival the IMF as the key institution of imperialism in the world today, and their functions are clearly complementary. The discipline imposed by the IMF has often eliminated the need for direct military intervention in order to preserve a climate friendly towards foreign investment.

Its power is made possible not only by the enormous resources (about 29 billion dollars) which it administers directly in short-term lending to cover balance-of-payments fluctuations, but more significantly as a result of its functions as an international credit agency. All of the major sources of credit in the developed capitalist world, whether private capital, bilateral government aid (of which U.S. aid is by far the most important), or other multinational institutions such as the World Bank group and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), will refuse to aid a country that persists in defying IMF "advice."⁵





HOW DOES IT WORK?

The IMF as lender to borrowers in distress sets up tough conditions before handing out money. IMF circles are not concerned whether the persistent deficit of some countries may be the necessary consequence of a persistent surplus in other countries, and if so, whether balance can ever be attained if adjustments are not made in the surplus countries as well as in the deficit countries.

By its structure and administrative procedures, the IMF acts only to reinforce the rules of the game that governs the existing power relations among countries--rules that evolved in the very process by which some nations became the rich nations and other nations became the poor nations.⁶

HOW DOES A COUNTRY GET A LOAN?

In order to get a loan, the country is required to file a letter of intent with the IMF which details the adjustments it intends to make to correct the imbalance, adjustments which follow the guidelines the IMF has already laid down.

Uruguay's involvement began in 1959, when the government passed the Monetary and Exchange Reform Law at the Fund's urging, and signed letters of intent in 1960, 1961, 1962. These declarations amounted to an acceptance of the financial policies which the IMF imposes on its borrowing countries, and their results demonstrate to the world the utter bankruptcy of these policies as a means of solving the problems of the underdeveloping countries.

The IMF, arguing that it is chiefly inflation which is responsible for the balance-of-payments crisis, enforces programs which invariably contain three main elements:

1/ elimination of controls over exports and imports, freeing exchange rates, currency devaluation;

2/ domestic anti-inflationary policies, including wage and price controls, contraction of bank credit, and efforts to balance the budget by reducing government spending and increasing taxes; and

3/ encouragement of foreign investment through policies which range from anti-strike legislation (and action), through tax benefits, to guarantees of profit remittance.


DO THE LOANS REALLY HELP?

The IMF claims that the aim of this stabilization package is long-term balance-of-payments stability, but its actual effect in practice has been the reinforcement of the dependence on traditional exports, which was the real cause of the instability in the first place. If the government implements these policies on IMF advice, it is rewarded, not with a healthy and diversified economy, but with temporary relief for immediate exchange difficulties. This relief typically takes the form of new loans to the government, rescheduling of old loans when payments become burdensome, and credit for the import of consumer goods.⁷

From 1959 on, Uruguay's trade imbalances were covered by short-term IMF credits--\$110 million in 1962 alone, an election year--which made the foreign debt rise to \$450 million, or more than double its annual exports. To this must be added massive capital flight: \$55 million in 1962, \$61 million in 1964, and \$90 million in 1965.

BUT ISN'T HELPING LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES FIGHT INFLATION A GOOD THING?

This chart shows what has happened to Uruguayan purchasing power under the influence of the IMF. It now costs 82 pesos to buy what 15 years ago cost one peso. Between 1955 and 1966 the cost of living increased 19 times. The real income of government employees



Source: Statistical Bulletin for Latin Am.,
Vol. VI, No. 2. United Nations, 1969

dropped 37 % from 1961 to 1966. In Uruguay, IMF policies have led to the same paradoxical mixture of inflation and stagnation that we have today in the United States.

The reason for this apparent contradiction is the effect that devaluation has on an underdeveloped country. In orthodox economic theory, devaluation could be expected to improve the balance of trade by encouraging exports and discouraging imports. Domestic producers would be encouraged to supply the goods that were previously imported and the drop in export prices would boost foreign exchange income. However, in Uruguay, for instance, imports are vital goods which are not available from domestic sources, while the export markets do not expand automatically when prices fall. The effect of devaluation is thus to worsen the already disadvantageous terms of trade, which forces the country to export more (if it can) to pay for essential imports, and raises the internal price level because imported goods comprise such a large part of it.⁸

IMF POLICIES ALSO HAVE THESE OTHER EFFECTS:

Domestic corporations

Locally owned and controlled enterprises are hard hit and often bankrupted. Devaluation increases the cost of imported capital goods; tightened credit and reduced government spending causes local depression. Uruguay's national meat packing house, FRIGONAL, was facing bankruptcy in 1970 because of such factors and was placed under control of a government board; since then its financial situation has deteriorated and it is estimated to be costing Uruguayan taxpayers five million pesos a day.

Wages and taxes

In a country where the tax structure is determined by the oligarchic interests, increases are bound to fall heavily on the shoulders of the working masses. As for the government wage and price control commission, COPRIN, the following comparison between wage and price increases permitted in the garment industry speaks for itself:⁹

year:	1968	1969	1970
<u>wages:</u> assembly	100	125.5	152.3
leather	100	123.1	149.5
textiles	100	119.7	145.4
<u>prices:</u> clothing	100	143.8	184.7

Social Welfare

As poor people in the United States know very well, one of the first places that the government makes cuts is in welfare spending and government pensions. The real name of the game called "balance-the-budget" is "Screw-the-poor." Uruguay's public corporations are also coming under attack. These firms, such as UTE (telephone and electricity), ANCAP (oil and gasoline), and AMDET (public transportation) are often run at a deficit as a type of consumer subsidy, providing cheap utilities and services to people who could not otherwise afford them. IMF attacks these subsidies as "distortions of free-market forces" and recommends jacking up the prices to "profitable" levels.





...U.S. TAXES,
REFINING COSTS,
AMORTIZATION,
INSURANCE...

LOAN SHARKS AND NEO-COLONIALISM

The system can be compared point by point with peonage on an individual scale. In peonage, or debt slavery, the employer pays less than subsistence wages to his workers, but "loans" them enough to keep them alive, and lets them use this credit to buy overpriced goods from his company store. The aim of the employer-creditor-merchant is neither to collect the debt once and for all nor to starve the employee to death, but rather to keep the laborer permanently indentured through his debt to the employer. The worker cannot run away, for other employers and the state recognize the legality of his debt; nor has he hope of earning his freedom at his low wages.¹⁰

Uruguay's debts grow and grow. In 1967 \$100 million in interest and amortization on foreign loans came duell while in this same year the country's entire revenue from exports was only \$158.7 million.¹² Thus 63% of export revenue was owed to the international loan sharks. In effect, the IMF orders Uruguay to continue laboring on the plantation, while it refuses to finance their efforts to set up a business for themselves.

IF URUGUAY DOESN'T BENEFIT, WHO DOES?

These measures do benefit some Uruguayans, the comprador classes who work hand-in-hand with the foreign corporations, and who have holdings in the beef and wool industries and the export banks. The principal beneficiaries, however, are the foreign corporations themselves. In addition to the specific concessions that they receive, they are not affected by the local depression. They can buy up bankrupt local firms at bargain prices; and if they are chiefly interested in export industries, their potential markets are not affected by the depression. Because the general level of employment and wages is reduced, the foreign firm can obtain a relatively stable labor force by paying slightly higher than the general level of wages--still a huge bargain.

WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE?

Cuba is probably the only nation in Latin America which has been able to put IMF recommendations into effect, with the significant exception of convertability of the peso and hospitality to foreign investment. The Cuban response, of course, was to opt out of the imperialist system, seek allies in the socialist camp, and begin to reconstruct their economy along diversified lines, with a full utilization of their human and natural resources. If the Broad Front gets a chance to implement its programs, Uruguay along with Chile will have an opportunity to try the socialist road to real development.



... TECHNICAL
ASSESSMENTS,
RENT FOR THE
NEW YORK OFFICE...

footnotes:

- ¹Jose Diaz, "The Situation in Uruguay," Tricontinental, no. 9 (Nov.-Dec. 1968).
- ²Ibid.
- ³Eduardo Galeano, "Uruguay: Promise and Betrayal," Latin America: Reform or Revolution?, ed. Petras and Zeitlin (N.Y., 1968).
- ⁴Ibid.
- ⁵Cheryl Payar, "The Perpetuation of Dependence: The IMF in the Third World," Monthly Review, vol. 23, no. 4 (Sept. 1971).
- ⁶Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York, 1969) p. 146.
- ⁷Payar, op. cit.
- ⁸Ibid.
- ⁹Marcha, August 6, 1971, p.8.
- ¹⁰Payar, op. cit.
- ¹¹Galeano, p. 464.
- ¹²Boletín Estadístico de América Latina, United Nations, vol. 6, no. 2 (1969).



RIGHT?



**AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS
IN
Uruguay.**



Abbott Laboratories Uruguay Ltda.
Manufacturers of pharmaceutical specialties.

All America Cables & Radio, Inc.
Telegraph company.

American International Underwriters S.A.
Insurance company.

Armco Uruguay S.A.
Importer of iron and steel semi-manufactures;
producer of fence wire, and other related
products.

Armour del Uruguay S.A.
Shipping office for packing house products.

Associated Press, The
News service company.

Bancroft-Brillotex International S.A.
Holding company.

Bank of America
Bank.

Bellows-Valvair FABOSA
Foundry and metalworking plant.

Bull del Uruguay S.A.
Importer of office and business machines.
Also rental services, and training school.

Chesebrough Pond's International Ltd.,
Sucursal Uruguay
Manufacturers of cosmetics.

Coca Cola Export Corp., The
Soft drink manufacturer.

Colgate-Palmolive, Inc.
Manufacturer of tooth-paste, soap and
other toilet articles.

Columbia Pictures of Uruguay, Inc.
Importer and distributor of motion
picture films.

Compania Burroughs de Máquinas Ltda.
Importer of office machines.

Compania de Chicle Adams, Inc.
Manufacturer of chewing gum.

Compania Standard Electric Argentina
S.A.I.C., Suc. Uruguay
Telegraph Company.

Compania Uruguaya de Cemento Portland
Manufacturer of cement.

Crown Zellerbach International, Inc.
Importer and wholesaler of paper

Deloitte, Haskins & Sells
Auditors.

Diner's Club Uruguay S.A.
Credit card service.

Dorothy Gray, Inc.
Manufacturers of cosmetics.

Dun & Bradstreet S.A.
Reference and credit information service
company.

ESSO Standard Oil Co. (Uruguay) S.A.
Importer of petroleum and related products.

cent →

First National City Bank of New York, The Bank.

Fleischman Uruguaya, Inc.
Manufacturer of yeast and ready mixed desserts.

Ford (Uruguay) S.A.
Assembler and distributor of automotive vehicles. Also importer of spare parts and accessories.

General Electric S.A.
Manufacturer of household and industrial electric products.

General Motors Uruguaya S.A.
Assembler and distributor of automotive vehicles. Also importer of spare parts and accessories.

Green, A.P. Comaco Refractorios S.A.
Manufacturer of refractory products.

Hart S.A.
Wool exporter.

IBM del Uruguay S.A.
Importer of office and business machines. Also rental services, and training school.

IBM World Trade Corp., South American Headquarters.

IMSA (Industrializadora de Maiz S.A.)
Corn processor and corn products manufacturer.

Industrias de Concentrados Grush Ltda.
Manufacturer of soft drinks.

International Advertising Service S.A.
Advertising service company.

International Harvestdr co of Uruguay S.A.
Importer of agricultural machinery and motor trucks.

Jackson, W.M., Inc.
Importer of general knowledge-type books. Also accounting books.

Kodak Uruguaya Ltda.
Wholesaler and distributor of photographic and motion picture equipment and products.

**AMERICAN FIRMS,
SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES**

Laboratorios Americanos S.A.
Manufacturer and importer of toothpaste a pharmaceutical specialities in general, a well as toiletries in general.

Maico del Uruguay
Importer of hearing aids.

McCann Erickson Corp., S.A.
Advertising agency.

Metro-Goldwyn Mayer del Uruguay
Importer and distributor of motion picture films and operator of a movie theatre.

Mobil Oil del Uruguay S.A.
Importer of automobile lubricants and related products.

Moore McCormack (Uruguay) S.A.
Shipping line.

National Schools
Technical school mail service company.

NCR del Uruguay S.A.
Importer of business machines.

Otis Elevator Co.
Importer and assembler of elevators, and importer of accessories and parts.

Pan American World Airways, Inc., (Div. Latino Americana)
Airline.

Pepsi-Cola Interamericana S.A.
Manufacturer of soft drinks.


Pfizer Corp., S.A.
Manufacturer of pharmaceutical products.

Press Wireless Uruguaya Ltda.
News service company.

Quimica Tec del Uruguay S.A.
Manufacturer and exporter of chemical raw materials.

Sinteticos Slovak S.A.
Man-made fibers and yarns manufacturer.

cont.
↓



Squibb, E.R., & Sons (Inter-American Corp., Sucursal Uruguay)
Manufacturer of pharmaceutical products and toilet preparations.

Stearns, Fredrick, S.A.
Manufacturer and importer of pharmaceutical specialties and cosmetics.

Sudamtex del Uruguay S.A.
Synthetic textile mill.

Sunbeam (Uruguay) S.A.
Importer assembler and manufacturer of household electric appliances.

Swan, Culbertson & Fritz (Uruguay) S.A., Comercial y Financiera
Stock brokers.

Sydney Ross Uruguay Ltda.
Manufacturer of pharmaceutical products.

Texaco Uruguay S.A.
Importer of petroleum and related products.

Thompson, J. Walter, Uruguay S.R.L.
Advertising Agency.

United Artists of Uruguay, Inc.
Importer and distributor of motion picture films.

United Press International
News Service Company.

United Shoe Machinery Co. of Uruguay
Importer of shoe-making machinery.

Warner, Lambert Ltda.
Importer and manufacturer of pharmaceutical specialties, drugs and cosmetics.

White Weld & Co.
Stock and bond broker.

Wyeth Laboratorios C.A.
Manufacturer and importer of pharmaceutical specialties.

Young, Arthur & Co.
Auditors.



U.S. Military & Police



UNITED STATES MILITARY AND POLICE OPERATIONS IN URUGUAY

MAP--The Military Assistance Program constitutes the major instrument of U.S. military policy in Latin America. Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, funds were made available for the strengthening of Latin armies in the interests of "hemispheric defense." In 1953, Uruguay signed a mutual defense assistance pact with the U.S. and became eligible for these funds. During the Kennedy years, MAP's focus shifted from hemispheric defense to internal security and funds for counterinsurgency training and equipment were made available through MAP.1

U.S. MAP GRANT AID TO URUGUAY (millions US)

1950-63	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
27.5	1.7	2.4	2.5	1.6	2.0	1.6


OPS--The U.S. plan to protect its 12 billion dollar investment in Latin America while avoiding more Vietnams involves becoming the world's policemen in a most direct sense. Through the Office of Public Safety (OPS)--a division of AID--and the International Police Academy, the United States trains ranking officers of the Third World police forces, sends advisors to foreign countries to train rank-and-file policemen, and provides equipment, such as radios, mobile units, weapons, ammunition and computers to local police forces.2

U.S. PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS IN URUGUAY--1970³

Richard D. Biava, PSA
 Lee E. Echols (PSA)
 Richard E. Martinez (PSA)
 Dan Mitrione (PSA)

RECENT URUGUAYAN GRADUATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE ACADEMY

Sub-Commissary Wilson W. LAZO de Leon,
 Maldonado Police Headquarters
 Official Inspector Sidney RIBEIRO Bitancourt,
 Montevideo Police Headquarters
 Sub-Commissary Esteban TECHERA Iglesias,
 Cerro Largo Police Headquarters



Note: The huge jump in funds in 1965 was probably due to the initial upsurge of the Tupamaros, and that of 1971 due to the possibility of the Broad Front winning the national elections.

footnotes:

¹NACLA, U.S. Military and Police Operations in the Third World, p. 5

²Ibid., p. 9.

³NACLA, vol. 4, no. 9.

⁴NACLA, vol. 4, no. 7.

⁵figures from NACLA, U.S. Military, p. 20 and vol. 5, no. 4.

63
2

Country: **Uruguay**

PROJECT DATA

TABLE III

PROJECT TITLE Public Safety	ACTIVITY Public Safety	FUNDS Economic	
PROJECT NUMBER 528-11-710-013	PRIOR REFERENCE P. 56, FY-1971 LA P.D.B.	INITIAL OBLIGATION FY: 1962	SCHEDULED FINAL OBLIGATION FY: 1974

Project Target and Course of Action: To assist in modernizing and improving Montevideo and interior police departments so that they will be better able to maintain law and order and to control subversion.

Progress to Date: 93 officers have been trained in the U.S. in riot control, police management, investigations and patrol improvement; a total of 739 officers have been trained locally in courses given in Uruguay. By the end of FY 1971 it is expected that communications networks will have been established in all 19 Uruguayan Departments. AID-financed commodities have improved Uruguayan capabilities in patrol, investigative procedures and in riot control. Uruguay has purchased over \$1 million worth of police equipment (including vehicles) from own funds since 1965. The annual rate of purchase is now \$200,000.

FY 1972 Program: Training and technical assistance which will be supplemented by some commodities will be provided for the improvement of patrol, riot control, police management, investigations and communications.

U.S. Technicians: 3 direct hire technicians (Chief, Investigations Advisor, and Training Advisor) for one year: (\$115,000).

Participants: 26 participants will each receive approximately 3 months training in the U.S. in riot control, investigations and police management: (\$75,000).

Commodities: Communications equipment and spare parts: (\$25,000).


Other Costs: Minor administrative costs related to project and salary for one local secretary for one year: (\$10,000).

(Increase in Estimated Cost to Completion due, in large part, to Emergency Procurement).

Reprinted from NACLA Newsletter, July-August 1971, p. 30.

U.S. DOLLAR COSTS (in Thousands)				OBLIGATIONS					
	Obligations	Expenditures	Unliquidated	Estimated FY 1971			Proposed FY 1972		
				Direct AID	Contract	Total	Direct AID	Contract	Total
Through 6/30/70	1,218	1,106	112						
Estimated FY 71	624	620		149		149	115		115
Estimated through 6/30/71	1,842	1,726	116	69		69	75		75
		Future Year Obligations	Estimated Total Cost	395		395	25		25
				11		11	10		10
Proposed FY 72	225	378	2,445	624		624	225		225
				Total Obligations					

Cost Components
 U S Technicians
 Participants
 Commodities
 Other Costs
 Total Obligations



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- CUBA FOR BEGINNERS - Rius - \$.50
- NACLA RESEARCH METHODOLOGY GUIDE - \$1.00

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