

Christian Anti-Communism Crusade

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October 1, 1979

WHY ARE THE SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA?

"Every day in every way it's getting clearer and clearer." This statement can be made concerning the Soviet Communist strategy to conquer the U.S.A. The presence of a brigade of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is a clear illustration of this strategy.

The strategic objective is to conquer the U.S.A. without the mutual destruction that would result from a thermonuclear war. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to encircle the United States so thoroughly that resistance would be suicide. Many, if not most, U.S. citizens would prefer surrender to suicide.

In order to avoid a conflict before the encirclement is complete, it is desirable that each increment of encirclement should be of a magnitude that, while it may cause protest, it will not cause confrontation. Diplomatic protests are acceptable, but economic and military actions are not. Nothing must be permitted to interfere with the shipment of U.S. wheat to the Soviet Union, for example, and every effort must be made to consummate the SALT II agreement despite the overwhelming evidence of Soviet hostility which the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba provides.

Will Soviet Strategy Succeed?

Will the Soviet strategy prove successful in this particular instance? This question has not been finally answered as this is written, but influential voices in the U.S.A. are urging that a policy that supports the Soviet strategy be adopted. The LOS ANGELES TIMES, September 15, carries the following report:

"Denouncing 'unproductive posturing and saber rattling,' Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.) said Friday that the new strategic arms limitation treaty should not be held hostage in the controversy over Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

"Apparently addressing senators who have demanded that the Soviet brigade of 2,000 to 3,000 men be withdrawn before the SALT II treaty is considered by the Senate, Huddleston suggested that the troop controversy is not a matter of vital national interest.

" 'I have no hesitation about this country 'standing up to the Russians' or any other country,' he said, 'but let's do so on matters of true importance and in a manner consistent with the significance of the issue.'

"He called the issue a serious one that should be closely monitored. But he added, 'There is a time for confrontation, but it should come only when this nation's vital interests are at stake--not when situations develop, which, while undesirable, do not go to the heart of our vital interests.'

"Huddleston, a member of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, is one of the Southern Democrats considered crucial to the Administration's chances of winning ratification of the embattled arms pact. He characterizes himself as uncommitted in the fight." (Page 5)

I would like to ask Senator Huddleston, "How many Soviet troops in Cuba would 'go to the heart of our vital interests,' and merit confrontation?" For the sake of argument, let us assume that the answer is 30,000. If this total were reached by surreptitious increments of 3,000, would each of these increments be regarded as undesirable but of insufficient magnitude to justify confrontation? If any increment were discovered, it could be argued that the change in the status quo was minor. This is precisely what the U.S. communists are contending concerning the presence of the troops in Cuba. The September 15 edition of the communist paper, PEOPLE'S WORLD, states editorially:

"Have they gone mad? Are the so-called policymakers in Washington so contemptuous of the well-being of some three billion people that they would sabotage, not only SALT II, but the very process of detente itself over an invented Soviet menace in Cuba.

"Even as the U.S. illegally and against the will of the Cuban people maintains an estimated 24,000 men under arms on Cuban territory at Guantanamo Bay the Democrats and Republicans in the White House and Congress have dared to make threats against the Cuban and Soviet people over Soviet military assistance, some 17 years old, to the Cuban people. Cuba has a sovereign right to such assistance.

"There is no Soviet combat battalion in Cuba. These charges raised so melodramatically by Democratic Senators Frank Church of Idaho and Richard Stone of Florida are 'totally groundless,' the Soviets charge. 'Neither the number or functions of the said Soviet personnel has changed throughout the years,' the Soviet news agency Tass said." (Page 7)

When Will Resistance Equate Suicide?

At what point will the encircling Soviet forces be so great that resistance will equate suicide? That point is rapidly being reached according to former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Speaking at a conference in Brussels, which was held during the Labor Day weekend, sponsored by Georgetown's University Center for Strategic and International Studies, titled "NATO, the next 30 years", Kissinger said that the West's ability to deter Soviet attack is failing at all levels--conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic. In Europe the Soviet superiority in conventional forces had, in the past, been counterbalanced by NATO tactical nuclear weapons. Now, however, the Soviets are ahead in theater nuclear weapons, and Kissinger stated that the U.S. may be unwilling to use strategic nuclear weapons in Europe's defense. If the U.S. did attack Soviet cities, the Soviet could devastate American cities in return.

Discussing crises or war, Kissinger posed the following question to his audience:

"I ask any of you around this conference table, if you were Secretary of State or security adviser, what you would recommend the president of the United States to do in such circumstances. How would he improve his relative military position? Of course, he could threaten a full-scale strategic response, but will he do it? Is it a realistic course?" (New Republic, September 15, page 17)

The logical answer to such a question is obvious. Make the best possible accommodation with the enemy. Even if that accommodation is really surrender, it will not be necessary to call it by that name and it will be possible to "save face" temporarily, although it will not be possible to save freedom and life.

The communists are adhering to their formula for conquest, "External encirclement, plus internal demoralization, plus thermonuclear blackmail, leads to progressive surrender."

The Soviets must be prevented from reaching such a commanding position. They must be fought on all fronts short of military conflict. They are particularly vulnerable economically and morally. Offensives should be mounted in these areas and pursued aggressively. Communist strength, while formidable, is brittle. Their people yearn for freedom and, given hope, will pursue it.

JONAS SAVIMBI, POTENTIAL LIBERATOR OF ANGOLA, SPEAKS

Jonas Savimbi is leading the forces of UNITA in an effective guerrilla warfare against the forces, including the Cubans, of the communist rulers of Angola. He was interviewed by the free Cuban, Tomas Regalado, and the interview was published in the free Cuban magazine, "Ideal."

As this interview reveals, Savimbi is confident that the communists will be defeated in Angola and the achievements of UNITA give solid grounds for this confidence. Since this interview was given, the communist ruler of Angola, Agostinho Neto, has died in Moscow.

"THE CUBAN PEOPLE MUST LEARN THAT THOUSANDS OF ITS CHILDREN DIE IN A SENSELESS WAR" Jonas Savimbi

An Exclusive Interview by Tomas Regalado

The Savimbi whom we met in a country in northern Africa, by the end of December, 1978, was a different one than the one who invited us to walk one of the many guerrilla encampments: his activity is constant, his voice is more vibrant, his hands move in a dramatic manner when he wants to stress a point, his eyes gain more brightness. Jonas Savimbi is in his country, in the land where he saw his first light, that he loves so much and that he (we are convinced) is going to free from the foreign Marxist yoke.

We walked for some minutes towards a clearing in the jungle; there are several chairs and improvised benches, made out of tree trunks; in the background we can hear the songs that Angolan women are singing, while they attend the conference in which they are denouncing Neto and Castro.

Status of the War

"It has already been several months since we saw you and inquired about the status of the war; we know that there have been changes and we would like for you to inform us."

SAVIMBI: "The situation of the war is getting better for UNITA since we met for the last time outside of Angola, and I came back here in February; since that date we have had several offensives launched by the Cubans, by the MPLA (Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and by the Russians, but we have resisted, we have fought; they (the Cubans and MPLA) have not been able to take any of our positions, while we have taken four from them: Diricu, Cuancare, Calai and Chamavera, and the most important item is that, in the center of the country, we have been successful in preventing the reopening of the Benguela railway. Of course, we must explain that the MPLA wanted to reopen the railway in order to get Zaire's and Zambia's dollars for the transportation of their products, but their plans have failed. We must also point out that we have had great success in preventing the reopening of the Mocamedes railway.

"Our guerrilla forces have advanced, during the last days, towards Dondo, a town located only 150 miles from Luanda, the capital city.

"We believe that, in the military field, we have had significant successes in the last months and that we should be able, in the coming months, to continue repeating them.

"UNITA presently controls two thirds of the Angolan territory and more than half of the population; we can affirm that the MPLA only controls the cities and their surrounding areas."

The Activities of the Cuban Troops

REGALADO: "And the Cuban troops, where are they, what do they do?"

SAVIMBI: "The most important issue to point out is that the number of Cuban troops in Angola has not decreased at any time; there are, presently, more than 20,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola and they can be seen not only in the towns but, every time there is an offensive, the Cubans are directly participating; for instance, during the offensive in the area of the Benguela railway, when they tried to dislodge us from that area, and the MPLA's Angolans failed, then they brought in a large number of Cuban troops, including a new kind, infantry troops, and now, even as we are talking, the Cubans are watching railroad bridges, river bridges, that is, they participate in and conduct all military operations.

"But the morale of Cubans is very low; I must say that, according to our information, we can assert that Cubans are rejected by the population, and they are not popular with the FAPLAS (armed forces of the communist government). Cubans feel themselves isolated, and that accounts for their low morale; we have positive information that the wishes of a majority of those soldiers are to desert and get out of Angola. However, there is a problem, that we discussed with you when we last met, some months ago: We need a guarantee that if these persons, these Cuban soldiers defect, we would be able to send them abroad, since none of those we have captured is interested in going back to Cuba; instead, they want to go to the United States."

REGALADO: "Precisely, this is one issue that we wanted to discuss with you, Dr. Savimbi, about the Cuban prisoners."

SAVIMBI: "We do not have any Cuban prisoners as of now. We had several, but as it was very difficult to maintain them, we sent them to neighboring countries such as Zaire and Zambia; we took them to the borders, and we do not know what their fate has been because we are not interested in keeping Cuban prisoners if we have no assurance of being able to send them to countries where they want to go in order to start a new life; the wish of Cuban soldiers is to get out of Angola. If favorable conditions were created for their transfer, we could intensify the campaign to foster defections, since we know through our sources, I repeat, that would be successful; but, for instance, we do not have any guarantee that Zambia would admit them, instead of returning them to the MPLA (the communist armed forces of Angola), and we do not have any assurances from Zaire either. Therefore, we are avoiding to take any prisoners until we can guarantee the exit of those soldiers towards countries where they can live securely."

Prisoner Exchange

REGALADO: "Mr. President: If UNITA would capture more Cuban prisoners, would you be willing to set up an exchange of these with Fidel Castro for political prisoners whom he has refused to release?"

SAVIMBI: "Definitely, yes. If we now had more prisoners, we would be willing to offer Fidel Castro an exchange, if Castro is ready to release true Cuban patriots who are imprisoned in Cuba; if we could set up any system with the movements that struggle for the liberation of Cuba in the United States, if we had the assurance that these Cuban soldiers could be exchanged for Cuban patriots, we are ready to offer such an exchange."

Problems Between Cubans and Angolans

REGALADO: "We are aware that there are problems between Fidel Castro and Agostinho Neto. How serious are these problems?"

SAVIMBI: "Of course they have problems. These are not ideological problems or differences, because both of them have the same communist ideology. Both Castro and Neto face national problems, technical problems, since Neto himself is feeling here the pressure from Fidel Castro; soldiers

of the MPLA (Angolan communist armed forces) feel oppressed by the Cubans, mistreated by the Cubans; these are involved in illegal transactions, in dirty businesses. But, on the other hand, Neto cannot free himself from the Cuban troops; he is caught in a dilemma: He is under pressure from the Angolan population and his own followers and, at the same time, Neto must keep the Cuban troops in this country in order to stay in power. Fidel Castro, on his side, has the same dilemma: He has his commitments with the Russians, with Neto and, probably, with other countries as Zambia, for instance, to keep Cuban troops in Angola; but this creates both economical and social problems for Cuba. In many instances, according to our information, Castro has proposed to Neto to transfer the economic responsibility of his troops to Angola; but Angola cannot take care of that situation. Cuban troops are creating problems for Castro as much as for Neto."

REGALADO: "And what is the status of the relationship between Cuban troops and the Angolans?"

SAVIMBI: "That relationship is very bad. Not because the Angolan people are against the Cuban people, as a nation; the problem is the attitude of Cuban soldiers, who behave as an expeditionary force, which they are; an expeditionary force that dominates and alienates the Angolan people. Friction between the Angolan people and the Cubans is a daily event."

REGALADO: "Are there also any problems between Cuban soldiers and members of the MPLA (Angolan communist armed forces)?"

SAVIMBI: "There are many problems. MPLA's troops are on their own in the field; they do not have any logistic support, any food, any decent living conditions, considering that they are the ones who take the highest risks, while Cuban troops, foreign troops, get a first-rate treatment overall, even to recover their dead, and the MPLA's troops are watching that reality."

Jonas Savimbi and the United States' Policies

REGALADO: "When we interviewed you for the first time, we asked for your opinion about the United States' policies on Angola and Africa. Six months have elapsed and we would like your opinion about that issue now."

SAVIMBI: "I must tell you that we are feeling frustrated. We had accepted the position that the United States took in 1976, despite the fact that, in that opportunity, the United States did not offer a strong opposition to the Soviet expansionism that the invasion by Cuban troops represented. We have proven that we have been the only ones who combat that Soviet expansionism.

"Now, what is difficult for us to understand is that the United States does not realize the importance and the strategic value of our fight; we are fighting against the Russians, to prevent them from totally occupying Angola and, with this we are not only contributing to liberate the southern African continent, but also impeding the Russians interests. We have had some contacts, in the United States, with friends that we have there, but we are still awaiting something more positive. I must say that our situation regarding the United States is more favorable now than it was six months earlier, but that is not enough; we want to feel, we want to know that Americans have decided to do something more than they did in 1976. Everybody thought that the Cubans and Russians were very powerful and that nobody could defeat them. Three years later we have proven that, with our limited resources, it is possible to confront the Russians. This is the theater where we shall defeat the Russians, for the benefit and tranquility of the rest of Africa.

"The MPLA (Movement for the Liberation of Angola) is an illegal government, because it was taken to power by the Cuban troops. That is why we believe that the United States must not recognize the Luanda regime; such a recognition would not be in the best interest of the United States.

"When we read in the U. S. newspapers that Gulf Oil is looking for oil in Angola, we think

that this is a short-term and short-sighted policy. There are many more minerals in Angola than Gulf Oil is able to find, which could be found by the United States in different conditions. Besides, from the political point of view, it is a contradiction to have Gulf Oil operating in a country that opposes the American democratic system. That is why we feel that the United States must stand firmly and deny recognition to the Luanda regime, so long as Cuban troops are in Angola. We feel that the United States should seek ways to find and help those who fight for the same ideals as the United States has fought throughout all of its history; this is the message that we want to send to the United States, and we hope they will listen to us."

Free Enterprise Under UNITA

REGALADO: "If elections are held and UNITA takes over, could the American and Free World enterprises function at ease in Angola?"

SAVIMBI: "Absolutely, absolutely. We are in total agreement with free enterprise, private industry. We consider that progress needs human encouragement and enthusiasm, the human factor; when one invests what is the product of his or her efforts, one wants to know that something will be received in return; if one knows that such a country does not have any private enterprises, that there is no future, then nobody will have an interest to invest in that country. That is why we can guarantee that, when the Angolan war comes to an end, private industry will be able to operate here fully, since those persons who wish to invest in Angola will not only bring their money and their technology, but also their enthusiasm, and that will help us to solve the problems of the country."

Democracy in Angola

REGALADO: "When UNITA reaches power, what kind of a government will you have?"

SAVIMBI: "First, before saying how the government will be, we must point out that we have Angolan problems, several of them. The first thing that we must do is to unite Angolans so we will frustrate nobody. What I mean is that there is UNITA, the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and even some in the MPLA who have repented of having participated in this adventure and are willing not to repeat the mistake of bringing foreign troops into Angola. We will create, then, a government of national unity. We also have to fight in order to keep our own culture, our customs; we must study those situations to make sure that everyone participates, but all these things must be done on the basic principle of a democratic government; it must be a democratic government where the people will participate, where there will be a parliament, where the government will know that it must respond to a body elected by the people, report about its political actions and even the private actions of its members; where there will be a free press, through which the government must follow a correct line, or else risk to be denounced publicly; a government that will solve Angolan problems. This conference is an example of that wish; all delegates shall give their opinions and participate; it is a true democratic exercise, because that is what we want for Angola; a democratic government of national unity."


CASTRO'S VISION

What visions does Fidel Castro see when he looks into the future? It is probable that he sees himself as the conqueror of the United States. When one considers what he has already achieved, this outcome no longer appears impossible. In addition to consolidating power in Cuba, Castroism is a potent force in Jamaica, Grenada, Guyana, Panama, and Nicaragua, while Cuban troops are consolidating much of Africa for communism. To Castro, all these achievements are but stepping stones towards the overthrow of his major enemy, the United States of America.

THE 1979 CHRISTMAS CARDS

The Crusade Christmas card for 1979 is now available, and we invite our friends and supporters to use them. These cards are provided at no charge, along with envelopes, in the quantity requested. We do not sell these cards but give them to those who ask for them. We do request those who receive the cards to make a gift to the Crusade. The size of the gift is left to the discretion of the donor.

The Design on the Front of the Card



*I live for those who love me,
For those who know me true,
For the Heaven that smiles above me,
And awaits my spirit too;
For the cause that lacks assistance,
For the wrong that needs resistance,
For the future in the distance,
And the good that I can do.*

(Author) George Linnaeus Banks

The Message Inside

"Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder; and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor, The Mighty God, The Everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace." Isaiah 9:6

Christmas speaks of love, happiness and peace. The headlong flight of men, women and children from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos announces to all the world that communism causes infinite suffering. With the hope and prayer that others, including our children and grandchildren, may not fall victim to communism, a gift has been given to support the work of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade.



Please ask for the number of cards you desire. Since the cards are not sold, do not send a sum and ask for as many cards as this will purchase.

These cards serve a dual purpose. They provide a means to send Christmas greetings to family, friends, and business associates, while the gifts given help the Crusade to continue the fight against communism.

The size is 6" X 4-1/2". The lettering is black on white, whereas the design contains reds, yellows and greens on a navy background.

The cards may be personalized with your name and a short message, if requested.

A sample card will be sent immediately on request to:

Christian Anti-Communism Crusade
Post Office Box 890
Long Beach, California 90801



Use bumper and envelope stickers containing the communist formula for the conquest of the United States: "External encirclement, plus internal demoralization, plus thermonuclear blackmail, leads to progressive surrender." For these stickers, Christmas cards, and free copies of the Crusade newsletter, write to: Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, P.O. Box 890, Long Beach, Ca. 90801

Dr. Fred Schwarz, Editor

GOOD THINGS FROM CAPITALISM

Very little printed material favorable to the free enterprise system reaches literate individuals in underdeveloped countries. It is not surprising, therefore, that most citizens of these countries, even Christians, regard the capitalist system as an unmitigated evil.

In the light of this, the following letter from a Nigerian national is especially significant. It is his response to an article published in the April 15 newsletter criticizing an article written by Stanley Mooneyham of World Vision which was published in the Campus Crusade magazine, Worldwide Challenge, under the title, 'The System': Creating Poverty Amidst Plenty.

I have been delighted to read your newsletter of April 15, 1979 in which you criticised the article of Dr. Mooneyham. I have also often blamed the advanced countries for the gains they take out of the third world but I have scarcely thought of the good things the third world would not have enjoyed but for the advanced nations. My view now has changed. It is better to ^{politely} insist that the advanced countries should ^{as gods stewards,} do a little bit more each time for the underprivileged countries.

Who told Dr Mooneyham that we have two Judgement Days? I don't understand how I can punish "crimes - those committed by governments against their people" without committing sin of killing, thinking of myself more highly than I should and the like. I feel that through prayers and preaching and ^{frank} consultation ^{with the poor groups} crimes can be eliminated - not through punishment "this side of Judgement Day".

May God bless and expand C.A.C.C.
Your regular reader