



**A Layman's
Pocket Guide
To
SALT II**

Introduction

Following a meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, a group of U.S. senators reported that the Russians "badly want" a SALT II treaty with the United States.

SALT II would give the Kremlin a substantial advantage over us while freezing us in an irreversible position of strategic inferiority. That is why the Russians "badly want" it.

"We are in danger . . ." warned Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb. "We should not allow the SALT II negotiators to impede measures that are vitally needed for our survival."

Calling for reversal of the Carter administration's policy of appeasement, Prof. Eugene Rostow, former undersecretary of state for political affairs under President Kennedy, equated SALT II with a "step toward war, not peace."

Echoing Rostow's concern, many segments of the American people—educational organizations, members of Congress from both parties, and prominent military, political, civic and professional leaders—have urged President Carter to reject the proposed pact.

In response, the administration has mounted, at taxpayer's expense, a nationwide sales campaign for SALT II, at the same time keeping details of the accord secret from the American public and glossing over the fact that all the crucial issues have not yet been settled.

What Is SALT II?

SALT—Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty—is a series of talks between the U.S. and the USSR designed to limit and reduce strategic nuclear weapons.

In the past 15 years, the U.S. has signed four arms limitations agreements with the USSR. The first SALT agreement—SALT I—was signed in May 1972. Although SALT I expired in 1977, its terms remain in effect as a bilateral understanding until conclusion of SALT II.

SALT I Failed. Why SALT II?

The most disturbing fact that SALT II sellers have avoided discussing is that with every arms limitations agreement the Russians have gained on us.

Far from stabilizing the arms race, SALT I has enabled the Soviet Union to develop new strategic weapons, vastly improve old ones and deploy them with virtual impunity. Furthermore, during the SALT I period, the Soviet Union has systematically sabotaged world peace—plunging the Middle East into a new war, defaulting on its obligations as a guarantor of the 1973 Indochina peace agreements, and launching proxy aggression in Africa, Southeast Asia and other parts of the world.

The Decline of U.S. Military Strength

Some 16 years ago, during the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. enjoyed an enormous strategic advantage over the Soviet Union—about 8 to 1 in our favor.

Today, because of SALT I, our supremacy has almost vanished.

We have virtually eliminated our powerful fleet of strategic bombers. Half of our B-52 long-range bombers have been deactivated. President Carter has cancelled the more modern B-1 bomber—widely regarded as an adequate replacement for the obsolescent B-52—although the Russians are producing a similarly modern version.

Other U.S. strategic weapons have been either delayed or eliminated. The USSR now has about 12,000 strategic anti-aircraft missiles, while the U.S. has none. Before SALT I, we had more than 1,000 medium-range strategic bombers; now, we have only 60.

Defense experts say that, by the early 1980s, thanks to the one-way U.S. policy of nuclear and conventional disarmament, the Russians will have the ability to destroy 90 percent of our antiballistic missiles by firing only one-third of their missiles.

In fact, before SALT I, the total destructive power of our strategic weapons exceeded 20,000 megatons, as compared with less than 15,000 for the Russians. Since then, they have increased their nuclear yield almost four times; ours has been reduced to less than 4,000 megatons.

According to Dr. Igor Glagolev, a former high-ranking Soviet SALT advisor who defected to the West in 1976, the USSR's present nuclear superiority is "considered by Soviet specialists sufficient to destroy the bulk of American strategic weapons and the population of the United States, and win a nuclear war."

Is The Soviet Union Preparing for War?

The U.S. Seventh Fleet is now outgunned by the Russian Pacific fleet. NATO is seriously outmatched in tanks, men and other hardware by Warsaw Pact forces. Everywhere in the world the forces of freedom are outgunned. Still, the Russians have not relented.

The Soviet Union's actual military budget is 40-80 percent higher than that of the U.S. Russian military expenditures in 1976 nearly tripled those of 1974, with some \$100 billion earmarked for nuclear weapons. In 1977 Russian defense spending reached \$130 billion. About 60 percent of Moscow's industrial enterprises is involved in military production and four-fifths of its scientific research budget is for military purposes.

The Soviet Union has invested an as-

tronomical \$65 billion in the last decade in its massive civil defense buildup. Over the same period, we have spent only \$898 million.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has attested to this drastic imbalance, saying in a December 1, 1978 memo that there are many indications that the Russians are structuring the forces to fight a nuclear war.

How can the U.S. successfully face such a threat with military expenditures that represent the lowest percentage of the total federal budget and of total U.S. output since the beginning of the Korean War, nearly three decades ago?

The Russians Have Cheated

The Russians have used arms limitations talks as a smokescreen to mask a drive toward military superiority. They have cheated under every arms limitations agreements, including the critical SALT I.

Experts have catalogued and analyzed at least 12 major instances of Moscow's violations of SALT I. The Russians have exploited "loopholes" and "vaguely-worded treaty provisions" for their own strategic benefit. In the judgment of former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, the Russians have conducted radar tests forbidden by SALT I, and have also cheated on the clear American under-

standing that neither side would appreciably increase the size of its inter-continental missiles.

Our open society gives the USSR a profusion of sizable means of checking on our weapons development and deployment—through illegal and legal intelligence, technical journals and open debate. While the Russian police state gives us none in return. With the clear intent of cheating, the Russians have not allowed on-site inspection of their missiles, thus forcing the U.S. to rely solely on its own electronic monitoring capabilities. Even these strictures have been obstructed by the Russians through the encoding of test data of their missiles, brazenly interfering with verification procedures established by SALT I.

Prominent defense and intelligence experts—including Dr. Ray S. Cline, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Gen. Daniel Graham, former chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency—have asserted that it will be impossible for the United States to verify the Soviet Union's compliance with SALT II.

Paul Warnke, outgoing chief negotiator of SALT II, testified before Congress that an agreement that is not completely verifiable is probably worse than no agreement at all and a "source of instability."

Why then is the Carter administration pressing so hard for SALT II?

What the United States needs is not another "source of instability" in this all too unstable world, but rather a truly even-handed and workable SALT treaty that would limit strategic arms, enhance national and global security, deter war and proxy aggression, and maintain the strategic balance.

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Marx Lewis, Chairman
P.O. Box 3183
Orlando, FL 32802
Tel: (305) 299-3007

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For further information write to:

Marx Lewis, Chairman
P. O. Box 3183
Orlando, Fla. 32802