fication for our chemical campaign in Vietnam.

I believe that the use of chemicals as an anti-food weapon is highly unprincipled. Starvation is a weapon that strikes the old and the young, the sick and infirm, first. The fighting man is the last to suffer as Dr. Jean Mayer, President Nixon's nutrition advisor has pointed out. We didn't use the blight against the Japanese rice crop in World War II; I don't believe that we should use herbicides against crops in Vietnam.

The use of defoliants and herbicides was not mentioned in the Geneva Protocol when it was drafted because these chemicals hadn't been invented. Although the UN Report discusses the use of defoliants and heribicides, it is not clear whether they are banned by the Protocol or not. I believe that herbicides used for crop destruction certainly are covered by the spirit of the Protocol. I have grave reservations about the use of defoliants on vegetation on the massive scale that we have employed them in Vietnam. Even the expert usually cited by the Departments of State and Defense to justify the use of defoliants in Vietnam, Dr. Fred Tsehirley, admits that we need to know much more about the effects of our activity than we do now. An intensive and careful assessment of the effects of our defoliation operations in Vietnam is one of the highest orders of priority. Only in this way will we know whether operations of this type permanently alter the ecology of a nation. Otherwise we may find our actions described in the words of Tacitus, "when they make a wilderness, they call it peace."

I have also recently learned that the herbicides used on crops in Vietnam, whether on purpose or by accident, has resulted in the birth of deformed children in Vietnam. That the application of chemicals to food has this effect should not surprise us. The history of the use of hard insecticides should have warned us that this would happen. What does surprise me is that we continue to use these herbicides and defoliants after reports of their danger have been received. I have asked Secretary Finch for a full report on the medical dangers inherent in this program.

STOCKPILES AND FORCES

I believe that we can significantly reduce our stockpiles of gas if we adopt the policies that I have recommended. I believe that we can convert our biological warfare laboratories and production centers into medical research laboratories without affecting our defense capability. I believe we can limit our chemical effort to research and development and a limited retaliatory capability.

INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

I have already urged President Nixon to resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the United States Senate for ratification. Ninety-eight other Congressmen and 23 Senators have joined in sponsoring resolutions urging him to do so. I am hopeful that the House Foreign Affairs Committee can hold hearings on the House Resolution in the near future. I believe that the Congress would welcome the chance to consider this treaty.

A second international initiative has been made by the United Kingdom at the Geneva Disarmament Committee. The UK has submitted a resolution that would ban the development, production, stockpiling and use of biological weapons. The White House indicated in a letter to me that the United States supports this resolution in principle. As a result of the National Security Council meeting, we should go on to endorse this resolution and fully support its passage at the United Nations. We do not need disease as a weapon.

Third, I believe that we can take the initiative at the United Nations to work for effective disarmament controls for chemical weapons. We spend only a fraction of the money on detection and arms limitation studies that we do on stockpiling. I think that if we redress this balance, we may be able to work out an effective arms limitation treaty for chemical weapons.

Fourth, I believe that we should establish a blue-ribbon panel of objective experts to examine the effects of the defoliation campaign in Vietnam. In this way, preparations for the study could be made and it could be initiated as soon as the conflict ends.

In conclusion, I believe that we should re-assert the traditional policy of the United States towards chemical and biological warfare, the policy enunciated by Presidents Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, Roosevelt and Eisenhower. This is a policy that states that we regard these forms of warfare with horror and revulsion and will only use them in retaliation. I believe we should go further and abandon biological warfare. And I believe that we should search for effective means of limiting chemical warfare. These objectives are within our reach. It is up to us to take them.

Warfare is a kind of madness, a collective sickness of mankind. Fortunately, our revulsion at over one million gas casualties in World War I led to the adoption of the one successful arms limitation in recent history. We can strengthen this limitation. And we can work to adopt other arms limitations, a ban on nuclear weapons, a means of resolving international conflict without resorting to violence. These are the ultimate objectives. Perhaps on CBW we can set a

INFLUENCE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT ON SOCIETY AND NATIONAL ECONOMY

HON. HAROLD E. HUGHES

OF IOWA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, November 5, 1969

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, we all know that there is a rising concern in our country regarding the influence of the military on our society and our national economy. This concern, which had its best known expression in President Eisenhower's farewell speech as President, is shared by a growing number of concerned citizens who represent a wide variance of opinion on other issues of war and peace.

Many of our young people are feeling this same concern over the influence of the Military Establishment on our culture. Some express this by dropping out, some by protest, some even by violence. However, an increasing number of young people are turning their intellectual capabilities to serious study and analysis of our system in order to find answers to the questions raised by the protestors.

Whether we agree with their conclusions or not, I believe we can applaud their initiative and constructive purpose. Research and investigation require intellectual discipline and the commitment of ideas to the cold logic of print shows a willingness to debate their validity.

One such group of young people was organized this summer by the Institute for Policy Studies, an independent research organization concerned with contemporary issues of public policy. Eleven college students spent the summer investigating the way policies are evolved in the Military Establishment, including our future policy toward foreign involvements and the way in which weapons procurement decisions are made.

I commend these students for their initiative in undertaking their studies and also their willingness to put their views on the line in this fashion. Recognizing that viewpoints expressed in such projects may be highly controversial, I nonetheless believe that studies of this nature are eminently worthwhile and I hope they will continue. I therefore ask unanimous consent that the report be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SUMMER RESEARCH PROJECT

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Under the sponsorship of the Institute for Policy Studies, a group of 11 college students has conducted an intensive investigation into the activities and policies of the American defense establishment. The use of a summer study to investigate an institution or policy has become frequent practice. In fact, this approach has been used by the national security establishment itself in the development of new weapon systems.

Leonard Rodberg, professor of physics at the University of Maryland and former head of science policy research of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, acted as coordinator for the students, with the assistance of the Institute's co-directors, Richard Barnet and Marc Raskin. Seymour M. Hersh, former AP correspondent at the Pentagon and author of the book *Chemical and Biological Warfare, America's Hidden Arsenal* advised the students on investigative matters

The students pored over military and industrial journals, studied the reports of research organizations like Rand and the Institute for Defense Analysis, and interviewed ranking officials in the Pentagon and State Department. They did not make use of classified material. The information and conclusions in this report are based on sources which are open to newsmen and the public — sources, however, which are little used other than by military contractors and military-oriented professional organizations.

This report is an attempt to illuminate, in some specific, critical areas, the functioning of the national security establishment which has evolved in the United States. The different sections of the report are based on longer, more detailed papers prepared by individual students during the course of the summer. The complete papers with research notes are expected to be published in book form in the near future

I. INTERVENTION

The policy has not changed

President Nixon's recent statements about American military disengagement from the Third World, particularly Asia, have a familiar ring. President Johnson stated that American boys would not be sent to do the job for Asian boys, and President Kennedy stressed the importance of self-reliance for the less developed nations. Such rhetoric should not be mistaken for policy. Our perusal of official government policy documents and our interviews with government officials

have led us to the conclusion that American foreign policy with regard to the Third World has not changed essentially from the days of Truman, and it will not be changed by the Nixon Administration.

Vietnam was not an aberration, but a logical outcome of U.S. foreign policy in the post-WWII era. Policy makers miscalculated only to the extent that they underestimated the ability of the enemy to resist American military might. As President Johnson noted in his 1966 State of the Union address, Vietnam "is not an isolated episode but another great event in the policy that we have followed with strong consistency since WWII."

Our investigation has shown that the U.S. failure in Vietnam has not called into question the basic premises of American foreign policy. Policy makers have not forsaken the policy of intervention—they merely wish to defend U.S. interests at a more acceptable level of cost. Policy makers have derived two important lessons from our Vietnam experience: (1) We need to be more selective in choosing the next country in which to apply our own forces; (2) We need to formulate more suitable tactics

An officer in the JCS counterinsurgency division told us, "Intervention on any scale leads to further intervention. So in the future any cause will be much more carefully examined and our response much more carefully assessed." Another noted that "we are going to make a more careful assessment of geography and historical circumstances. When these factors make the situation favorable, we should be able to defeat them without risking the involvement of combat troops, which is something we deeply desire to avoid." By way of illustration, the officer explained that "*the historical circumstances of Thailand make it a good bet.* Unlike South Vietnam, it is a nation to begin with; it has experienced centuries of stable governments, has religious and social cohesion, has a pretty secure economic base, and is included under treaty arrangements with the United States."

Walking over to a map of Asia, he planted his finger on Burma. "Here would be a country we would have second thoughts about protecting, from the simple standpoint of geography. It has a long border with China, which would give the insurgents a secure sanctuary, and would allow an almost painless infiltration of men and supplies." Moving his finger over to the Philippines, he continued. "In the Philippines, however, there is a chance to assert our naval power. The country is surrounded by water, so it would be impossible for an insurgent movement to receive outside aid. There, sources of weapons could easily be dried up."

The question of future armed interventions is, thus, one of risk-calculation. High and middle-level officials from the State Department and Department of Defense regularly participate in elaborate war games sponsored by the JCS Joint War Games Agency. Players act out scenarios of crisis situations. "Some games," said General Wheeler, "have caused a revision in contingency plans . . ." The danger is that such methods have the effect of assuring policy makers that they have explored and resolved all aspects of a problem, and they may decide to intervene, confident that the correct calculation has been made.

As the Pentagon sees it, one of the problems with Vietnam—in addition to our failure to properly assess the risk involved there—was that our methods were clumsy. "Vietnam," explained an officer on the JCS staff, "was not a test of counterinsurgency operations in the proper sense of the phrase. We ended up fighting a limited conventional war in a mobile battlefield . . . Instead of doing this again, we have to devote more attention to nipping insurgencies in the bud, to preventing them from occurring rather than jumping in after the conflict has escalated."

The U.S. Army has thus assumed the mission of acting as an agent of social change. "When a society is in order," said another officer, "insurgencies don't occur. We are in favor of helping people to make a non-violent appropriate change." Consequently, civic action is stressed as a way to prevent inappropriate, i.e., pro-communist or anti-Western, guerrilla movements from gaining hold. American military assistance groups involve themselves in road-building, construction of schools and medical facilities, and in the promotion of internal security measures. Having been taught by experience in Vietnam that the use of large military forces is an ineffective way of counteracting insurgency, the importance of civilian police training is being stressed.

The trouble is that this "new" wisdom is really old wisdom; policy makers have learned from Vietnam what was already available knowledge: revolutionary movements arise from conditions of social and political unrest. Nothing really has changed in American foreign policy. *The U.S. will continue to intervene in other countries, using military and economic peneration (which we prefer to call "assistanee") and clandestine subversion whenever policy makers perceive that it is in our national interest to do so.*

"To lose another Latin American country is simply not allowable," explained a high State Department official, "because it would seriously affect the world's perception of the United States' ability to keep its own house in order." And an analyst from the Army's think tank, the Research Analyst Corporation, said of Ethiopia, "We have a vital interest in seeing that Haile Selassie doesn't fall. The Soviet Union has long had designs on the Red Sea—in order to give them access in the Indian Ocean. If they can overthrow Haile, they could then fill the power vacuum in the Indian Ocean."

The world is filled with potential trouble-spots which, in the eyes of policy makers, may demand American involvement. Reassessment of the underlying premises of American policy do not take place in the Pentagon or State Department. "At the Pentagon," says a former high-ranking member of the DOD Systems Analysis Office, "there are certain rules of debate that dictate subjects that simply can't be discussed except informally at lunch. *Overall strategic objectives are never challenged; the basic premise is interventionism, and the topic of debate is the most effective way of configuring our forces to serve this policy.* After initial policy decisions are made, events just lumber on; the effects ooze down into every part of the establishment." He continued, "At the start of the Kennedy years, great interest and enthusiasm was devoted to counter-in-surgency. This became the saleable environment in which the services could market their hardware. Each service would invent its force needs and say, 'What programs can we field this year under the rubric of counterinsurgency?' This will probably go on for a decade until the fashion changes."

The inertia of the Pentagon bureaucracy, and the vested interests which have grown up around the role of America as the keeper of the world law and order, make significant policy change all but impossible. Even the power of the President is limited. "The options the President exercises over foreign policy are bound to be limited," said a high State Department official. *"There is little possibility that the President can alter basic policy premises.* Our conception of fundamental interest is non-controversial; the question is what you do to promote these interests. What the President can do is develop force configurations; he can decide, for example, whether we should have eight divisions in Southeast Asia or five."—Research by Bill Stivers and Nick Herman.

The capacity to intervene

"Now the rest of the world can try to catch up" proclaims a double-page ad in a recent issue of *Life* magazine. Beneath a photo of the huge Lockheed C-5A plane, we learn that: "The C-5A Galaxy is more than the world's largest airplane. It's a new kind of defense system. It's like having a military base in nearly every strategic spot on the globe."

To meet the needs of America's interventionist foreign policy, the Defense Department has developed the capability to "project" its forces anywhere in the world on short notice. In the name of a Rapid Deployment Strategy, the programs to increase airlift and sealift capabilities of the armed forces have been given unprecedented support inside the Pentagon. *The $2.1 billion requested for airlift/sealift programs in the FY 1970 budget represented the largest percentage increase over FY 1969 of any major military program.* With the development of a rapid response capability, it is obvious that Nixon's announced policy of selectively withdrawing American troops from Vietnam does not necessarily signal any real change in intervention strategy. We will have the capability to intervene when and where we want—a capability which is controlled by Executive power and over which Congress has no say.

The Defense Department no longer favors permanent stationing of U.S. troops at "potential trouble spots" throughout the world, because of adverse political reactions and economic consequences such as the balance of payments problem. To maintain strategic flexibility, the Pentagon has decided to rely instead on direct transportation from the U.S. Using these new mobility concepts, much of the equipment which the Army deemed necessary for "maximum combat effectiveness" was unable to fit into our older aircraft. By 1964, the requirements for the new C-5A aircraft were finalized. This year in August, at the Dulles Air Show outside Washington, D.C., the first C-5A was unveiled for the public.

The C-5A is not the only necessary element of the Rapid Deployment Strategy. In 1964 a JCS Staff's special studies group concluded that the most effieient rapid deployment capability could be atttained by a mix of airlift, sealift, and selective pre-positioning of equipment. The study suggested that rapid deploymnet could be used as a "deterrent"—it would provide the capability for stopping all revolutionary threats, because it would enable U.S. forces to mount quickly a "show of force."

A high level Air Force official described this capability to us as an advanced form of "gunboat diplomacy." The justification given is that a quick commitment of force will mean a smaller commitment in the long run, or, as General H. K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, put it, "A brigade in time may save the commitment of nine."

The Military Airlift Command now directs more than 109,000 planes at 419 locations in nearly 40 countries; it is also in charge of approximately 20,000 Air Force reservists, and of the operation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)—a backstop force composed of civilian planes which, in an emergency, would replace military aircraft in more routine logistics missions. Prior to 1963, the airlift capability of CRAF was not available to the Defense Department unless the President declared a national emergency. Now, however, *in a "State I" emergency determined by the Secretary of Defense, CRAF aircraft can be requisitioned, according to a MAC information bulletin, "to perform airlift service for DOD in support of counter-insurgency activities, localized military emergencies and similar type actions".* As of

August 1968, there were 350 aircraft (300 of them jets) in the international fleet of CRAF.

A demonstration of American airlift capacity was given in March, 1969, when 2,700 soldiers were transported from the East Coast of the U.S. to Korea. "This 10,000 mile airlift," wrote General Jack Catton, head of the Military Airlift Command, "demonstrated the U.S. national resolve to support its allies and its ability to place its combat forces in the most distant of locations on the shortest notice, equipped and ready to fight."

Pentagon studies demonstrated that the cost of airlift operations, even with the C–5A, were generally prohibitive and that a complementary sealift capability was needed. In 1964 a Navy study endorsed the idea of the Fast Deployment Logistic (FDL) ship loaded with military equipment and converging on trouble spots to "marry up" with troops airlifted from the U.S. In his 1967 presentation outlining the potential of the FDLs, Admiral Nathan Sonenshein, project manager of the program, said:

"Because of the freedom of the seas and the extended endurance envisioned for them, FDLs could steam *without public knowledge*, if necessary, to an advantageous position for rapid deployment." (Emphasis added.)

The potential for rapid intervention, without knowledge of the Congress or the public, is apparent.

Although Congress has, thus far, failed to approve funds for the FDL, the Navy is still intent on its program, and the program still has the strong endorsement of the Pentagon. The July, 1969, edition of the Army Logistic Study Program reports on a study initiated by the Deputy Chief of Staff for military operations "to develop concepts and doctrine concerning Army participation in FDL ship operations, to insure that the proposed characteristics of FDL ships are compatible with Army requirements." The Navy is seeking a maritime equivalent to the Air Force's Civil Reserve Air Fleet, and is now working with the maritime industry on a similar concept called the "Respond commercial augmentation program."—Research by Tom Klein

Special forces

The defense establishment continues to nurture the elite force trained to combat guerrilla forces in the Third World. Recent disclosures on the CIA have noted the close, operational relationship between the CIA and the Army's Special Forces.

Elevated to national stature in the first years of the Kennedy Administration—Kennedy gave the Special Forces the right to wear the Green Beret again overruling top Army officials who felt such gear encouraged a trend toward "private armies"—the Special Forces are involved in counterinsurgency operations around the world. They have worked with the Kurds in Iran; they are currently active in Ethiopia; they trained the Thai troops now in Vietnam; they work with the Nationalist Chinese army on Taiwan; they were active in the Congo and Liberia. During the American intervention in the Dominican Republic, the Green Berets reported directly to the CIA, which currently maintains a liasion officer at Ft Bragg, home of the Army's Special Forces.

One of the key functions of the Special Forces at Ft. Bragg (the John F. Kennedy School for Military Assistance) is training foreign military officers. Between 1952–62 more than 800 officers from 44 foreign countries were graduated. "The foreign trainees ostensibly represented the uniformed services of their countries," wrote a former defense official, "but actually they were handpicked by their nations' intelligence organizations and had to be approved by the CIA. Under the guise of a military aid program, these men attended the Special Forces School at Ft. Bragg."

According to a publication prepared by Ft. Bragg, these foreign "students" have come from such countries as Portugal, Spain, and South Africa (in addition to other NATO and SEATO countries and almost every country in Latin America). Purportedly we are protecting American interests, by training the officers of avowedly fascist and racist countries to counter internal threats against their oppressive regimes and (in the case of Portugal) to maintain colonial regimes in Africa.

The Navy and the Air Force maintain their own special forces. The "Blue Berets", our air commandos, train at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. One of their important jobs is to fly air cover missions for the Green Berets. The Navy has its Seal teams (the name is derived from sea, air, and land) who are "trained to conduct unconventional or paramilitary operations and to train personnel of allied nations in such operations." As off-shoots of Navy Underwater Demolition Units, Seal teams train at little Creek, Virginia, and Coronado, California, to operate from subs and air drop into coastal areas. Seal units are used in Vietnam to ambush Viet Cong.—Research by Derek Shearer

II ARMS AND INDUSTRY

*Defense industry. The fourth branch of Government**

The military market supports the largest single industry in the country today, providing more than $40 billion in sales each year and involving in total over 20,000 firms. In FY 1969 there were more than $24 billion in prime contracts for new weapons systems and components, in addition to more than $6 billion for military research and development. The industry is remarkably concentrated, with the 100 largest contractors receiving two-thirds of the total contract funds, and the top 25 receiving half these funds.

Negotiated contracts are the rule rather than the exception in the defense industry, accounting for 58% of all military prime contracts in 1968, with advertised competitive bidding accounting for only 11.5% of the total procurement dollars. As Admiral Rickover has said, "Of course there is no real price competition for military equipment. There is some less competition 'to buy in', that is to make the initial award of a popular item. However there is usually little or no competition in the price of the original contract, and the government must negotiate with a supplier to establish prices."

Supposedly there is substantial competition among the firms in the defense business, but in fact this industry is one of our least competitive. Firms seldom if ever suffer a financial loss in their defense business. *The Defense Department acts to insure that the firms which do business with it remain financially healthy.* Through the widespread use of negotiated contracts and "change orders", to add a firm is almost automatic. And the investment which a defense firm must make is considerable smaller than that of a firm doing business with the public. The Federal Government will often provide the building and much of the capital equipment at no cost to the firm (roughly half of the capital assets controlled by defense firms are government property), and it will make "progress payments" even before it receives the finished product.

There also appears to be an informal policy within the Defense Department to provide an automatic share of military business to each of the large defense firms, rationalized by a belief that these firms represent a necessary part of our national security and must be kept financially healthy. As one industry official put it to us, "Everyone feeds at the trough, even though it isn't planned that way." Any idle industrial capacity is filled by new programs. When the Fast Deployment Logistic Ship program was cancelled by the Congress, the Division of Litton Industries which had begun building shipyard facilities for this program instead received a contract (expected to total over a billion dollars) for construction of the new Helicopter Assault Ship. *The result of this policy is a striking entrenchment of the major defense firms in their successful profit positions; 21 of the top twenty-five defense firms in 1966 were also in the top twenty-five a decade earlier. Furthermore, no large defense firm has folded and few have significantly reduced their military business in the last decade.*

A recent sampling of the views of industry leaders indicated that they are quite satisfied with this situation and have no intention of gambling its future on risky ventures in the civilian market. While much industry advertising refers to their potential contribution to solving the nation's social ills, in fact there have been little industry funds invested in this area, and defense firms have shown little capacity for participating successfully in the civilian market. It is therefore important to them that the market of defense contracts continue active and that their firm receives a significant share of the defense business. This requires an all out effort to be involved with the weapons decision process itself, and these firms have been highly successful in this effort.

To maintain a high volume of sales, the defense industry employs an army of salesmen, whose job is to establish close relations with Defense Department officials charged with developing and procuring weapons systems and materiel. The private firms which benefit from this procurement employ thousands of military officers and former defense officials, and high positions in the Pentagon are filled by officials of these companies. But day-to-day contact between industry representatives and government officials is the primary means of insuring that the interests of the industry are well represented and continuously in the minds of those in the government who make the decisions.

Industry efforts are aimed at winning contracts for the actual production of hardware or, in the words of one representative, "the pot of gold." However, this does not mean that they wait for the procurement decision. Rather, industry must "buy in" early in the research and development phase to gain the specialized information that will make it a 'sole source" when the procurement award is made. As an officer of General Dynamics told us, "You have to get in on the ground floor or forget it." Or, as Murray Weidenbaum, now Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, put it, "At the present time, typically, the key competition is for the relatively small development contract, and the winner of that virtually automatically gets the large so-called 'follow-up' procurement contracts." At this stage the competition for the development contract is stiff and they will go all out to win. As Frederic Scherer, an authority on the weapon acquisition process, has put it, "Firms are frequently compelled to make overly optimistic technical promises, to divert top technical talents from research and development work to selling activities, to hoard scarce technical talent, and to diversify at government expense into fields often served more effectively by existing specialists."

Industry representatives are in continuing contact with government officials, where they can influence new research and development decisions, suggest ideas for new systems and for system improvement, and establish in the minds of the government official the special competence of their firms to carry out the job. As one sales representative told us, *"If you wait around until the RFP [request for proposal] comes out, you're dead."* Such close contact is viewed as essential by these firms, if they are to be prepared to suggest and

*This section is based on extensive interviews with Washington representatives of ranking defense firms.

then carry out the specialized tasks required in any weapons systems development. As an official of North American Rockwell told us, "Any company which would go by all the rules would have no idea what the government wants and would be developing things that would be completely out of line."

Industry attempts, as much as possible, to staff its sales force with engineers, so they can deal as professional colleagues with their government counterparts, rather than acting merely as salesmen looking for the government's money. As one representative put it, "The day of back-slapping, cigar-smoking, cocktail-sipping, glossy brochure-selling is gone. The marketing process is highly technical and sophisticated."

Industry takes advantage of the insistence of each service that it remain on the frontier of advanced technology. The contractor is free to come up with a design that exceeds the initial requirements, and in most cases such a proposal will be enthusiastically received. As an official at LTV remarked, "Several companies may come up with a good design, but what makes you better is what else you might come up with, what added component you have, what possible breakthrough you stimulate." Since the pressure for technological sophistication is far greater than any pressure to keep costs down, this results in rapidly rising costs and, even more important, a direct and powerful influence by defense contractors on the weapons which the military wants and procures.

Defense firms maintain active research and development programs supported by overhead receipts on prior contracts. Through these efforts they develop ideas and products which can then be sold to the government on a sole-source basis. By this means they can, in industry jargon, "create a need", that is, generate the demand which they alone can meet. As a representative of North American Rockwell informed us, "Your ultimate goal is to actually write the RFP, and this happens more often than you might think." *Another, from Pratt and Whitney, boasted, "We have the technical superiority and are on the offensive. We spoon-feed them. We ultimately try to load them with our own ideas and designs, but in such a way that, when they walk away from the conference table, they are convinced it was their idea all along."*

This process was described to us by one salesman in these words: "We get together with the development planning people in the military services and swap information around, coming up with something new through an interactive process." This is, of course, a quite different picture of the weapons decision process from what the public usually gets. While in official presentations the Defense Department acts as if it uses independent analysis in deciding on weapons procurements, in fact the decisions are made through an interactive process which is invisible to the public and in which those in industry who benefit financially and those who benefit through increased power for the Services work hand in hand.

As a recent editorial in *Fortune* magazine said, "At staggering costs, the military has repeatedly bought weapons and deployed forces in ways that have added only marginally to national security . . . The interplay between the services and their suppliers generates pressures to maintain high levels of defense spending, almost regardless of the external threat. The natural desire of military men to have ever-more sophisticated and expensive weaponry coincides with the desire of contractors to supply it." This was put even more forcibly by Peter Schenck, an official of the Raytheon Corporation and former president of the Air Force Association: "The day has passed when the military requirement for a major weapons system is set by the military and passed on to industry to build the hardware. Today it is more likely that the military requirement is the result of joint participation of military and industrial personnel, and it is not unusual for industry's contribution to be a key factor. *Indeed, there are highly-placed military men who sincerely feel that industry is currently setting the pace in the research and development of new weapons systems.*"—Research by David Sims.

Missiles

The operation of the defense industry is predicated upon continuing technological change, which makes weapons purchasing a never-ending process. Jerome Wiesner, former Presidential science advisor, has said that "we are running an arms race with ourselves." This can nowhere be seen more clearly than in the missile industry, where technological change within our own program has fueled a spiraling arms race.

Based on concepts developed in our own research and development programs, the intelligence arms of the Pentagon conjure up a Communist "threat". Even when there is no evidence that the Soviet Union, for instance, is actually developing a particular weapon, it is assumed that they will come up with the requisite technology and will embody it in a new, deployed weapons system. For public consumption the "threat" is then multiplied to attain a "greater than expected threat", which requires that the U.S. go ahead with the urgent development and deployment of the new weapon. *In such an environment the only ceiling on weapons development becomes technological imagination.*

The newest weapons in the strategic arsenal, the ABM and MIRV, grew out of this process. The development of MIRV was linked to the Air Force desire to attain a first-strike capability. John S. Foster, Jr., head of defense R&D, has testified that the MIRV concept was originally generated as a means of increasing the number of targets we could attack with our ICBMs. But when the program was publicly announced, it was justified as a necessary improvement to allow us to penetrate a ABM defense which we believed the Russians were building. Even though we now know that the Russians have halted installation of their ABM system, so that the "threat" has vanished, the MIRV program goes on. In the process, our own MIRV program has generated fears of a Soviet MIRV program, a possibility which has been used to justify deployment of the Safeguard ABM system.

As this arms race has developed, there have been three public "generations" of the Air Force's Minuteman missile, each claimed to have definite advantages over the previous model, and each justified by the need to counter anticipated Soviet advances in offensive weapons. In actuality, developments in the Minuteman program have been cumulative, with over 8,000 changes in the Minuteman system since its inception. *The designations Minuteman I, II, III were afterthoughts developed as part of the publicity program for this missile, with the identification of these "generations" clearly intended to show that their development is ongoing and even evolutionary, not unlike American cars which come in new models each year.*

A. E. Fitzgerald, an Air Force management specialist, reported that officials working on the Minuteman knew nothing of Minuteman II until they received notice from the Pentagon ordering them to re-estimate the costs of a system designated "Minuteman II." And when the initial contracts for the MIRV system were let in 1965, it was considered a new component for Minuteman II. These continuous changes in the components of the Minuteman system keep a continuing flow of funds to the aerospace contractors and, as Merton Tyrell, an Air Force consultant, has testified, permit these companies to recoup losses they may have suffered during early stages of the program. (Even unchanged parts like cable assemblies then show substantial increases in cost, from $13,700 in Minuteman I to $19,800 in Minuteman II.)

The aerospace industry is certain that further "improvements" in the Minuteman missile are inevitable, and that substantial sums will be spent on this system in the coming decade. The project manager at Boeing, the prime contractor for the Minuteman system, assured his employees last year that there would be at least eight more years of Minuteman procurement and that *"the future of Minuteman appears almost limitless."*—Research by Nancy Lipton, Mary McCarthy, and Marc Kramer.

Arms under the sea

While the Army is proceeding with the deployment of a nationwide ABM system, and the Air Force has new missiles and the new manned bomber in the works, the Navy is quietly planning the conquest of the ocean's depths. Programs in the works offer a chance for industry to find another source of government money and give the Navy an opportunity to extend the American military presence into yet another domain beyond our borders.

The Navy is actively pursuing the development of a deep submergence rescue vehicle, billed as the answer to the Scorpion and Thresher disasters. However, the new ship's capabilities as a submarine rescue vehicle are only a thin cover for the Navy's desire to develop a vehicle which can resupply a submarine while it remains submerged, leading ultimately to the establishment of self-sustained undersea bases which could be resupplied in a similar manner. As a high official in the deep-submergence program told us, *"The DSRV isn't worth its cost as a rescue vehicle. Submarines just don't sink that often, but that was the only way we could sell it."* (Only two submarines have been lost in recent years, and even in those cases, the DSRV would not have helped, because of the time required to find the sunken submarine and transport the DSRV to the site.)

Proponents of the Navy's Deep Submergence program have been quite open in stating its objectives, "to provide a capability for supporting rescue and recovery operations, maintaining bottom-mounted equipment, exploring and exploiting the continental shelf, and possibly assisting in covert military operations." The Director, John Craven, has suggested that, if man can develop the ability to work in water of great depths for extended periods of time, it is an easy conceptual leap to under-water armies operating under the sea as soldiers do on land. Indeed, the Navy has argued (in a similar fashion to Air Force arguments for the uses of space) that the conduct of warfare under the sea provides a "humane" way of carrying out military conflicts, with civilian casualties minimized.

A Navy study of ocean engineering and deep submergence for the next decade urges that it develop the capacity to establish a manned underwater habitat, with a station set up on the continental shelf within the next 10 years. This underwater laboratory would house 40–50 men at a depth of more than a thousand feet and go into operation in the mid-'70's. Already the Bureau of Yards and Docks is preparing to build underwater stations for supply depots, submarine repair facilities, and nuclear weapons shelters, and the Navy has signed contracts with several aerospace firms to design a station housing a 5-man crew for 30 days at a depth of 6,000 feet.

One ambitious proposal presented jointly by the University of Miami and the Chrysler Corporation—and modestly labeled "Project Atlantis"—envisions an extensive undersea construction program beginning with a series of undersea bases at depths of more than 1,000 feet off the coast of Florida. The proposal looks toward an eventual line of stations along the mid-Atlantic ridge and on seamounts (underwater mountains) in the

Pacific. The Navy would use such stations for command and control of sea warfare, as underwater communication centers, to control floating minefields, as bases for seabottom launched acoustic torpedoes, and as surveillance sites for sonar and magnetic detection. *Ocean Science News*, an industry newsletter, reported that:

"The Navy is thinking specifically in terms of sub-sea floor military bases, surveillance gear, manning missile stations, and providing logistic support and staging areas for the under-sea military forces of the future. It is talking only secondarily about such facilities on the continental shelves. It is far more interested in the deep ocean—and the "deep ocean" in this context ballparks out (sic) to about 6000 feet, which not at all coincidentally is the depth of the higher peaks of the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. . . . This is the kind of program which, if carried to its ultimate conclusion, would turn the ocean market into a major market indeed."

One early program that has already been completed is Tektite I, an experiment to test man's ability to live under the sea for extended periods of time. This venture was a multi-agency program (the Navy, NASA, Interior, and the Coast Guard), with strong collaboration (and financial support) from the Re-entry Systems Department of General Electric, which built an undersea habitat to house 4 men for a period of 60 days on the ocean bottom. One General Electric official has suggested that these stations would be appropriate for a set of defensive stations across the Mid-Atlantic Ridge to look up at the waters with sophisticated sonar. *As he noted with some realism, "A plan like this could get quantities of money pumped into it."* A number of defense contractors, including not only General Electric, but Grumman, General Dynamics, Lockheed, Westinghouse, and North American Rockwell, have, with their own funds, constructed deep ocean submersible craft, hoping to recoup their money by landing future Navy contracts for more such vehicles.

The Navy, while thinking seriously of the possibility of establishing undersea bases, is not viewing them as fixed installations. Such bases would be extremely vulnerable if an opponent wished to destroy them, and it is considered easier to use mobile systems which simply rest on the bottom in a temporary location. The U.S. and the Soviet Union are currently negotiating a treaty that would forbid the emplacement of fixed nuclear weapon launching platforms on the seabed; but we were told by one high official in the Navy that *"the U.S. treaty is an exercise in sophistry. It bans systems no one would build anyway, since it is just as easy to make these bases movable."*

The Navy has unsuccessfully attempted to manufacture a threat to justify its undersea program. The Soviet Union is known to have only two craft capable of deep submergence, and it recently sought to purchase such a craft from General Dynamics Corporation; the sale was blocked by the U.S. government. However, the absence of a threat has not halted similar development programs in the past, and it doesn't seem to be retarding this one either.

A major justification for the Navy program is to aid the extension of American enterprise into the deep sea. Robert Frosch, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, argued that one of the main undersea military missions would be "protection of those engaged in exploitation of the sea," and Dr. John P. Craven, head of the Deep Submergence System Project, has written that "even a marginal exploitation of ocean resources will give the controlling institution a probable majority of the world's wealth." With heavy investments already by the oil industry in undersea exploration and recovery of oil, and with growing interest in the mineral resources of the sea, this confluence of interests between the Navy and industry could well provide the setting for a new extension of American military influence.

Today the Navy employs half of the country's oceanographers. More than half of the nation's oceanographic budget is spent by the Navy, and it expects these funds to grow, in both relative and absolute terms. Navy plans, recently approved by the Defense Department, look forward to a tenfold increase in its annual expenditures on undersea research and exploration, from $300 million today to $3.8 billion a decade from now. It recognizes, as does industry, that it is far easier to obtain appropriations for programs carried out under Navy auspices, with an apparent military connotation, than under the auspices of such civilian agencies as the National Science Foundation or the Department of Commerce. And, of course, the Navy is not modest in its own goals. A recent Navy report asserts that "the Navy has accepted the responsibility for helping to develop the undersea technology needed for effective use of the sea in the military, economic, social, and political sense. This must be a corporate venture: a science-industry-Navy team."—Research by Kerry Gruson and Sam Baker.

III. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

This report is not intended as another attack on the "military-industrial complex"—we do not see America as a victim of an insidious conspiracy emanating from this power bloc. It appears to us more accurate to say that American society is becoming what we have chosen to call a National Security State, whose dominant institutions and ideology are focused upon the military establishment and military solutions to national policy problems. The issues which have recently made news: the cost-overruns on weapons systems; the extent of our chemical and biological arsenal; the clandestine practices of the Green Berets—and the new material which we present in this report are not accidents or exceptions. They are all part of the operation of a total system which was laid down in the immediate post-war era by the Truman Administration and strengthened by each successive administration.

In the immediate post-war years, a number of bills were passed which had the effect of transforming ad hoc wartime arrangements into law. All the essential institutions of the National Security State were created in that period. The draft was resumed. The National Security Act of 1947 coordinated the Armed Forces under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, created the National Security Council, and established the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. James Forrestal, soon to become the first Secretary of Defense, told the Senate:

"This bill provides . . . for the coordination of the three armed services, but what is to me more important, *it provides for the integration of foreign policy with national policy, of our civilian economy with military requirements."*

The Armed Service Procurement Act of 1947 created the basic structure for the close relationship that has developed between the military and American business. It established the legal standards for the procurement process, including the provisions allowing the Defense Department to offer contracts by direct negotiation with a single contractor. It asserted that "all purchases and contracts [are to be made] . . . by advertising . . . except [that they] may be negotiated . . . if", and then it provided seventeen exceptions, including "for supplies for which it is impracticable to secure competition" and, most especially, if it is "in the interest of the national defense that any plant, mine, or facility or any producer, manufacturer, or other supplier be made or kept available."

The total effect of these exceptions was clear to those involved in the passage of this bill:

Senator HARRY F. BYRD. This bill simply means that we are changing our policy from buying by advertising to a policy of buying by negotiations, provided the agency head certifies that this should be done in the interest of the government . . .

Under Secretary of the Navy W. JOHN KENNEY. That is substantially correct, Senator . . . [but] it is the intent that the bulk of these contracts should be let by advertising and competitive bidding.

Senator BYRD. I have learned by long experience that you should not extend an authority unless you expect that authority to be exercised . . .

The result, of course, has been the growth of a condition in which little more than a tenth of all defense contracts are let by competitive bidding, and in which a small number of large corporations dominate the military business.

The Atomic Energy Commission was formed in 1946 with, in President Truman's words, "civilian direction, which will serve the military needs." The President was empowered to appoint the AEC Commissioners, but the act also established a Military Liaison Committee to advise the AEC on military research and empowered to appeal any Commission decision:

"If the Committee at any time concludes that any action, proposed action, or failure to act of the Commission on such matters is adverse to the responsibilities of the Departments of War or Navy derived from the Constitution, laws and strategics, the Committee may refer such action to the Secretary [of Defense]. If he concurs, he may refer the matter to the President . . ."

Congress also delegated to the President the right to develop in secret any size stockpile of nuclear weapons which he feels desirable. He was given the power to direct the AEC to "deliver such quantities of fissionable materials or weapons to the armed forces for such use as he deems necessary" and "to authorize the armed forces to manufacture, produce or acquire any equipment or devise utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy."

An essential part of the building of the National Security State was the creation of a system to maintain secret information and ensure loyal workers. A security classification system was set up and, in 1947, by Executive Order, President Truman created a loyalty investigation program for federal employees. By 1953, it is estimated that 13,500,000 people, one out of five members of the total work force, were subject to some loyalty or security procedure. Such steps by the government helped to encourage a national atmosphere of paranoia and the growth of McCarthyism. Thus, all elements of American society were fitted into the National Security State. The power of the executive increased as it assumed the functions of the legislature. Congressional scrutiny of the defense budget became perfunctory and approving. The Pentagon expanded its power and influence, both at home and abroad.—Research by Bob Borosage.

CONCLUSION

Our investigation into the national security establishment, and recent events such as the failure of the Senate to make any substantial cuts in the defense budget, have convinced us that *America faces a deepening governmental crisis.* The checks and balances set out in the Constitution have been eroded by the growth of the defense sector, so that the present Congress—supposedly the representative of the people—is all but powerless to halt the growing militarization of our society. No force exists in the country today with the necessary resources and power to counter the continuing expansion of the National Security State.

An important conclusion of this report is that the issue of the day is *not* how to control the military. Professional military men

are not under attack for having overstepped their proper bounds. It is the functioning of the national security establishment itself—a set of institutions operated jointly by civilian and military personnel—which we question. The operation of the Pentagon, and its relationship to the rest of the government, derive from the foreign policy of the United States, and it is this policy, formed essentially by eminent civilians, which we believe must be rethought and drastically revised if the country is, in the words of Nobel Prize winner George Wald, "to choose life."

In critically looking at the Pentagon and the foreign policy which it serves, we came to realize that the way in which America faces the world, the manner in which it deals with other nations, is a direct outgrowth of the structure of our own domestic institutions. Relationships like those between the military establishment and the defense industry, or the military and universities, grew at first from the country's chosen policies; but having come to life, *institutional structures such as the military-industrial complex gain a momentum of their own as they become more deeply embedded in the American economy and political system.*

We were not able to find effective voices anywhere in the defense establishment for restraint on defense expenditures or for a reduction in the development of new and more sophisticated weapons; we did not find anyone in a position to advocate alternative ways of achieving the goal of "national security". The defense establishment seems to have been designed, either by intention or by chance, to encourage only the growth and autonomy of the military machine.

The defense establishment has become a massive, self-propelling juggernaut, demanding unquestioning faith and an endless flow of funds, all in the name of national security—a security which is believed to be enhanced by adding to our armament and intervening in the affairs of other, less powerful countries. In a world where nuclear war would bring total devastation, and attempting to control all political change is a futile impossibility, such a belief is simplistic and ultimately destructive to our society. It is no accident that it is in the self-interest of all members of the defense establishment—policy makers, military men, politicians, industrialists, scientists—to adopt this belief and work diligently for its maintenance.

One of the purposes of the summer project was to demonstrate that concerned Americans can critically examine the fundamental premises and operations of the government, even in the sensitive area of national security. Indeed, it is vital to the society that such searching inquiry be carried on by Congress and by public groups such as universities, labor unions, and community action organizations. The American people should call for a complete opening up of the activities of the national security establishment to public view. *It is our firm belief, after many conversations within the Pentagon and elsewhere in Washington, that the security classification system is largely used not to prevent information from being revealed to potential enemies, but to prevent its revelation to the American people and to ensure control by the Executive Branch over national security policy.* The result is that the American public remains ignorant of most of our defense programs. In some cases, weapons systems are reviewed in trade journals but the general press is not technically equipped to recognize the significance of information which appears in specialized journals, and, for the most part, it has not taken a critical, investigative stance toward the defense establishment.

The MIRV program is one example. Discussions of the MIRV concept, and announcements of contracts awarded for MIRV engineering developments, appeared in the technical press as early as 1965, but only an expert in the field of missiles could know that a "post-boost control system" would have the capacity to target a large number of individual warheads at different targets, and thereby to pose a first-strike threat to the Soviet deterrent. The Soviet Union recognized this and appears to have reacted, in part, by an expansion of its deterrent force. The American public, however, was not aware of this development until years later, and its significance did not become apparent until MIRV was close to deployment and had acquired irresistible bureaucratic momentum. Even then, its existence became widely known only through the efforts of a few non-government scientists.

To help meet the need for public information on the defense establishment, *the type of investigations conducted by the summer "Pentagon Watchers" will be continued by a permanent, independent, privately-funded research group, to be called the National Security Research Project. The project's Washington-based office will have a permanent staff and will, in addition, draw on students and others around the country to prepare periodic reports on the operations of the National Security State.*

APPENDIX

This section, in addition to a list of the participants in the summer project, includes what we think are two highly revealing documents.

The "FDL Public Affairs" paper was given to us by a DOD official. It provides detailed insight into the lobbying effort which the military and the defense industry continually operate on Capitol Hill. Such a well-coordinated program of pressure is not the exception, but the rule.

The second document is a list of foreign countries whose officers have received training at the U.S. Army Special War School (now the John F. Kennedy School of Military Assistance) at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. The list was provided to us by the post's information officer (the written additions are his); we were told that the names of the foreign officers are classified. It is interesting to speculate as to what use the soldiers of such countries as South Africa, Portugal, Spain, Haiti, etc. might put their American training.

MEMBERS OF THE SUMMER PROJECT

Sam Baker, Harvard B.A.; fall: graduate student, Harvard Economics Dept.

Bob Borosage, Yale Law School.

Kerry Gruson, Radcliffe, B.A.; fall: reporter, Raleigh News & Observer.

Nick Herman, Yale, B.A.; fall: Union Theological Seminary.

Tom Klein, Larchmont High School; fall: Columbia University.

Marc Kramer, Lake Forest College, B.S.; fall: graduate student, Univ. of Michigan Physics Dept.

Nancy Lipton, Radcliffe, B.A.; fall: graduate student, Harvard Government Dept.

Mary McCarthy, Radcliffe.

Derek Shearer, Yale; fall: National Security Research Project.

David Sims, Yale B.A.; fall: Harvard Graduate School of Design.

Bill Stivers, Reed College.

FDL PUBLIC AFFAIRS

I. *Completed actions and results*

A. *Congressional.*

Congressman Sikes (Florida)—Mr. Bannerman discussed the FDL program with the Congressman on 15 December 1966. Congressman Sikes enthusiastically supports the program. No further direct action necessary.

Congressman Bennett (Florida)—Admiral Sonenshein and Army representative explained the program. Congressman Bennett fully supports the FDL program. No further direct action necessary.

Congressman Gibbons (Florida)—Captain Henning (Project Manager's Staff) briefed Congressman Gibbons. He is a supporter of the FDL program and its concept. No further direct action necessary.

Senator Tydings (Maryland)—Admiral Sonenshein briefed Senator Tydings. The Senator apparently has no feeling for or against the program. No immediate follow-up required.

Senator Russell (Georgia)—Mr. Dan Houghton (Lockheed) talked to Senator Russell. The Senator was not responsive. Direct contact by Army/Navy personnel required.

Senator Kennedy, Congressman Burke (Massachusetts)—Contacted by Mr. Roger Lewis (General Dynamics) who explained the overall merits of the program. Follow-up briefing required.

Congressman Rivers (South Carolina)—The Chairman does not desire briefing prior to hearings (Tab A). However, efforts will be made to see him.

Armed Services Committees, Merchant Marine & Fisheries, Government Operations Committees—On 30 December 1966, Admiral Sonenshein briefed staff members of these Committees. The discussion following indicated that MM&F staffers are still opposed to the program and that other staffers may still challenge the program. Further approach to staffers may not be productive. It is necessary to get to the Congressmen and Senators directly.

House Appropriations Investigative Staff—Since October 1966, a team of staffers headed by Mr. W. F. Currall have been investigating all aspects of the FDL program. They have interviewed many naval officers and industry people and have been provided with background documents as requested. Their report is due this month (January). It is likely that the report of this group will point up that the money might be better spent on amphibious ships and merchant marine. The interviews which we have knowledge of do not support this.

Congressman Stratton (New York)—The Congressman was briefed by Admiral Sonenshein on 9 December 1966. The Congressman, a member of the HASC, supports the FDL program.

B. *Public and Private.*

N.Y. Times Article of 3 January 1967 (Tab b). Result of interview with Mr. Bannerman. No direct reaction known.

Speech before National Defense Transportation Association in San Francisco, 18 January 1967. General reaction favorable. Considerable press, radio and TV coverage (Tab c.). Mr. Dewey, President, American Steamship Association followed Admiral Sonenshein and prefaced his remarks by commenting that the Admiral's presentation was the finest and most informative he had heard concerning the FDL program. Mr. Dewey's remarks (Tab d.) were somewhat critical of the program though his speech might have been different had he been aware of the whole program rationale beforehand.

Armed Forces Management will devote its February ssue to the FDL program. Interviews have been held with many of the participating Defense personnel.

The Committee of American Steamship Lines (CASL) though not arguing about the requirement for a rapid deployment capability, has submitted proposals for new typea of cargo ships to augment the FDL's (Tab e.). However, in October 1966, Mr. W. B. Rand, then Chairman of CASL, was extremely critical of the program (Tab f.).

Mr. Andrew Pettis, Vice President of International Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, has written a letter (Tab r.) to Admiral Galantin pointing out that his Union supports the FDL program. Further briefing of Union representatives scheduled February.

Mr. Dan Holden, President of Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Corporation, in a speech on 9 January 1967, spoke

favorably about the new procurement concepts and the favorable effect of multi-year procurement on the modernization of private shipyards (Tab s.).

II *Specific adverse indications.*

A. Congressman Leggett (California) has written a letter to the President (Tab j), with copies to many of his colleagues, strongly objecting to the FDL program and recommending that it be rejected. The reply, signed in BUBUD, offers a briefing. Follow-up is required.

B. Senator Russell objected to reprograming of funds for Contract Definition. After a letter to the Senator from Mr. Nitze and discussions with the committee staff, the reprograming was approved but it is obvious that the Senator does not favor the FDL program (Tab h). A briefing for the Senator will be arranged.

C. Congressman Garmatz has expressed opposition to the FDL on the basis that the program will be detrimental to the Merchant Marine (Tab i). He is attacking the concept of the FDL vs Merchant Marine rather than the military necessity. Since he does not understand the "instantaneous response" requirement, a briefing is in order and will be scheduled.

D. The Shipbuilders Council of America, as a whole, is taking no position on the basic concept of the FDL military mission (Tab j). The Council agrees that substantial savings can be realized from series production of standardized ships. Mr. Hood, President of the Council, has been briefed on the program. There is wide difference of opinion among the Shipbuilders Council members. Mr. Cort, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, has criticized the program (Tab k), whereas Mr. Dan Holden, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, has favored the program (Tab s).

E. The Maritime Unions are opposed to the program as it appears to them to be a threat to the Merchant Marine. Arrangements are being made to brief the Union executives and the people who write speeches and press releases (February).

F. Captain Lloyd Sheldon, President of International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, has said that the project puts the Defense Department in the business of operating a fleet of military supply ships which will eliminate both unions and private business from the military end of shipping (Tab L). Briefing arranged February.

G. Representative Lennon (North Carolina) opposes the FDL program and recommends instead that the money be applied to amphibious ships and the merchant marine. Representative Lennon has heard only one side of the story. Briefing required.

III. *Schedule.*

A. *Congressional.*

Joe Califano—White House, Senator Jackson, Senator Brewster, Senator Stennis, Congressman Garmatz, Congressman Leggett, Congressman Hébert, Congressman Hardy, Congressman Pike, Congressman Philbin, Congressman Nedzi.

B. *Public and private.*

1 January 1967—Mr. Prina (Copley Press) to interview Mr. Bannerman.

February 1967—FDL joint briefing of Maritime Union groups—

a. Maritime Trades Department (AFL/CIO).

b. Metal Trades Department (AFL/CIO).

c AFL/CIO Maritime Press representatives.

d. Labor and Maritime Press representatives.

1 February 1967—Admirals Galantin and Sonenshein will lunch with Mr. Grogan and Mr. Pettis of the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America.

3 February 1967—Admiral Sonenshein will lunch with Admirals Leggett and Carney.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT HAVE BEEN REPRESENTED AT THE U.S. ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL

Agrentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Denmark.

Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Guatamala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan.

Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlends, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Okinawa, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines.

Peru, Portugal, Rep. of South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somolia, Spain, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UAR (United Arab Republic), Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet-Nam.

WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR

HON. GLENN CUNNINGHAM

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, November 6, 1969

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, Peter Kiewit, of Omaha, is head of one of the world's largest construction firms. But more than that, he is a friend to his fellow man.

Two years ago this distinguished Nebraskan received the National Brotherhood Award of the National Conference of Christians and Jews. On that occasion, October 3, 1967, Peter Kiewit presented an acceptance address entitled "Without Fear or Favor."

This was called to my attention again recently by Mr. V. J. Skutt, a longtime friend who is chairman of the boards of the Mutual of Omaha Cos. In arranging to have the address reprinted, Mr. Skutt said he felt "there are certain statements that become more significant with the passage of time."

Mr. Speaker, this certainly is true of Peter Kiewit's presentation and I would urge each of my colleagues to devote a few minutes from their busy schedule to read his remarks:

WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR

(By Peter Kiewit)

I am deeply humbled by this great honor you are bestowing upon me this evening.

This award rightfully belongs to others, and I accept it on their behalf. It belongs to many of you here tonight, and to many who are not here. It belongs to all those who have labored long and hard in this great and growing city of ours to promote better understanding between religious and ethnic groups . . . men and women who are dedicated to the principles of brotherhood.

The first group I should like to mention consists of those who have adopted as a part of their life's work the task of bringing closer the day when people of all races, colors and creeds may live in harmony with equal respect, equal rights and equal opportunities. These people are giving of themselves because they are convinced that it is better to give than to receive. We find them in the churches of all faiths, in the ranks of the Salvation Army, in the Red Cross, in the Urban League, and in many other organizations too numerous to mention. To all these people we owe a great debt of gratitude.

The second group I want to mention consists of the army of volunteer parttime workers on whom Omaha largely depends to accomplish the objectives of brotherhood in its numerous civic undertakings . . . men and women who devote a part of their valuable time to help their fellow man. I am thinking of business and professional people, housewives, salaried and hourly paid workers. To these people we also owe a great debt of gratitude.

The third group I want to mention consists of those who give financial support, including men and women in the first two groups and thousands of others. They give though the United Community, Services through churches, through civic and fraternal organizations and through countless other ways. To these people we also owe a great debt of gratitude—for the work of brotherhood always has and always will require financial assistance.

There is a fourth group that is the most important of all, in my opinion. This group consists of those who have formed deep and abiding convictions concerning equal respect, equal rights and equal opportunities for all men, and who practice these convictions without fear or favor in their business, social, religious and political activities. These people come from all walks of life, all races and all creeds. They are found among the fortunate and the less fortunate. They are found in minority and majority groups alike. I would like to suggest that each of us ask ourselves how close we come to qualifying as members of this fourth group. These are truly brothers of their fellow man and all of them, wherever they may be, share with me in this honor.

In spite of what any of may have done in the past to promote the ideals of brotherhood, we can and must do more in the future. In particular, I want to stress the importance of helping others to help themselves. Although there will always be those among us who need personal assistance and financial aid to cover all or most of their needs—the crippled, the old and the orphaned young—the great majority of those who are underprivileged, for whatever cause, can be helped best by being given encouragement and being provided opportunities.

I have been impressed with the brotherhood work of Archie Moore, retired light-heavy weight boxing champion, which was mentioned in recent newspaper columns throughout the country, and the subject of an editorial in the "local daily"—I hope you will pardon me for this short commercial. Archie has organized and is heading an organization called ABC, which stands for "Any Boy Can", and is intended to help young people of all races. Through this organization he tells the boys how he and other youngsters in the tough St. Louis neighborhood in which he grew up became jazz musicians, doctors, lawyers and sports figures because, as Archie puts it, "We had a goal and were willing to work to accomplish it." He teaches dignity and self respect which are the most important building blocks any brother can give a fellow brother, in my opinion.

This ABC organization, along with the Boys' Club, the YMCA, Jewish Community Center, Catholic Youth Organization, and other similar oraganizations, is doing an outstanding job of providing encouragement, motivation, and at the same time, fostering dignity and self-respect. Each of us should look for the time to help such organizations, and in addition, we should look for opportunities to work individually.

MORE THAN A MORAL ISSUE

Providing opportunities is more than a moral issue—I believe it is an economic necessity if we are to continue to raise our standard of living and compete in world markets. In this day of shortages among professional, skilled craftsmen and technicians, discrimination based on church affiliation,