

to 10,000 for a force of 3,100,000—diminishes their potential influence. Only 8% of the pre-Vietnam force was drafted, and the percentage for the post-Vietnam force will probably be lower even if the draft were not repealed. Draftees, who are more commonly bewildered, intimidated, and malleable nineteen-year-olds than dedicated anti-militarists, simply do not have the knowledge or authority to influence the professional officer corps.

- **DRAFTEES DO NOT AFFECT MILITARY ISOLATION**

Military isolation from civilian society is a result of the institutional framework of military life, not the method of initial manpower procurement. Military men generally live together on the same bases, eat together in the same mess halls, shop at the same commissaries, utilize the same medical facilities, attend the same training programs, and even read many of the same magazines. The solution to the problem of military isolation is not to bring in a few thousand reluctant nineteen-year-olds for two year terms, but to alter the patterns of military life to emphasize greater participation in civilian communities. Nor would repeal result in an army of long-term professionals; turnover would be three-fourths as great as under a partially drafted force.

- **THE DRAFT DIMINISHES EFFECTIVE PROTEST**

While the draft may or may not stimulate political protest, it can do so only at the price of providing manpower for the war. The draft has been used for the Vietnam War precisely because it ensures adequate manpower with the least possible protest. The Johnson and Nixon Administrations have had the option of calling

up the Reserves or replacing draftees with volunteers. The latter was rejected simply because there were almost no volunteers to be had for combat duty; activation of the Reserves was bypassed in order to avoid the monumental caterwauling which would have ensued. The draft takes youth primarily from the working and lower middle classes, where allegiance to the war and the military is greatest. It is the legal obligation to serve in the military, in fact, which enhances among many of these people the legitimacy of war-making. The recent enactment of a lottery draft, moreover, which will end eligibility for all young men at age nineteen and for about half of them at any age, will eliminate any frictional protest which may have stemmed from personal eligibility, especially among college students.

The real question at issue is the militaristic power to draft, not the composition of the armed forces. Only under large-scale mobilization would the use of draftees significantly influence the make-up of the military forces. The power to draft is vital to those who would wage war by administrative decree. While draft repeal alone will not be sufficient to turn the growing tide of American militarism, it would be a firm step in the right direction; and by demonstrating the feasibility of regaining freedom in America, it could spark more and greater victories. The authority to draft will expire on June 30, 1971; concerned Americans must prevent its extension.



National
Council to

REPEAL THE DRAFT

101 D Street, S.E., Suite 4
Washington, D. C. 20003
202/544-2041

OCTOBER 1970

Published as an
educational service by:

An All-Volunteer 'Professional' Army?

Many Americans who fear militarism have opposed draft repeal on the grounds that a professional military elite would result. The idea that an armed force composed completely of volunteers would foster inbred professional loyalties, a militaristic ethos free of civilian influence, and an uncontrollable penchant for foreign adventures, has considerable superficial appeal to it. It is commonly understood that history reveals the dangers of professional armies, and it seems only logical that an annual influx of reluctant civilians will leaven the armed forces with a diverse assortment of unsympathetic viewpoints. But it is a mistake to accept such arguments too readily. What does history really demonstrate? What are the actual uses of the power to draft, and what kind of civilian control has it provided? What kind of armed forces do we already have? And what significant influences do draftees exert on policy?

- **HISTORY SHOWS THAT MILITARISM AND CONSCRIPTION GO HAND-IN-HAND**

If the history of conscription shows anything, it reveals a striking concurrence of drafting and militarism. From Napoleon on down, conscription has provided the cannon-fodder supporting virtually every major war. The infamous Hessians who fought for Britain in the American Revolution were individually conscripted and 'volunteered' en masse by their prince for money. The Prussians based their aggressive military policies of the latter third of the nineteenth century on the concept of the nation in arms; their hallmark was universal conscription. Both World Wars were fought by draftees; all modern militarists, including the Soviet Union, China, and the countries of both the Middle East and Southeast Asia, rely on conscription to man their standing armies. Wherever one finds an aggressive military policy one finds a draft to back it up; the absence of the power to draft generally accompanies a small and relatively inactive military establishment, as found in England, Canada, and the United States before 1940.

- **MANPOWER MAKES WARPOWER**

It is for one and only one reason that governments conscript their citizens into the army: to provide the manpower which is the *sine qua non* of war-making. No state ever authorized national conscription to provide 'equity' in manpower procurement or a civilian influence in their forces; drafts have always been instituted to ensure a ready and ample flow of fodder. Citizens have demonstrated again and again that they will not voluntarily enter the army in large numbers unless they strongly believe in a war's objectives, especially when the initial parades and

flag-waving have been replaced by shattering destruction and lengthy casualty lists. Millions of immigrants to America fled oppressive policies of military conscription in their homelands. Today the Vietnam War offers an excellent illustration of this principle. Fewer than 800 men a month have been volunteering for combat duty; without the draft the war would have long since come grinding to a halt (or at least a substantial phase-down).

- **THE POWER TO DRAFT ALLOWS THE EXECUTIVE TO BYPASS CONGRESS**

The power to draft is a broad and sweeping power which permits the Executive to raise troops and commit them to foreign involvements with neither popular nor Congressional debate and approval. Without a draft law on the books a president is compelled to come to Congress for either the authority to conscript or supplemental appropriations for volunteers, ensuring debate before rather than after commitments are made. The 1965 escalation of the military involvement of the United States in Indo-China by President Johnson is a vivid illustration of the dangers of institutionalized conscription, which makes a travesty of civilian control of the military by any other civilian than the President. The power to draft provides the vital control over manpower resources which the potent cooperation of the military-industry 'team' ensures over material resources. The miniscule cost of low-ranking manpower allowed by conscription encourages huge standing armies, whose professional leaders may soon become restless for activity. The loss of the power to draft would undermine the American propensity to apply military force to problems which are essentially social and economic.

- **AMERICA ALREADY HAS A PROFESSIONAL ARMED FORCE**

More than 2.1 million men in the U.S. armed forces, including virtually all officers above the rank of first lieutenant and enlisted men above the rank of sergeant, are already true (not motivated by the draft) volunteers. All personnel with policy-making responsibilities are already volunteers ('professionals'); rather than constraining them in any way, the draft provides an unlimited and unchecked source of manpower for whatever policies they and their non-uniformed counterparts in the White House and Pentagon decide to follow. This tremendous power explains the fact that the overwhelming majority of military officers favors retention of the authority to draft. America has the worst aspects of both alternatives: a large and entrenched professional force backed up by an unlimited source of cheap manpower, who must suffer the risks and hardships. It is first-term personnel, predominantly drafted and draft-induced, who are dying in Vietnam, not the professionals who know better. Eighty-eight per cent of infantry riflemen in Vietnam in 1969 were draftees and 10% were first-term volunteers. Two per cent were career Army men.

- **DRAFTEES CANNOT INFLUENCE POLICY**

The rigid authoritarianism of the military hierarchy in combination with the repressive code of military justice stifles what little effect reluctant participants might have on military policy. Heavy indoctrination throughout basic training and skillful manipulation of group pressures against individuals produce compliant soldiers whose primary goal is to finish their hitch and get out, not determined resisters. The small proportion of draftees—monthly calls are down