

This article is from the July 1969 issue of "The Army Reporter".

America Division

A combination of gunships and infantrymen killed eight North Vietnamese Army soldiers June 18, five miles west of Duc Pho. Teaming up for the fight were infantrymen from Co. B, 1st Bn., 20th Inf. and gunships from the 123rd Aviation Bn.

Three days earlier, a division forward air controller and mechanized troops teamed up to kill 13 NVA soldiers. The forward controller, flying an aircraft of the 198th Light Infantry Brigade, was flying over hilly terrain 10 miles southwest of Duc Pho when he received fire from an unknown number of NVA troops concealed in the dense jungle below. The aerial observer called the NVA position to tankers of the 3rd Platoon, H Troop, 17th Armored Cavalry, and armored personnel carriers were immediately dispatched. The artillery and helicopter gunship fire directed by the division troopers killed 13 of the enemy.

This centerfold photo filled feature came from the Americal "Southern Cross", August 17, 1968.

The men of the 123rd Avn. Bn. make their presence known daily to both the enemy and friendly troops throughout the Americal Div. area of operations.

Their duties range from finding the enemy to destroying him and from resupplying isolated landing zones to providing transportation for division personnel. The battalion is made up of the Co. A "Pelicans," the Co. B "Warlords," the Trp. F, 8th Cav. "Blue Ghosts," a signal detachment, a transportation detachment and a headquarters element.

Organic Aviation

It was organized early this year as the division's organic aviation unit from outfits already in the area. It is commanded by LTC John N. Brandenberg. The Co. A "Pelicans" are responsible for general air support for the division. Their duties include resupply, road patrol, the transportation of VIP's and the providing of aircraft for the various courier flights from Chu Lai.

Their efforts are often unsung, but nonetheless represent a vital cog in the air support of the fighting soldiers of the Army's only named division.

For instance, they fly nearly 50 tons of cargo each week.

Take War to VC

The high-flying "Warlords," the only aero-scout company in Vietnam are equipped to take the war right to the enemy's doorstep. The company carries its own infantry, reconnaissance and firepower support elements in one neat, three-helicopter package.

Using the standard OH-23 observation helicopter, the Co. B "Warlords" primary mission is reconnaissance. Teams of two gunships and one OH-23 scour the division area for traces of the enemy, and the mobile aerial-rifle section is available for closer inspection when it is needed.

Though the company's duties are primarily reconnaissance, and not combat, its members have accounted for more than their share of kills in action which has been centered mainly in the southern part of the division's area of operations.

Other Support

The "Blue Ghosts" of Trp. F, 8th Cav., though assigned to the battalion for organizational purposes, are attached to the 1st Sqdn., 1st Cav., and more will be said about them in a later issue.

The 449th Sig. Det. provides avionics support for the battalion's aircraft. Though the scope of the signalmen's mission has greatly increased as the size of the battalion has increased, they have never failed in the vital job of keeping the aviators "on the air."

The 406th TC Det. "Roadrunners" keep the battalion in the air and on the go. The detachment provides direct support for the battalion, and calls no job short of entirely rebuilding an aircraft too large or too small.

Personnel from the battalion also are responsible for the operation of the Ky Ha tower, which controls much of the helicopter traffic coming in and out of Chu Lai.

This came from the Americal Southern Cross August 30, 1968 issue.

Aero Scouts kill 18 VC, Round up 16

Chu Lai- A trigger-happy Viet Cong got more than he bargained for when he fired upon an apparent "defenseless" Aero Scout OH-23 observation helicopter, which was flying a routine mission recently five miles west of here.

One crewman of the small chopper was wounded with the initial burst of enemy automatic weapons fire, but he was the only American casualty taken during the fierce three-and-a-half hour air and ground battle which followed, netting 18 enemy dead and 16 detainees.

The 123rd Aviation Bn.'s OH-23, trailed by four choppers including two heavily armed gunships, was winding up a reconnaissance flight when the shooting started.

Maj. Junius Tanner, Aero Scout CO, described the action: "The OH-23 marked the position for the two gunships, which began returning the hostile fire. We killed five VC before we ran out of ordnance. Then we flew home to reload and refuel.

Infantrymen Mop Up

"When we returned to the battle," MAJ Tanner continued, "We brought along 20 infantrymen and set them on the ground. The "Skeeter" (OH-23), moving ahead to direct the action took more hostile fire, and the gunships came in again, followed by the ground troops." Three weapons were captured along with grenades and other supplies, and seven VC hootches and three bunkers were destroyed.

Aero Scout flight platoon leader, CPT Theimer Moe, added this footnote:

"Under questioning, one of the detainees admitted he had triggered the engagement by firing on the small lead helicopter. Apparently he didn't know the "Skeeter" was backed up by so much firepower. It must have been quite a surprise when the gunships cam down on him followed by infantrymen."

This article also came from the same issue.

'Aero Scouts' Smash VC Cache, Motor Pool

LZ Bronco- A Viet Cong weapons cache and a primitive motor pool were hit recently by division "Aero Scout" helicopter crews and infantrymen acting on information supplied by a former Viet Cong platoon leader.

The platoon leader had been relieved of his command several months ago and sent to a "reform prison."

He escaped after three months of confinement and later turned himself over to American forces west of Quang Ngai. He agreed to lead Allied troops to a base camp area where he had seen sampans unload weapons and food supplies.

The 123rd Avn. Bn. unit with its infantry platoon swept into the Song Re Valley, 25 miles southwest of Quang Ngai in the 11th Inf. Bde.'s reconnaissance zone.

Hidden Weapons

"The Hoi Chanh told us there were weapons hidden in the valley guarded by a small enemy force," said WO1 Alan Levy, an Aero Scout pilot from Asonia, Conn. "After we put the infantry on the ground, Charlie opened up on us."

While gunships remained on station to cover the infantrymen. Scout helicopters lifted Montagnard Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) soldiers and their Special Forces advisers from Ha Thanh to the contact area. Two tactical air strikes resulted in five major secondary explosions and silenced the enemy gunners, allowing the American and CIDG soldiers to move in.

Discoveries

They found six dead enemy soldiers, four Chinese-made 120 mm mortar tubes, more than 20,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 5,000 pounds of rice and numerous enemy documents.

In addition, 75 bicycles rigged with weapons racks, and a bicycle repair shop were destroyed.

"We expected to find more weapons," said Levy, "but without those bicycles the enemy will have a tough time moving equipment through the valley."

This came from the Americal News Sheet for Saturday July 26, 1969

Iron Mountain - The "Warlords" of B Co., 123rd Avn. Bn., spotted two VC trying to evade, 12 miles west of Duc Pho, at 1730 yesterday. The VC were taken under fire and killed by B Co.

This came from the Army Reporter, March 2, 1970.

Americal soldiers of the 123rd Avn. Bn. tangled three times with NVA and VC troops Feb. 11 near Duc Pho, accounting for nine of the 17 communists killed by the division that day.

This came from the January 1970 issue of the "Americal" magazine.

16th CAG: metal Angels of Hope & Mercy
by SP4 Craig Couture.

I will excerpt the portion dealing with the 123rd.

The 123rd Cbt. Avn. Bn., like its sister battalion, provides air mobility and direct air support to elements of the Americal Div. The battalion, led by LTC Richard K. Dietsch (Manchester, N.H.), prides itself on the professionalism and consciousness in supporting the division. The battalion is comprised of A and B Companies; HQs. and Hqs. Co. E Co., 723rd Maint. Bn; F Trp. 8th Cav; and D Trp., 1st Sqdn., 1st Cav.

Providing the Americal with general aviation support is the primary mission of A Co., 123 CAB. While B Co. essentially has the role of an air cavalry troop. Many of B Co.'s missions are visual reconnaissance operations in which a team of four aircraft, on Light Observation Helicopter (LOH), two Cobra gunships, and one Huey "slick" with five infantrymen aboard search an assigned area for signs of enemy activity. During the past year, B Co. accounted for 429 enemy kills.

Known as the "Blue Ghost," F Trp. 8th Cav. arrived in Vietnam in October, 1967. Commanded by MAJ Charles E. Ivey (Urbana, Ill.), F Trp. has the primary mission of gathering intelligence. The unit accomplishes this by means of aerial and ground reconnaissance making maximum use of its firepower, communications, and mobility.

An organic infantry platoon, nicknamed the "Blues," is used for insertions to perform detailed searches of an area. Normally with insertion of the "Blues" the aerial recon teams, consisting of two Cobras and a LOH, screen in the immediate vicinity and provide armed escort for the platoon.

A newcomer to the 16th Group is D Trp., 1st Sqdn., 1st Cav., who arrived in Vietnam on May 1, 1969. D Trp., called the "Sabres," extends the reconnaissance and security capabilities of ground units by aerial means. To find the enemy, fix his position, and then annihilate him is the mission of the "Sabres."

Providing the Americal with aircraft direct support maintenance is E Co., 723rd Maint Bn. The job os this unit like that of the 335th Trans. Co. is to support and help maintain the aviation units assigned to the Americal.

From "Cover-Up" by Seymour M. Hersh.

During the weeks following My Lai 4, Thompson and many other pilots and crewmen in the 123rd had remained angered and demoralized by the Americal Division's failure to investigate the massacre and punish the offending participants. Thompson was personally convinced that his two crewmen deserved medals for helping him rescue the threatened civilians at My Lai 4, even though there were no enemy troops opposing them. He put both in for citations. By so doing, he made it easy for one of his superiors, fully aware of Thompson's bitterness over My Lai 4, to reward him for keeping his peace and continuing to be one of the boys.

On April 23 the Americal Division awarded a Bronze Star to Glenn U. Andreotta a two-year veteran of Vietnam who had flown with Hugh Thompson as a door gunner on March 16 (1968). The award was made posthumously; Andreotta died before its final approval. He was

honored for his heroism "in connection with military operations against a hostile force" at My Lai 4. Andreotta was credited with

saving the lives of civilians hiding in a bunker "located between friendly forces and hostile forces engaged in a heavy fire fight." Major Frederick Watke signed the falsified recommendation; an eyewitness statement was submitted by Thompson (The book seems pretty hard on a man that was shot down and sent to the states to recover in April 1968). A few weeks later Specialist Four Lawrence Colburn, the other door gunner, also got a Bronze Star. A medal was sought for Thompson, too, and he eventually received the Distinguished Flying Cross. The citation that came with the pilot's medal noted that Thompson had rescued fifteen young Vietnamese children who were "caught in the intense cross fire" at My Lai 4. "Officer Thompson's heroic actions saved several innocent lives while his sound judgment greatly enhanced Vietnamese-American relations in the operational area," the citation, written by the 123rd Aviation Battalion, said.

Names of members of the 123rd Aviation Bn mentioned in the book are:

LTC John Holladay (Bn. Commander)

William Bezanson on a slick.

Major Watke (B Co. Commander).

Warrant Officer Jerry Culverhouse.

Sp5 Lawrence Colburn (OH-23 Door Gunner)

Sp5 Lawrence Kubert (communications sergeant)

Warrant Officer Hugh C. Thompson (OH-23 pilot)

Sp4 Glenn Andreotta (door gunner OH-23 gunner)

Captain Thelmar Moe (Section leader)

Captain Randolph E. Sabre (flight platoon leader)

Captain Brian Livingston (pilot)

Scott A. Baker (Flight commander)

Warrant Officer Robert W. Whitham (Pilot General Koster)

*SP5 Dennis Chapin & Preston Rogers and many others from B Co. were questioned.

The 16th Aviation Group (Combat) was first activated and organized on 20 December 1967 and became operational on 23 January 1968, at the Marine Marble Mountain Air Facility, Da Nang. This was just one week before the 1968 Tet Offensive explosion throughout Vietnam. The 16th Group, as our motto implies, was truly "Born in Battle".

Originally part of the 1st Aviation Brigade, the 16th CAG was attached to the Americal Division on December 1968. Within a week, the Group relocated from Marble Mountain to its present location at Chu Lai. The unit has the distinction of being the only aviation group in the United States Army assigned to an infantry division.

Intent upon carrying out its mission, the 16th CAG, commanded by LTC James M. Leslie, (Missoula, Montana), is composed of a Headquarters Company, the 335th Transportation Company, and two Battalions; the 14th Aviation Battalion (Combat), with all units presently stationed in the Chu Lai area, and the 123d Aviation Battalion (Combat) with units in Marble Mountain and Chu Lai.

The Group crest is symbolic of the combat aviation capabilities of the 16th Group. The Group has had a three fold operation of supporting the United States, Republic of Vietnam, and the Free World Military Forces to win freedom and secure peace. Since 1969 and up to the present time the 16th CAG has centered activities around the support of the Americal's 196th, 198th, and 11th Infantry Brigades and the 2nd ARVN Division with the main obligations being; resupply, combat assaults, gunship support, aerial reconnaissance and security plus providing the command and control aircraft for the General Officers, Special Staff, and all Senior Commanders of the Americal Division. Since January of 1968 assets from the 16th CAG have been involved in every major operation that the Americal Division has undertaken.

Resupply is a primary mission for the UH-1 and CH-47 of the 16th CAG. Resupply accounts for the highest number of sorties by type of mission. Fire support, gunship sorties flown in support of ground units is of tremendous importance to all members of the 23 Infantry Division. Armed helicopters possess the capability for detecting and immediately engaging battlefield targets of opportunity close to friendly troops on the ground unmatched by any other weapons system in the U.S. Army inventory. Troop movement is also a primary mission for the 16th Group. Mass movement of troops to and from any point is done only by the aid of the 16th CAG.

The quality of aviators flight training continues to be monitored by the Group Standardization section. Instrument instructors continue to be trained to provide instrument instruction at the unit level as we approach another monsoon season. The ADF and GCA are in constant use as aviators keep current on instrument flying and prepare themselves for possible bad weather in the near future.

On-the-job training, material readiness, and formal training continue to be stressed by this Headquarters. Due to the increase of replacements who are not MOS qualified, on-the-job training has become more important to the performance of the Group mission. In country schools are being used to full advantage in all areas.

Classes for junior grade officers are held once a week on the areas important for the proper training and background for a future in the Army.

The officers and men of the 16th Aviation Group (Combat) pride themselves on the ability to do their jobs regardless of any difficulties. With courage and determination and the professional competence of its subordinate units, the 16th CAG supports the Americal in I Corps.

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SUBJECT: Base Area 116 (Nui Mat Rang)

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 October 1966

LOCATION: I Corps, Quang Nam Province, BT025410, AT970355, AT915390, AT930440, BT000470, BT030450

TERRAIN: The base area is positioned in a finger of mountains extending into the coastal plain southwest of Hoi An, approximately twenty kilometers into the coastal plain southwest of Hoi An, approximately 20 kilometers from the coast. The area lies abreast of the coastal rail line, seven kilometers southwest of Route 1 and fifteen kilometers west of the district capital of Than Binh. This mountainous promontory overlooks the complex intersection of water and land LOC's – the Song Hoi An and Song Thu Bon (rivers), Route 1, Route 14, and the railroad. This point is surrounded by heavily populated lowlands. Vegetation in the mountainous areas is predominantly evergreen forest and scrub; in the central portions of the designated area there is considerable scarring due to steep slopes and deep narrow gullies. The lowlands surrounding the base are rice-producing areas; smaller hill complexes are covered with brushwood.

ENEMY ACTIVITY: Twelve installations are reported within the delineated area – one general, one base, four medical, one training and five food storage areas. While no units have been reported in the base area, movement reports indicate the presence of the 60th Battalion/1st VC Regiment to the southeast and the R20 Battalion to the northwest. Throughout August and September there were enemy-initiated contacts to the north. One secondary explosion was observed located on a line of communication into the base area.

SUMMARY: The reported installations indicate that the area is a forward base area from which the river delta region can be controlled.

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SUBJECT: Base Area 117 (Nui Co)

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 October 1966

LOCATION: I Corps, Quang Tin Province, BT200030, BT255030, BT255090, BT200100, BT170050

TERRAIN: The base area lies in an enclosed valley dotted with small clusters of villages. The Song Bong Mieu (river) meanders west through the valley and exits by the only major opening in the wall of encircling mountains. Except for rice paddies and areas within the villages, the valley is predominantly evergreen forest with isolated areas of brushwood scattered indiscriminately throughout. The base area lies fifteen kilometers southwest of the city of Tam Ky and Route 1.

ENEMY ACTIVITY: Seventeen installations -- one general, four bases, seven ordnance, two medical, and three food storage areas -- are reported within the base. One secondary explosion was reported in August. Many sightings of identified and unidentified units were reported moving to and from the area. The 21st Regiment was reported on the western edge of a delineated area. Incidents surround the area. Three unidentified Special Agent Reports were recorded within the boundaries of the base area.

SUMMARY: The data continues to indicate that the enemy has the support of the population and is receiving food and ordnance. It is likely that the base lends logistical support and limited refuge to operational units rather than containing any high level military or political apparatus.

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SUBJECT: Base Area 118 (Nui Sud La)

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 October 1966

LOCATION: I Corps, Quang Ngai Province, BS360850, BS400800, BS450850, BS400880

TERRAIN: The base area is located four kilometers southeast of Tra Bong, the district headquarters and site of a USSF camp, and twenty kilometers west of Route 1. The base consists of a series of rounded hills and small interior valleys which extend eastward into the coastal plain. The north edge of the base abuts the Tra Bong Valley, and the southern boundary adjoins the Song Giang Valley. To the east the hills are progressively smaller and begin to merge with the plain; to the west the hills increase in size and relief. Vegetation is predominantly dense evergreen forest interspersed with areas of open forest and brush, particularly on the outer edges of the base. The two valley systems, the Tra Bong and Song Giang, are rice-growing areas and are populated with scattered villages.

ENEMY ACTIVITY: Fifteen logistical installations — two general, two bases, two medical, two ordnance, six food storage and one training area — are reported within the designated area. The 409th Sapper Battalion was reported to the south. Other unidentified units were reported on the area's perimeter. AA fire and harassment formed a pattern surrounding the area.

SUMMARY: This base area is considered to support operational troops in the Tra Bong area rather than being a military or political headquarters. Operations by friendly forces in the vicinity have not seemed to affect enemy activity within and on the perimeter of the base area.

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SUBJECT: Base Area 119 (Do Xa)

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 October 1966

LOCATION: I Corps, Quang Ngai Province, BS030750, BS050840, BS180710, BS230770, BS180815

TERRAIN: The base area is located forty-five kilometers west of Quang Ngai City within the Annamite Mountains. The area is extremely rugged and is incised by narrow valleys. These valleys contain the headwaters of rivers which cut their way out through the mountains toward the coast. The mountains within the base rise to heights approaching one thousand seven hundred meters. Seven hundred feet below the mountains lies the Nuoc Ong Valley, the major valley within the base area. Vegetation is predominantly dense evergreen forest; there are some small areas of brushwood and some clear forest.

ENEMY ACTIVITY: Three logistical installations — one general on medical, and one ordnance — are reported in Nuoc Ong Valley (vic BS1873). In addition, rear service and MR-5 administrative headquarters are reported three kilometers west of the valley. Seventeen unidentified and one identified Special Agent Reports have been recorded in or around the area from July through September.

SUMMARY: The extent of this base area is unknown. It is reported to be the headquarters for MR-5. All information that has been received substantiates this possibility. The extremely high mountains would facilitate line of sight communications. The steep slopes and dense vegetation would minimize air interdiction and aerial surveillance. In addition, the number of suitable transmitting sites, existence of the valley and neighboring bivouac areas, and the virtual inaccessibility of the area make it appropriate for a staff headquarters and command center.

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(Comment "Study ST 67-104 Base and Operational areas update")

SUBJECT: Base Area 122 (Suoi Da)

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 October 1966

LOCATION: I Corps, Quang Ngai Province, BS570530, BS535489, BS560445, BS600500

TERRAIN: The base area is located on the eastern fringe of the control mountains and isolated by the Song Ve Valley to the east and the Song Phuoc Giang Valley to the west. It is fifteen kilometers west of Route 1 and two kilometers southeast of district headquarters at Minh Long which is also the site of a USSF Camp. The base area consists of a ridge system of rounded mountains up to six hundred meters in height, and a series of narrow valleys which extend inward from the west and east. The mountains are covered with evergreen forest and scrub; the valleys are wet-rice growing areas.

ENEMY ACTIVITY: Four logistical installations - one ordnance, one base, one food storage and one general facility - have been reported. One Special Agent Report was recorded to the east of the area. Unit and logistical movement was sighted to the north and northeast. Battalion-size units have been reported on the perimeter and within the base.

SUMMARY: Enemy activity would indicate that this area is part of a series of small bases positioned on the edge of the coastal plain. The bases are used to support operational units and to store supplies and equipment infiltrated by sea.

SUBJECT: Base Area 123 (Nui Coi)

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 October 1966

LOCATION: I Corps, Quang Ngai Province, BS620490, BS655420, BS695455, BS675497, BS640500

TERRAIN: The base area is located fifteen kilometers from the coast and twenty-seven kilometers south of Quang Ngai City on a series of rugged hills severed from the central mountains by the Song Ve Valley in the west and the Song Tra Cau Valley to the south. The base area has small interior valleys and several flat-topped mountains that are suitable for bivouac and staging. Evergreen forest is the predominant type of vegetation.

ENEMY ACTIVITY: Eight logistical installations — two prisons, two training areas, one general and three ordnance installations — have been reported in the area. A single Special Agent Report was recorded to the west. Unidentified units and troop movements have been reported near the perimeter.

SUMMARY: This area would provide the enemy with a forward operational base from which to deploy on the coast. It could control traffic along both river valleys and along the roads leading west to Kontum.

SUBJECT: Base Area 124 (Nui Vu)

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 October 1966

LOCATION: I Corps, Quang Ngai Province, BS720390, BS690350, BS720320, BS760370

TERRAIN: The base area is located in the transitional hills that border the coastal plains, nine kilometers from the coast and five kilometers west of Route 1. The mountains enclose a segment of a narrow valley which bisects the area along a southwest-northeast axis. The mountains are covered with evergreen forests. The valleys which penetrate the edges of the area are suitable for wet-rice cultivation.

ENEMY ACTIVITY: Three food storage areas were reported positioned in the valley floor and one ordnance depot is reported in the mountains. Movement around the base area to the north and northeast was reported in July. In September the base area to the north and northeast was reported in July. In September two Special Agent Reports were recorded on the northern perimeter. Battalion and regimental-size unit sightings have also been reported to the north of the north of the designated area. The enemy initiated contact with friendly forces to the east.

SUMMARY: Enemy activity indicates that the area is both a forward operational base and an area for limited logistical support. Friendly installations, The USSF Camp at Ba To ten kilometers west of the base area and two ARVN installations located twelve kilometers east of the base, appear to be no major obstacle to enemy activity within or around the designated area.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Adjutant General
Washington, D.C. 20310

In Reply Refer to
AGAM-P (M) (20 Feb 69) For OT UT 684231 3 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968.

SEE DISTRIBUTION "This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title, 18, U. S. C., Section 795 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

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 Americal Division Artillery

1. (C) Section I: Operations: Significant Activities

a. Command:

(1) Division Artillery commands the following assigned or attached units:

3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155T): Assigned

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8"/175mm SP): Assigned

1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (155T/8"SP): Assigned

6th Battalion, 56th Artillery (Hawk): Assigned

Battery G, 55th Artillery (FG): Assigned

3d Platoon, Battery G, 29th Artillery (Searchlight): Attached

251st Countermortar Radar Detachment: Assigned

252d Countermortar Radar Detachment: Assigned

(2) Division Artillery monitors the activities of the direct support battalions of the three infantry brigades.

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery: Assigned 11th Infantry Brigade

1st Battalion, 11th Artillery: Assigned 11th Infantry Brigade

3d Battalion, 82d Artillery: Assigned 196th Infantry Brigade

b. Operations:

(1) Supporting Artillery Fires

(a) Heavy artillery support continues to be available throughout the division area of operations. Typical targets for heavy artillery are: infiltration routes, heavy enemy concentrations, base areas, acquired targets, and lucrative close-in targets.

(b) Medium artillery is weighted toward the Chu Lai and Burlington Trail areas of operation. In order to provide medium artillery support throughout the division AO, two of the medium artillery batteries operate as split fire units. Quick fire channels to five units

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have been established with direct support battalions. One battery continues to be in direct support of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment.

(c) Light artillery fire units made fifty-five moves during the period. Displacement by air was utilized as the primary method of moving light artillery units to otherwise inaccessible forward fire support bases. The provisional fourth firing battery of the direct support battalion again provided added coverage for the large brigade AOs. In order to support maneuver battalions moving to high enemy threat areas, direct support artillery from other brigades was sometimes placed under operational control of the maneuvering brigade.

(d) Artillery ammunition expenditures and per cent of observed fires by caliber for the ammunition reporting period are as follows:

<u>Caliber</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>	<u>Per Cent Observed</u>
105mm	160,395	57
155mm	77,500	46
8 inch	17,436	36
175mm	11,210	8

(2) Division Artillery provided supporting fires for the following major operations of the American Division:

Operation Wheeler/Wallowa	11 Nov 67 to present
Operation Burlington Trail	8 Apr 68 to present
Operation Pocahontas Forest	6 Jul 68 to 4 Aug 68
Operation Champagne Grove	4 Sep 68 to 24 Sep 68
Operation Dukes Glade	2 Oct 68 to 9 Oct 68
Operation Logan Field	7 Oct 68 to 12 Oct 68
Operation Dale Common	18 Oct 68 to 19 Oct 68
Operation Vernon Lake I	15 Oct to present

(a) Wheeler/Wallowa

1. Operation Wheeler/Wallowa continued during the reporting period with the 196th Infantry Brigade with the 2-1st Inf, 4-21st Inf, and 3-21 Inf conducting operations with the 1st Squadron, 1st Cav Reg. On the termination of Pocahontas Forest on 4 Aug, the 4-31st Inf rejoined the operation.

2. Division Artillery supported the operation as follows:

a. C/6/11 moved from Fire Support Base Buck at AT806320 to LZ Center (BT 050250) on 2 Aug and out of the Wheeler/Wallowa AO on 3 Sep. On 9 Aug C/3/82 moved out to LZ Gimlet (AT 858230) from LZ West (AT 990250). b/3/82 moved out to LZ Gimlet (AT858230) from LZ West (AT 990250). B/3/82 moved into LZ Center from the Chu Lai TAO on 3 Sep. As a result of the arrival of the 1/82d Arty in the Chu Lai TAOR, 3/82 was now able to retain all its batteries within the 196th Bde AO. C/3/82 moved back to LZ West on 18 Sep. On 1 Oct D/3/82 supported an operation at LZ Cacti (BT060473) in an AO extension

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in 2d ROK Bde Ao. A platoon of C/3/82 moved out to Polar Bear II (AT 939211) on 2 Oct from LZ West. On 9 Oct D/3/82 moved to LZ Baldy, the 196th Bde HQ, located at BT 130449.

b. Reinforcing artillery moved to support operations in the AO. On 2 Aug C/3/16 moved south to LZ Ross (BT 028341), and on to LZ O'Connor (AT935243) on 8 Aug. Three howitzers moved into LZ Ross (BT 0283341) from Fat City (BT 440077) and LZ O'Connor on 12 Aug from C/3/16. On 2 Aug, 3 howitzers of A/3/16 moved to LZ West on 21 Sep from LZ O'Connor. C/3/16 (-) moved to LZ Baldy from LZ Ross on 1 Oct, returning to LZ Ross on 14 Oct.

c. GS artillery from 3/18 Arty was employed in the western portion of the AO and withdrew closer to Tam Ky as the monsoon season started. B/3/18 moved out to LZ Lurch (AT 926238) from LZ Karen on 4 Aug. On 19 Aug the battery returned to LZ Ross to remain there for the balance of the reporting period.

d. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (+)(105T) - DS 196th Infantry Brigade
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-)(155T) - DS 1/1 Cav and GSR 3/82d Arty
#d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)(8"/175G) - GS

(b) Burlington Trail

1. Operation Burlington Trail continued during the period with the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry and 198th Infantry Brigade conducting the operation.

2. On 6 Aug D/1/14 moved to LZ Professional (BT 173076) and A/6/11 moved to LZ Pleasantville from LZ Young and Tien Phuoc, respectively. D/1/14 moved to LZ Pleasantville on 13 Aug. On 19 Aug B/1/14 moved to LZ Bowman (BT238140) from Hill 54. A/6/11 moved from LZ Pleasantville (BT 051049) to LZ Bowman (BT 238140) on 21 Aug. During the four day contact with the 1st MF VC Regiment, 2d NVA Division at BT2221 the unit contributed fires which resulted in a total of 510 NVA KIA and 57 VC KIA. On 4 Sep, Plt 1/A/3/16 returned from LZ Baldy to Hawk Hill (BT224311) as DS 1/1 Cav. B/1/14 moved to LZ Young from LZ Bowman on 19 Sep. After three days of fighting results were: 402 NVA KIA and 23 VC KIA. On 28 Sep A/1/14 moved to Tien Phuoc from LZ Chippewa (BS 485 967). C/1/14 moved to LZ Bowman (BT 238140) from LZ Gator (BS 571963) on 9 Oct, and moved to LZ Sheryl (BT302192) on 17 Oct to support a combined US - ARVN operations.

3. Reinforcing artillery of A/3/18 (2-175mm) on Hill 54 supported Burlington Trail operations. On 4 Aug this platoon moved to

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LZ Young and returned to Hill 54 on 7 Sep. A Plt/B/3/16 joined the battery at Tien Phuoc on 9 Aug. Plt C/3/18 moved to Hawk Hill from Fat City (BT 436076) on 20 Sep.

4. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

1st Battalion, 14 Artillery (+)(105T) - DS 198th Infantry Brigade

3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-)(155T) - DS 1/1 Cav

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)(8"/175G) - GS

(c) Pocahontas Forest terminated on 4 Aug. Units returned to the Wheeler/Wallowa AO.

(d) Dukes Glade was initiated on 7 Oct by 4-21st Inf to destroy enemy forces in vicinity AT 9948. It was terminated on 9 Oct.

1. D/3/82 moved to LZ Cacti (BT060473) and C/3/16(-) moved to LZ Baldy (BT 132 438) from LZ Baldy and LZ Ross, respectively on 1 Oct.

2. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (-)(105T) - DS 196th Infantry Brigade

3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-)(155T) - Reinforce

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)(8"/175G) - GS

(e) Chu Lai TAOR

1. Operations in the Chu Lai TAOR were conducted by the 198th Infantry Brigade and by the 11th Infantry Brigade when they resumed responsibility for the southern portion.

2. Division Artillery provided support as follows:

a. Direct support artillery moves frequently between several fire support bases in the TAOR in order to provide sufficient coverage and mutual support, and permit flexibility in offensive operations. On 8 Aug, B/3/82 moved from LZ O'Connor to LZ Chippewa (BS4855967) and then returned to LZ Center on 3 Sep. D/1/14, on 22 Aug, moved from Hau Duc (BT048043) to Fat City (BT 439075). A/6/11 moved from LZ Bowman to Hill 54 (BT396143) on 29 Aug and then to LZ Buff (BS539824) on 7 Sep. B/1/14 moved to Hill 54 from Fat City on 28 Aug. On 2 Sep A/1/14 moved to LZ Chippewa from LZ BUFF. On 16 Sep Plt C/1/14 moved to LZ Gator (BS571963) From LZ Jane (BS 660758). B/6/11 moved to LZ Buff from FSB Cork (BS450612) on 23 Sep. D/6/11 also

moved from LZ Dottie from LZ Chevy (BS428718). On 4 Oct A/1/14 moved to LZ Chippewa from Tien Phuoc. On 9 Oct they moved to LZ Center. C/14 moved from LZ Bowman to Hill 54 on 13 Oct. D/6/11 moved back to LZ Dottie on 13 Oct from LZ Uptight (BS726857). On 23 Oct C/1/14 moved back to LZ Buff from LZ Sheryl (BT102192).

b. 1/82 Arty became operational in early August, A/1/82 at Hill 54 on 5 Aug, later sending a Plt to Fat City on 12 Aug, returning to Hill 54 on 20 Sep. B/1/82 moved into LZ Gator on 8 Aug, fully operational. Plt C/3/16 moved to Fat City on 6 Aug from Hill 54. D/1/82 became operational at LZ Dottie on 4 Aug. Plt C/3/18 (2-8") moved from Fat City on 7 Aug from LZ Dottie. 7 Sep, Plt A/3/18 (2-175G) moved to Hill 54 from LZ Young. On 23 Sep, B/1/82 returned to LZ Gator from an operation in the 11 Inf Bde AO. On 13 Oct, Plt B/1/82 moved to LZ Dottie from LZ Gator to provide illumination.

3. Artillery organization for combat was as follows,

1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (+)(105T) - DS 198th Infantry Brigade

1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (-)(155T/8"SP) - GSR 1/14 Arty

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-)(105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)(8"/175G) - GS

(f) Logan Field

1. Operation Logan Field was conducted from 7-12 Oct as the 1-20th Inf moved to the Batangan Peninsula.

2. D/6/11 moved to LZ uptight (BS726857) from LZ Dottie to provide direct support for the 1-20th Inf.

(g) Champagne Grove

1. From 3-24 Sep the 11th Inf Bde deployed its forces for operation Champaign Grove with three US Battalions and three ARVN battalions to take pressure off the Ha Thanh Special Forces Camp.

2. C/6/11 moved to Quang Ngai Air field (BS605719) on 4 Sep from LZ Center. On 11 Sep B/1/82 (-) moved to LZ Chevy (BS 428714) from LZ Gator. On 20 Sep, B/6/11 moved to LZ Cork (BS 450612) from LZ Bronco (BS 450612)

3. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-)(105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade OPCON

Battery B(-), 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (155T) 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-) 917G) - GS

(h) Duc Pho AO

1. Operations in the Duc Pho AO continued throughout the reporting period.

2. Several moves were made in order to support several other smaller scale operations. On 7 Aug, D/6/11 moved to Minh Long Special Forces AO (BS458466) from Bato (BS555325). On 8 Aug, C/1/82 became operational with four guns on LZ Liz (BS75432) and two guns on LZ Thunder (BS 869318). On 9 Aug D/6/11 moved to LZ Dragon (BS730529) from Minh Long (BS 548466). B/6/11 moved to Bato Special Forces Camp (BS 581326) on 14 Aug from LZ Thunder. A/6/11 moved to LZ Dragon on 30 Aug from Hill 54 and D/6/11 moved to Ha Thanh (BS 428718) from LZ Dragon. C/6/11 moved to LZ Bronco on 10 Sep from Quang Ngai Airfield. C/1/14 moved down to LZ Jane (BS 660758) on 13 Sep. On 16 Sep A/6/11 moved to LZ Dragon, C/6/11 moved to LZ Thunder, and B/6/11 moved to LZ Bronco from LZ Buff, LZ Bronco and LZ Thunder, respectively.

3. On 28 Aug, Plt C/3/18 (2-175G) moved to LZ Dottie from LZ Dragon. They moved back to LZ Dragon on 23 Sep. Plt C/3/18 moved from Fat City to LZ Dragon to LZ Bronco with 2-8" guns. From 14-15 Oct C/1/82 (4-155) moved from LZ Liz to LZ Snoopy and back to LZ Liz.

4. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-)(105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade

OPCON

Battery C, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (155T)

1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (-)(105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade.

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)(8"/175G) - GS

(i) Dale Common

1. Operation Dale Common was a short operation from 18-19 Oct with 3-1st Infantry working in the Song Ve Valley (BS 6050).

2. A/6/11 moved to LZ Bulldog (BS 730528) from LZ Dragon on 18 Oct and returned on 19 Oct.

(j) Vernon Lake I

1. Vernon Lake I commenced on 25 Oct with 4-3d Inf and 3-1st Inf in the Song Ve Valley. On 28 Oct friendly units moved north between Ha Thanh and Quang Ngai Airfield. 1st Cav moved to the AO.

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2. On 25 Oct D/6/11 and B/6/11 moved to LZ Dancer (BS 682402) and LZ Bulldog (BS 637552) from LZ Dottie and LZ Buff, respectively. On 28 Oct, B/1/82 (-), 4 guns, moved to Hill 10 (S 583722) from LZ Dottie and LZ Gator. On 29 Oct, B/6/11 moved to LZ Pepper (BS 496716) from LZ Bulldog. D/6/11 then moved to LZ Pepper from LZ Dancer on 30 Oct.

3. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-)(105t) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade OPCON

Battery B (-), 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (155T)

c. The 251st and 252d Countermortar Radar Detachments are positioned on LZ East (BT 13102025) and Artillery Hill (BT51580399), respectively. The 251st's primary sector is south down the valley toward the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp. The 252d's primary sector is northwest into the Chu Lai rocket belt.

d. The 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery became operational on 8 August 1968. The battalion is employed along Highway# 1 in the Chu Lai area of Operations, except for Battery C which is OPCON to the 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery in the 11th Infantry Brigade AO.

e. The 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery (Hawk) became operational in the Americal AO on 2 Oct 1968. The battalion (-) is employed to defend Chu Lai Base. Battery C is located at Tan Son Nhut AFB, RVN. The battalion is OPCON to the 7th Air Force.

f. 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery: See Inclosure 1.

g. 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery: Secret, Forwarded Separately

2. SECTION 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel

Shortage of Artillery Chiefs of Section and Gunners

(a) OBSERVATION: Not enough qualified replacements for E5 Gunners and E6 Section Chiefs, MOS 13840, are forthcoming from the replacement stream.

(b) EVALUATION: The lack of qualified replacement personnel in the grade of E5 gunners and E6 Section Chiefs forces the Battery Commanders to assign personnel in the grade of Specialist Four E4, or lower, to these responsible positions without the depth of experience necessary to fully accomplish the job. This lack of experience requires the Chief of Firing Battery and the Executive Officer to supervise firing battery operations more closely than normal. This closer supervision detracts from the responsiveness of artillery fire support.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That an adequate flow of qualified personnel in the grades of E5 and E6 13B40 be maintained.

b. Operations

(1) Development of an azimuth template containing indices at 0200 mil increments throughout 6400.

(a) OBSERVATION: Considerable time is consumed in constructing new firing charts with a 6400 mil capability. This is especially true when a battery displaces and survey data is initially unavailable.

(b) EVALUATION: Accuracy and time would be gained by utilizing a permanent, transparent, plastic, machined template which would contain accurate azimuth markers at 0200 mil increments around the battery center. Once data is received for a new battery position this template is placed under the current plastic grid sheet, and azimuth markers are traced on the grid sheet. The template is then removed and the grid sheet is ready for firing. One battery is currently utilizing a prefabricated template which has increased the accuracy and speed in constructing new firing charts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A machined or prefabricated azimuth template be manufactured for issue to all units to insure accuracy and reduce time when preparing new firing charts.

(2) Additional aiming circles for split battery operation.

(a) OBSERVATION: MTOE 6-4?? authorizes two aiming circles for each 8"/175mm battery. A common practice in a 175mm/8 inch composite battalion is to split batteries into two platoons for operations in to separate locations.

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(b) EVALUATION: Two aiming circles are required in each firing location to insure accurate timely fire with a 6400 mil capability.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: Two additional aiming circles to be authorized each 8"/175mm battalion. This unit is initiating MTOE action at this time.

(3) 81MM mortars for self-illumination of fire bases.

(a) OBSERVATION: Heavy Artillery does not have the capability of self illumination in defense of the fire base. The 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery received permission, under MTOE 6-447E to use 81mm for self illumination. Under new MTOE 6-4350, firing batteries are not authorized 81mm mortars.

(b) EVALUATION: 81mm mortars are critically needed for self illumination of fire bases since they provide immediate illumination in the event of a ground attack.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Heavy battalions to authorized on 81 mm mortar for each firing battery.

(4) Occupation of position during air-mobile operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: When an artillery battery displaces to a new position by helicopter, the unit commander has little time in which to plan and prepare for the occupation of the position. In a recent operation, a battery began arriving at a landing zone within five minutes of a combat assault by the infantry.

(b) EVALUATION: During operations into remote areas, it is essential that a firing battery be prepared to fire in support of infantry units conducting combat assaults as soon as possible. To accomplish this a firing battery advance party can go in with the infantry combat assault. In this manner the advance party can quickly organize the position. The battery can begin occupying the new position within 10 minutes of the combat assault.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The battery advance party should accompany the infantry during a combat assault to facilitate occupation of the position by the firing battery.

(5) Artillery Air Warning

(a) OBSERVATION: Artillery maintains an air warning net to advise aircraft of artillery fires. Many times aircraft do not check for artillery Advisories. At other times aircraft entering the area will ask for a check fire of artillery so that the aircraft can proceed.

(b) EVALUATION: Air advisory service is useful only if pilots are aware of it. Whenever an artillery unit enters a new area of operations, it notifies the local aviation unit of the procedures used to obtain

artillery air advisories request for check fires by aircraft must be monitored carefully by the artillery battalion to prevent indiscriminate use. In most cases Aircraft can be rerouted, or only one mission need be check fired. There is no requirement to check fire units which will not endanger the aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Artillery units should maintain close liaison with aviation units to explain the operation and use of artillery air warning advisories.

(6) Clearing of Registration Grids.

(a) OBSERVATION: When a firing unit first occupies a new position during air-mobile operations, difficulty is often encountered in clearing registration points.

(b) EVALUATION: Artillery should register as soon as possible after occupying a new position. However, the fluid situation on encountered in air-mobile operations often makes it difficult to clear grids. Artillery units have been successful in having its Liaison Officers clear tentative registration grids with the maneuver battalion prior to the conduct of an operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Registration grids should be cleared before an operation commences.

(7) Displacement of Battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC).

(a) OBSERVATION: When an artillery battalion FDC is required to displace, it should be non-operational for the shortest possible time. Battery FDCs do not have sufficient personnel or equipment to operate as alternate Battalion FDC for any length of time.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to minimize non-operation time "Jump" FDCs have been constructed from 2 CONEX containers. A side wall of each CONEX was removed and two CONEXs were welded together. Equipment and radios were pre-positioned in the "Jump" FDC. As a result, the "Jump" FDC was ready to begin operation within minutes of arrival at a landing zone. This system also precludes having to construct bunker frames as sandbags can be stacked about the CONEX.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: "Jump" FDCs should be constructed by each artillery battalion and battery for use in air-mobile operations.

(8) Lack of Man Pack Radios in Artillery Firing Batteries.

(a) OBSERVATION: Firing batteries are not authorized any portable FM radios for use within the battery. Only vehicle mounted FM radios are available.

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(b) EVALUATION: When a battery moves by helicopter, it must be capable of communicating with the helicopters by radio. To do so the advance party must have a portable radio available. At times it is possible to borrow a radio from infantry elements. However, this is not a dependable method of insuring communications.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Each firing battery should be authorized and issued an AN/PRC-25 radio for use in air-mobile operations.

(9) FADAC data for shell, illuminating, M485.

(a) OBSERVATION: Sizeable differences exist in firing data for shell, Illuminating M485, between FADAC computed data and manual data using the FT 155-Q-4.

(b) EVALUATION: FADAC data produces consistently lower quadrant elevations. Experience shows that observers consistently call for up corrections to FADAC fired illuminating rounds. Examples are indicated below. Manual data conversely results in minimum corrections from observers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That FADAC tapes be reviewed in order to reconcile them with manual data.

ILLUMINATION DATA - MANUAL VS FADAC

	<u>Manual</u>	<u>FADAC</u>	
Chg 6, Rg 8559m AZ 4898	Df 0902	0899	
	Ti 26.2	27.7	
	QE 485	462	
Chg 5, Rg 6562m AZ 4928	Df 0872	0869	
	Ti 21.7	23.1	
	QE 501	467	
Chg 4, Rg 5571m AZ 4951	Df 0849	0854	
	Ti 20.7	34.4	
	QE 555	549	
Chg 3, Rg 3606m AZ 5035	Df 0773	0765	
	Ti 16.1	14.1	
	QE 516	565	

(10) FADAC data for Selected Ammunition.

(a) OBSERVATION: Significant differences exist in firing data for Shells, Selected M449, 449E1, and 449E2 between FADAC computed data and manual data using the FT 155-ADD-A-1 with Charges 2, 4, and 5 or FT 155-ADD-C-1 (provisional).

(b) EVALUATION: The examples show the differences in data for three different shell types. Data was developed using current GFT settings and met corrections. Past experience gathered during demonstration and combat firing shows that FADAC data is the better of the two, producing fewer duds.

SELECTED MUNITIONS - MANUAL VS FADAC

Battery A, Grid 300300, Alt 22, Rg 7630, Ch 5.

<u>Manual</u>	<u>449</u>	<u>FADAC</u>
Df 2255		
Ti 25.7		2259
QE 473		26.0
	445	

Max Ord. 1050.32

<u>449 E-1</u>	
Df 2255	2259
Ti 25.7	25.7
QE 475	440

Max Ord. 1027.13

<u>449 A-1</u>	
Df 2255	2259
Ti 25.4	25.7
QE 447	436

Statistical data is being compiled on the 105mm and 8 inch Howitzer. None is available at this time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That differences be reviewed in order to develop manual data producing desired results. In this regard it should be noted that manual data computed using FT 155-ADD-B-1, designed for the M109 self-propelled Howitzer, does check with FADAC data for M114 Howitzer.

(11) Gunnery Safety SOP.

(a) OBSERVATION: The many safety factors to be considered in firing artillery in Vietnam requires that all supervisory personnel be constantly aware of these considerations.

(b) EVALUATION: In order for artillery supervisory personnel to have ready access to safety data, a pocket SOP, which is attached as inclosure 2, provides guidance to Commanders, Staff Officers, Fire Direction Officers, Liaison Officers, Forward Observers, and Section Chiefs. Areas covered include FDC checks, Firing Battery checks, and safety criteria to be followed by FOs and LNs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: None

c. Training: Omitted

d. Intelligence: Omitted.

e. Logistics:

(1) Repair parts for M110 and M107 artillery weapons.

(a) OBSERVATION: The M110 and M107 are frequently inoperative as a result of an inadequate supply of a few critical repair parts.

Examples of these parts are as follows:

<u>Item</u>	<u>FSN</u>
Carrier, Traversing Mechanism	2520-733-8163
Differential Assembly	2520-937-3133
Valve, Solenoid	2520-736-0242
Switch, Oil Pressure	2520-736-0233
Valve, Safety Relief	4820-719-6348
Tube, Assembly, Metal	2590-955-5498
Hydraulic Elevating Motor	2520-733-8144
Cylinder	2520-730-6645
Cylinder Assembly	1025-863-7786
Screw, Cap Hex Head	5305-655-9279
Switch, Sensitive	5930-699-9085
Pump, Rotary	4320-745-7865
Motor, DC	6105-513-9631
Pump, Rotary, Power Driven	2520-860-0557
Drive Assembly, Torque Lock	2520-909-2460

(b) EVALUATION: A shortage of repair parts has resulted in several battalion weapons being inoperative for periods of 3 days to 3 weeks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continuing emphasis be placed on bringing the repair part stock level at direct support and general support units up to the authorized level of stockage.

(2) M-578 for each firing battery of heavy SP battalions.

(a) OBSERVATION: A mobile heavy lifting capability combined with a recovery capability is vital to a heavy SP artillery battalion in combat. The lift capability is required to assist in the frequent tube changes of the 175mm Gun, for two vehicles with a lifting capability are required for each tube change. An M-578 is required to recover M110/M107 vehicles which become disabled during road marches. At the present time the flank batteries in the battalion are separated by approximately 120 KM. This considerable separation distance, periodic adverse road conditions, and virtual isolation of those batteries has required an M-578 to be assigned to each battery. The remaining firing battery is located a short distance from battalion headquarters, and therefore, this unit is supported by service battery's M-578 or by the 588th DS Company. A recent change in the battalion's TOE (MTOE 6-435G, dtd 1 July 1968) authorizes only the M-578 in service battery. This one M-578 has proven to be inadequate to support the continuing requirements for 175mm Gun tube changes and the recovery of disabled guns. An MTOE is being prepared.

5th Bn, 46th Inf
Trp H, 17th Cav
57th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
87th Chem Det

8. NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

6th CA Plat, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)
Det 1 (DS of Chu Lai)
Det 2 (DS of Duc Pho)

Det 3, 7th Psyop Bn (DS of Div)

USASSG, ACSI, DA

Inclosure 1