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(RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

X-ray had phased out and Task Force Oregon PSE had assumed responsibility for fire support coordination in the Chu Lai area.

4. Aviation.

a. (U) The Aviation officer was a member of the initial planning group. On 19 February the aviation requirements for the Task Force were given to the Task Force G3. These requirements consisted of three assault helicopter companies, one medium support helicopter company, one air cavalry troop, an artillery aviation section, aircraft organic to the assigned brigades and one aircraft maintenance company.

b. (U) On 20 February, 34th Group (Aircraft Maintenance) recommended the assignment of one general support aircraft maintenance company to support the aviation elements of the Task Force provided there was an organic maintenance company (direct support) within the Task Force.

c. (C) The S3, 1st Aviation Bde, agreed with the proposed aviation requirements on 20 February. It was not felt that these requirements could be met by present in-country assets due to the shortage of aviation units. The priorities would have to be set by COMUSMACV.

d. (U) On 20 February, the USARV aviation maintenance officer informed the Task Force aviation officer that the Infantry brigades did not have direct support maintenance capabilities. They receive support on an area basis depending on their operational location.

e. (C) The Task Force aviation officer briefed the Deputy USARV aviation officer 21 February on the aviation requirements to support the Task Force. The general agreement was that the requirements were valid but there were insufficient aviation assets in RVN to provide them all.

f. (U) An analysis of in-country aviation assets was submitted to USARV DCG on 26 February. The results of this analysis showed adequate aviation to support the Task Force with in-country assets.

g. (U) On 9 April the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion was notified that they would come under the operational control of Task Force Oregon effective 20 April. The advance party of the battalion arrived at Chu Lai on 14 April and made arrangements for one assault helicopter company to park temporarily at Ky Ha Heliport. Of the two remaining assault helicopter companies, one would deploy to English Airfield in support of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div; this company could

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not fully deploy to Duc Pho due to the lack of maintenance facilities and local security. The other assault helicopter company would move temporarily to the cross-wind runway at Chu Lai Airfield until adequate parking facilities could be constructed.

h. (U) The 161st Assault Helicopter Company arrived 18 April to assume the general aviation support of the Task Force and the 71st Assault Helicopter Company arrived as the direct aviation support of the 196th Inf Bde.

i. (U) The medium support helicopter company arrived at Chu Lai on 21 April.

j. (U) When aviation units arrived in the Task Force TAOR, many problems involving the aviation unit's locations had to be resolved. The insecure and unprepared area at Duc Pho prevented the 174th Assault Helicopter Company from basing all their aircraft at this position and prevented their direct support maintenance detachment from moving with them. Due to a late change in plans when USMC aviation units were not able to vacate the Chu Lai area, the home base operating room of the 161st and the 71st Assault Helicopter Companies was restricted.

5. Chemical.

a. (U) The Task Force Chemical Section, consisting of 2 officers and 2 enlisted men, was at authorized strength by 16 April. The section with its equipment arrived at Chu Lai on 18 April and became operational that day.

b. (C) Riot Control Agent (RCA) munitions availability was an immediate problem area in the operational area. The CS hand grenade was the only RCA munition available. A device was designed to dispense these on 27 April. This device was unsuccessfully tested on 28 April by 1st Bn, 35th Inf. The Task Force ALO was contacted in reference to providing Air Force RCA support with air delivered CBU-19A RCA bombs. This delivery capability is expected to become available during the next reporting period and offers distinct advantages over Army-air delivered RCA munitions.

c. (C) As of 30 April there were no E-8 CS launchers nor E-159 and E-158 tactical CS munitions available to Task Force elements. The Task Force ammunition officer has been unable to obtain them as of the end of the reporting period. An XM-3 smoke landing device was borrowed from the 1st Cav Div and issued to 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, on 29 April as a substitute means to deliver RCA.

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6. Engineer.

a. (U) During the planning phase of Task Force Oregon it was established that the Task Force would be composed of separate brigades, each with its own organic engineer company. The decision was then to provide a light but balanced direct support engineer battalion for the Task Force. The battalion chosen for the mission was the 39th Engineer Bn (C) composed of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, two line companies (A & D), and the 554th Engineer Co (Panel Bridge) which includes one platoon of the 509th Engineer Co (Panel Bridge). In addition, this basic structure was augmented by additional earth-moving equipment from the 577th Engineer Bn (Const) and the 572nd Engineer Co (LE), as well as an asphalt distributor from the 35th Engineer Bn (C).

b. (U) During the period 18 February-11 March the Engineer Annex for the Task Force Field SOP was written as was the Engineer Annex to OPLAN I-67. During this same period, the decision was made to use a TOE Assistant Division Engineer section as a part of the Task Force staff. Equipment and personnel for this section were drawn from units throughout the U.S. Army Engineer Command Vietnam (Provisional).

c. (U) On 10 April, an advance party of the 39th Engineer Bn (C), accompanied by the Assistant Task Force Engineer, moved to Duc Pho. The ATFE moved to Chu Lai on 19 April.

d. (U) The remainder of the section moved to Chu Lai 18 April and was confronted immediately with requirements for engineer support; the 14th Aviation Bn maintenance and parking facilities and 1st Logistical Command General Support Group storage and maintenance facilities. Since the 39th Engineer Bn was already fully committed to the construction of the C-130 airfield and the beach road near Duc Pho, the Task Force was virtually without Army Engineer support in the Chu Lai area. Only the 175th Engineer Co was in the area and it was committed in direct support of the 196th Inf Bde. However, the 9th USMC Engineer Bn and two Mobile Construction Battalions are located in the Chu Lai area, and a request for engineer support by these units was forwarded to III MAF. Within hours, engineer support was provided by units within III MAF.

e. (U) The Engineer Section became involved in two major problems: shortage of water and shortage of electrical power for the Task Force headquarters. The basic cause of these problems was the withdrawal of the existing equipment by the Marine units moving out

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of the area. Equipment and materials required to correct these problems were requisitioned.

f. (U) The major engineering projects being constructed for Task Force operational requirements during the reporting period were:

(1) 39th Engr Bn and Co D, 65th Engr Bn at Duc Pho:

(a) A C-130 capable airfield, 3,900 feet long, to include MX-19 runway and MBA1 taxiways and parking apron.

(b) A class 35, 6,000 meter, two-lane road from the beach east of Duc Pho to the airfield installation at Duc Pho.

(c) Helicopter facilities for two airmobile companies.

(d) PSA facilities for surrounding tactical forces.

(2) 9th USMC Engineer Bn at Chu Lai:

(a) One 13-pad ASP, complete with necessary berthing and access roads, for the 15th Support Brigade.

(b) Hardstand facilities and access roads for the 8th Support Bn, 196th Inf Bde.

(c) Hardstand facilities and access roads for a Class I, and II and IV yard for the 221st S&S Co, 94th S&S Bn.

(d) Maintenance and supply hardstands for the 88th Maintenance Bn.

(e) A helipad for the Task Force PW compound.

(f) Wiring and fixture renovation for the 563rd Med Co, 1st Logistical Command hospital area.

(g) Construction of an office building for the Assistant Task Force Commander and his staff.

(3) Mobile Construction Battalion 71 (Seabee) at Chu Lai:

(a) Expansion of facilities at the Chu Lai Airfield to accomodate the 71st Airmobile Co (Lt) and the 178th Airmobile Co (Med).

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(b) A heliport for the 161st Airmobile Co (Lt).

7. Signal.

a. (U) The Signal officer was part of the original planning staff for the Task Force. Initially the staff consisted of two officers and three enlisted men. Subsequently, a Crypto Warrant Officer and a Crypto Clerk were added to the group.

b. (U) The Communications-Electronics element for the Task Force was tailored after a division signal battalion. The tailoring of the unit eliminated the headquarters of the Forward Area Signal Company as the brigades of the Task Force were required to deploy with attached Forward Area Signal Center Platoons.

c. (U) Units designated as elements of the Task Force Signal Battalion did not conform exactly to the organization of a division signal battalion, and tailoring prior to their being committed with the Task Force was impractical due to their operational commitments. Units designated and their operational roles were:

(1) HHD 509th Sig Bn: Provide HHD of the Task Force Signal Bn.

(2) Co C, 459th Sig Bn: Provide Command Operations Co of Task Force Signal Bn.

(3) Co A, 36th Sig Bn: Provide Support Operations Co of the Task Force Signal Bn.

(4) Platoon (+), 167th Radio Relay Co: Augment the VHF capabilities of Co A, 36th Signal Bn, and C C, 459th Signal Bn, to replace committed equipment.

(5) 69th Signal Bn AM Radio Section: Provide HF capability to Co, 36th Sig Bn, and Co C, 459th Sig Bn.

d. (U) During the entire planning period the Signal section continued work on the SSI, SOI and crypto-distribution plans. The writing of the SOI was hampered by the changes of units designated as elements of the Task Force.

e. (U) The advance signal element, consisting of three officers and seven enlisted men, moved to Chu Lai on 14 April. Equipment accompanying the advance party consisted of 2 AN/MRC-112, SB-22, 12 TA-312 and 4 AN/PRC-25 radios. The AN/PRC-25 radios were put into use immediately establishing a movement-control net for incoming units.

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the remainder of the Signal Bn arrived in Chu Lai by 20 April and much of the equipment was put into operation immediately upon arrival.

f. (U) Original planning called for the Marines to evacuate the Chu Lai area as relieved by Army elements. However, many Marine units remained in the area and their requirements for frequencies plus the change in the designation of one of the Task Force brigades completely invalidated the SOI. In order to overcome this situation, a number of clear frequencies were assigned to each major unit and a new SOI was written which did not conflict with Marine elements in the area.

g. (U) Due to the fact that the companies designated for the Signal Bn were not structured to fit a division signal battalion organization, numerous shifts in personnel and equipment were required to satisfy operational requirements. Personnel shortages existed especially in the message center section of Co C, 459th Signal Bn.

h. (U) Unprogrammed requirements which were placed upon the battalion caused delays in the installation of some communications. Task Force Artillery had only organic radio equipment, so land-line communications to their GS battalions had to be installed. The Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC) required an extensive communications network.

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E. Logistics

1. (U) The office of the G4 was established 19 February as part of the initial planning group for Task Force Oregon. By 21 February, the office was manned by four officers and four enlisted men.

2. (U) Guidance was received to structure the combat service support element of the Task Force base austerely, with only essential functions covered. The base support was to contain only those elements which were needed and not available either within the designated brigades or the 1st Logistical Command support. No divisional support command type units were available. Based upon this guidance, and the availability of units, it was planned to use a modified Supply and Services Battalion to perform the support command functions. Such a unit would require a major upgrading to meet the requirements.

3. (U) The overall force structure was presented to the USARV Deputy Commanding General on 26 February. MG Eifler, 1st Logistical Command CG who was present, stated that the support command structure was insufficient. He recommended that the command and staff element of the support command should be based on a modified Support Brigade headquarters with subordinate battalion headquarters to control company-sized service and support elements.

4. (U) As a result of the conference of 26 February, the Task Force Support Command was developed to consist of a Support Brigade Headquarters; Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Supply and Service Battalion; and Headquarters and Main Support Company with appropriate companies.

5. (U) A list of equipment required for the Task Force Oregon headquarters was prepared and forwarded to USARV and 1st Logistical Command on 28 February. The message requested that the equipment be collected in one location and segregated by section, since the headquarters had not received all the personnel required to maintain the equipment. It was later determined that the equipment would have to be collected in three locations; Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon until called for by Task Force Oregon. This was the only way that sufficient depot storage space could be provided, and it would also prevent double handling of the equipment.

6. (U) As a result of a visit to observe the logistics operations of the 1st Inf Div, it became apparent that a Logistical Operations Control Center (LOCC) was needed for the Task Force. It was decided that the interests of the Task Force could be best served if the LOCC were a Support Command function. The Task Force, G4 would establish a Logistical Information Center (LIC) to assemble, evaluate and present

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data from the IOCC.

7. (U) Deployment planning began on 20 February. This planning was complicated by the fact that many units in Vietnam are operating with MTOEs and the latest MTOEs were not available to USARV. By 8 March it was determined that refined movement data were required from the designated units and a message was sent to all units requesting data for movement by sea and airlift. A small movement control center was established to prepare the data received and formulate movement control tables.

8. (U) Determination of Medical Support units was another problem during this period. There were no non-divisional units available that could act as a Task Force base medical facility. The USARV Surgeon recommended that a divisional medical company be selected. Company C, 25th Medical Battalion, was assigned as the Task Force medical support.

9. (U) On 13 March, 1st Logistical Command notified the Task Force G4 that there was no authority to go out of country for equipment not in stock to fill the Task Force requirements. The decision was made to pull items from stock as they came in country until the demands were . During the following week it became obvious that equipment requirements could not be filled by waiting for the items to come in from out of country. On 27 March USARV G4 requested that certain items be earmarked to come from units in Vietnam upon deployment of Task Force Oregon.

10. (U) With the announcement of the activation of Task Force Oregon, equipment and supplies for the Task Force were assembled at the 1st Logistical Command motor pool. They were then issued to the staff sections of the Task Force

11. (U) The G4 Section moved to Chu Lai and became operational on 18 April.

F. Civil Affairs/Civic Action

1. (U) The office of the G5 was established 19 February as part of the initial planning group. It was manned by one officer, the G5.
2. (U) During the period 22-24 February, a staff visit was made to Hq III MAF and Task Force X-ray. It was determined during this visit that records of Military Civil Affairs/Civic Action were not kept by either headquarters. Areas of responsibility were assigned to organizational commanders and area tasks were developed for the two U.S. Army Civil Affairs Platoons which were under operational control of Task Force X-ray from the 29th Civil Affairs Company (U.S. Army). Each organizational commander in Task Force X-ray determined the tasks to be accomplished in his area of responsibility. At the request of the Task Force Oregon G5, the Task Force X-ray G5 developed an inventory of projects planned, in progress, and completed.
3. (U) On 27-28 February, the Task Force Oregon G5 again visited Headquarters III MAF and Task Force X-ray to obtain information on the status of Revolutionary Development (RD) in the proposed areas of operation for Task Force Oregon. There was only one 1967 RD Program National Priority Area in the areas--immediately around Da Nang City. Province priorities are established in the province capitals of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin. The Task Force X-ray G5 provided a roster of Office of Civil Operations (OCO) and G7X officials concerned with civil affairs and Revolutionary Development.
4. (U) The Task Force Oregon G5 Section became fully manned with two officers and three enlisted men on 8 April. This austere organization was considered inadequate when augmented with the two Civil Affairs Platoons that been attached to Task Force X-ray.
5. (U) The G5 and assistant G5 moved to Chn Lai on 13 April. The enlisted men of the section arrived at Chn Lai 18 April and the section became operational that same day.
6. (U) Task Force Oregon assumed operational control of the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) on 20 April. At that time emphasis was placed on insuring that all high-impact projects underway were taken over by Army units in the area. This was considered necessary to insure that the benefits of those projects did not cease and that the Vietnamese people did not have an additional hardship placed on them by interruption in civic action, particularly in the MEDCAP program.
7. (U) The 6th CA Platoon came under the operational control of Task Force Oregon 28 April by VCO 29th Civil Affairs Company. The other Civil Affairs Platoon attached to Task Force X-ray will come under the operational control of the Task Force Oregon in early May.

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8. (U) Below is a recapitulation of Task Force Oregon MEDCAP activities:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No. of MEDCAPS</u>	<u>Patients Treated</u>
196th Inf Bn	70	5,611
3d Bn, 25th Inf Div	7	645
TF Oregon, Arty	2	51
Totals	85	6,334

9. (U) In support of the CIV Program of Revolutionary Development, liaison visits have been made to the Province Headquarters at Quang Ngai and Quang Tia as well as to the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) in each province. These visits will continue and will include district, village and hamlet officials and Vietnamese and U.S. Advisory personnel.

10. (U) The military civic program in the Task Force is carried out by local commanders who determine the needs of the villages and hamlets in their areas of operations. After weighing these needs against his ability to furnish manpower, the programs are coordinated with the Task Force G5. Units are being encouraged to engage in high-impact projects because of their immediate effect.

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G. Inspector General.

1. (U) The Task Force Inspector General's office is organized with an Inspector General, Assistant Inspector General, Chief Clerk and a clerk. This manning, augmented with assistance of Acting Inspectors General at subordinate commands, is adequate to provide Inspector General services for the entire Task Force. As is normal, the section will be further augmented with inspection-team members to conduct Annual General Inspections.

2. (U) The personnel and equipment of the IG section moved from Saigon on 18 April and that same day became operational at Headquarters, Task Force Oregon, Coulai.

3. (U) The Inspector General visited all major subordinate commands of the Task Force during the period 19-30 April to establish liaison, identify personnel to be appointed as Acting Inspectors General, identify problem areas peculiar to the command and obtain a general terrain and organisational orientation. Problem areas identified during these visits included:

a. Conditions in base camp areas are crowded because of Army units being partially superimposed over Marine Corps units. This is the result of the operational necessity of maintaining adequate forces in the area during the transition from Marine control to Army control. No immediate action is considered warranted since the condition will correct itself with the departure of the Marines.

b. A general lack of morale and comfort items such as day-room equipment and facilities was noted. Equipment for these facilities is on order and adequate facilities will be established with its arrival. These items have been released for shipment to the Task Force units but have not arrived.

c. Establishment or re-establishment of unit clubs and/or Open Messes appeared to be a potential problem area. The IG gave assistance and advice on establishing funds for the operation of these facilities. Units were cautioned to maintain close supervision over the funds during the period of movement and organization to insure compliance with appropriate regulations and protection of the funds from loss. This problem is inherent in movement of troops and transfer of responsibility, but is being controlled.

d. Morale and esprit appear to be high at present throughout the Task Force, but many individuals are faced with excessive guard and KP duties. Indigenous personnel are being hired as KPs,

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and sound requirements are being reviewed with a view toward relief
in these areas.

2. (U) A total of one complaint and 10 requests for assistance were processed by the IG office during the period 19-30 April. The majority of the requests involved R&R applications, malassignment of personnel, and non-delivery of mail.

a. R&R requests were submitted by some individuals at their parent units immediately prior to their departure for duty with Task Force Oregon. R&R quotas must come from these parent units since all personnel of Headquarters Task Force Oregon are in TDY status. Because of the classified nature of the operation during the reporting period, units were uncertain of lines of communication and did not notify personnel of approval or disapproval and of specific dates for R&R. Each case is being handled individually and units are being contacted through IG channels to get needed information for the individuals concerned.

b. Three individuals requested assistance in obtaining reassignment from Task Force Oregon. Two requests were based on medical reasons and the other was based on personal reasons. One reassignment was effected based on a medical recommendation obtained by the IG. Medical treatment available within the command alleviated the second request. In the third case it was determined that the reasons set forth in the request did not merit special handling.

c. The many requests for assistance in speeding up mail forwarding service resulted in a series of informal inquiries and checks into the mail system. Errors which could be corrected locally were corrected as they were identified. Several visits were made to the postal facility servicing Task Force units resulting in a determination that the personnel and equipment available for mail handling at Chu Lai are inadequate for the number of troops serviced. The primary cause of this was the failure to anticipate the large initial influx of mail brought about by the temporary hold placed on individual mail at units furnishing personnel to the Task Force and subsequent release of this mail when a forwarding address was obtained. There was also an indication that change-of-address cards were not forwarded as expeditiously as possible. Rerouted mail was arriving in large amounts as of 30 April. A few cases of misplaced mail are being inquired into and the problems solved on an individual basis. This situation serves to point up again the important morale factor represented by timely delivery of mail.

3. (U) The IG office is developing a schedule of Annual General Inspections for Task Force Oregon units.

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H. Information.

1. (U) The Task Force Information Office became operational 10 April at Tan Son Nhut, RVN, with an Information Officer and one Information Supervisor.

2. (U) During the period 10-14 April, appropriate regulations and the Task Force Information Office SOP were completed. Three information specialists reported for duty to bring the section to a strength of one officer and four enlisted men. The section reached its authorized strength of two officers and six enlisted men on 18 April.

3. (U) The advance party of one officer and one enlisted man arrived at Chu Lai 15 April to establish working facilities and prepare for the arrival of the main body. The Task Force Information Office became operational at Chu Lai with the arrival of these personnel on 18 April.

4. (U) The first edition of the "OREGON NEWS SHEET" was published and distributed 20 April to the Task Force Headquarters elements as the sole source of national, international and local news. Material for the news sheet was obtained by taping the hourly AFRTS news broadcasts. Initial printing was by "Ditto" process since the Information Office had not been issued a mimeograph machine. Since that date a mimeograph machine has been received and 500 copies of the news sheet are published daily.

5. (U) On 22 April at 1630 hours, per approval of MACV and III MAF, the following initial announcement of Task Force Oregon was made in Saigon and Da Nang:

"The U.S. Army Task Force Oregon has joined the units of III MAF in I Corps Tactical Zone to support the Government of Vietnam Forces."

"The U.S. Army Task Force is commanded by Maj Gen William B. Rosson, USA, and will be under OPCON of CG III MAF."

6. (U) A request was dispatched to Headquarters USAFW on 23 April for distribution of the Stars and Stripes. USAFW replied that distribution would start with the 2 May edition in 4,500 copies for the Task Force and all subordinate units.

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I. Headquarters Support

1. The Headquarters Commandant office was established 19 February with the assignment of a Headquarters Commandant, Operations Sergeant and a clerk. The first mission of the Headquarters Commandant was to obtain office space and equipment for the planning group that was to develop the Task Force organization and the initial operations plan.

2. During the period 21-27 February equipment requirements to support a 90-day operation were determined and submitted to USARV G4. These requirements included normal TOME-type equipment, station-type equipment and expendable supplies. USARV G4 was requested to gather this material in such a configuration as to permit inspection by the Task Force Commander on 10 March. The equipment was then to be held pending the order to activate the Task Force, at which time it was to be delivered to the objective area.

3. Visits by members of the planning staff to Chu Lai led to a revision of the equipment needed. It was determined that a considerable amount of station-type equipment would be needed to operate the Task Force headquarters at that location.

4. The equipment and material that was available in depot stocks was assembled. A request was submitted to USARV G3 to levy units within USARV for those items that were not available in depots. This request was approved and requirements were placed on units for the equipment to be available on an on-call basis.

5. The final assembly of the Task Force equipment was accomplished by ordering that present in the Saigon area to be delivered to the Headquarters Commandant at Saigon 12 April. All other equipment was delivered to the Headquarters Commandant at Chu Lai from 16-18 April. Equipment was issued to staff sections of the Task Force as soon as it was received. Equipment received in the Saigon area was shipped to Chu Lai by sea and air from 15-18 April. All equipment arrived in the Chu Lai area prior to 19 April.

6. The initial planning for the organization of the Task Force Headquarters base camp provided for the complete take-over of Marine Task Force X-ray base camp in Chu Lai. Plans had to be revised when it was learned that the Marines would not vacate the area as quickly as previously planned and would permanently retain a portion of the billeting area. This resulted in placing the Task Force Signal Battalion in tents initially. The Signal Battalion will be moved to the Task Force headquarters area during the month of May.

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7. Police and sanitation appeared to be a problem throughout much of the area. Garbage and trash pickup was sporadic. Latrines were inadequate in numbers, location and maintenance. Screening on billets, offices and mess halls was in a bad state of repair upon arrival of Army units. Garbage and trash pickup have been established on a regular basis. Materials have been received to re-screen and repair buildings. The work is being done by the Task Force Repairs and Utilities Detachment with assistance from the Task Force Engineers. Indigenous personnel have been hired on a daily and permanent hire basis to pick up trash, clean latrines and burn waste from latrines. Latrines in the base camp are of two types; those from which the waste must be burned and those with water-borne sewage systems. At the present time, the water supply is insufficient to operate the water-borne sewage system. As soon as the water system is expanded, the burn type latrines will be closed.

8. Existing personnel protective bunkers in the base camp were inadequate primarily because of insufficient numbers and lack of overhead cover. A simple-to-construct design was developed by the Assistant Task Force Engineer and an active program of bunker construction is underway with an expected completion date of 15 May.

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Section 2, Part I, Observations-Lessons Learned.

A. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline

ITEM: (U) Strength Reports.

DISCUSSION: (U) The subordinate units of Task Force Oregon were gathered from several commands, each of which has its own method of strength reporting designated to meet the needs of the specific command. Information desired by the Task Force Oregon CG included the number of personnel present for duty of each unit in the TAOH. This required a modification of the reporting format for most units.

OBSERVATION: (U) USARV AG Statistical Branch provided a team to assist the Task Force in the submission of these reports. A standardized reporting system has been instituted within the Task Force.

ITEM: (U) Unqualified Personnel

DISCUSSION: (U) Several personnel selected for assignment to Task Force Oregon were found to be unqualified in their MDS. Due to the austere organization of the headquarters, it was imperative that all personnel be qualified to perform the duties for which requisitioned. The Task Force did not have the time nor the resources with which to offer on-the-job training.

OBSERVATION: (U) Those personnel found to be unqualified were returned to the furnishing units and replacements were requested. Whenever a headquarters such as Task Force Oregon is formed from existing resources, commanders furnishing personnel must give particular attention to the quality and qualifications of those personnel.

ITEM: (U) Organization of the Task Force Headquarters

DISCUSSION: (U) The original planning group of the Task Force kept foremost in mind the requirement to keep the headquarters staffing to the minimum. Accordingly, organizational structuring followed closely that of the various TOEs, but reducing much of the strength provided for in those documents. Even at full strength, however, TOEs do not provide the staffing required for field operations in all organizational elements. Elements, which in a combat environment are required to operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis or in two locations, do not have the requisite personnel authorizations on a TOE basis. This is borne out by the overstrengths encountered in other division-level headquarters currently operating in Vietnam. The sparse approach to personnel staffing also contains another pitfall for a major operating headquarters. The tendency is to make reductions in the numbers of low ranking officers and enlisted men, and it is these personnel who

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must perform many of the mundane, but essential, duties such as guard and fatigue. The result is that the sections which were slim to begin with become even slimmer as the necessary tasks associated with being in the field are accomplished.

OBSERVATION: (U) When faced with such restrictions, it becomes imperative to subject all requirements to thorough analysis and to be highly selective in manning of staff sections.

ITEM: (U) Casualty Reporting

DISCUSSION: (U) The Task Force casualty-reporting system was implemented quickly as a result of liaison visits with reporting units. Some of the units submitting casualty reports through this headquarters have their personnel records with their parent units. This has, at times, caused delay in the verification of certain reportable information.

OBSERVATION: (U) The prompt reporting of casualty information is essential. The reporting of casualty information would be speeded if all units carried their personnel records whenever they are detached from their parent units.

ITEM: (U) Chaplain Coverage for Task Force Artillery Battalions

DISCUSSION: (U) Artillery battalions which deployed with Task Force Oregon did not have assigned Chaplains. Consequently, Chaplain coverage for these units had to be obtained from other sources. The interim solution was to assign this coverage as an additional duty for the Chaplain of the U.S. Army General Support Group (Provisional) and to gain assistance from Marine Chaplains on an area-coverage basis. This arrangement provides minimum Chaplain coverage to the units in the area and will continue to do so provided neither the Artillery battalions nor the General Support Group are physically moved from the area.

OBSERVATION: (U) The USARV Chaplain has been informed of this situation through technical channels.

ITEM: (U) Finance Support of Task Force Oregon

DISCUSSION: (U) A non-integrated disbursing activity was activated to support Task Force Oregon. The establishment of a disbursing activity requires:

(1) Approval by Department of the Army in accordance with the Treasurer of the United States.

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(2) Requisitioning of blank checks from the Treasury of the United States.

(3) Accounting and reporting of funds and transactions.

(4) Requisitioning of specialized office machines and blank forms.

Once activated, accounting and reporting for funds and transactions become a major task for the disbursing officer. A Class B agent, on the other hand, is a commissioned or warrant officer who receives and disburses funds as an agent of a Finance Officer. Procedures to establish a Class B agent office are not intricate. Approval is local. In addition, reporting and accounting procedures for Class B agents are relatively simple; the reporting and accounting is the responsibility of the parent finance office. Further, as an agent of a Finance Officer, normally the Class B agent is insured of continued administrative and logistical support.

OBSERVATION: (U) In the formation of a Task Force type organization, consideration should be given to the establishment of a Class B agent finance activity as opposed to a non-integrated disbursing activity in the interests of both speed of establishment and adequacy of finance support.

ITEM: (U) Joint Military Police Patrols

DISCUSSION: (U) With the arrival of Task Force Oregon at the Marine base of Chu Lai, the problem of enforcement of regulations and maintenance of order and discipline among approximately 25,000 Army and Marine personnel arose. Included were the tasks of both on-base and off-base highway patrols, accident investigation, and control of off-duty Army and Marine personnel in the surrounding communities and within the Chu Lai Base area.

OBSERVATION: (U) A joint US Army-Marine-ROK MP force was established. Marine personnel were placed under the operational control of the Task Force Oregon Provost Marshal. All areas of mutual interest are policed by these joint MP patrols. Further, in areas with a high density of civilians, Vietnamese National Police are included in the patrols.

ITEM: (U) General Court-Martial Jurisdiction

DISCUSSION: (U) Task Force Oregon personnel were drawn from 8 General Court Martial jurisdictions within RVN. It was the apparent intention to place all of the units under Task Force Oregon for administration of military justice. At the end of the reporting period,

the units are only OPLAN to the Task Force. Therefore, the command is engaged in organizing the units for the proper functioning of the military justice system. An appropriate general order was needed at the time of deployment.

OBSERVATION: (U) USAARV is preparing a general order attaching the units to Task Force Oregon for General Court Martial jurisdiction.

B. Operations

ITEM: (U) Aerial CS Delivery Method.

DISCUSSION: (U) The CS M-7A3 grenade shipping box was made into a means of bulk grenade delivery by nailing the bottom half of the oval fiber shipping container to the shipping box bottom and placing the grenades with the safety pin removed back into the open oval fiber shipping container. The box was turned upside down from a UH-1 Helicopter over a target area and the grenades fell out of the containers. This released the safety handle activating the grenades on their descent.

OBSERVATION: (U) On testing, two grenades were blown back into the helicopter and the system proved too hazardous for use. An XM-3 smoke-landing device, made by the Limited Warfare Laboratory was borrowed from the 1st Cav Div to dispense CS grenades. The device is designated to dispense CS and smoke grenades from Army helicopters and is not hazardous to crew members.

C. Training and Organization.

ITEM: (U) Organization of the Assistant Task Force Engineer Section.

DISCUSSION: (U) In the initial deployment of tactical forces of the Task Force to Chu Lai and Duc Pho, it was necessary to geographically separate the engineer battalion headquarters from the Task Force headquarters. This required the augmentation of the Assistant Task Force Engineer section in order to accomplish the normal engineer missions of design, reconnaissance, material requisitioning and coordination of engineer effort that normally would have been accomplished by the battalion staff.

OBSERVATION: (U) Augmentation of the staff consisted of an additional officer, a supply NCO and a clerk-typist.

D. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

ITEM: (U) Interim Clearances.

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DISCUSSION: (U) From the activation of Task Force Oregon there was an immediate need to grant interim confidential and secret clearances to personnel who were to be working with classified information, but who had no previous clearance or an insufficient clearance, i.e., a confidential clearance when a secret clearance was required.

OBSERVATION: (U) Personnel requiring interim clearances were granted such clearances on the basis of favorable files checks. Those personnel who did not have records available in Chu Lai could not be granted clearances.

ITEM: (U) Map Requirements

DISCUSSION: (U) Requisitions for maps for the Task Force were submitted in March. Taken into consideration were the size of the Task Force and the number of units that would comprise the Task Force. The requisitions had not been filled by 18 April when the Task Force headquarters arrived at Chu Lai. Units began requesting maps immediately upon their arrival in the area of operations, but there was not an adequate supply to meet the demands.

OBSERVATION: (U) Requirements were met insofar as possible with existing supplies. An interim supply source was established with U.S. Marine Corps G2.

E. Logistics.

ITEM: (U) Receipt of Supplies and Equipment

DISCUSSION: (U) During the planning stage of Project Oregon, equipment requirements were prepared and submitted to USARV G4 with the proposal that all the equipment be pooled in one location. This procedure was recommended in lieu of drawing the equipment since none of the staff sections, to include the Headquarters Company, had received their full complement of personnel. A further consideration was that Task Force Oregon had not been activated. All items available in depots were located in three locations; Saigon, Qui Nhon and Con Ranh Bay. In view of the uncertainty that the Task Force would be activated and the shipping problem of moving all items to Saigon, it was agreed that segregation and storage of these items would take place at each depot and, if the Task Force were activated, the items would be shipped to Chu Lai. Items that were not available in depots in country were reported to the Task Force G4 and action was taken through USARV G3 and G4 to levy units for the remaining requirements. When the Task Force was activated, difficulties were encountered in receiving all items from depots due to shipping priorities and procedures, all of which resulted in non-receipt of a large amount of supplies at the Chu Lai location in a timely manner. To date, there

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are still a number of items that have not been received.

OBSEPATION: (U) This procedure did not allow each element of the headquarters to insure that they had their authorized equipment and the extended delay or non-receipt of supplies hampered or created problems in many operations. All items should have been received by the Task Force Headquarters Commandant prior to movement from Saigon.

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Section 2, Part II, Recommendations: None

FOR THE COMMANDER:


EDGAR R. POOLE
Colonel, GS
Chief of StaffWithdrawn,
Hqs, DA

Inclosures:

1. Project Oregon Personnel Roster, 12 Feb 67
2. Task Force Oregon Organizational Structure
3. Task Force Oregon Distinguished Visitors
4. Psy-Ops Leaflet - Arrival of Task Force Oregon (Copies 1-10 only)
5. China-Hai Leaflet (Copies 1-10 only)
6. Task Force Oregon Poster 413-67 (Copies 1-10 only)
7. Task Force Oregon Officer Roster 30 April 1967

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TASK FORCE OREGON ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Task Force Troops

HHC, Task Force Oregon (Prov)
Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (Air)
Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor
2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
148th Military Police Platoon
HHC, 509th Signal Bn
Co C, 459th Signal Bn (Cmd Op)
Co A, 36th Signal Bn (Spt Op)
Platoon (+), 167th Radio Relay Co
39th Engineer Bn (C) (-)
3d Military History Detachment
HHC, 14th Aviation Bn
174th Aviation Co (AM)
161st Aviation Co (AM)
71st Aviation Co (AM)
178th Aviation Co (AM)
Task Force Oregon Military Intelligence Det (Prov)
Task Force Oregon Radio Research Co (Prov)

Task Force Artillery (Prov)

HHC, Task Force Artillery (Prov)
2d Bn, 11th Artillery (155mm) (T)
3d Bn (-), 18th Artillery (8" / 175mm) (SP)
Battery A, 2d Bn, 94th Artillery (175mm) (SP)

Task Force Support Command (Prov)

HHC, 15th Support Bde (GS) (-)
HHC, 94th Sup & Svc Bn (DS) (-)
221st Sup & Svc Co
163d Trans Co (Lt Trk)
Platoon, 10th Trans Co (Med Trk)
Hq & Maint Spt Co, 168th Maint Bn
335th Trans Co (DS) (Afcft Maint)
Co C, 25th Medical Bn

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

HHC, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
1st Bn, 14th Infantry
1st Bn, 35th Infantry
2d Bn, 35th Infantry

Enclosure 2

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2d Division, 25th Infantry Division continued

2d Bn, 9th Artillery (105mm) (T)
Troop C, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry
Co B, 65th Engineer Bn (C)
Co B (-), 12th Signal Bn
40th Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog
Platoon, 25th MP Co
Team, 25th MI Det
Detachment, 37th Radio Research Co
3d Support Bn (Prov)
 Det, 25th S-T Bn
 Co D, 725th Maint Bn
 Co B, 25th Medical Bn
 Det, 25th Admin Co (AG)
 Team C, 41st C.I. Co

196th Infantry Brigade (Lt.)

HHC, 196th Infantry Bde
2d Bn, 1st Infantry
3d Bn, 21st Infantry
4th Bn, 31st Infantry
Troop F, 17th Cavalry
3d Bn, 82d Artillery (105mm) (T)
175th Engineer Co (C)
156th Signal Plt, (Prod Area)
48th Infantry Plt, Scout Dog
27th Chemical Det (CPR)
596th MI Det
408th Radio Research Det
544th MP Platoon
8th Combat Service Support Bn
8th CA Platoon, 2d CA Co
10th Public Information Det

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