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c. Because of a scheduled increase in CORDS materials and the current heavy commitment of the division's surface transportation capability, this headquarters, after study and evaluation, requested the support of ten 12-ton S&P trucks from HQ, III MAF. The request was approved but only five trucks were furnished. The trucks and drivers arrived on 19 August. The following commodities and amounts listed were shipped to Quang Ngai City and Tam Ky during the remainder of the reporting period:

Cement	2,113 tons
Reinforcing Bar	126 tons
Tin Roofing	50 tons
Lumber	51,133 bd ft

d. At the request of the Refugee Division, Quang Ngai Province Advisory Team 17, this headquarters coordinated with the US Navy to transport a supply of food to Son Tra (N), BT622015. The food was moved by truck to Chu Lai on 8 Oct and moved by sea to Son Tra on 9 October. The shipment included the following:

894 bags corn meal
300 bags rolled oats
320 bags corn
60 cases salad oil

4. (U) Civic Action/Revolutionary Development

a. This division supports the Revolutionary Development Program in three provinces: Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, and Quang Nam. The primary method of support is civic action. This division initiated an intensive review and study of the civic action program with the goal of improving control and coordination of the program. Two conferences were held with civic action officers to discuss problems and proposed solutions. The improvements in administration and better understanding resulting from these efforts have increased the effectiveness of the program. A by-product of the review and study has been a decrease in the time required to coordinate civic action projects were started during the reporting period.

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10 Wells	1 School addition	1 Billet
4 Schools	2 Showers	1 Kindergarten
3 Dispensaries	4 Latrines	1 Road
3 School repair	1 Well repair	1 Latrine repair
1 Hospital repair		

The following civic action projects were completed during the reporting period:

1 Church	1 Police checkpoint	1 Shower
1 Hospital	1 Culvert	1 Latrine
1 Well platform	1 Pig pen	1 Market
1 Hamlet Headquarters 1 School		

b. A second method of support provided by the Revolutionary Development Program is MEDCAP-II. The number of patients treated during this period versus last period increased approximately 10%. Since 1 August 1968, Americal Division units and other units operating within the AO have performed the following MEDCAP activities:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VISITS</u>	<u>PATIENTS</u>
11th Inf Bde	216	13,405
196th Inf Bde	34	3,507
198th Inf Bde	429	27,216
1/1st Cav	19	3,287
Div Arty	33	2,313
DISCOM	10	457
26th Eng Bn	16	476

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VISITS</u>	<u>PATIENTS</u>
1st CAG	1,101	81,529
9th Eng Bn	13	381
MMCB-71	<u>4</u>	<u>165</u>
Total	1,875	132,736

c. A third method of support provided the Revolutionary Development Program is voluntary contributions. These contributions are normally used to assist specific individuals, families, or groups of families. The collection and distribution of these resources is completely administered by the units concerned. The following items and amounts listed were contributed by individuals and units:

Money	\$4074.00
Clothing	3,800 lbs
Soap	2,000 bars

5.(U) a. This report covers organizational and unit activities of 05 (PSYOP) Americal Division during the period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968. At the end of the reporting period the PSYOP section was staffed as follows:

PSYOP Officer	1	O-4
Asst PSYOP Officer	1	O-2
Clerk-Typist	1	E-5
Driver	1	E-4
Translator/Interpreters	2	E-6 (ARVN)

b. In direct support of the Division is Detachment 3, 7th PSYOP Bn, consisting of 5 officers and 8 enlisted men. These personnel presently comprise 1 command (EA), 2 audio-visual (HE) and 3 combat loudspeaker (HB) teams. The HE teams consist of 1 officer and 1 enlisted man while the HB teams consist of 2 enlisted men each augmented by 2 Kit Carson

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Scouts and an interpreter. The loudspeaker teams provide ground, waterborne and aerial broadcasts in support of tactical operations and civic action projects in each brigade area. The audio visual teams are in support of the division and are used to show films on health and education, conduct broadcasts and provide general entertainment throughout the division area of operations. In addition, an intelligence/developmental team consisting of 2 officers is present at this location with the mission of accumulating intelligence material with which PSYOP exploitation can be readily performed. The 7th PSYOP Bn also supports the division with the production of leaflets, posters and tape recordings. A quick reaction leaflet has been obtained during this period within 12 hours, however a normal time frame for production of an original leaflet has been 6 to 10 days.

c. The US Air Force, 9th Special Operations Squadron, provides C47 aircraft for large leaflet drops. The 02B aircraft broadcasts during daylight hours and drops limited amounts of leaflets on designated target areas.

d. Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) provides support in the form of leaflets, tapes and films in the Vietnamese language. These films are shown by the audio-visual team throughout the division area of operations to local populace audiences.

6. PSYOP ACTIVITIES AUG - OCT 1968

a. Leaflets

	<u>Disseminated</u>	<u>Targets</u>	<u>Avg Per Tgt</u>
Aug	49,427,450	498	99,000
Sep	36,022,750	394	91,000
Oct	20,945,200	272	77,000
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TOTAL	106,395,400	1,164	91,000
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b. Loudspeaker broadcasts

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	<u>Aerial</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
Aug	113 hrs 45 min	279 hrs	4 hrs 30 min
Sep	87 hrs 05 min	265 hrs 45 min	6 hrs 30 min
Oct	56 hrs 25 min	274 hrs 45 min	4 hrs 30 min
TOTAL	257 hrs 15 min	819 hrs 30 min	15 hrs 30 min

e. Movies

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Audience</u>
Aug	111	58	18,100
Sep	133	54 3/4	10,275
Oct	232	116 1/4	13,943
TOTAL	476	229	42,318

d. Printed propaganda initiated by Americal Division

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7-402-68	30th Sign Bn - Hardships		Anti NVA
7-426-68	Rallier - 196th Bde		Chieu Hoi
7-427-68	Rallier - 196th Bde		Chieu Hoi
7-438-68	Rallier - 198th Bde		Chieu Hoi
7-452-68	Rallier - 198th Bde		Chieu Hoi
7-455-68	196th Bde - Rewards for Weapons/Ammo	Rewards	
7-458-68	Rallier - 196th Bde		Chieu Hoi
7-462-68	3rd NVA Div - Malaria		Anti NVA

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7-463-68	2nd NVA Div - Lack of Medical Aid	Anti NVA
7-464-68	3rd NVA Div - Lack of Medical Aid	Anti NVA
7-465-68	3rd NVA Div - Allied Power will Destroy You	Anti NVA
7-466-68	3rd NVA Div - Defeat is Certain	Anti NVA
7-467-68	2nd NVA Div, 1st Regt - Battle Losses	Anti NVA
7-474-68	VC Atrocity - Long Than Village?	Anti VC
7-482-68	Rallier - 1/1 Cav	Chieu Hoi
7-483-68	VC Village Atrocity - 11th Bde	Anti VC
7-486-68	409th Sapper Bn - Think on These Things	Anti NVA
7-487-68	Explanation of Chemicals	Pro GVN
7-511-68	Battle Losses - 3rd NVA Div	Anti NVA
7-512-68	Reward for 105mm Howitzer	Rewards
7-513-68	Exploitation of 105mm Howitzer	Rewards
7-517-68	These Planes Will Destroy You	Anti NVA/VC
7-523-68	2nd NVA Div - Battle Losses	Anti NVA
7-524-68	2nd NVA Div - Unfulfilled Promises	Anti NVA
7-526-68	1st MF Regt, 2nd NVA Div - Battle Losses	Anti NVA
7-536-68	48th Bn - Battle Losses	Anti VC
7-549-68	1st MF Regt, 2nd NVA Div - Lack of Med Sups.	Anti NVA
7-550-68	1st MF Regt, 2nd NVA Div - Battle Losses	Anti NVA
7-551-68	2nd NVA Div - Battle Losses	Anti VC
7-557-68	Mining Incident - Que Son	Anti VC

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7-558-68	Mining Incident - Que Son	Anti VC
7-559-68	Report VC Mines - Duc Pho District	Rewards
7-581-68	V15 Co - Rally before too Late	Anti NVA
7-582-68	Blue Ghost Will Stalk You	Anti NVA/VC
7-583-68	Rallier - 196th Bde	Chieu Hoi
7-585-68	409th, 21st, 95th Sapper Units - No Cause	Anti VC for Celebration
7-586-68	506B LF Sapper Co Losses	Anti VC
7-599-68	Men of 95th LF Co	Anti VC

e. Tapes initiated by Americal Division.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7??	Allied Power - 2nd NVA Div	Anti NVA
783?	Defeat to 2nd NVA Division	Anti NVA
784?	Report VC Activity - Binh Son District	Anti VC
830?	Evacuate Civilians of Hau Duc	Pro GVN
842	Encourage Family to Evacuate	Pro GVN
848	3rd NVA Division - Malaria	Anti NVA
849	Rallier - 196th Bde	Chieu Hoi
850	2nd NVA Div, 1st Regt - Battle Losses	Anti NVA
852	Rallier - 198?the Bde	Chieu Hoi
864	Report VC Activity to Prevent Evacuation	Anti VC
869	Rallier - 1/1 Cav	Chieu Hoi

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
870	3rd Offensive Doomed to Fail	Anti NVA/VC
872	Defeat of 1st Regt, 2nd NVA Division	Anti NVA
877	Allied Firepower - 8 & 9 Bn, 31st Regt	Anti NVA
881	Rally Instructions - 31st Regt	Chieu Hoi
884	Reward for 105mm Howitzer	Rewards
885	Rallier - 196 Bde	Chieu Hoi
916	Hardships - 31st Regt, 2nd NVA Div	Anti NVA
920	Evacuate this Area	Pro GVN
957	506B Sapper Co - Rally to GVN	Chieu Hoi
960	506B Sapper Co - Rally to GVN	Chieu Hoi
963	95th VC Co - Battle Lessons	Anti VC
964	Food Shortage	Anti NVA/VC
977	Excess Rice Feeds Refugees	Pro GVN
978	Ralliers - 11th Bde (81st LF Bn)	Chieu Hoi
985?	VC of Phuc Thien Village	Chieu Hoi
1017	Men of 74th MF Bn	Anti VC

f. PSYOP in support of major operations Aug - Oct 68

(1) WHEELER/WALLOWA	(2) BURLINGTON TRAIL
(a) Leaflets - 36,062,000?	(a) Leaflets - 16,665,000
(b) Aerial Broadcasts - 92:55	(b) Aerial Broadcasts - 39:30
(c) Ground Broadcasts - 225:00	(c) Ground Broadcasts - 83:00

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(3) CHAMPAIGN GROVE (4-24 Sep 68) (4) POCAHONTAS FOREST (term 4 Aug 68)

(a) Leaflets - 4,465,000 (a) Leaflets - 964,000
(b) Aerial Broadcasts - 9:40 (b) Aerial Broadcasts - 1:55
(c) Ground Broadcasts - None (c) Ground Broadcasts - 3:00

(5) DUKES GLADE (2-9 Oct 68) (6) LOGAN FIELD (7-12 Oct 68)

(a) Leaflets - 452,000 (a) Leaflets 984,000
(b) Aerial Broadcasts - :40 (b) Aerial Broadcasts - 1:15
(c) Ground Broadcasts - None (c) Ground Broadcasts - None

(7) Vernon LAKE I (commenced 25 Oct 68)

(a) Leaflets - 1,139,000
(b) Aerial Broadcasts - :20
(b) Ground Broadcasts - None

g. "Chieu Hoi" program

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
Quang Nam	11	5	7	23
Quang Tin	24	23	22	69
Quang Ngai	23	39	27	89
	58	67	56	181

(2) Hoi Chanh by operation Aug - Oct 68

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	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
Wheeler/Wallowa	17	12	8	37
Burlington Trail	18	16	21	55
Champaign Grove	—	9	—	9
Total	35	37	29	101

(3) Hoi Chanh turned in to Americal Division Aug - Oct 68

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
Quang Nam	-	-	-	-
Quang Tin	8	4	1	13
Quang Ngai	1	1		2
	9	5	1	15

h. Volunteer Information Program.

(1) Number of informants Aug - Oct 68

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
26th Eng Bn	4	-	-	4
11th Bde	6	72	58	136
196th Bde	373	388	517	1,278
198th Bde	78	1	64	143
39th Eng Bn	10	10	68	88

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
1/1 Cav	-	1	1	2
TOTAL	471	432	748	1,651

(2) Total payments (\$VN) Aug - Oct 68

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
26th Engr Bn	1,800	—	—	1,800
11th Bde	7,350	58,750	64,180	130,280
196th Bde	254,660	254,495	412,103	921,258
198th Bde	43,550	500	72,200	116,250
39th Engr Bn	28,000	35,800	261,320	325,120
1/1 Cav	—	200	6,000	6,200
TOTAL	335,350	349,745	815,803	1,500,908

i. Chieu Hoi Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Chieu Hoi Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>
Aug	26,566,000	25 hrs 55 min	23 hrs 45 min
Sep	11,271,000	16 hrs 55 min	51 hrs
Oct	7,992,000	7 hrs 50 min	10 hrs 30 min
TOTAL	45,829,000	50 hrs 40 min	85 hrs 30 min

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(2) A total of 9 Hoi Chanh were reported as turning themselves in to US units during Operation Pocahontas Forest (6 Jul - 4 Aug 68). All of these returnees were exploited and all indicated that they were influenced by the leaflets and aerial broadcasts disseminated in the area.

(3) B-52 airstrikes in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces were exploited extensively by dissemination of appropriate leaflets and broadcasts. One Hoi Chanh who defected on 6 Aug 68 indicated that the intensity of allied firepower persuaded him to give up and the PSYOP leaflets told him how and why he should return.

(4) The total number Hoi Chanh rallying within the division area of operations continue to decrease as many VC units are now manned by a majority of less susceptible NVA soldiers. Future propaganda should concentrate on the following:

- (a) Repudiation of the theme that to become a Hoi Chanh means torture and eventual death.
- (b) Inclusion of the requirements placed upon a Hoi Chanh when he returns to GVN.
- (c) Formulation of a separate appeal to NVA without reference to reunification with the family while the war is in progress.

I. Rewards Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Rewards campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
Aug	3,110,450	13 hrs 40 min	136 hrs 30 min	-----
Sep	6,442,000	24 hrs 05 min	94 hrs 30 min	2 hrs
Oct	3,739,200	11 hrs 05 min	133 hrs 45 min	1 hr 15 min
TOTAL	13,291,650	48 hrs 50 min	364 hrs 45 min	3 hrs 15 min

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(2) This campaign has been marked by a decrease in the number of voluntary informants who have given information concerning enemy activity. The reduction in the number of informants compared with the previous quarter is not considered significant as the majority of the informants previously reported came from the area encompassed by the now completed Operation Muscatine. The total monetary amount paid actually increased as payment was made in accordance with the standardized prices offered throughout ICTZ.

(3) Significant payments made under this program include:

(a) On 28 August an 8 year old VN boy pointed out the location of 10 satchel charges emplaced alongside buildings in Phuong Thuan (V) Quang Ngai (F) (BS 6997). For this information he was paid \$VN5,000.

(b) On 5 Sep 68 a payment of 30,000\$VN was made for the discovery of three (3) 30# anti tank mines which had been emplaced on Highway 1 vicinity BS 619879.

(c) On 12 September 1968, two Montagnard civilians who had sought refuge, led US forces to a 105mm howitzer at coordinates BS517711 (Quang Ngai). They were paid VN\$ 25,000 each for this information. Tape and leaflet coverage was made in the surrounding area to exploit this significant find amongst the local populace and enemy forces.

k. Pro GVN Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Pro GVN Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
Aug	3,313,000	3 hrs 25 min	60 hrs 45 min	4 hrs 30 min
Sep	1,655,750	5 hrs 45 min	35 hrs – min	4 hrs 30 min
Oct	1,314,000	5 hrs 10 min	76 hrs 30 min	2 hrs 15 min
TOTAL	6,282,750	14 hrs 20 min	172 hrs 15 min	11 hrs 15 min

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(2) A concerted effort has been made to inform US forces arriving in country of the pertinency and practical usage of PSYOP in Vietnam. 77 classes have been presented to 8,114 new arrivals to the Division during the reporting period. The instruction covered a basic orientation of in country PSYOP with emphasis being given to the participation of the individual soldier in the "Chieu Hoi" and Rewards Campaigns.

(3) A significant increase in activities of the 2 HE (audio/visual) teams supporting the Division during October has resulted in a more effective Pro GVN campaign. In addition to the movies which are shown throughout the area of operations, news broadcasts are taped daily composed of items extracted from national and local newspapers. These newscasts are then broadcast to the local populace in conjunction with the movie shows.

1. Anti NVA Campaign.

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Anti NVA Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>
Aug	12,302,000	49 hrs 15 min	1 hr
Sep	12,995,000	24 hrs – min	None
Oct	3,972,000	6 hrs 50 min	None
TOTAL	29,269,000	80 hrs 05 min	1 hr

(2) On 23 August, 1/1 Cav became engaged with elements of 1st MF Regt, 2nd NVA Division in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. Within two days over 400 casualties had been suffered by the enemy. Quick reaction propaganda was developed and disseminated within 12 hours addressed to the commander of the enemy force. This was followed by aerial broadcasts pointing out the futility of the battle in informing the enemy elements of the battle losses suffered during the action.

(3) In September 68, Operation Champaign Grove was conducted in Quang Ngai province. Propaganda oriented specifically to vulnerabilities present in the 3rd NVA Division were exploited. These pertaining to malaria sickness, lack of medical supplies, and superiority of allied firepower were specifically directed at this

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division. Losses suffered by 95th Bn, 2nd Regt were immediately exploited as were all B-52 strikes in the area, adding to the overall effectiveness and success of this operation.

m. Anti VC Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Anti VC Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
Aug	3,136,000	21 hrs 30 min	57 hrs	—
Sep	3,659,000	16 hrs 20 min	85 hrs 15 min	—
Oct	3,928,000	25 hrs 30 min	54 hrs	1 hr
TOTAL	11,723,000	63 hrs 20 min	196 hrs 15 min	1 hr

(2) On 18 Aug 68 a VN lambretta detonated a VC emplaced mine at BS 917262 (Quang Ngai). 10 VN were killed. Ground loudspeaker teams and a poster were disseminated to portray to the local populace the extent of the VC atrocity and requesting that all VC activity be reported.

(3) On 1 Oct 68 a VN bus traveling on Highway 1 vicinity coords BT 121487 hit a VC emplaced land mine. 13 VN civilians were killed and 13 VN civilians were wounded. Within 3 hours a message was broadcast throughout the area exploiting this incident. A poster and leaflets were further disseminated to inform the local populace of this VC initiated incident and to gain their support in reporting the location of such mines.

(4) Active PSYOP support of the RISE Denial program has resulted in the dissemination throughout the division area of operations of the following propaganda:

Leaflets - 1,940,000

Broadcasts - 12:35

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This propaganda although small in amount, compared to the total distributed for the month, has been specifically oriented to target audiences where rice denial operations have been conducted. This pin point distribution has materially contributed to the denial of 673 tons of rice to the enemy in contested areas.

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A. Personnel - Administration, Morale and Discipline

1. (U) SUBJECT: Reproduction.

a. Observation. The Bruning camera and the electrostatic copier have remained inoperative due to the lack of necessary special supplies. The full capabilities of the "Luttilith" presses cannot be realized without the photographic processes provided by this idle equipment.

b. Evaluation. The feasibility of an electrostatic copier in RVN as opposed to the "Xerox" process is doubtful. This is due in part to the climate, and in part to the difficulty of obtaining special supplies. The electrostatic copier requires a special type of paper in contrast to the "Xerox" copier, which utilizes ordinary bond or writing paper. Also, the special paper must be stored in a humidity-free and temperature controlled area, as opposed to ordinary bond or writing paper. Both the "Xerox" and electrostatic copiers must be operated in a temperature-controlled and humidity-free environment; however, the electrostatic copier is more sensitive to the climate in RVN than the "Xerox" process.

c. Recommendations. It is recommended that the "Xerox" process be used in RVN instead of the electrostatic process because of the following shortcomings of the electrostatic process:

- (1) Its more extreme sensitivity to the climate.
- (2) The difficulty of obtaining special paper through logistical channels.
- (3) The special environment in which the special paper must be stored.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Numerous Casualty Reports.

a. Observation. Casualty reports have been received at this headquarters and further relayed to Headquarters, USARV, that have contained erroneous information which, if furnished to the next of kin, could cause a great deal of embarrassment to the US Army.

b. Evaluation. Erroneous casualty reports can be reduced by requiring all units to transmit data in the clear and avoid the use of rosters. Verification of reports should be accomplished by the Division Casualty Branch by checking applicable data with the hospital or graves registration point, as appropriate, and further against military personnel records.

c. Recommendation. That the above cited procedure be incorporated into the USARV casualty reporting regulation so that other units may increase accuracy in casualty reporting.

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3. (U) SUBJECT: Construction Priorities and Funding.

a. Observation: An effective Special Services program requires much construction and renovation work to be done. It is difficult to operate an effective program because Special Services projects are not given a high priority for funding or construction.

b. Evaluation: Tennis courts cannot be constructed because there are no funds available to Special Services to buy concrete, a multiple crafts facility has not been established because the planning board has not approved funds for it nor given it a construction priority.

c. Recommendations: Authorize Special Services through use of Central Welfare Fund Council to contract for and make the money available for the support of vital Special Services projects.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Use of VN National Police Field Force.

a. Observation: Utilization of National Police Field Forces under the operational control of Brigade Provost Marshals was initiated on a limited basis during this reporting period. These forces are used in conjunction with the Bde company and platoon level units on Combat Assaults and Cordon and search missions. The 11th Inf Bde Provost Marshal was assigned a platoon size force from the Quang Ngai Province and the 196th Inf Bde Provost Marshal, received a squad size force. Each of the Brigade PFF's assigns an NCO and RTO to the NPFF unit as coordinator and advisor.

b. Evaluations: The success of operations utilizing the NPFF at both the 196th and 11th Bde has been extremely satisfactory. The NPFF have responded well to instructions and contributed to the success of the operations thru their knowledge of the people. Rapid assimilation of information on VC activities is made available with their presence on an operation. Housing, rations and supplies have not created any great problem. Working hours of the force initially presented a problem but has since been solved.

c. Recommendation: That NPFF be utilized to the fullest extent possible at Brigade level.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Use of NPFF Women in Processing VN Employees on and off US Installation in the Americal Division.

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a. Observation: The 196th Bde Provost Marshall, after favorable utilization of NPFF on operation missions, arranged for the assignment of several NPFF women for use as processing personnel in controlling and searching VN/F employees entering and leaving LZ Baldy. It had been determined that marijuana was being smuggled into Baldy by female kitchen help and house maids. Local Females failed to make a thorough search of the female employees for fear of retaliation by VN in their home villages.

b. Evaluation: The use of NPFF women as matrons has been extremely successful at the 196th Bde. There is no fear of retaliation from the local VN as the NPFF women are not from the local area and are billeted and rationed at LZ Baldy. The NPFF women's loyalty is to the Bde Provost Marshal and not to a local village or hamlet chief thereby enabling them to perform their jobs effectively and efficiently without political or cultural interference.

c. Recommendation: That NPFF women be utilized to the fullest extent possible to aid in the processing of VN employees.

6. (U) SUBJECT: Racial Incidents and disturbance have become a serious and explosive problem. Most instances occur late in the evening or shortly after midnight. Investigations reveal that marihuana or alcohol are almost always involved to some degree. EM clubs are the most critical areas. Assaults, accidental and/or intentional loss of life have increased during this reporting period.

b. Evaluation: The failure of commanders to note the danger signs of impending racial conflicts within their commands has often resulted in serious incidents. Lack of control of personnel movement and discipline are indicated in the majority of incidents. The ready availability of alcoholic beverages, late club hours, and accessibility of weapons and ammunition have proved to be a dangerous combination. The constant complaint of Negro personnel is the lack of communication with commanders. Extremely loose control measures over personnel in a stand down status is obvious thru out the Chu Lai Installation and Brigade base camps.

c. Recommendation: That commanders exercise stricter control of personnel in their units both on standdown and normal duty status. Commanders and NCO's should take positive action to prevent the buildup of racial tensions and should take immediate action to identify leaders of groups.

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7. (U) SUBJECT: Command Information.

- a. Observation: Command information objectives are being met by printed materials.
- b. Evaluation: The Americal Division publications, Stars & Stripes, USARV & MACV materials are distributed and read by Americal Division soldiers. Unit news is the prime attention getter. However, oral communication of CI program material is not routinely conducted by troop leaders.
- c. Recommendation: That troop leaders place more stress on oral communication of the command information objectives, using the printed materials as a means of improving their program at company level.

B. Operations.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Rice Denial Operations.

a. Observation: The basic purpose of rice denial operations is to prevent rice grown outside of GVN controlled areas from being harvested and consumed by VC/NVA forces. This purpose is fulfilled by using refugees, under the protection of US/GVN forces and supervision of GVN authorities, to harvest rice in contested or VC controlled areas. In addition to denying much needed food to the enemy, such operations produce other significant benefits. Large quantities of rice are made available to local GVN authorities for equitable distribution, thereby enhancing their ability to support the refugee population in their areas. Of equal importance is the fact that the refugees themselves are given meaningful employment and an opportunity to contribute directly to their own support. Finally, public confidence in local GVN forces is increased by their successful participation in such operations.

b. Evaluation:

(1) In planning for rice denial operation, the area to be harvested should be reconnoitered daily to determine when the rice will be fully mature and ripe. Approximately one week to 10 days prior to the actual harvest, the ground security force should move into the area and conduct search and clear operations. Whenever possible, this force should consist of both US and GVN troops. Once the harvest begins, these troops should be employed to establish two perimeter type defenses, with S forces established strong points and conducting linking patrols on the outer edge of the harvest area.

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Depending on the terrain, the outer perimeter should be 800-1000 meters from the harvest area. The inner security forces should consist of GVN troops maintaining visual contact with the workers.

(2) In isolated areas not readily accessible by foot to workers from GVN areas, transportation must be arranged to move the workers to and from the harvest site and the harvested rice to collection points. The CH-47 helicopter is ideally suited for this purpose and the security force can secure the desired LZ. Once the rice is out the stalk and all is transported from the field. The stalk can be used for weaving baskets and making roofs for huts. To transport the harvested rice and stalk from the field to GVN controlled areas, cargo nets lined with scrap canvas have been used with success. This allows the rice to be transported with appreciable loss. Each cargo net of rice weighs approximately 8000 lbs and produces 6000 lbs of rice.

(3) Since all rice is not ready for harvest at the same time, a large amount of rice must be left in the fields after the first harvest. A cyclical program is required to move back into the area as the remaining rice ripens. Delays up to three weeks can be expected. If the area is left unsecured during this period, VC/NVA will move in to harvest the rice, particularly at night. An artillery H&I program, utilizing both illuminating and HE rounds, discourage night harvesting. Operations should also be conducted in the area to capture rice which the VC/NVA are successful in harvesting and to disrupt enemy plans for future harvesting. "Eagle Flight" operations are ideal for this purpose.

(4) When operating in an area for more than a three day period, ground security forces are restricted in their movement and their locations can be pin-pointed by enemy forces. A sudden halt in the harvest efforts, with ground forces conducting sweeps in the area of operation, will disrupt VC/NVA plans and will usually produce contact with enemy forces.

c. Recommendation: Rice denial operations are extremely beneficial and should be conducted to the extent practicable. When planning rice denial operations, commanders should coordinate with local GVN forces and selection of areas to be harvested well ahead of established harvest dates. One rice denial operation conducted as discussed above produced more than 5000,000 pounds of rice. The technique employed can be used by commanders as a guide in planning future rice denial operations.

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2. (C) SUBJECT: Unexploded Ordnance.

- a. Observation: On 9 Oct 68, a fin assembly from a high drag 500 lb or 750 lb bomb (HE) was found. The fin assembly had been modified and made into a 60mm mortar.
- b. Evaluation: The fin assembly is about 30" long, consisting of a tube 67mm in diameter with four fins attached. A piece of wood had been driven into the bottom end of the tube to act as a stop for the mortar round and a nail centered in the wood block served as a firing pin. The fins, used as supporting legs, are removable, making the tube very light to transport. Without the fins, a forked stick can be used as legs. This field expedient mortar is not as accurate as a regular 60mm mortar.
- c. Recommendation: All air strikes should be observed closely and unexploded ordnance reported and destroyed by ground troops as soon as possible to deprive the VC of explosives for making mines and booby traps and to deny him a very useful weapon.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Marking Night Positions when Strobe lights are not available.

- a. Observation: It is difficult to effectively mark a night location when strobe lights are not available.
- b. Evaluation: It has been found that the placing of a heat tablet surrounded by a small mound of dirt will provide the necessary marking lights for aircraft trying to locate your position at night.
- c. Recommendations: Since strobe lights are not always available it is recommended that each time a night laagar is established and positions prepared, a heat tablet be placed by each position to serve as a night device for marking these positions.

4. (U) SUBJECT: 106 Recoilless Rifle, Track Mounted.

- a. Observation: Each of the "Light" infantry brigades in the Republic of Vietnam, has been organized to obtain a high degree of mobility permitting rapid movement to exploit the tactical situation. Most of these brigades have a separate cavalry troop attached. In keeping with the light concept the cavalry do not have the tank section which robs the cavalry men of their firepower. In an effort to regain the bore firepower, the use of the track mounted 105mm recoilless rifle has become quite common.

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b. Evaluation: The use of the 106mm recoilless rifle allows the armored cavalry to assume a more aggressive posture in any difficult situations.

c. Recommendation: The adaptation of the 106mm Recoilless Rifle to the M106A1 mortar carrier is fairly simple and requires only the addition of two (2) bolt holes in the top deck of the track. The M106A1 mortar carrier was chosen for two (2) reasons. The cargo hatch is much larger than that of the M135A1 and this allows the leader the necessary room to maneuver the large 106mm round during loading. Second, the interior of this vehicle lends itself well to the storage of the 106mm ammunition.

The weapon itself needs only slight alteration to its normal mount to allow it to be fitted to the M106A1. All alteration necessary can be accomplished at the direct support maintenance level and any items necessary to effect the adaptation can be fabricated at the level.

The employment of this weapon is limited to several factors. First, the vehicle is only lightly armored and is easily penetrated by any weapon larger than small arms. Secondly, this vehicle is a prime target and should be employed in support element rather than as an assault vehicle. When advancing toward the enemy the vehicle should be held in reserve or just behind the advancing APC's. This gives a degree of protection to the vehicle and permits maximum delivery of firepower. Due to the added weight of the ammunition and weapon the track is vulnerable to mines which might not effect the other lighter vehicles.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Light Armored Vehicle Launch Bridge.

a. Observation: During the monsoon season the area of operation becomes impassable to tanks and like-size vehicles, including organic AVLB.

b. Evaluation: Operations are conducted in the monsoon season using pure ACAV platoons. Due to the many streams in the area, and the steep banks of these streams much valuable time is spent in searching for suitable crossing sites. The problem is made worse by the continued use of the same crossing sites. The flexibility of the unit is restricted by the number of sites available. Vulnerability to mines laid in these areas, then becomes a problem.

c. Recommendation: That a light armored vehicle launch bridge be developed. This vehicle should be capable of supporting the weight of the ACAV. The recommended basis of issue is one per armored cavalry Troop.

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6. (U) SUBJECT: Monsoon Operations.

- a. Observation: In order to continue operations during the monsoon season it may become necessary to scramble the organization of the armored cavalry troop and platoon.
- b. Evaluation: Prior to the onset of the monsoon season orders were issued to all troops to be prepared to operate with three pure ACAV platoons and to form a provisional tank platoon. Daily operations are being conducted using the ACAV platoons. The tank platoon is holding the reserve role, or it may be used on separate missions over terrain which remains trafficable in the support role. By judicious choice of routes and positions, the fire power inherent to the troop is still available, with no loss of maneuverability.
- c. Recommendation: The similar units operatic in RVN give consideration to this method to insure year-round operations without loss of effectiveness.

7. (U) SUBJECT: Battle Drill (Armored Cavalry Operations)

- a. Observation: During the platoon and troop operations it had become common practice to use the column formation exclusively when moving through the AO.
- b. Evaluation: Over the months the misconception had been developed that by moving in column formation the vulnerability to mines was reduced. The loss of the inherent capabilities of armored cavalry when operating in this manner is obvious. The fact that the lead vehicle rarely detonated a mine discredits the reason for moving in this manner. Vulnerability to ambush by small sapper squads is increased with the loss of flank security which should be provided by organic scout section. It is possible that we have attempted to tailor our operations too much to the terrain over which we must operate and have disregarded the basic tactics outlined for armored cavalry units in FN 117-36. It has become necessary to re-educate our small unit leaders in these basic tactics and re-emphasize the capabilities which can be realized by development of battle drill and moving in varied formations. It is still too early to tell if a change in tactics has reduced the number of mine incidents, however, there has been marked decrease in mine incidents since the units have stopped using the column formation exclusively.
- c. Recommendation: Continued emphasis on following the basic tactics as outlined in FN 17-36. They apply to operations in RVN as well as any terrain over which armored cavalry may operate.

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8. (U) SUBJECT: Care and Maintenance of R17 Protective Mask.

a. Observation: Recent observation and inspections indicate a lack of knowledge of the individual soldier of his responsibilities for the proper care and maintenance of the R17 Protective Mask.

b. Evaluation: When personnel are assigned to the unit from CONUS it is assumed that these personnel undergo training on the R17 Mask prior to being assigned to RVN. The lack of this training places a burden on the unit to retrain the soldier in a basic subject that he should know before coming to Vietnam.

c. Recommendation: That training centers give more time to care and cleaning of R17 Protective Mask in their program of instruction.

9. (U) SUBJECT: Expedient Road Opening Using Combat Engineer Vehicles (CEV).

a. Observation: A deliberate minesweep and road repair operation over long distances in an insecure area to extract critical vehicles that are not air transportable is overly time consuming.

b. Evaluation: With time a critical factor, the operation involves three (3) important phases:

(1) Recon: An aerial reconnaissance is performed. Estimates are made of quantity and location of fill required. Other possible problem areas are noted and solutions Planned.

(2) Minesweep Preparation: The night prior to movement, sweep teams are positioned in secure areas at both ends of the roads. Sweep team security is arranged.

(3) Execution: Sweep teams begin work at first light. The convoy of recovery vehicles follows dump trucks loaded with fill which are led into the area by two (2) CEV's. Major advantages are gained by employment of the CEV's in pairs.

(a) If one CEV becomes stuck, the other is able to recover it.

(b) For large washouts of the roadbed, one (1) CEV will push fill to the hole and up on the abankment while the other concurrently pushes the fill into the hole and compacts it. Two (2) CEV's working in this manner, can move and place great quantities of fill in a short time.

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(c) Once the road is repaired, the recovery vehicles move into the site, and the convoy of vehicles to be extracted begins to move out. The CEV's are placed at critical locations along the road to assist the convoy across soft spots. The CEV's perform well at this and can easily catch the convoy once it has passed and are able to maintain convoy speed.

c. Recommendations:

- (1) CEV's are excellent for expedient road opening operations and should be used extensively for similar operations.
- (2) CEV's should be employed in pairs for this type of work. Employment in pairs greatly increased flexibility in execution for a given operation, and significantly increased equipment efficiency for earth moving work.

10 (U) SUBJECT: Engineer Support in Clearing Fire Bases (FSB).

a. Observations: Earth moving equipment must be moved by air to clear FSB's for tactical operations. Because of the limited availability of CH 54 Cranes, air transport must be accomplished by CH 47 aircraft.

b. Evaluation:

(1) The 26th Engineer Bn is authorized to D-4 and three D-5 class dozers. One D-4 and two D-5's are on hand. The D-4 can be effectively airmoved by CH 47 (see operational report - lessons learned, 1 Aug 1968), however a CH 54 is required to move the D-5 even after the blade, pusharms, and track have been removed. Because of the lead time required to obtain CH 54 aircraft the short notice upon which tactical moves must often be conducted, the CH 47 must be utilized.

(2) For most operations in the Americal AO, the D-5 cannot be classified as airmobile equipment, nor is it heavy enough to be effectively used in rear areas with the TD 24/D-7 class dozer. Except for the few operations for which cranes are made available, the D-5 is of little use.

c. Recommendations: That the D-5 dozers authorized for Divisional Engineer Battalions in the theatre, be changed to D-4 dozers.

11. (U) SUBJECT: Antenna AT-912 (VRC-12 Series)

a. Observation: Antennas for the FM radios (VRC-12 Series) have a tendency to corrode very easily as a result of the climatic conditions with the Republic of Vietnam. Daily maintenance must be performed

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or the antenna will eventually become unserviceable.

b. Evaluation: When the antenna, AT-912 becomes corroded, its transmitting range maybe decreased considerably. In most cases the antenna cannot be separated after it has become corroded, however, if the antenna sections are cleaned daily with a light coat of silicone compound, placing particular emphasis on the threads which join the sections, the corrosion can be reduced to a minimum.

c. Recommendation: That all units utilizing the antenna AT-912 use silicone compound to reduce corrosion. The compound can be round under FSN 6850-631858 on page 479 of Federal Catalogue C6800-II dated July 1967.

12. (U) SUBJECT: Cable CX1065/G.

a. Observation: Due to the concept of operations in the Chu Lai area of Vietnam, it has been necessary to utilize Cable (spiral four) systems for multi-channel communications from Division to Brigade.

b. Evaluation: In addition to the cable that is required for normal communications to the Brigade, spare and alternate routing cables are maintained. On many occasions it has been necessary to utilize the spare cable, but it was noted that the quality of the subscriber reception was less than that of the original cable systems for a short period of time. After analyzing the situation, it was concluded that because the back-up cable had not had power applied to it periodically, condensation had accumulated within the connections thereby reducing the efficiency of the entire system.

c. Recommendation: All alternate routing or back-cable CX1065/G (spiral four) must be subjected to a periodic application of power to prevent excessive amounts of condensation from accumulating within the cable connections.

13. (U) SUBJECT: Radio Set AK/GRC-142.

a. Observation: Immediately after receiving two AH/GRC-142 Radio Sets within the battalion, extreme difficulty was experienced with the amplifier (AM 3349/GRC-106).

b. Evaluation: In an effort to determine the probable cause of the amplifier failure it was discovered that the most likely factor producing the failure was the ground system. The ground system was improved by positioning the air conditioner drain duct directly over

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the ground rod; thereby dampening the ground around the rod.

c. Recommendation: Units experiencing similar problems with the AM3349/GRC-106 should use this method to improve their ground system. This method significantly reduced amplifier failures within this Battalion.

14 (U) SUBJECT: Rapid Troubleshooting the KY-28 Secure Voice Device.

a. Observation: The location of the KY-28 Secure Voice Device associated with the pilots console is in a location that makes operational adjustments & maintenance difficult and time consuming. The device must be removed to make these adjustments i.o. volume, board changes.

b. Evaluation: Due to the inconvenient location of the device it is essential that it be removed from the normal mount located forward of the left pilots seat and near the right foot pedal. A method needs to be devised which will enable the Crypto maintenance man to perform operational maintenance checks and trouble shooting at the aircraft without complete removal of the device from the aircraft. A special purpose extension cable has been fabricated by the Americal Distrat which permits uninterrupted maintenance system. This saves valuable time in performing on the spot maintenance (adjustments), operational checks, and/or equipment substitutions.

c. Recommendation: That the special extension cable be used for all, on the spot, operational checks and maintenance of the Ky-28 while operating with the radio system of the aircraft.

(a) Cable Specifications:

1. Length 48 inches.

2. Nomenclature: Connector Receptacle, Part Nr ON097184-2, FSN 5935-986-2284, Connector Receptacle, Part Nr ON097184-1, FSN 5935-986-2283.

Connector Plug, Part Nr MS3126F-12-10-8, Connector Plug Nr MS3126F-16-26-SW.

Cable, 16 gauge stranded.

15. (U) SUBJECT: MS5A2 Front Engine Mounting Bolts.

a. Observation: Loosening of M35A2 front engine mounting bolts by road

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vibration has caused damage to front-cross members and has caused the entire engine to be replaced.

b. Evaluation: A common discrepancy with the M35A2, LDS 465-1 Engine, is a frequent loosening of the front engine mount bolts. These should be checked daily and even more frequently if possible, because road conditions quickly loosen them. Engine torque, if the bolts become loose, will invariably cause the front cross-member to crack on the left side, hence a wash-out. Further, if the bolts drop out the engine drops down on the front out-put flange of the differential causing the necessity to replace the engine.

c. Recommendation: M35A2 front engine mounting bolts should be checked at least once daily.

C. Training - Omitted.

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D. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Debriefing of Hoi Chanh.

a. Observation: The average Hoi Chanh has a wide knowledge of Viet Cong tactics, including area security procedures, signs used by the VC, and the strength and weapons of the enemy in the Hoi Chanh's unit area.

b. Evaluation: The Hoi Chanh may supply information concerning tactics rice and or weapons caches and other pertinent operational intelligence. Hoi Chanh normally have an extensive knowledge of Infrastructure personalities residing in his area of operation. It has been found that proper interviewing of Hoi Chanh results in information not previously revealed because they have not been asked specific questions.

c. Recommendation: That all Hoi Chanh be debriefed after their initial interrogation.

2 (C) SUBJECT: Blacklists.

a. Observation: The compiling of a complete and accurate Blacklist requires a complete and accurate coordinated search of all sources of intelligence data.

b. Evaluation: Names of Viet Cong Infrastructure personalities have been obtained from interrogation reports (provincial, division and brigade), and from captured documents, source reports, and Hoi Chanh debriefings.

c. Recommendation: It is recommended that all PW, civil defendants, and Innocent civilians be questioned about Viet Cong Infrastructure believed to be operating in their area. This should be done after information of tactical value is obtained. Captured enemy documents should be examined thoroughly for infrastructure personalities.

3. (C) SUBJECT: Enemy Wire Tapping.

a. Observation: During the month of Aug 68, a land line connecting two TOCs on the same firebase was tapped using a simple T-splice into the wire at an isolated point.

b. Evaluation: Simple land-line communications are extremely vulnerable to enemy tapping.

c. Recommendation: That commanders and intelligence officers make it a continuing practice of training personnel in communications security. Wire communications must be inspected frequently, particularly in those areas where the lines are not under continual observation. In addition telephones are not a secure means of communication and should not be used for the discussion of classified information.

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4. (C) SUBJECT: LRP Insertion.

- a. Observation: LRP insertions at dawn and dusk, using special equipment, greatly decrease the chance of mission compromise.
- b. Evaluation: During hours of limited visibility, the enemy moves into positions and relaxes his security. Under these conditions, insertions using the following techniques will be guaranteed a high degree of success. The lead ship carries the team for insertion. The remainder of the ships follow, in column, behind the insertion ship. As the column reaches the point of insertion, the lead ship drops down to off-load the team. All other ships pass overhead and the insertion ship, after dropping the team, takes the rear position in the column. Insertion by repelling may be used with this technique, after must fly slower than in other methods. Spacing between helicopters is critical as it is possible to leave too wide a gap between the last element and the insertion ship when the latter returns to the formation. The primary advantage is that the circling maneuvers of the escort ships are eliminated which has tended to pinpoint the LZ location. An additional advantage is a reduction in the time the aircraft spend in the LZ area.

- c. Recommendation: That this method of insertion be tested and further refined by other LRP units.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Maintenance of Optical equipment.

- a. Observation: The extreme dampness and dust in RVN can seriously damage Imagery Interpretation optical equipment.
- b. Evaluation: Dust and water have corrosive effects on optical equipment unless maintenance is performed daily. Proper optical cleaning equipment must be used to prevent further damage to the lens. Extra care should be given to special equipment such as the prism mirror stereoscope and the photogrammetric stereometers.
- c. Recommendation: That SOP's require daily maintenance, the use of prescribed cleaning equipment only and storage in proper protection case.

E. Logistics.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Seasonal Equipment Requirements

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- a. Observation: Many logistical requirements are of a seasonal nature. During the monsoon season, there develops a critical need for weather gear, heater, and warming and drying facilities.
- b. Evaluation: Forecasting requirements and submitting of necessary requisitions with sufficient lead item can insure prompt receipt of seasonal equipment. The seasonal nature of the requirement/demands must be recognized in maintenance of ASL.
- c. Recommendation: That units project impending requirements and requisition seasonal equipment well in advance. That ASL/PLI demand experience be subjectively evaluated prior to deletion of items from ASL/PLL.

2 (U) SUBJECT: Installation of 10,000 Gallon Collapsible Tank

- a. Observation: The 10,000 gallon collapsible tanks are frequently installed in a berm.
- b. Evaluation: During the monsoon season accumulation of water under and around the tank causes surface blisters. Water should be drained from the tank berms, utilizing a water pump if available. Standing water also causes berm wall erosion.
- c. Recommendation: Tanks be installed above ground level with drain hoses to allow for drainage of berm area. Berms should be high and thick enough to protect tanks from shell fragments and small arms fire.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Fire Control Equipment Fogging

- a. Observation: During inclement weather fire control equipment becomes inoperative due to fogging.
- b. Evaluation: Fire control equipment modified to allow nitrogen purging will reduce fogging.
- c. Recommendation: Fire control equipment and night vision devices be modified in CONUS for nitrogen purging prior to shipment to Southeast Asia.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Borescope, M2, 6650-587-0968.

- a. Observation: The M2 borescope is not durable and portable enough for continuous operation in Vietnam.

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b. Evaluation: The tactical situation in Vietnam preclude the transporting mortars and howitzers to direct units when boroscoping is required. Armament technicians must boroscope "on site". This requires transporting the boroscope by vehicle or helicopter. This is a delicate instrument and continuous operation under these conditions renders it rapidly unserviceable.

c. Recommendation: The 12 boroscope be evaluated for redesign emphasizing durability and portability.

(2) A minimum of two boroscopes be authorized per direct support unit to insure continuous support when one scope is inoperative.

5. (C) SUBJECT: Procurement of Herbicide for Ground-Based Defoliation Operations.

a. Observation: In recent months the chemical section has had difficulty procuring herbicide Orange for ground-based defoliation operations.

b. Evaluation: At the present time all herbicide is controlled by GVN forces, United States forces are not permitted to stock this item. The end results are long and involved procedures both in procuring and transporting the herbicide. The 2d ARVN Division who supplies herbicide to the Americal Division has inadequate stockage to meet operational requirements. Subsequently, herbicide must be requested through ARVN channels in Da Nang. This causes delays because of special transportation requirements.

c. Recommendation: That US Forces be permitted to stock an ample amount of herbicide Orange for ground-based defoliation operations. This would not interfere with GVN control since all requests must be approved by local prince chiefs.

6. (U) SUBJECT: Track and Suspension System, Armored Personnel Carrier, M113.

a. Observation: Frequent inspections are required by the track and suspension systems on the M113 to insure proper performance.
b. Evaluation: Special attention must be given track block connection points, when excessive wear is noted, the track blocks should be immediately replaced. If new blocks are not available, extreme caution must be exercised.

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c. Recommendation: M113 APC's with worn track block connection points not be used except in case of combat necessity. The vehicle should move at a slow rate of speed to insure that the vehicle can be safely stopped in the event of track or suspension system failure.

7. (U) SUBJECT: Lubrication Intervals.

a. Observation: In several instances lubrication intervals required by the lubrication order has proven inadequate in the Vietnam environment.

b. Evaluation: Vehicles should be completely lubricated every 300 miles or 30 day, which ever comes first. Generators should be checked daily with oil and filters changed weekly. Refrigeration units should also be lubricated weekly.

c. Recommendations: That equipment be lubricated in accordance with the above evaluation.

8. (U) SUBJECT: Front Engine Mounting Bolts, M35A2.

a. Observation: Loose front engine mounting bolts has caused damage to front cross members and engines on the M35A2's.

b. Evaluation: A problem with the M35A2, LDS 465-1 engine is loosening of the front engine mount bolts. These should be checked daily. Engine torque will cause the front cross member to crack on the left side. If the bolts drop out, the engine drops down on the front out-flange of the differential ruining the engine.

c. Recommendation: The M35A2 front engine mounting bolts be checked at least daily.

9. (U) SUBJECT: Squad Radio Sets, AN/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9.

a. Observation:

(1) Squad radio sets AN/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9 do not have sufficient range for communications required from platoon to squad in the counter insurgency environment. Squad sized patrols and night ambushes are normally deployed beyond the 1,000 meter range of these sets. In addition, it has been found that tick vegetation will reduce the effective range of the radio sets down to 200 to 300 meters. Maintenance problems have been encountered in the use of the squad radio sets due to the high susceptibility to water and moisture damage.

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(2) The antennas are easily broken when operating in thick foliage AN PRR-9 speaker horn assemblies are not sturdy enough to withstand tactical use.
(3) There are insufficient spare parts available to maintain the sets properly, especially antennas, speaker horns and lanyards.

b. Evaluation: The squad radio sets, An/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9 are unsatisfactory for employment in the counter insurgency environment due to the limited range, multiple maintenance problems and the lack of spare parts.

c. Recommendation: That a radio set of greater range and durability be authorized the infantry squad in the counter insurgency environment. That sufficient spare parts be maintained in supply and maintenance channels for authorized squad radio sets that redesign of the present squad radio sets be considered to increase durability and decrease susceptibility to moisture damage.

G. Civil Affairs/Civic Action.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Utilization of Psyop Resources.

a. Observation: A more effective PSYOP program could be implemented throughout the area of operations if PSYOPs assets were decentralized and units were supported on an area basis rather than assets being concentrated in one location.

b. Evaluation: The need exists for a coordinated PSYOP support developmental center at Chu Lai to not only take advantage of the PSYOP expertise available within the 12th DTA but also to insure the production of a more meaningful, unit oriented PSYOP product based on local needs and local intelligence. It is envisioned that this center would be responsible for coordination the development, production and dissemination of all propaganda within 12th DTA. It would be staffed by representatives of both US (Amical Division and 7th PSYOP Bn) and GVN (ARVN and Province) who would collectively insure that a coordinated program was implemented throughout the area. This would require an increase in 7th PSYOP Bn assets presently located at Chu Lai to include graphic and printing capabilities. An allocation of aircraft would further be required to insure that a means of aerial dissemination would be available. This system would leave the asset's centralized at Corps headquarters to work exclusively on development and production of propaganda which has general applicability and requires less immediate dissemination. Experience has shown that the present system is not fully responsive to the needs of this area and more complete use needs to be made of all units possessing PSYOP expertise throughout the area.

c. Recommendation: That a PSYOP support unit be located in the Chu Lai area with the capability to develop, produce and disseminate propaganda throughout the entire area encompassed by the 12th DTA.

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2. (U) SUBJECT Volunteer Informant Program.

a. Observation. The effective conduct of a volunteer informant program is dependent upon the degree of credibility attained with the prospective informant. Propaganda disseminated which advertises collection points, amount to be paid for turn in of items and willingness of allied forces to reward the civilians for such information must be credible to the target audience if any degree of success is to be attained.

b. Evaluation. The following techniques have been employed by this division in the successful conduct of this program.

(1) Areas were initially targeted based on the density of population and presence of friendly troops. Leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were followed by ground loudspeaker broadcasts made by a combat loudspeaker team. This team, using 2 Kit Carson Scouts in a face to face role informed the civilian populace of the benefits to be gained by participating in the program and designated a collection point where the items could be turned in.

(2) To insure that all potential informants were offered an opportunity to participate in this program, funds for payment were also carried by the engineer unit responsible for road clearance in the area and by the combat loudspeaker team itself.

(3) Children comprised a high percentage of the informants. At least 60% of the informants were under 16 years of age and they enthusiastically received and transmitted the program to other would be informants. The effects were cumulative. When the program was initially implemented and propaganda distributed very few informants showed interest. By attaining credibility as payments were made for the items turned in so the information was passed on by word of mouth from village to village. This coupled with the techniques outlined above resulted in the following items being turned in within the Americal Division's area of operation during the reporting period.

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	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
Arty(rds)	197	281	365	943
Mortar(rds)	1,004	167	461	1,632
Grenades(ea)	303	289	640	1,232
Mines(ea)	41	34	282	357
40m(ea)	38	257	416	761
S/Arms(rds)	22,650	6,000	32,100	62,750
TNT(lbs)	37	22	24	83
Wpns(ea)	3	3	42	48

c. Recommendation: That a system, as outlined above, be initiated and implemented in areas where an effective volunteer informant program is not presently in effect.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JACK L TREADWELL
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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DISTRIBUTION:

1-ACSFOR-DA (thru USARPAC)	1-CO, 1st Bn, 14th Arty
2-ACSFOR-DA (thru USARV to DA)	1-CO, 3d Bn 16th Arty
2-CINCUSARPAC	1-CO, 3d Bn, 18th Arty
3-CG, USARV	1-CO, E Trp, 1st Cav
2-Co, 11th Inf Bde	1-CO, F Trp, 17th Cav
2-CO, 196th Inf Bde	1-CO, H Trp, 17th Cav
2-CO, 198th Inf Bde	1-CO, 6th Spt Bn
2-CO, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav	1-CO, 8th Spt Bn
	1-CO, 9th Spt Bn
	1-CO, 23d S&T Bn
	1-CO, 23d Med Bn
	1-CO, 723d Maint Bn
2-CO, Div Arty	1-CO, 123d Avn Bn
1-CO, 3d Bn, 1st Inf	1-CO, 14th Avn Bn
1-CO, 4th Bn, 3d Inf	
1-CO, 4th Bn, 21st Inf	2-TACP (ALO), Americal Div
1-CO, 1st Bn, 20th Inf	1-CO, 26th Engr Bn
	1-CO, 39th Engr Bn
1-CO, 2nd Bn, 1st Inf	1-CO, 523d Sign Bn
1-CO, 3d Bn, 21st Inf	1-ACofS, G1
1-CO, 4th Bn, 31st Inf	1-ACofS, G2
1-CO, 1st Bn, 6th Inf	5-ACofS, G3
1-CO, 1st Bn, 46th Inf	1-ACofS, G4
1-CO, 5th Bn, 46th Inf	1-ACofS, G5
	1-Comdt, Americal Division Combat Center
1-CO, 1st Bn, 52nd Inf	1-IG
1-CO, 6th Bn, 11th Arty	1-OCMH-DA
1-CO, 3d Bn, 82d Arty	
1-CO, 1st Bn, 82d Arty	
1-Chemical Officer	
1-Provost Marshal	
1-AG	
10-CO, 3d Mil Hist Det	

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AMERICAL DIVISION TROOP LIST

(as of 1 Nov 68)

1. HQ AMERICAL DIVISION

HHC, Americal Division
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
F Troop, 8th Cav
415th Sig Det
570th TC Det
26th Engr Bn
123d Avn Bn
449th Sig Det
406 TC Det
523d Sig Bn
23d MP Co
3d Mil Hist Det

2. AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY

HHB, Div Arty
3d Bn, 16th Arty
3d Bn, 18th Arty
1st Bn, 82d Arty
3d Plt, Btry, 29th Arty, Searchlight (OPCON)
G Btry, 55th Arty (.50)
251st Radar Det
6th Bn, 56th Arty

3. AMERICAL DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

HHC and Band
23d S&T Bn
HQ & A Co, 23d Med Bn
HQ & A Co, 723d Maint Bn
23 Admin Co
258th Pers Svcs Co
Co E, 51st Inf (LRP)
63d Inf Plt (CTT)
Americal Combat Center (PROV)

4. 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 11th Inf Bde
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 3d Inf

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1st Bn, 20th Inf
4th Bn, 21st Inf
6th Bn, 11th Arty
6th Spt Bn
E Trp, 1st Cav
11th Sig Plt
59th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
52d Chem Det
31st Public Information Det

5. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196TH Inf Bde
2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
3d Bn, 82d Arty
8th Spt Bn
F Trp, 17th Cav
48th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
156th Sig Plt
10th Public Information Det
27th CML Det
569th MI det
636th MI Det, OB

6. 198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 198th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 6th Inf
1st Bn, 46th Inf
5th Bn, 46th Inf
1st Bn, 52d Inf
1st Bn, 14th Arty
9th Spt Bn
H Trp, 17th Cav
57th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
635th MI Det
87th Chem Det
49th Sig Det

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7. NON DIVISIONAL UNITS

14th Combat Avn Bn
71st Aslt Spt Hel Co
132d Aslt Spt Hel Co
174th Aslt Hel Co
176th Aslt Hel Co
178th Aslt Hel Co
16th TC Det
94th Ssign Det
151st TC Det
348th A. S. Det
400th TC Det
39th Engr Bn
4th CA Plt
6th CA Plt
51st CA Plt
Americall RR co (PROV)
408th RR Det
415th RR Det
601st RR Det
O/16, Det 31, 5th Weather Sqdn USAF
USASSG, ACSI, DA
160th Engr Det
506th Engr Det
548th Engr Det
600th Engr Det
603d Engr Det

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HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 97375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Reports-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, Americal Division.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning reproduction, page 57, Section II, paragraph A1. Bruning Model 2100 and Xerox Model 720 are both electrostatic copying machines, and are equally susceptible to climatic conditions. Both copiers have a secondary feature the ability to reproduce off set masters. However, the masters are of doubtful quality. The Americal Division should initiate action to obtain a Holoid Camera 4, manufactured by Xerox Corporation, as listed on page 44, AR 310-1. Action will be taken to notify the Americal Division of this recommendation.

b. Reference item concerning erroneous casualty reports, page 57, Section II, paragraph A2. The procedures outlined by Americal Division have merit in the actual reporting of casualties, and are items that are helpful for all units below Division level. This headquarters will take appropriate action to disseminate these suggested procedures to the major subordinate commands.

c. Reference item concerning construction priorities and funding, page 58, Section II, paragraphs A3. Funds are available for justified construction projects. However, priorities for construction are assigned by USAECAV and Special Services projects do not have high enough priority for construction at this time.

d. Reference item concerning use of NPFF women for processing VN employees, page 58, Section II, paragraph A5. Concur with the recommendation. National Police women are being used at a number of locations in RVN and are usually more effective than direct-hire personnel.

e. Reference item concerning incidents and disturbances, page 59, Section II, paragraph A6. The recommendation is considered appropriate.

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- f. Reference on item concerning light armored vehicle launched bridge, page 63, Section II, paragraph B5. Concur with the recommendation. Shipment to fill this need is under development by CONUS agencies.
- g. Reference item concerning care and maintenance of X17 Protective Masks, page 65, Section II, paragraph B8. Concur with recommendation.
- h. Reference item concerning engineer support in clearing fire bases (FSB), page 66, Section II, paragraph B14. The use of the special extension cable to adjust and troubleshoot the KY-28 will be evaluated.
- j. Reference item concerning LRP insertion, page 71, Section II, paragraph D4. The technique of inserting LRP patrols described by the Americal Division appears to have merit. An article describing the technique will be included in the next issue of the USARV publication, Combat Intelligence Lessons.
- k. Reference item concerning fire control equipment fogging, page 72, Section II, paragraph E3. Concur USAWECOM is aware that fire control devices in RVN become fogged and consequently they have developed or are developing for each fire control device a MWO to allow nitrogen purging. The modification will be performed in-country for devices in use and in CONUS for devices returned for overhaul.
- l. Reference item concerning boroscope, M2, page 72, Section II, paragraph E4. Concur with the first recommendation. In order for USAVECOM to evaluate the design of the M2 boroscope, the problems relating to its durability and portability must be reported on an Equipment Improvement Recommendation by the using unit. Nonconcur with the second recommendation. Because of their expense it is not economically advisable to authorize spare boroscopes at the user level. USAWECOM has reported that replacement boroscopes are available and may be requested by priority requisition to replace those damaged.
- m. Reference item concerning procurement of herbicide for ground based defoliation operations, page 73, Section II, paragraph E5. Nonconcur. The current policy for stocking and issue of orange herbicide was established by agreement between the governments of Vietnam and the United States. Adequate supplies of orange herbicide are on hand, but because of its sensitive nature decentralized stockage is not advisable.

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n. Reference item concerning utilization of PSYOP resources, page 75, Section II, paragraph G1. Nonconcur. GVN province officials and provincial advisory teams have been directed by Change 1, MACV Directive 10-1, dated 10 July 1968 and GVN directives, to establish a PSYOP/CA coordinating committee in each province. Maximum utilization of these province level organizations will minimize the requirement for a PSYOP developmental center at Division Tactical Area (DTA) level.

FOR THE COMMANDER

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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