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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (1 May 69) FOR OT UT 691316 15 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

AD 502518

AD 502518

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-GC 10 February 1969
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS-CSFOR-65) (RI) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

I. SECTION I. Operations: Significant Activities

A. (U) Command

1. (U) Brigadier General Wallace L. Clement became the Assistant Division Commander (A) on 18 December 1968 replacing Brigadier General James V. Galloway who departed from this command 2 December 1968.

2. (U) The following distinguished persons visited the Americal Division during the reporting period:

a. Brigadier General W. M. Van Harlingen Jr. Dep C/S Comm/Elec, USARV - 12 November 1968.

b. Hon D. E. McGiffert, Under Secretary of the Army - 17 November 1968.

c. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, DEPCOMUSMACV - 18 November 1968.

d. Brigadier General John H. Wheelock III, Dep AC/S J3, USMACV - 5 December 1968.

e. Mr. Joseph Alsop, Nationally Syndicated Columnist - 29 November 1968.

f. Mr. L. James Binder - Editor, Army Magazine - 7 December 1968.

g. Brigadier General John H. McLaughlin USMC, Dir COC USMACV - 16 December 1968.

h. Brigadier General George E. Dooley USMC, C/S III MAF - 19 December 1968.

i. V/ADM E. R. Zumwalt Jr. COMNAVFORV - 21 December 1968.

j. Bob Hope and Operation Holly - 24 December 1968.

k. ADM John S. McCain, CINCPAC - 25 December 1968.

l. General J. K. Woolnough COUSCOMARC - 27 December 1968.

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m. Lieutenant General P.M. Hunt (UK) CMDR Far East Forces - 9 January 1969.

n. Major General C.A. Youngdale Dep CG III MAF - 16 January 1969.

o. Lieutenant General Frank T.Mildren Dep CG USARV - 17 January 1969.

p. Brigadier General C. J. Levan, Dir Air Defense AC/S for DA and Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn Dir Plans and Program OCRD DA - 22 January 1969.

q. Colonel B. M. Read G3 USARV - 29 January 1969.

B. (U) Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline.

1. (U) G1 Section

a. On 28 November 1968, LTC Henry I. Lowder assumed duties as Assistant Chief of Staff, G1. LTC Lowder replaced LTC Edwin D. Beers.

b. The first AG/G1 Conference was held on 10 and 11 January 1969. The conference was attended by S1 Adjutants of all battalions and brigades. This conference was organized to inform individuals of problems encountered or expected within the personnel management area. Individuals attending felt that the subjects covered by G1/AG were informative and helpful. This conference will be conducted once monthly in the future.

2. (U) AG Section

a. GENERAL

(1) LTC Bernard L. J. Callahan continued as the Adjutant General during the period of this report.

(2) LTC James R. Ralph Jr. reported in on 23 January 1969 to assume duties as Division Adjutant General upon rotation of LTC Callahan.

(3) Finalization of plans and coordination for the movement, and processing of approximately 2,062 personnel scheduled for redeployment to CONUS during the period 1-5 Dec 68. During the period 24 Nov thru 4 Dec, 1,821 personnel were moved from fire bases to Chu Lai, outprocessed and further moved to Cam Ranh Bay for transportation to CONUS. This loss of redeploying personnel consequently required the inprocessing and assignment of 2,100 replacements during the period 15 Nov thru 25 Nov 68. The requesting of, and early arrival of replacements was necessitated by the fact that 2,062 personnel could not be moved to Chu Lai from the fire bases in a five day period and

required a phased movement over a 10 day period. Consequently although still counted in the division strength, the personnel were operational losses to the maneuver battalions.

b. Personnel Services Division.

(1) Personnel management (for period 16 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69).

(a) Promotions. Enlisted promotions accomplished during the reporting period were as follows:

E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4
8	7	59	195	2681	3471

Promotions of top graduates of the Combat Center and Recon School were accomplished as follows:

E-6	E-5	E-4
4	4	0

During the reporting period 21 hospitalized promotions were processed.

(b) Proficiency Pay. Proficiency Pay awards were accomplished as follows:

00E	00Z	05C	11B	11C	11D	11E	11G	11P	12B	12C	12E	13B
2	2	3	2	2	5	13	6	1	9	11	3	7

13E	13F	16B	16J	22J	24F	31G	31H	36K	63B	63C	64B	67H
1	1	6	1	1	9	9	1	1	11	1	6	1

71B	71D	71E	71L	71T	76U	76Z	91B	91Z	94B	95B
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	22	2	1

Request for Misc Testing: Army Classification Battery - 30
Recruiter's Self-Description Battery-3

(c) Redeployment. During the reporting period 4,208 personnel departed the command, port calls were published through 20 Feb 69. 4,458 requests for orders were submitted and 372 personnel actions were processed.

(2) Awards and Decorations

	Received	Completed
(a) Recommendations for awards-	3,029	4,246

(of these 433 were requests for Good Conduct Medals and 3,823 were for Purple Hearts or higher)

(b) There were 2,167 General Orders cut on 2,388 individuals.

(3) Personnel Actions Branch. All actions were completed except as follows:

	RECEIVED	COMPLETED
(a) Compassionate Reassignments:	6	4
(b) Hardship Discharges:	22	6
(c) Compassionate Leaves:	199	App: 11 Disapp: 93
(d) 212 Cases:	39	29

c. Enlisted Records.

(1) Number of personnel under flagging action: 625

(2) Number of personnel serviced: 6,882

(3) Number of personnel inprocessed: 7,278

(4) Number of personnel outprocessed: 4,573

(5) The following requests for awards were approved and orders requested:

(a) Combat Infantry Badge: Off 123 EM 2,584

(b) Combat Medical Badge: Off 26 EM 230

(c) Aircraft Crewman Badge: Off 13 EM 61

d. Officers Branch.

(1) A total of 602 Officers were inprocessed and 397 were outprocessed.

(2) The following number of promotions to grade indicated were effected:

LTC	MAJ	CPT	1LT
5	9	36	115

e. Administrative Services Division.

(1) Admin Services Division continues to provide administrative support for the division headquarters in the area of reproduction, publications, forms control, records management, mail and distribution, and the operations of the AG Staff Message Center/TOP SECRET repository. No significant changes in operations have occurred during the reporting period, although equipment difficulties experienced with reproduction equipment resulted in reduced effectiveness of the reproduction branch.

(2) Admin Machine Branch. This is the initial report for this recently activated automatic data processing (ADP) facility which has the missions of providing mechanized support for the Americal Division and transmitting machine processable input to Headquarters, USARV. Data forwarded to USARV, as well as local processing, is accomplished using formats and procedures prescribed under the Department of the Army, Personnel Management and Accounting-Card Processor (PERMACAP) System. This system interfaces all AF ADP activities world-wide down to division/personnel service company level with the Department of the Army.

(3) Reenlistment. In the month of January the number of AUS enlistments totaled 27, surpassing by 12 the previous monthly high in the calendar year 1968. The 11th Inf Bde alone had 19 AUS enlistments, which itself is higher than any single 1968 monthly total of all AUS enlistments in the entire division. The Division's January percentage of AUS enlistments is 11.6 passing the DA objective of 6.7% in the category.

f. Postal Services.

(1) The Americal APO functions as a base post office in that it provides complete postal service to all military units on the Chu Lai post. MAO 96326 is used to serve Marine and Army non-individual units: whereas, Naval units are served by FPO 96696. APO 96374 directly services Americal Divisional Units, other than the three brigades. Complete postal service is provided to each brigade by the APO listed below:

11th Infantry Bde - APO 96217 - Duc Pho.
196th Infantry Bde - APO 96256 - Chu Lai Area of Operation.
198th Infantry Bde - APO 96219 - Chu Lai Area of Operation.

(2) The 1968 Christmas Mail Program was a complete success. This outstanding accomplishment was the result of detailed prior planning and support received from each level of command. During the period of time covered by this report, the Postal Officer was reassigned within the Americal Division AG Section. The incumbent Postal Officer assumed duty on 18 December 1968.

g. Special Services.

(1) A beach recreation area was opened near the USO. This includes a miniature golf course, archery range, basketball court, volleyball court, horse shoe pits, badminton court, and fishing equipment for daily checkout. The area was constructed solely through the use of Special Services personnel and borrowed personnel operating equipment as construction priorites prohibited the work from being accomplished by the engineers.

(2) A musical troupe, the "Aunt Willie Memorial Band" consisting of two Special Services personnel and three enlisted men attached to Special Services from units of the Americal Division, have been touring the division areas of operation, performing at fire bases and landing zones. During the Christmas holiday period, this group performed two and three times a day covering all available troop locations.

(3) R&R space utilization dropped significantly during this reporting period. This is attributed to the large turn-over of personnel during October and November. Space utilization is expected to increase greatly in February and March when the newly arrived personnel have completed the required three months in-country prior to eligibility for R&R.

4. (U) Provost Marshal

a. Significant activities: During the reporting period five PW Collection Points were operated. The five PW Points processed the following number of detainees:

(1)	Total Detainees Processed	2301
(2)	PW	49
(3)	CD	506
(4)	IC	1667
(5)	Returnee (Chieu Hoi)	20
(6)	Detainee (MI or CI held)	59

5. (U) Information Office

a. Operation Russell Beach began 13 January with extensive press interest. A CH-47 Chinook was sent to DaNang to pick up representatives from Stars and Stripes, UPI, Associated Press, CBS, AP, ABC, and NBC on 14 January. The correspondents received a detailed briefing on the operation from Brigadier General Cooksey and were pleased with the treatment they received. Heavy monsoon rain hampered their activity somewhat on the opening days. As the operation progressed correspondents continued to come in a steady flow. Transportation has not been too great a problem as the Chief of Staff's helicopter and command and control helicopters were usually available through the 198th Brigade.

b. Operation Hardin Falls began 2 December. Only a few reporters from AP, UPI, and CBS have covered the story up to now. A CBS story film on the pacification program was killed in New York because of lack of visual impact. Efforts are being continued by this office and the Army representative at the DaNang Press Center to interest the press in the operation, but response has been nil.

c. Operation Fayette Canyon, which began 15 December, has not drawn any civilian correspondents for two main reasons: the remoteness of the area from DaNang and the fact that the Marine's Operation Taylor Common borders on the Fayette Canyon area and is easily accessible through DaNang.

d. Operation Vernon Lake II has drawn only a few civilian correspondents, again because of the difficulty in reaching the area and getting back out again.

e. In preparation for the opening of the Chu Lai television station, a technical representative from Saigon came to Chu Lai in early January and two others arrived toward the end of January to check facilities, electricity, housing and other administrative items. At the end of January, the representative had arranged for onpost electrical power for the station, and was awaiting the arrival of the TV van, shipped from Saigon on 26 January.

f. Operation Holly, code name for the Bob Hope Christmas Show, ended 24 December. The press tent and facilities near the stage area were well used by the show's organic public relations personnel and the other visiting civilian newsmen. Betty Lanigan, an NBC official with the public relations phase of the show, said the people were the best organized and most helpful of all places they had seen. She was also helpful in allowing Americal photographers and writers to talk with the entertainers.

g. During the past quarter, a bi-weekly newspaper, the Southern Cross, and a quarterly magazine, Americal, were published. The Americal has initiated a quarterly "log" feature which gives a short review of the divisional activities during the preceding three months. A "pull out" centerfold, giving command information regarding R&R sites, was included in the January issue of the magazine. For the first time, The Southern Cross used a two-color front and back page and an all-art centerfold, both in the Christmas issue. No problems have been encountered in distribution.

h. Distribution of PS&S and UPTIGHT magazine has presented no problems. The information office continues to monitor the distribution of both the items. All distribution is brought up to date by deletions and additions as the division strength and assigned units change. All distribution lists are reviewed quarterly.

i. Almost all of the articles published in Americal, Southern Cross, and The Americal Daily News Sheet are internally produced. The use of "canned" items is avoided whenever possible to preserve a local approach to each command information topic and assure the readership of being able to establish better identification with the subject.

j. Since 1 November 1968, other Command Information publications produced were:

(1) Money Power (No 69-6 revised)
(2) Biography: MG Clement
(3) VN Cultural Fact Sheet - The Greetings (No 3)
(4) VN Cultural Fact Sheet - VN Lunar Calendar (No 4)
(5) Biography: COL J. L. Treadwell
(6) The Mail Must Go Through
(7) Study Dudly
(8) Combat Typewriter

k. Five subordinate units have begun publication of mimeographed newsletters during this period.

l. During this period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969, the following support was given to military and civilian media:

(1) Number of Printed Releases 228
(2) Number of Photo Releases 247
(3) Number of Radio Features 90
(4) Number of Home Town Releases 5464
(5) Number of Home Town News Printed Releases 9
(6) Number of Home Town News Photo Releases 61
(7) Number of Formal Press Briefings and Interviews 107

6. (U) Finance

a. The period from 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969 was characterized by continued evolution toward a standardized non-integrated division finance activity. A reorganization, conducted in phases so that impact on continuity of operations was minimized, was concluded during the period. The objective of this reorganization was to more clearly identify and functionalize the varied operating elements within the Division Finance Office based on general guidance provided in DA Circular 37-22. The end result had been a better definition of responsibilities in each function, an improved workflow, a reduction of span of control, and an overall improvement in control of scheduled workloads and component activities within major functional areas. Additionally the new organizational structure will facilitate orientation of newly assigned finance personnel, permit a more effective training program, and simplify the establishment of written procedures to each component.

b. A continued expansion of records maintenance workload was experienced during November and December with the addition of approximately 2,000 officer and enlisted records. These records had previously been maintained by the unit personnel functions of the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion and the 6th Bn, 56th ARTY (ADA). Prior to this time, payrolls had been prepared by the unit personnel functions and were

computed by the Division Finance Office without personnel augmentation for the services rendered. One non-divisional battalion unit personnel office continues to receive finance support from the division.

c. On 25 November 1968, the Division Finance Office, previously staffed under MTOE 12-37E with 4 commissioned officers, 3 warrant officers and 90 enlisted men, adopted the new staffing under MTOE 12-37G with an addition of 14 enlisted spaces. The TOE staffing provides a servicing capability for 17,600 troops. During the period of this report, the capability was exceeded by approximately 7,000 troops. The excess workload has been accommodated by attachment of 17 enlisted personnel.

d. Selected workload statistics for the period:

	Nov 1968	Dec 1968	Jan 1969
Payrolls prepared	335	342	345
Regular Monthly vouchers	22,484	22,543	25,321
PCS Travel Vouchers	3,829	2,844	2,782
TDY Travel Vouchers	267	206	429
Counter Payments	6,735	7,094	3,396
Allotments Processed	2,775	2,843	2,710
In/Out Processing	5,350	3,380	4,783

7. (U) Division Surgeon

a. Mission: The Americal Division Surgeon's Section provides staff assistance to the Commanding General and technical assistance to all medical activities of the Division in the areas of Medical Administration, Preventive Medicine, Aviation Medicine and Environmental Sanitation.

b. Organization: (1) The Division Surgeon's Section was augmented by the assignment of Captain Micheal Kaplan, MSC, who is an Environmental Sanitarian.

(2) The position of Aviation Medicine Officer was filled by the assignment of Captain Harry B. Richardson, MC, of the United States Air Force.

c. Preventive Medicine: The incidence of malaria continues to be a major health concern of the command. The incidence of malaria declined during this quarter from a rate of 123.5 in October to 69 in November and 70 in December. The decline is seasonal which was reflected in a greater decrease in the percentage of Falciparum Malaria and an increase in the percentage of Vivax Malaria. Continued emphasis on Malaria chemporphylaxis has been of the greatest command interest.

d. Other (1) The Division Surgeon conducted the first Brigade and Battalion Surgeon's meeting on 15 November 1968.

(2) The urine assay for chloroquine which determines whether a man has taken the Chloroquine-Primaquine for Vivax Malaria, was introduced.

(3) During the period, 147 men were trained in field sanitation procedures.

8. (U) Staff Judge Advocate Section

a. During the period: This section experienced in December 1968 a change of SJAs, the loss of one Captain and the assignment of a new Legal Clerk; also in Jan 69, a Captain was assigned to bring the office up to full strength. Military Justice/Military Affairs still comprise the largest activity area. During the quarter November 68-January 69 this command tried 12 general courts-martial and received 107 special and 19 summary court-martial cases for administrative review. In addition, 1,152 Article 15's were received for administrative review corrections, logging and forwarding to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana for file. Military Affairs Action for this quarter included 96 LOD's, 66 Article 15 appeals, 82 reports of survey and 48 congressional inquiries. Quarterly rates for general, special and summary courts-martial during the period were 0.17, 1.52 and 0.27 respectively. These rates reflect the average number of cases per month per thousand troop strength.

b. The Soldier Advocate Division processed 2,510 cases during this quarter, including but not limited to income tax, domestic relations indebtedness, wills and powers of attorney and general counseling and advice regarding disciplinary action and administrative procedures.

c. This office continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Convention with strong emphasis on war crimes and detainee treatment to each group of replacements processed through the Americal Combat Center.

d. During the quarter 57 claims were received for loss or damage of servicemens property. Foreign claims are monitored at this headquarters for substantive and procedural completeness and forwarded to the Foreign Claims Commission for adjudication.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS-CSFOR-65) (RI) (U)

C. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

1. (C) G2 Section

a. LTC Robert B. Nelson was assigned as the ACofS, G2 on 2[illegible] November. LTC Nelson came to the position after seven months as Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 1st Inf. Major John M. Hayes served as the Acting ACofS, G2 from 5 December to 12 January, during LTC Nelson's Special Leave. LTC A.E. Adkins and CPT J. Carlton departed for CONUS on 27 November and 31 January respectively. Other newly assigned officers include Maj. L.S. Smith, G2 Air, CPT E.J. Posadak Assistant G2 Air, CPT S.E. Hawkins, Assistant G2 TOC, CPT J.P. Huddle, Staff Weather Officer, and CPT J.R. McWilliams, LRRP CO.

b. G2 Operations: The Americal Division continued operations against the 2d NVA Division and provincial and local force units in the Quang Tin and southern Quang Nam Provinces. Emphasis was placed upon an aggressive collection plan to include patrols and small unit reconnaissance operations in addition to the divisional resources available. The objective of this plan was to provide more timely information on areas considered to be enemy sanctuaries. The G2 Section developed a method of employing aero scouts and Long Range Patrols (LRP) designed to detect enemy units under the heavy jungle canopy. LRP's would be inserted through the vegetation, locate enemy forces and direct aero scouts to fix and destroy or capture them. The anticipated results are the narrowing of any intelligence gaps and increased accuracy in targetting B-52, other air strikes and artillery strikes. In conjunction with the Division Chemical Section, CS strikes against enemy divisional, regimental, and battalion headquarters were executed. A concept for the use of ground sensors was developed and implemented in the Division during the quarter. Plans for additional sensor utilization are being initiated.

c. G2 Air: The G2 Air operations were somewhat hampered by weather conditions which frequently prevented reconnaissance aircraft from flying scheduled missions. However the monsoon season was not as severe as expected, and the aerial surveillance program was able to provide significant intelligence collection and target acquisition support to the division. Of special note was the heavy enemy movement detected by visual reconnaissance and airborne sensors during the Christmas truce period. Increased emphasis was placed on visual reconnaissance. An O-1G aircraft was provided the G2 Air by the 21st Reconnaissance Airplane Company. Observers, provided by G2 Air and the Americal MID, utilized this aircraft six hours daily for long range visual reconnaissance missions and for hand-held photography as required. Mission planning for this aircraft was performed by the G2 Air with special interest being placed on the surveillance of

areas reported by agents, PW's, Hoi Chanhs and other sources to be locations of enemy activity. This method produced considerable success including the sighting of enemy base camps, hospitals and supply points. On 15 January G2 Air, Americal Division, assumed the responsibilities of Visual Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Air Coordinator (VARSAC) for southern I Corps. The function of the VARSAC is to insure complete and adequate visual reconnaissance of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces and to implement a responsive reporting system. This being accomplished by the allocation of aircraft to the Americal Division and the Second ARVN Division and the assignment of specific areas to be covered by each Division on a periodic basis.

d. Staff Weather Office (SWO): During the quarter, the SWO acquired a transmit capability within the weather teletype circuit JGVR. Observations and forecasts are now transmitted directly to Tan Son Nhut for dissemination on weather circuits. Two weather vans were newly located at Duc Pho and LZ Baldy to expand weather service. Vans contain height set, wind measuring set, temperature/dew point set and radio. The Duc Pho set was put into use in early Dec, the LZ Baldy set is expected to be fully operational in early Feb.

e. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company (LRRP): A number of improvements occurred in the LRRP Co in the last quarter. A Tactical Operations and Intelligence Center was established, linked to the LRRP Plts at LZ Baldy and Bayonet by direct radio. To insure more thorough and timely transmission of intelligence information, patrol leaders are debriefed upon mission completion by both the Bde S2 and then the LRRP Co CO. Through this system more reliable information is now forwarded to the ACofS, G2. A three week "pre-recondo" school was established at Chu Lai. The top five graduates of each class are sent to the MACV Recondo School for further training. During the quarter, 53 missions were completed, resulting in 122 sightings, 62 KIA's and 1 WIA.

f. Enemy Situation

(1) Quang Tin and Quang Nam: Enemy activity from 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69 was characterized by fire which consisted primarily of mortar and rocket fire against NDP's, LZ's and fixed bases such as Bayonet, Hill 69, Fat City and Hill 54. On 18 Dec 68, elements of the 1st NF Regt, 2d NVA Division were contacted in Que Son (D) and suffered approximately 200 KIA over a week long period. This Regiment suffered sufficent casualties to seriously impair its offensive capability. From 18-21 Dec 68 Chu Lai Base received a total of 14 140mm rockets resulting in 8 KIA. Enemy activity then subsided until 19 Jan 69 when the 2d ARVN Division in Tam Ky (D) contacted a large enemy unit resulting in 30 NVA KIA. Captured documents indicated that the unit was an element of the first Bn, 3d

Regt, 2d NVA Division. From 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69 captured enemy documents and agent reports continued to mention a Winter/Spring Offensive that was being planned.

(a) On 1 Nov 68, vic BT 109 248, B/3-21 Inf was ambushed by an estimated 18-20 enemy which resulted in 2 KHA. Suppressive fire accounted for 5 enemy KIA. Earlier on the same day, vic BT 129 259, they accounted for another 8 NVA/VC KIA in scattered contacts.

(b) On 1 Nov 68, vic AT 952 296, AT 974 313, and 982 316, B/4-31 Inf and D/2-1 Inf found and evacuated 14,000 lbs of rice. In addition, C/4-21 Inf found and evacuated 12,000 lbs of rice, vic of BT 144 495.

(c) On 4 Nov 68, vic BT 229 163, D/1-46th Inf found and evacuated 9,500 lbs of rice. In addition 20 camouflaged huts with fortified bunkers were found and destroyed. On the same day, vic BT 067 404, and BT 06[illegible] 405, B/2-1 Inf found and evacuated 9,100 lbs of rice.

(d) On 9 Nov 68, vic AT 901 224, and AT 903 224, B&D/4-31st Inf found and evacuated 13,500 lbs of rice.

(e) On 11 Nov 68, vic BT 054 379, and BT 057 375, B/2-1 Inf found and evacuated 13,500 lbs of rice.

(f) On 11 Nov 68 at 2400 hr, Operations Wheeler/Wallowa and Burlington Trail terminated with a total of 11, 924 enemy KIA, 2,165 individual weapons and 43[illegible] crew served weapons captured. On this same date at 1201 hr, Oregon AO was initiated which included the area formerly covered by Wheeler/Wallowa and Burlington Trails.

(g) On 13 Nov 68, vic AT 936 2-3, C/4-31 Inf found and evacuated 9,200 lbs of rice.

(h) On 14 Nov 68, vic BT 093 373, BT 085 371, and BT 083 37[illegible] A/2-1 Inf found and evacuated 26,800 lbs of rice in and buried around huts in the area.

(i) On 17 Nov 68, local force units staged a well coordinated attack by rocket and mortar fire against numerous NDP's and FSBs. Eleven sappers were KIA after penetration LZ Baldy, Hill 54 and Hill 69. At LZ Bayonet, the sappers were split in 3 groups of 2 men each and penetrated the perimeter during the mortar attack. At Hill 69 an estimated 6 VC infiltrated before the mortar attack was initiated. At Hill 54 an estimated 15-20 VC infiltrated the perimeter from the SE but were halted by claymore mines and flares which forced the enemy

to evade in a SW direction. Friendly casualities were 1 US KHA and 22 US WHA.

(j) On 17 and 18 Nov 68, vic BT 111 381, BT 131 384, and BT 115 394, A/2-1 Inf found and evacuated a total of 13,000 lbs of rice in and around huts in the area.

(k) From 19 to 27 Nov 68, within a 1 km radius of AT 860 290 4-31st Inf engaged an estimated enemy Regiment which fought from well fortified positions. Airstrikes, artillery and small arms fire accounted for 54 NVA/VC KIA. Documents captured during this engagement identified the units in contact as elements of the 1st MT Regt, 2d NVA Division. A PW captured during this encounter stated that he worked in a hospital in the area and that 113 American PWs had been treated at the hospital over an unknown period of time.

(l) On 19 Nov 68, vic BT 121 408 and BT 131 396, A/2-1 Inf found and evacuated 14,500 lbs of rice hidden inhedgerows and huts in the area. On the same day, vic BT 014 354, C/2-1 Inf found and evacuated another 4,000 lbs of rice.

(m) On 20 Nov 68, vic AT 856 289, A/4-31st Inf received heavy .30 caliber and AK-47 fire from an unknown size enemy force which resulted in 4 US KHA and 8 WHA. A/4-31 Inf engaged the enemy force with small arms fire and machinegun fire and then pulled back as airstrikes were employed with unknown results. A sweep of the area on the following day revealed 20 NVA KIA by the airstrikes.

(n) On 24 Nov 68, vic BT 081 480, B/1-46th Inf found and evacuated 12,000 lbs of rice buried in large vats. On the same day, vic AT 955 299, C/2-1 Inf found and evacuated 4,000 lbs of rice.

(o) On 1 Dec 68, vic BT 144 244, B/3-21 Inf contacted an unknown enemy unit estimated at 150 NVA. The unit received heavy sniper fire from AK-47's and heavy machinegun fire. Gunships were called in and D/3-21 Inf made a combat assault into the area of contact. Airstrikes and artillery were employed in the area with unknown results. Ordnance, miscellaneous equipment, medical supplies and documents, were found in a base camp large enough for 400 people with 15 huts and fighting positions destroyed and 5 huts intact. Civilians in the area said there were 150 VC/NVA in the unit.

(p) At 150600 hrs Dec 68, elements of the 196th LIB initiated Operation Fayette Canyon.

(q) On 18 Dec 68, vic AT 971 411, B/2-1 Inf engaged an unknown

number of NVA with artillery and airstrikes. At 1605 hrs B/2-1 Inf engaged 3 more NVA resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 rifle captured. At 1750 hrs B Company found 58 NVA KIA, 8 of whom were in fresh graves vicinity AT 970-405. Total results of this contact were 3 US WIA 61 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

(r) On 19 Dec 68, vic AT 971 411, B/2-1 Inf returned to the place of the 18 Dec 68 contact and found an additional 9 NVA bodies who were killed by small arms fire. C/2-1 Inf vic AT 956 385 at 1200 hrs found a total of 11 NVA bodies in graves. Two thousands lbs of rice were found in the same area in a small cave. A/26 Engr found 20 NVA killed by artillery along with one crew served and two individual weapons and miscellaneous equipment. PW's and documents captured in the locations of the contact identified the unit engaged as the 1st MP Regt, 2d NVA Division.

(s) On 19 Dec 68, vic AT 990 436, C/1-46 Inf found a VC/NVA training center with 58 foxhole-type sleeping positions, 32 bunker type sleeping positions and 31 new huts. Several 15' by 15' clearedareas were found under triple canopy jungle. Also found in the area were several trails, 2 meters wide showing heavy and recent use, 2 silhouettetargets, ammunition and other miscellaneous pieces of equipment. Fresh cooked rice evidenced that the area was used early in the morning of 19 Dec 68.

(t) On 19 Dec 68, vic AT 964 385, B/2-1 Inf found a base camp hospital complete with a surgical ward, recovery ward, and five mess halls. Also found were 50 graves containing decomposed bodies. B/2-1 had found vic AT 964 385 on the same day, 80 to 90 NVA bunkers. The area had taken heavy hits from airstrikes which resulted in 5 to 10 bunkers destroyed. Sixty bunkers were destroyed that day and the remainder were destroyed the next morning.

(u) On 20 Dec 68, vic AT 957 385, C/2-1 Inf found a base camp consisting of 50 to 75 bunkers, in addition to the 100 found on 19 Dec 68. Later the same day, 125 more bunkers were found making a total of 200. A large quanity of miscellaneous equipment was found including 1 AK-47, one case of 7.62mm ammunition, documents and HE rounds along with 1 NVA KIA by artillery.

(v) On 3 Jan 69 vic BT 345 312, and BT 335 315, a total of 150 villagers rallied to the 1st CAG Psychological Operations. The VC attempted to ambush the ralliers but were unsuccessful and suffered one VC KIA. The ralliers stated that several VC units moved in to the area and were taking all their food.

(w) On 4 Jan 69, A/3-21 Inf, vic BT 108 327 found and evacuated 1,200 lbs of rice located under the floors of several huts. This

same unit, vic BT 081 304, found and destroyed 4,000 lbs of rice the same day.

(x) From 5-11 Jan 69, LF Professional received a total of 39-49 rounds of 60mm and M1/M2 mortar fire. On 11 Jan 69, five US personnel were wounded by one satchel charge.

(y) On 13 Jan 69, vic BT 152 272, B/3-21 Inf found and evacuated 20,000 lbs of rice located in bins within two huts.

(z) On 14 Jan 69, LZ Professional, vic BT 172 078 received 46 rounds of mixed 60mm and M1/M2 mortar and RPG fire. B/1-52 Inf detected an unknown number of VC near the wire on the west side of the perimeter. The VC were engaged and suffered 7 KIA, thirteen chicom handgrenades were later CIA.

(a.a) On 15 Jan 69, vic BT 149 275, B/3-21 Inf found 1,200 lbs of rice. Three tons of the rice were evacuated, along with miscellaneous documents. The remaining rice was damaged by moisture and was destroyed.

(2) Quang Ngai: Enemy contact was generally light and scattered as MF/NVA units avoided allied operations and LF units continued their harassing activities. An exception to this occurred on 17 Nov 68 when a well-coordinated series of attacks was conducted by LF units on LZ's, outposts, refugee camps, district headquarters, and Quang Ngai Province Headquarters and an ambush on an allied reaction force. This attempt failed as enemy maneuvers elements did not reach their objectives. Contact with elements of the 22d NVA Regt occurred again near LZ Buff on 20-25 Jan 69. Numerous reports of a Winter/Spring Offensive were received indicating widespread attacks by LF, MF, and NVA units. Although no definite timetable for initiation of this offensive has been determined, an often mentioned time for the attacks has been in the period prior to TET (17 Feb 69).

(a) On 6 Nov 68 vic BS 775 860, a Navy Swift Boat received fire from a weapon identified as a 75mm recoilless rifle. The boat was heavily damaged and 1 KHA, 1 WHA resulted. This marked the first employment of this weapon in the vicinity of Batangan Cape. The 48th LF Bn, operating in this area was not known to possess this weapon.

(b) On 17 Nov 68, LZ Dottie, LZ Dragon, LZ Snoopy, Binh Son District Headquarters, Quang Ngai City and airfield and Minh Long USSF/CIDG Camp received well-coordinated mortar fire. LZ Snoopy received a ground attack which was repelled. Binh Son District Headquarters, Nui Dep Outpost, Quan Lac Hamlet and the Refugee Camp at Pho Lac were also subjected to ground attacks. 103 VC KIA and 19 individual weapons captured, as well

as 4-crew served weapons captured resulted from these attacks. The local force companies identified as participating in the attacks were the 95th LF Sapper Co, the P-31 LF Co, and K-51 Weapons Co, an unconfirmed unit. Units involved in the attack on Binh Son District Headquarters were C-19 LF Co and B-45 Sapper Platoon (possible unit) at Quan Lac Hamlet, the 21st LF Sapper Co and elements of 506A LF Sapper Co at Nui Dep Outpost, and C-219 LF Co at Pho Lac Refugee Camp.

(c) On 23 Nov 68 vic BS 705 610, B-39th Engineers reported receiving CS gas within their perimeter along with 20 rounds of unknown caliber mortar fire.

(d) On 3 Dec 68, vic BS 343 604, D/1-20 Inf found a large cache which contained 3,000 lbs of rice, 21 RPG rounds, 171 B-40 rockets, 211 82mm mortar rounds, 3,200 AK-47 rounds, and miscellaneous uniforms and documents.

(e) On 6 Dec 68, vic BS 635 389, D/4-21 Inf found an ammunitions cache containing 180 rounds of 60mm mortar, 62 rounds of 82mm mortar, 46 rounds of 57mm RR, and approximately 36,00 rounds of small arms ammunition.

(f) On 6 Dec 68, vic BS 449 611, LZ Cork received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire with negative results.

(g) On 3 Jan 69, vic BS 847 312, C/4-3 Inf found a rice cache totalling 24,000 lbs buried under a hut.

(h) On 13 Jan 69, vic Batangan Peninsula, Operation Russell Beach/ Bold Mariner, a multi-battalion operation involving American, ARVN and Marine Forces was initated. The operation was initiated to locate and destroy the 38th and 48th LF Battalion and VCI on the Peninsula.

(i) On 19 Jan 69, vic BS 449 611 LZ Cork received 35-40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and a ground attack by an estimated 2-3 Sapper Squads. Results were 3 US KHA, 14 US WHA and several structures destroyed during the attack.

(j) On 20 Jan 69, vic BS 741 821, C/5-46 Inf found and evacuated 24,00 lbs of rice in a cache.

(k) On 20-25 Jan 69, vic BS 526 796 and BS 570 807, RAC/3-1 Inf, A,B,&C/4-21 Inf, B/1-1 Cav, F-8 Cav engaged in a series of contacts in which artillery and gunships were employed, resulting in 45 VC/NVA KIA.

(l) From 2 Nov 68 to 26 Jan 69, vic Vernon Lake II AO, operations disclosed 56 rice caches, totalling approximately 36 tons. A total of

132 base camps were discovered of which 94 were company-size or larger.

(m) As of 31 Jan 69, total results for Operation Bold Mariner/ Russell Beach were as follows: 137 VC KIA, 218 VCI captured, 56 PW's captured, 10.3 tons of rice captured, 15.5 tons of salt captured, and 11,257 detainees held at the Combined Holding and Interrogation Center.

2. (C) Military Intelligence Detachment:

(1) General: With the departure of Major Raymond E. Zickel on 25 November 1968, Major Thomas J. Kelley assumed command of the Americal MI Detachment and remained in that capacity throughout the period. Captain Joseph A. Binelli, Executive Officer, Captain Joseph C. Liberti, Chief, CI Section, Captain David A. Hartman, Chief, Imagery Interpretation Section, Captain Jack W. Wolfe, Chief, Interrogation Section and Captain Donald L. Sparaco, Chief, Order of Battle Section provided valuable continuity during the critical consolidation/reorganization of the unit. On Dec 68, Master Sergeant Stephen Sathmary was assigned as the Detachment 1st Sergeant.

b. Organization:

(1) During the reporting period a major reorganization and consolidation of military intelligence resources took place. Americal Division General Order #064, dated 15 November 1968, authorized the consolidation of the 52d, 635th, 569th and 636th Military Intelligence Detachment into the Americal Intelligence Detachment (Provisional). This provisional detachment was organized in accordance with a USARV MTOE which standardized all divisional MID's in Vietnam and prescribes a manning level of 96 intelligence specialists and support personnel. The Detachment Headquarters and four operational sections (CI, II, OB and IPW) are located at Division Headquarters, providing intelligence support to not only the Commanding General and ACofS, G2, but also to the three Infantry Brigades and the Division Cavalry Squadron. Additionally, 10 to 12 men MI Teams (MIT), consisting of CI, IPW, and OB specialists, are attached to each brigade. These MIT's are under the operational control of the Brigade S2 and are immediately responsive to the the Brigade Commander's needs. MIT's are frequently augmented with personnel from the Division detachment to insure complete intelligence coverage of specific operations or peak work load periods. The Division Detachment also provides, on a full time basis, one IPW Specialist to the 1-1 Cav, one CI agent to LZ Dottie and an intelligence Liaison Officer to the numerous US/GVN agencies in Quang Ngai City.

(2) Consolidation and reorganization has resulted in centralized control of intelligence assets thus insuring fully coordinated intelligence

coverage of the entire division areas of operations and interest. The responsiveness to the individual commander's intelligence needs remains high. Augmentation of MI specialists to meet special operations or unexpected work loads at Brigade level is readily accomplished by shifting personnel resources. Using the Detachment's extensive intelligence files, more timely information is provided to all elements of the division.

c. Order of Battle Section: The Order of Battle Section continued to produce timely intelligence concerning the enemy situation in the Southern ICTZ. During the reporting period this section received a 71% increase in personnel. This increase has enabled the section to extend its detailed knowledge about enemy trends, units and probable courses of action. The section has been divided into Province Teams, each headed by an officer. This permits in depth coverage of specific geographic areas and the enemy forces working within these areas. Significant events of the Order of Battle Section are as follows:

(1) A program was implemented to have the order of battle factors incorporated into unit folders. This enables a quick reference in determining the composition, disposition, strength, training, tactics, logistics, combat efficiency and miscellaneous data on any unit operating within the Americal Division AO. This program should be completed prior to the next reporting period.

(2) A program was implemented to reduce the time factor in the preparation of area studies. An all source study will be prepared for each map sheet (1/50,000) covering the Division Area of Operation. Each study will be updated weekly with all information received concerning enemy activity in the area. This will facilitate identification of increased enemy activity and assist in the rapid exploitation of likely targets. The system is designed to insure the timely flow of intelligence without undue preparation time.

(3) Liaison visits with intelligence specialists in the field has produced a better understanding of the field unit needs with regard to intelligence and has again produced a greater dissemination.

d. Imagery Interpretation Section: The II section went through a large expansion program during the reporting period. The consolidation of all the Bde MID's gave the section new equipment which increased our capability and performance. New light tables and some 70 stereoscopes were received giving the section the capability of reading out duplicate positive imagery. An ES-38B Photo Lab was received giving the II Section its own processing and printing lab to support the proposed cameras for the 21st RAC. The month of December was the heaviest month for photography in the last six. 89 photo missions were read out and 35 mosaics were made. The following projects were started and are now complete or being continued:

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(1) Golden Valley project was updated and delivered.

(2) Project Duffel Bag Man and terrain study was completed.

(3) A photo data base was started on 1 Dec and will continually be updated.

(4) A trail study was started 1 Dec and will continually be updated.

(5) A debriefing program under the supervision of the G2 Air was started.

(6) A hand held photo program was organized.

(7) An aerial observer training program was started.

e. Counterintelligence Section: Significant events of the Counter-intelligence (CI) Section for the period ending 31 January 69.

(1) The CI Section received seven new personnel enabling an increase in CI support furnished to the American Division.

(2) Division Blacklist files are maintained by a CI Coordinator, a political CB specialist and ARVN NCO under the supervision of a Senior Agent. Individual Blacklists of the Division PI Field Teams were consolidated into a master file thus increasing the amount, accuracy, and flexibility of the CI Blacklist material. Hence, requesting units receive information of a much more factual and complete nature in considerably less time than was previously possible. During the last three months the section has turned out over two hundred and fifty case lists of VCI personalities. In addition to the communication and exchange of Blacklist information between the section and the MID teams, the section continues to maintain a working liaison and exchange of information with the various Province/District level Interrogation Centers, Phoenix Coordinators, National Police Representatives and DIOCCS.

(3) A "Walk In" Informant Office was opened in November inside the Chu Lai main gate. This enables volunteer sources to provide information with a reduced chance of compromise to the informant. It has grown more successful as the number of volunteer sources increases. It also allows the CI Section to maintain greater liaison with the Military Security Service (MSS) and the Industrial Relations Office (IRO) located near the main gate.

(4) The CI Section has given direct support to the division on Operation Daring Endeavor, conducted in November, and Operation Russell

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Beach with its Marine counterpart, Bold Mariner, a joint operation which is currently in progress. On Operation Russell Beach/Bold Mariner CI personnel from Division and from MI Team #3 are deployed with the forward tactical elements making up the cordon and with the Combined Handling and Interrogation Center (CHIC). These personnel are used primarily to exploit information furnished by Hoi Chanhs, PW's, and detainees concerning VCI and other CI targets and to conduct close liaison with the GVN Agencies involved in the operation.

(5) The following Counterintelligence activities were performed:

Validations:	171
Local Agencies Checks:	853
National Agency Check:	69
United States Army Investigative Records Repository:	165
Fingerprint Cards:	23
Security Clearance Rosters:	7
Subject Interviews:	2
Source Meetings:	359
Intelligence Reports:	291
Source Training:	35 hours
Inspections:	
(a) CI Inspections (Announced)	14
(b) Courtesy Inspections	18
Lead Sheets:	15
Agent Reports:	77
201 File Checks:	158
Access Suspensions:	10
Miscellaneous Investigations:	119
Technical Assistance:	34

(6) The CI Section, in an effort to increase the general security posture of the Americal Division, has revised the Installation Security Program.

(7) The number of indigenous employees on Chu Lai Base has increased to a point near the 6,000 mark. In an effort to control these people the CI Section is revising their indigenous employee files. IRO and units employing Vietnamese personnel have helped to record identification and place of employment of all permanent hire Vietnamese Nationals. An on-base informant program was established in late November 1968, geared primarily to detect VC infiltration into the permanent hire program.

(8) Progress made in the Kit Carson Scout Program has been primarily administrative. A distinctive Americal Division Kit Carson Scout Identification Card has been obtained. Arrangements have also been made to obtain "Dog Tags" for Scout Personnel. These two items are designed to assist in identifying KCS personnel during Medical Evacuation and during any encounter in which their identity and relationship with the Americal Division is in question. A permanent record system has been instituted including personnel files, a fully cross-indexed card file containing immediately available information pertaining to current status of each Scout, and a locator file. The changeover of personnel and payroll handling from the CTO, Qui Nhon to the IRO, Chu Lai has been completed and promises to increase handling efficiency. During the period, 16 new scouts were hired, 1 was killed in hostile action and 9 were terminated. Considerable study has been devoted to the overall operation of the program, including administration, personnel, goals, and training as well as needed guidance for the using units. The results of this study will take the form of recommendations for the overall improvement and expansion of the program. Of primary importance is the securing of adequate training facilities and billeting spaces to insure an effective and continuing flow of Scout personnel to the tactical units.

(9) The Volunteer Informant Program (VIP) has continued to expand to unforeseen heights and remains the largest program country-wide. Average expenditures were in excess of 1,000,000 $VN ($8,474.58) monthly. The program has continued to be principally one of ordnance collection of mostly US manufacture. Efforts to induce the population to report information of intelligence interest (ex., location and movement of VC/NVA troops) have remained unsuccessful. Efforts are being made to determine the origin of US ordnance collected which has not been fired and is in new condition.

f. Interrogation Section:

(1) During the reporting period, 1,976 detainees were screened, interrogated and classified by the Interrogation Section and its field teams located at the Collecting Points of the 11th Bde, 196th Bde, 198th Bde, the Divison Cavalry Squadron, the Americal Division, and also at the 27th Surgical Hospital and the 312th Evacuation Hospital. The following is a listing of detainees by classification processed during the reporting period.

(a) PW/NVA 27

(b) PW/VC 37

(c) Civil Defendants 438

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(d)	Returnees	16
(e)	Regroupees	0
(f)	Doubtful Cases	0
(g)	Innocent Civilians	1458

The above figures represent an increase of 28 prisoners of war over the last reporting period.

(2) The consolidation of MI resources established one Interrogation Section at Division with subordinate Interrogation Teams attached to each of the three brigades and to the Division Cavalry Squadron. With the central control element there is now a unification of efforts and closer coordination in the screening, interrogation and classification of detainees and the screening and translation of captured documents. This has resulted in more thorough and more complete interrogations and translations and more expeditious reporting of information obtained at all levels.

(3) The division element of the Interrogation Section continued to send teams to the Combined Interrogation Center, Quang Ngai City, to obtain tactical information of value to the division from detainees in ARVN custody.

(a) On 22 Nov 68, an interrogation team was sent to Quang Ngai City to interrogate Nguyen Phong and Nguyen Tin. Both detainees were classified PW/VC. Nguyen Phong, from the 95th Local Force Sapper Co, stated that the 95th Sapper Company has a strength of approximately 50 men, divided into three infantry platoons and one heavy weapons platoon. They are armed with 3xRPG's, 3xBAR's, 1xM60, and an unknown number of AK-47's CKC's, and M16's. Nguyen Tin, from the 31st Local Force Company, stated that the 31st Company has a strength of approximately 48 men, divided into three infantry platoons. They are armed with 3xBAR's, 15xCKC's, 6xCarbines, and 6xAK-47's. (Reference: Americal Report Number AMER-537-68).

(b) On 23-25 Dec 68, one interrogation team was sent to Quang Ngai City to interrogate Nguyen Quong. Source was a member of the 1st Bn, 2d Regt, 3d NVA Div. He could only furnish information on the 2d Co of the 1st Bn because he had been with the unit only about two weeks. The 2d Co had an approximate strength of 50 men armed with 1x82mm mortar, 2xRPG's, 9xRPG's, and 47xAK-47's.

(c) On 4-5 Jan 69, one interrogation team was sent to Quang Ngai City to interrogate Ho Duc Bui, an NVA Warrant Officer/Returnee. Source

was a platoon leader with the 3d Co, 8th Bn, 3d Regt, 2d NVA Div. The 8th Bn is composed of three infantry companies and one heavy weapons company. The 3d Co, an infantry company, was armed with 2xBAR's, 2x30 cal machine guns, 2xB40's, and numerous AK-47's and CKC's. The 4th Company, the heavy weapons company, had 2x50 cal machineguns, 4x82mm mortars, 4x57mm recoilless rifles, and 4xB41's. There were approximately 60 men in each company of the 8th Bn. Source estimated the strength of the 3d Regt. to be approximately 1,000.

(4) On 8 Jan 69, a returnee (Hoi Chanh) led an interrogation team from Interrogation Team #1, 11th Bde, and an infantry company from the 11th Bde to a rice cache vic BS755455. The cache contained approximately 750 lbs of rice.

(5) On two separate occasions Interrogation Team #2, 196th Bde, had detainees lead friendly forces to caches:

(a) On 20 Dec 68, a returnee led an interrogation team and elements of the 2-21st Inf, 196th Bde, to a weapons cache containing 2xrifles, many rocket and mortar rounds, and miscellaneous small arms ammunition.

(b) On 20 Dec 68, a returnee led an interrogation team and elements of the 2-1st Inf, 196th Bde, to a 500 lb rice cache.

(6) On 13 Jan 69, the Interrogation Section dispatched one officer and three interrogation teams from Interrogation Team #3, 196th Bde, and four interrogators and three interpretors from the division section in support of Operation Russell Beach. Four of these teams were further dispatched in support of the two US Army battalions on the operation and three of the teams were employed at the Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC) to screen and interrogate refugees and detainees for tactical information in support of the operation. .

(7) The Division Interrogation Section screened, provided summaries of, and forwarded to the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) in Saigon approximately 26,500 pages of captured enemy documents.

(8) Eighty-seven captured weapons were screened for intelligence purposes and were registered as war trophies.

(9) The Interrogation Section continues to coordinate with the Quang Ngai Combined Interrogation Center, the Tam Ky District S2 Advisor and Chieu Hoi Center, and III MAF to insure the fastest possible dissemination of intelligence obtained through the interrogation of Prisoners of War and Returnees.

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D. (C) Plans, Operations, Training and Organization

1.(U) G3 Section

a. General

(1) The Americal Division continued offensive operations in the Americal AO during the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969. Contact varied from light and sporadic to moderate/heavy engagements. Four named operations were initiated during the reporting period: Operations Vernon Lake II, Hardin Falls, Fayette Canyon and Russell Beach. Operations Wheeler/Wallowa, Vernon Lake I and Burlington Trail were terminated during the reporting period. The Oregon AO was established from the former Burlington Trail and Wheeler/Wallowa AO's.

(2) On 19 November 68 MAJ Dale E. Davis (Deputy G-3) departed the command.

(3) On 26 November MAJ Fred H. Mourey, Jr. assumed the duties of Asst G-3, DOT from MAJ Paul J. Goldman.

(4) On 1 December 68 LTC Richard D. Lawrence assumed the duties of ACofS, G-3 from MAJ Colin L. Powell, who became Deputy G-3.

(5) On 12 December 68 MAJ Douglas M. Craver assumed the duties of Asst G-3, Operations from MAJ Wade E. Medbery.

(6) On 3 January 69 MAJ Charles M. Banister was assigned the duties of Asst Project Officer for ROAD Reorganization.

(7) On 27 January 69 MAJ Jerry A. White assumed the duties of Asst G-3 Air from MAJ Roger B. Olson.

b. Organization: The buildup of the Americal Division was completed during the reporting period. Plans were initiated for the reorganization of the division under the ROAD concept. At the end of the reporting period the division was awaiting the necessary General Orders implementing the reorganization, and individual units were completing their plans for the reorganization. The following organizational actions were completed during the reporting period:

(1) USARV General Order 5076, 1 November 68, amended USARV GO 3953 pertaining to Troop D, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry as reads: Special instructions: Attached for all purposes less transfer, promotion and requisitioning of personnel which remains with parent unit is amended to

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read: Special instructions: Attached for all purposes to include transfer, promotion and requisitioning of personnel.

(2) Americal General Order 8604, 11 November 68, organized the United States Army Military Intelligence Detachment (Provisional) effective 15 Nov 68 with an authorized strength of 18 OFF, 5 WO, 73 EM, and 96 AOG from the resources of 52d MID, 569th MID, 635th MID and 636th MID. The mission is to perform specialized intelligence and counterintelligence functions which require the employment of special skills or the utilization of foreign languages in support of the division. Paragraph two of GO 8604 attached the USAMID (PROV) to the 23d Infantry Division (Americal) Support Command for administration of military justice. Paragraph three of GO 8604 attached the USAMID (PROV) to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 23d Infantry Division (Americal) for rations and normal second echelon maintenance. The USAMID (PROV) is under the OPCON of the ACofS, G-2.

(3) USARPAC General Order 771, 22 November 68, inactivated the following units, effective 25 November 68:

(a) 94th Signal Detachment

(b) 452d Signal Detachment

(c) 454th Signal Detachment

(d) 16th Transportation Detachment

(e) 151st Transportation Detachment

(f) 400th Transportation Detachment

(g) 409th Transportation Detachment

(h) 411th Transportation Detachment

Paragraph two of GO 771 reorganized the listed units under the following MTOE:

(a) MTOE 01-2560 PAC 1/68:

1. 132d Avn Co

2. 178th Avn Co

(b) MTOE 01-770 PAC 2/68:

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1. 71st Avn Co

2. 174th Avn Co

3. 176th Avn Co

(e) MTOE 01-256G PAC 1/68: HHD, 14th Avn Bn

(4) USARPAC General Order 775, 22 November 68 reorganized the listed units under the following MTOE:

(a) MTOE 5-156G PAC 1/68: HHC, 26th Engr Bn

(b) MTOE 5-157G PAC 1/68:

1. Co A, 26th Engr Bn

2. Co B, 26th Engr Bn

3. Co C, 26th Engr Bn

4. Co D, 26th Engr Bn

(c) MTOE 5-148G PAC 1/68: Co E, 26th Engr Bn

(d) MTOE 6-302G PAC 1/68: HHB, 23d Inf Div Arty

(e) MTOE 7-4G PAC 1/68: HHC, 23d Inf Div

(f) MTOE 12-37G PAC 1/68: 23d Admin Co

(5) USARV General Order 5498, 30 November 1968, attached the following units to the Americal Division for all purposes to include promotion, transfer and requisition of personnel:

(a) Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 16th Aviation Group

(b) Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 14th Aviation Battalion

(c) 71st Aviation Company

(d) 174th Aviation Company

(e) 176th Aviation Company

(f) 132d Aviation Company

(g) 178th Aviation Company

(h) 14th Security Platoon

(i) 534th Medical Detachment

(j) 756th Medical Detachment

(k) 94th Signal Detachment

(l) 452d Signal Detachment

(m) 454th Signal Detachment

(n) 151st Transportation Detachment

(o) 409th Transportation Detachment

(p) 411th Transportation Detachment

(q) 16th Transportation Detachment

(r) 400th Transportation Detachment

(s) 335th Transportation Company

(6) Americal General Order 9432, 16 December 68, attached the following units to the 16th Combat Aviation Group for all purposes:

(a) Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 16th Aviation Group

(b) Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 14th Aviation Battalion

(c) 71st Aviation Company

(d) 174th Aviation Company

(e) 176th Aviation Company

(f) 132d Aviation Company

(g) 178th Aviation Company

(h) 534th Medical Detachment

(i) 756th Medical Detachment

(j) 94th Signal Detachment

(k) 452d Signal Detachment

(l) 454th Signal Detachment

(m) 151st Transportation Detachment

(n) 409th Transportation Detachment

(o) 411th Transportation Detachment

(p) 16th Transportation Detachment

(q) 400th Transportation Detachment

(r) 14th Security Platoon

(s) Headquarters, Headquarters Company, A Company, B Company, 123d Aviation Battalion

(t) 449th Signal Detachment

(u) 406th Transportation Detachment

(v) 335th Transportation Company

(7) American General Order 10, 1 January 69 attached the following units to the 123d Aviation Battalion for all purposes:

(a) 132d Aviation Company

(b) 178th Aviation Company

(8) USARV General Order 29, 2 January 69, amended USARV GO 5496 (1968 series) pertaining to attachment of aviation units to the 23d Infantry Division (American) as reads: Not Applicable, is amended to delete:

94th Signal Detachment
452d Signal Detachment
454th Signal Detachment
151st Transportation Detachment

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409th Transportation Detachment
411th Transportation Detachment
16th Transportation Detachment
400th Transportation Detachment

(9) Americal General Order 332, 14 January 69, amended Americal GO 9432 (1968 series) pertaining to attachment of aviation units to the 16th Combat Aviation Group as reads: Not Applicable, is amended to delete:

94th Signal Detachment
452d Signal Detachment
454th Signal Detachment
151st Transportation Detachment
409th Transportation Detachment
411th Transportation Detachment
16th Transportation Detachment
400th Transportation Detachment

c. Disposition and Movement:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period, Americal units were conducting combat operations as follows:

(a) 196th Inf Bde (Lt) with 2-1, 3-21, 4-31 and 4-21 Inf Bns conducted combat operations in the Wheeler/Wallowa AO.

(b) 198th Inf Bde (Lt) with 1-46, 1-52, 5-46, and 1-6 Inf Bns conducted combat operations in Operation Burlington Trail and the Chu Lai TAOR.

(c) The 11th Inf Bde (Lt) conducted operations in the Duc Pho AO with 3-1 Inf Bn and in the Vernon Lake I AO with 4-3 Inf and 1-20 Inf Bns.

(d) 1-1 Cav conducted operations in the Vernon Lake I AO and with the 2d ARVN Div near Quang Ngai.

(2) Major movements of units during the reporting period were as follows:

(a) Trps A, B, C/1-1 Cav concluded operations on 1 Nov 68 with 2d ARVN Div vic Quang Ngai and returned to conduct operations in the Burlington Trail AO. A Trp moved to LZ Baldy OPCON to the 196th Bde (Lt).

(b) On 2 Nov 68, the 11th Inf Bde (Lt) was designated part of Task Force Cooksey and conducted operations in the Duc Pho AO and initiated operations in the Vernon Lake II AO.

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(c) On 9 Nov 68 C/2-1 Inf airmoved to Hawk Hill and became OPCON to 1-1 Cav for cordon and search operations in the Burlington Trail AO.

(d) On 10 Nov 68 4-21 Inf Bn airmoved from LZ Baldy to the Duc Pho AO returning to the 11th Inf Bde (Lt). 1-46 Inf Bn airmoved from Duc Pho to LZ Baldy and conducted operations in the Wheeler/Wallowa AO OPCON to the 196th Inf Bde (Lt).

(e) On 10 November 1968, Trps B, C/1-1 Cav moved to vic BT 2343 and BT 2244 to support USMC Operation Daring Endeavor. On 17 November they terminated supporting operations and returned to Hawk Hill.

(f) On 14 Nov 68, 4-3 Inf Bn concluded operations in the Vernon Lake II AO and initiated combat operations in the Duc Pho AO.

(g) On 20 Nov 68, Co's A, B, and C/3-1 Inf combat air assaulted to vic Minh Long to conduct search operations in the Song Ve Valley in support of Operation Vernon Lake II. On 22 Nov 68 they returned to the Duc Pho AO.

(h) On 7 Dec 68, TF Cooksey, which had been created on 2 Nov 68, was dissolved and its elements returned to the 11th Inf Bde (Lt).

(i) On 15 Dec 68, Operation Fayette Canyon was initiated with 2-1, 4-31 and 1-46 Inf Bns combat air assaulting to pre-planned locations in the Fayette Canyon AO. A Trp 1-1 Cav moved to LZ Baldy and became OPCON to 196th Inf Bde.

(j) On 17 Dec 68, 3-1 Inf airmoved to Vernon Lake II AO and occupied positions held by 1-20 Inf which returned to the Duc Pho AO.

(k) On 4 January 69, Co's A, B, C and D/1-46 Inf Bn moved from the Fayette Canyon AO to the Oregon AO to conduct combat operations.

(l) On 13 January 69, Operation Russell Beach was initiated by American Forces designated as Task Force Cooksey.

(m) On 6 Jan 69, A Trp, 1-1 Cav was relieved from OPCON to the 196th Inf Bde (Lt) and returned to 1-1 Cav, Hawk Hill.

(n) On 18 January 69, B and C Co's 4-21 Inf Bn airmoved to the Chu Lai TACR from Vernon Lake II and initiated combat operations vic LZ Buff targeting the 504th LF Sapper Company and 22d NVA Regt.

(o) On 20 Jan 69, B/1-1 Cav moved to the southern Chu Lai TACR becoming OPCON to 4-21 Inf. On 25 Jan 69, B/1-1 Cav was returned to the control of 1-1 Cav having completed operations in the Chu Lai TACR.

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(p) On 25 Jan 69, A Trp 1-1 Cav became OPCON to TF Cooksey and made an amphibious landing via White Beach (BT743863) to initiate combat operations in Operation Russell Beach.

d. Plans: The following plans, operation orders and frag orders were in effect or initiated during the reporting period:

(1) OPORD 9-68 (Special Pacification Offensive), 10-68 (Duffel Bag), 1-69 (Russell Beach-MD DUC), and 1-69A (Russell Beach-BATAXOAN) were published and implemented.

(2) OPLAN 2-68 (Trey), 3-68 (Non-Combatant Emergency Relocation/Evacuation), 4-68 (Natural Disaster Relief), 5-68 (Golden Valley) and 6-68 (Golden Valley Rehearsals) continued on a contingency basis. OPLAN 1-69 (Contamination of Enemy LOC's) was published and distributed 17 Jan 69.

(3) Frag Order #97-68, w/change 1, continues in effect. This order provides for intensified surveillance of a suspected NVA Division in southern DMZ. Frag Order #114-68 continues in effect, directing Division missions for the southern DMZ Winter Campaign.

(4) Numerous planning directives and frag orders have been issued that have a bearing on operations covered in paragraph 3 e.

e. Operations:

(1) The reporting period was characterized by light to moderate contact with some heavy initial contact reported in Operation Fayette Canyon. Mine and Booby trap incidents continued high, notably in the Operation Russell Beach area. The American Division initiated four named operations: Operations Vernon Lake II, Hardin Falls, Fayette Canyon and Russell Beach. During the reporting period, three named operations were terminated: Operation Vernon Lake I, Wheeler/Wallowa and Burlington Trail.

(2) Operations in the Chu Lai TAOR continued throughout the period with scattered light contact reported. Small unit patrols, ambushes along infiltration routes, and security operations along lines of communication characterized American operations designed to locate and eliminate enemy forces, enhance the security of friendly installations and ensure the safety of the local population. There were a total of four mortar and/or rocket attacks on the Chu Lai Base during the reporting period with occassional mortar/rocket attacks on friendly fire support bases, battalion bases, and GVN installations and outposts. Employment of patrols in the Chu Lai rocket belt and detailed search operations of Ky Hoa and K-3 islands were found to be successful techniques resulting in a decrease of attacks by fire on the airbase and the

city of An Tom. Results of operations in the Chu Lai TAOR for the period were as follows:

FRIEND	ENEMY
28 KIA	378 VC KIA (C)
224 WIA	47 NVA KIA (C)
	2 PW/VC
	38 IMC
	23 CSMC

(3) Operations in the Duc Pho AO continued throughout the period with light scattered contact reported as the enemy continued to avoid major engagements. Mine and booby trap incidents continued high. Intensive small unit patrols, ambushes, and search operations characterized American Division operations designed to support the APC and destroy VCLF units. Extensive use was made of short range reconnaissance patrols (SRKPG) to provide information on enemy movement, locate enemy staging areas, and ambush small enemy units. Results for operations in the Duc Pho AO during the reporting period was as follows:

FRIEND	ENEMY
23 KIA	443 VC KIA (C)
106 WIA	23 NVA KIA (C)
	2 PW/VC
	38 IMC
	2 CSMC

(4) The Oregon AO was created following the termination of Operations Wheeler/Wallowa and Burlington Trail, and encompasses the northern portion of the American AO in Quang Tin and Quang Nam provinces. Elements of two Infantry brigades, 1-1 Cav, and support elements operated throughout the AO targeting the 2d NVA Div, VCMF/VCLF units and VCI. During the reporting period, contact ranged from light to moderate with numerous instances of mine and booby trap installation; notably along major lines of communication. American units conducted saturation patrols, reconnaissance in force operations, and searches to locate and destroy troop concentrations and the VC infrastructure. Rice denial operations were concluded with approximately three million pounds being captured from the enemy and turned over to GVN officials for distribution to refugees. Results for operations in the Oregon AO were as follows:

FRIEND	ENEMY
18 KIA	1027 VC KIA (C)
222 WIA	213 NVA KIA (C)
	6 VC/PW
	6 PW/NVA

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	ENEMY
129	IMC
10	CSMC

(5) Operation Wheeler/Wallowa was terminated on 11 November 68 after having been in existence for one year. Designed to locate and destroy VC and NVA elements in Quang Tin and Quang Nam provinces, Operation Wheeler/Wallowa was successful in cutting enemy lines of communication, denying the enemy use of base areas and needed supply caches, and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy causing the replacement of experienced troops to be a problem. Contact during the final days of the operation was light with sporadic mining and booby trap incidents. Cumulative totals at the termination of the operation were as follows:

FRIEND	ENEMY
663 KIA	5994 VC KIA (C)
2550 WHA (E)	11 VC DISC
1049 WHA (M)	4014 NVA KIA (C)
24 MIA	1 NVA DISC
106 MDW	4949 DET
25 MIA	184 PW/VC
8378 Refugees	62 PW/NVA
	40 CH/VC
	8 CH/NVA
	589 CIV DEF
	4011 IN CIV
	1724 IMC
	329 CSMC

(6) Operation Burlington Trail was terminated on 11 Nov 68 and its area of operation included in the new Oregon AO. Operation Burlington Trail was conducted in Quang Tin province focusing on the 1st VCMF Regt and the 2d NVA Div operating in the Piedmont area north of Tam Ky. The operation was successful in preventing enemy forces from being able to mass and launch attacks on Tam Ky and it resulted in the destruction of the 1st VCMF Regiment as an effective fighting unit. During the eleven days of the current reporting period, contact with enemy units was light and sporadic. Cumulative totals for the operation are as follows:

FRIEND	ENEMY
129 KIA	726 VC KIA (C)
747 WHA (E)	13 VC DISC
238 WHA (M)	1187 NVA KIA (C)
33 MIA	17 NVA DISC
9 MDW	1264 DET

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FRIND	ENEMY
1 KIA	20 PW/VC
336 Refugees	14 PW/NVA
1 ARVN WHA (E)	10 CH/VC
	2 CH/NVA
	171 CIV DEF
	1044 IN CIV
	441 IMC
	104 CSMC

(7) Operation Vernon Lake I was terminated on 1 Nov 68. Conducted by elements of the 11th Inf Bde (LA), this operation targeted 3d NVA Div and 81st VCLF Bn elements in Quang Ngai Province via the Song Ve Valley and the Da Vach mountains. Operations were characterized by reconnaissance in force operations, ambushes, and cordon and searches to disrupt enemy base camps and sanctuaries, eliminate staging areas and training facilities, and to destroy the effectiveness of enemy units as fighting forces. Extensive use of B-52 strikes was made against suspected enemy troop concentrations and lines of communications. Contact remained at a relatively low level during the operation as the enemy tended to avoid contact. Cumulative totals for the operation were as follows:

FRIND	ENEMY
1 KIA	63 VC KIA (C)
4 WHA (E)	5 VC DISC
3 WHA (M)	11 NVA KIA (C)
	17 NVA DISC
	19 DET
	2 CIV DEF
	9 IN CIV
	23 IMC
	1 CSMC

(8) Operation Vernon Lake II was initiated on 2 November 1968 by elements of the 11th Inf Bde (LA). This operation is designed to locate and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Div operating in the Son Re/Song Ve Valley, and the Da Vach mountains. Initial contact in the operation was moderate with later contacts being light and sporadic. Intensive bombing strikes by B-52's have been utilized. The use of small unit patrols and search operations have denied the enemy use of base areas, caches, and has resulted in preventing the enemy from being able to launch offensive operations against Quang Ngai City and the populated coastal region. Totals for the reporting period are as follows:

FRIND	ENEMY
22 KIA	145 VC KIA (C)

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FRIND	ENEMY
96 WIA (E)	34 VC DISC
30 WIA (M)	111 NVA KIA (C)
	34 NVA DISC
	89 DET
	1 PW/VC
	6 PW/NVA
	1 CH/NVA
	8 CIV DET
	70 IN CIV
	129 IWC
	5 CSWC

(9) USMC Operation Daring Endeavor was initiated on 10 November 1968 by SLF B on Barrier Island to locate and destroy VCMF/VCLF troop concentrations, base areas, and to extend GVN control over the area. The Americal Division supported this operation utilizing Trps B and C/1-1 Cav which occupied blocking positions vic BT2343 and BT2244 with F Trp 8th Cav flying combat missions and aerial surveillance in support of the operation. Contact was light and sporadic with several instances of mines and booby traps. The Americal Division units terminated operations on 17 November 1968. Americal totals for the operation were:

FRIND	ENEMY
1 KIA	33 VC KIA (C)
15 WIA (E)	4 IWC
2 WIA (M)	1 CSWC

SLF Alpha initiated Operation Valiant Search in the northern Oregon AO on 15 December 1968 targeting VCMF/VCLF elements. Americal Division participated by providing gunship support to USMC elements. Americal Division assets were no longer required after 6 January 1969. Both operations were splendid examples of inter-service cooperation and coordination.

(10) Operation Mardin Falls was initiated on 2 December 68 by 1-1 Cav and GVN forces to find, fix and destroy elements of the V-15 and 78th Local Force companies vic BT 1944 and to conduct long term pacification operations to extend GVN control in the region. Contact with enemy forces has been light throughout the reporting period. Instances of harassing attacks by mortar and small arms fire have been sporadic during the period. Primary emphasis has been placed on security operations, psychological operations and refugee resettlement in support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. Cumulative totals for the period are as follows:

FRIND	ENEMY
1 KIA	63 VC KIA (C)

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FRIEND	ENEMY
12 WHA (E)	1 VC DISC
1 WHA (M)	17 DET
	2 CH/VC
	11 CIV DEF
	5 IN CIV
	2 IMC

(11) Operation Fayette Canyon was initiated on 15 December 1968 by elements of the 196th Inf Bde (Lt) to accelerate combat operations to the north and northeast of Antenna Valley and the Nui Lat Hang mountains to find, fix and destroy the 1st VCMF Regt of the 2d NVA Div. The operation consists of reconnaissance in force and search operations to disrupt enemy training and refitting operations, destroy base camps and capture caches. This Americal Division operation complements Operation Taylor Common being conducted by Task Force Yankee (1st Marine Division) against Base Area 112. Initial contact in the operation varied from moderate to heavy. On 18 December 68, H/2-1 Inf killed 61 NVA in a day-long contact. Extensive use of bombing attacks has been made with good results. 2-1 Inf Bn discovered a total of 63 NVA KIA on 19 December 1968. From late December to the present, contact has been light as the enemy has tended to avoid engagement. Cumulative totals for the reporting period are as follows:

FRIEND	ENEMY
2 KIA	71 VC KIA (C)
9 WHA (E)	5 VC DISC
4 WHA (M)	171 NVA KIA (C)
2 MSF KIA	65 NVA DISC
6 MSF WHA (E)	34 DET
	2 CH/VC
	1 CH/NVA
	4 PW/NVA
	7 CIV DEF
	44 IN CIV
	55 IMC
	14 CSMC

(12) Operation Russell Beach, in conjunction with USMC Operation Bold Mariner, was inaugurated on 13 Jan 1969 on the Batangan Peninsula. This operation has a three-fold mission: first, to neutralize and deny the enemy the Batangan Peninsula as a resupply point for elements infiltrating from the west; second, to locate and destroy the 38th and 48th VCLF Bns; and third, to pacify the area through the elimination of VCI and the extension of GVN control over the area. This operation has been characterized by cordon and search operations supported by 2d ARVN Div elements and psychological warfare units. Detained personnel have been screened and VCI

have been isolated. Tunnel complexes, staging areas, and arms and food caches have been located and destroyed. Incidences of mining and booby traps have been high while contact with enemy units have been relatively light. Results of the operation during the reporting period are as follows:

FRIND	ENEMY
16 KIA	84 VC KIA (C)
96 WHA (E)	3 VC DISC
5 WHA (M)	28 IWC
25 USMC KIA	5 CSWC
66 USMC WHA (E)	218 VCI
1 USMC WHA (M)	56 PW/VC
	32 CH/VC
	11,257 DET AT CHIC

f. Close Air Support:

(1) Total Close Air Support (CAS) and Combat Skyspot (CSS) Missions and Sorties: During the period 1 Nov 68 through 31 Jan 69 the Americal Division employed 1909 CAS and CSS missions utilizing 3256 aircraft sorties.

(2) CSS Missions: The division received 1581 requests from subordinate units for CSS/TPQ-10 or MSQ-77 radar controlled missions. The division passed 1063 mission requests to III MAF and 797 were subsequently approved for strikes. The USAF flew 52 missions utilizing 64 aircraft sorties, the USMC flew 574 missions utilizing 652 aircraft sorties in support of the division. Total CSS missions completed during the reporting period was 626 missions utilizing 716 sorties.

(3) Forward Air Controlled (FAC) CAS Missions: The division received 1773 requests for preplanned forward air controlled missions, of which 1744 were passed to III MAF and 845 were subsequently approved. The USAF flew 83 missions utilizing 166 aircraft sorties and the USMC flew 605 missions utilizing 1197 aircraft sorties in support of the division. The division received 595 immediate/divert missions utilizing 1177 aircraft sorties of which 467 sorties were flown by the USAF and 710 sorties by USMC. Total FAC missions for the period was 1283 missions utilizing 2540 aircraft sorties.

(4) ARC Light Strikes: 15 ARC Light Strikes were flown in support of the division during the reporting period.

(5) Ordnance Expended: Total ordnance expended by close air support

during the reporting period was 4503 tons of bombs, 486.7 tons of napalm and 7038 rockets. Additionally, 4,896 tons of bombs were dropped in support of the division during ARC Light Strikes.

(6) Damage Assessment: Forward air controllers made the following bomb damage assessment (BDA) during the reporting period: 1174 structures destroyed, 170 bunkers destroyed, 2810 meters of trench line opened or destroyed, 63 weapons positions and spider holes uncovered or destroyed, 3 sampans destroyed, 126 secondary explosions and secondary fires, 147 killed by air (KBA).

g. Training:

(1) The Americal Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all assigned and attached individuals, through the grades of O-3, in the division. During the reporting period 72 courses were completed and 6121 personnel completed training.

(2) 167 junior leaders completed the training conducted in the Americal Combat Leadership Course.

(3) 42 personnel completed the Unit Reconnaissance Course Training.

(4) The following training was presented to students of the Combat Leadership Course by personnel of the 2d ARVN Division:

(a) Structure of the RVN Government, Province level and below.

(b) Structure of the RVN Military Forces.

(5) The following training facilities were constructed at the Americal Combat Center during the reporting period:

(a) Gas Chamber.

(b) Classroom at the small arms range.

2.(U) Artillery- See Seperate CEEL for Division Artillery..

3.(C) Aviation.

a. General

(1) The 16th Combat Aviation Group (CAG) was detached from the 1st Aviation Brigade and attached to the Americal Division for all purposes on 1 December

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1968. The group headquarters moved from Da Nang to Chu Lai becoming operational on 15 December 1968. The commanding officer, 16th CAG is the Division Aviation Officer (DAO) and is responsible for planning, coordinating and supervising all division aviation activities, to include aircraft maintenance.

(2) Major elements of the 16th CAG are: the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion organized with three (3) Assault Helicopter Companies; the 123d Aviation Battalion with Company A (Airmobile), Company B, (Aero-Scouts) and two Assault Support Helicopter Companies (Medium Helicopter); and the 335th Transportation Company (Aircraft Direct Support). It is envisioned that the experience gained under this concept and organization, which is unique and differs from other ROAD infantry divisions can be used as a basis for future infantry division aviation organizations.

(3) The Americal Division Army Aviation Element (AEE) and Aviation Administrative Officer remained co-located with and under the general staff supervision of the ACofS, G3 but was realigned organizationally as a part of the 16th CAG S3 Section.

(4) The 16th CAG will submit a separate ORLL for the reporting period.

b. Aviation performance recapitulation for the reporting period:

(1) Mission data:

	Nov 68	Dec 68	Jan 69	Total
Hours Flown	14587	14358	14346	43291
Sorties	54812	55965	70858	181635
Med Evac	56	47	69	172
Tons Cargo	13946	14390	16143	296190

(2) Ordnance Expended:

	Nov 68	Dec 68	Jan 69	Total
7.62	1284255	1878795	1594436	4757486
40mm	17631	18918	15401	51950
2.75 FFAR	8928	9255	9085	27268

(3) Combat Losses:

	Nov 68	Dec 68	Jan 69	Total
Aircraft Hits	60	37	68	165
Aircraft Shot Down	1	6	5	12

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	Nov 68	Dec 68	Jan 69	Total
KIA	5	1	2	8
WIA	11	13	15	39

4. (C) Chemical

a. In November 1968 the Division Chemical Section initiated a new technique for employing E-158 CS Canisters in an effort to exploit targets in the Division AO where ground forces were not available to attack the targets. Targets furnished by the Division G-2 were confirmed with the Airborne Personnel Detector. The target area was then covered by E-158 CS Canisters dropped from a CH-47, under the control of a FAC, and finally engaged by air strikes, artillery and gunships. The technique has proven effective and quite responsive, giving the Division the capability of engaging enemy units without employment of ground forces. Since the initiation of this technique for employing CS, chemical section personnel have conducted or participated in five E-158 drops.

b. At the end of December 1968, the Division Chemical Section began conducting Airborne Personnel Detector missions in an effort to reduce the reaction time in meeting requirements, within the Division AO. While the Brigade Chemical Detachments have had this capability for some time, establishing the capability at Division has decreased the reaction time for these requirements.

c. On 24 January 1969, The Division Chemical Section demonstrated and gave instruction on the construction of flame fougasse to CLDC. Emplacement of these field expedients around the CLDC perimeter will greatly strengthen the CLDC defensive capability. These expedients consist of 55 gallon drums filled with thickened fuel, using a WP grenade for ignition, and are command detonated. The main problem in construction is mixing enough thickened fuel; however, the Division is programmed to receive four tracked service units this quarter. Each unit is capable of mixing and delivering large quantities of thickened fuel which should solve this problem.

d. Herbicide operations have continued to expand in scope. The division has some difficulty in obtaining approval for the use of herbicides from the Quang Tin Province Chief. Personnel of the Division Chemical Section defoliated much of the CLDC perimeter in November, and are presently engaged in completing the coverage. In January 1969 the Chemical Section defoliated the perimeters of the 3-16 Arty and the 3-18 Arty on Artillery Hill.

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e. The Division Chemical Section is presently working with the 16th CAG to bring the Division's helicopter-mounted smoke generator capability to an operational status. This will provide the division with a quick reaction smoke capability.

f. Presently the Division Chemical Section is preparing for extensive use of bulk CS1 and CS2 to contaminate enemy LOC's and base areas, and to canalize enemy movements into killing zones within artillery range.

5. Engineer:

a. Activities for the reporting period consisted of a continuation of primary engineer effort in support of Americal Division maneuver elements and Lines of Communication (LOC). Supporting engineer units committed approximately 70% of total effort to LOC improvement.

(1) QL-1 continues to receive priority horizontal emphasis in the Americal AO, with four engineer battalions committed to the road.

(a) 19th Engr (Cbt): II/I Corps boundary to BS 740525.

(b) 39th Engr Bn (Cbt) augmented by 630th Engr Co (LE) and 511th Engr Co (Panel Bridge), minus 1 bridge platoon: (GS Americal Division) BS 740525 to BT 520044 (Chu Lai main gate).

(c) 9th Engr Bn (USMC): BT 520044 to northern boundary of Americal AO.

(d) 104th Engr Bn (ARVN): Supports LOC improvement work by 9th and 39th Engr Bn's.

(2) The 26th Engr Bn (Cbt) continued to devote approximately 85% of total effort to direct combat support of Americal Division maneuver elements.

b. Engineer operations in the AO consisted generally of the following:

(1) The 19th Engr Bn (Cbt) continued to devote maximum effort to mine-sweeping, upgrading, and maintaining QL-1 as defined in para 5a (1) (a) above. Three combat engineer line companies were committed to QL-1 in the Americal AO. This section of QL-1 assigned to the 19th Engr Bn is the worst basic section of road in the AO. Between BS 7352 and BS 7646, QL-1 sustained major damage during tropical storm "Hester" (11-20 Oct 68) and was not passable to convoy traffic until 16 Nov 68. A storm of lesser magnitude occurred 5-8 Jan 69 causing the same section of the road to be closed until 25 Jan 69. QL-1 is not paved in this section.

(2) The 39th Engr Bn (Cbt) used two combat engineer line companies to minesweep, upgrade, and maintain QL-1 on the section defined in para 5a (1) (b) above.

(a) On 18 Dec 68 the 511th Engr Co (Panel Bridge), minus one bridge platoon, was attached to the 39th Engr Bn to augment their haul capability. Primary equipment augmentation consisted of 80 ft DS Bailey Bridge and fourteen 5 ton dump trucks. The bridge was offloaded at LZ DOTTIE, and was therefore immediately available for deployment at BS 691646 (QL1-409). (See para 5c (2) (c). The unit is bivouacked at Chu Lai for the purpose of hauling rock on QL-1 south from the rock crusher at Chu Lai.

(b) On 25 Nov 68 the 639th Engr Co (LE), minus one line platoon, was attached to the 39th Engr Bn to further augment their horizontal construction capability. After staging in Chu Lai for a brief period, the unit was relocated to LZ DOTTIE for committment to QL-1. On 19 Jan 69, one platoon moved to LZ SNOOPY and the remainder of the company relocated to Quang Ngai.

(c) One combat engineer line company of the 39th Engr Bn remained committed to minesweep and maintenance of HL 535, and the HQ and one line company remained at Chu Lai.

(3) The 9th Engr Bn did not relocate company sized elements during the reporting period except for moving one line company to Da Nang on 20 Jan 69, to accomplish urgent vertical construction for III MAF.

(a) Their disposition within the AO at the end of the reporting period included the HQ Co, Service Co, and one line company in Chu Lai, and one line company each at LZ BALDY and Hill 10.

(b) QL-1 paving operations to the north of Chu Lai began 8 Dec 68. Paving has been accomplished from BT 480075 to BT 400146.

(c) Of significant note is that the 9th Engr Bn completed the longest (722 ft) Non-standard bridge in Marine Corps history at BT 102511 on 6 Jan 69.

(4) The 104th Engr Bn (ARVN) supported LOC improvement by committing effort on QL-1 near Tam Ky, and assisting US Engr units on various tasks. Approximately 4 km of HL 553 have been repaired and upgraded to limited all weather standard. Although the unit has become more active during the reporting period, overall effectiveness is considered marginal.

(5) 26th Engr Bn operations consisted primarily of combat support. The battalion also functioned as the Task Force Headquarters for movement of a heavy artillery Battery to Ira Bong. The TFC directed a combined arms team

of Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery and Engineers.

(a) Company A supported the 196th Inf Bde in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa until the operation was terminated on 11 Nov. Primary effort since that time has been in support of 196th Inf Bde operations in the Oregon AO, and to Operation Fayette Canyon. Operations consisted of minesweeping, constructing new fire support bases, reopening previously vacated fire support bases, and bunker and tunnel destruction. Minesweeping and essential road repair on HL 535 were continued throughout the reporting period.

(b) Company B continued to provide direct engineer support to the 198th Inf Bde. Operations supported were Burlington Trail and Russell Beach/Bold Mariner. The company provided the major force to the Bn Task Force on the Tra Bong operation. During the reporting period, Co B constructed and rehabilitated several fire support bases, destroyed tunnels and bunkers, and conducted several deliberate and hasty minesweeps in unsecured areas. B Co losses during the period included 9 KHA and 15 WHA.

(c) Company C continued to support the 11th Inf Bde on operations Vernon Lake I, Vernon Lake II, and the opening of the road to Minh Long CIDG camp for the movement of C Btry, 3-18th Arty to that location. Extensive effort was required to establish fire support bases in the rugged mountainous terrain of operation Vernon Lake II.

(d) Companies D and E provided general support to the Americal Division. Operation Hardin Falls, conducted by the 1st Bdn, 1st Cav has been supported by Co D throughout most of the reporting period. LOC interdiction, and the road openings to Minh Long and Tra Bong CIDG camps kept Co E heavily committed during the period.

e. LOC interdiction continued at a high rate. Incidents during the period are summarized below.

(1) Casualties/Damage by Mines and Major LOC Interdictions: See Chart 1.

(2) On 17 Nov 68, the VC attacked all major installations in the Americal AO. During these attacks, bridges received major damage as follows:

Bridge Number	Coordinate	Bridge Length	Damage
QL1-409	BS 691646	50 feet	North span completely destroyed.
QL1-422	BT 497067	90 feet	Blew one bent and two middle spans.

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Bridge Number	Coordinate	Bridge Length	Damage
QL1-423	BT 430109	150 feet	Blew one bent and three spans.

(a) Bridge QL1-423 was repaired by Co E, 26th Engr Bn initially by installing 150' of DD Panel Bridge. Repairs were completed by 19 Nov 68, to Class 32 caution. A float bridge, was then installed adjacent to the site to allow Class 60 loads to cross, and to provide a bypass so permanent repairs could be made to the damaged bridge. In late Dec 68, permanent repairs were completed on the fixed bridge, and Co E, 26th Engr Bn relocated the float bridge to An Tan (para 5e (2) (b).

(b) Bridge QL1-422 at An Tan was temporarily repaired on 17 Nov 68 by the 9th Engr Bn (USMC) using 90' M-6 panel bridge. Upon installation of the float bridge bypass by Co E, 26th Engr Bn, the 9th Engr Bn made permanent repairs to the fixed bridge. Repairs were completed on the fixed bridge by 27 Jan 69.

(c) Bridge QL1-409 was repaired by the 39th Engr Bn by installing 80' of DS Bailey Bridge, Class 50/55, by 19 Nov 68. The panel bridge is still in place.

(d) Several other bridges sustained minor damage during the reporting period. (Damage to abutments and decking.)

4.(C) Signal

a. During the reporting period Major Douglas E. Hawkins, Assistant Division Signal Officer and Captain Charles Whitehair, Division Radio Officer were transferred. Major Robert F. Feeley, and 1LT Calvin H. Meyer assumed the duties of Assistant Division Signal Officer and Radio Officer respectively. 1LT Meyer was later transferred and CPT Daniel M. Ranovic assumed duties as Radio Officer.

b. During the reporting period there were seven probable compromises of the Division SOI. This resulted in seven major SOI Changes.

c. The Aerial Photo Section continued to provide photographic support to the Division IO.

Casualties/Damage from mines and major LOC Interdictions

	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	TOTAL
Armored Personnel Carriers											
Minor Damage	4										4
Combat Loss	5			2							7
Vehicles (US)											
Minor Damage	6										6
Combat Loss	10		2					2			15
Vehicles (ARVN)	6		4								11
Engineer Equipment											
Minor Damage	2										2
Combat Loss	1										1
Personnel											
KIA (US)	51		5			2		11	16		85
WIA (US)	55		19	1							75
KIA (ARVN)	8					1		4	1		14
WIA (ARVN)	44		15	2							61
TOTAL MINE INCIDENTS (Those found and destroyed plus those causing incidents.)	87	1	27	9	2	1	1	11	1	2	148
Road Barriers	11										11
Culverts Blown	31										31
Bridges Blown	9										9

Chart 1

E (U) Logistics.

1. (U) General

a. Personnel Changes.

(1) Departures.

(a) CPT James B. McWilliams departed 30 December 1968.

(b) LTC James F. Mourionnet departed 2 December 1968.

(c) MSG James F. Stricker departed 7 December 1968.

(d) SFC Harold D. Gilmore departed 16 December 1968.

(e) CPT John M. Frazier departed 28 January 1969.

(f) MAJ Kenneth C. Crane departed 30 January 1969.

(2) Arrivals.

(a) MAJ Lewis A. Johnson arrived 23 November 1968.

(b) MAJ Melvin C. Rupp arrived 15 November 1968.

(c) SFC William G. Hall arrived 25 November 1968.

(d) MSG Joseph D. Sertine arrived 25 December 1968.

(e) 1LT Anthony M. Taylor arrived 15 January 1969.

b. During this reporting period the 16th Avn Gp headquarters was attached to the Americal Division bringing all Avn units (except the organic aviation sections belonging to the 11th and 198th Brigades) under a common headquarters for control, admin and logistics. The 23d S&T Battalion supports all elements of the 16th Avn Gp for non-aviation items. The 723d Maint Bn is the DS unit for non-aviation equipment belonging to all units of the 16th Avn Gp except the 14th Avn Bn which will continue to be supported by the 588th Maint Co.

c. A complete, formal inventory was conducted of the technical supply activity of the 723d Maintenance Battalion, and a similar inventory is in progress at the Class II and IV activity of the 23d Supply and Transport Battalion.

2.(U) Services Division.

a. The 57th Transportation Battalion headquarters, an element of 60th Support Group, 1st Logistical Command, was assigned to Chu Lai in December 1968. The unit's mission is to provide a controlling headquarters for all 60th Support Group units in the Chu Lai area.

b. Two additional 60th Support Group units, the 737th Transportation Company (Medium) and the 63d Transportation Company (Light) were assigned to Chu Lai to provide additional line haul capability to support unit's operation in the Americal AO.

c. The 1st Transportation Company (COMB) served in the Americal AO during December 1968 and January 1969, providing interim transportation assistance to the Division during the Monsoon Season and to fill the need for line haul until the units listed in paragraph b arrived. The unit departed on 3 February 1969.

d. Significant logistical support was provided to the Province Senior Advisor, Quang Ngai Province, for use in the combined Holding and Interrogation Center established in conjunction with Operation Russell Beach. Class II and IV items accounted for the bulk of the support. Liaison was made with 3d, III MAF, to coordinate delivery of support beyond the capability of the Division.

3.(U) Supply Division

During December the Division received the first 50 AN/PVS-3 of the 435 authorized the Division. The AN/PVS-3 (Night Vision Sight) is a miniaturized, battery powered, electro-optical hand held monocular used for observing distant objects under conditions of either night or day illumination.

4.(U) Maintenance Division.

a. During the month of December, the Americal Division exchanged 25 APC M113A1 that had in excess of 6,000 miles per vehicle.

b. Project DOG, an effort to identify equipment with histories of continuous maintenance problems, was initiated in January 1969. Once identified, replacement items will be requested and the items classified as "DOGS" retrograded.

c. Project SKIP was continued during the month of January. This project was designed to identify excess stocks of supplies and equipment for return to the supply system.

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d. The initial transaction of 900 chrome chamber M16A1s for exchange with a like number of non-chrome weapons now in the hands of troops was completed on 18 January 1969.

e. The Americal Division CMMI Team conducted 22 courtesy and 15 record inspections (12 receiving satisfactory rating) during the period 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69. The 73d Maint Bn and the 6th Spt Bn conducted 102 roadside spot inspections during this same period.

5.(U) ROAD Reorganization

a. The forthcoming reorganization of the Americal Division from its present configuration to ROAD is now scheduled to commence on 15 February 1969. This transition will necessitate changes in all logistical areas. In order that this transition will be smooth, this reporting period has been characterized by the development of phasing plans at Division level and detailed planning at all levels.

b. A list of all Americal Division Property authorized upon reorganization/standardization and currently on hand has been compiled. Instructions for the redistribution of these assets are being sent out to units at this time.

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F. (U) Civil Affairs/Civic Action

1. (U) ORGANIZATION

Changes in personnel during the reporting period are as follows:

Departed	LTC Robinson	10 Jan 69
	MAJ Evans	26 Nov 68
Joined	LTC Wetzel	10 Jan 69
	MAJ Batchelar	16 Nov 68
	1LT Niemhaus	27 Jan 69

2. (C) OPERATIONS

a. Operation Golden Fleece continues as part of the resource denial program. The primary responsibility for resource denial is given to the GVN with assistance from ARVN/FWMAF. US/FWMAF provide a protective screen for workers in GVN controlled area. During this period an estimated 1,757 tons of rice were harvested. An additional 246 tons of rice were captured, evacuated, and turned over to province and district officials. Operation Golden fleece is expected to continue for an indefinite period.

b. Christmas Celebration. During the period 18-25 Dec 68 units in the division and the Navy and Marine units in Chu Lai held Christmas parties. The purpose of the program was threefold:

(1) To develop a feeling of unity between FWMAF and VN people.

(2) To bring about a better understanding of a part of Western culture.

(3) Humanitarian: assist needy Vietnamese.

Planning for the festivities began early in November. Requests for toys, paper bags, and candy were received at division, consolidated and sent to III MAF G-5. Additional materials were provided by the PX and money for candy was donated by the Division Chaplain. The shipment of 12,000 toys from Da Nang was arranged by III MAF G-5. Trucks from the 29th CA Company transported the materials to Chu Lai. Breakdown and distribution of toys and candy was accomplished by the 6th CA Platoon. Activities varied from childrens parties, assistance to orphans and distribution of small bags of rice and health items to refugees. US personnel actively participated in Christmas activities.

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c. Refugee Movement. During the period 19-20 December 1968 this office, with assistance from the 198th Bde, 1/6 Bn 198th Bde, 23rd Medical Bn, 26th Eng, and Div PMO, coordinated the movement of 1200 refugees from Quang Ngai through Chu Lai to Cam Ranh Bay. The refugees arrived at the rate of 600 per day. They were moved from Quang Ngai to Chu Lai by C-123 and from Chu Lai to Cam Ranh Bay by C-130. During the four hour lay over in Chu Lai shelter, medical aid and water was provided. PSYOPS loudspeaker teams and combined ARVN/US Military Police controlled the refugee movement. No incidents or accidents occurred.

d. CORDS Materials. Transportation of CORDS materials from the Sand ramp, NSAF Chu Lai, to Quang Ngai and Tam Ky province capitals continues to be significant. The 12 ton S&P truck support, provided by III MAF, was withdrawn on 22 Nov 68. Division transportation has provided adequate support for this activity. The following commodities were shipped during the reporting period.

Cement	842 pallets
Roofing tin	101 pallets
Rebar	16 pallets
Asphalt	216 pallets

3. (U) Civic Action/Revolutionary Development.

a. This division supports Revolutionary Development in two provinces: Quang Tin and Quang Ngai, and two districts of Quang Nam: Que Son and Duc Duc. The primary method of support is civic action.

b. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), a Vietnamese nationwide effort, began on 1 Nov 68 and ended on 31 Jan 69. The division vigorously supported the campaign in the areas of combined combat operations, PSYOP, and civic action. Surveys of all targetted hamlets within the division AO were conducted by the brigade and battalion S5's. Civic Action projects were initiated in most hamlets in cooperation with GVN district officials. Final results of the campaign are not available at this time. Results furnished by province advisors as of 1 Jan 69 are as follows:

QUANG TIN PROVINCE (31)	1 Nov	30 Nov	31 Dec
GVN Controlled	10	11	19
Contested	14	18	12
VC	7	2	0
QUANG NGAI PROVINCE (22)			
GVN Controlled	3	5	8
Contested	13	16	14
VC	6	1	0

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Que Son District (7)	1 Nov	30 Nov	31 Dec
GVN Controlled	0	1	6
Contested	2	6	1
VC	5	0	0

e. Construction Programs. Construction projects constitute a major portion of the civic action conducted during this period. All projects are of the self help variety. Division units provide materials through CORDS and the Vietnamese build the project. The following civic action projects were completed during the reporting period.

Projects	Completed
Bridges	11 and 2 repaired
Churches, Temples, Pagodas	1
Culverts	3
Dispensaries	7
Dwellings	5
Fences	27
Hospitals	2
Market places	1
Roads	3 Miles
Leveling/grading projects	7
Schools	2
Walls	4
Barber Shops	1
4T club	1
Village Tunnel	1
Flag poles	1
Drainage ditches	3
Islands HQ w/extension	1
Playground equipment	4

d. Another method of supporting Revolutionary Development is medical civic action. On 8 Jan 69 this office received a copy of USARV directive subject MEDCAP from the division surgeon. All plans must be approved by the province chief, province medical chief, and province senior advisors. Division surgeon and civil affairs officers will coordinate plans at battalion, brigade, and division levels. MEDCAP,s will supplement the 1969 GVN Pacification Plans. Results during the reporting period are listed below:

UNIT	VISITS	PATIENTS
23rd Med Bn	8	331
11th Bde	197	17,670
196th Bde	36	5,664
198th Bde	372	30,301
Div Arty	76	4,855
1/1st Cav	20	2,087
26th Eng	10	440
1st CAG	1,195	126,302
9th Eng	13	973

UNIT	VISITS	PATIENTS
MASS 3	7	263
MAG 12	3	357
MAG 13	3	381
MCB-74	3	732
Total	1,943	190,555

e. A third method of support provided the Revolutionary Development Program is voluntary contributions. These contributions are normally used to assist specific individuals, families, or groups of families. The collection and distribution of these resources is completely administered by the units concerned. The following items and amounts were listed by individuals and units:

Money	$ 3,107.00
Clothing	1,190 lbs
Soap	17,385 bars

f. A III MAF G5 conference was held in Da Nang on 24 January 1969. The purpose was to discuss the 1969 GVN Pacification Plan and allow for an exchange of ideas between the representatives present. During 1969 priority of effort will shift from hamlet to village level government. Selected village officials will attend training courses at Vung Tau National Training Center, others will attend provincial courses. The village chief and village counsel will have expanded powers and responsibilities to include:

(1) Control of Popular Force.
(2) Control of RD cadre.
(3) Increased fiscal responsibility.
(4) Training and organising Self Defense Groups.

Civil Affairs activity will shift from doing or building projects to more of an advisory and monitoring role.

4. (U) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Changes in personnel included the departure of LTC Holtom on 31 Dec 68 and the arrival of Maj Frie on 19 Dec 68.

5. (U) PSOP ACTIVITIES NOV 1968 - Jan 1969

a. Leaflets

	DISSEMINATED	TARGETS	AVG PER TGT
Nov	44,160,000	589	75,000
Dec	46,303,000	773	60,000
Jan	40,872,000	603	68,000
Totals	131,335,000	1,965	67,000

b. Loudspeaker broadcasts

	Aerial	Ground	Waterborne
Nov	72hrs	246hrs 15min	7hrs
Dec	130hrs	278hrs	6hrs 30min
Jan	200hrs	340hrs 40min	5hrs 30min
Totals	402hrs 55min	864hrs 55min	19hrs

c. Movies

	Number	Hours	Audience
Nov	326	127	18,912
Dec	218	93:15	14,190
Jan	251	113:30	44,750
Totals	795	333:45	77,852

d. Printed Propaganda by the Americal Division

(1) Twelve leaflets in support of the Chieu Hoi Campaign.
(2) Sixteen leaflets in support of the Rewards Campaign.
(3) Nine leaflets in support of the Anti VC Campaign.
(4) Two leaflets in support of the Anti NVA Campaign.
(5) Five leaflets in support of the Pro GVN Campaign.

NUMBER	TITLE	CAMPAIGN
7-20-69	Rewards for VCI-Ky Que	Rewards
7-21-69	Rewards for VCI-Binh Son	Rewards
7-22-69	Rewards vor VCI-Binh Sa	Rewards

e. Tapes initiated by Americal Division

(1) Five tapes in support of the Chieu Hoi Campaign.
(2) Ten tapes in support of the Anti VC Campaign.
(3) Four tapes in support of the Anti NVA Campaign.
(4) Seven tapes in support of the Pro GVN Campaign.

f. PSYOP in support of major operations Nov 68 - Jan 69

OPERATION	LEAFLETS	AERIAL BDCASTS	GROUND BDCASTS
WHEELER/WALLOWA (terminated 11Nov68)	4,844,000	4:35	9:45
BURINGTON TRAIL (terminated 11Nov68)	8,024,000	10:05	1:30
VERNON LAKE I (terminated 2Nov68)	1,0,000	:20	None

OPERATION	LEAFLETS	AERIAL BDCASTS	GROUND BDCASTS
VERNON LAKE II (commenced 2Nov68)	22,091,000	59:00	2:30
HARDIN FALLS (commenced 2Dec68)	130,000	12:30	4:30
RUSSELL BEACH (commenced 13Jan69)	651,000	123:40	58:00

g. "Chieu Hoi" program

(1) Hoi Chanhs by sector Nov 68-Jan69

	NOV	DEC	JAN	Total
Quang Nam (Que Son, Duc Duc, and Duy Districts)	8	24	47	79
Quang Tin	70	125	75	270
Quang Ngai	18	41	67	126
TOTAL	96	190	189	475

(2) Hoi Chanhs by operation Nov 68-Jan 69

Wheeler/Wallowa	8	-	-	8
Burlington Trail	5	-	-	5
Vernon Lake II	-	5	-	5
Fayette Canyon	-	17	38	55
Hardin Falls	-	56	3	59
Russell Beach	-	-	32	32
TOTAL	13	78	73	154

(3) Hoi Chanhs turned into the Americal Division Nov 68-Jan 69

	Nov	Dec	Jan	Total
Quang Nam (Que Son, Duc Duc, and Duy Xuyen Districts)	-	1	-	1
Quang Tin	2	4	18	24
Quang Ngai	-	1	33	34
TOTAL	2	6	51	59

h. Volunteer Informant Program

(1) Number of informants Nov 68-Jan 69

Unit	Nov	Dec	Jan	Total
26th Eng Bn	-	4	-	4
11th Bde	138	181	485	804
196th Bde	341	351	324	804
198th Bde	310	263	304	877
39th Eng Bn	150	92	83	325
TOTAL	839	981	896	2,626

(2) Totals payment ($VN) Nov 68-Jan 69

Unit	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOTAL
26th Eng Bn	-	650	-	650
11th Bde	121,660	73,610	470,520	665,790
196th Bde	300,065	230,404	250,060	708,529
198th Bde	424,489	496,500	3,850	924,339
39th Eng Bn	335,700	270,200	162,500	768,400
TOTAL	1,181,914	1,071,364	886,930	3,140,208

(3) The following items by type were turned in to the Americal Division during the reporting period:

Item	Nov	Dec	Jan
Arty (rds)	477	279	252
Morter (rds)	912	846	832
Grenades	738	1,382	831
Mines	438	444	255
40mm (rds)	551	1,310	14,316
Small Arms Ammo (rds)	24,382	23,586	14,316
TNT/C4 (lbs)	39	65	130
Weapons	3	11	7

i. Chieu Hoi Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Chieu Hoi Campaign:

	Leaflets	Aerial Ldspkr	Ground Ldspkr	Waterborne
Nov	12,945,000	10 hrs	18 hrs	None
Dec	18,200,000	41 hrs 25 Min	24 hrs	2 hrs
Jan	20,550,000	69 hrs 35 min	91 hrs	3 hrs
TOTAL	51,695,000	122 hrs	133 hrs	5 hrs

(2) Directly attributable to the increased PSYOP effort made in support of the pacification program is the marked increase in the number of Hoi Chanhs reported during the reporting period from Quang Tin Province. Returnee interviews have indicated that the increase in face to face contact made by both GVN and US agencies coupled with the following underlying causes was instrumental in persuading them to rally to the GVN.

(a) Growing absence of hard core influence in form of NVA troops or VC Cadre.
(b) Increased Allied military operations.
(c) Continued food shortage.
(d) Illness and lack of proper medicine.
(e) Breakup of units/cells due to battle losses, ralliers and disillusionment with the VC cause.

(3) Operation Russell Beach, commenced 13 Jan 69, has thus far produced 32 Hoi Chanhs. Extreme discomfort, hunger and despair brought

about by the realization of encirclement and unit/cell breakup due to the effective coruoa, were primary factors for rallying. By virtue of full time access to a helicopter, aerial PSYOP teams were able to exploit these vulnerabilities to the grievous extent, and were a major contributing factor in the accumulation of the relatively large number of Hoi Chanhs. An emotic catalyst [illegible] Hoi Chanh decision to rally was the presence of timely, accurate [illegible] and air strikes. Immediately subsequent to these strikes, helicopter broadcast teams assured the VC of a continuation of the strikes, expounded on the futility of continued resistance, appealed to their obligations to themselves and their families and offered them the opportunity to rally to the GVN.

j. During the reporting period the following was expended in support of the Rewards campaign:

	Leaflets	Aerial Ldspkr	Ground Ldspkr	Waterborne
Nov	6,920,000	2 hrs 10 min	76 hrs	30 min
Dec	6,560,000	3 hrs 25 min	56 hrs 45 min	--
Jan	2,408,000	12 hrs 30 min	74 hrs 30 min	30 min
TOTALS	15,888,000	18 hrs 05 min	207 hrs 15 min	1 hr

(1) This campaign has been marked by a significant increase in the number of informants, monetary amount paid and times collected during the reporting period as compared with the previous reporting period. Division wide implementation of outlined VIP procedures and increased command interest were primary for the resurgence of the program. Efforts to further exploit the informants for information concerning enemy activity have not met with great success.

(2) The rewards campaign was extended to include payment for VCI through the development and dissemination of 12 leaflets targetted specifically for 11 villages within the Quang Tin Province and one village in Quang Ngai Province. The leaflets contain the names and titles of known VCI operating within the respective villages, and list the amount of reward payable for information leading to the capture of each listed VCI. The leaflet also instructs the US soldier to escort the informant to the unit commander or S2.

k. Pro GVN Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following was expended in support of the Pro GVN Campaign:

	Leaflets	Aerial Ldspkr	Ground Ldspkr	Waterborne
Nov	1,947,000	3 hrs 45 min	124 hrs 15 min	3 hrs
Dec	4,482,000	15 hrs	150 hrs 15 min	4 hrs 30 min
Jan	5,900,000	71 hrs	182 hrs	2 hrs
TOTAL	12,329,000	89 hrs 45 min	456 hrs 30 min	9 hrs 30 min

(2) A concerted effort has been made to inform US forces arriving in country of the pertinency and practical usage of PSYOP

in Vietnam. 72 classes have been presented to 6,286 new arrivals to the division during the reporting period. The instruction covered a basic orientation of in country PSYOP with emphasis being given to the participation of the individual soldier in the "Chieu Hoi" and Rewards program.

(3) Concentrated use of resources has been made to support the GVN pacification program. Sixty-nine missions (movies and broadcasts) have been conducted in 21 of the contested hamlets by teams supporting this division. In coordination with VIS assets organic to each province, extensive and continuous coverage has been made in all 60 target hamlets which are located within the 12th DTA. Extent of support by this division has amounted to:

No. of movies shown:	115
No. of movie hours:	52:00
Population contacted (face to face):	8,975
Propaganda hand disseminated (pieces):	16,650
No. of Broadcasts hours:	95:45

(4) Extensive usage of PSYOP assets through leaflet dissemination and aerial broadcasts for population control purposes during Operation Russel Beach, resulted in 10,852 civilians, being evacuated to the Province Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC) refugee compound. The division supported the VIS at the CHIC by providing one HE (Audio/visual) team to assist in entertaining the refugees, and a liaison team to coordinate the PSYOP activities in support and requests.

(5) Division PSYOP resources supported the Christmas Campaign by disseminating printed propaganda and by broadcasting before, during and after scheduled Christmas activities in support of units sponsoring the activities.

(6) Support of the Tet campaign commenced on the 18th of January by dissemination of Pre-Tet literature. This campaign will continue through Tet and Post-Tet periods. Leaflets and tapes directed at the local populace are designed to enhance the GVN image in the eyes of the people. Tet propaganda targetted at the VC/NVA is designed to demoralize the individual soldier, denounce the cause and leadership that takes him from his home and urges his return to his family.

1. Anti-NVA Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Anti NVA campaign.

	Leaflets	Aerial Ldspkr	Ground Ldspkr
Nov	18,257,000	24 hrs 05 min	None
Dec	10,560,000	25 hrs 30 min	None
Jan	5,281,000	15 hrs 55 min	None
TOTAL	34,098,000	65 hrs 30 min	None

(2) Operations Vernon Lake II in Quang Ngai province and Fayetter Canyon in Quang Nam province were initiated on 2 Nov 68 and

15 Dec 68 against the 3d NVA Div and the 2nd NVA Div respectively. PSYOP support for these operations has been characterized by dissemination of propaganda oriented to specific units exploiting known vulnerabilities of battle losses, food and medicine shortages, malaria sickness superiority of Allied fire power and the failure of the enemy to achieve the promised victory. All B-52 strikes in the area were exploited, adding to the effectiveness and success of the operation.

m. Anti VC Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Anti VC Campaign:

	Leaflets	Aerial Ldspkr	Ground Ldspkr	Waterborne
Nov	4,092,000	32 hrs 25 min	28 hrs	3 hrs 30 min
Dec	6,501,000	44 hrs 40 min	47 hrs	None
Jan	6,733,000	31 hrs 10 min	35 hrs 10 min	None
TOTAL	17,325,000	108 hrs 15 min	110 hrs 10 min	3 hrs 30 min

(2) On 9 Nov 68 at coords BS 799398 a VN Lambretta bus hit a VC mine emplaced on Highway 1. Fifteen civilians were killed and 5 VN civilians were evacuated for treatment of injuries. On 10 Nov 68 at coords BS 753499 another VN Lambretta bus hit a VC Mine emplaced on Highway 1 which resulted in 6 VN civilians being injured. On 2 Jan 69, a mining incident at BT 1644 resulted in the death of a 14 year old girl. On 3 Jan 69 a Lambretta detonated a mine at BT 0314 killing 12 and injuring several other Vietnamese. All of these incidents were immediately exploited by ground broadcasts as examples of the disregard the VC have for the lives of innocent civilians and appealed to the people to report VC activity.

(3) Operation Russell Beach has thus far resulted in the confinement of 218 VCI, 22 VCS and 76 PW. In addition to the previously mentioned aerial speaker teams; armed propaganda teams, attached to maneuver elements, and organic ground loudspeaker teams working with the cordon have assisted in the locating and capturing the above VC.

(4) Intelligence reports in Nov 68 indicated 16 village elections were held by the VC in Que Son, Thang Binh and Tam Ky districts. These elections were held to elect hamlet, village and district officials. The elected bodies are known as the Peoples Liberation Committee or the Village Peoples Council. Candidates who were elected are known to be members of the VCI. Six leaflets were developed, targetted at all 16 villages. These leaflets are of two types. One directed at the Local Populace pointing out the illagality of the elections and appeals not to support false actions. The other type is directed at the VCI and exploits lack of credibility by these elections.

II. Section II, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations, Recommendations (U).

A. Personnel - Administration, Morale and Discipline.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Unit Reenlistment Personnel.

a. Observation. It was noted that unit commanders and unit reenlistment personnel were not thoroughly familiar with regulations governing the reenlistment program in RVN.

b. Evaluation. Enlisted personnel assigned to USARV have a variety of options available to them while serving in country and these should be explained to the individual during counseling sessions as prescribed in USARV Reg 601-201. To insure unit reenlistment personnel are familiar with the reenlistment regulations and options in RVN, the Division Reenlistment Office has conducted reenlistment orientations to all unit reenlistment personnel. In addition, newly appointed personnel are required to report to their primary duty career counselor for an orientation as soon as possible. Commanders of companies on stand-down are also personnally contacted by the Division Reenlistment Officer. At this time, command support at the company level is emphasised and the company commander is asked in what ways he feels his reenlistment program is deficient and how it can be improved. With this information the Division Career Counselors have been able to deal with specific problems and achieve significant results by bringing unit reenlistment personnel up to date on all phases of the program, particularly options and interviews, the two areas which indicated the most necessity for emphasis.

c. Recommendation.

(1) That all major subordinate commands within USARV have their reenlistment office implement reenlistment orientations to unit reenlistment personnel, specifically at brigade and battalion levels.

(2) That all newly appointed unit reenlistment personnel be required to report to their primary duty career counselor for orientation.

2. (U) SUBJECT: American Division Hospital Mail Section.

a. Observation. The method utilized to process mail for hospital and casualty personnel was inefficient and caused undue delays in mail delivery.

b. Evaluation. Delivery was delayed because units held mail for excessive periods of time, and in many cases, failed to receive forwarding information. This undesirable situation was compounded because of the patient mobility within the hospital system. The Americal Division Hospital Mail Section was created and maintains a current locator file on all hospital and casualty personnel. Mail is processed daily and then either hand carried to the patient or forwarded to the appropriate hospital. In addition to mail delivery, hospital mail section personnel assist patients by resolving mail difficulties.

c. Recommendation. The services rendered by this section are indispensible and have enhanced the postal system within the Republic of Vietnam. The hospital mail section should be incorporated into the next MTOE.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Postal Claim and Inquiries.

a. Observation. Numerous inquiries were being received in reference to claims that either had not been properly processed or had not been returned in accordance with the established suspense date.

b. Evaluation. Claims were being handled by the individual brigade APO's. Personnel were untrained and were not knowledgeable of proper processing procedures. Centralized claim processing was established as a responsibility of the main APO. One responsible individual handles all claims and is under the direct supervision of the Division Postal Officer. An accurate suspense system for both incoming and working claims has been implemented. File maintenance has become a matter of major significance and will preclude future loss or no record responses to inquiries.

c. Recommendation: This change in processing procedures has proved its merits and should be continued.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Organization of Special Correspondence Section.

a. Observation. The tremendous work load in the Personnel Actions Branch, 130-150 Congressional inquiries constantly pending plus the other voluminous tasks required to support over 20,000 personnel, precluded the desirable quality of work from being produced in a timely manner.

b. Evaluation. The Special Correspondence Section was organized. This section is now directly under the supervision of the Adjutant General's Office. Drafts and final copies of replies are no longer required to be submitted through the Chief, Personnel Services Division,

thereby reducing the number of persons reviewing these replies by two (2) individuals. A finer quality of work and a larger quantity has resulted from splitting the Personnel Actions Branch. Additionally, a more expeditious reply can be made.

c. Recommendation. The splitting of the Personnel Actions Branch and formulation of the Special Correspondence Section under the supervision of the Adjutant General's Office has proven to be meritorious and should be incorporated into the next MTOE.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Medical Congressionals.

a. Observation. Congressional inquiries pertaining to allegations of a medical nature were taking too long to be processed and a reply dispatched to the Member of Congress. Much of the information furnished the Adjutant General's Office was insufficient.

b. Evaluation. A decision was made to establish a clerk in the Division Surgeon's Office to perform liaison between the Division Surgeon's Office and the Adjutant General's Office. This clerk is trained by the Special Correspondence Section and is completely familiar with all facets of their operation. Medical evaluations were formerly scheduled by company sized units and performed by the battalion or brigade surgeon. Currently the Special Correspondence Section prepares and forwards a Disposition Form to the Division Surgeon requesting he furnish sufficient information to enable them to reply to all allegations of a medical nature. The Division Surgeon then has the individual concerned report to him and has him evaluated and any consultations he may require completed. The Division Surgeon is thus able to furnish the Special Correspondence Section the information they require within ten days, normally.

c. Recommendation. The establishment of the clerk in the Surgeon's Office has proven to be a very valuable asset to the Adjutant General's Office. This procedure should be considered for adoption by other Divisions.

6. (U) SUBJECT. Internal Office Organization.

a. Observation. Many typing errors, misfiling, and other poor office techniques were noted. Time was consumed in retyping material and looking for misfiled cases.

b. Evaluation. The office was reorganized to provide for three typists and three writers. In the past, all clerks were considered typists and writers. Each clerk wrote and typed his drafts, finals,

and other related forms. The present system eliminates many errors and contributes to uniform high quality work. All writers are typists prior to being appointed as writers. This gives them cross training and makes them familiar with all operations. Previously, each clerk maintained his own suspense system and filed his own cases. The system has been changed so that the NCOIC maintains all suspense and one clerk-typist has the additional duty as file clerk.

c. Recommendation. In the event the Special Correspondence Section is incorporated into the MTOE, this is the method in which the individuals can be best utilized.

7. (U) SUBJECT: Utilization of Catholic Chaplains.

a. Observation. Experience indicates some problems in providing adequate Catholic religious coverage in a Division of this size with only six assigned Catholic Chaplains. A Catholic Chaplain assigned to a brigade with four maneuver battalions needs assistance to achieve adequate Catholic coverage. The Catholic Chaplain assigned to Division Artillery can render little assistance to the brigades and battalions because of his wide area of responsibility to Division Artillery units. In an effort to maximize Catholic coverage, the Catholic Chaplain normally assigned to DISCOM, has been assigned to the Division Engineer Battalion with the additional responsibility of assisting the brigades with Catholic religious coverage.

b. Evaluation. The use of a Catholic Chaplain with the Engineer Battalion is a recent innovation. On short notice observation, this plan is revealing itself to be effective. DISCOM units are not being slighted as the Division Chaplain personnel assume additional responsibility in conducting services and further Chaplain combat service support.

c. Recommendation. That Infantry brigades and maneuver battalions continue to receive priority coverage and that Chaplains assigned to Division Troops assume additional coverage responsibilities. That efforts continue to be made to secure a seventh Catholic Chaplain for this Division.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Consolidated Chaplain's Fund Clerk.

a. Observation. The workload in maintaining the record of receipts, disbursements, preparation of purchase orders and other administrative details attendant to a consolidated fund the magnitude of the Division Consolidated Chaplain's Fund requires a full time clerk. Experience indicates that one clerk cannot perform this mission and the other duties normally required of a 71M20.

b. Evaluation. This office is currently using, with high success, the assistant that would normally work with the second chaplain assigned to DISCOM. While DISCOM has been deprived of its second chaplain, the assistant is maintained in DISCOM to handle the fund and render chaplain duties as needed elsewhere as time permits.

c. Recommendation. That it be recognized that to properly maintain fund records, an almost full time clerk is needed. His remaining time can be used in normal duties expected of personnel serving in MOSC 71M.

9. (U) SUBJECT: After-Action report of Activities Related to Christmas.

a. Observation. This office found the "cupboard bare" this year when an effort was made to determine what chaplain-related activities transpired last Christmas. To plan without benefit of an after-action report deprives one of history's lessons and thus leaves one barren of lessons learned.

b. Evaluation. There are many demands and requests made on the chaplains during the Christmas season. Frequently, there is not time to properly evaluate areas of greatest need. Many requests came late and there was not time to find resources to meet these demands. Since Christmas is a "one time experience" for every person in Vietnam, the need for an after-action report is essential to have a properly balanced program.

c. Recommendation. That a full and practical after-action report be left in the file to answer the following questions:

(1) What was done?

(2) When was it done?

(3) How was it done?

(4) What is recommended next year?

10. (U) SUBJECT: Support of Press.

a. Observation. Transportation of the press is still a major problem in the Americal Division area.

b. Evaluation. The relative inaccessibility of many Americal Division units and operations discourage newsmen from visiting the division. When they work out of DaNang, they prefer to stay close to

that city so they can file their copy and put their news files on state-side flights for fast delivery. A few newsman covering Operation Russell Beach, have been stranded in Chu Lai when they missed the last fixed-wing flight to DaNang in the afternoon. The unfavorable flight schedule from Chu Lai to DaNang, plus the fact that helicopters are not always readily available here, contribute to the problem.

c. Recommendation. Continue to make every effort to schedule transportation within the division limits and strengthen the ties of cooperation and coordination between the DaNang Press Center units with helicopters here.

B. Operations.

1. (U) Subject: Operation of the OH-6A Helicopter

a. Observation: The OH-6A tends to spin clockwise during a right turn at low airspeed.

b. Evaluation: A right turn should not be attempted at less than 20 knots airspeed. If this does occur and the tail begins to spin to the left, the pilot can correct the spin by reducing power and neutralizing the anti-torque pedals. Although this tendency is discussed in TM 55-1520-219-10, many OH-6A pilots are not aware of it. It is not known whether or not the USAARTS instructs on this particular point.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That pilots in all units equipped with the OH-6A be appraised of the tendency of the OH-6A to spin clockwise during right turns at airspeeds less than 20 knots.

(2) That the USAARTS be made aware of the lack of knowledge of this problem among OH-6A pilots.

2. (U) Subject: Armored Cavalry Operations During the Rainy Season

a. Observation: During the rainy season, trafficability for the M48A3 tank is poor in the coastal plain of Quang Tin Province.

b. Evaluation: The maneuverability of the ACAV (M113A1) can be exploited to the fullest if the nine tanks of each troop are detached and formed into a separate tank platoon. In this organization, the tanks provide road security and fire support, but do not attempt to move cross-country with the ACAV's.

c. Recommendation: That Armored Cavalry Troops operating in the coastal plain during the rainy season form tank platoons prior to tactical operations.

3(U) Subject: Kit Carson Scouts attached to Combat Tracker Teams.

a. Observation: The three (3) scouts attached to the 63d Inf Plt (CTT) provide coverage for three of the four teams currently available in the Americal Division.

b. Evaluation: The background of Kit Carson scouts increases the effectiveness of combat tracker teams by providing intimate knowledge

of enemy tactics which might be encountered during a tracking mission, as well as the ability to communicate with indigenous personnel who may provide information concerning the enemy being tracked.

c. Recommendation: Kit Carson scouts provide capabilities which should be organic to units with similar missions.

4(U) Subject: Training of Combat Tracker Personnel

a. Observation:

(1) Combat Tracker Personnel lack adequate familiarization with the types of mines and booby traps employed by VC/NVA forces.

(2) The terrain used in the conduct of training Combat Tracker Personnel, in general, is completely dissimilar to that encountered in RVN.

b. Evaluation:

(1) Combat Tracker teams operate with the point-man of the unit they are supporting during the conduct of missions, and detailed knowledge of mines and booby traps, and their employment by the VC/NVA, is considered an essential element of their training.

(2) The terrain and climate of the Fort Gordon area does not provide a realistic simulation of the environment encountered in RVN. The training of Combat Tracker Personnel is not sufficiently oriented toward infantry tactics and operations.

c. Recommendations:

(1) Greater emphasis should be placed on mines and booby traps, and their employment, in the form of integration into all phases of practical work in addition to classroom type instruction.

(2) Responsibility for the training of Combat Tracker Personnel should be transferred to the Infantry School, and collocated with the Ranger Department for training at Eglin AFB and Dalohnaga, Georgia.

5.(U) Pile Driving Thru Tactical Bridge Decking

a. Observation: To properly repair bridges QL1-423 and QL1-422 (par 5c (2) (a) and 5c (2) (b), piles had to be driven for the repair of the abutments and for construction of the intermediate piers. For

pile driving on abutments, the pile driver was set up on firm ground and the job accomplished without major problems. However, the opposite was true when piles for the intermediate piers had to be driven.

b. Evaluation: In both of the bridges mentioned above, a panel bridge (M-2 Bailey in one case, and an M-6 in the other) was placed over the destroyed spans. The pile driver was then set on the panel bridge, and a portion of the decking was removed to allow piles to be driven "thru" the bridge. This procedure not only eliminated placing the pile driver on a floating raft, but allowed piles to be driven so that intermediate piles were completed prior to placing stringers. Such a procedure greatly facilitated construction of the bridge superstructure.

c. Recommendation:

(1) If a panel bridge can be placed directly over the site for a fixed bridge, piles for intermediate piers should be driven "thru" the deck of the panel bridge.

(2) Driving piles thru the deck of a panel bridge is an excellent method for placing an intermediate pier to raise the Class of the panel bridge, thus eliminating the extensive substructure preparations necessary for a conventional pier.

6.(U) Subject: Use of Kit Carson Scouts

a. Observation: The use of Kit Carson Scouts has been increased. Their knowledge of enemy activity has proven invaluable, provided US units can use them effectively. Problems arise from the inability of the Kit Carson Scouts to read maps, failure of US units to create a solid working relationship with the Scouts, and failure to properly debrief them after a visual reconnaissance operation.

b. Evaluation: The Kit Carson Scout's knowledge of map reading is unreliable. To surmount this problem and increase the Scout's effectiveness, we have initiated a new policy of taking them on VR (Visual Reconnaissance) prior to the conduct of a tactical operation. Once a Kit Carson Scout becomes properly oriented he can point out areas of enemy activity, enemy base camps, and weapons and supply caches. In order to effectively employ this technique, a solid, friendly relationship must exist between the Kit Carson Scout and the US unit he is working with. The US unit must greet the Scout in a warm sincere manner, letting him become accustomed to US military personnel, equipment, food, and tactical operations. Once the Kit

Carson Scout has overcome his initial fear and misgivings regarding the US military, his knowledge can be used much more effectively.

c. Recommendations: Every opportunity to employ Kit Carson Scouts should be utilized as quickly as possible. The greater the time period before their use, the less chance our units have of capitalizing on their knowledge. Every means must be explored to establish friendly relationships with the Scout by equipping him with the necessary equipment and supplies, introducing him to unit leaders and interpreters, and taking a sincere interest in him and his knowledge. Since the Kit Carson probably cannot read maps, he should be taken on a VR to orient himself and make use of his information. During the VR he should not be forced or rushed in any manner, because this new experience may confuse or frighten him, and reduce his effectiveness. Finally, once the VR and/or operation has been completed, a complete debriefing is essential. Once again, the Kit Carson Scout must not be rushed, and the impression must be conveyed to him that his information is truly useful to our units. If these suggestions are carefully followed our effectiveness from the use of Kit Carson Scouts will be greatly increased.

7. (U) Subject: Coordination of FWMAF Operations.

a. Observation: Due to the nature of operations and the distribution of the population, the situation frequently arises where various FWMAF operate concurrently in the same AO without any one unit having complete authority over the area. In the past, incidents have arisen due to this situation which have caused the loss of life.

b. Evaluation: Operations within the Oregon AO have proceeded without serious incident, only because of the excellent coordination developed between the US units, ARVN advisors, Sector Advisors, and Special Forces personnel at Tien Phuoc. In the conduct of normal operations within the Oregon AO, there is a constant requirement for close, direct coordination among all elements. The movement of maneuver elements and the use of supporting fires must be closely supervised to prevent friendly contact. Various techniques are being utilized to facilitate coordination and control. Liaison Officers have been co-located with ARVN battalion advisors and radio contact is maintained with Special Forces as required. The frequent interchange of locations and plans between all elements, and the establishment of the informal sub-areas of operation, facilitate coordination and control. Frequent use is also made of AO extensions when operations require boundary changes. Although emphasis is constantly placed on complete coordination, and all possible measures are taken to

avoid potential friendly contacts, this problem continues to exist. Small units without US Advisors are unable to effect direct coordination with US units, and the use of artillery and mortar fire is frequently not properly coordinated.

c. Recommendations: The ideal solution would be to create exclusive AO's for each element operating within the area. A buffer zone of at least 1 km should be established along the entire boundary. All non US units requesting to operate within the US AO should be required to have an American advisor with each element in order to insure adequate coordination. Finally all artillery and mortar fire within the US AO should be passed with complete air clearance data prior to the granting of military clearance. If these additional procedures are followed, and close coordination maintained, the potential for tragic accidents would be greatly reduced.

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C. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Standard Alignment and Designators.

a. Observation. It has been noted that the designation and alignment of routes crossing the Laos-Vietnam border varies between scale maps as well as between studies and reports prepared by high headquarters intelligence sections.

b. Evaluation. Since roads and trails are often referred to by route number in intelligence reports and studies, there is a possibility of misunderstanding between the originators and the users who may be referring to different sources for route designation and alignment information. III MAF, G2, and PIIC Det B, 1st MIBARS, and 245th SAC, II Section, all use the 1:250,000 Standard Alignments, Designators, and Linear Segments maps prepared by USARPAC, G2, under the direction of CINCPAC for route designation and alignment.

c. Recommendation. That the Standard Alignment, Designators, and Linear Segments Maps be adopted as the standard for all references to routes along the Laos-Vietnam border.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Photo Data Base.

a. Observation. Ideally, imagery interpreters should report only those military significant items which are new or which have never been reported before. Due to the size of the division area of interest and the turnover of personnel, it is not possible for the imagery interpreters to get to know their area well enough to remember each defensive position, trail, and bridge which has been previously reported.

b. Evaluation. There are two ways to prevent duplicate reports of the same item:

(1) The interpreter could check all previous photo missions, or all previous reports on file. This, however, would take an excessive amount of time.

(2) The section could maintain overlays of the division area with all previously reported items marked on them.

c. Recommendation. Neat overlays, keyed to 1:50,000 maps of divisional areas of interest, be maintained in II shops. The interpreters will read out each mission and note all military significant items. They will then plot these on the overlays. Those already on the overlay will not be reported. The others will be added to the overlay and written up in a imagery interpretation report.

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3. (U) SUBJECT: Security Clearances.

a. Observation. Commanders and supervisors are not initiating prompt action to validate security clearances of newly-assigned personnel who will require access to classified information.

b. Evaluation. Commanders and supervisors are not always cognizant of their responsibility under AR 604-5, USARV 604-5, and Americal Reg 604-5, to initiate through their S2 or ACofS, G2, the validation of the security clearances of newly-assigned personnel.

c. Recommendation. That S2/G2 personnel make a continuing practice of educating commanders and supervisors at all levels of their responsibility to initiate prompt action for validation of security clearances of their personnel. This is accomplished by personal liaison, telephonic contact, and periodic reminders in the form of written notification such as the Daily Bulletin.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Effect of Kit Carson Scout (KCS) Morale on Operational Efficiency.

a. Observation. Experience has indicated that the field efficiency of KCS personnel is directly affected by their level of morale. The level of morale is also directly related to the level of unit concern for the welfare of each scout.

b. Evaluation. Units in which scouts are considered to be full-fledged members of the combat team have reported considerable benefits gained through use of scout personnel. Such units have also reported greater scout initiative and fewer discipline/disaffection problems. The greatest number of specific and general problems with scouts have occurred in units which have neglected the scout's welfare and have maintained little control over scout personnel. Scouts from these units have requested transfer in a number of cases. The majority of proven and suspected security problems have occurred in those units which have displayed a general lack of concern for scout personnel.

c. Recommendation. That all units to which scouts are assigned, assure that scout personnel are properly utilized and avoid assigning the scout more than his fair share of menial tasks to perform and that scouts are fully integrated into the unit and made to feel themselves an important part of the unit. Such attention and consideration toward scout personnel will enhance their efficiency and initiative, increase unit loyalty among scouts as well as making inherent security threat a less viable liability.

D. Logistics.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Communications Problems in Wet Weather.

a. Observation. Extremely wet and rainy periods during the monsoon season are causing radio communications problems in vehicular mounted radios. Some problem areas can be anticipated and preventive measures can be taken to avoid these problems.

b. Evaluation. When the weather is extremely wet, we have discovered that the antenna connections on the M113A1's become wet and short out. These connections are around the base of the antenna where the antenna screws into the mount or where the antenna base on the top deck of the track connects with the matching unit beneath the top deck. When these connections become saturated, receiving and transmitting capabilities are seriously limited.

c. Recommendation. Crew members should continuously check the antenna mast base bolts to insure tightness, and insure that the mast itself is screwed down tight on the base. If these connections should become wet, they should be disconnected and dried out with a dry cloth. The gasket between the mast base and the top deck of the vehicle should be periodically checked and replaced if necessary. If these procedures are observed, communications problems of vehicular mounted radios in wet weather can be avoided.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Collapsible Intrenching Tool.

a. Observation. The new collapsible intrenching tool has been reported to be inferior to its forerunner. It is easier to carry but is inadequate for digging in rocky soil. The men using the new intrenching tool tire more rapidly due to the extra digging effort exerted.

b. Evaluation. If the new intrenching tool could maintain its present design but use a heavier metal in the blade, it would prove to be an advantage in the rocky terrain. The addition of a pick to the intrenching tool would be an advantage to the personnel using it, enabling them to soften the ground to be dug.

c. Recommendation. The new collapsible intrenching tool be modified to dig in rocky ground.

3. (C) SUBJECT: Lensatic Instrument Protection.

a. Observation. Due to the amount of rainfall during the monsoon period, lensatic instruments have the tendency to collect moisture

between the lenses. This moisture, especially noted on the boresight, M-45, renders them ineffective.

b. Evaluation. It has been found that this condensation can be almost completely prevented by putting desicant packets, the type found in the shipping cases of 4.2 fuses, into the instrument case when it is not in use.

c. Recommendation. Because lensatic instruments are frequently subjected to jarring and concussion, the use of desicant packets is necessary to supplement the seal of the instrument.

4. (C) SUBJECT: Shortage of Repair Parts for Rough Terrain Forklifts.

a. Observation: Repair parts for rough terrain forklifts were in short supply throughout the reporting period.

b. Evaluation. The deadline rate for rough terrain forklifts (28.3% of available days in November 1968; 41.7% of available days in December; and 25% of available days in January 1969) has had an adverse effect on the operations of the 23d Supply and Transport Battalion. To continue operations with this excessive level of deadline, operational forklifts are required to assume greatly increased workloads for longer periods of time.

c. Recommendation. If the existing shortage of repair parts is general throughout USARV, increased procurement and stockage efforts are required to achieve the necessary support base. If the shortage exists only locally, action should be taken to relocate in country stocks.

5. (C) SUBJECT: Recently Deployed Electronic Equipment - Radar Chronograph.

a. Observation. Lack of repair parts and handling instructions (for an item requiring special handling) impairs maintenance of recently developed electronic equipment.

b. Evaluation. An effective maintenance program can be accomplished only if repair parts are made available concurrent with the issue of newly developed equipment. Lack of instruction for items requiring special handling causes undue delay in maintenance operations. Radar chronographs are being air moved to US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, for general support maintenance, in accordance with instructions that it is the only in-country maintenance facility for division units.

c. Recommendation. Recently developed electronic equipment should be issued on a project basis with provisional repair parts package issued to direct support elements. Maintenance facilities should be provided with special handling instructions for equipment requiring them.

6. (C) SUBJECT: Amplifier AN-3349.

a. Observation. Improper cleaning of the cooling/fan system in amplifier AN-3349, is likely the cause of system outages.

b. Evaluation. The close tolerances of parts in the cooling/fan system of this amplifier makes proper and frequent cleaning of these parts mandatory.

c. Recommendation. A thorough washing with hot soapy water, followed by rinsing with hot water and allowing to air dry, is both sufficient and recommended. An alternate method of cleaning, somewhat less desirable, is a thorough "blowing out" with an air hose.

7. (C) SUBJECT: TT-4 and TT-76.

a. Observation. Constant running of the TT-4 and TT-76 when used in the poking position may cause unnecessary damage to the equipment.

b. Evaluation. Running any motor when not in actual use will cause wear to the moving parts which could otherwise be avoided.

c. Recommendation. Remember to turn off any TT-4 or TT-76 used in the poking position when it is not in use. The motor brushes will last longer that way.

8. (C) SUBJECT: Teletype Tape.

a. Observation. 0.875 width teletype tape with a pine wooden core is better than the paper fiber core.

b. Evaluation. Wooden core tape tends to warp considerably less in a moist climate than paper fiber core tape does, especially during shipment.

c. Recommendation. To get maximum efficiency and to minimize unnecessary losses, try to obtain pine wooden core tape whenever possible.

9. (C) SUBJECT: Telephone Lines.

a. Observation. Telephone lines often become grounded out during wet weather.

b. Evaluation. During wet weather, water may collect in junction panels, terminal boxes, ready access points, etc., and ground out the lines contained therein.

c. Recommendation. To prevent the accidental grounding of these lines, terminals should be well taped and canvas hung over them for protection from the weather.

10. (C) SUBJECT: Antenna AS 2169/G.

a. Observation. When raising the antenna for the AN/GRC-163 to certain heights (45 feet) it bends.

b. Evaluation. The guy plates are improperly spaced.

c. Recommendation. The guy plates should be placed 10 feet apart. The problem of bent mast sections would be eliminated through proper spacing of the guy plates.

11. (C) SUBJECT: Nylon Cables MX 1469/G.

a. Observation. The cables for the erection of the antenna AS 2169/G are usually entangled.

b. Evaluation. Entangled cables slow down the erection of an antenna.

c. Recommendation. Develop a reel for retrieving the cable.

12. (C) SUBJECT: Weather and its Effects on the AN/GRC-163.

a. Observation. Adequate protection from the elements is necessary for the GRC/163. The component which was most effected by the wet weather was the power supply (PP-2953).

b. Evaluation. If a rubber gasket were inserted on the power supply between the control plate and the case on the lower supply itself, it would stop most of the moisture from entering this component.

c. Recommendation. If the rubber gaskets are not readily available for the PP-2953, it should be covered completely so as not to interfere with communicating.

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13. (C) SUBJECT: Utilization of the KS-98 Camera when Climate is Subject to Extreme Changes.

a. Observation. On many occasions the flash bulb mechanism failed to go off when the shutter was released on the KS-98 camera.

b. Evaluation. Most of these occurrences may be attributed to condensation forming on the flash gun contacts when the camera is brought into an air-conditioned room from the outside.

c. Recommendation. The KS-98 camera should be conditioned to the air-conditioning for approximately twenty minutes prior to use.

14. (C) SUBJECT: Weapons Accounting for Casualties.

a. Observation. Casualties evacuated from the field directly to a hospital take their weapon and field equipment with them. If they are returned to duty, they recover their weapon and equipment. Those personnel who are further evacuated, are separated from their equipment and are unable to maintain any control over it. At this point, the whereabouts of the weapon and equipment become extremely confused and difficult to track down. Because of the distances between unit trains areas and various hospital locations, it is not possible for the unit supply sergeant to stop by the hospital and check on the man's equipment as a routine course of action.

b. Evaluation. It appears that there is no set procedure at some hospital facilities for notifying units of weapons and equipment belonging to evacuated personnel that should be picked up. At the present time, whenever a unit discovers the man is no longer in country, a lengthy series of phone calls must be made to discover where the man's weapon and mask is and who must be seen to claim these items back. If the weapon and equipment cannot be tracked down, a report of survey must be initiated.

c. Recommendation. Recommend that all hospital units initiate a standardized list of field gear and weapons. This list should be used to check off items of equipment brought with the patient, then sent through regular correspondence channels to the man's unit so that the unit supply personnel would be aware of the location of weapons and equipment to be picked up and thereby simplifying equipment accountability.

15. (C) SUBJECT: Gasket Failure in Drum, Collapsible, Fuel, 500 Gallon.

a. Observation. It has been observed that the gaskets used in 500 gallon collapsible drums are of such quality that they lose their sealing

capability very rapidly. These gaskets are in the dust cap, the check valve assembly and the hand valve. Apparently the gaskets were designed for stateside usage, not conditions encountered in Vietnam. A fuel residue is constantly in the drums and the gaskets are extremely vulnerable to corrosion.

b. Evaluation. Five hundred gallon drums are used in the supply of forward support elements since these drums are, to a large extent, hard to obtain in supply channels. Failure of the gaskets adversely affects the support of these elements.

c. Recommendation. It is recommended that the manufacturers of these gaskets improve upon their composition. Until that time, these gaskets should be extensively stocked in supply channels in order to expedite their replacement.

16. (C) SUBJECT: Fender Brace.

a. Observation. The 5 ton tractor right front fenders are breaking in four to five places.

b. Evaluation. The weight of the air filters on this fender is too heavy for the fender to support by itself. Therefore, it is breaking loose from the body and at the curves of the fender.

c. Recommendation. To prevent the fender from breaking, a supporting brace should be installed. The frame of the truck has two holes that can be utilized for mounting a short piece of angle iron. Another angle iron can be bolted to the fender. A steel pipe brace can be welded between the two angle irons to provide the required support for the air filter and thus prevent the fender from breaking.

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E. Civil Affairs/PSYOPS.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Development of PSYOP Resources.

a. Observation. Increased usage of loudspeaker equipment by maneuver battalions augments organic resources and enables the pacification program to be supported to fullest extent without loss of effectiveness in other campaigns.

b. Evaluation. Each maneuver battalion in the division presently possess loudspeaker set AN/UIH-5. This equipment can be operated by organic personnel who have received OJT on the use of the equipment and PSYOP techniques, thus providing the commander with ready access to PSYOP assets to support and enhance his tactical operations. It further allows each battalion a greater capability with which to conduct VIP missions, support MEDCAPS with PSYOP, exploit enemy vulnerabilities, inform local populace of atrocities, advertise and exploit civic action projects, and promote the GVN image. This capability within each battalion increases the flexibility of the combat loudspeaker (HB) team attached to each brigade and allows them more opportunities to work with district and province officials in support of the pacification campaign to supplement the missions of the battalion PSYOP teams, and to be an advisory and training vehicle designed to improve the overall PSYOP effectiveness of the brigade.

c. Recommendation. That commanders evaluate organic PSYOP resources and take necessary measures to insure optimum usage of battalion loudspeaker teams.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Use of the "Surrender or Die" Theme.

a. Observation. Recent operations within the division AO, and reports from other organizations operating against VC and NVA forces, have disclosed that the usage of the "Surrender or Die" ultimatum issued to certain VC and NVA units has only served to instill a more tenacious will to fight and strengthen opposition to surrender.

b. Evaluation. Reports of the above observation have been counteracted by reports where the "Surrender or Die" hard-line ultimatum has been very successful in breaking the resistance of the enemy and has led to his early surrender. The presence or absence of discipline, training, and competent leadership, appears to be the determining factor in the effectiveness of the theme. Hence, Main Force and NVA Regular units normally would be more resistant to the ultimatum, while Local Force units would be more susceptible. An alternate approach to the "Surrender or Die" pitch is a mellowed appeal to the individual's responsibility to himself and his family to live. This appeal would be made subsequent to acknowledgement of his bravery and ability as a soldier, and credible appraisal of the hopelessness of his situation and futility in continued resistance. This approach is designed to overcome the

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inherent dishonor associated with surrendor, and inform the individual that it is his obligation to live, even though confined, for eventual repatriation and future productive life subsequent to cessation of hostilities.

c. Recommendation. Commanders use discretion in usage of "Surrender or Die" ultimatum and consider relative factors in selection of appropriate theme.

3. (C) SUBJECT: Heliborne Broadcasts in Cordon and Search Operations.

a. Observation. Heliborne broadcast teams used for population control and Chieu Hoi appeals in Operation Russell Beach, contributed significantly to the success attained during the operation.

b. Evaluation. Full time access to a helicopter during the evacuation and cordon phases of Operation Russell Beach afforded the broadcast teams maximum opportunity to disseminate instructions, issue guidance, react quickly to requests, and exploit situations and vulnerabilities. This capability, and intelligence, professional PSYOP were primary reasons for the successful evacuation of over 10,000 refugees from the operational area, and contributed significantly to the acquistion of 32 Hoi Chanhs and the confinement of 218 VCI, 92 VCS, and 76 PW as of the end of the reporting period.

c. Recommendation. Planning for future cordon and search operations include provisions for PSYOP helicopter assets.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Jack L. Treadwell

1 Inclosure
Amcal Div Trp list

JACK L. TREADWELL
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

AVHGC-DST (10 Feb 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS-CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 24 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, Americal Division.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Operation of the OH-6A Helicopter, page 66, paragraph B1: concur. The in-country OH-6A Training Team is aware of the problem. Under the supervision of an instructor the problem/situation is duplicated and the student is taught recovery techniques.

b. Reference item concerning Pile Driving through Tactical Bridge Decking, page 67, paragraph B5: concur that the technique described is a worthwhile lesson learned.

c. Reference item concerning Use of Kit Carson Scouts, page 68, paragraph B6: concur. The recommendation is in keeping with the spirit of the Kit Carson Scout (KCS) Program, however employment of a KCS is an assumed security risk. An individual in the Chieu Hoi Center may be used on a combat operation to exploit fresh information, then returned to the Center. The suggestions were previously published in appropriate guidance documents.

d. Reference item concerning Collapsible Intrenching Tool, page 73, paragraph D2: concur. Recommendation for a heavier blade has been approved by DA. Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) advises that the addition of a pick to the intrenching tool is under consideration.

e. Reference item concerning Shortage of Repair Parts for Rough Terrain Forklifts, page 74, paragraph D4: nonconcur. Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) repair parts including rough terrain forklift parts are in short supply. Requirements for deadline parts should be submitted on RED BALL requisitions. Timely follow-up must be taken to insure that RED BALL requisitions remain valid.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS-CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

f. Reference item concerning Recently Deployed Electronic Equipment-Radar Chronograph, page 74, paragraph D5; concur. Direct support units were issued repair parts packages when the M36 chronograph was introduced to South Vietnam. A Weapons Command (WECOM) representative is currently in South Vietnam for a period of 45 days visiting every unit that has the chronograph and giving instruction on operation and all phases of maintenance. Preliminary reports from the field indicate that this technical assistance is tailored exactly to unit requirements and is doing much to improve the readiness posture of the chronograph.

g. Reference item concerning Nylon Cables, MX 1469/G, page 76, paragraph D11; nonconcur. Proper care during dismantling of antennas will preclude tangled guying cables. No action is recommended by higher headquarters.

h. Reference item concerning Utilization of the KS-98 Camera when climate is subject to extreme changes, page 77, paragraph D13. Nonconcur in the necessity for conditioning cameras as described. Two reasons for flash failures may be attributed to corrosion on contacts or weak batteries. The Unit will be contacted by a Southeast Asia Pictorial representative, who will render any assistance necessary.

i. Reference item concerning Weapons Accounting for Casualties, page 77, paragraph D14; concur. The 44th Medical Brigade published a memorandum (Memorandum 700-4, 28 February 1969) regarding accountability procedure for weapons. Weapons are taken from patients at the time of admittance and registered. For patients expected to be evacuated, a certified letter is sent to the patient's unit requesting pickup of the weapon within 15 days. If the weapon is not picked up in the specified time, the weapon is turned-in to the medical facility's supporting supply activity. One copy of the vouchered turn-in document is sent by certified mail to the patient's unit. Field equipment is either processed and returned to the patient upon discharge, or turned-in to the Property Salvage Officer or Direct Support Unit if the patient is further evacuated.

j. Reference item concerning Gasket Failure in Drum, Collapsible, Fuel, 500 Gallon, page 77, paragraph D15; concur. This is the first report received of the failure of this particular gasket; however, it is not unusual for these type materials to deteriorate rapidly in this climate. The Americal Division has been requested to submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR).

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k. Reference item concerning Fender Brace, page 78, paragraph D16; concur. The field fix, as described, has been successfully applied to several 5 ton tractors in the Americal Division. The fix provides adequate support for the air filter and has prevented further deterioration of the fenders. The unit has been advised to submit Equipment Improvement Recommendations (EIRs) describing the design weakness of the 5 ton tractor fenders; 50,000 EIRs have been submitted and a study is underway to develop an MWO to solve the problem. Recommend DA expedite an MWO publication.

l. Reference item concerning Use of the "Surrender or Die" Theme, page 79, paragraph E2: concur. The importance of audience analysis is established in current psychological operations doctrine.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. Wilson

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistent Adjutant General

Cy furn:
Americal Div

GPOP-DT(10 Feb 69) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Americal Div for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

UNCLASSIFIED
Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310	2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Confidential 2b. GROUP 4

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, Americal Division

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

CG, Americal Division

6. REPORT DATE 10 February 1969	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 92	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. b. PROJECT NO. c. N/A d.	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 691316 9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 20310

13. ABSTRACT

CONFIDENTIAL

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 1473

UNCLASSIFIED
Security Classification

END

DATE
FILMED

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