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WP5.0

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY, REFER TO

AGDA (H) (23 Oct 69) FOR OT UT 693290

30 October 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal
Division, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDP-GCLO

10 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969.

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I Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.

A. Command.

1. (C) Background. The Americal Division continued extensive operations during the reporting period. Enemy contacts varied from moderate to heavy in May, and declined to light and sporadic throughout June and July, with a noticeable decrease in enemy activity throughout the Tactical Area of Operational Interest.

2. (U) Command Changes.

a. General Officers. Major General Lloyd B. Ramsey became the Division Commander on 1 June 1969, replacing Major General Charles M. Gettys.

b. Brigade Commanders.

(1) Colonel Thomas H. Tackaberry assumed command of the 196th Inf Bde on 16 May 1969 from Colonel Fredrick J. Krosen.

(2) Colonel Jere O. Whittington assumed command of the 198th Inf Bde on 24 May 1969 from Colonel Robert B. Tully.

c. Battalion Commanders.

(1) 1st Bn, 20th Inf. LTC Robert E. Wilson assumed command from Major Wayne C. Harrington on 14 July 1969.

(2) 4th Bn, 3d Inf. LTC Robert N. Fernandes assumed command from LTC Albert J. Smith on 18 June 1969.

(3) 1st Bn, 46th Inf. LTC Craig G. Coverdale assumed command from LTC George R. Underhill on 14 June 1969.

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(4) 2d Bn, 1st Inf. LTC Clarence P. Campbell assumed command from LTC Sinclair L. Melner on 19 May 1969.

(5) 3d Bn, 21st Inf. LTC Eli P. Howard assumed command from LTC John W. Brandenburg on 15 July 1969.

(6) 4th Bn, 31st Inf. LTC Cecil M. Henry assumed command from LTC Robert S. Longino on 4 July 1969.

(7) 1st Bn, 6th Inf. LTC Thomas J. Ambrose assumed command from LTC Albert J. Dombrosky on 2 June 1969.

(8) 5th Bn, 46th Inf. LTC Julian F. Wagner assumed command from LTC Alfred Barnes on 24 May 1969.

(9) 123d Avn Bn. LTC Dietrich assumed command from LTC Brown on 17 July 1969.

(10) 3-16 Arty. LTC Foster assumed command from LTC Pilk on 1 June 1969.

(11) CLIC. LTC Coverdale assumed command from LTC Foster on 1 June 1969. LTC George R. Underhill assumed command from LTC Craig G. Coverdale on 14 June 1969. LTC Kenneth Skaer assumed command from LTC Underhill on 22 June 1969.

(12) ACC. LTC George R. Underhill assumed command from LTC Craig G. Coverdale on 14 June 1969. LTC Robert C. Jacob assumed command from LTC Underhill on 20 July 1969.

(13) 3-18th Arty. LTC William F. Sifiori, Jr., assumed command from LTC James R. Pruitt on 19 July 1969.

(14) 23d S&T. LTC Richard M. Maunwinder assumed command from LTC Edward Hishon on 3 May 1969.

(15) DISCOM. Colonel Joseph G. Clemens assumed command from Colonel Harry A. Janor on 26 July 1969.

(16) 14th Cav. Colonel Albert L. Townsend assumed command from Colonel Harry K. Drueger on 30 June 1969.

(17) 11th CAS. LTC Jerry L. Teague assumed command from LTC Robert E. Wilson on 30 June 1969.

(18) 3-82d Arty. LTC Knight assumed command from LTC Peloquin on 24 June 1969.

(19) 1-87d Arty. LTC James M. Compton assumed command from LTC John R. Luxemberger, Jr., on 3 July 1969.

(20) 523d Sig Bn. LTC Robert E. Barter assumed command from LTC Louis F. Harruder on 26 July 1969.

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3. (U) Staff Changes.

- a. LTC Sinclair I. Melner became ACoFS, G1, on 19 May 1969, replacing LTC Henry I. Lowder.
- b. LTC Francis A. Kerone became ACoFS, G2, on 6 July 1969, replacing LTC Robert B. Nelson.
- c. LTC Jack C. Davis became ACoFS, G3, on 15 June 1969, replacing LTC Richard D. Lawrence.
- d. LTC Albert J. Dombrosky became ACoFS, G5, on 19 June 1969, replacing LTC Robert L. Wetsel.
- e. LTC William B. Wilson, Jr. assumed the duties of Division Surgeon on 13 July 1969, replacing LTC Henry L. Robinson.
- f. LTC Arthur F. Fisher became the Inspector General on 15 July 1969, replacing LTC Eli P. Howard.
- g. LTC Thomas H. Davis replaced Major Barney I. Prannen as Staff Judge Advocate on 5 July 1969.
- h. LTC James E. Shaw became Division Chaplain on 27 July 1969, replacing LTC Francis J. Dolan, who departed the Command on 27 June 1969. LTC Jack C. Kandle took command in the interim.
- i. Major John T. Pauli became the Division Information Officer on 31 July 1969, replacing LTC Paul D. Partam.
- j. LTC Robert K. Cornell became Provost Marshal on 12 July 1969, replacing LTC Thomas J. Irwin.

4. (U) The following distinguished persons visited the Americal Division during the reporting period:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
EC BAKER	J1 CoFS (PMA) USMCV	4-5 May 69
LTC RICHARDS, USMC	OC, III MAF	5 May 69
EG STANLEY, USAF	ASST WING CDR, 1st MAFB A.F.	11 May 69
GEN. FAIRER	CINCPACAFAC	13-14 May 69
IE JACKELKA	ADC, 1st MAF BTV	14 May 69

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NAME	LOCATION	PERIOD
LTC STILLWELL	CG, XXIV CORPS	14 May 69
LTC MILLER	DET CG, USARV	15 May 69
IE HULL	MAC(S), 101st ABR DIV	16 May 69
EO TUAN	CG, 2d ARVN DIV	17 May 69
MAJ. JENNIS	COMPHIB FOR SEVENTH FLT	18 May 69
LTC NICKERSON	CG, III MAF	19 May 69
LTC LAM	CG, I CORPS	19 May 69
EO TOAN	CG, 2d ARVN DIV	19 May 69
ME SDFSON	CG, 1st MAR DIV	19 May 69
LTC COLLINS	ACofS FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT	20 May 69
EO LATEL	CG, USADCAV	21 May 69
LTC STILLWELL	CG, XXIV CORPS	23 May 69
GEN ADAMS	COMUSMACV	25 May 69
ME RANNEY	DOC, 1st LCT	25 May 69
EO CLARKE	CG, USASAPAC	26 May 69
EO TUAN	CG, 2d ARVN DIV	27 May 69
EO GALLAGHER	ACofS, MA, MACV	27-28 May 69
EO BURKE	DEP CoFS, PLAME, III MAF	29 May 69
ME WRIGHT	CG, 101st ABR DIV	29 May 69
COL PAUL	CHIEF, SJS HISTORY, MACV	30 May 69
LTC MILLER	DOC, USARV	1 Jun 69
LTC NICKERSON	CG, III MAF	1 Jun 69
LTC STILLWELL	CG, XXIV CORPS	1 Jun 69

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
MG PARKER	CG, ENGR COMD	1 Jun 69
MG DAVIDSON	ACofS, J2 MACV	1 Jun 69
EG FREELY	CG, FORCE LOG CMD, III MAF	1 Jun 69
EG CLAY	ACofS, J1 MACV	1 Jun 69
EG LEE	CG, 8th MARINE BDE	1 Jun 69
EG POTTS	J2 MACV	1 Jun 69
MR. DILLERY	PSA, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE	1 Jun 69
MR. BURKE	PSA, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE	1 Jun 69
COL HERSHEY	ACofS, G5, III MAF	4 Jun 69
COL HILL	EXECUTIVE ASST TO ACofS, J3 MACV	5 Jun 69
EG GUNN	CG, DANANG SPT COMD	6 Jun 69
EG HUNTER	DCG, DANANG SPT COMD	6 Jun 69
RADM BUNNER	COMNAUSUPACT, DANANG	6 Jun 69
RADM COMBS	COMNAUSUPACT, DANANG	6 Jun 69
MG DENHOLM	CG, USASA	7 Jun 69
COL HENDREN	USARV AG	8 Jun 69
COL KIMBALL	USARMS	10-11 Jun 69
COL LADSON	USACMCS	10-11 Jun 69
LTC JACOBS	USACGSC	10-11 Jun
LTC NICKERSON	CG, III MAF	13 Jun 69
COL WHITESIDES	USARPAC CHEMICAL OFFICER	13-14 Jun 69
GEN ROSEN	DEP COMUSMACV	14 Jun 69
EG JOHNSON	AWC, 1st MARINE A.W.	16-17 Jun 69

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
GEN ROSSON	DEP COMUSMACV	17 Jun 69
EG GUNN	CG, DANANG SPT COMD	18 Jun 69
GEN VINH	CHIEF, JCS, ARVN	20 Jun 69
EG TOAN	CG, 2d ARVN DIV	24 Jun 69
COL WILLIAMS	DEP DIR of DOC SYSTEMS, ACSFCR	24-25 Jun 69
COL REID	CG, ACTIV	24-25 Jun 69
COL COMEE	DEFENSE ATTACHE TO BRITISH EMB	26-27 Jun 69
EG REINZI	CG, 1st SIG BDE	28-29 Jun 69
EG BURDETT	CG, 1st AVN BDE	1-2 Jul 69
COL WITT	CO, 23d MED DEPOT	2-3-4 Jul 69
EG DULOCKI	ACofS, G3, III MAF	2 Jul 69
COL O'BRIEN	USARV AG (DES)	3-4 Jul 69
COL KOCH	DEP AG USARV	3-4 Jul 69
EG ALBRECHT	CG, 1st SIG BDE	4 Jul 69
COL MARKS	IG, OACofS, INTEL, DA	5-6 Jul 69
MG MAERY	CofS, USARV	7 Jul 69
MR. HARDIN	ASST FOR SEA TO ASA(R&D,O&A,R&D)	7-8 Jul 69
MG HEISER	CG, 1st LOG COMD	7 Jul 69
EG GUNN	CG, DANANG SUP COMD	7 Jul 69
MG PALMER	CG, ENGR TRCOPS, USARV	12 Jul 69
COL CLAUSEN	DEP SURGEON GENERAL, USARV	12-13-14 Jul 69
MG BOWMAN	DEP CG (DES) III MAF	12 Jul 69
COL WALDIE	DEP, INTEL DIV, G2, USARPAC	12-13 Jul 69

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
MG YOUNGDALE	DEP CG, III MAF	12 Jul 69
COL HOWE	DEP G2, III MAF	14 Jul 69
COL MACDONALD	CofS, 101st ABN DIV	15 Jul 69
MR. GERANIS	CONSEC, MACV	16 Jul 69
COL FALL	DEP SURGEON, USARPAC	17-18 Jul 69
BO TOAN	CG, 2d ARVN DIV	18 Jul 69
COL WALTERS	DIR, DASC VICTOR	17 Jul 69
MG HEISER	CG, 1st LOG COMB	21-22 Jul 69
COL LEDBETTER	CHIEF PERSONNEL OFF, USARV SURO	23-24 Jul 69
COL KIRKE	MACV CHEMICAL OFFICER	25-26 Jul 69
COL REIMAN	ACofS, G5, III MAF	28 Jul 69
LTC FLEMING	I CORPS LNO, CDC	29 Jul 69
COL MURRAY	NEUROPSYCHIATRIC CONSULTANT TO USARV SURGEON	29 Jul 69
COL SHERIFF	CUSTOMER ASSISTANCE OFF, AMC	31 Jul 69
COL DYER	C.A.O. ASSISTANCE OFF, USARV	31 Jul 69
LTC RICKERSON	CG, III MAF	31 Jul 69
BO CHASTLE	MACV, J6	31 Jul 69

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B. (U) Personnel.

1. (U) Finance.

a. Activity during the period 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 was restricted to consolidation and adjustment of the manning levels for operating components of the finance section. In the previous report covering the period 1 February to 30 April 1969, it was reported that fifteen spaces were to be authorized as overstrengths to raise manning levels to a total of 188 officer and enlisted strengths. As a consequence of the disapproval of this authorized overstrength by higher headquarters, the reduced manning level of one hundred and seventy-three (173) officers and enlisted personnel had to be reallocated among functional elements to meet requirements in order of priority. A realignment of five enlisted and one officer records teams into three equal branches saved two positions and increased per capita workload was required to absorb the additional thirteen spaces.

b. During this period, the military banking facility continued to grow with approximately seven thousand (7000) accounts by the end of the period. Though readily accepted by personnel, difficulties continued to arise in providing check cashing service to field troops.

c. During this reported period, a loss by rotation of forty-four (44) enlisted personnel was only partially offset by twenty-nine (29) enlisted replacements. The increased workloads caused by summer rotations, annual leave audit, preparations for pay raise, and changes from service number to social security account number was accomplished without diminution of finance service.

d. Selected workload statistics for the period:

	<u>May 1969</u>	<u>June 1969</u>	<u>July 1969</u>
Payrolls Prepared	383	380	385
Regular Monthly Vouchers	26,954	26,722	27,243
PCS Travel Vouchers	3,228	3,429	4,776
TDY Travel Vouchers	317	378	409
Counter Payments	6,574	6,283	7,224
Allotments Processed	2,751	2,905	2,674
In/Out Processing	5,446	6,405	7,704
Cash Disbursements	\$6,029,560.50	\$6,031,323.91	\$6,475,065.63
Check Disbursements	\$653,012.01	\$1,047,759.79	\$1,090,109.31

2. (U) Provost Marshal.

a. During the reporting period five (5) PW collecting points were operated. The five PW collecting points processed the following number of detainees:

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(1) Total detainees processed	1724
(2) PW	63
(3) CD	547
(4) IC	941
(5) CH	44
(6) Holds (MI-CID-MP)	129

b. There was a total of 74 US Government vehicles reported as stolen during this reporting period. Seven vehicles were reported recovered.

c. A total of 171 cases of possession and/or use of marijuana and other harmful drugs were reported.

d. Resources control activities were at a low level during the reporting period due to stringent restrictions on search and seizure of contraband and blackmarket items in the possession of VN Nationals outside base camp. However, the following figures are considered significant due to the fact that most contraband was found by MP gate guards in the possession of VN Nationals attempting to depart from Chu Lai installation.

MPC		1327.75
Cigarettes	Cartons	256
Beer	Cases	120
Soda	Cases	229
Sugar	Lbs.	2,700
Shortening	10 lbs.	162

3. (U) Surgeon. During the reporting period a completely new program of physically moving the DUSTOFF Commander and the Division Surgeon to the forward LZ to give demonstrations and lectures on proper DUSTOFF calling procedures as well as classifications has resulted in a clearer understanding of the system and should result in better service in the future. All battalions in the division will be visited to brief key personnel.

4. (U) Personnel Administration, Morale and Discipline. On and after 15 May 1969, any individual who sustains a wound as defined by paragraph 34a, AR 672-5-1, which is due to enemy action and for whom a hostile casualty report was submitted is awarded the Purple Heart without submission of the USAFV Form 157-R (Recommendation for Decoration for Valor or Merit) and the USAFV Form 1300 (Field Medical Treatment Card). Authority for such award is the USAFV Form 130-R (United States Army Vietnam Casualty Reporting Format) reflecting a hostile action which did not

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result in death of the individual. This new procedure was introduced to facilitate processing of the award of the Purple Heart in a more expedient and accurate manner. By extracting the information from the casualty report the day after an individual is reported as a casualty, the Purple Heart is processed to completion in a two day period. Under the previous procedure, Purple Hearts were processed to completion in a minimum of 25 days. The new procedure has also proved much more accurate and timely in that often units did not prepare and submit the USARV Form 157-M for individuals who were wounded, or submitted it months after the date of the wound.

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(HCS-C3FOR-65) (RI) (U)

C. Intelligence

1. (C) Enemy Situation

a. Quang Nam/Quang Tin

(1) From 1 through 10 May 1969, enemy forces avoided contact with Allied forces while preparing for sustained offensive activities to begin in the middle of May 1969. Light contact during this period accounted for 97 VC/NVA KIA. One relatively large weapons and ammunition cache was discovered in the vicinity of BT 1201 by elements of the 196th Inf Bde on 7 May 1969. The cache contained 48 individual weapons, one 122mm rocket, 126 cases of small arms ammo, 107 rounds of assorted mortar and 57 rounds of 82 ammunition, 44 RPG rounds, 1,732 ChiCom M/Gren's, and assorted explosives. There was a sharp increase in enemy activity as the Summer Offensive began on 12 May 1969 with a series of attacks by fire and maneuver against LZ's, NIF's, and fixed installations. The 1st NF Regt, 2d NVA Div reentered the Americal OE from Dai Loc (D), Quang Nam (P) to reinforce elements of the 3d Regt, 2d NVA Div which were already deployed in the northeastern portion of Nam Duc (D). Detainees, IR, and APD missions indicated that elements of the 1st NF Regt had moved into western Tien Phuoc (D) in the beginning of May. In the Old Nam Duc area, the Regiment split into two groups, with the 40th and 60th Battalions maneuvering north of the Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDG Camp; and the Regimental HQ's and the 90th Battalion following a route which ran along the Nam Duc/Tien Phuoc District border area south of LZ Professional. Both groups met in east-central Tam K District where the units reorganized in preparation for the attack on Nui Yon CP, via BT 2416. On 12 May, LZ's Professional, Baldy, and Center were subjected to ground and/or sapper attacks resulting in 48 NVA KIA at LZ Professional, 40 NVA KIA at LZ Baldy, and 4 NVA KIA at LZ Center. The CLDC, Hank Hill, and Thang Binh District HQ's received approximately 30 rounds of 122mm Rocket fire throughout the week. LZ's Professional, Center, Ross, Baldy, Hank Hill, Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDG Camp and various NIF's received over 300 rounds of mixed mortar fire, with LZ Professional receiving over 90 rounds of mixed mortar fire on 13 May. Nui Yon Outpost was overrun on 12 May 1969, by an enemy force later identified as elements of the 40th and 90th Battalions of the 1st NF Regiment. Elements of the 196th Inf Bde and the 5th ARVN Regiment retook the CP on 15 May 1969, finding 53 NVA killed by artillery and air strikes. Further contact in this area accounted for 72 NVA KIA. Although certain individual enemy units sustained relatively heavy casualties during this period, nearly all enemy forces remained at a high level of combat effectiveness and were prepared to carry out sustained offensive activities. This was evidenced by the fact that the 1st NF Regiment, 2d NVA Division did not move out of the area of contact, but preferred to remain in defensive positions, as had the 3d NVA Regiment, 2d NVA Division. This was further evidenced by the locations of anti-tank units from both the 1st and 3d Regiments

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which were identified by PW's as being dispersed in 1-man tank killer teams along the Tam Phuoc (D) area. Contact throughout the period of 11 through 17 May 1969 accounted for 332 VC/NVA KIA. Enemy activity dropped sharply in the week following the initiation of the offensive. Moderate contact, generally concentrated in the LZ Young/Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDG Camp area, the northern portion of Base Area 117, and the area 12km west of Tam Ky City, accounted for 278 VC/NVA KIA. During this period of time, the 1st NF Regiment remained in the same general area, just east of Base Area 117. The Regiment managed to avoid any major contact with Allied forces during this time. A PW reported that the 80th Battalion, 21st NVA Regiment had moved to Tam Ky (D) to support the 1st NF Regiment. The Regiment suffered moderately heavy casualties in previous weeks. As a result, the 2d NVA Division HQ's had assigned the 80th Battalion to support the 1st NF Regiment in its combat operations. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 3d NVA Regiment continued to operate in the vicinity of the Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDG Camp/LZ Professional area during this period. The 3d NVA Regiment HQ's and the 3d Battalion were forced out of their base area southwest of Base Area 117 by B-52 strikes and Allied sweep operations, into the vicinity of BT 1600. By the last week of May, the 3d NVA Regiment HQ's and the 3d Battalion had relocated in the vicinity of BT 1618. The most significant change in enemy disposition during the latter half of May was the relocation of the 2d NVA Division HQ's south of Base Area 117, in the vicinity of BT 2198. This move by the Division HQ's was an attempt to allow for better control of its subordinate Regiments, operating in both southern Quang Tin (P) and northern Quang Ngai (P). LZ's Professional, Center, Hawk Hill, Young, East, the CLDC, and various NRP's received over 190 rounds of mixed mortar fire throughout the latter half of May 1969. Contact throughout the month of May had accounted for 707 VC/NVA KIA, while Allied LZ's, NRP's and fixed installations received over 490 rounds of mixed mortar fire.

(2) The early part of June was characterized by light contacts and attacks by fire against isolated LZ's and NRP's. By 11 June 1969, preparations for the next phase of the Summer Offensive had been completed and enemy forces launched a series of attacks against strategic Allied positions. The most significant thrust of the initial part of this offensive occurred when elements of the GR-35 Sapper/Recon Battalion, 2d NVA Division penetrated LZ East, resulting in 27 NVA KIA in the vicinity of the LZ. The discovery of an LPO-50 flamethrower confirmed the fact that the 2d NVA Division does possess a flamethrower capability; a possibility which had been unconfirmed until this attack. In marked contrast to the previous week, over 200 rounds of mixed mortar ammunition were expended from 8 through 14 June 1969, with LZ Young receiving 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 9 June 1969. Throughout the week, Hawk Hill and the CLDC received 19 and 13 rounds of 122mm rocket fire, respectively, while various LZ's and NRP's received over 50 rounds of

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57/75mm recoilless rifle fire. During the 2d week of June 1969, agent reports, heavy IR readings, and moderate contact indicated that the 70th NF Battalion had moved out of its normal AO, north of Base Area 117, to the vicinity of BT 1847, 5km east of LZ Baldy. This was an indication that the 70th NF as well as the 72d LF Battalion had been given the assignment of disrupting the pacification program in Thang Binh (D). There were 365 VC/NVA KIA during the first 2 weeks of June 1969. The latter half of June evidenced a marked decrease in enemy activity as enemy forces conducted limited attacks by fire against LZ's, HUP's, the Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDO Camp and the CIDG Camp and the CLDC. Allied offensive activity, however, increased during this period accounting for 390 VC/NVA KIA. On 18 June 1969, elements of the 5th ARVN Regiment found an additional 100 NVA KIA in graves, in the vicinity of BT 2011. Documents found in this area identified the 40th Battalion, 1st NF Regiment as the unit involved. Heavy contact in the same area during the previous week also indicated that these KIA were probably from the 1st NF Regiment. The 3d NVA Regiment had continued to operate in the area immediately south of LZ Center, as demonstrated by the discovery of 30 NVA KIA in the vicinity of BT 0821 on 28 June 1969. The 70th NF and 72d LF Battalions remained in the coastal area of Thang Binh (D) as 23 enemy were KIA in the vicinity of BT 2537 on 28 June 1969. There were 755 VC/NVA KIA during the month of June 1969, while over 355 rounds of mixed mortar ammunition were expended on Allied positions.

(3) There was no appreciable change in the pattern of enemy activity during the month of July 1969. Enemy activity continued at a low level as enemy forces successfully avoided major contact with Allied forces. Two of the largest caches found in the Americal OZ were discovered by elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division in the vicinity of AS 9395 and AS 9797 on 2 July 1969. The combined caches contained the following: 895 82mm mortar rounds, 790 60mm mortar rounds, 13 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 27 57mm recoilless rifle rounds, 37 122mm rockets, 8 140mm rockets, 440 RPG rounds, 13 cases of AK-47 ammunition, 10 cases of S&S ammunition, 19 cases of blasting caps, numerous mortar fuses, 39 S&S's, 72 AK-47's, and 3 complete 60mm mortars. These finds confirmed previous indications of an increase in the infiltration of men and materials in the Americal OZ, with a corresponding increase in concentration on supply and transportation elements. A PW from a unit of the 230th Transportation Regiment, captured on 5 July in the vicinity of BS 0295, stated that his Battalion HQ's was located in the vicinity of AS 9797 as of 30 June 1969, with companies dispersed within a one hour walk from the HQ's. There have been increasing indications that transportation elements subordinate to Military Region 5 have been moving closer to the coastal area, possibly to expedite transportation through Allied Operational areas. During the first three weeks of July 1969, the area of greatest enemy activity occurred in a region 1-7km north of LZ Baldy where approximately 70 VC/NVA were killed in contact with Allied forces.

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The enemy unit believed to be involved in these contacts is the V-25 LF Battalion which recently moved into the northeastern region of the Americal CZ. Scattered contacts with squad size enemy units occurred in Base Area 117 and in an area approximately 7km northwest of LZ West in the vicinity of AT 9632. Elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division continued to uncover enemy base camps and caches in operations south of Base Area 117. On 8 July 1969, members of IERP Team Georgia led B/1-6th, 198th Inf Bde to an elaborate base camp in the vicinity of BS 1499, which was discovered on a previous reconnaissance patrol. This camp contained 2 large buildings, cooking facilities, livestock pens, and a shower room with a running water supply constructed of bamboo pipes. On 18 July 1969, in the vicinity of BS 2899, elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division found an NVA Base Camp and Hospital complex of 27 huts. A further search of the area resulted in the finding of graves containing 25 NVA. The 3d NVA Regiment continues to operate in central Tien Phuoc (D) while reports indicate that the 1st NF Regiment is moving south into Quang Ngai (P) to assist NVA/NF units in future offensive activities. Due to information obtained from a PW captured on 18 July 1969 in the vicinity of BF 0747, the GK-33 mortar Battalion, 2d NVA Division is located in western Que Son (D) in the vicinity of AT 9438. While reports indicating an upcoming enemy offensive have decreased during the last two weeks of July, it is thought that NVA, NF and LF units operating in Quang Nam/Quang Tin (P) still possess the capability to launch an offensive in the month of August 1969. During the period 1 through 31 July 1969, there were 476 VC/NVA killed in scattered contacts throughout Quang Nam/Quang Tin (P). Enemy units directed approximately 66 rounds of mixed mortar fire against Allied installations.

b. Quang Ngai

(1) The relatively low level of activity which prevailed through the last weeks in April continued during the first week and one-half of May. Incidents were characterized by scattered harassing attacks by fire and moderate contact. Documents captured in the vicinity of inactive BA 118 and inactive BA 120 identified the unknown regimental size force in that area as the 21st NVA Regt, 2d NVA Div. Further information revealed that the 21st NVA Regt had the objective of attacking and occupying the area around LZ Stinson. PW's and documents have stated that due to the losses of the 81st LF Bn, the battalion was downgraded to a company with approximately 100 men. Enemy units began moving to their staging areas as the final preparations for the renewed offensive were being completed. The 2d NF Regt HQ and the 93d NF Bn, 2d NF Regt, moved from inactive BA 123 to inactive BA 124. The 97th NF Bn moved from southcentral Nghia Hanh (D) to an area on the Ba To/Duc Pho (D) border and the 95th NF Bn, 2d NF Regt moved from an area south of LZ San Juan Hill to the Ba To/Duc Pho (D) border just south of the 97th NF Bn. The 22d NVA Regt, 3d NVA Div moved out of BA 121 with the 7th Bn relocating in western Nghia Hanh (D), the HQ and 8th NVA Bn locating on the Nghia Hanh (D)/No Duc (D)

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border and the 9th NVA Bn locating in eastern Tu Nghia (D). In addition to the 22d FFA Regt, several of the battalions subordinate to the Quang Ngai (P) force moved toward Quang Ngai City further indicating that Quang Ngai City was to be a major target during the coming offensive. A PW from the 9th NVA Bn, 22d NVA Regt stated that the 9th NVA Bn had been conducting reconnaissance of the area southeast of Quang Ngai City since 11 May 1969, and that the battalion had the objective of attacking the city by 19 May 1969 (Ho Chi Minh's birthday). Early in the morning of 12 May 1969, the enemy launched well coordinated attacks by fire against all major LZ's, District HQ's and some population centers. Also on 12 May 1969, LZ Snoopy and LZ Buff received light ground attacks which were repelled, resulting in 23 VC KIA and 25 VC KIA respectively. On 11 and 13 May 1969, a total of 65 NVA bodies were discovered by 1/4th ARVN Bn as a result of BDA conducted for an Arelight strike via BS 6145 and BS 6147. On 21 May 1969, the 3/16th ARVN Bn engaged an estimated 2 VC Companies, thought to be elements of the 48th LF Bn, resulting in 15 VC KIA. The attacks by fire and sporadic contacts continued from 12 through 24 May 1969 accounting for a total of 331 VC/NVA KIA, 557-575 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire directed against Allied installations and 13 rounds of 140mm rocket fire directed against LZ Bronco. During the last week of May 1969 (25-31 May 1969), enemy initiated activity decreased, characterized by attacks by fire and scattered contact resulting in 135 VC/NVA KIA. On 31 May 1969 elements of the 11th Inf Bde and E/1st Cav engaged an UNSF via BS 810 420 resulting in 28 NVA KIA. Also on 31 May 1969 elements of the 198th Inf Bde and F/8th Cav engaged and killed 20 VC via BS 5780 in a series of small contacts. Documents captured by the 11th Inf Bde stated that the 7th NVA Bn, 22d NVA Regt, 3d NVA Division will remain north of the Song Tra Cau and support the 2d NF Regt which is targeted against the 11th Inf Bde. Throughout the month of May, a total of 597 VC/NVA were killed by Americal forces. Allied installations and NDF's received a total of approximately 637-657 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire.

(2) The month of June began with a generally low level of activity. A document captured on 6 June 1969 from the 5th Bn, AKA 70th Bn, 21st NVA Regt revealed a dated schedule of events to include movement of ammunition and food supplies as well as training to completed by 7 June 1969. This agreed with captured PW's and agent reports indicating an offensive phase to begin prior to Mid-June 1969. The first week of June demonstrated a decrease of enemy initiated activity with 18 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire directed at Americal Forces. Scattered contacts during the week resulting in 122 VC/NVA KIA. The relatively slow pace of the two previous weeks was sharply interrupted when the enemy launched attacks by fire during the second week of June. On 11 June 1969, LZ Lis received all night ground attack which was repelled resulting in 14 NVA KIA. On 14 June 1969, LZ Don received 2 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. In addition LZ Debbie, LZ Dotie, LZ Jeff, and LZ San Juan Hill also

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came under attack throughout the week. Several contacts were also made west of LZ Bronco which were thought to be elements of the 2d MF Regt, 3d NVA Div. Throughout the week there were approximately 131 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire directed against ARVN and US installations. LZ Bronco received 4-6 rounds of 140mm rocket fire in two separate attacks. Activity for the week resulted in 258 VC/NVA KIA. Also during the week the 90th Engr Bn, 3d NVA Div previously unlocated in Quang Ngai (P), was located vicinity BS 6543 due to statements of a PW and a Hoi Chanh from this unit. Attacks by fire continued through the final two weeks of June. On 15 June 1969, the Tra Khuc Bridge came under mortar attack, followed by an unsuccessful ground assault from three directions, resulting in 16 VC KIA. Documents found on dead bodies identified the following units as participating in the attack: 81st LF Co, 506th A LF Sapper Co, subordinate to the 525th LF Sapper Bn, and the C-137 Co AKA Son Tinh (D) Force unit. On 17 June 1969, LZ San Juan Hill received a sapper attack from 17 NVA resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 1 NVA CIA. A later interrogation of a PW revealed the attacking unit was the 90th Engr Bn, 3d NVA Div. Scattered attacks by fire and small ground probes continued. On 22 June 1969, vicinity BS 820 346, a convoy was ambushed by 2 NVA Companies resulting in 3 NVA CIA. The PW's identified the units as the 1st and 2d Companies, 95th MF Regt. On 23 June 1969, LZ Bronco received 20 rounds of 75mm ER, 50 EPG rounds, 25-30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and a light sapper attack which was repelled, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. In a sweep conducted on 29 June and 2 July 1969 vicinity BS 4080, BS 4380, BS 3881 and BS 4082, elements of the 198th Inf Bde found 4,500 lbs of rice in two caches vicinity BS 485 804 and BS 478 833. From 29 June to 1 July 1969, elements of the 11th Inf Bde found a total of 3,800 lbs of rice vic BS 7540. The disposition of enemy units was fairly static during the month of June. The 2d MF Regt Headquarters, 93d Bn, and 97th Bn operated in the eastern portion of inactive BA 123 and along the Duc Pho (D) and Ba To (D) border. The 95th Bn, 2d MF Regt operated north of inactive BA 124. The 21st NVA Regt Headquarters, 2d NVA Div operated in the western portion of Son Tinh (U). The 60th Bn, 21st NVA Regt was located between inactive BA 118 and LZ Stinson while the 70th Bn, 21st NVA Regt was located east of LZ Stinson vicinity BS 5886. The 80th Bn, 21st NVA Regt remained opcon to the 1st MF Regt, 2d NVA Regt in Quang Tin (P), until the 28th June when it rejoined the 21st NVA Regt Headquarters. During the early part of June the 22d NVA Regt was located vicinity of the middle Song Ve Valley and operated vicinity inactive BA 123 for the remainder of June 1969. During the period 1-30 June 1969, there were approximately 254 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire directed against Allied NDF's and installations. There was a total of 675 VC/NVA KIA in scattered contacts throughout Quang Ngai (P).

(3) Activity in Quang Ngai (P) during the first two weeks of July was at a low level characterized by light, scattered contacts. On 2 July 1969, F/1-1st Cav and A/3-1st Inf engaged an UNKSF, vic BS 841 294,

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resulting in 15 NVA KIA, 3 x RPG's and 4 x AK-47's CIA. Documents found on the bodies identified the enemy unit in contact as the 3d Co, 95th MF Bn, 2d MF Regt, 3d NVA Div. As in June, the disposition of enemy units remained fairly static. The 2d MF Regt moved south of inactive BA 124 to operate from southeastern Ba To (D) to southern Duc Pho (D). The 21st NVA Regt HQ and 80th Bn, 21st NVA Regt, 2d NVA Div operated near inactive BA 118. The 60th Bn, 21st NVA Regt and the 70th Bn, 21st NVA Regt operated northwest of LZ Stinson vic BS 4885 and vic BS 4989, respectively. The 22d NVA Regt, 3d NVA Div continued to operate in the Song Ve Valley with the exception of the 9th Bn which was located vic BS 5661. A Hoi Chanh from the 4th Co, 7th Bn, 22d NVA Regt, 3d NVA Div who rallied on 11 July 1969, stated that his company was located vic BS 652 245. A PW from the 36th Transportation Co, 22d NVA Regt, 3d NVA Div stated that his company was located vic BS 307: 500 on 3 July 1969. During the third week of July, enemy activity in Quang Ngai (P) increased over the first two weeks of the month, and was characterized by scattered contacts. As in the first two weeks of July, enemy disposition remained fairly static with the 21st NVA Regt, 2d NVA Div operating south-east of inactive BA 118, the 22d NVA Regt, 3d NVA Div operating in the Song Ve Valley, and the 2d MF Regt, 3d NVA Div operating southeast of inactive BS 124. The 107th NVA Hvy Wpns Bn moved to vic BS 5575 and the 526th LP Sapper Bn moved to vic BS 5774. On 14 July 1969, FSB 411 (BS 539 731) received a ground probe from an unidentified UNSEF resulting in 4 VC KIA and DMC. Also on 14 July, elements of the 3-1st Inf, 11th Bde engaged an unidentified UNSEF vic BS 741 319 resulting in 6 NVA KIA and 2 DMC. At 160200H July 1969, LZ Debbie received 5 RPG rds 15-20 x Chicom H/grenades 15-20 x Russian H/grenades, and a sapper attack from 6-10 NVA from an unidentified element of the 2d MF Regt, 3d NVA Div. At 160425H July, LZ Bronco received 7-10 x RPG rds, SA/AN fire, and a sapper attack from an unidentified element of the 2d MF Regt, 3d NVA Div, resulting in 6 NVA KIA, 4 DMC, and 50 x Chicom H/grenades CIA. On 19 July 1969, D/3-1st Inf 11th Bde engaged an estimated NVA Co vic BS 720 410 resulting in 6 NVA KIA, 3 DMC, and 1 CSWC. Also on 19 July 1969, B/3-1st Inf, 11th Bde engaged an UNSEF vic BS 723 410 resulting in 5 NVA KIA, 1 DMC and CSWC. During the week, as in the previous two weeks, there was a noticeable decrease of attacks by fire with only 39-44 rds of 60/82mm mortar fire directed against Allied LZ's and NDF's. Throughout the week, elements of the 198th Inf Bde found 10,475 lbs of rice vic BS 737 458, BS 4081, BS 4981, and BS 7883; and destroyed 32 bunkers and 10 tunnels vic BS 5775 and BS 5483. Elements of the 11th Inf Bde, found 31,600 lbs of rice vic BS 737 458, BS 784 475 and BS 745 456, a base camp vic BS 736 310 containing 15 huts with tunnels, 1 sewing machine, and tank silhouettes. Elements of the 11th Inf Bde also found an aid station vic BS 740 316 containing 9 huts with 20-25 beds built into the walls, and two stretchers. Enemy activity remained at a low level through the remainder of the month characterized by a decrease of enemy initiated activity, with only 3 significant contacts. The first contact occurred on 23 July 1969, when elements of the 4-21 Inf, 11th Bde, engaged 15 VC/NVA vic BS 856347 and BS 857349 resulting in 12 VC KIA, 2 NVA KIA, 5 DMC and 1 CSWC. On 27 July 1969, CC/5-46 Inf and

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and USAF FAC engaged an estimated VC Platoon vic BS 744833 resulting in 7 VC KIA and on 28 July 1969, 176 Avn engaged 18 VC vic BS 719834 resulting in 7 VC KIA. A corporal from the 2d Sapper Bn, MR-5, who rallied on 20 July stated that the 2d Sapper Bn, with a strength of 400 men, was located vic BS 644362. The key personalities given by the returnees agreed with those given by the two PW's from the 9th Bn, 305th L's, captured in the same vicinity on 26 June 1959. During the last week of the month over 300 refugees arrived at FSB 411 and asked to be resettled. With VC/NVA units located along the banks of the Song Tra Khuc and with FSB 411 located nearby, the refugees were apparently afraid they would find themselves in a battle area. Throughout the month of July 1969, there was a total of approximately 154-160 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire directed against Allied LZ's and NDF's. There was a total of 282 VC/NVA KIA in scattered contacts throughout Quang Ngai (P).

2. (C) G2 Section: Summary of Significant Activities

The G2 section continued its normal intelligence operations for the past quarter. The month of May saw the creation of the G2 Target Mission Force Platoon, an outgrowth of Project "Duffel Bag". As new school trained personnel arrived, the expansion of sensor coverage was initiated. A secure radio net was established, and requests for additional equipment were made. By 1 June 1969, the Chu Lai "Rocket Pocket" sensor field had reached its maximum number of RF sensors. The enemy's one attempt to fire rockets at Chu Lai from the Rocket Pocket was interrupted on 8 June, and seven 122mm rockets were captured. Sensor intelligence gave a 12 minute prior warning of that attack. Target Mission Force has established a sensor capability in each brigade. Presently there are operational sensor fields in all brigade LZ's. The monitoring sites are located at: Hill 270, BT 420048(198th), LZ Pineapple, BS 371966(Div), LZ Bronco, BS 812383(11th), and LZ Professional, BT 176070(196th). For the period of 1 May to 4 June, 52 targets were detected. 34 were engaged by artillery, 4 by small arms, and 14 received negative clearance. Sensor equipment has proven to be of definite value in area reconnaissance, OP defense, base camp monitoring, and economy of force operations. Priorities of future sensor locations have been set as OP1, BS 516778, and the Rock Crusher, BT 108428. All sensor fields continue to grow and to be serviced. A sensor officer has been assigned to the 198th Bde and additional sensor officers arrive, they will be allotted to the 11th and the 196th Bde.

The G2 Air Section's reconnaissance missions continued to obtain timely information of enemy locations and infiltration routes. During the reporting period 773 Infra-Red Missions, 160 SLAR Missions, 70 APD Missions, 535 Photo Missions, and 1046 Visual Reconnaissance Missions were completed. A total of 4025 targets were acquired as a result of Infra-Red and SLAR missions. Of these 334 were engaged by artillery fire.

3. (U) Military Intelligence Detachment: Summary of Significant Activities

a. (C) Counterintelligence:

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(1) During the reporting period there were no reportable incidents of known sabotage, subversion, or espionage.

(2) During the reporting period three spot security checks of eligible draft-age males were conducted on the Chu Lai installation. A total of 121 males were apprehended and turned over to Ly Tin District Headquarters for processing into the Vietnamese Army. This brings the total of eligible draft age males apprehended on Chu Lai to 162.

(3) Investigations concerning Vietnamese Nationals showed a slight decrease during this quarter as compared to last quarter. During the reporting period, 17 investigations were conducted as compared to 24 reported the last quarter. This is a marked improvement from the quarter of November, December, and January, when a total of 97 investigations were conducted. This significant reduction is attributable mainly to better security procedures used on base.

(4) During this reporting period, the Counterintelligence Section case officers conducted approximately 510 Source Meetings and turned in over 532 Information Reports. These figures include approximately 30 oral reports which were not followed up by written memoranda. This quarter shows a substantial increase over the 440 Source Meetings held in the last quarter which yielded only 372 Information Reports. The quarter for November, December, and January recorded only 306 Information Reports being filed. The marked increase in Source Meetings and in the number of Information Reports is due in part to an increase in the number of language-qualified agents assigned to the unit. The accuracy/reliability of the reports remains consistent, with Source evaluations of "B" and "C", and Information evaluations of "2" and "3".

(5) During the quarter, there were a number of reports from sources which were acted upon by mounting operations in which the agents and the sources participated. A brief summary of six of the more significant operations, with the results, follows:

(a) On 10 May 1969, an agent, one interpreter, and two sources accompanied the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2-1 Inf Bn, on an operation based upon information received from the sources. The operation resulted in over three tons of unpolished rice captured and extracted, along with 300 lbs of sugar.

(b) On 11 May, the above team again accompanied the Recon Plt, 2-1 Inf Bn, and captured and extracted over one ton of polished rice.

(c) On 5 June 1969, an agent and a source led elements of B/3-1 to a VC tunnel in the vicinity of BS 929268. While the unit exchanged small arms fire and hand grenades with the enemy force, the agent interrogated three VC CIA and learned that the tunnel complex contained

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approximately 20 VC/NVA. Results of the operation were: 4 VC KIA, 12 NVA KIA, 3 VC CIA, 1 NVA CIA, and 1 AR47 CIA.

(d) On 21 June 1969, an agent, one interpreter, and a source were dispatched with B/2-1 Inf Bn to locate a rice cache based upon information provided by the source. The operation resulted in 2,500 lbs of polished rice captured and extracted.

(e) On 23 June 1969, an agent, one interpreter, and a source accompanied B/2-1 Inf Bn on a mission to seize a rice cache based upon information provided by the source. The operation resulted in 2,500 lbs of unpolished rice captured and extracted.

(f) On 27 June 1969, two agents accompanied personnel from 1/6 Inf Bn to BT 531990 as a result of information provided by a casual informant. A rice cache containing 600 lbs of unpolished rice was found and destroyed.

(6) During the final quarter, Fiscal Year 1969, the Volunteer Informant Program showed a slight decrease in the expenditure of funds, yet had an increase in the total number of informants. For the current reporting period, the sum of \$22,699.49 was paid to 4,873 informants, as compared to \$26,679.73 expended on 4,560 informants the previous quarter. The program continues to emphasize the purchase of arms and ammunition, and does not place enough emphasis on the collection of intelligence information. The majority of funds expended was for the purchase of arms and ordnance, mostly of US origin. The percentage of funds expended for information ranges between 6% and 10%.

(7) A major problem anticipated for Fiscal Year 1970 is that only \$50,000 was approved of the approximate \$154,000 requested for the annual ICF budget. This two-thirds reduction of funds for the entire yearly expenditure is expected to create serious budgetary problems. Unless more funds are received, which is not anticipated, the VIP program will have to cut back heavily on current monthly expenditures.

b. (C) Imagery Interpretation:

The II Section moved to a new building during the quarter thus expanding its working area. Additionally the ES-38 (Photo Lab) became operational. One new program was established during the last quarter. Because of the vast turnover of personnel throughout the Division, a program of periodic visits of representatives from the II Section was established to the Brigade Headquarters to present a briefing to the Brigade/Battalion S-2's and to answer any questions they may have as to how we can support them.

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e. (C) Interrogations:

(1) During the reporting period the IPW Section interrogated and classified 1077 detainees. The breakdown of detainees by classification compared to the previous period illustrates that the significant proportional change in detainee levels are in the categories of Innocent Civilians and Returnees.

	<u>Mar-July 1969</u>	<u>Feb-Apr 1969</u>
NVA/PW	34	17
VC/PW	24	39
Civil Defendant	425	365
Returnee	43	29
Innocent Civilian	<u>551</u>	<u>1162</u>
	1077	1992

The Drop in the level of innocent civilians detained compared with the level of other classifications indicates better screening of civilians in the field. The totals for this quarter are apparently not affected by the lull in enemy activity, though a sharp decrease in detainees has been noted in the closing weeks of the quarter.

(2) Fifty-seven man days were spent in support of cordon and search operations, screening operations, and other actions in which interrogation teams worked directly with units in the field.

(3) Information from 65 interrogations resulted in response by tactical units. The breakdown of the classification of detainees providing such valued information is as follows:

Returnee 18

PW 15

CD or IC $\frac{32}{65}$

Responses were made to reports of food and weapons caches, identification of VCI, unit locations, and rocket firing positions.

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d. (C) Order of Battle Section:

Order of Battle support for the brigades has been reinforced. Two analysts have been trained and are in the process of replacing OB analysts at the 11th Inf Bde and the 196th Inf Bde. The new analysts will bring with them to the brigades all-source plots, all-source studies, and a complete set of unit folders. The OB Section at Division will keep the brigades' all-source plots updated by sending weekly copies of the all source studies to the OB analysts at brigade. A total of four enlisted personnel left the OB Section and there were only two new men as replacements. While OB Section is still above TOE strength, there will be three more enlisted men leaving during the months of August and September without projected replacements. 1Lt Dileonardo replaces Captain Donald L. Sparaco as Chief, OB Section.

e. (C) Kit Carson Scouts:

(1) The Americal Kit Carson Scout Training Center was officially opened on 1 July 1969. Opening ceremonies were conducted by the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Clement. The first class of students began formal training on the same day and graduated on 21 July 1969.

(2) The newly instituted 21 day training cycle includes the following blocks of instruction:

English	47hrs
Duty/Strategy of ECS	14.5hrs
Weapons	10.5hrs
Demolitions/Mines and Booby traps	11hrs
Ambushes/Counter-Ambushes	4hrs
Physical Training	13hrs
In-processing	18hrs
Other	24hrs
TOTAL	141hrs

(3) Adjustments to the period of instruction are planned, based on lessons learned from the first training cycle. Ten additional hours of English will be programmed for future cycles in an effort to improve English proficiency. Due to the serious shortage of ARVN Interpreters, English is particularly vital to the field Scout. In addition, discipline and physical fitness will be given greater emphasis in future cycles.

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(4) Other adjustments to the POI are anticipated, based on feedback reports from tactical unit commanders concerning the performance of "school-trained" Scouts. The objective is to provide the best qualified Scout to the field, and only the using unit can determine the validity and effectiveness of instruction by observing the performance of trained Scouts.

(5) On 20 July 1969, EC3 Nguyen Hoi was posthumously awarded the Silver Star for Valor. While working with 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, Hoi gave his life to save those of his US comrades. When a US soldier tripped a booby trap, Hoi threw himself in front of several US soldiers and shielded them from the blast with his own body. This award is the first award made to a Kit Carson Scout in the Americal Division. Experience has shown that past recommendations have been misplaced either before or after approval. To avoid such recurrence, all recommendations for awards to EC3 are now forwarded through the Americal Division EC3 Coordinator who is responsible for monitoring the progress of recommendations and for delivering the award to the Scout upon approval.

4. (C) Co G (Ranger) 75th Inf: Summary of Significant Activities

a. One of the most important programs initiated by the Rangers during the reporting period has been the Radio Relay site atop Hill 1362 (BS 357962) approximately 18km west of Chu Lai. The hilltop was secured by Ranger team South Carolina on 25 May 1969 and was improved and fortified by a well coordinated effort between the Rangers and the 26th Engineer Battalion. Rising 4,300 feet above sea level, the radio relay site atop Hill 1362 (LZ Pineapple) has been able to communicate with both LZ Bronco and LZ Baldy and with Ranger team Arkansas, which operated approximately 44km west. LZ Pineapple is completely manned and defended by members of Co G (Ranger), 75th Inf, and will prove invaluable in providing direct communications with future Ranger team operations anywhere in the Americal Division OZ.

b. Inter-service coordination proved highly successful as the Rangers and the United States Navy combined their efforts to launch a Ranger operation 14 July 1969. Ranger team Texas was inserted by Navy Swift Boat 140001H July 1969 on the northern shore of Nui Nam Tram to perform an area reconnaissance of that area. The team discovered a platoon-sized VC camp, killed one VC and captured numerous documents and various equipment. Because of the results of that mission, Ranger team Ohio (+) made a beach assault of the same area on 17 July 1969 with the Navy Swift Boats again providing a means of infiltration. While the Ranger team assaulted, the Swift Boats sat approximately 200 meters off-shore and provided suppressing fire at the enemy. Results of that operation were one VC KIA, the camp completely destroyed and numerous

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enemy ammunition destroyed. The results of these operations proved that ground reconnaissance by Ranger teams operating from and supported by Swift boats in coastal and riverine areas is operationally successful. Both units enhance the other's effectiveness.

c. The importance of utilizing field intelligence reports in planning and coordinating Ranger operations was demonstrated in a recent Ranger mission. A local farmer in the Tra Bong area provided information concerning the location of a VC camp located at BS 443898. In his report, the agent gave the description and number of hootches in the camp, the number of personnel occupying it and the defense capabilities. Using the agent's report as basis, Ranger teams Texas and Michigan were combined to form a Hunter/Killer team and inserted into the area of the base camp 31 July 1969. Results of this operation were four VC KIA, one AK-47 rifle and various equipment captured, and the complete destruction of the camp. The Agent's report proved to be accurate in all details and was the contributing factor to another successful Ranger Mission.

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D. Operations

1. (C) Operations Summary:

a. General: Americal Division forces continued combat operations throughout the Division TAOI (Tactical Area of Interest) during the period 1 May to 31 July 1969 with contact varying from moderate to heavy in May; declining to light and sporadic in June and July. The main areas of enemy activity tended to be in the Frederick Hill and Iron Mountain OZ's (Operational Zones). During the reporting period, Operation Russell Beach, a major pacification operation on the Batangan Peninsula, was terminated on 21 July 1969. Operation Lamar Plain, designed to destroy elements of the 2d NVA Division operating in the mountains to the west of Tam Ky, was initiated on 16 May 1969. Operation Nantucket Beach, conducted in conjunction with USMC Operation Brave Arrow, was initiated on 20 July 69 on the area north of the Batangan Peninsula and is designed to increase pacification in this area northeast of Quang Ngai City. Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Park and Iron Mountain, conducted in conjunction and close coordination with the 2d ARVN Division, continued throughout the period.

b. Major engagements: During the three month reporting period, Americal Division forces were engaged in one large-scale battle with enemy forces of battalion size or larger. This engagement took place in the Frederick Hill Operational Zone during the period 12 to 15 May 69 when elements of the 1st VC Main Force Regiment, 2d NVA Division overran and captured Nui Yon OP (vic BT2416) thereby posing a direct threat to the security of Tam Ky City. This operation was reactive in nature for Americal Division forces had not received intelligence information indicating that an attack on the OP was imminent.

(1) The capture of Nui Yon was the only successful ground operation that took place during the last phase of the enemy's Spring Offensive. This phase began on the night of 11 May and the early morning hours of 12 May 69 when attacks by indirect fire were launched against Americal/ARVN/GVN installations throughout the Americal Division TAOI. Little damage and light allied casualties resulted from the attacks. At the Nui Yon OP, however, enemy forces attacked in strength and quickly overwhelmed the defending Regional Force (RF) Company. This OP, which dominates major routes of approach to Tam Ky City, had to be recaptured to eliminate the threat of a major enemy attack against this large Vietnamese population center.

(2) Early on the morning of 12 May 69, B and C Troops, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav were committed to recapture Nui Yon. The VC/NVA forces were well dug-in and were able to effectively use mortar fire, RPG's and heavy

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ammunition weapons fire against the attacking cavalry. During the initial assault, launched at 0730, C/1-1 Cav was met with a heavy volume of fire. An M-48 tank was destroyed by an RPG-7 round and four Americans were seriously wounded. The Cav pulled back and air strikes were processed on the hill. Close-in, heavy concentrations of artillery fire were placed on the OP and gunships were called to support the Cavalry troops. At 0700H, C troop again assaulted the hill. Again enemy fire was intense and resulted in the destruction of three Armored Cavalry Vehicles (ACAV's), 3 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). As it was obvious that attacks by the cavalry alone were not sufficient to recapture the OP, A,B,C/3-21 Infantry were combat air assaulted into the area to reinforce the armored forces.

(3) As the three companies of 3-21 Infantry were maneuvered into position during the late afternoon, and early evening of 12 May, further air strikes and artillery fires were placed on the CP. The enemy positions had been skillfully prepared but were slowly being diminished in effectiveness by the superior American firepower. On the 13th of May, a sharp three hour contact was fought at the base of the OP as a mixed infantry/armor force engaged an estimated VC/NVA company. Two VC were killed in the contact. Two Americans were killed in the fighting, nine evacuated with serious wounds, and one ACAV was destroyed. Once again, artillery and air strikes were processed on the battered enemy-held OP. Enemy forces, rapidly being destroyed by the heavy and concentrated use of Allied firepower, began to attempt to infiltrate the area. On the afternoon of 14 May 69, C/3-21 Infantry and A/1-1 Cav engaged a large enemy force southeast of the OP killing 11 NVA, and 25 VC, and capturing a number of individual weapons during the three hour long battle. With the approach of darkness, contact was broken. American Division forces formed night defensive positions blocking suspected enemy routes of egress from the area, resupplied, and readied plans for a final assault of the hill. B/3-21 Inf, in an NDP vicinity BT228163, received RPG and mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force attempting to leave the area resulting in 4 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Five NVA were killed by the American infantrymen and the infiltration route was successfully blocked. On the morning of 15 May, American forces launched coordinated combat sweeps up the hill engaging the fleeing enemy forces. At 0915H, C/3-21 Inf engaged 10 NVA attempting to escape from the area killing all of the enemy, capturing 1 individual and two crew-served weapons. At the same time, A/3-21, supported by elements of B/1-1 Cav, assaulted the OP and recaptured it with little resistance. Fifty-three dead NVA were found in the trenches at the top of the hill, thirteen individual weapons, three crew-served weapons, communications equipment, medical supplies and a large amount of miscellaneous military gear. Following the recapture of Mai Yen, 3-21 Inf in conjunction with 2/5 ARVN Pn, began a large scale sweep to the west and south of the area to eliminate further pockets of enemy resistance.

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(4) As a result of combat operations at Hui Yen, the immediate threat of attack on Tam Ky City was eliminated. A total of 24 VC and 86 NVA were killed thereby indicating that the fighting effectiveness of an enemy battalion had been severely impaired. As a direct result of the Battle of Hui Yen, Americal Division forces were strengthened by the addition of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM) to the operational control of the Americal and intensive combat operations were begun to neutralize Base Area 117 and long used enemy lines of communication from the west.

c. Summary of Operations:

(1) Terminated Operations: Operation Russell Beach

Operation Russell Beach, initiated on 13 January 1969, was terminated on 21 July 1969 having successfully introduced GVN authority onto the Batangan Peninsula, a longtime enemy stronghold. This operation was conducted in five phases: Phase I and II consisted of cover and deception operations and the bringing together of allied forces for the promulgation of combat operations. Phase III of the operation consisted of combat operations conducted by two battalions of the 196th Inf Bde in conjunction with USMC and 2d ARVN Division elements. Phases IV and V of this operation consisted of pacification and pacification support operations designed to reintroduce a GVN controlled population into the area, build secure hamlets, and reopen arteries of communication. During the combat operations phase of the operation, 11,617 Vietnamese were evacuated from the Batangan Peninsula to the Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC) north of Quang Ngai City where a screening of the population resulted in the elimination of 256 members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure. During the present reporting period, contact with enemy forces on the Batangan Peninsula was limited to a small number of mining incidents and two attacks by indirect fire against LZ Minuteman. No large scale forces were able to operate in the area, pacification operations continued ahead of schedule, and the securing of the area by GVN/ARVN elements continued as planned. Total results for Operation Russell Beach since its inception are as follows:

<u>FRIEND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
31 US KIA	193 VC KIA (C)
177 US WIA (E)	176 MIA
13 US WIA (M)	104 PW/VC
25 USMC KIA	256 VCI Eliminated
77 USMC WIA (E)	4 GVN/VC
1 USMC WIA (M)	51 GVN MIA
	62 IN CIV
	85 INC
	4 CSNC

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(2) Operations by OZ

(a) Operation Frederick Hill: Operation Frederick Hill, conducted by the 196th Inf Bde and the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav, in conjunction with the 5th ARVN Regiment, continued throughout the reporting period with contact varying from heavy to moderate in May, declining to light during the months of June and July. The heavy contact during May resulted from the last phase of the enemy's Spring Offensive. On 12 May 1969, enemy forces launched heavy attacks by indirect fire throughout the Frederick Hill OZ targeting Americal/GVN/ARVN fire support bases and installations. With the exception of the capture of the Hui Yon OP, no significant gains were made by the enemy forces and the attacks were rapidly blunted. (Ref paragraph 11b for discussion of Hui Yon) During the month of June, enemy attacks by indirect fire on Americal installations were launched on 8 and 9 June, indicated that another phase of the offensive was about to begin. With the exception of a heavy attack on LZ East, no large scale contact resulted after these mortar/rocket attacks. The attack on LZ East, launched on the evening of 11 June, was conducted by the 3d Company, GK 35th 3rd Bn, 2d NVA Division. Following a heavy attack by mortar fire and BFG's, elements of this NVA unit attempted to infiltrate the small Americal fire support base. Extremely heavy contact and instances of hand to hand combat resulted. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses on both sides. The advent of dawn found 27 NVA KIA inside the wire, and 16 individual weapons were captured by elements of A/3-21 Inf. Americal losses were 16 US KIA and 33 US WIA(E). Other than this engagement at LZ East, contact throughout the month of June remained light. Contact during July was characterized by enemy avoidance of engagement with Americal forces and no significant battles were fought during this month. Throughout the reporting period, emphasis was placed on preemptive operations designed to deny the enemy the use of base areas and supply/arms caches and to interdict suspected enemy lines of communication. Barrier Island, a long thin strip of land separated from the mainland by the Truong Giang Channel, was the scene of four (4) major preemptive operations conducted during June and July which were designed to neutralize the area thereby increasing the security of pacification operations being conducted on the coastal plains. On 10 June 69, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav and elements of 2-1 Inf initiated combat operations on northern Barrier Island to force suspected WLF elements out of the area, destroy enemy bunker complexes and eliminate arms/supply storage areas. During this four day operation, a large number of enemy trench line networks, bunker complexes, and suspected small base areas were destroyed. A number of heavy mining incidents were noted with Americal forces losing four ACAV's as a result of mines. A total of 23 WC were killed during this operation, the immediate threat of enemy attack against Thang Binh District was reduced, and valuable intelligence was gathered which indicated that long-term

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operations were necessary in this area. During the period 20-24 June 1969, elements of A Troop, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav with fourteen Vietnamese Companies (RF's, PF's, and Viet Lops) conducted a three pronged search operation on the southern portion of Barrier Island (C/M BT3824) targeting suspected elements of the 72d WCLF Bn. Maneuvering from the north, west and south, the rapid advancement of Allied forces caused the WCLF units to rapidly exfiltrate the area. Contact remained light throughout the operation but the act of forcing the enemy out of the area eliminated the threat to Tam Ky City which emanated from this location and effectively neutralized it. The third and final large preemptive operation conducted during the reporting period took place on northern Barrier Island and was initiated on 7 July 69 and continued to the end of the period. A, B/2-1 Inf in conjunction with F Trp 17th Cav and Thang Binh PF's began systematic combat patrols sweeping throughout the area. On 19 July 69, C/2-1 Infantry via BT134495 fought a sharp two hour engagement with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 8 VC KIA, 2 US WIA(E). On 10 July, B/2-1 Inf and F Trp 17th Cav discovered 12 graves located vicinity BT069505 containing 5 VC killed by small arms fire. Extensive search operations were continued uncovering a number of bunker complexes and trench lines which were systematically destroyed. On 13 July 69, A, B/2-1 Inf and F Trp 17th Cav engaged an estimated NVA Company vicinity BT196540. In a four hour contact, American forces killed 8 NVA capturing 5 individual weapons while losing 2 US KIA, 1 US WIA(E). Enemy forces began to attempt to exfiltrate the area and began to avoid contact with the allied forces. On 14 July 69, Helix 11 spotted 10 NVA in the open vicinity BT205530 and engaged them with air strikes killing all 10 of the enemy. On 17 July 69, A/3-82 Arty and 1/C/3-16 Arty fired artillery missions on an estimated VC Company moving via BT144477 resulting in 11 VC KIA. Thang Binh PF's picked up 11 individual weapons when they found the bodies. Beginning on 20 July and continuing until the end of the reporting period, operations were conducted to destroy the long-built up enemy positions. Elements of the 26th Engineer Battalion were moved in to assist the combat forces. Contact remained at a very low level for the remainder of the period. Throughout the remaining areas of Frederick Hill 02, contact remained light and sporadic as enemy forces continued to avoid combat. Results of operations during the reporting period in the Frederick Hill 02 are as follows:

FRND	ENEMY
136 US KIA	753 VC KIA (G)
574 US WIA(E)	632 NVA KIA (G)
173 US WIA(N)	428 DET
1 ARVN KIA	2 PW/VC
10 ARVN WIA(E)	12 CH/VC

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FRND
1 ARVN WIA(M)

ENEMY
2 CH/NVA
110 CIV DEF
279 IN CIV
231 IWC
35 CSWC
2 CSWC by ARVN
20 NVA KIA (C) by ARVN

(b) Operation Geneva Park: Operation Geneva Park continued throughout the reporting period concentrating on the security of major lines of communication and the destruction of enemy forces attempting to attack Quang Ngai City and/or the Chu Lai Base Complex. 1-6 Inf was utilized for security measures in the Rocket Belt vicinity Chu Lai Base, targeting elements of 409th and the 78th VCMF Rocket Bns. Saturation patrolling and extensive night-time ambush operations combined with a heavy concentration of pre-planned H and I fires and utilization of sensor devices severely inhibited enemy attempts to shell the base complex. A total of 7 attacks by indirect fire were launched against Chu Lai during the reporting period resulting in extremely light damage and very few casualties. During the period 8 through 19 July, 1-6 reinforced by D/3-21 Inf and B/5-46 Inf, initiated a preemptive operation in the Bo Cong Mountains to the west of the Chu Lai Rocket Belt. This operation was designed to destroy suspected VCLF troop concentrations, base camps and staging areas. Contact with enemy forces remained very light as the enemy exfiltrated the area avoiding combat. On 9 July, 1-6 Inf uncovered a large enemy base camp and hospital complex located vicinity BS339989. The area contained several large huts, pens for livestock and an elaborate piped-in water system. The complex was destroyed. Following the conclusion of this operation, 1-6 Inf returned to its normal FCA (Fire Control Area) and continued defensive security operations north and west of Chu Lai. 5-46 Infantry, while conducting operation Russell Beach, continued extensive combat operations in the vicinity of Binh Son District Headquarters supporting pacification operations and securing lines of communication. From 27 June to 5 July 69, 5-46 Inf utilizing 3 maneuver companies conducted operations in the Hui Inoi Mountains exploiting an Arc Light Strike. On 29 July, B/5-46 discovered an NVA hospital complex located vicinity BS401-803. Twelve NVA KIA were found, 4 wounded NVA were captured and a large stock of miscellaneous medical supplies was captured and evacuated. Continuing their systematic combat patrols, B company operating vic BS401801 discovered 66 enemy graves containing 50 NVA KIA and 16 VC KIA. Following the conclusion of this operation, 5-46 Inf increased its support of pacification operations and made preparations for the initiation of Operation Mantucket Beach. 1-52 Inf conducted extensive reconnaissance in force operations and detailed searches in the southern portion of the Geneva Park

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FRND
1 ARVN WIA(M)

ENEMY
3 ARVN/NVA

110 017 007
279 18 007
231 18 007
35 000
2 000 by ARVN
20 NVA KIA (C) by ARVN

(b) Operation Geneva Park continued throughout the reporting period. The security of major lines of communication and the security of the Chu Lai base, targeting elements of 409th and extensive night operations combined with a heavy concentration of pre-planned fires and utilization of sensor devices severely inhibited enemy attempts to attack the base complex. A total of 7 attacks by indirect fire were launched against Chu Lai during the reporting period resulting in extremely light damage and very few casualties. During the period 8 through 19 July, 1-6 Inf reinforced by D/3-21 Inf and B/5-46 Inf, initiated a preemptive operation in the Bo Cong Mountains to the west of the Chu Lai Rocket Belt. This operation was designed to destroy suspected VC/LF troop concentrations, base camps and staging areas. Contact with enemy forces remained very light as the enemy infiltrated the area avoiding combat. On 9 July, 1-6 Inf uncovered a large enemy base camp and hospital complex located vicinity BS339989. The area contained several large huts, pens for livestock and an elaborate piped-in water system. The complex was destroyed. Following the conclusion of this operation, 1-6 Inf returned to its normal FCA (Fire Control Area) and continued defensive security operations north and west of Chu Lai. 5-46 Infantry, while conducting operation Russell Beach, continued extensive combat operations in the vicinity of Binh Son District Headquarters supporting pacification operations and securing lines of communication. From 27 June to 5 July 69, 5-46 Inf utilizing 3 maneuver companies conducted operations in the Hui Luoi Mountains exploiting an Arc Light Strike. On 29 July, B/5-46 discovered an NVA hospital complex located vicinity BS401-803. Twelve NVA KIA were found, 4 wounded NVA were captured and a large stock of miscellaneous medical supplies was captured and evacuated. Continuing their systematic combat patrols, B company operating vic BS401801 discovered 66 enemy graves containing 50 NVA KIA and 16 VC KIA. Following the conclusion of this operation, 5-46 Inf increased its support of pacification operations and made preparations for the initiation of Operation Mantucket Beach. 1-52 Inf conducted extensive reconnaissance in force operations and detailed searches in the southern portion of the Geneva Park

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02 north of the Song Tra Khuc River. These operations were designed to interdict enemy avenues of approach to Quang Ngai City and to secure the area for accelerated pacification operations. A number of sharp contacts were made with enemy forces who were unable to make any in-roads in the area. On 31 May 69, B/1-52 Inf and F Trp 8th Cav (air) conducted a series of Eagle Flight Operations. These flights were designed to disrupt small groups of VC/NVA forces attempting to infiltrate the Triangle area south of LZ Stinson. One platoon from B/1-52 Inf and F Trp 8th Cav (Air) conducted a number of rapid sweeps throughout the area from B34876 to B35779 killing 43 VC/NVA in one day of operation. The effectiveness of this operation in terms of demoralizing the enemy and rapidly decreasing infiltration efforts in the area has led to the planning of similar such operations in the future. Beginning on 2 July and continuing until the end of the reporting period, 1-52 Inf in conjunction with 26th Engr Bn and ARVN Engrs conducted land clearing operations north of the Song Tra Khuc River (C/M B35776). The purpose of this operation was to remove mines and unexploded ordnance from the area, destroy enemy bunker complexes and restore the area to effective use by the GVN controlled population. By the end of the reporting period, the equivalent of 2 grid squares of land had been effectively cleared and made available for civilian use. Results of operations in the Geneva Park 02 during the reporting period are as follows:

FRIEND
79 US KIA
424 US WIA(E)
34 US WIA(M)

ENEMY
358 VC KIA (C)
157 NVA KIA (C)
327 DET
1 PW/VO
5 PW/NVA
13 CH/VO
2 CH/NVA
127 CIV MEF
171 IN CIV
64 IMC
15 QSMC

(e) Operation Iron Mountain: Combat Operations in the Iron Mountain 02 continued throughout the reporting period with emphasis placed on pre-emptive operations designed to destroy enemy troop formations and increase the level of security of pacification operations on the coastal plain. During the reporting period, one significant enemy ground attack was made against an Americal installation in the Iron Mountain 02. On 11 June 69, B/1-20 Inf and C/L-82 Arty located on LZ Lds received a heavy attack by an unknown size enemy element from the 40th Sapper Bn (AKA 90th Engr Bn) 3d FVA Div. The attack was launched with a heavy barrage of 82mm mortar, RPG and automatic weapons fire. Under the cover of this barrage, sapper

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elements attempted the infiltration of the fire support base but were rapidly repulsed resulting in 14 NVA KIA, 3 individual and 1 crew-served weapon captured. Americal losses were 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA(E) and 6 US WIA(X). 1-20 Inf and E Trp 1st Cavalry continued to conduct combat operations in the northern portion of the Iron Mountain OZ. During the period 28 May 69 to 15 Jun 69, 1-20 Inf began a series of combat sweeps along the Song Tra Cau Valley where VC/NF/NVA elements were thought to be infiltrating in order to attack the Duc Pho area. On 31 May, D/1-20 Inf and E Trp 1st Cav via BS7942 were locked in a day long contact with a large NVA force. Gunships and close-in air support was utilized to reinforce the mixed armor/infantry elements. At the end of the battle, 27 dead NVA were found on the field and 4 individual and 2 crew-served weapons were captured. To the south, C/1-20 engaged units of this enemy force as they attempted to exfiltrate the area retreating to the mountains to the west, killing 10 NVA and capturing various pieces of military equipment. Extensive reconnaissance in force operations were continued by the Americal Battalion maneuvering to the west to clear the area. On 9 and 10 June 69, contact was again made with a large NVA force estimated at battalion size via BS7637 at the far western edge of the Song Tra Cau Valley. In a two day contact, A, R/1-20 and cavalrymen from E Trp 1st Cav killed 61 NVA capturing 11 individual and 5 crew-served weapons. Operations in this area were concluded on 15 July but rapid forays into the area were continued to maintain an allied presence. On 15 July 69, A/1-20 Inf via BS7445 found a rice cache consisting of 47,000 pounds of rice. The rice was evacuated from the area and given to GVN officials for distribution to refugees. 3-1 Inf operated in the Hui Sang Mountains and the southern portion of the Iron Mountain OZ for the first 2 months of the reporting period concentrating on security of lines of communication and pacification and support operations. Contact with enemy forces remained at a low level and were widely scattered. During the period 7-9 July, 3-1 Inf airmoved into the Hui Tam Cap Mountains to conduct operations to the west of the 1-20 FCA. At the same time, A/3-1 combat air assaulted to a cold LZ vicinity BS539731 and began construction and development of Fire Support Base 411 in conjunction with elements of the 4th ARVN Regt. Remaining brigade elements in the Hui Tam Cap Mountains conducted a series of combat sweeps designed to neutralize the area prior to their redeployment north to rejoin A company and the initiation of operations in Base Area 121. On 2 July 69, B/3-1 Inf while on a reconnaissance in force via BS8426 engaged an estimated reinforced NVA company. At the end of the five hour contact, 20 NVA KIA were found on the field along with 4 individual and 4 crew-served weapons. In response to intelligence indicators that told of the location of a large enemy force operating to the west of this 2 July contact, a thirteen day preemptive sweep was begun into the area. On 14 July, B, B/3-1 Inf via BS7431 engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 6 NVA and capturing two individual weapons. Americal losses were light

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and systematic combat patrolling supported by air strikes and artillery continued. On 18 July 69, B-1 Inf via H37735 found 5 NVA ERM as a result of artillery fire called on suspected sniper positions the day before. On 19 July 69, B-1 Inf engaged an estimated NVA company, killing 11 NVA and capturing 4 individual and 4 crew-served weapons. From 20 July to the end of the reporting period, contact in the 3-1 FCA remained at a low level. 4-3 Inf continued combat operations during the reporting period in the area centered on LZ San Juan Hill. Contact remained light and scattered throughout the reporting period. Systematic combat patrolling and extensive reconnaissance in force operations prevented enemy forces from effectively using the 4-3 Inf FCA as either a route of infiltration or as a staging area for attacks on the populated coastal plain. 4-21 Inf conducted a number of combat sweeps in the Mai Son Vu Mountains during May and June 69 interdicting suspected enemy routes of infiltration and discovering a number of small base camps and staging areas. Contact remained light and widely scattered. During July, 4-21 Inf assumed responsibility for the security of QL-1 and its surrounding area from the southern TAOI boundary to the north of LZ Charlie Brown. Extensive combat patrolling and ambush operations maintained the security of this major artery of communication and furthered pacification operations being conducted by GVN authorities. Results of combat operations in the Iron Mountain OZ during the reporting period are as follows:

FRND	ENEMY
187 US KIA	311 VC KIA (C)
960 US WIA (E)	681 NVA KIA (C)
175 US WIA (M)	334 DEF
	10 PW/VC
	4 PW/NVA
	2 CH/VC
	3 CH/NVA
	202 CIV DEF
	127 IN CIV
	196 INC
	44 CSNC

2. Initiated Operations

a. Operation Lamar Plain: Operation Lamar Plain conducted by 1st Rde, 101st Airborne Division (AM), OFCON to Americal Division was initiated on 16 May 69 in the vicinity of Base Area 117 and continued throughout the reporting period. During this period, three major preemptive operations were conducted in the Lamar Plain OZ. The first of these preemptive operations ran from 17 to 25 May 69 and was conducted by elements of 1/101

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1st and 1-46 Inf (ONCON to 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div) in the western and southern portions of Base Area 117. Operations were initiated by a series of combat air assaults on 17 May from LZ Professional to the area west of the Song Hong Hieu River. Systematic combat patrols and extensive reconnaissance in force operations were conducted to destroy suspected enemy lines of communication, arms supply caches and staging areas. Contact was sharp as the enemy strongly resisted the Americal forces. On 21 May, for example, a five hour battle via BT1611 resulted in 6 NVA KIA, 7 US KIA and 19 US WIA(E). Air strikes were extensively used in support of this operation. On 21 May 69, Halix 16 called an air strike on a large NVA force via BT1710 resulting in 10 NVA KIA. The following day, operating one grid square to the south, B/1-501 engaged a large NVA force killing 11 of the enemy. A number of arms caches were found and destroyed thereby disrupting enemy supply channels. On 19 May 69, a cache was found by C/1-46 yielding 4 rifles, a large number of mortar rounds and a thousand rounds of ammunition of assorted calibers. Three days later, B/1-46 Inf discovered another cache located via BT1806 capturing 9 rifles and a large amount of small arms and automatic weapons ammunition. At the conclusion of this preemptive operation, the use of the western portion of Base Area 117 by VC/NVA forces and the threat of enemy attack on pacification operations at New Ban Duc were greatly reduced. On 19 June 1969, the second preemptive operation was conducted in the Song Tran Valley by elements of 1-502 Inf. The purpose of this operation was two-fold: (a) deny the enemy the use of the Song Tran Valley as a major infiltration route towards the coastal plain and (b) enhance the security of pacification operations being conducted at New Ban Duc by eliminating the threat of attack from the southeast. Contact with enemy forces tended to remain light and scattered on the whole. On 8 July 1969, however, the heaviest engagement of the operation was fought via BT1400 when A/1-502 engaged an estimated NVA company resulting in 4 NVA KIA, 3 NVA, 9 US KIA and 7 US WIA(E). On 15 July 69, B/1-502 operating with 1-501 Inf discovered 7 NVA killed by air strikes/artillery via BT1403 thought to have been killed in the 8 July contact. A number of rice caches were captured and evacuated to New Ban Duc and given to refugees. On 1 July 1969, B/1-502 via AS932955 found the largest weapons cache uncovered to date in the Americal Division TAOI. A total of 112 individual weapons and 48 crew-served weapons were captured; 1,875 rounds of mortar ammunition, 23 cases of small arms ammunition and hundreds of pounds of various types of equipment were also captured. Detailed search operations and extensive reconnaissance in force operations were continued until the termination of the operation on 17 July 1969. The third major operation conducted in the Lamur Plain OI was initiated on 6 July and continued through the end of the reporting period. This operation was conducted by elements of 1-501 Inf and was preceded by an A-1H light strike in the area to the southeast of Base Area 117. Elements of the 1-501 Inf combat air assaulted into the area, constructed

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FEU Backler, and initiated extensive reconnaissance in force and detailed combat sweeps throughout the area. A systematic grid square by grid square search of the area encountered little enemy resistance. A large number of enemy bunker complexes, trench lines and small way stations were found to have been destroyed by air strikes. On 13 and 14 July 1969, operating via H2696, B/L-501 discovered 17 NVA in graves who were killed by air strikes. Operating 3 alics to the north, D/L-501 uncovered an NVA base camp/hospital complex consisting of 27 huts. A small amount of medical supplies and documents were captured and evacuated. Fifteen NVA killed by air strikes were uncovered in a series of graves. On the whole, contact continued light for the remainder of the reporting period. Results of combat operations in the Lamar Plain OI during the inception of the operation are as follows:

FRND	ENEMY
99 US KIA	149 VC KIA (C)
277 US VIA (S)	327 NVA KIA (C)
33 US VIA (N)	387 DET
1 US MIA	7 FM/VC
	3 FM/NVA
	2 CH/VC
	67 CIV DET
	257 IN CIV
	246 TMC
	99 CSUC

b. Operation Mantucket Beach: Operation Mantucket Beach was initiated on 20 July 1969 on the northern Estangon Peninsula targeting the 48th VCIF Bn and elements of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) in order to eliminate these enemy forces from the area and introduce and expand GVN control. Combat operations are being conducted by 5-46 Infantry in conjunction with 1-6 and 2-6 ARVN Bns. Unlike Operation Russell Beach, the population is not being removed from the area; rather, extensive use of cordon and search techniques with N777 and PRU teams are being utilized for the elimination of the VCI. Saturation patrolling and reconnaissance in force operations are being conducted throughout the countryside to destroy organized VCIF units. To the north of this operation on the Son Tra Peninsula, USMC Special Landing Forces (SLF) are conducting Operation Brave Armada which complements Americal Division activities in the Mantucket Beach OI. Since the beginning of the operation, contact with enemy forces has remained extremely light as the enemy has avoided engagement. Visual reconnaissance missions and intelligence reports, however, indicate that enemy forces are still in the area in some strength. Results of operations in the Mantucket Beach OI for the eleven days of the reporting period are as follows:

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TRND
17 US WIA (E)

DEMY
25 VC KIA (C)
2 NVA KIA (C)
7 DET
5 IN CIV
2 IAC

3. (C) Plans

a. The following plans, operation orders, and frag orders were in effect or initiated during the reporting period.

(1) OPORD 1-69A (Russell Beach-BATANGIAN) was in effect. OPORD 4-69 (Lamar Plain) was published and implemented during the period. OPLAN 8-69 (Noncombatant Emergency Relocation/Evacuation) was published, distributed and is in effect on a contingency basis.

(2) OPLAN 3-68 (Noncombatant Emergency Relocation/Evacuation), 4-68 (Natural Disaster Relief), 5-68 (Golden Valley) and 6-68 (Golden Valley Rehearsals) continued on a contingency basis. OPLAN 3-68 (Noncombatant Emergency Relocation/Evacuation) was superseded by OPLAN 8-69 (Noncombatant Emergency Relocation/Evacuation) on 1 July 1969.

b. Numerous Fragmentary Orders and Planning Directives have been published and have bearing on the operations listed in paragraphs 1 and 2.

4. (U) Organization

a. On 1 May 69, D Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry was detached from the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and returned to the Americal Division.

b. Effective 1 June the 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery and 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery were authorized to activate a fourth firing battery under MHQ 6-117T, MAC 1/69 in order to provide direct support to the fourth infantry maneuver battalion attached to the brigades they supported.

c. A copy of the current troop list is attached as Inclosure 2.

5. (U) Training

a. The Americal Combat Center continued the mission of expediting in-country orientation and replacement training for all assigned and attached individuals through the grade of O-3, in the division. During the reporting period 82 courses were completed and 8788 personnel completed training.

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b. 245 junior leaders completed the training conducted in the Americal Combat Center Leadership Course.

c. 30 personnel completed the Joint Reconnaissance Course Training.

d. 80 RF/IF officers completed the newly instituted RF/IF Leadership and Orientation Course. The student input has been raised from 20 to 30 students per class, and a study is presently underway to determine the feasibility of increasing the school input to 60 students per class.

6. (C) Close Air Support

a. During the period 1 May through 31 July 69, the Americal Division employed, 2,979 CAS and CSS missions, using 4,458 aircraft sorties. The increase over the 2355 Missions and 3448 sorties for the previous quarter is due in part to the attachment of a fourth brigade to the Division, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM) during the entire reporting period, increasing napalm allocations and immediate requests.

(1) CSS Missions: Combat Skyspots (CSS) accounted for 1000 missions using 588 aircraft during the period as compared to 973 missions with 794 aircraft during the previous period. Two factors accounted for the increased number of missions flown by fewer aircraft:

(a) Increased availability of the A6 aircraft making possible several missions per aircraft sortie.

(b) Introduction of the ground transponder beacon working in conjunction with the computer on the Marine AGA aircraft for bombing during periods of reduced visibility. The USAF flew 56 missions with 47 aircraft sorties and the USMC flew 944 missions using 541 aircraft sorties.

(2) Forward Air Controlled (FAC) CAS Missions: A total of 1979 FAC Close Air Support (CAS) missions using 3870 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the division, an increase over the previous quarter's total of 1382 missions and 2654 aircraft sorties. This increase was due to the presence of an additional brigade in the Division Operational Zone, expanded operations of the division into former VC/NVA base areas, and increased availability of USAF aircraft for immediate and divert missions in support of ground troops in contact. The USAF flew 6 preplanned and 579 immediate/divert missions using a total of 1157 aircraft sorties, and the USMC flew 835 preplanned and 559 immediate/divert missions, using a total of 2713 aircraft sorties.

(3) Ordnance expended: Total ordnance expended by Close Air Support during the period was 6,906 tons of bombs, 1,227 tons of napalm and 4,499 rockets.

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b. ARC Light Strikes were placed on 25 different target boxes with a total of 3,504 tons of bombs dropped. ARC Light Strikes were targeted against enemy base camps, headquarters areas and supply/logistical installations, disrupting resupply, training, and command and control activities, spoiling enemy attempts to launch attacks against friendly installations and pacified population areas.

c. Bomb damage assessment made by Forward Air Controllers during the reporting period: 1,442 structures destroyed, 422 structures damaged, 1570 bunkers destroyed, 259 bunkers damaged, 292 secondary explosions, 321 secondary fires, and 64 enemy killed by air strikes (KBAS) with 19 probable kills. Secondary damage included 44 fighting positions destroyed, 122 tunnels destroyed, 819 huts destroyed, 200 spider holes destroyed, 43 AA/AM positions destroyed, 26 pack animals killed, 5 bridges destroyed, and 7 caves collapsed. Damage observed was 75% greater than that during the previous quarter.

7. Artillery - A separate ORLL for the Americal Division Artillery will be submitted on 15 August 1969.

8. Aviation - A separate ORLL for Aviation will be submitted by the 16th Combat Aviation Group on 15 August 1969

9. (C) Chemical

a. During the period 13 May 69 - 16 Jul 69, the Division Chemical Section and the 90th Chemical Detachment defoliated Ambush Alley and the wooded area adjacent to QLI south of LZ Debbie using the AGEVENCO helicopter borne spray apparatus. Sporadic sniper fire was received on 3 Jun 69, however the mission was completed.

b. On 9 Jul 69, a feugasse demonstration was held at FSB Fat City. The demonstration was given to representatives of all Artillery Batteries from the Americal Division on proper methods of employment. The demonstration was concluded with the firing of eight feugasse emplacements.

c. During the period 1 May - 31 Jul 69, the Division Chemical Section, the 27th Chemical Detachment, the 87th Chemical Detachment and the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the following chemical activities:

(1) 88,888 pounds of persistent CS was dropped for terrain contamination.

(2) 286 E-156 Tactical CS Cluster Bombs were employed.

(3) 70 Airborne Personnel Detector missions were run.

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(4) Approximately 2,438 acres were defoliated using 11,193 gallons of defoliant.

10. (C) Engineer

a. Activities for the quarter (1 May - 31 July 1969) consisted of organic engineers devoting primary effort to direct combat support to the Americal Division while non-divisional engineers devoted primary effort to improvement of QLL (LOC) and operational support construction.

b. QLL continues to receive priority horizontal effort in the Americal TAOI, with three engineer battalions fully committed, two engineer battalions partially committed, and approximately a three engineer company effort equivalent from the Contractor (RMC-ERJ) committed to restoration of QLL. Engineer battalion disposition within the TAOI remains essentially the same as last reporting period.

(1) The 19th Engineer Battalion (Combat) augmented with the 137th Engineer Company (Light Equipment) and the 73d Engineer Company (Construction Support): Upgrade and paving of QLL from the I/II Corps Border to Duc Pho via BS806378 and providing asphalt for paving QLL Duc Pho BS806378 to Mo Duc BS733543.

(2) The 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) augmented with the 630th Engineer Company (Light Equipment) (-) and the 511th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) (-): Upgrade QLL (less paving) from Quang Ngai, BS647723, to Mo Duc, BS733543. Upgrade and pave QLL, Mo Duc, BS733543, to Duc Pho, BS806378.

(3) Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 58 (NMCB 58): QLL maintenance from Binh Son, BS596927, to Chu Lai Main Gate, BT520044.

(4) The 9th Engineer Battalion, USMC, Fleet Marine Force (FMF): Upgrade and pave QLL, Chu Lai Main Gate, BT520044, to the Song Ba Ren via BT702510.

(5) 104th Engineer Battalion (Combat) ARVN: Provides limited assistance to the 9th and 39th Engineer Battalion for QLL restoration.

(6) RMC/ERJ Contractors: QLL upgrade and paving from Binh Son, BS596927, to Quang Ngai, BS642372; paving from Quang Ngai, BS647723 to Mo Duc, BS733543.

c. Engineer Operations in the TAOI consisted generally of the following:

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(1) The 19th Engineer Battalion (Combat) continued to devote maximum effort to minesweeping, upgrading, maintaining and paving Qll as specified in paragraph 10b(1) above. Their disposition is as follows:

- (a) HHC, (Forward): LZ DEBBIE.
- (b) HHC, (Rear): LZ LOWBOY.
- (c) 1st and 2d Platoons, Company A: LZ CHARLIE BROWN.
- (d) A Company (-): LZ LOWBOY.
- (e) Company B: LZ DEBBIE.
- (f) Company C: LZ LOWBOY.
- (g) Company D: LZ DEBBIE.
- (h) 137th Engineer Company (IE): LZ MAX.
- (i) 73d Engineer Company (CS): LZ LOWBOY.

(2) Using LZ LOWBOY as a base of construction operations (quarry, crusher, asphalt plant) the 19th Engineer Battalion (Combat) has continued to pave Qll north. At the end of the report period, Qll in Americal TAOI was paved from I/II Qalls border to BS876310 with paving expected to be complete to Jns Pho about 1 September 1969.

(3) The 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) utilized one combat engineer line company to minesweep and make tactical repairs on Qll between Binh Son and Quang Ngai. Three line companies plus their attached units were employed to minesweep, maintain, and upgrade (less paving) Qll between Quang Ngai Duc Pho. (Ultimately, the 39th Engineer Battalion will pave Qll between Ks Duc and Duc Pho.) The 39th Engineer Battalion disposition at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

- (a) HHC and 511th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) (-): Chu Lai.
- (b) Company A and 630th Engineer Company (Light Equipment) (-): LZ GOLDIE.
- (c) Company B (-): LZ DOTTIE.
- (d) Company C: LZ MAX.
- (e) Company D: LZ GOLDIE.

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(f) One Platoon of Company B: LZ SNOOPY.

(4) At the end of the report period, the 39th Engineer Battalion had completed all sub base upgrade between Quang Ngai and Duc Pho, completed base course from Quang Ngai (south) to BS724570. Estimated date of completion for paving QLL south of Chu Lai is 15 Oct 69.

(5) The 9th Engineer Battalion continued to minesweep, upgrade, maintain, and pave QLL between Chu Lai and the Song Ba Ben. At the end of the report period, paving is complete from Chu Lai to BT247310. Their disposition during the report period was:

(a) H4C, Service Company, Companies B(-) and C(-): Chu Lai.

(b) One platoon from Company B: Tam Ky.

(c) One platoon from Company C: Da Nang.

(d) Company A(-): Hill 10.

(e) One platoon of A Company: HAWK HILL.

(f) Company D: LZ BALDY.

(6) The 104th Engineer Battalion (Combat) ARVN, supported LOC restoration by committing effort on QLL south of Quang Ngai by assisting the 39th Engineer Battalion construct several bridges. They continued to minesweep and maintain as necessary Rt 533 from Tam Ky to Tien Phouc in support of convoys run about once a month by Quang Tin Province. The 104th Engineer Battalion does an outstanding job on convoy support on Rt 533.

(7) RMK-BRJ Contractor completed upgrade and paving of QLL between Binh Son and Quang Ngai during the reporting period. Additionally, they have paved south of Quang Ngai to BS690648 (paved the section of road upgraded by the 39th Engineer Battalion). The contractor expects to continue paving south to Mo Duc by 1 Sep 69. (This will complete contractor work on QLL.)

(8) MCB 58 is tasked with maintenance of QLL between Chu Lai and Binh Son and repair of the Binh Son Bridge. Permanent repairs to the Binh Son Bridge were completed by MCB 58 on 24 July 1969.

(9) 26th Engineer Battalion (Combat):

(a) Operation Russell Beach: On 10 May 1969, Company D, 26th Engineer Battalion deployed one platoon in support of the 1969 Pacification

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Program on the Bataangas Peninsula. Two D7E dozers and the A Company CEV were landed by LCU in the vicinity of An Ky (BR0420) to support construction of defensive works around the refugee village established in March 1969. The dozers constructed approximately 1000 meters of defensive berm and the troops provided technical assistance to the villagers for construction of wire obstacles. Company B relieved Company D on 19 May 1969. The work on An Ky was completed on 2 June 1969 and the troops and equipment moved by LCU and landed at coordinates BS774861 to begin work on the Cape itself. The project was completed on 24 June 1969. On 25 June 1969 all troops and equipment moved to Chu Lai by LCU. Casualties to Company B were heavy. A sweep team member stepped on a bouncing type mine on 23 June resulting in two KIA and five WIA. The A Company CEV was ambushed by the enemy on 17 June. Four KIA and three WIA resulted. Total casualties were six KIA and eight WIA of which one KIA and one WIA were from the A Company CEV crew.

(b) Tap An Bac (1) and (2) Land Clearing Operation: Company C was tasked in June to clear two abandoned villages just north of LZ BRONCO in coordinate squares BS7942 and BS8042. Two D7E dozers and the D Company CEV began clearing on 17 June 1969. On the 19th of June the engineers came under fire from NVA forces in the village of Tap An Bac (2). An exchange of fire continued throughout the day as air strikes and artillery pounded the enemy positions. Late in the evening a final assault by the Infantry and Armored Cavalry elements spearheaded by the D Company CEV stopped all opposition. The operation terminated on the 23d of June with approximately one and a half square kilometers of land cleared and 93 bunkers destroyed. Engineer casualties were one WIA (a CEV crewman wounded in the final engagement on 19 June 1969).

(c) Tra Bong Road II: The opening of HL 529 was progressing at the end of the last period and progress up until the end of April was reported in the last Operations Report. Company B reached Tra Bong on 11 May 1969 after completing the upgrading of the road and clearing the right of way. After working on artillery positions and Special Forces facilities, the B Company element moved from Tra Bong to LZ BAYONET on 3 June 1969. The enemy ambushed the engineer column and its infantry security during the move. The action was initiated by the enemy after a five ton dump truck struck a mine. The column then came under RPG and small arms fire. A five ton dump was destroyed by RPG fire and a total of seven engineers were WIA.

(d) Horseshoe Land Clearing Operation: In late June 1969 a series of abandoned villages which exist along the north side of the Song Tra Khuc river west of Quang Ngai were designated by the 198th Infantry Brigade for clearing. The villages were utilized periodically by the VC and NVA as

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transitory base camps and storage areas. Company B, with four D7E dozers, security elements from the 1-52d Infantry and two M48 tanks from the 1-1 Cav moved into Phouc Loc (1) (BS5676) on 1 July 1969 to begin work. Rains, coupled with heavy vegetation, made clearing slow. Mines were frequently encountered and on 13 July 1969 a D7E dozer was destroyed by a mine. On advice of the 723d Maintenance Battalion, the machine was stripped of useful parts and buried. The clearing operation is continuing at this time. Working with B Company elements is a company of ARVN engineers from the 2d ARVN Engineer Battalion. They have performed in an exceptional manner. The Vietnamese engineers blow tunnels and bunkers, cut down large trees to conserve dozer effort, and provide general combat engineer support to the Americal Infantry. One casualty (WIA Minor), a Headquarters Company dozer operator, occurred to date during the operation.

(e) Barrier Island Land Clearing Operation. On 17 July 1969 elements from A Company with four D7F dozers were landed on Barrier Island (vic BT194553) by LCU to commence clearing of a strip of land about eight square kilometers along the south bank of the Song Cua Dai river. The area had provided cover and concealment for the VC who constantly harass friendly shipping on the river and stage attacks against Roi An. This project is currently under way with the clearing progressing at a rapid rate. Contact with the enemy has been moderate (one VC KIA during an engagement on 25 July 1969). On 30 July 1969 one dozer was moderately damaged by a mine and the operator slightly wounded.

(f) Tien Phouc Road Opening (Rt 533): The Battalion was tasked to minesweep and repair Route 533 from Tam Ky to LZ YOUNG for the passage of two 8" Howitzers from the 3-18th Artillery and a large ammunition convoy on 19 June 1969. This portion of the Route, approximately 14 kilometers, was swept and opened in four hours by Company D. The artillery convoy moved in one day, the supply vehicles returning over the route late in the afternoon. Later, on 22 July 1969, Company D again opened the road for the return of the artillery to Tam Ky. Heavy rains had damaged the road at culvert locations and caused some delay in opening the road. A lowbed trailer carrying a D7E dozer was badly damaged by a mine, but continued to move under its own power during the day. No casualties or contact occurred during either road opening.

(g) Minesweep Operations: Company A continued periodic minesweep operations on Route 535 from LZ BALDY to LZ ROSS. The enemy continued to mine this route with skill and determination. During the period, Company A lost nine pressure test vehicles and 17 WIA on this route. They also lost two bucket loaders and one other vehicle for a total of 12 vehicles of all types. The Battalion also assumed minesweeping responsibility on QLL from Chu Lai to Binh Son on 3 June 1969. No mining incidents have occurred during the period on this section.

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(h) Fire Base Support: Commitment of engineer effort to Fire Support Base (FSB) construction continued to be extensive throughout the TAOI. Support was provided at LZ's BALDY, ROSS, KAREN, WEST, CENTER, EAST, YOUNG, PROFESSIONAL, HUSTLER, PINEAPPLE, CINDY, MINUTEMAN, STINSON, SAN JUAN HILL, DEBBIE, BUDDHA, and 411, the latter name denoting the joint efforts of the 4th Infantry Regiment, 2d Division (ARVN), and the 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division. There also was effort expended on Hill's 410, 76, 270, 26, and also at Tan Ky and Bau Duc. Effort on these FSB's consisted of clearing fields of fire, construction of bunkers, artillery positions, heliports, sumps and roads.

(i) Bridging Operations: The Battalion was constantly engaged in bridging missions along QLL in support of the 39th Engineer Battalion and the 9th Marine Engineer Battalion (FMP). The bridge companies capability was greatly increased upon receipt of a quantity of M4 pontons. Requirements to have more than one large float bridge in operation simultaneously could not have been met without this additional asset. Bridging operations are shown in chronologic order below.

1. On 1 May the 180' DT Bailey Bridge installed during the previous reporting period was removed at the Binh Son bridge site. This enabled MCB 58 to proceed with reconstruction of the permanent concrete bridge. (The installation of an M4T6 bridge bypass, to facilitate MCB 58's work, was recorded in the last report).

2. The An Tan Bridge (QLL-422) was badly damaged by the enemy of 12 May. This was the third interdiction of the bridge in eight months. The 9th Engineer Battalion, FMP, completed installation of 105' M5 bridge, class 60, on 13 May. Company E emplaced a 240' M4T6/M4 bridge bypass at the site on 22 May 1969.

3. To pass immediate traffic after destruction of the Timber Trestle bridge at the Bau Bau (Bridge QLL-424), a 100' TS Bailey Bridge was emplaced on 20 May 1969.

4. On 20 June 1969 the M4T6/M4 at An Tan was removed and emplaced at the Bau Bau to allow reconstruction of the permanent span.

5. After emplacement of the M4T6/M4 at the Bau Bau, Company E removed the 100' of TS Bailey Bridge on 23 June 1969.

6. After heavy rains on 11 July 1969, the M4T6 bridge at Binh Son broke loose and floated approximately five kilometers downstream where it beached on an island. The bridge was recovered the next day but it was not until 13 July that other bridging was emplaced and QLL reopened to traffic. One man from Company E drowned during recovery operations.

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7. To facilitate repair of Bridge QLI-403, a '40' bridge, using M4 and M416 decking, was emplaced on 21 July 1969.

d. QLI paving completed to the end of the report period is shown below.

(1) I/II Corps Border north to BS876310.

(2) QLI via BS690648 north to BT247310.

e. LOC interdictions continued; however, compared to last report period, they were moderate.

(1) Casualties/damage by mines and other LOC interdictions: See summary at Inclosure 1.

(2) During the period 6 May through the end of the reporting period, major bridges received damage as follows:

BRIDGE #	COORDINATES	DATE	DAMAGE
436	BT201384	06 May 69	M48 tank caught fire on bridge, bridge burned.
422	BT497067	12 May 69	One half of pier on south end blown.
424	BT379174	19 May 69	South two spans blown.
440	BT102511	21 May 69	South three spans blown.
433	BT230339	12 Jun 69	Elw decking off, one stringer dropped.
434	BT225347	17 Jun 69	Burned.
430	BT268272	11 Jul 69	North two spans blown.
398	BS440330	17 Jul 69	Burned.

(a) QLI-436 was restored to use by installing four 60" culverts. Bypass was opened to traffic on 7 May 1969 by the 9th Engineer Battalion (FMF).

(b) QLI-422 was reopened to traffic upon the completion of a 105' M6, class 60, bridge by the 9th Engineer Battalion (FMF) on 13 May 1969.

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(c) To open Bridge QLL-424, a 100' TS M2 Bailey Bridge was installed by E Company on 20 May 1969.

(d) QLL-440: There was nothing done to repair this bridge immediately, since there was another bridge adjacent to it with a classification of 11. There is a new bridge under construction at this time, open to one way, class 60 traffic.

(e) QLL-433 reopened to traffic on 13 July 1969 by 9th Engineer Battalion (FMF) upgrading the bypass.

(f) Bridge QLL-434 was replaced by emplacing 105' M5 Panel Bridge. Bridge completed by the 9th Engineer Battalion (FMF) on 18 June 1969.

(g) QLL-430 reopened to traffic by upgrading the bypass. Route opened on 12 July 1969 by the 9th Engineer Battalion (FMF).

(h) QLL reopened to traffic by upgrading the bypass. Route opened on 18 July 1969 by the 19th Engineer Battalion (Combat).

11. (S) Signal: Intelligence and Counterintelligence: During the reporting period, there were eleven (11) compromises of the Americal Division SOI, requiring seven (7) major changes in the Division SOI.

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E. Logistics

1. (U) General

Logistical support for the Americal Division stabilized greatly during the reporting period as the newly organized Division Support Command efficiently assumed the division support mission. Intensive internal management programs were initiated by the DS Maintenance Battalion and the Supply and Transport Battalion in order to give quicker, more efficient support to their supported units.

2. (U) Services Division.

a. The 6-56th Artillery went on standown 1 July 1969 in preparation for inactivation during August. The redistribution of the Hawk peculiar equipment and Hawk missiles was accomplished by 1st Logistical Command during the standown period, and the redistribution of the 6-56th Artillery common equipment and real estate was accomplished by the Americal Division. As of the end of the current reporting period, those items of equipment scheduled for lateral transfer to units outside of the Americal Division have as yet not been transferred. Anticipated completion date is 15 August 1969.

b. Several significant real estate transactions have taken place during this reporting period. All are a result of the 6-56th Artillery inactivation. That portion of Ky Hoa Island (BT515159) that was formerly occupied by Battery D, 6-56th Artillery was transferred to the Second ARVN Division on 31 July 1969. The other three areas, Headquarters, A, and B Battery areas, were retained by the Americal Division for occupation by division units.

c. In the area of new construction, the Chu Lai perimeter bunker system is now about 65% completed. The remaining bunkers should be completed during the August - October 1969 reporting period.

3. (U) Supply Division.

a. Two major endeavors in the supply field initiated during the quarter were the retrograde of trailers, all sizes, from the division and the securing of secondary items of equipment to increase the division unit readiness rating.

b. For sometime units have been required to dilute their maintenance effort and their material resources by maintaining equipment, specifically trailers, that they are authorized but not needed to accomplish the mission. A systematic plan has been initiated by the ACofS, G4 to obtain approval to turn in this unneeded equipment. To date seven units have turned in 170 trailers. Seven requests for turn in are pending approval. Ultimately, 295 trailers will be turned in by the Americal Division.

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c. The second project is aimed at specifically raising the Division unit readiness rating by obtaining secondary items of equipment. Although these items are reportable, and contribute just as significantly as do major end items, they are often overlooked when compared to high dollar value items. Nine messages were forwarded to USARV requesting assistance in securing these items. Units reported 91 items that have been forwarded to 1st Log by ACofS, G4 for special consideration. To date six replies have been received and significant quantities of equipment released.

d. The Division is still experiencing difficulty in obtaining authorization documents under the ROAD reorganization. TOE, MTOE and special letters and message coordination with G4 USARV has provided a substantial number of subject publications, and further progress is expected in the near future.

e. During June and July the Division received M16s to replace all M14s within the Division. This project has been completed and all M14s with PLL are being retrograded to Anniston Depot, Anniston, Alabama.

4. (C) Maintenance Division.

a. Project Strip is an internal program within the division and among subordinate units designed to identify and retrograde excess material. It was initiated on 10 July 1969. This program is constituted along the lines of the USARV Project Strip program and consists of a free turn-in period followed by an inspection conducted by a team formulated from division resources. The program is designed to help the commander manage his logistical operations more efficiently by identifying, and eliminating excess material thereby reducing the additional work necessary to maintain and store unneeded and/or unauthorized material. Although this program is just beginning, over 69 short tons of excess have been identified thus far.

b. The M16 chrome barrel/black barrel exchange program is approximately 84% complete with current on hand figures indicating 17,310 chrome barrel weapons on hand and 3,451 nonchrome barrel weapons on hand.

c. The Americal Division CMSG Team conducted 16 courtesy and 12 record inspections (10 receiving satisfactory ratings) during the period 1 May through 31 July 1969. The 723d Maintenance Battalion conducted 279 roadside spot inspections during the same period.

d. Effective 1 July 1969, DA Cir 750-29 came into effect. The circular eliminated the TAERS six digit line number as shown in TM 38-750 (except for commercial vehicles), and replaced it with an equipment category code (ECC). This ECC code along with replacing the six digit TAERS line number, will be used as a prefix to the SB 700-20 line item number (LIN) on all material readiness reports. The regulation is designed to eliminate the TAERS (LIN)

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causing both supply and maintenance personnel to use the SB 700-20 LIN's, thereby bringing together two important facets of logistics, supply and maintenance.

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F. Civil Affairs/Civil Action

1. (U) Organization:

a. During the reporting period, C5, continued to undergo basic administrative/management changes to insure more efficient operation in support of the GVN Pacification/Development campaigns.

b. The internal effects of this change can be seen with the publication of a new unit SOP, the first complete revision since 1968. Externally this tightening of control is seen in a stream of Sub-Zone Coordinator regulations which are directed at clarifying and improving our support functions in light of the increasing emphasis on pacification. It is anticipated that this effort will be culminated in a comprehensive pacification plan for the Americal Division.

2. (C) Operation:

a. Operation Golden Fleece continues as part of the program to deny vital resources to the VC. Although the primary responsibility for resource denial rests with the GVN, a protective screen for harvesters and logistical support is provided upon request by US units. During the reporting period 294,100 lbs of rice were captured, and evacuated and turned over to province and district officials, an additional 49,675 lbs of rice were destroyed because of the tactical situation and to prevent use by the VC. With four rice plantings and 2-3 harvests common in the Americal TAOI yearly, it is anticipated that this resource denial program will continue for an indefinite period.

b. Refugee: Refugees present an acute problem within the Americal AO. During the reporting period, three-man teams from the 29th CA were injected into refugee camps in Quang Ngai with the dual purpose of upgrading the camps and conducting a comprehensive survey of the facilities. A similar program was conducted in Quang Tin and was capped in July with the publication of an information survey. Both Quang Ngai, which has some 213,000 refugees, and Quang Tin, which has 57,000, are extending these resources to the limit in an attempt to assist these people.

c. Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development Support material. This office continued to coordinate the shipment of CORDS materials to Quang Ngai during the reporting period. The following supplies were sent:

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Boxes of Medicine	7
Wire Concertina (Rolls)	55
Rebar (Bundle)	24
Desk Tables	24
Work Benches	10

2. (C) Civil Affairs Pacification

a. This division supports the GVN Pacification Program throughout Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces and Que Son District and a portion of Duy Xuyen of Quang Nam Province.

b. The reporting period saw the conclusion of Phase I of the GVN 1969 Pacification Campaign (1 Feb - 31 Jun) and the initiation of Phase II, the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign (1 Jul - 31 Oct).

c. The goals for both these phases remain basically the same.

- (1) Security of 90% of population.
- (2) Elimination of VC.
- (3) Organize more Peoples Self Defense Forces.
- (4) Establish local governments.
- (5) Rally more Hoi Chanhs.
- (6) Increase propaganda and information efforts.
- (7) Resettle refugees.
- (8) Stimulate rural economy.

d. The Americal Division considerably increased its activity in support of the GVN Pacification Program during the reporting period. This support is reflected in the increasing frequency with which combined cordon and search operations are being conducted to neutralize VCI and provide local security.

e. Progress in the pacification program in the Americal TAOI, 1 May - 31 July.

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(1) Security of population (31 July).

(a) Quang Tin Province. 283,825

(b) Quang Ngai Province. 468,784

(2) VCI Neutralized (1 May - 31 July)

(a) Quang Ngai. 164

(b) Quang Tin 139

(3) People Self Defense Force (1 May - 31 July)

	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>TRAINED</u>	<u>ARMED</u>
(a) Quang Ngai	38,545	17,925	8,741
(b) Quang Tin	39,372	24,292	10,251

(4) Elections have been conducted in 130 villages and 498 hamlets.

(5) Hoi Chanhs (1 May - 31 July)

(a) Quang Ngai 278

(b) Quang Tin 466

(c) Que Son 44

(6) Refugees resettled.

(a) Quang Ngai 6,500

(b) Quang Tin 7,000

(7) Vietnamese Information Service. During the reporting period, closer coordination has been effected between this office and the province and district VIS Branches. Province and District have received additional equipment including TV sets. Due to increased capability and activity on the Vietnamese side, our movie teams now provide only a portion of evening programs which in the past were completely US shows.

(8) Stimulate Rural Economic Development. During the reporting period increased IRS rice acreage was placed under cultivation, tens of thousands of chickens were imported, fish hatcheries were opened at Tam Ky and steady progress continued on the Quang Ngai sugar mill construction. An additional

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item of note during this period was a province wide Quang Tin agriculture training course held at Chu Lai.

f. Another significant method of supporting Revolutionary Development is through the MEDCAP II Program. During the reporting period, because of an increase in controls and coordination required, the total number of patients treated decreased, however, we feel that the quality of the treatment has increased and greater provision has been made for assumption of these duties by GVN personnel.

	<u>Visit</u>	<u>Patient</u>
11th Bde	250	29,507
196th Bde	58	5,168
198th Bde	73	9,521
1-1st Cav	16	3,110
DIVARTY	8	721
26th Engr	4	390
1st CAG	818	66,383
MAG 12	121	4,239
MAG 13	57	3,608
MCB 58	52	526

g. Voluntary contributions are another aspect of our support to the GVN program. These contributions, generally directed at specific institutions, are completely administered by the units concerned.

Money	168,302\$VN
Clothing	5,136lbs
Soap	30,708bars

h. Community Relations Council. During the reporting period the Ly Tin District Friendship Council continued to function in high gear. In addition, on 26 June, the first full scale meeting of the Binh Son Friendship Council was held. The departure of the 6th Bn, 56th Arty from Chu Lai in late July demonstrated the major role such organizations can play in reducing the impact of such actions on the Vietnamese economy. The projected move was discussed at meetings over a one month period. Through the efforts of the 6-56th and council members, employment levels were maintained, Civic Action projects were continued and responsibility transferred, and an essential ferry service to Ky Hoa Island was maintained. In summary, because of the efforts of this organization, all potential adverse effects of the move were eliminated. Anticipating the increasing frequency of such moves, the creation of these "community relations" or "friendship councils" in all areas where an excess number of US personnel could be expected to effect the local population, is encouraged.

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4. (C) PSYOP Activities: May - July 1969

a. Leaflets dropped by C47 aircraft, by campaign:

<u>Campaign</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
Chieu Hoi	30,961,000	24,103,000	23,898,000
Rewards	4,538,000	3,640,000	6,731,000
Anti VC	2,678,000	1,889,000	2,172,000
Anti NVA	10,704,000	9,026,000	8,232,000
Pro GVN	2,438,000	8,191,000	5,195,000

b. Total leaflet drop missions flown by the 9th Special Operation Squadron in support of the Americal Division:

<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
847	901	835

c. Total newspaper distribution:

<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
34,025	33,700	21,400

d. Aerial loudspeaker missions during the period:

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
Aerial tape missions	661	624	537
Aerial tape time	110:10	85:55	83:05
Early Word missions	12	28	38
Early Word time	20:00	28:40	47:55
Heliborne mission	8	5	6
Heliborne broadcast time	12:30	5:30	7:05

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e. Ground loudspeaker broadcasts:

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
Missions	68	73	93
Broadcast hours	262:30	240:45	222:05

f. Waterborne loudspeaker broadcasts:

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
Missions	5	4	1
Broadcast hours	18:30	17:00	2:00

g. Movie missions conducted during period:

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
Movie missions	25	22	37
Movies shown	98	146	205
Movie hours	55:45	81:00	114:00
Audiences	11,820	25,100	34,170

h. During the period there were a total of 45 new leaflets developed at the request of the Americal Division.

5. (C) Indicators for PE Effectiveness:

a. Number of Hoi Chanhs in the Americal Division

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
	286	150	352

b. Number of informants and amount paid out for information and munitions.

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
Informants	1001	899	674
\$VN paid out	865,580	770,690	484,370

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6. (C) Recent Significant Developments:

a. In an attempt to extend the PSYOP efforts in new areas off the main lines of communications, movie teams operated at three special forces camps (two US and one ARVN) at Ra To, Minh Long, and Gia Vuc. This was the first time that the people in these areas had ever seen a movie. During 11 days of operations, 42 movies were shown to approximately 6,000 people. The people were very enthusiastic and were very pleased that efforts were being made to extend GVN influence in their area. It is felt that operating in remote areas contributes very substantially to increasing information and propaganda efforts in support of the 1969 Pacification Plan.

b. Innovations: In April 1969, a device was developed and tested by the Air Force to give the 9th Special Operations Squadron 02B Super Skymaster loudspeaker aircraft a retransmission capability. This innovation gives the capability of quick reaction exploitation of ralliers by utilizing organic radios on the ground. Numerous Early Word retransmission missions have been flown since its innovation, and several Hoi Chanhhs have rallied as a direct result of its employment. In addition, it has been used by GVN officials to speak to the local populace in support of Civic Action Projects. This innovation has greatly increased the versatility of PSYOP speaker operations.

c. Enemy Propaganda: On two occasions, enemy loudspeaker propaganda teams have operated in the Division Area of Operation. They used anti-American, Chieu Hoi, and rewards for defectors themes. On 26 July 1969, PSYOP equipment consisting of one movie camera, one instamatic camera and two tape recorders were recovered by B/1-46th Inf in the vicinity of BT173007.

d. Special Campaigns: During the period 22 July - 29 July 1969, a PSYOP Campaign was conducted in conjunction with the 6th Bn, 56th Arty (Hawk) redeployment. The entire campaign was jointly planned and conducted by Ly Tin District, Quang Tin (P), VIS and Americal personnel. It was determined that the main aspirations of the people were security, economic well being and ferry boat services. LTC Ambrose, CO, 1-6th Inf, 198th Inf Bde, spoke to the people of four hamlets in Ky Hoa Village about the reasons for redeployment. He also assured the villagers that security would be maintained and their economic well being was of great concern, and maximum efforts would be made to insure their economic well being. The people were very impressed because a LTC was interested in them and would take the time to discuss their problems and aspirations. A movie team has been employed on four occasions in support of the PSYOP redeployment campaign. It is believed that the participation of high ranking officials in PSYOP campaigns in conjunction with troop redeployment adds credibility to the program and serves to reassure the people that security will be maintained.

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II. Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations, Recommendations (U).

A. Personnel.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Treasury Checks - Exchange for Cash.

a. Observation: Army Regulations in the area of financial administration are relatively silent on the subject of Treasury Check exchanges for cash by Class "A" Agents. This is particularly true in the area of control, status of the funds as public or private, and responsibilities for ascertaining and resolving claims.

b. Evaluation: Treasury check exchanges for cash in the field or combat situation, both for a morale factor and to achieve the objective of reducing cash in the field, are necessary. The Class "A" Agent remains the best vehicle to provide this service for reasons of area coverage and mutual personal interest and trust between the agent and members of his unit. It is necessary, however, to safeguard the enlisted soldier against an agent's loss of the Treasury check funds of the resmitter through omission or commission. No prescribed interim receipt procedure exists.

c. Recommendation: That an interim receipt procedure patterned after the Uniformed Services Savings Deposit Program temporary receipt procedure be adopted. In the Americal Division, local forms have been developed to be signed by the agent which tell the check purchaser that the interim receipt will be replaced with a copy of the requestor's purchase document by the finance office within fifteen days and that document will bear the validation of the finance officer and the check number and date. In addition, agent officers are required to furnish the finance officer with a listing bearing name of purchaser, payee, signature of purchaser, and dollar amount. This listing serves as a retained record of each agent's action and verification against funds and purchase documents turned in to the finance office. The result has been a severe drop in inquiries regarding checks and, also, claims of non-receipt by payee which previously were difficult to trace. Greater service to the member has resulted by providing a record of the check issue and assurance that the funds had reached the finance office.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Finance Section in Division TOE.

a. Observation: The fixed allocation of finance section spaces in a Division TOE is too inflexible to meet changes in Division structure, environment, and dispersion.

b. Evaluation: As a service support element, the finance section's workload is directly proportional to the number of assigned Division personnel in a given environment and dispersion. Yet, augmentations by combat

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and combat support elements are seldom accompanied by collateral additions to the finance section. Requests for modification to the finance section portion of the TOE are required. The delay and processing time of such modifications far exceeds the immediacy of the finance service support required by the added combat and combat support units. The impact, pending approval of the modified TOE, is felt in areas of service, quality, and effects on accountability, which is far more strict than in other areas of combat service support.

c. Recommendation. That TOE 12-37G be modified so that finance personnel are added to TOE 12-37G in cellular teams on the basis of workload, dispersion, and environment as is done in the 14-500 series TOE for separate finance units.

3. (U) SUBJECT. Religious Retreats for Companies on Standown.

a. Observation. It is recognized that a unit on standown has earned this brief respite. It is a time of relaxation, refitting, recreation and re-creation. Man is not divided into separate compartments. He is a person and must be dealt with as a whole, because that is the way his needs present themselves. During the past quarter, one battalion chaplain offered his companies the opportunity to attend a religious retreat during their standown period. This was done with the conviction that man needs an opportunity for spiritual refurbishment as well as physical and mental refurbishment.

b. Evaluation. Chaplain (CPT) Ronald W. Bensing, attached to the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 11th Brigade, provided Protestant and Catholic retreats for his unit during the period 9-17 June 1969. Chaplain support was furnished by Chaplains assigned to the Chu Lai area. The retreats were held on the second morning of each company's standown period from 0800-1200 hours. The Catholic personnel met at the Americal Division Support Command Chapel while the Protestant personnel met at the Division Artillery Chapel. Transportation was furnished by the unit on standown. The following statistics indicate to some degree the measure of success experienced:

(1) Attendance.

Catholic	53
Protestant	95
TOTAL	148

(2) Total Men on Standown 500

(3) Percentage of Attendance 30%

59

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Evaluation sheets were presented to the retreatants to be completed at the conclusion of the retreat. The consensus of the men who attended was without exception, that it was a positive and worthwhile venture.

c. Recommendation: That commanders and chaplains incorporate a religious retreat program into the overall standown activities. Each chaplain would be responsible for determining the type of retreat to be provided for his unit.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Relocation of APO 96256.

a. Observation: Approximately 5,000 troops operating from LZ Baldy were experiencing a delay in the receipt of their mail.

b. Evaluation: The entire 196th Brigade, located at LZ Baldy, was experiencing this difficulty because the serving MAO (96256) was located at LZ Bayonet, Republic of Vietnam. Mail for the 196th Brigade was being airlifted from DaNang to Chu Lai, shuttled by vehicle to APO 96374 where it was preprocessed, then further shuttled to MAO 96256 where it was delivered to Battalion Mail Clerks. At that point the mail was broken down to companies and sent to the units at LZ Baldy via resupply helicopters. Frequent delays occurred because of weather conditions, mechanical failure and non-availability of helicopters. On 1 May 1969, MAO 96256 was physically relocated and became operational at LZ Baldy. In addition to receiving direct mail service from DaNang on a daily basis, a Finance unit is located there and complete postal services are now available to all members of the 196th Infantry Brigade. Subsequent to the relocation, mail service has greatly improved and intransit time has been reduced by two days.

c. Recommendation: That future operation orders pertaining to the movement of brigade size units include plans that will allow the serving APO to be relocated simultaneously with the troop movement.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Purple Heart Award System.

a. Observation: That by awarding Purple Hearts from the Casualty Report, the processing time required could be significantly reduced and accuracy could be increased.

b. Evaluation: This system has proved more expedient, with processing time reduced from 25 days to 2 days. The number of inquiries by individuals and units on the status of Purple Hearts which were never submitted or lost in administrative channels has been eliminated.

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c. Recommendation: The Purple Heart Medal continue to be awarded solely on the basis of USARV Form 130-R.

B. Operations

1. (C) SUBJECT: Security and Assault Using the Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV)

a. Observation:

(1) The CEV has repeatedly proved to be an invaluable asset to Engineer and Infantry operations in the Americal Division TAOI. (See Lessons Learned Aug - Oct 1968; Nov 68 - Jan 69; and Feb - Apr 69.) Because of the combat environment in RVN, the CEV's effectiveness has been proven in FSB security, counter ambush fire, direct assault of fortified positions, limited reconnaissance by fire and security of field night laager positions. However, the versatility of the vehicle has, on occasion, been limited by the selection of ammunition for the main gun.

(2) Currently the only round available for the main gun is the M123E1 High Explosive Plastic (HEP), which is designed primarily for demolition of hardened structures. Experience has shown this round to be 100% effective in serving its intended purpose; but, other than producing a certain demoralizing effect when used on concealed enemy troops, it is of very limited use in an anti-personnel role.

b. Evaluation:

(1) The three CEV's of the 26th Engineer Battalion, Americal Division, have expended 194 rounds of 165mm ammunition from 1 Jan to 24 Jul 69. Only 12% of these rounds were directed against specific enemy bunkers and fortifications.

(2) Additional analysis indicates that a "canister or beehive" round, if available, would have been more effective than the demolition round against approximately 65% of the targets.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That development be initiated for an ammunition selection for the 165mm Demolition Gun on the CEV.

(2) Additional types of rounds should include a "canister" or beehive" round, and possibly a High Explosive (Frag) round.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Case for XM76 Antioscillation Sighting System

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a. Observation:

(1) During the reporting period, the Americal Division received for testing and evaluation, a quantity of XM76 Antioscillation Sighting System units (Binoculars).

(2) It became immediately evident that the binocular unit and power source were relatively fragile, and that constant movement in and out of helicopters, vehicles and storage areas damages them.

b. Evaluation: In order to make carrying easier, and to protect the device during these critical times, a carrying case was designed and constructed.

c. Recommendation: A carrying case, similar to the design shown at Incl 3, be made an item of issue with the system.

C. Training. None

D. Intelligence. None

E. Logistics.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Water Resupply

a. Observation: Water containers for field use, five gallon, "LUG-A-JUG's", made of plastic and experience has shown that they become damaged beyond repair after only relatively short use.

b. Evaluation: That the "LUG-A-JUG" is a very convenient container for the transport of water to the field. It is lightweight and can be discarded when it becomes unserviceable. The bottom portion of the container is not reinforced, however, and through normal use it quickly becomes unserviceable. The life of the containers could be easily tripled were the bottom to be reinforced.

c. Recommendation: That the present container be modified and a more durable base be incorporated or that a different method be devised for transporting water to the field.

2. (U) SUBJECT: AM/GRC-163

a. Observation: The AM/GRC-163 radio telephone terminal is being utilized within the brigade but no back up or spare parts are presently available.

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b. Evaluation: The above mentioned piece of communication equipment is excellent and provides high quality radio/telephone service. Since it is such a new item, however, there are virtually no spare parts, no back up communications and no qualified repairman to service the sets. When a major component breaks down, such as the multiplexer AN/TCC 70, it must be returned to depot (Sacramento, California) and 30 to 40 days are required to repair the part and return it to the unit.

c. Recommendation: That when a new item of equipment, especially something as intricate as the 163, is introduced, spare parts be available in the command, as well as sufficient back up equipment and qualified repairmen.

3. (C) SUBJECT: "AGAVENCO" Herbicide Sprayer.

a. Observation: The helicopter mounted herbicide sprayer produced by the Agricultural Aviation Engineering Company of Las Vegas, Nevada (Contract Number DAAK01-69-G-3427) is not durable enough to withstand extensive combat use. After 100 spray missions, the equipment is completely inoperational, due to component breakdown and lack of repair parts.

b. Evaluation: The materials used in the construction of the AGAVENCO Sprayer were chosen for their light weight, but not for durability. The plastic blades in the windmill assembly tear off after continued exposure to air pressure on the outside of the aircraft. The aluminum braces on the spray boom crack under pressure, and the aluminum fittings are easily scarred by small pieces of sand, causing burred threads which make coupling difficult.

c. Recommendation: Procurement authorities should demand strength as well as lightness for aircraft mounted apparatus. Pliable plastic should not be used for fan blades that will continually be exposed to air pressure of 100 knots or greater. Points of stress, such as braces and struts, should be constructed of a rugged non-malleable substance.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Amplifier AM-3349.

a. Observation: The amplifier AM-3349 has a tendency to overheat, resulting in both the Power Amplifier tube and the tube socket burning.

b. Evaluation: If the amplifier remains keyed for periods in excess of two (2) hours, the tube and tube socket will burn up from overheating. Although the air conditioner provides cooling for the equipment, the base of the tube becomes extremely hot.

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c. Recommendation: For each two hours of operation, cool the amplifier at least five (5) minutes. Allow the amplifier to cool every hour. Operate the air conditioner when the entire Radio Set, AN/GHC 122 is in operation.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Developing Chemicals

a. Observation: The chemical processing of photographs and films is affected by the existing climate.

b. Evaluation: Due to the extremely hot climate in Vietnam, it is sometimes difficult to maintain developing chemicals at the proper temperature (68 degrees F).

c. Recommendation: To maintain the proper temperature in hot climates, small plastic containers which have been filled with water and frozen can be placed in the developing tanks to cool the chemical solutions.

6. (U) SUBJECT: Marking of Repair Parts Containers

a. Observation: Marking of Repair Parts Containers should be improved.

b. Evaluation: It has been found that because of weather, storage and shipping conditions in this area, the markings on repair parts (class II) containers are often obliterated, resulting in lost or misplaced items. It has been experienced that many common hardware items bearing simple names such as bearing, screw, spring, instrument, etc., are often lost to the system because of federal stock number (FSN) changes. In addition, many of the same items bear different FSN's because of a difference in manufacturer.

c. Recommendation: The addition of the end item application would aid considerably in the identification of containers that may have had part of the FSN obliterated. It would also assist in the location of items that may be lost through FSN changes. If the FSN is not legible, a supply handler would be more prone to remember where he placed a container marked "Bar, Torsion, Tank, M-48A3" than if the container were simply identified "Bar, Torsion" as is the current practice. The costs involved in this procedure would be minimal when compared to the benefits derived in the reduction of lost items and faster and more accurate filling of requests from using units.

7. (C) SUBJECT: Helicopter Herbicide Spray Operations

a. Observation: The windmill assemblies on two of the Division's three AGEVENCO spray rigs were damaged by enemy fires during the reporting period.

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b. Evaluation: Tests have shown that the windmill assembly, although designed to function with six blades, will also function properly with two blades. Any other number of blades, other than six, results in dangerous vibration in the spray rig.

c. Recommendation: That if the full number of blades are not available, no more than two blades should be used on the ACEVENCO spray rig windmill assembly.

F. Organization. None

G. Psychological Warfare

1. (U) SUBJECT: Employment of PSYWAR Aircraft

a. Observation: The innovation of Early Word retransmission capability has greatly increased the versatility of PSYWAR aerial speaker operations by allowing a ground station to retransmit a broadcast over the aircraft's loudspeaker system.

b. Evaluation: The procedures for units requesting an Early Word mission requires the requesting unit to utilize insecure communications. At the present time, the Early Word aircraft is using an unclassified administrative frequency for retransmission broadcasts. The need for a second unclassified administrative frequency exists where two Early Word missions are being conducted concurrently.

c. Recommendation: Two unclassified administrative frequencies be assigned to the Early Word aircraft to permit simultaneous operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incl

1. LOC Interdictions
2. Americal Div Troop List
3. Diagram of case for the XM76 Antioscillation System

JOHN W. DONALDSON
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969,
RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco

16375 30 SEP 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters,
Americal Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Treasury Checks - Exchange for
Cash," section II, page 58, paragraph A1; concur. Disbursing officers have
improvised interim receipts which are provided personnel purchasing
treasury checks through Class A agents.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Finance Section in Division TOE,"
section II, page 58, paragraph A2; nonconcur. The recommendation appears
to have merit but it can only be evaluated after a proposed TOE change has
been submitted through command channels to the Army Combat Development
Command in accordance with AR 310-31 and AR 310-44.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Relocation of APO 96256," section II,
page 60, paragraph A4; concur. All requests for the relocation of APO's
will be submitted to this headquarters as far in advance of the effective
date as practicable. This advance notification is necessary to provide DA,
USARPAC and the USAMMT's at San Francisco and Seattle sufficient lead
time to effectively reroute mail with a minimum disruption of service.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Security and Assault Using the
Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV)," section II, page 61, paragraph B1;
concur. An ENSURE request was disapproved by this headquarters because
of the low density of CEV's in RVN and the fact that each vehicle has organic
cal. 50 and 7.62mm machine guns for close-in protection. A request was
forwarded for the development of a "beehive" round under normal R&D

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

procedures. This request was not favorably considered by USARPAC and no further action is contemplated.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Case for XM76 Antioscillation Sighting System," section II, page 61, paragraph B2; concur. This headquarters will recommend in the suitability statement to DA that a case be designed and provided for each XM76 issued.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Water Resupply," section II, page 62, paragraph E1; concur. This unit is advised to submit an Equipment Improvement Report (EIR) in accordance with paragraph 3-7, 4 of TM 38-750, Army Equipment Record Procedures, to the Defense General Supply Center at Richmond, Virginia.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "AGAVENCO Herbicide Sprayer," section II, page 63, paragraph E3; concur. The AGAVENCO Herbicide Sprayer is a commercial off-the-shelf item and was not "built" for military use. CG, MECOM has been advised of the problems with this sprayer (USARV Msg 77221, 010201 Nov 68, Subj: AGAVENCO Helicopter Spray System). Because of this item's lack of ruggedness, commanders must insure that proper handling procedures and maintenance practices are employed by their commands. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Amplifier AM-3349," section II, page 63, paragraph E4; concur. An internal problem may exist in the AM-3349 in the AN/GRC-122 configuration. The problem will be investigated by USAECOM personnel from this headquarters and the Division advised of any findings.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Marking of Repair Parts Containers should be improved," section II, page 64, paragraph E6; concur. Headquarters, Army Materiel Command (AMC), letter dated 27 May 1969, subject: Requirements for Improving Item Identification Markings on Exterior Containers Destined for Vietnam, addresses this problem. AMC has directed that new marking requirements be implemented immediately for Army-sponsored shipments destined for RVN from depots and procurement sources. Most containers currently arriving in RVN are marked with the FSN and nomenclature as established in Appendix C, paragraph 1, AMC Regulation 746-8.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10


AVHGC-DST (10 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

j. (U) Reference item concerning "Helicopter Herbicide Spray Operations," section II, page 64, paragraph E7; concur. This field expedient will keep the item operational while waiting for repair parts. It should be pointed out, however, that the strain placed on the two blades will be greater than normally experienced, therefore, a higher failure rate can be expected. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

k. (U) Reference item concerning "PSYWAR Aircraft," section II, page 65, paragraph G1; concur. The Early Word system was a significant development in quick reaction and personalized PSYOP. The allocation of frequencies to the system should be sufficient to allow the exploitation of its capabilities in consonance with tactical requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
Americal Div

GPOP-DT (10 Aug 69) 2d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Americal Division for Period Ending
31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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LOC INTERDICTIONS

	Q11	535	533	529	523	518
VEHICLES						
Minor	2	8				
Combat Loss	3	9		2		
VN Vehicles	1					
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS						
Minor						1
ENGINEER EQUIPMENT						
Minor	1	1				
Combat Loss		1	1			
PERSONNEL						
MIA (US)	4	25		7	1	3
MIA (VN)						
KIA (US)		1				1
KIA (VN)	2					
TOTAL MINE INCIDENTS	10	20	3	3	1	1
ROAD BARRIER	4		1			
CULVERTS BLOWN	7	2				
BRIDGES BLOWN	7					

Inclosure 1

CONFIDENTIAL

AMERICAL DIVISION TROOP LIST
(as of 1 August 1969)

1. HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION

HHC, Americal Division

1st Sqdn, 1st Cav

26th Engr Bn
160th Engr Det

523d Sig Bn

23d MP Co
146th MP Plat, 504th MP Bn

3d MIL Hist Det

USAMID (PROV)
52d MI Det
569th MI Det
635th MI Det
636th MI Det

328th RR Co

OL, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

60th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

2. AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY

HQB, Div Arty

6th Bn, 11th Arty

1st Bn, 14th Arty

3d Bn, 82d Arty

3d Bn, 16th Arty

3d Bn, 18th Arty

1st Bn, 82d Arty

G Btry, 55th Arty (.50 Cal)

B Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Arty (FO Party and Metro Section)

3d Plat, G Btry, 29th Arty (Searchlight)

Inclosure 2

251st FA Det (Radar)

252d FA Det (Radar)

271st FA Det (Radar)

3. AMERICAN DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

HHC and Band

23d S&T Bn

23d Med Bn

723d Maint Bn (-)

23d Admin Co

Co G (Ranger), 75th Inf

63d Inf Plat (CTT)

American Combat Center (PROV)

Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)

4. 16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP

HHC, 16th CAG (Cbt)

14th Combat Avn Bn

71st Avn Co (Aslt Hel)

174th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)

176th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)

534th Med Det

756th Med Det

14th Security Plat

123d Avn Bn (Cbt) (Inf Div)

132d Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)

178th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)

E Co, 723d Maint Bn

F Troop, 8th Cav

415th Sig Det

570th Trans Det

335th Trans Co

Inclosure 2 (Con't)

5. 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 11th Inf Bde

3d Bn, 1st Inf

4th Bn, 3d Inf

1st Bn, 20th Inf

4th Bn, 21st Inf

E Trp, 1st Cav

59th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

90th Chem Det

31st Public Information Det

327th Avn Det

Combat Weather Team 2

6. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196th Inf Bde

1st Bn, 46th Inf

2d Bn, 1st Inf

3d Bn, 21st Inf

4th Bn, 31st Inf

F Trp, 17th Cav

48th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

27th Chem Det

10th Public Information Det

Combat Weather Team 1

7. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196th Inf Bde

1st Bn, 6th Inf

Inclosure 2 (Con't)

5th Bn, 46th Inf

1st Bn, 52d Inf

H Trp, 17th Cav

57th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

67th Chem Det

8. NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (Airmobile) (OPCON)

6th CA Plat, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)

Det 1 (DS of Chu Lai)

Det 2 (DS of Duc Pho)

Det 3 (DS of LZ Baldy)




Det 3, 7th Psyop Bn (DS of Div)

USASSG, ACSI, DA

46th Engr Det

9. Request notification of any changes/corrections be made to
CPT Major, G3 DOT 493/3776.

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Division Engineering Office (Engr. Lab.)
Landing Case for the
Anticollusion Bienting System

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(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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