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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGAM-P (M) (6 Mar 69) FOR OT UT 684321

11 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal Division, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH B. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-GC

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(RCS-CSFOR-65) (RI) (U)
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Section I
Significant Organization and Unit Activities.

A. Command.

1. (U)
Command

Colonel Lewis B. Tixier became the Acting Chief of Staff on 24 August 1968 replacing Colonel Nels A. Parson Jr. On 4 October Colonel Jack L. Treadwell assumed his duties as Chief of Staff of the Americal Division replacing Colonel Tixier.

2. The following distinguished person visited the Americal Division during the reporting period.

a. Major General Burl W. McLaughlin, Commanding General 824th Air Division, 6 August 1968.

b. Major General Conn L. Milburn, Chief Surgeon, USARPAC 13 August 1968.

c. General Andrew J. Mildren, Deputy CG USARV, 20 August and 18 October 1968.

d. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, DEPCOMUSMACV, 19 August 1968.

e. Major General Elias C. Townsend, J-3 MACV 30 August 1968.

f. Brigadier General William Van Harlington Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff, Communication & Electronics USARV, 17 September 1968.

g. Brigadier General Hal C. Pattison, Chief of Military History, DA, 20 September 1968.

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h. Major General W.C. Gribble Jr., Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DA 21 September 1968.

i. Brigadier General Don R. Hickman, Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration, USARV, 24 September 1968.

j. General Ralph E. Haines Jr., Commander in Chief U.S. Army Pacific, 29 October 1968.

k. Lieutenant General Louis W. Walt, Assistant Commandant, Marine Corps, 30 October 1968.

l General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, visited the Division several times for operational guidance and orders.

B. Personnel Administration, Morale, and Discipline.

1. Personnel

a. (U) Enlisted Records:

(1) The enlisted Records Branch processed 5110 personnel during the reporting period. Personnel out processed numbered 3024.

(2) The out processing section has continued to lessen the load on the personnel teams as reported in earlier reports.

b. (U) Awards and Decorations: There was an increase to 6506 awards processed. A total of 2940 General Orders were published.

c. (U) Administrative Service Division: Reproduction. In August 1968 the quonset hut, which had been constructed in June for the Administrative Services Division's reproduction facilities, was installed with wiring and lights. The Reproduction Branch move from its previous location was accomplished in three days with no interruption of its operation. One 18,000 B.T.U. air conditioner and two de-humidifiers were installed. However, new photographic equipment could not be utilized because of a lack of supplies which hinders the offset presses from realizing their full capabilities.

2. (U) Reenlistment:

a. Reenlistment involves the activities required to retain the maximum number of qualified competent enlisted personnel in the Regular Army

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b. In order to achieve this objective, the enlisted personnel have to be counseled and advised by motivated and knowledgeable personnel who can assist in planning the enlisted man's career. The Reenlistment Division must provide qualified personnel to aid the commander in initiating and implementing his Reenlistment Program. All documents concerning separation, Reenlistment and extension of enlistments are prepared and processed by the Reenlistment Division.

3. (U) Special Services:

a. The Sandpiper Service Club was opened and is housed in two large quonset huts connected by and enclosed walkway between the buildings. The enclosed walkway also houses the club's kitchen facilities. One disadvantage is the club's location in the 723d Maint Bn area which is not centrally located as it should be near the Division Headquarters area. The club was opened only after most of the personnel from the AG section worked one day to finish the painting and decorating that the engineers were not able to complete. As a result of publicity, it is becoming a service club for most of Chu Lai Base.

b. A building has been obtained in the 523d Sig Bn area which will house the Chu Lai Base Central Library facility. Construction on the renovation of the old mess hall awaits the approval of the installation engineer and subsequent planning board approval for funding and establishment of a construction priority.

c. A 18 hole miniature golf course was set up on a concrete slab near the old USAO site. In the same area work has progressed on the establishment of a complete beach recreation site. The bolts that secured the old USA building have been cut off the concrete slabs and overhead power lines have been removed. The site is ready for concrete to be put in to level the existing slabs and fill in open areas to provide space for two full-size tennis courts, on badminton and one volleyball court. A full-size basketball court complete with backboards and goals already exists in the area. The concrete project is awaiting planning board approval, funding and establishment of a priority of construction.

d. A two man soldier show who call themselves "Aunt Willie's Memorial Band" has been playing for all of the clubs and hospital wards on Chu Lai Base for the past 30 days. They are attached to the Special Services Entertainment branch located at the Americal Amphitheater. The unit commanders of the two men recently approved a 60 extension of attachment for the two men so they could continue touring the CHu Lai Base with their music.

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4. (U) Provost Marshal:

a. During the reporting period five (5) PW Collecting Points were operated. The five PW Collecting Points processed the following number of detainees:

(1) Total Detainees Processed	2202
(2) PW	44
(3) CD	283
(4) IC	1859
(5) CH	16

b. The 23d Military Police Company escorted a total of 2,662 convoy vehicles for 20,480 miles. Armor Kits were received for the Units M-151 jeeps and the unit now has four (4) operational armored escort jeeps for use on the daily resupply convoys to LZ Baldy and Quang Ngai. These statistics do not include convoy escorts by the 11th Bde Military Police. Resource Control Activities were at a low level during the latter part of the reporting period due to stringent restrictions on search and seizure of contraband and blackmarket items in the possession of NV Nationals. Results of raids and checkpoints are as follows:

MPC		938.45
CIG	Cartons	311
Marijuana	CIG	892
Beer	Cases	169
Soda	Cases	192

5 (U) Information Office:

a. On 25 and 26 August, the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry engaged in a battle near Tam Ky which received extensive press coverage. However, the unit was identified as 1st Air Cav, 1st Cav Div, or other incorrect names in the civilian media. Likewise, the Americal Division continued to be call the "An American Division" or otherwise be misidentified. The problem was brought to the attention of all civilian bureau chiefs by MACOI, USARV-IO, and III MAF MACV representatives. When the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry fought a similar battle, killing 208 NVA on 25 September, both the unit and division were promptly identified in the U.S. press.

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Both battles received wide publicity across the United States.

b. Operation Champaign Grove in late September received extensive coverage by CBS and NBC. BG Galloway made his helicopter available to the teams and gave them extensive briefings. Transportation of the press has been a problem in the Americal Division because of the scarcity of helicopters here. Operational missions come first. Reporters, with their need for timeliness, must get into the action, get their story, and get back to Da Nang to file. They have been hesitant to cover hard news in our area due to the lack of transportation. The treatment given by BG Galloway to CBS, and to NBC's John Coats, caused these agencies to praise the Americal Division to other agencies in Da Nang.

c. During the past quarter, a bi-weekly newspaper, The Southern Cross, and a quarterly four color magazine, The Americal, have been published. A written contract was negotiated for both periodicals assuring us of a better quality of printing and punctuality of delivering the finished product. The newspaper requires that the completed product be delivered to the Stars & Stripes, Tokyo, packaged for shipment to Vietnam not later than one week after the delivery of our copy to the printer. Further shipment is via Stars & Stripes delivery service through Da Nang. The only problem encountered so far has been the delay of shipment from Da Nang to Chu Lai.

(1) Magazine shipment has been simplified by a modified pin-point distribution program. The magazines are bundled into packages of 25 by the printer and are mailed via APO directly from Tokyo to the receiving unit. Magazines to all units receiving less than 25 copies are consolidated and mailed to the division IO for distribution through the local M&D. This method has presented no major problem, and the MOM method as recommended by the Chu Lai APO Officer will result in a money saving to the government, offering no delay in shipment.

d. Distribution of Stars & Stripes and USARV's UPTIGHT magazine has presented no problems. The Information Officer continues to monitor the distribution of both items, and supplies the UPTIGHT with labels to facilitate direct mailing to all of our units. Stars and Stripes distribution to Americal Division has been satisfactory. All distribution lists are brought up to date by delegation and additions as the division's strength and assigned units change.

e. The division's Command Information Guidance for the Second Quarter FT 69 was published and distributed to all subordinate units with copies of the Command Information Guidance Letter supplied by USARV.

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Emphasis has been placed in The Southern Cross newspaper on command type articles. An informative editorial column and a special feature on Vietnamese life are now included in the standard format. Command Information fillers are also used in the Americal Daily News Sheet, which has a wider readership and a better reception by the troops in the field than a fact sheet. All of these articles are internally produced. This affords a variety of approaches to the subject matter by adding local interest touches to each subject.

f. Since August 1, 1968, other Command Information publications produced are:

Americal Fact Sheet No. 69-3 Marijuana

Americal Fact Sheet No. 69-4 Immersion Foot

Americal Fact Sheet No. 69-5 Never on C-Day

Americal Flyer (Aug 68) New General Orders

Americal Flyer (Aug 68) Chain of Command

Americal Flyer (Aug 68) Stash your trash

Americal Flyer (Sep 68) Condensed Biography: MG Gettys

Americal Flyer (Sep 68) Condensed Biography: BG Cooksey

Americal Vietnamese Fact Sheet (Sep 68) TET-trung-Thu

Americal Vietnamese Fact Sheet (Oct 68) The Beginnings

(1) The Flyers and the Vietnamese Fact Sheet are very abbreviated and cheerfully illustrated to attract attention. They are distributed whenever the situation requires an immediate publication and are published to satisfy a specific, immediate need.

g. During the period 1 August to 31 October 1968, the following support was given to military and civilian media:

Number of Printed Releases 135

Number of Photo Releases 160

Number of Radio Features 20

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Number of Home Town Releases 275

Number of Home Town News Printed Releases 3508

Number of Home Town News Photo Releases 85

Number of Formal Press Interviews and Briefings 18

Number of Correspondents Visiting Division 80

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C. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

1. (C) G-2 Section:

a. LTC A. E. Adkins remained assigned to ACoFS, G2 for the entire period. Major John Dorf, G2 operations officer departed for CONUS on 6 October and CPT Cecil Oxford was reassigned within the division. Newly assigned personnel include Majors J. R. Bell, G2 Admin Officer; J. M. Meyes, G2 Plans; T.G. Kershaw Jr, G2 Operations; and CPTs C.T. Newkirk and J. Carlton, both TOC operation officers. SGM N. W. Lillard also arrived during this period.

b. G-2 Operations: The Americal Division continuous operations against the 2d NVA Division and provincial and local force units in Quang Tin and southern Quang Nam Province and the 3d NVA Division and provincial and local force units in Quang Ngai Province. Operations consisted primarily of combat assaults, sweep operations against local force and provincial units and spoiling operations against major MF/NVA units and headquarters complexes in base areas and staging areas. Operations against major MF/NVA targets have been increasingly and successfully supported by B-52 strikes against battalion and regimental bases and division base complexes. On the three occasions when elements of the 2d and 3d NVA divisions attempted large scale attacks against the provincial capitals of Quang Ngai and Tam Ky Cities, they were intercepted and defeated, suffering approximately 1500 KIA. Intelligence collection and small scale operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) were intensified.

c. G2 Air:

(1) The G2 Air Section continued to plan and monitor the collection effort through aerial reconnaissance and surveillance. Weather conditions were generally favorable and resulted in a further increase in actual coverage flown. The monthly reconnaissance plan was adjusted in an attempt to gain comparative photographic coverage in areas of increased enemy activity. The infrared monthly reconnaissance targets have been changed from a set frequency to a request basis. This allows more flexibility in attempting to concentrate on areas of heaviest enemy activity. The volume of daily requests increased with the percentage of requests filled remaining at the same high level.

(2) Increased emphasis was placed on the dissemination of information received by aerial surveillance. Close coordination with subordinate units and Division Artillery, and follow-up by the G2 Air Section, has resulted in an increase in the number of acquired targets engaged by artillery fire.

(3) The feasibility of the use of the infrared ground data link AM/TAQ 1 was investigated. It was determined that at present the division does

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not have the capability of processing the imagery received by the system. The Division Signal Battalion has the necessary equipment for processing on requisition. Upon receipt of the equipment, the An/TAQ I will be requested from the 243 SAC for employment in the Americal AO.

d. Enemy Situation:

(1) Quang Tin and Quang Nam.

(a) Enemy initiated activity consisted primarily of small arms, AW, mortar and rocket fires in scattered attacks against NDPs, fire bases and district and provincial towns. In late August and late September the 1st MF Regt, 2d NVA Division, deployed to attack Tam Ky City from staging areas in the piedmont to the west and southwest. During October the 1st MF Regt was not identified in a major engagement, probably indicative of reduced combat effectiveness. The 3d NVA Regt was identified in an attack on the RF/PF outpost at Hau Duc. In this action the 3d NVA Regt suffered losses sufficient to render one battalion combat ineffective. During October enemy initiated activity dropped to an extremely low level, as MF/NVA and LF units engaged in supply and replacement activities. The enemy continued periodic ambushes and interdiction of QL-1.

1. On 1 Aug, vic BT460 084, Ly Tin District HQ, Revolutionary Development Team engaged 1 VC which resulted in 1 VC KIA and 1xAK-47 captured. Documents indicated that the VC was a member of C-70 Co, 409th Sapper Bn.

2. On 4 Aug, vic BT 085 017, F8 Cav engaged an unknown number of NVA. Friendly units received intense small arms cal .30 and .50 cal fire which resulted in 1 UH1H lost. Later in the day one OH6A was hit by ground fire, forced to land, but was later recovered.

3. On 4 Aug, Operations Pocahontas Forest terminated with a total of 54 VC KIA, 40 NVA KIA, 93 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon captured.

4. On 16 Aug, vic AT 961 128, C-5/46 Inf detained 1 VC who pointed out a VC hospital complex consisting of 20 huts. The unit searched the area and found miscellaneous instruments and medical supplies. While in the area, C Company engaged 1 VC which resulted in 1 VC KIA and 1xK-44 captured.

5. On 17 Aug, vic BT 136 546, elements of the 71st Avn Co observed and engaged an unidentified number of VC moving across the Song The Bon. The ensuing engagement resulted in 2 VC KIA. C-4/21 Inf moved into the area of contact and killed an additional 33 VC and captured 1xM-1 rifle and 1 CAR 15.

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6. On 23 Aug, CLDC received a total of 16x122mm rockets, D-4/3 Inf, vic BT 397 145, received 12 rounds of 60 mm mortar, 26th Engineers, Vic BT 434 075, received 15-20 rounds of mixed 82 mm and 60 mm mortars, A&E-5/56th Inf, vic BT238 143 received a ground attack and 25 rounds of 82 mm mortar. Results of this contact were 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA and 2 AK-47 rifles captured. LZ West, vic AT 990 250, received 10 rounds of 60 mm mortar, LZ Ross, vic BT 027 342 received 10-12 rounds of 60mm and 81mm mortar and small arms fire. Probing attacks were attempted at LZs Bowman and West but were turned back with 55 VC/NVA KIA.

7. During the period 24-27 Aug, vic BT 220 230, 1/1 Cav, F-8 Cav, 4/21 Inf and the 3d ARVN ACAV Squadron engaged a large enemy force which resulted in over 500 VC/NVA KIA. PW and documents identified the enemy as the 1st Main Force Regt and elements of the 3d and 21st NVA Regts, 2d NVA Division.

8. On 30 Aug, vic BT 224 323, Binh Quang New Life Hamlet had 72 homes burned by the VC in an act of terrorism that left 572 Vietnamese homeless.

9. During the period 1-4 Sep, the 1/6th Inf vic BS 466 996 engaged an unknown size enemy force who fought a defensive battle from well-prepared bunkers and entrenchments. The results of a series of contacts were 26 NVA KIA, and 6 VC CIA. The unit in contact was thought to be elements of the 3d NVA Regt, 2d NVA Division.

10. On 9 Sep, C-4/31 Inf, vic AT 850 154, found and enemy base camp and captured 31 SKSs, 5 AK-47s, 7 B-40 rocket rounds, miscellaneous documents and 9 portable flamethrowers. In addition to the portable flamethrowers, eight large tanks, later identified as the Soviet TPO-50M, were found. This was the first report of the TPO-50M in RVN.

11. On 11 Sep USMC and ARVN units operating west of An Hoa, vic AT916660, made contact with a large enemy unit. PW captured stated their unit was the 21st Regt, 2d NVA Division. This marked a significant move of this regt from Quang Tin Province into Quang Nam Province resulting in a corresponding decrease in the enemy threat to Tam Ky City.

12. On 17-18 Sep, vic BT 174 140, an element of A-39th Engineers was ambushed by an unknown size NVA force which resulted in 43 NVA KIA. The unit in contact was thought to be the 1st Main Force Regt, 2d NVA Division, but no confirmation could be obtained.

13. On 21-23 Sep, vic BT 070 050, Hau Duc Outpost, manned by RF/PF Forces, came under intense 60mm and 82mm mortar and 57 RR fire. A ground attack was then launched by an unknown size enemy force. This action resulted in 186 VC/NVA KIA and 5 VC/NVA captured. The PW identified their

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unit as a battalion of the 3d NVA Regt, 2d NVA Division, marking the move of the Reg. westward from its previous location vic BS 420 980 on 10 Sep 68.

14. On 24-25 Sep, vic BT 245 165, A, B-1/1 Cav, elements of the 1/52 Inf, F-8 Cav and D-4/21 Inf engaged an unknown NVA force. The enemy was in a defensive position. After breaking contact, the enemy forces withdrew to vic BT 268 168. A sweep of the battle field revealed that the enemy has lost 300 KIA, 10 individual weapons and 8 crew served weapons. One unit in contact was later identified as the 90th Bn, 1st MF Regt, 2d NVA Division.

15. On 26 Sep, vic BT 180 199, 123d Avn Aero Scouts and D-1/52 Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force north of LZ Young (vic BT 180 190). The results of the action were 76 NVA KIA, 13 individual weapons and one crew served weapon captured.

16. On 1 Oct, vic BT 086 078, heavy contact was made with a well dug in unidentified enemy force. Heavy AA fire resulted in one aircraft lost and one forced to land. This contact resulted in 9 enemy KIA.

17. On 1 Oct, a Provisional Reconnaissance Unit in night defensive positions vic the provincial headquarters (BT 286 226) at Tam Ky City received eight rounds of 82mm and 120mm mortar fire. Some of the rounds were reported to have contained CS gas.

18. On 1 Oct, vic BT 129 439, the 196th LIB reported 12-15 huts burned in an act of terrorism; 1 NV child was WHA (E).

19. During the period 2-5 Oct, enemy activity was light with only a few LZs and FSBs receiving attacks by fire. Operation Dukes Glade was initiated in Norther Que Son District on 2 Oct.

20. During the period 6-12 Oct, enemy continued light and scattered. There were no significant engagements with NVA/MF or Local Force units. Local Force units were probably engaged in rice harvesting/gathering activities for MF and NVA units. Operation Dukes Glade terminated on 9 Oct and accounted for 21 enemy KIA and 18 individual weapons captured.

21. During the period 13-18 Oct contacts with cell and squad size Local Force units increased with a total of 36 friendly initiated incidents and 12 enemy initiated incidents. A total of 41 enemy were KIA and GVN targets increased in the Quang Tin/Quang Name area but caused little damage and no casualties.

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22. On 20 Oct, vic BT 253 153, D-1/46 Inf discovered and extensive cave and tunnel complex. Forty-four rounds of 70mm ChiCom ammunition and a sight for a model 92 Howitzer were located. This was the first evidence of this particular weapon being present in the Americal AO.

23. From 19-23 Oct, enemy activity was very light as MV/NVA units continued to avoid contact with friendly forces.

24. During the period 1 Aug-23 Oct, operations in Quang Tin and Quang Nam Province resulted in a total of 497 NVA KIA, 881 VC KIA, 355 Individual weapons and 62 crew served weapons captured.

(2) Quang Ngai.

(a) Enemy initiated activity in Quang Ngai Province consisted primarily of standoff mortar and rocket attacks against military and official GVN targets. Elements of the 3d NVA Division brought mortar and rocket fires on the USSF/CIDG camps at Ha Thanh in an apparent attempt to draw friendly forces into the piedmont. Following a measured, friendly response, other elements of the 3d NVA Div attempted a thrust at Quang Ngai City. The attack force was engaged in the lowlands west of the city and suffered heavy losses without reaching its objective. B-52 strikes in the highlands west of Ha Thanh, effectively prevented the 3d NVA Div from massing forces. Local Forces continued interdiction of QL-1.

1. From 1-10 Aug, contact was light with no significant incidents.

2. On 10 Aug 68, vic BS 5336 925, 123d Avn Aero Scouts working with the 198th LIB engaged an unidentified enemy force. Action during the encounter resulted in two secondary explosions. A sweep of the battlefield yielded 13 KIA 1xK-44, 1xSKS, 3xpistol belts, 4xpacks, a set of binoculars, and several hand grenades. Sixteen suspects were detained for further interrogation.

3. On 12 Aug, vic BS 444 643, an element of the 3/1 Infantry encountered an enemy force moving along a ridge line. After the initial contact by friendly point elements, the enemy withdrew. A later search of the area revealed four bunkers, miscellaneous equipment, NVA and USSR flags, and several documents Lapel emblems, with one and two stars, and documents indicated that the position was probably a division headquarters base area. Detailed document readout later identified the enemy as the 3d NVA division.

4. On 12 Aug, vic BS 541 432, MINH LONG USSF/CIDG Camp captured a PW named LE VAN HUE. He stated that he was from Unit 492, (possibly the Political Staff Section, 3d NVA Division).

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5. On 16 Aug, NGUYEN VAN HUE rallied to elements of the 2d ARVN Div. He stated that he was from CK-33 Mortar Bn, 2d NVA Div and that he was on a mission with 26 other men to TU PHUOC (V), vic BS 460 760, to pick up rice. The Bn was located around Que Son (V), vic BT 045 348, and was undergoing political training and preparing for a general offensive.

6. On 16 Aug, the Son Ha District Chief reported to Ha Thanh USSF/CIDG Camp that the 95th Bn, 2d MF Regt, 3d NVA Div was moving from an unreported location to coordinates BS 4420 782. He had information that the battalion had suffered 29 KIA and 56 WIA from b-52 strikes conducted on 14 and 15 August. He indicated that the 120th MF Bn also suffered 39 KIA and 28 WIA from the same strike.

7. On 18 Aug vic BS 437 626, R-3/1 Inf found a base camp with approximately 30 huts recently built or under construction with tunnels between the completed huts. Among the completed buildings were a well-constructed officer's mess and an enlisted mess.

8. On 21-22 Aug, vic BS 573 750, 4/4 Regt of the 2d ARVN Div contacted and estimated enemy battalion. Results of the encounter included 68 enemy KIA. Captured documents identified the unit as the 95th Bn, 2d MF Regt, 3d NVA Div. It is probable that elements of the Regt were moving toward attack positions west of Quang Ngai City.

9. On 22 Aug, Ha Thanh USSF/CIDG Camp came under heavy fire. One of the camp's OP's was over-run, but was retaken on 23 August. The camp continued to receive almost daily attacks by fire from 60, 82 and 120mm mortars through 6 September. Although no positive identification was made, elements of the 22d NVA Regt, 3d NVA Div and the 120th MF Bn were probably involved in this series of attacks.

10. On 4 Sep, Operation Champaign Grove was initiated as elements of the 11th LIB, under control of Task Force Galloway, conducted operations in the vicinity of BA 121 to locate and destroy the 3d NVA Div as well as LF and MF units operating there. Contact during the operation was scattered and varied from light to heavy.

11. On 7 Sep, vic BS 540 770, R-4/3 Inf came under heavy fire from an estimated enemy battalion. Aided by gunships, the contact continued until well after dark. A sweep of the area resulted in 20 enemy KIA.

12. On 12 Sep, vic BS 517 711, elements of B-4/3 Inf were led to a cache by two Hoi Chanh who had recently escaped from the enemy after having been forced to act as laborers. The cache included a US 105mm Howitzer which was completely buried.

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13. On 13 Sep, vic BS 577 714, A-4/3 Inf, B-1/46 Inf, and A&B 1/1 Cav, operating as maneuver elements for Task Force Galloway, engaged an unknown size enemy force. Friendly forces were engaged by small arms automatic weapons, and RPG fire. Results of the encounter included 54 VC KIA, 7 NVA KIA, 12 IWC, and 4 CSWC. Captured documents identified the enemy as elements of the 2d MF Regt, 3d NVA Div.

14. On 17 Sep, vic BS 664 889, Aero Scouts from the 123d Aviation Bn contacted an unidentified enemy force, estimated to be a VC company, killing 22 and capturing 2 M-1 Carbines.

15. On 22 Sep, the enemy initiated coordinated attacks by fire on LZ Bronco, LZ Gator, LZ Dottie, Son Tinh (D) HQ, Binh Son (D) HQ, Quang Ngai City, and Ha Thanh USSF/CIDG Camp. Hardest hit by the enemy action was Binh Son, vic BS 380 690. which received 100 rounds of 60 & 82mm mortar fire as well as 57mm RR fire. A total of 18 houses were destroyed. The District PW compound was attacked, resulting in 3 PW freed, 10 PW KIA, and 62 PW WIA.

16. On 24 Sep, Operation Champaign Grove was terminated with 378 enemy KIA, 57 IWC, and 16 CSWC.

17. On 26 Sep in Duc Pho, an assassination attempt was made at a dedication ceremony attended by the CO, 11th LIB, the Duc Pho District Chief, the Duc Pho District Police Chief, and other ranking Brigade officers and local Vietnamese dignitaries. Three sniper rds were fired resulting in on VN dignitary WHA. One VC was apprehended. The ceremony was for the purpose of dedicating a new market place in Duc Pho, recently constructed with the assistance of the 11th LIB.

18. On 29 Sep, the 2d ARVN Div reported that elements of the 506A and 506B LF Sapper Co's, the 81st LF Bn, and H-16 LF Sapper Co (previously carried as a possible Nghia Hanh (D) unit) entered and occupied a small portion of the western sector of Quang Ngai City, vic BS 630 724. The enemy fired six RPG rounds, four of which hit the Province Hospital. The Song Tre Khuc Bridge received 2 rds of RPG fire. A military warehouse was burned and the RD HQ was heavily damaged by satchel charges. A 21st RAC one quarter ton vehicle was ambushed vic BS 629 722 with 1 USA KHA. An ARVN and RF/PF reaction forces moved into the area, engaging the enemy for most of the day. Seventy-five VC were killed; 11 were captured. Three x .30 cal MG, 2x 82mm mortar tubes, and 4 individual weapons were seized.

19. On 3 Oct vic BS 655 999, D5/46 Inf found and destroyed a mine field consisting of 48 anti-personnel mines.

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20. On 7 Oct, vic BS 668 587, A&D-3/1 Inf engaged an estimated VC Company, killing 18. Captured documents identified the unit as the 506B Sapper Company.

21. On 7 Oct, Operation Logan Field was initiated against the 48th LP Bn operating in the Batangan Cape area. Contact was generally light and scattered with the majority of friendly casualties resulting from mines and booby traps. The operation was terminated on 12 October with 14 VC KIA and 6 IWC.

22. On 14 Oct Binh Son District HW, vic BS 606 920, received SA/AW fire, 1 60 mm mortar round, possibly containing CS gas, on unknown type rocket round, and 10-15 satchel charges. There were no casualties, but one temple was destroyed and one church received heavy damage.

23. On 14 Oct, the Quang Ngai City area, including the airfield and the Citadel, received 12-14 140mm rockets with 4 VN KHA, 1 ARVN KIA, 4 VN WHA, 5 ARVN WHA, 2 US WHA, and 3 houses destroyed. The attack was reported to be a rocket registration mission.

24. On 16 Oct, Duc Pho market, vic BS806 376, received 8 rounds of RPG-7 fire, satchel charges, and AW fire. The northern section of Cuc Pho (V) received an unknown number of mortar rounds with 3 PF KHA and 5 PF WHA.

25. On 18 Oct, Operation Dale Common was initiated in the Song Ve Valley. Friendly units met with light contact as enemy units attempted brief delaying actions to cover their withdrawal. The operation terminated on 19 October when friendly units could not regain contact. Results were 23 VC KIA, 3 IWC, and 1 VC provisional cadre CIA.

26. On 25 Oct, Operation Vernon Lake I was initiated in the Song Ve Valley to exploit B-52 strikes on a suspect enemy base area. A search of this area uncovered a Bn size training complex, probably occupied by elements of the 2d MF Regt. The camp which was 80% destroyed, consisted of approximately 170 well-built bunkers and over 50 foxholes. Twenty-four enemy bodies were found in the immediate vicinity, however it is estimated that were 15-200 enemy killed or wounded by the strikes. As of 31 Oct, the operation has resulted in 93 enemy KIA, 23 IWC, and 1 CSWC.

2. (C) MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT: Significant events of the detachment for the quarter ending 31 Oct 1968.

a. Intelligence report for Americal Division was provided by personnel specializing in counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, interrogation, document exploitation, and order of battle. Although the MID was not formally

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organized and personnel shortages remained, the quality and timeliness of intelligence information produced was markedly improved. Interrogation and document translation reports were revised and expanded to provide a more complete and clear intelligence document. The value of information elicited from sources, as well as the number of sources, increased. Improvements were also noted to the processing of information and the production of intelligence for the AcofS, G2.

b. On 25 Oct 1968, the Chief of Staff, Americal Division, approved organization of the Americal Division MID from the existing brigade MIDs. Consolidation will be accomplished in phases and should be completed by 25 Nov 1968. Military Intelligence teams will support each brigade but will be flexible. Current plans are to support each brigade with a team of interrogators (1 off, 4 K3Q, 3 CI specialists (1 off, 2 K1Q, 1 enlisted QB specialist, and 2 enlisted imagery interpreters on a continuous basis. These teams can then be augmented, when required, on a mission basis.

c. Order of Battle Section: The Order of Battle Section continued to produce timely intelligence concerning the enemy situation in the Southern ICTX. The several officer and enlisted replacements who arrived in the section rapidly adjusted to their new duties and are presently performing in an exceptional manner. Significant activities of the Order of Battle Section are as follows:

(1) A continued briefing on the enemy situation for 1/46 Inf, Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer, 3/16 ARTY, INF Section, Americal MID, S-2 MAG 13, Intelligence Sergeant, MAG 12, 21st Reconnaissance Aircraft Company, Americal Division.

(2) Continued to maintain order of battle files on all confirmed enemy units within the Americal AO.

(3) Prepared a study, with overlay, of Base Area #117 and vicinity.

(4) Prepared a road study for Americal Support Command, on Route #535 from Tien Phuoc to Tam Ky.

(5) Prepared a study of enemy incidents in July in the coastal area of Americal AO.

(6) Furnished information in support of PSYOP.

(7) Prepared enemy situation overlays on Danang and Bong Be areas.

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- (8) Prepared a chart on assassinations and terrorist attempts in refugee centers in the Americal AO.
- (9) Continued to evaluate Agent Reports based on current OD holdings.
- (10) Prepared weekly summaries of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities.
- (11) Prepared weekly update listings of enemy units within the Americal AO.

- (12) Continued updating enemy order of battle summaries.

- (13) Continued update of LRP Debriefings.

d. Imagery Interpretation Section:

- (1) The II Section continued to furnish the Division imagery interpretation support through photo readouts and special studies.

- (2) Specific accomplishments were:

- (a) Photography resulting from 146 photo missions was received; 101 were distributed to brigades.

- (b) Fifty-nine supplementary Imagery Interpretation Reports were published and distributed.

- (c) Twenty-one Special Studies were completed. These included 12 mosaics, river studies and several trail overlays.

- (d) Initiated revision of Special Forces Camp Studies including overlays, mosaics, and drawings.

- (e) A total of 15 Visual Reconnaissance flights were made by the aerial observers of the II Section. They reported 40 significant sightings. The handheld 35mm camera was used effectively, producing photographs of brigade, fording sites, and trails.

- (f) Liaison missions were continued to all brigades, several US SF/CIDG Camps, III MAF and 1st MIDARS.

e. Counterintelligence Section:

- (1) The CI Section received replacements and was therefor able to increase the CI support furnished the Americal Division.

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(2) Increased emphasis was placed upon the compilation of a current Division Blacklist. Numerous sources were screened daily to provide input, updating, and deletions. One MI Coordinator and two enlisted MI specialists from the 8th ARM MI Detachment were assigned to the Blacklist project. All PW interrogation reports from brigade IPW sections and the Division IPW Section are screened, as well as reports from province interrogation centers at Quang Ngai and Tam Ky.

(3) Firm Channels of communications with Phoenix Coordinators at Tam Ky and Quang (Ngai) City were established and a mutual exchange of pertinent data is being accomplished. Several liaison trips were made to Tam Ky and Quang Ngai in addition to the continuous liaison maintained with the DIOCC of Li Tin District.

(4) During the months of July, August, and September, units of the Americal Division neutralized 56 individuals who could be positively identified as members of the VC infrastructure. These 56 VCI members are as follows:

- (a) VC Village Chiefs: 5
- (b) Autonomous Committee Chairmen: 7
- (c) Intelligence Cadre: 4
- (d) Chiefs of Farmer's Association: 2
- (e) Commo/Liaison Agents: 3
- (f) Economics Chiefs: 2
- (g) District Cadre: 1
- (h) Provincial Cadre: 1
- (i) Security Chief: 1
- (j) Nurse: 1
- (k) Other Cadre, all levels: 29

(5) In an effort to increase the general security posture of Americal Division, the CI Section assisted in the revision of Americal Reg 380-5.

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(6) Fourteen CI inspections were conducted of the following division units: 160 Engr Det: 14th Avn Bn, 8th Spt Bn; 1/52 Inf; Co E, 511st Inf (LRP): H Troop, 17th Cav; HHC, 11th Bde (52d MID, 90th Chem Det, 302); 3d Bn, 1st Inf; 4/3 Inf; 1/20th Inf; and 6/11th Arty.

(7) The number of recruited informants was greatly increased. The quality and quantity of information provided by the Agent nets indicated forthcoming attacks and VC/NVA troop movements. Several threatened attacks were thwarted, due in part to the timeliness and accuracy of information provided by sources. Liaison with military and civilian intelligence agencies at district and province levels continued to benefit both Americal Division and the agencies contacted.

(8) The Volunteer informant Program (VIP) has continued to expand at a rapid rate. The program is still geared primarily to the purchase of munitions, which are predominately of US manufacture. Efforts to persuade the local populace to report information of intelligence interest under the VIP (e.g. location and movement of VC/NVA troops) have met with little success. The present rate of expenditure of funds for the VIP is approximately \$4000 (472,000 \$VN) monthly. As of Oct, FY 69 VIP expenditures have totaled \$14,303.50 (1,687,813 \$VN). The unparalleled success of the Americal Division VIP can be measured by the fact that it comprises about 90% of the VIP in I Corps and approximately 45% of the effort country-wide. The most significant single purchase during the reporting period was a 105mm howitzer in firing condition. It was purchased for 50,000 \$VN (\$423.73). In an effort to streamline the administration of the VIP, Americal Division Reg 38102 was revised during the reporting period.

(9) Americal Kit Carson Scouts continued to provide assistance in the accomplishment of the division's mission. Scouts participated in 1976 patrols and/or operations with division tactical units. Their activities resulted in 22 Viet Cong KIA, 2 VC captured and 56 suspects detained. These Viet Cong surrendered to Scouts under the Chieu Hoi program. Americal Scouts were credited with the recovery of 19 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon. A Scout working with the 11th Brigade forces assisted in the operation with the two Hoi Chanhs who recovered the captured US 105mm howitzer. Their efforts contributed to the discovery of 46 caves, tunnels and caches including a cache containing 2 tons of rice. They are also credited with finding 44 mines and booby traps. The Scouts continued to assist Division PSYOP efforts by participating in 246 broadcasts emphasizing the Volunteer Informant Program and the GVN's Chieu Hoi program. The general effectiveness of the Kit Carson Scout program continues to improve throughout the Division. Four Kit Carson Scouts were killed in action while serving with division units during the quarter.

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(f) Interrogation Section:

(1) The Interrogation Section interrogated and classified 107 detainees at the Chu Lai Collection Point, the 312th Evacuation Hospital, and the 27th Surgical Hospital.

(a) PW/NVA	17
(b) PW/VC	19
(c) Civil Defendants	10
(d) Returnees	12
(e) Regroupees	0
(f) Doubtful Cases	0
(g) Innocent Civilians	49

The above totals represent a decrease of 127 from the previous reporting period.

(2) The Interrogation Section continues to provide field interrogation support and to process all detainees apprehended by the Division Cavalry Squadron. One Interrogation Team, consisting of an interrogator and interpreter, supports the Cavalry Squadron in the accomplishment of its mission. Through field interrogations, these teams have helped the Cavalry Squadron locate many rice caches, tunnel complexes, and weapons caches. The team also provides a screening capability in the field, thus reducing the detention time of Innocent Civilians and expediting the flow of detained personnel to Brigade and Division Collection Points.

(3) On 12 Oct 68, one Interrogation Team was sent to the Combined Interrogation Center, Quang Ngai, to interrogate one NVA/PW who was in the custody of ARVN Forces.

(4) On 14 Oct 68, One Interrogation Team was sent to the Combined Interrogation Center, Quang Ngai, to interrogate three Returnees in the custody of ARVN Forces.

(5) On 26 Sep 68, two Interrogation Teams were sent to Tam Ky to interrogate five NVA/PW who were in the custody of the ARVN Forces.

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(6) The Division Interrogation Section screened, provided document summaries of, and forwarded to the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) approximately 30,000 pages of captured enemy documents. Total average days from time of capture to forwarding of documents to CDEC was seven days.

(7) Ninety-one weapons were registered as war trophies. Other captured enemy equipment continues to be forwarded to the II MAF Collection Branch in response to SICR's levied by higher headquarters.

(8) The Interrogation Section continues to coordinate with the IPW Sections of the 11 Bde, 196th Bde, and the Division Cavalry Squadron. The Section is also in constant contact with the Quang Ngai Interrogation Center, the Tam Ky S2 Advisor, and III MAF to insure the fastest possible dissemination of intelligence obtained through the interrogation of prisoners of war.

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D. (C) Plans, Operations, Training, and Organization

1. G3 Section

a. General

(1) The Americal Division continued offensive operations in the Americal Ao during the period from 1 August 68 to 31 October 68. Contact varied from light and sporadic to prolonged heavy engagements. Two major named operations, Wheeler/Wallowa and Burlington Trail continued throughout the period. Operation Pocahontas Forest, Champaign Grove, Logan Field, Dale Common and Dukes Glade terminated during the reporting period. Operation Vernon Lake I was initiated on 25 Oct 68 and continued past the end of the reporting period.

(2) On 1 August 1968, MAJ Wade B. Medbery assumed the duties of Asst G3 Operations from LTC Clark H. Benn.

(3) On 19 September 1968 MAJ Donald W. Jones assumed the duties of Asst G3 Plans from MAJ Carl S. Krebbs.

(4) On 28 September 1968, MAJ Colin L. Powell assumed the duties of ACofS, G3 from LTC William J. Baxley, Jr.

(5) On 4 October 1968, MAJ Roger B. Olson assumed the duties of ACofS, G3 Air from MAJ Lowell D. Bittrich.

(6) On 6 October 1968, MSG Kenneth E. Camell assumed the duties of Chief Operations Sergeant, G3 from SGM William P. Franklin.

(7) On 25 October 1968, SGM William J. Skytta assumed the duties of Chief Operations Sergeant, G3 from MSG Kenneth E. Camell.

b. Organization. The buildup of the Americal Division continued during the reporting period. The Division Troop List, as of 1 November 1968 is attached as inclosure 1. The following organizational actions were completed.

(1) USARV General Order 3912, 11 August 68, assigned Troop D, 1st Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry.

(2) USARV General Order 3953, 12 August 68, attached Troop D, 1st Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry to the 101st Air Cavalry Division, APO 96383.

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(3) USARV General Order 4101, 25 August 68, reassigned the 48th Public Information Detachment to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, APO 96448.

(4) USARPAC General Order 459, 30 August 68, reorganized the 27th Chemical Detachment under MTOE 03-500 EP02 P00168 effective 54 September 68.

(5) USARPAC General Order 488, 5 September 68, reorganized the 258th Personnel Service Company under MTOE 29-247TP01 P00168 effective 20 September 1968:

- (a) Company B, 6th Support Battalion.
- (b) Company B, 8th Support Battalion.
- (c) Company B, 9th Support Battalion.

(7) USARPAC General Order 529, 12 September 68, reorganized the 406th Transportation Detachment under MTOE 55-500RP37 P00168 effective 2 October 68.

(8) USARPAC General Order 551, 17 September 68, reorganized the Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the 11th Infantry Brigade, 196th Infantry Brigade, and 198th Infantry Brigade under MTOE 77-102T effective 2 October 1968.

(9) USARPAC General Order 597, 8 October 68,, amended USARPAC 00 300, 2 Dec 67, pertaining to Organization of 23d Supply and Transportation Bn as reads authorized strength: 25 Off, 2 WO, 420 ENL, 447 AGG to read authorized strength: 26 OFF, 422 ENL, 450 AGG, and pertaining to organization of Company A, 23d Supply and Transportation Battalion as reads authorized strength: 5 OFF, 133 ENL, 138 AGG to read authorized strength: 6 OFF, 135 ENL, 141 AGG.

(1) USARV General Order 4664, 8 October 1968, reassigned the 6th Battalion, 56 Artillery to the Americal Division effective 10 October 1968.

(11) USARPAC General Order 649, 22 October 1968, amended USARPAC 00 551, 17 Sep 68, by deletion of HHC, 11th Inf Bde, HHC, 196th Inf Bde, and HHC, 198th Inf Bde from reorganization.

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c. Disposition and Movement of units during the reporting period.

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period Americal units were conducting combat operations as follows:

(a) 196th Inf Bde (LT) with 4-21 and 3-21 Inf: Conducted operations in Wheeler/Wallowa.

(b) 198th Inf Bde (LT) with 1-46, 10-6 and 1-52 Inf: Conducted operations in the Burlington Trail AO and the Chu Lai TAOR.

(c) 11th Inf Bde (LT) with 3-1 and 1-20 Inf: Conducted operations in the Duc Pho AO and Chu Lai TAOR.

(d) TF Cooksey with 4-3, 5-46, 2-1 and 4-31 Inf: Conducted Operation Pocahontas Forest.

(e) 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav: Conducted Operations Burlington Trail and Wheeler/Wallowa.

(2) Major movements of units during the period were as follows:

(a) On 1 August 68, 2-1 Inf was extracted from Operation Pocahontas Forest and moved to the Wheeler/Wallowa with Hqs at LZ Ross.

(b) On 3 August 68, 5-46 Inf was extracted from Pocahontas Forest and moved to Hau Duc and Tien Phuoc to stage for Operations in the Phuoc Chau Valley west of Tien Phuoc.

(c) On termination of Pocahontas Forest (4 August 68) 4-3 Inf moved to Hill 54 to conduct operation in the Burlington Trail AO and 4-31 Inf moved to the Wheeler/Wallowa Ao.

(d) On 3 Sep 68, the 11th Inf Bde (LT), began redeploying forces in preparation for operation Champaign Grove which was initiated on 4 Sep with Task Force Galloway conducting operations with a three battalion ARVN Task Force.

(e) On 4 Sep, 1-20 Inf assumed responsibility for securing the landing zones in the Duc Pho AO. The 198th Inf Bde (LT) assumed responsibility for the southern Chu Lai TAOR, 301 and 403 Inf began Champaign Grove with combat assaults into the area west of Quang Ngai vic Ha Thanh SF/CIDG Camp.

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(f) On 12 Sep, 1/1 Cavalry became OPCON to Task Force Galloway and moved to the Champaign Grove AO. The 196th Inf Bde assumed responsibility for the 1/1 Cav AO.

(g) On 16 Sep, 1-20 Inf replaced 4-3 Inf at Ha Thanh, 4-33 Inf assumed responsibility for the Duc Pho area of operations, and 1/1 Cav returned to the Burlington Trail and Wheeler/Wallowa AO's.

(h) On 22 Sep, 11th Inf Bde began redeployment of forces in preparation for the termination of Operation Champaign Grove. 3-1 Inf airmoved from vic Ha Thanh to the Duc Pho AO and the operational control of the 11th Inf Bde.

(i) On 23 Sep, 1-20 Inf airmoved 4 companies from vic Ha Thanh to the Duc Pho AO.

(j) On 24 Sep, Operation Champaign Grove terminated and the remaining maneuver elements returned to the Duc Pho AO.

(k) On 28 Sep, 1-46 Inf airmoved from the Chu Lai TAOR to the area southwest of Tien Phuoc to support the Hau Duc RF/PF outpost.

(l) On 2 Oct, 4-21 Inf combat air assaulted into vic of the Nui Mat Mountains vic AT9948 to conduct Operation Dukes Glade.

(m) On 4 Oct, 1-46 Inf returned to the Chu Lai TAOR.

(n) On 7 Oct, 1-20 Inf moved to the Batangan Peninsula vic BS7884 to conduct operation Logan Field.

(o) On 9 Oct, operation Dukes Glade terminated and 4-21 Inf moved back to the Wheeler/Wallowa Ao.

(p) On 12 Oct, Operation Logan Field terminated and 1-20 Inf moved back to the Duc Pho AO.

(q) On 18 Oct, Operatic Dale Common was initiated by 3-1 Inf with combat assaults into the Song Ve Valley center mass BS6050.

(r) On 19 Oct, Operation Dale Common was terminated and 3-1 Inf returned to its own area.

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(s) On 25 Oct, 3-1 and 4-3 Inf initiated Opn Vernon Lake I by combat air assaulting into the Song Ve Valley vic BS6356. 1-20 Inf assumed responsibility for the Duc Pho AO and 5-46 Inf assumed responsibility for the southern Chu Lai TAOR.

(t) On 26 Oct, 1/1 Cav moved to Quang Ngai under operational control of the 11th Inf Bde for Operation Vernon Lake I.

d. Plans. The following plans, operations orders or fragmentary orders were in effect or initiated during the reporting period.

(1) There were no OPCRD's published during the reporting period.

(2) OPLAN 5-68 (GOLDEN VALLEY), 6-68 (GOLDEN VALLEY REHEARSALS) were published during the reporting period. OPLAN 2-68 (TROY), 3-68 (NON-COMBATANT EMERGENCY RELOCATION/EVACUATION PLAN), 4-68 (NATURAL DISASTER RELIEF PLAN) continued in effect.

(3) Frag Order 357-68 w/ change 1, continues in effect. This order provides for intensified surveillance of a suspected NVA Division in souther ICTZ.

(4) Numerous planning directives and frag orders have been issued that have bearing on operations covered in para D1 e.

e. Operations.

(1) The reporting period was characterized by light scattered contacts with the enemy avoiding any major engagements. Mine and booby trap incidents continued high. Americal Division initiated operations Champaign Grove, Dukes Glade, Logan Field, Dale Common, and Vernon Lake I during the reporting period and operation Burlington Trail and Wheeler/Wallowa continued throughout the period.

(2) Operations in the Chu Lai TAOR continued throughout the period with light scattered contact reported. small unit actions characterized operations that were designed to locate and destroy enemy forces, interdict enemy infiltration routes, and enhance the security of friendly installations and the local populace. There were a total of 4 mortar and/or rocket attacks on the Chu Lai Base during the period with occasional mortar or rocket attacks on friendly fire support bases, battalion bases, GVN installations, RV/PF outposts and friendly villages. The technique of saturation patrolling of the Chu Lai Base rocket belt was continued from the last reporting period and resulted in a decrease of attacks by fire on the airbase and city. Results of the operations for the period were as follows:

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FRND

34 KHA
222 WHA

ENEMY

239 VC KIA (C)
40 NVA KIA (C)
45 IWC
7 CSWC

(3) Operations in the Duc Pho AO continued throughout the reporting period. Light scattered contact characterized operations as the enemy avoided any major engagement. Mine and booby trap incidents continued high. Results for operations in the Duc Pho AO were as follows:

FRND

29 KHA
164 WHA

ENEMY

388 VC KIA (C)
34 NVA KIA (C)
61 IWC
4 CSWC

(4) Operation Wheeler/Wallowa continued throughout the reporting period. Contacts varied from extremely light to sporadically heavy. The first significant contact occurred on 15 Aug when elements of 4-21 Inf made contact while working in an AO extension vic BT1153. In the four day battle that ensued 132 NVA were killed and 15 weapons cache was found at an enemy base camp vic BT850154 by C/4-31 Inf. 39 individual and 17 crew served weapons of various types were captured. There was one incident of a coordinated enemy mortar and rocket attack during the reporting period. On 23 Aug the majority of the LZ's in the AO were attacked by fire. The attacks were not substantially followed up however, and casualties and damages light. Sporadic and light contacts were experienced during the remainder of the reporting period. Results for Operation Wheeler/Wallowa were as follows:

FRND

12 KHA
146 WHA (E)
41 WHA (M)

ENEMY

821 VC KIA (C)
69 NVA KIA (C)
164 IWC
21 CSWC

(5) Operation Burlington Trail also continued throughout the reporting period. Action was light and scattered until the middle of August when the first Main Force VO Regiment began building up its forces in the foothills of Quang Tin Province for an attack on Tam Ky. On 24

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August, A Trp, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav made heavy contact with elements of the regiment vic BT2221. B and C Troops of the Cavalry and a company from 4-231 and 2-1 Inf were also committed to the battle. Helicopter gunships and numerous airstrikes supported the action which continued until 28 Aug. Results of the contact were 510 NVA KIA (C), 57 VC KIA (C), 46 IWC and 17 CSWC. On 24 Sep, contact was made again with elements of the First Main Force VC Regiment, B Troops, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav made initial contact and one company from 4021 Inf were also committed to the action. Fierce fighting continued for three days resulting in 402 NVA KIA (C), 23 IWC and 9 CSWC. Contact was light and sporadic during the remainder of the reporting period. The results for Burlington Trail were:

<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
66 KHA	179 VC KIA (C)
383 WHA (E)	962 NVA KIA (C)
95 WHA (M)	126 IWC
	43 CSWC

(6) Operation Pocahontas Forest was initiated on 6 July 68 in the area west of the Phuoc Chau Valley (center mass AT9909) to find, fix and destroy elements of the 11st Main Force VC Regiment and the 2d NVA Division. The maneuver elements were 4-21 and 4-31 Inf of the 196th Inf Bde (LT), and 4-3 Inf of the 11th Inf Bde (LT). The three battalions and a company of the 26th Engr were designated Task Force Cooksey. Two Marine Battalions and three ARVN battalions also took part in the operation. There was no significant contact made during the operation as the enemy avoided a decisive engagement. One weapons cache consisting of 60 AK47 rifles was found vic AT8021 on 4 Jul. Pocahontas Forest extended into this reporting period four days and terminated on 4 Aug with the following results:

<u>FRND</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
4 KHA	56 VC KIA (C)
22 WHA (E)	40 NVA KIA (C)
36 WHA (M)	93 IWC
	1 CSWC

(7) Operation Champaign Grove was initiated on 4 Sep 68, in the area west of Quang Ngai City to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces and installations in base area 121 and the Song Re Valley area and to stop the enemy buildup around the Special Forces CIDG Camp at Ha Thanh. The maneuver elements were two battalions of the 11th Bde (LT) operating under Task Force Galloway and three battalions of the 2d ARVN Division. The 1st Sqdn.

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1st Cav joined the task force on 2 Sep 68. During the operation contact ranged from light to moderately heavy. On 6 Sep, Recon 4-3 Inf made contact vic BS548773 that continued sporadically for the next two days. Results were 76 VC KIA (C) and 2 IWC. A significant contact occurred on 13 Sep when the cavalry squadron reinforced 2 Inf Companies from 4-3 Inf made contact with an undetermined size enemy force vic BS 5711. Results were 61 NVA KIA (C), 12 IWC and 4 CSWC in the one day encounter. On 16 Sep 1-20 Inf replaced 4-3 Inf at the Ha Thanh SF/CIDG Camp and 4-3 Inf returned to the Duc Pho AO. There were no further significant contacts in the operation and it terminated on 24 Sep 68. Total results for the operation were:

FRND

43 KHA
156 WHA (E)
16 WHA (M)

ENEMY

147 VC KIA (C)
176 NVA KIA (C)
57 IWC
16 CSWC

(8) Operation Dukes Glade was initiated on 2 Oct 68 by 4-21 Inf to find, fix, and destroy VC/NVA forces in the Nui Mat and Nui Ve Dap Mountains vic AT9948. There was no significant contact made during the operation and it was terminated on 9 Oct 68 with the following results:

FRND

1 KHA
3 WHA (C)

ENEMY

16 VC KIA (C)
1 VC DISC
4 NVA KIA (C)
18 IWC

(9) Operation Logan Field was initiated on 7 Oct 68 by 1-20 Inf to destroy elements of the 48th LF Bn on the Batangan Peninsula center mass BS7884. Scattered and very light contact was experienced throughout the operation and it terminated on 12 Oct with the following results:

FRND

13 KHA
42 WHA (E)
24 WHA (M)

ENEMY

14 VC KIA (C)
6 DET
1 IN CIV
4 IWC

(10) Operation Dale Common was a minor operation initiated on 18 October by 3-1 Inf to find, fix, and destroy VC/NVA Forces west of Mo

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Duc in the Song Ve Valley center mass BS6050. No significant contact was made and the operation terminated on 19 Oct with the following results.

FRND

3 WHA (E)

ENEMY23 VC KIA (C)
3 IWC

(11) Operation Vernon Lake I was initiated on 25 Oct by the 11 Inf Bde to find, fix, destroy elements of the 3d Regiment 3d NVA Division in the Song Ve Valley center mass BS6356. 3-1 and 4-3 Inf were the maneuver elements along with 1 ARVN Battalion that established blocking positions in the north-eastern corner of the AO. Light contact was characteristic of the operation up to 31 Oct. Results for the period 25 to 31 Oct as follows:

FRND1 KHA
4 WHA (E)
3 WHA (M)ENEMY60 VC KIA (C)
5 VC DISC
11 NVA KIA (C)
23 IWC
1 CSWC

f. Close Air Support.

(1) Total Close Air Support (CAS) and Combat Skyspot (CSS) Missions and Sorties: During the period 1 Aug 68 through 31 Oct 68 the Americal Division employed 1613 CAS and CSS missions utilizing some 3878 aircraft sorties.

(2) CSS Maecenas: The Division received 839 requests from subordinate units for CSS/TPQ-10 or MSQ-77 radar controlled missions. The Division passed 615 mission requests to II MAF and 605 subsequently approved for strikes. The USAF flew 320 missions utilizing 400 aircraft sorties, the USMC flew 147 missions utilizing 153 aircraft sorties and the RAAF flew 3 missions utilizing 3 aircraft sorties in support of the Division. A total of 470 CSS missions were completed during the reporting period utilizing 556 sorties.

(3) Forward Air Controlled (FAC) CAS Missions: The Division received 1626 requests for preplanned forward air controlled missions, of which 1565 were passed to III MAF and 1162 subsequently approved. The USAF flew 666 missions utilizing 1330 aircraft sorties and the USMC flew 318 missions utilizing 619 aircraft sorties in support of the Division. The Division received 489 immediate/divert missions utilizing 951 aircraft sorties of which 575 sorties were flown by the USAF, 358 by USMC and 18 sorties by VNAF. A total of 1473 FAC missions were completed for the period utilizing 2891 aircraft sorties.

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(4) Arc Light Strikes: 85 Arc Light Strikes were flown in support of the Division during the reporting period.

(5) Ordnance Expended: Total ordnance expended by close air support during the reporting period was 3114.41 tons of bombs, 234.47 tons of napalm and 7381 rockets. Additionally, 12660 tons of bombs were dropped in support of the Division during Arc Light Strikes.

(6) Damage Assessment: Forward air controllers made the following bomb damage assessment (BDA) during the reporting period: 1170 structures destroyed, 291 bunkers destroyed, 224 meters of trench line opened or destroyed, 39 weapons positions and spider holes uncovered or destroyed, 12 sampans destroyed, 303 secondary explosions and secondary fires observed 143 killed by air (KBA).

g. Training.

(1) The Americal Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all assigned and attached units of the Division. During the reporting period 73 courses were completed and 7894 individual and unit personnel completed training.

(2) 206 junior leaders completed the Americal Combat Leadership Course.

(3) 26 personnel completed the Unit Reconnaissance Course.

(4) The Mobile Training Team Program continued. The following training was conducted by the Division for the 2d ARVN Division.

(a) Reconnaissance training was presented to the 2d ARVN Div Reconnaissance Company.

(b) Characteristics, maintenance and employment of the M-29 81mm Mortar.

(c) Characteristics, maintenance and employment of the M-72 LAW.

(d) Characteristics, maintenance and employment of the M-60 Machinegun.

(5) The 2d ARVN Division conducted the following training for the Americal Division:

(a) Structure of the RVN Government, Province level and below.

(b) Structure of the RVN Military Force.

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(6) The following training facilities were constructed at the Americal Combat Center during the reporting period:

(a) Five (5) Classrooms.

(b) Briefing Room

(c) Dispensary

2. Artillery - See separate ORLL for Division Artillery.

3. Aviation.

a. General: The 14th CAB remained OPCON to the Americal Division, providing aviation Direct Support. A Co, 123d Avn Bn continued in General Support of the Division. B Co, 123d Avn Bn (Aeroscouts) continued in General Support of the Division. Their concept of employment was to assign them to perform reconnaissance, screening, and BDA for subordinate units on a mission basis. F/8th Cav was attached to 1/1 Cav for all purposes on 2 Sep 68.

b. Accomplishments:

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hrs Flown	16,269	15,374	14,047	45,690
Sorties	59,936	54,650	59,593	174,179
Medevacs	174	80	83	337
Tons Cargo	15,078	12,818	11,947	39,843
Pax Carried	99,188	95,001	107,376	301,565
Ordnance Expended				
7.62	1,726,899	1,745,185	1,237,430	4,709,511
40MM	26,837	23,270	12,465	62,572
2.75 FFAR	10,794	10,091	6,567	27,452

Combat Losses:

Aircraft Hit	32
Aircraft Shot Down	0
WHA	5
KHA	0

4. Chemical

a. Organization

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(1) During the reporting period there were several personnel changes in the Division Chemical Section. Captain Roe was reassigned from the 196th Infantry Brigade to the Division Chemical Section on 1 October 1968. He is currently assigned as Radiological Center Director. CPT Fellerman was assigned to the 196th Infantry Brigade as the Brigade Chemical Officer. At the present time the Division Chemical Section is short 1 E-7 Radiological Plotter (MOS 54E40).

b. Training.

(1) During the last reporting period the Division Chemical Section received a new item of equipment, the Airborne Personnel Detector, (APD). On 4 August this piece of equipment was issued to the 87th Chemical Detachment for use in operations in the 198th Infantry Brigade AO. A two hour class was given by CPT Kotouch, Assistant Division Chemical Officer, to familiarize the Detachment with the operational capabilities and maintenance requirements of the APD. Excellent results have been obtained in locating suspected enemy positions with this new piece of equipment.

(2) On 22 August SPC Bauer and SFC Spencer presented instruction on proper employment and operational capabilities of the E-8 tactical CS launcher to selected members of the Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC). E-8 launchers are now employed on the CLDC perimeter to compliment bunker defenses.

(3) On 26 September SFC Spencer and SP4 Rabadieu traveled to DaNang to present special instruction to members of the 1st Marine Division on operation and maintenance to be performed on the Modified Personnel Detector (MPD).

(4) The Division Chemical Section continued to conduct special CBR training in an effort to cross-train all personnel in the functions required to operate the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Element (CBRE).

e. Operations.

(1) On 3 August a twelve man team headed by MAJ Arter, Division Chemical Officer, departed for DaNang to prepare for a Country Squire Mission. Country Squire is the name for the delivery of CS drums rigged with fuses and bursters, by Air Force C-130 aircraft to contamination area with CS powder. The target was a section of route 534 which is used by the enemy as a line of communication. The Country Squire Mission was completed on 6 August.

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(2) On 13 August 1968 a three man team headed by SFC Spencer departed for Quang Ngai Province to assist the 2d ARVN Division in ground based defoliation operations. During the period 14 through 16 August the perimeters of Kramer Compound and Hill 10 were defoliated by the Division team utilizing a sprayer mounted on a 3/4 ton truck.

(3) On 5 and 16 September a three man team headed by SFC Spencer defoliated the perimeter of LZ Bayonet at the request of the 198th Infantry Brigade. Later reports received from the 198th Infantry Brigade indicated that visibility and field of fire were greatly increased due to the defoliation of the perimeter.

(4) During the period 2-4 October a three man team defoliated portions of the 3d Battalion 18th Artillery perimeter. Operations were limited to certain portions of the perimeter due to the inaccessible terrain which could not be negotiated by the chemical Section's 3/4 ton vehicle.

5. Engineer.

a. Primary engineer effort in the Americal Division AO continues to be directed toward operation support of the Division maneuver elements. Supporting engineer units have a high percentage of effort committed to LOC improvements.

(1) QL-1 has priority horizontal emphasis in the Americal AO, with three (3) Engineer Battalions committed to the road.

(a) 19th Engr Bn (CBT) II/I Corps boundary to BS740525.

(b) 39th Engr Bn (USMC): BT520044 (Chu Lai Main Gate to north boundary of Americal AO).

The 104th Engr Bn (ARVN) supports LOC improvement primarily by assisting US Engr Bn's with limited equipment support.

(2) QL-1 from Chu Lai to the norther boundary of the Americal AO remains basically 2 lane, class 60. Several stretches (the worst being BT231315 to BT 133453) are characterized by soft shoulders, during and up to 48 hours after rain storms. One way convoy traffic is a necessity during such periods. Stretches of the road between BT107504 to BT118490 and BT246312 to BT254298 are subject to inundation after heavy rains. During the period 13-20 Oct 68, these portions of the road were under 12" to 16" of water.

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(3) QL-1 from Chu Lai to the southern boundary of the Americal AO remained basically 2 lane, class 50 until 15 Oct 68, when Tropical Storm "Hester" inundated and destroyed several stretches of the road. Culvert bypasses a the bridge failed first, followed by severe flooding around both approaches. Water rose of 4 1/2 ft in the Song Bing Son River in less than 12 hours. QL-1 in the vicinity of Quang Ngai was inundated by 5' of water; QL-1 between Quang Ngai and Duc Pho was under 4' of water in numerous places and sustained sever damage.

(4) 110 feet of panel bridge was destroyed at BS596929 on 9 Oct 68 from overloading by US Forces. Tropical Storm "Hester" struck 11 Oct 68, causing the Song Binh Son River to become a significant obstacle.

(5) HL 535 from LZ Baldy to LZ Ross was upgraded and maintained as a one way, limited all weather route by the Division Engineer Battalion until 5 Oct 68. At that time, the 39th Engr Bn (D Co) assumed the mission on a continuing basis.

(6) The road from LZ Ross to AT920250 which was opened by the 26th Engr Bn as a pioneer road in support of Operation Pocahontas Forest, is no longer maintained.

(7) HL 533 from Tam Ky, (BT318222) to Tien Phoc, (BT1181442) which was being upgraded and maintained by the 30th Engr Bn is closed. A Co 39th Engr Bn was relieved of the mission on 1 Oct 68 because of the tactical situation, and was extracted from the area 7-8 Oct 68.

b. All LOC's in the Americal Division AO remained targets for enemy interdiction. During the first two months of the reporting period, approximately 30 mines were discovered on QL-1, HL 535, with frequent incidents of blown culverts and craters. October marked a decrease of incidents, due primarily to increased tactical operations in the trouble-some areas. More than 180 mines were discovered during the period.

6. Signal.

a. On 10 August 1968 LTC Lewis F. Magruder assumed command of the 523d Signal Battalion from LTC James V. Bailey. On this same date LTC Magruder became the Americal Division Signal Officer.

b. During the reporting period CPT Steven L. Singer, Division Wire Officer was transferred and 1LT Richard N. Perry assumed the duty as Wire Officer.

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c. In the reporting period, thirteen (13) possible compromises of the Division SOI were reported. Of this amount, six (6) of the possible compromises were determined to be probable, resulting in three (3) major and three (3) minor SOI changes.

d. One hundred and two (102) TSEC/KY-38 Secure Voice Devices were received during the period and 186 TSEC/KY28's were received. This equipment was distributed within the Division IAW current BOI established by USARV.

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E. (U) Logistics.

1. General.

a. Personnel Changes.

- (1) LTC Frank P. Clarke departed 15 August 1968.
- (2) LTC David K. Lyon arrived 15 September 1968.
- (3) SGM Jimmie M. Hall departed 23 September 1968.
- (4) SGM Harold D. Gilmore arrived 6 October 1968.

b. No major changes in combat service support or logistical organization was made during this reporting period.

2. Service Division.

a. The 126th Supply and Service Company, and element of 80th Support Group, 1st Logistical Command, was assigned to Chu Lai in September 1968. This unit's mission is to support nondivisional units with Class II, III, IV supplies in the Chu Lai area. These non-divisional units have been supported by the Americal Division Support Command up to this time.

b. The 295th Ordnance Company replaced the 205th Ammunition platoon in October. This company will be responsible for 1st Logistical Command ammunition supply points supporting Americal Division. At the present time there are three operational ASP's at Duc Pho, Chu Lai and LZ Baldy.

e. 80th Support Group, DaNang, started hauling ammunition by convoy from DaNang to LZ Baldy during this reporting period. This provides a much more economical means of transportation. Previously, ammunition was transported from DaNang to Chu Lai by LST the convoyed to LZ Baldy.

3. Supply Division.

The M726 Combat Engine vehicle (CEV) was introduced into the Americal Division inventory during this reporting period. The Americal Division was allocated four of the vehicles for combat evaluation. A material development training team conducted a two week training program for selected personnel of 26th Engineer Battalion.

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4. Maintenance Division.

a. On 3 September 1968, the division prepared the first automated material readiness report. Unit reports were transcribed to a systematized digital program on an IBM card, then processed through a UNIVAC 1005 Computer.

b. A program of CMMI and roadside spot inspections was instituted throughout the TAOR.

F. CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

1. (U) GENERAL. This report covers the significant organization, activity, and lessons learned during the period 1 August to 31 October 1968.

2. (U) ORGANIZATION.

a. The G5 Section is an augmentation to TOE 7-4E and is organized according to paragraph 25, TOE 7-4E as follows:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GRADE AUTH/ACT</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
ACofS, G5	LTC/LTC	1	1
Dep G5	MAJ/MAJ	1	1
Asst G5	?/1LT	0	1
Admin Supv	E7/E7	1	1
Clerk Typist	E4/E3	1	1
Lt Truck Driver	E3/E3	2	2
Interpreter	K6 (ARVN)	1	1

b. Changes in personnel during the reporting period are as follows:

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Departed:	LTC McCarthy	16 Sep 68
	SFC Walthall	16 Oct 68
	SP5 Yehle	26 Sep 68
	SP4 Jones	16 Sep 68
Joined:	LTC Robinson	26 Aug 68
	1LT Gumbiner	15 Aug 68
	SFC Mueller	8 Oct 68
	PFC Johnson	2 Sep 68
	PFC Calkins	14 Sep 68

c. The G5 Section is augmented by three Civil Affairs Platoons from the 29th Civil Affairs Company. The 4th and 6th Platoons are assigned to the company and the 51st Platoon is attached to the company. The 29th CA Co provides civil affairs support to III Marine Amphibious Force. The three platoons are assigned duty stations with the Americal Division and personnel are attached for rations and quarters. Command remains with the 29th CA Company and operational control is given to the division. All three platoons are assigned area support missions and work generally one in each brigade AO; the 4th CA Platoon at Duc Pho, the 6th CA Platoon at Chu Lai, and the 51st CA Platoon at LZ Baldy. The platoons coordinate civic action programs within the areas of responsibility and act as liaison between the US military and local MACV and civilian agencies.

d. The organic brigades, maneuver battalions, and division artillery of the division have principle duty civil affairs officers. The 26th Engineer Battalion assigns civil affairs duties as a major additional duty.

e. The 29th CA Co provides other civil affairs platoons in support of each of three provinces; Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, and Quang Nam. Division units operate in each of these provinces. These platoons provide civil affairs support to each province and serve as a point-of-contact for this office.

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f. Several non-Army units are engaged in military civic action in the division AO. These units are Marine Aircraft Groups 12 and 13, 1st Combined Action Group, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion-71, 9th Engineer Battalion, and Naval Support activity Detachment. Projects initiated by these units are coordinated by this headquarters with the province concerned.

3. (C) OPERATIONS.

a. Operation Golden Fleece. Operation Golden Fleece, as part of the resource denial plan, was implemented by the division in early August. The purpose of the operation is to deny the fall rice harvest to the enemy. The primary responsibility for resource denial is given to ARVN forces with assistance from US/FWMAF. The divisions' infantry brigades, after coordination with GVN officials, published operation plans for the current harvest season. The division cavalry squadron has been unable to fully execute rice denial operations because of combat commitments elsewhere in the AO. To date, 6,104 tones of rice has been harvested and placed under GVN control. An additional 110 tons has been captured and evacuated to either US or GVN control. Operation Golden Fleece is expected to continue into early December.

b. On 5-7 October 1968, the annual Mid-Autumn Festival was celebrated throughout Vietnam. Americal Division planning for the festival began in July, 1968. Divisional units were requested to submit orders for toys, candy, etc, to this headquarters. All orders were consolidated and forwarded to III MAF on 14 Aug 68. Additionally, G5, III MAF arranged for units with US/FWMAF Civic Action Fund accounts to purchase especially prepared gift bags containing a toy, cookies, and candy. The cost was 30 VN\$ per bag. Six thousand bags were ordered at a cost of 180,000 VN\$. Shipments were made in late September and early October. All supplies were flown by Air America to Tam Ky and transported by truck to Chu Lai for breakdown and further distribution to subordinate units. Approximately one-third of the toys and candy ordered were shipped and all of the individual bags purchased were delivered. Subordinate units distributed all supplies to the appropriate VN officials during ceremonies on 5 October 1968. US personnel did not actively participate in the celebration on 6-7 October unless specifically invited. A total of 15,000 assorted toys, 2000 soap bars, 500 lbs of candy, 6000 cookie bags, and 600 lbs clothing were distributed.

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c. Because of a scheduled increase in CORDS materials and the current heavy commitment of the division's surface transportation capability, this headquarters, after study and evaluation, requested the support of ten 12-ton S&P trucks from HQ, III MAF. The request was approved but only five trucks were furnished. The trucks and drivers arrived on 19 August. The following commodities and amounts listed were shipped to Quang Ngai City and Tam Ky during the remainder of the reporting period:

Cement	2,113 tons
Reinforcing Bar	126 tons
Tin Roofing	50 tons
Lumber	51,133 bd ft

d. At the request of the Refugee Division, Quang Ngai Province Advisory Team 17, this headquarters coordinated with the US Navy to transport a supply of food to Son Tra (N), BT622015. The food was moved by truck to Chu Lai on 8 Oct and moved by sea to Son Tra on 9 October. The shipment included the following:

894 bags corn meal
300 bags rolled oats
320 bags corn
60 cases salad oil

4. (U) Civic Action/Revolutionary Development

a. This division supports the Revolutionary Development Program in three provinces; Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, and Quang Nam. The primary method of support is civic action. This division initiated an intensive review and study of the civic action program with the goal of improving control and coordination of the program. Two conferences were held with civic action officers to discuss problems and proposed solutions. The improvements in administration and better understanding resulting from these efforts have increased the effectiveness of the program. A by-product of the review and study has been a decrease in the time required to coordinate civic action projects were started during the reporting period.

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10 Wells	1 School addition	1 Billet
4 Schools	2 Showers	1 Kindergarten
3 Dispensaries	4 Latrines	1 Road
3 School repair	1 Well repair	1 Latrine repair
1 Hospital repair		

The following civic action projects were completed during the reporting period:

1 Church	1 Police checkpoint	1 Shower
1 Hospital	1 Culvert	1 Latrine
1 Well platform	1 Pig pen	1 Market
1 Hamlet Headquarters	1 School	

b. A second method of support provided by the Revolutionary Development Program is MEDCAP-II. The number of patients treated during this period versus last period increased approximately 10%. Since 1 August 1968, Americal Division units and other units operating within the AO have performed the following MEDCAP activities:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VISITS</u>	<u>PATIENTS</u>
11th Inf Bde	216	13,405
196th Inf Bde	34	3,507
198th Inf Bde	429	27,216
1/1st Cav	19	3,287
Div Arty	33	2,313
DISCOM	10	457
26th Eng Bn	16	476

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VISITS</u>	<u>PATIENTS</u>
1st CAG	1,101	81,529
9th Eng Bn	13	381
MMCB-71	<u>4</u>	<u>165</u>
Total	1,875	132,736

c. A third method of support provided the Revolutionary Development Program is voluntary contributions. These contributions are normally used to assist specific individuals, families, or groups of families. The collection and distribution of these resources is completely administered by the units concerned. The following items and amounts listed were contributed by individuals and units:

Money	\$4074.00
Clothing	3,800 lbs
Soap	2,000 bars

5.(U) a. This report covers organizational and unit activities of 05 (PSYOP) Americal Division during the period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968. At the end of the reporting period the PSYOP section was staffed as follows:

PSYOP Officer	1	O-4
Asst PSYOP Officer	1	O-2
Clerk-Typist	1	E-5
Driver	1	E-4
Translator/Interpreters	2	E-6 (ARVN)

b. In direct support of the Division is Detachment 3, 7th PSYOP Bn, consisting of 5 officers and 8 enlisted men. These personnel presently comprise 1 command (EA), 2 audio-visual (HE) and 3 combat loudspeaker (HB) teams. The HE teams consist of 1 officer and 1 enlisted man while the HB teams consist of 2 enlisted men each augmented by 2 Kit Carson

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Scouts and an interpreter. The loudspeaker teams provide ground, waterborne and aerial broadcasts in support of tactical operations and civic action projects in each brigade area. The audio visual teams are in support of the division and are used to show films on health and education, conduct broadcasts and provide general entertainment throughout the division area of operations. In addition, an intelligence/developmental team consisting of 2 officers is present at this location with the mission of accumulating intelligence material with which PSYOP exploitation can be readily performed. The 7th PSYOP Bn also supports the division with the production of leaflets, posters and tape recordings. A quick reaction leaflet has been obtained during this period within 12 hours, however a normal time frame for production of an original leaflet has been 6 to 10 days.

c. The US Air Force, 9th Special Operations Squadron, provides C47 aircraft for large leaflet drops. The 02B aircraft broadcasts during daylight hours and drops limited amounts of leaflets on designated target areas.

d. Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) provides support in the form of leaflets, tapes and films in the Vietnamese language. These films are shown by the audio-visual team throughout the division area of operations to local populace audiences.

6. PSYOP ACTIVITIES AUG - OCT 1968

a. Leaflets

	<u>Disseminated</u>	<u>Targets</u>	<u>Avg Per Tgt</u>
Aug	49,427,450	498	99,000
Sep	36,022,750	394	91,000
Oct	20,945,200	272	77,000
TOTAL	106,395,400	1,164	91,000

b. Loudspeaker broadcasts

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	<u>Aerial</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
Aug	113 hrs 45 min	279 hrs	4 hrs 30 min
Sep	87 hrs 05 min	265 hrs 45 min	6 hrs 30 min
Oct	56 hrs 25 min	274 hrs 45 min	4 hrs 30 min
TOTAL	257 hrs 15 min	819 hrs 30 min	15 hrs 30 min

e. Movies

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Audience</u>
Aug	111	58	18,100
Sep	133	54 3/4	10,275
Oct	232	116 1/4	13,943
TOTAL	476	229	42,318

d. Printed propaganda initiated by Americal Division

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7-402-68	30th Sign Bn - Hardships	Anti NVA
7-426-68	Rallier - 196th Bde	Chieu Hoi
7-427-68	Rallier - 196th Bde	Chieu Hoi
7-438-68	Rallier - 198th Bde	Chieu Hoi
7-452-68	Rallier - 198th Bde	Chieu Hoi
7-455-68	196th Bde - Rewards for Weapons/Ammo	Rewards
7-458-68	Rallier - 196th Bde	Chieu Hoi
7-462-68	3rd NVA Div - Malaria	Anti NVA

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7-463-68	2nd NVA Div - Lack of Medical Aid	Anti NVA
7-464-68	3rd NVA Div - Lack of Medical Aid	Anti NVA
7-465-68	3rd NVA Div - Allied Power will Destroy You	Anti NVA
7-466-68	3rd NVA Div - Defeat is Certain	Anti NVA
7-467-68	2nd NVA Div, 1st Regt - Battle Losses	Anti NVA
7-474-68	VC Atrocity - Long Than Village?	Anti VC
7-482-68	Rallier - 1/1 Cav	Chieu Hoi
7-483-68	VC Village Atrocity - 11th Bde	Anti VC
7-486-68	409th Sapper Bn - Think on These Things	Anti NVA
7-487-68	Explanation of Chemicals	Pro GVN
7-511-68	Battle Losses - 3rd NVA Div	Anti NVA
7-512-68	Reward for 105mm Howitzer	Rewards
7-513-68	Exploitation of 105mm Howitzer	Rewards
7-517-68	These Planes Will Destroy You	Anti NVA/VC
7-523-68	2nd NVA Div - Battle Losses	Anti NVA
7-524-68	2nd NVA Div - Unfulfilled Promises	Anti NVA
7-526-68	1st MF Regt, 2nd NVA Div - Battle Losses	Anti NVA
7-536-68	48th Bn - Battle Losses	Anti VC
7-549-68	1st MF Regt, 2nd NVA Div - Lack of Med Sups.	Anti NVA
7-550-68	1st MF Regt, 2nd NVA Div - Battle Losses	Anti NVA
7-551-68	2nd NVA Div - Battle Losses	Anti VC
7-557-68	Mining Incident - Que Son	Anti VC

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7-558-68	Mining Incident - Que Son	Anti VC
7-559-68	Report VC Mines - Duc Pho District	Rewards
7-581-68	V15 Co - Rally before too Late	Anti NVA
7-582-68	Blue Ghost Will Stalk You	Anti NVA/VC
7-583-68	Rallier - 196th Bde	Chieu Hoi
7-585-68	409th, 21st, 95th Sapper Units - No Cause for Celebration	Anti VC
7-586-68	506B LF Sapper Co Losses	Anti VC
7-599-68	Men of 95th LF Co	Anti VC

e. Tapes initiated by Americal Division.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7??	Allied Power - 2nd NVA Div	Anti NVA
783?	Defeat to 2nd NVA Division	Anti NVA
784?	Report VC Activity - Binh Son District	Anti VC
830?	Evacuate Civilians of Hau Duc	Pro GVN
842	Encourage Family to Evacuate	Pro GVN
848	3rd NVA Division - Malaria	Anti NVA
849	Rallier - 196th Bde	Chieu Hoi
850	2nd NVA Div, 1st Regt - Battle Losses	Anti NVA
852	Rallier - 198?the Bde	Chieu Hoi
864	Report VC Activity to Prevent Evacuation	Anti VC
869	Rallier - 1/1 Cav	Chieu Hoi

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
870	3rd Offensive Doomed to Fail	Anti NVA/VC
872	Defeat of 1st Regt, 2nd NVA Division	Anti NVA
877	Allied Firepower - 8 & 9 Bn, 31st Regt	Anti NVA
881	Rally Instructions - 31st Regt	Chieu Hoi
884	Reward for 105mm Howitzer	Rewards
885	Rallier - 196 Bde	Chieu Hoi
916	Hardships - 31st Regt, 2nd NVA Div	Anti NVA
920	Evacuate this Area	Pro GVN
957	506B Sapper Co - Rally to GVN	Chieu Hoi
960	506B Sapper Co - Rally to GVN	Chieu Hoi
963	95th VC Co - Battle Lessons	Anti VC
964	Food Shortage	Anti NVA/VC
977	Excess Rice Feeds Refugees	Pro GVN
978	Ralliers - 11th Bde (81st LF Bn)	Chieu Hoi
985?	VC of Phuc Thien Village	Chieu Hoi
1017	Men of 74th MF Bn	Anti VC

f. PSYOP in support of major operations Aug - Oct 68

(1) WHEELER/WALLOWA	(2) BURLINGTON TRAIL
(a) Leaflets - 36,062,000?	(a) Leaflets - 16,665,000
(b) Aerial Broadcasts - 92:55	(b) Aerial Broadcasts - 39:30
(c) Ground Broadcasts - 225:00	(c) Ground Broadcasts - 83:00

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- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| (3) CHAMPAIGN GROVE (4-24 Sep 68) | (4) POCAHONTAS FOREST (term 4 Aug 68) |
| (a) Leaflets - 4,465,000 | (a) Leaflets - 964,000 |
| (b) Aerial Broadcasts - 9:40 | (b) Aerial Broadcasts - 1:55 |
| (c) Ground Broadcasts - None | (c) Ground Broadcasts - 3:00 |
| (5) DUKES GLADE (2-9 Oct 68) | (6) LOGAN FIELD (7-12 Oct 68) |
| (a) Leaflets - 452,000 | (a) Leaflets 984,000 |
| (b) Aerial Broadcasts - :40 | (b) Aerial Broadcasts - 1:15 |
| (c) Ground Broadcasts - None | (c) Ground Broadcasts - None |
| (7) Vernon LAKE I (commenced 25 Oct 68) | |
| (a) Leaflets - 1,139,000 | |
| (b) Aerial Broadcasts - :20 | |
| (b) Ground Broadcasts - None | |

g. "Chieu Hoi" program

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
Quang Nam	11	5	7	23
Quang Tin	24	23	22	69
Quang Ngai	23	39	27	89
	58	67	56	181

(2) Hoi Chanhs by operation Aug - Oct 68

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	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
Wheeler/Wallowa	17	12	8	37
Burlington Trail	18	16	21	55
Champaign Grove	--	9	--	9
Total	35	37	29	101

(3) Hoi Chanhs turned in to Americal Division Aug - Oct 68

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
Quang Nam	-	-	-	-
Quang Tin	8	4	1	13
Quang Ngai	1	1		2
	9	5	1	15

h. Volunteer Information Program.

(1) Number of informants Aug - Oct 68

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
26th Eng Bn	4	-	-	4
11th Bde	6	72	58	136
196th Bde	373	388	517	1,278
198th Bde	78	1	64	143
39th Eng Bn	10	10	68	88

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
1/1 Cav	-	1	1	2
TOTAL	471	432	748	1,651

(2) Total payments (\$VN) Aug - Oct 68

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
26th Engr Bn	1,800	---	---	1,800
11th Bde	7,350	58,750	64,180	130,280
196th Bde	254,660	254,495	412,103	921,258
198th Bde	43,550	500	72,200	116,250
39th Engr Bn	28,000	35,800	261,320	325,120
1/1 Cav	---	200	6,000	6,200
TOTAL	335,350	349,745	815,803	1,500,908

i. Chieu Hoi Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Chieu Hoi Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>
Aug	26,566,000	25 hrs 55 min	23 hrs 45 min
Sep	11,271,000	16 hrs 55 min	51 hrs
Oct	7,992,000	7 hrs 50 min	10 hrs 30 min
TOTAL	45,829,000	50 hrs 40 min	85 hrs 30 min

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(2) A total of 9 Hoi Chanh were reported as turning themselves in to US units during Operation Pocahontas Forest (6 Jul - 4 Aug 68). All of these returnees were exploited and all indicated that they were influenced by the leaflets and aerial broadcasts disseminated in the area.

(3) B-52 airstrikes in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces were exploited extensively by dissemination of appropriate leaflets and broadcasts. One Hoi Chanh who defected on 6 Aug 68 indicated that the intensity of allied firepower persuaded him to give up and the PSYOP leaflets told him how and why he should return.

(4) The total number Hoi Chanh rallying within the division area of operations continue to decrease as many VC units are now manned by a majority of less susceptible NVA soldiers. Future propaganda should concentrate on the following:

(a) Repudiation of the theme that to become a Hoi Chanh means torture and eventual death.

(b) Inclusion of the requirements placed upon a Hoi Chanh when he returns to GVN.

(c) Formulation of a separate appeal to NVA without reference to reunification with the family while the war is in progress.

j. Rewards Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Rewards campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
Aug	3,110,450	13 hrs 40 min	136 hrs 30 min	-----
Sep	6,442,000	24 hrs 05 min	94 hrs 30 min	2 hrs
Oct	3,739,200	11 hrs 05 min	133 hrs 45 min	1 hr 15 min
TOTAL	13,291,650	48 hrs 50 min	364 hrs 45 min	3 hrs 15 min

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(2) This campaign has been marked by a decrease in the number of voluntary informants who have given information concerning enemy activity. The reduction in the number of informants compared with the previous quarter is not considered significant as the majority of the informants previously reported came from the area encompassed by the now completed Operation Muscatine. The total monetary amount paid actually increased as payment was made in accordance with the standardized prices offered throughout ICTZ.

(3) Significant payments made under this program include:

(a) On 28 August an 8 year old VN boy pointed out the location of 10 satchel charges emplaced alongside buildings in Phuong Thuan (V) Quang Ngai (F) (BS 6997). For this information he as paid \$VN5,000.

(b) On 5 Sep 68 a payment of 30,000\$VN was made for the discovery of three (3) 30# anti tank mines which had been emplaced on Highway 1 vicinity BS 619879.

(c) On 12 September 1968, two Montagnard civilians who had sought refuge, led US forces to a 105mm howitzer at coordinates BS517711 (Quang Ngai). The were paid VN\$ 25,000 each for this information. Tape and leaflet coverage was made in the surrounding area to exploit this significant find amongst the local populace and enemy forces.

k. Pro GVN Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Pro GVN Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
Aug	3,313,000	3 hrs 25 min	60 hrs 45 min	4 hrs 30 min
Sep	1,655,750	5 hrs 45 min	35 hrs -- min	4 hrs 30 min
Oct	1, 314,000	5 hrs 10 min	76 hrs 30 min	2 hrs 15 min
TOTAL	6,282,750	14 hrs 20 min	172 hrs 15 min	11 hrs 15 min

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(2) A concerted effort has been made to inform US forces arriving in country of the pertinency and practical usage of PSYOP in Vietnam. 77 classes have been presented to 8,114 new arrivals to the Division during the reporting period. The instruction covered a basic orientation of in country PSYOP with emphasis being given to the participation of the individual soldier in the "Chieu Hoi" and Rewards Campaigns.

(3) A significant increase in activities of the 2 HE (audio/visual) teams supporting the Division during October has resulted in a more effective Pro GVN campaign. In addition to the movies which are shown throughout the area of operations, news broadcasts are taped daily composed of items extracted from national and local newspapers. These newscasts are then broadcast to the local populace in conjunction with the movie shows.

1. Anti NVA Campaign.

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Anti NVA Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>
Aug	12,302,000	49 hrs 15 min	1 hr
Sep	12,995,000	24 hrs -- min	None
Oct	3,972,000	6 hrs 50 min	None
TOTAL	29,269,000	80 hrs 05 min	1 hr

(2) On 23 August, 1/1 Cav became engaged with elements of 1st MF Regt, 2nd NVA Division in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. Within two days over 400 casualties had been suffered by the enemy. Quick reaction propaganda was developed and disseminated within 12 hours addressed to the commander of the enemy force. This was followed by aerial broadcasts pointing out the futility of the battle in informing the enemy elements of the battle losses suffered during the action.

(3) In September 68, Operation Champaign Grove was conducted in Quang Ngai province. Propaganda oriented specifically to vulnerabilities present in the 3rd NVA Division were exploited. These pertaining to malaria sickness, lack of medical supplies, and superiority of allied firepower were specifically directed at this

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division. Losses suffered by 95th Bn, 2nd Regt were immediately exploited as were all B-52 strikes in the area, adding to the overall effectiveness and success of this operation.

m. Anti VC Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Anti VC Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspkr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspkr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
Aug	3,136,000	21 hrs 30 min	57 hrs	-----
Sep	3,659,000	16 hrs 20 min	85 hrs 15 min	-----
Oct	3,928,000	25 hrs 30 min	54 hrs	1 hr
TOTAL	11,723,000	63 hrs 20 min	196 hrs 15 min	1 hr

(2) On 18 Aug 68 a VN lambretta detonated a VC emplaced mine at BS 917262 (Quang Ngai). 10 VN were killed. Ground loudspeaker teams and a poster were disseminated to portray to the local populace the extent of the VC atrocity and requesting that all VC activity be reported.

(3) On 1 Oct 68 a VN bus traveling on Highway 1 vicinity coords BT 121487 hit a VC emplaced land mine. 13 VN civilians were killed and 13 VN civilians were wounded. Within 3 hours a message was broadcast throughout the area exploiting this incident. A poster and leaflets were further disseminated to inform the local populace of this VC initiated incident and to gain their support in reporting the location of such mines.

(4) Active PSYOP support of the Rise Denial program has resulted in the dissemination throughout the division area of operations of the following propaganda:

Leaflets - 1,940,000

Broadcasts - 12:35

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This propaganda although small in amount, compared to the total distributed for the month, has been specifically oriented to target audiences where rice denial operations have been conducted. This pin point distribution has materially contributed to the denial of 673 tons of rice to the enemy in contested areas.

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A. Personnel - Administration, Morale and Discipline

1. (U) SUBJECT: Reproduction.

a. Observation. The Bruning camera and the electrostatic copier have remained inoperative due to the lack of necessary special supplies. The full capabilities of the "Lutilith" presses cannot be realized without the photographic processes provided by this idle equipment.

b. Evaluation. The feasibility of an electrostatic copier in RVN as opposed to the "Xerox" process is doubtful. This is due in part to the climate, and in part to the difficulty of obtaining special supplies. The electrostatic copier requires a special type of paper in contrast to the "Xerox" copier, which utilizes ordinary bond or writing paper. Also, the special paper must be stored in a humidity-free and temperature controlled area, as opposed to ordinary bond or writing paper. Both the "Xerox" and electrostatic copiers must be operated in a temperature-controlled and humidity-free environment; however, the electrostatic copier is more sensitive to the climate in RVN than the "Xerox" process.

c. Recommendations. It is recommended that the "Xerox" process be used in RVN instead of the electrostatic process because of the following shortcomings of the electrostatic process:

- (1) Its more extreme sensitivity to the climate.
- (2) The difficulty of obtaining special paper through logistical channels.
- (3) The special environment in which the special paper must be stored.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Numerous Casualty Reports.

a. Observation. Casualty reports have been received at this headquarters and further relayed to Headquarters, USARV, that have contained erroneous information which, if furnished to the next of kin, could cause a great deal of embarrassment to the US Army.

b. Evaluation. Erroneous casualty reports can be reduced by requiring all units to transmit data in the clear and avoid the use of rosters. Verification of reports should be accomplished by the Division Casualty Branch by checking applicable data with the hospital or graves registration point, as appropriate, and further against military personnel records.

c. Recommendation. That the above cited procedure be incorporated into the USARV casualty reporting regulation so that other units may increase accuracy in casualty reporting.

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3. (U) SUBJECT: Construction Priorities and Funding.

a. Observation: An effective Special Services program requires much construction and renovation work to be done. It is difficult to operate an effective program because Special Services projects are not given a high priority for funding or construction.

b. Evaluation: Tennis courts cannot be constructed because there are no funds available to Special Services to buy concrete, a multiple crafts facility has not been established because the planning board has not approved funds for it nor given it a construction priority.

c. Recommendations: Authorize Special Services through use of Central Welfare Fund Council to contract for and make the money available for the support of vital Special Services projects.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Use of VN National Police Field Force.

a. Observation: Utilization of National Police Field Forces under the operational control of Brigade Provost Marshals was initiated on a limited basis during this reporting period. These forces are used in conjunction with the Bde company and platoon level units on Combat Assaults and Cordon and search missions. The 11th Inf Bde Provost Marshal was assigned a platoon size force from the Quang Ngai Province and the 196th Inf Bde Provost Marshal, received a squad size force. Each of the Brigade PFF's assigns an NCO and RTO to the NPFF unit as coordinator and advisor.

b. Evaluations: The success of operations utilizing the NPFF at both the 196th and 11th Bde has been extremely satisfactory. The NPFF have responded well to instructions and contributed to the success of the operations thru their knowledge of the people, Rapid assimilation of information on VC activities is made available with their presence on an operation. Housing, rations and supplies have not created any great problem. Working hours of the force initially presented a problem but has since been solved.

c. Recommendation: That NPFF be utilized to the fullest extent possible at Brigade level.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Use of NPFF Women in Processing VN Employees on and off US Installation in the Americal Division.

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a. Observation: The 196th Bde Provost Marshall, after favorable utilization of NPFF on operation missions, arranged for the assignment of several NPFF women for use as processing personnel in controlling and searching VN/F employees entering and leaving LZ Baldy. It had been determined that marijuana was being smuggled into Baldy by female kitchen help and house maids. Local Females failed to make a thorough search of the female employees for fear of retaliation by VN in their home villages.

b. Evaluation: The use of NPFF women as matrons has been extremely successful at the 196th Bde. There is no fear of retaliation from the local VN as the NPFF women are not from the local area and are billeted and rationed at LZ Baldy. The NPFF women's loyalty is to the Bde Provost Marshal and not to a local village or hamlet chief there by enabling them to perform their jobs effectively and efficiently without political or cultural interference.

c. Recommendation: That NPFF women be utilized to the fullest extent possible to aid in the processing of VN employees.

6. (U) SUBJECT: Racial Incidents and disturbance have become a serious and explosive problem. Most instances occur late in the evening or shortly after midnight. Investigations reveal that marihuana or alcohol are almost always involved to some degree. EM clubs are the most critical areas. Assaults, accidental and/or intentional loss of life have increased during this reporting period.

b. Evaluation: The failure of commanders to note the danger signs of impending racial conflicts within their commands has often resulted in serious incidents. Lack of control of personnel movement and discipline are indicated in the majority of incidents. The ready availability of alcoholic beverages, late club hours, and accessibility of weapons and ammunition have proved to be a dangerous combination. The constant complaint of Negro personnel is the lack of communication with commanders. Extremely loose control measures over personnel in a stand down status is obvious thru out the Chu Lai Installation and Brigade base camps.

c. Recommendation: That commanders exercise stricter control of personnel in their units both on standdown and normal duty status. Commanders and NCO's should take positive action to prevent the buildup of racial tensions and should take immediate action to identify leaders of groups.

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7. (U) SUBJECT: Command Information.

a. Observation. Command information objectives of are being met by printed materials.

b. Evaluation: The Americal Division publications, Stars & Stripes, USARV & MACV materials are distributed and read by Americal Division soldiers. Unit news is the prime attention getter. However, oral communication of CI program material is not routinely conducted by troop leaders.

c. Recommendation: That troop leaders place more stress on oral communication of the command information objectives, using the printed materials as a means of improving their program at company level.

B. Operations.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Rice Denial Operations.

a. Observation: The basic purpose of rice denial operations is to prevent rice grown outside of GVN controlled areas from being harvested and consumed by VC/NVA forces. This purpose is fulfilled by using refugees, under the protection of US/GVN forces and supervision of GVN authorities, to harvest rice in contested or VC controlled areas. In addition to denying much needed food to the enemy, such operations produce other significant benefits. Large quantities of rice are made available to local GVN authorities for equitable distribution, thereby enhancing their ability to support the refugee population in their areas. Of equal importance is the fact that the refugees themselves are given meaningful employment and an opportunity to contribute directly to their own support. Finally, public confidence in local GVN forces is increased by their successful participation in such operations.

b. Evaluation:

(1) In planning for rice denial operation, the area to be harvested should be reconnoitered daily to determine when the rice will be fully mature and ripe. Approximately one week to 10 days prior to the actual harvest, the ground security force should move into the area and conduct search and clear operations. Whenever possible, this force should consist of both US and GVN troops. Once the harvest begins, these troops should be employed to establish two perimeter type defenses, with S forces established strong points and conducting linking patrols on the outer edge of the harvest area.

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Depending on the terrain, the outer perimeter should be 800-1000 meters from the harvest area. The inner security forces should consist of GVN troops maintaining visual contact with the workers.

(2) In isolated areas not readily accessible by foot to workers from GVN areas, transportation must be arranged to move the workers to and from the harvest site and the harvested rice to collection points. The CH-47 helicopter is ideally suited for this purpose and the security force can secure the desired LZ. Once the rice is out the stalk and all is transported from the field. The stalk can be used for weaving baskets and making roofs for huts. To transport the harvested rice and stalk from the field to GVN controlled areas, cargo nets lined with scrap canvas have been used with success. This allows the rice to be transported with appreciable loss. Each cargo net of rice weighs approximately 8000 lbs and produces 6000 lbs of rice.

(3) Since all rice is not ready for harvest at the same time, a large amount of rice must be left in the fields after the first harvest. A cyclical program is required to move back into the area as the remaining rice ripens. Delays up to three weeks can be expected. If the area is left unsecured during this period, VC/NVA will move in to harvest the rice, particularly at night. An artillery H&I program, utilizing both illuminating and HE rounds, discourage night harvesting. Operations should also be conducted in the area to capture rice which the VC/NVA are successful in harvesting and to disrupt enemy plans for future harvesting. "Eagle Flight" operations are ideal for this purpose.

(4) When operating in an area for more than a three day period, ground security forces are restricted in their movement and their locations can be pin-pointed by enemy forces. A sudden halt in the harvest efforts, with ground forces conducting sweeps in the area of operation, will disrupt VC/NVA plans and will usually produce contact with enemy forces.

c. Recommendation: Rice denial operations are extremely beneficial and should be conducted to the extent practicable. When planning rice denial operations, commanders should coordinate with local GVN forces and selection of areas to be harvested well ahead of established harvest dates. One rice denial operation conducted as discussed above produced more than 5000,000 pounds of rice. The technique employed can be used by commanders as a guide in planning future rice denial operations.

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2. (C) SUBJECT: Unexploded Ordnance.

a. Observation: On 9 Oct 68, a fin assembly from a high drag 500 lb or 750 lb bomb (HE) was found. The fin assembly had been modified and made into a 60mm mortar.

b. Evaluation: The fin assembly is about 30" long, consisting of a tube 67mm in diameter with four fins attached. A piece of wood had been driven into the bottom end of the tube to act as a stop for the mortar round and a nail centered in the wood block served as a firing pin. The fins, used as supporting logs, are removable, making the tube very light to transport. Without the fins, a forked stick can be used as legs. This field expedient mortar is not as accurate as a regular 60mm mortar.

c. Recommendation: All air strikes should be observed closely and unexploded ordnance reported and destroyed by ground troops as soon as possible to deprive the VC of explosives for making mines and booby traps and to deny him a very useful weapon.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Marking Night Positions when Strobe lights are not available.

a. Observation: It is difficult to effectively mark a night location when strobe lights are not available.

b. Evaluation: It has been found that the placing of a heat tablet surrounded by a small mound of dirt will provide the necessary marking lights for aircraft trying to locate your position at night.

c. Recommendations: Since strobe lights are not always available it is recommended that each time a night laagar is established and positions prepared, a heat tablet be placed by each position to serve as a night device for marking these positions.

4. (U) SUBJECT: 106 Recoilless Rifle, Track Mounted.

a. Observation: Each of the "Light" infantry brigades in the Republic of Vietnam, has been organized to obtain a high degree of mobility permitting rapid movement to exploit the tactical situation. Most of these brigades have a separate cavalry troop attached. In keeping with the light concept the cavalry do not have the tank section which robs the cavalry men of their firepower. In an effort to regain the bore firepower, the use of the track mounted 105mm recoilless rifle has become quite common.

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b. Evaluation: The use of the 106mm recoilless rifle allows the armored cavalry to assume a more aggressive posture in any difficult situations.

c. Recommendation: The adaptation of the 106mm Recoilless Rifle to the M106A1 mortar carrier is fairly simple and requires only the addition of two (2) bolt holes in the top deck of the track. The M106A1 mortar carrier was chosen for two (2) reasons. The cargo hatch is much larger than that of the M135A1 and this allows the leader the necessary room to maneuver the large 106mm round during loading. Second, the interior of this vehicle lends itself well to the storage of the 106mm ammunition.

The weapon itself needs only slight alteration to its normal mount to allow it to be fitted to the M106A1. All alteration necessary can be accomplished at the direct support maintenance level and any items necessary to effect the adaptation can be fabricated at the level.

The employment of this weapon is limited to several factors. First, the vehicle is only lightly armored and is easily penetrated by any weapon larger than small arms. Secondly, this vehicle is a prime target and should be employed in support element rather than as an assault vehicle. When advancing toward the enemy the vehicle should be held in reserve or just behind the advancing APC's. This gives a degree of protection to the vehicle and permits maximum delivery of firepower. Due to the added weight of the ammunition and weapon the track is vulnerable to mines which might not effect the other lighter vehicles.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Light Armored Vehicle Launch Bridge.

a. Observation: During the monsoon season the area of operation becomes impassable to tanks and like-size vehicles, including organic AVLB.

b. Evaluation: Operations are conducted in the monsoon season using pure ACAV platoons. Due to the many streams in the area, and the steep banks of these streams much valuable time is spent in searching for suitable crossing sites. The problem is made worse by the continued use of the same crossing sites. The flexibility of the unit is restricted by the number of sites available. Vulnerability to mines laid in these areas, then becomes a problem.

c. Recommendation: That a light armored vehicle launch bridge be developed. This vehicle should be capable of supporting the weight of the ACAV. The recommended basis of issue is one per armored cavalry Troop.

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6. (U) SUBJECT: Monsoon Operations.

a. Observation: In order to continue operations during the monsoon season it may become necessary to scramble the organization of the armored cavalry troop and platoon.

b. Evaluation: Prior to the onset of the monsoon season orders were issued to all troops to be prepared to operate with three pure ACAV platoons and to form a provisional tank platoon. Daily operations are being conducted using the ACAV platoons. The tank platoon is holding the reserve role, or it may be used on separate missions over terrain which remains trafficable in the support role. By judicious choice of routes and positions, the fire power inherent to the troop is still available, with no loss of maneuverability.

c. Recommendation: The similar units operatic in RVN give consideration to this method to insure year-round operations without loss of effectiveness.

7. (U) SUBJECT: Battle Drill (Armored Cavalry Operations)

a. Observation: During the platoon and troop operations it had become common practice to use the column formation exclusively when moving through the AO.

b. Evaluation: Over the months the misconception had been developed that by moving in column formation the vulnerability to mines was reduced. The loss of the inherent capabilities of armored cavalry when operating in this manner is obvious. The fact that the lead vehicle rarely detonated a mine discredits the reason for moving in this manner. Vulnerability to ambush by small sapper squads in increased with the loss of flank security which should be provided by organic scout section. It is possible that we have attempted to tailor our operations too much to the terrain over which we must operate and have disregarded the basic tactics outlined for armored cavalry units in FN 117-36. It has become necessary to re-educate our small unit leaders in these basic tactics and re-emphasize the capabilities which can be realized by development of battle drill and moving in varied formations. It is still too early to tell if a change in tactics has reduced the number of mine incidents, however, there has been marked decrease in mine incidents since the units have stopped using the column formation exclusively.

c. Recommendation: Continued emphasis on following the basic tactics as outlined in FN 17-36. They apply to operations in RVN as well as any terrain over which armored cavalry may operate.

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8. (U) SUBJECT: Care and Maintenance of R17 Protective Mask.

a. Observation: Recent observation and inspections indicate a lack of knowledge of the individual soldier of his responsibilities for the proper care and maintenance of the R17 Protective Mask.

b. Evaluation: When personnel are assigned to the unit from CONUS it is assumed that these personnel undergo training on the R17 Mask prior to being assigned to RVN. The lack of this training places a burden on the unit to retrain the soldier in a basic subject that he should know before coming to Vietnam.

c. Recommendation: That training centers give more time to care and cleaning of R17 Protective Mask in their program of instruction.

9. (U) SUBJECT: Expedient Road Opening Using Combat Engineer Vehicles (CEV).

a. Observation: A deliberate minesweep and road repair operation over long distances in an insecure area to extract critical vehicles that are not air transportable is overly time consuming.

b. Evaluation: With time a critical factor, the operation involves three (3) important phases:

(1) Recon: An aerial reconnaissance is performed. Estimates are made of quantity and location of fill required. Other possible problem areas are noted and solutions Planned.

(2) Minesweep Preparation: The night prior to movement, sweep teams are positioned in secure areas at both ends of the roads. Sweep team security is arranged.

(3) Execution: Sweep teams begin work at first light. The convoy of recovery vehicles follows dump trucks loaded with fill which are led into the area by two (2) CEV's. Major advantages are gained by employment of the CEV's in pairs.

(a) If one CEV becomes stuck, the other is able to recover it.

(b) For large washouts of the roadbed, one (1) CEV will push fill to the hole and up on the abankment while the other concurrently pushes the fill into the hole and compacts it. Two (2) CEV's working in this manner, can move and place great quantities of fill in a short time.

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(c) Once the road is repaired, the recovery vehicles move into the site, and the convoy of vehicles to be extracted begins to move out. The CEV's are placed at critical locations along the road to assist the convoy across soft spots. The CEV's perform well at this and can easily catch the convoy once it has passed and are able to maintain convoy speed.

c. Recommendations:

(1) CEV's are excellent for expedient road opening operations and should be used extensively for similar operations.

(2) CEV's should be employed in pairs for this type of work. Employment in pairs greatly increased flexibility in execution for a given operation, and significantly increased equipment efficiency for earth moving work.

10 (U) SUBJECT: Engineer Support in Clearing Fire Bases (FSB).

a. Observations: Earth moving equipment must be moved by air to clear FSB's for tactical operations. Because of the limited availability of CH 54 Cranes, air transport must be accomplished by CH 47 aircraft.

b. Evaluation:

(1) The 26th Engineer Bn is authorized to D-4 and three D-5 class dozers. One D-4 and two D-5's are on hand. The D-4 can be effectively airmoved by CH 47 (see operational report - lessons learned, 1 Aug 1968), however a CH 54 is required to move the D-5 even after the blade, pusharms, and track have been removed. Because of the lead time required to obtain CH 54 aircraft the short notice upon which tactical moves must often be conducted, the CH 47 must be utilized.

(2) For most operations in the Americal AO, the D-5 cannot be classified as airmobile equipment, nor is it heavy enough to be effectively used in rear areas with the TD 24/D-7 class dozer. Except for the few operations for which cranes are made available, the D-5 is of little use.

c. Recommendations: That the D-5 dozers authorized for Divisional Engineer Battalions in the theatre, be changed to D-4 dozers.

11. (U) SUBJECT: Antenna AT-912 (VRC-12 Series)

a. Observation: Antennas for the FM radios (VRC-12 Series) have a tendency to corrode very easily as a result of the climatic conditions with the Republic of Vietnam. Daily maintenance must be performed

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or the antenna will eventually become unserviceable.

b. Evaluation: When the antenna, AT-912 becomes corroded, its transmitting range maybe decreased considerably. In most cases the antenna cannot be separated after it has become corroded, however, if the antenna sections are cleaned daily with a light coat of silicone compound, placing particular emphasis on the threads which join the sections, the corrosion can be reduced to a minimum.

c. Recommendation: That all units utilizing the antenna AT-912 use silicone compound to reduce corrosion. The compound can be found under FSN 6850-631858 on page 479 of Federal Catalogue C6800-11 dated July 1967.

12. (U) SUBJECT: Cable CX1065/G.

a. Observation: Due to the concept of operations in the Chu Lai area of Vietnam, it has been necessary to utilize Cable (spiral four) systems for multi-channel communications from Division to Brigade.

b. Evaluation: In addition to the cable that is required for normal communications to the Brigade, spare and alternate routing cables are maintained. On many occasions it has been necessary to utilize the spare cable, but it was noted that the quality of the subscriber reception was less than that of the original cable systems for a short period of time. After analyzing the situation, it was concluded that because the back-up cable had not had power applied to it periodically, condensation had accumulated within the connections thereby reducing the efficiency of the entire system.

c. Recommendation: All alternate routing or back-cable CX1065/G (spiral four) must be subjected to a periodic application of power to prevent excessive amounts of condensation from accumulating within the cable connections.

13. (U) SUBJECT: Radio Set AK/GRC-142.

a. Observation: Immediately after receiving two AH/GRC-142 Radio Sets within the battalion, extreme difficulty was experienced with the amplifier (AM 3349/GRC-106).

b. Evaluation: In an effort to determine the probable cause of the amplifier failure it was discovered that the most likely factor producing the failure was the ground system. The ground system was improved by positioning the air conditioner drain duct directly over

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the ground rod; thereby dampening the ground around the rod.

c. Recommendation: Units experiencing similar problems with the AM3349/GRC-106 should use this method to improve their ground system. This method significantly reduced amplifier failures within this Battalion.

14 (U) SUBJECT: Rapid Troubleshooting the KY-28 Secure Voice Device.

a. Observation: The location of the KY-28 Secure Voice Device associated with the pilots console is in a location that makes operational adjustments & maintenance difficult and time consuming. The device must be removed to make these adjustments i,o, volume, board changes.

b. Evaluation: Due to the inconvenient location of the device it is essential that it be removed from the normal mount located forward of the left pilots seat and near the right foot pedal. A method needs to be devised which will enable the Crypto maintenance man to perform operational maintenance checks and trouble shooting at the aircraft without complete removal of the device from the aircraft. A special purpose extension cable has been fabricated by the Americal Distra which permits uninterrupted maintenance system. This saves valuable time in performing on the spot maintenance (adjustments), operational checks, and/or equipment substitutions.

c. Recommendation: That the special extension cable be used for all, on the spot, operational checks and maintenance of the Ky-28 while operating with the radio system of the aircraft.

(a) Cable Specifications:

1. Length 48 inches.

2. Nomenclatures:: Connector Receptacle, Part Nr ON097184-2, FSN 5935-986-2284, Connector Receptacle, Part Nr ON097184-1, FSN 5935-986-2283.

Connector Plug, Part Nr MS3126F-12-10-8, Connector Plug Nr MS3126F-16-26-SW.

Cable, 16 gauge stranded.

15. (U) SUBJECT: MS5A2 Front Engine Mounting Bolts.

a. Observation: Loosening of M35A2 front engine mounting bolts by road

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vibration has caused damage to front-cross members and has caused the entire engine to be replaced.

b. Evaluation: A common discrepancy with the M35A2, LDS 465-1 Engine, is a frequent loosening of the front engine mount bolts. These should be checked daily and even more frequently if possible, because road conditions quickly loosen them. Engine torque, if the bolts become loose, will invariably cause the front cross-member to crack on the left side, hence a wash-out. Further, if the bolts drop out the engine drops down on the front out-put flange of the differential causing the necessity to replace the engine.

c. Recommendation: M35A2 front engine mounting bolts should be checked at least once daily.

C. Training - Omitted.

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D. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Debriefing of Hoi Chanh.

a. Observation: The average Hoi Chanh has a wide knowledge of Viet Cong tactics, including area security procedures, signs used by the VC, and the strength and weapons of the enemy in the Hoi Chanh's unit area.

b. Evaluation: The Hoi Chanh may supply information concerning tactics rice and or weapons caches and other pertinent operational intelligence. Hoi Chanh normally have an extensive knowledge of Infrastructure personalities residing in his area of operation. It has been found that proper interviewing of Hoi Chanh results in information not previously revealed because they have not been asked specific questions.

c. Recommendation: That all Hoi Chanh be debriefed after their initial interrogation.

2 (C) SUBJECT: Blacklists.

a. Observation: The compiling of a complete and accurate Blacklist requires a complete and accurate coordinated search of all sources of intelligence data.

b. Evaluation: Names of Viet Cong Infrastructure personalities have been obtained from interrogation reports (provincial, division and brigade), and from captured documents, source reports, and Hoi Chanh debriefings.

c. Recommendation: It is recommended that all PW, civil defendants, and Innocent civilians be questioned about Viet Cong Infrastructure believed to be operating in their area. This should be done after information of tactical value is obtained. Captured enemy documents should be examined thoroughly for infrastructure personalities.

3. (C) SUBJECT: Enemy Wire Tapping.

a. Observation: During the month of Aug 68, a land line connecting two TOCs on the same firebase was tapped using a simple T-splice into the wire at an isolated point.

b. Evaluation: Simple land-line communications are extremely vulnerable to enemy tapping.

c. Recommendation: That commanders and intelligence officers make it a continuing practice of training personnel in communications security. Wire communications must be inspected frequently, particularly in those areas where the lines are not under continual observation. In addition telephones are not a secure means of communication and should not be used for the discussion of classified information.

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4. (C) SUBJECT: LRP Insertion.

a. Observation: LRP insertions at dawn and dusk, using special equipment, greatly decrease the chance of mission compromise.

b. Evaluation: During hours of limited visibility, the enemy moves into positions and relaxes his security. Under these conditions, insertions using the following techniques will be guaranteed a high degree of success. The lead ship carries the team for insertion. The remainder of the ships follow, in column, behind the insertion ship. As the column reaches the point of insertion, the lead ship drops down to off-load the team. All other ships pass overhead and the insertion ship, after dropping the team, takes the rear position in the column. Insertion by repelling may be used with this technique, after must fly slower than in other methods. Spacing between helicopters is critical as it is possible to leave too wide a gap between the last element and the insertion ship when the latter returns to the formation. The primary advantage is that the circling maneuvers of the escort ships and eliminated which has tended to pinpoint the LZ location. An additional advantage is a reduction in the time the aircraft spend in the LZ area.

c. Recommendation: That this method of insertion be tested and further refined by other LRP units.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Maintenance of Optical equipment.

a. Observation: The extreme dampness and dust in RVN can seriously damage Imagery Interpretation optical equipment.

b. Evaluation: Dust and water have corrosive effects on optical equipment unless maintenance is performed daily. Proper optical cleaning equipment must be used to prevent further damage to the lens. Extra care should be given to special equipment such as the prism mirror stereoscope and the photogrammetric stereometers.

c. Recommendation: That SOP's require daily maintenance, the use of prescribed cleaning equipment only and storage in proper protection case.

E. Logistics.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Seasonal Equipment Requirements

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a. Observation: Many logistical requirements are of a seasonal nature. During the monsoon season, there develops a critical need for weather gear, heater, and warming and drying facilities.

b. Evaluation: Forecasting requirements and submitting of necessary requisitions with sufficient lead item can insure prompt receipt of seasonal equipment. The seasonal nature of the requirement/demands must be recognized in maintenance of ASL.

c. Recommendation: That units project impending requirements and requisition seasonal equipment well in advance. That ASL/PLI demand experience be subjectively evaluated prior to deletion of items from ASL/PLL.

2 (U) SUBJECT: Installation of 10,000 Gallon Collapsible Tank

a. Observation: The 10,000 gallon collapsible tanks are frequently installed in a berm.

b. Evaluation: During the monsoon season accumulation of water under and around the tank causes surface blisters. Water should be drained from the tank berms, utilizing a water pump if available. Standing water also causes berm wall erosion.

c. Recommendation: Tanks be installed above ground level with drain hoses to allow for drainage of berm area. Berms should be high and thick enough to protect tanks from shell fragments and small arms fire.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Fire Control Equipment Fogging

a. Observation: During inclement weather fire control equipment becomes inoperative due to fogging.

b. Evaluation: Fire control equipment modified to allow nitrogen purging will reduce fogging.

c. Recommendation: Fire control equipment and night vision devices be modified in CONUS for nitrogen purging prior to shipment to Southeast Asia.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Borescope, M2, 6650-587-0968.

a. Observation: The M2 borescope is not durable and portable enough for continuous operation in Vietnam.

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b. Evaluation: The tactical situation in Vietnam preclude the transporting mortars and howitzers to direct units when boroscoping is required. Armament technicians must boroscope "on site". This requires transporting the boroscope by vehicle or helicopter. This is a delicate instrument and continuous operation under these conditions renders it rapidly unserviceable.

c. Recommendation: The 12 boroscope be evaluated for redesign emphasizing durability and portability.

(2) A minimum of two boroscopes be authorized per direct support unit to insure continuous support when one scope is inoperative.

5. (C) SUBJECT: Procurement of Herbicide for Ground-Based Defoliation Operations.

a. Observation: In recent months the chemical section has had difficulty procuring herbicide Orange for ground-based defoliation operations.

b. Evaluation: At the present time all herbicide is controlled by GVN forces, United States forces are not permitted to stock this item. The end results are long and involved procedures both in procuring and transporting the herbicide. The 2d ARVN Division who supplies herbicide to the Americal Division has inadequate stockage to meet operational requirements. Subsequently, herbicide must be requested through ARVN channels in Da Nang. This causes delays because of special transportation requirements.

c. Recommendation: That US Forces be permitted to stock an ample amount of herbicide Orange for ground-based defoliation operations. This would not interfere with GVN control since all requests must be approved by local prince chiefs.

6. (U) SUBJECT: Track and Suspension System, Armored Personnel Carrier, M113.

a. Observation: Frequent inspections are required by the track and suspension systems on the M113 to insure proper performance.

b. Evaluation: Special attention must be given rack block connection points, when excessive wear is noted, the track blocks should be immediately replaced. If new blocks are not available, extreme caution must be exercised.

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c. Recommendation: M113 APC's with worn track block connection points not be used except in case of combat necessity. The should move at a slow rate of speed to insure that the vehicle can be safely stopped in the event of track or suspension system failure.

7. (U) SUBJECT: Lubrication Intervals.

a. Observation: In several instances lubrication intervals required by the lubrication order has proven inadequate in the Vietnam environment.

b. Evaluation: Vehicles should be completely lubricated every 300 miles or 30 day, whichever comes first. Generators should be checked daily with oil and filters changed weekly. Refrigeration units should also be lubricated weekly.

c. Recommendations: That equipment be lubricated in accordance with the above evaluation.

8. (U) SUBJECT: Front Engine Mounting Bolts, M35A2.

a. Observation: Loose front engine mounting bolts has caused damage to front cross members and engines on the M35A2's.

b. Evaluation: A problem with the M35A2, LDS 465-1 engine is loosening of the front engine mount bolts. These should be checked daily, Engine torque will cause the front cross member to crack on the left side. If the bolts drop out, the engine drops down on the front out-flange of the differential ruining the engine.

c. Recommendation: The M35A2 front engine mounting bolts be checked at least daily.

9. (U) SUBJECT: Squad Radio Sets, AN/PRT-4 and An/PRR-9.

a. Observation:

(1) Squad radio sets AN/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9 do not have sufficient range for communications required from platoon to squad in the counter insurgency environment. Squad sized patrols and night ambushes are normally deployed beyond the 1,000 meter range of these sets. In addition, it has been found that tick vegetation will reduce the effective range of the radio sets down to 200 to 300 meters. Maintenance problems have been encountered in the use of the squad radio sets due to the high susceptibility to water and moisture damage.

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(2) The antennas are easily broken when operating in thick foliage AN PRR-9 speaker horn assemblies are not sturdy enough to withstand tactical use.

(3) There are insufficient spare parts available to maintain the sets properly, especially antennas, speaker horns and lanyards.

b. Evaluation: The squad radio sets, An/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9 are unsatisfactory for employment in the counter insurgency environment due to the limited range, multiple maintenance problems and the lack of spare parts.

c. Recommendation: That a radio set of greater range and durability be authorized the infantry squad in the counter insurgency environment. That sufficient spare parts be maintained in supply and maintenance channels for authorized squad radio sets that redesign of the present squad radio sets be considered to increase durability and decrease susceptibility to moisture damage.

G. Civil Affairs/Civic Action.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Utilization of Psyop Resources.

a. Observation: A more effective PSYOP program could be implemented throughout the area of operations if PSYOPs assets were decentralized and units were supported on an area basis rather than assets being concentrated in one location.

b. Evaluation: The need exists for a coordinated PSYOP support developmental center at Chu Lai to not only take advantage of the PSYOP expertise available within the 12th DTA but also to insure the production of a more meaningful, unit oriented PSYOP product based on local needs and local intelligence. It is envisioned that this center would be responsible for coordination the development, production and dissemination of all propaganda within 12th DTA. It would be staffed by representatives of both US (Americal Division and 7th PSYOP Bn) and GVN (ARVN and Province) who would collectively insure that a coordinated program was implemented throughout the area. This would require an increase in 7th PSYOP Bn assets presently located at Chu Lai to include graphic and printing capabilities. An allocation of aircraft would further be required to insure that a means of aerial dissemination would be available. This system would leave the asset's centralized at Corps headquarters to work exclusively on development and production of propaganda which has general applicability and requires less immediate dissemination. Experience has shown that the present system is not fully responsive to the needs of this area and more complete use needs to be made of all units possessing PSYOP expertise throughout the area.

c. Recommendation. That a PSYOP support unit be located in the Chu Lai area with the capability to develop, produce and disseminate propaganda throughout the entire area encompassed by the 12th DTA.

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2. (U) SUBJECT Volunteer Informant Program.

a. Observation. The effective conduct of a volunteer informant program is dependent upon the degree of credibility attained with the prospective informant. Propaganda disseminated which advertises collection points, amount to be paid for turn in of items and willingness of allied forces to reward the civilians for such information must be credible to the target audience if any degree of success is to be attained.

b. Evaluation. The following techniques have been employed by this division in the successful conduct of this program.

(1) Areas were initially targeted based on the density of population and presence of friendly troops. Leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were followed by ground loudspeaker broadcasts made by a combat loudspeaker team. This team, using 2 Kit Carson Scouts in a face to face role informed the civilian populace of the benefits to be gained by participating in the program and designated a collection point where the items could be turned in.

(2) To insure that all potential informants were offered an opportunity to participate in this program, funds for payment were also carried by the engineer unit responsible for road clearance in the area and by the combat loudspeaker team itself.

(3) Children comprised a high percentage of the informants. At least 60% of the informants were under 16 years of age and they enthusiastically received and transmitted the program to other would be informants. The effects were cumulative. When the program was initially implemented and propaganda distributed very few informants showed interest. By attaining credibility as payments were made for the items turned in so the information was passed on by word of mouth from village to village. This coupled with the techniques outlined above resulted in the following items being turned in within the Americal Division's area of operation during the reporting period.

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	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
Arty(rds)	197	281	365	943
Mortar(rds)	1,004	167	461	1,632
Grenades(ea)	303	289	640	1,232
Mines(ea)	41	34	282	357
40m(ea)	38	257	416	761
S/Arms(rds)	22,650	6,000	32,100	62,750
TNT(lbs)	37	22	24	83
Wpns(ea)	3	3	42	48

c. Recommendation: That a system, as outlined above, be initiated and implemented in areas where an effective volunteer informant program is not presently in effect.

FOR THE COMMANDER

JACK L TREADWELL
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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DISTRIBUTION:

1-ACSFOR-DA (thru USARPAC)
2-ACSFOR-DA (thru USARV to DA)
2-CINCUSARPAC
3-CG, USARV

2-Co, 11th Inf Bde
2-CO, 196th Inf Bde
2-CO, 198th Inf Bde
2-CO, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav

2-CO, Div Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn, 1st Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 3d Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 21st Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 20th Inf

1-CO, 2nd Bn, 1st Inf
1-CO, 3d Bn, 21st Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 31st Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 6th Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 46th Inf
1-CO, 5th Bn, 46th Inf

1-CO, 1st Bn, 52nd Inf
1-CO, 6th Bn, 11th Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn, 82d Arty
1-CO, 1st Bn, 82d Arty
1-Chemical Officer
1-Provost Marshal
1-AG
10-CO, 3d Mil Hist Det

1-CO, 1st Bn, 14th Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn 16th Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn, 18th Arty
1-CO, E Trp, 1st Cav
1-CO, F Trp, 17th Cav
1-CO, H Trp, 17th Cav
1-CO, 6th Spt Bn
1-CO, 8th Spt Bn
1-CO, 9th Spt Bn
1-CO, 23d S&T Bn
1-CO, 23d Med Bn
1-CO, 723d Maint Bn
1-CO, 123d Avn Bn
1-CO, 14th Avn Bn

2-TACP (ALO), Americal Div
1-CO, 26th Engr Bn
1-CO, 39th Engr Bn
1-CO, 523d Sign Bn

1-ACofS, G1
1-ACofS, G2
5-ACofS, G3
1-ACofS, G4
1-ACofS, G5

1-Comdt, Americal Division Combat Center

1-IG
1-OCMHH-DA

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AMERICAL DIVISION TROOP LIST
(as of 1 Nov 68)

1. HQ AMERICAL DIVISION

HHC, Americal Division
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
F Troop, 8th Cav
415th Sig Det
570th TC Det
26th Engr Bn
123d Avn Bn
449th Sig Det
406 TC Det
523d Sig Bn
23d MP Co
3d Mil Hist Det

2. AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY

HHC, Div Arty
3d Bn, 16th Arty
3d Bn, 18th Arty
1st Bn, 82d Arty
3d Plt, Btry, 29th Arty, Searchlight (OPCON)
G Btry, 55th Arty (.50)
251st Radar Det
6th Bn, 56th Arty

3. AMERICAL DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

HHC and Band
23d S&T Bn
HQ & A Co, 23d Med Bn
HQ & A Co, 723d Maint Bn
23 Admin Co
258th Pers Svcs Co
Co E, 51st Inf (LRP)
63d Inf Plt (CTT)
Americal Combat Center (PROV)

4. 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 11th Inf Bde
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 3d Inf

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1st Bn, 20th Inf
4th Bn, 21st Inf
6th Bn, 11th Arty
6th Spt Bn
E Trp, 1st Cav
11th Sig Plt
59th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
52d Chem Det
31st Public Information Det

5. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196TH Inf Bde
2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
3d Bn, 82d Arty
8th Spt Bn
F Trp, 17th Cav
48th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
156th Sig Plt
10th Public Information Det
27th CML Det
569th MI det
636th MI Det, OB

6. 198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 198th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 6th Inf
1st Bn, 46th Inf
5th Bn, 46th Inf
1st Bn, 52d Inf
1st Bn, 14th Arty
9th Spt Bn
H Trp, 17th Cav
57th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
635th MI Det
87th Chem Det
49th Sig Det

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7. NON DIVISIONAL UNITS

14th Combat Avn Bn
71st Aslt Spt Hel Co
132d Aslt Spt Hel Co
174th Aslt Hel Co
176th Aslt Hel Co
178th Aslt Hel Co
16th TC Det
94th Sign Det
151st TC Det
348th A. S. Det
400th TC Det
39th Engr Bn
4th CA Plt
6th CA Plt
51st CA Plt
Americal RR co (PROV)
408th RR Det
415th RR Det
601st RR Det
O/I6, Det 31, 5th Weather Sqdn USAF
USASSG, ACSI, DA
160th Engr Det
506th Engr Det
548th Engr Det
600th Engr Det
603d Engr Det

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HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 97375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO
96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Reports-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, Americal Division.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning reproduction, page 57, Section II, paragraph A1. Bruning Model 2100 and Xerox Model 720 are both electrostatic copying machines, and are equally susceptible to climatic conditions. Both copiers have a secondary feature the ability to reproduce off set masters. However, the masters are of doubtful quality. The Americal Division should initiate action to obtain a Holooid Camera 4, manufactured by Xerox Corporation, as listed on page 44, AR 310-1. Action will be taken to notify the Americal Division of this recommendation.

b. Reference item concerning erroneous casualty reports, page 57, Section II, paragraph A2. The procedures outlined by Americal Division have merit in the actual reporting of casualties, and are items that are helpful for all units below Division level. This headquarters will take appropriate action to disseminate these suggested procedures to the major subordinate commands.

c. Reference item concerning construction priorities and funding, page 58, Section II, paragraphs A3. Funds are available for justified construction projects. However, priorities for construction are assigned by USAECAV and Special Services projects do not have high enough priority for construction at this time.

d. Reference item concerning use of NPFF women for processing VN employees, page 58, Section II, paragraph A5. Concur with the recommendation. National Police women are being used at a number of locations in RVN and are usually more effective than direct-hire personnel.

e. Reference item concerning incidents and disturbances, page 59, Section II, paragraph A6. The recommendation is considered appropriate.

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f. Reference on item concerning light armored vehicle launched bridge, page 63, Section II, paragraph B5. Concur with the recommendation. Shipment to fill this need is under development by CONUS agencies.

g. Reference item concerning care and maintenance of X17 Protective Masks, page 65, Section II, paragraph B8. Concur with recommendation.

h. Reference item concerning engineer support in clearing fire bases (FSB), page 66, Section II, paragraph B14. The use of the special extension cable to adjust and troubleshoot the KY-28 will be evaluated.

j. Reference item concerning LRP insertion, page 71, Section II, paragraph D4. The technique of inserting LRP patrols described by the Americal Division appears to have merit. An article describing the technique will be included in the next issue of the USARV publication, Combat Intelligence Lessons.

k. Reference item concerning fire control equipment fogging, page 72, Section II, paragraph E3. Concur USAWECOM is aware that fire control devices in RVN become fogged and consequently they have developed or are developing for each fire control device a MWO to allow nitrogen purging. The modification will be performed in-country for devices in use and in CONUS for devices returned for overhaul.

l. Reference item concerning boroscope, M2, page 72, Section II, paragraph E4. Concur with the first recommendation. In order for USAWECOM to evaluate the design of the M2 baroscope, the problems relating to its durability and portability must be reported on an Equipment Improvement Recommendation by the using unit. Nonconcur with the second recommendation. Because of their expense it is not economically advisable to authorize spare boroscopes at the user level. USAWECOM has reported that replacement boroscopes are available and may be requested by priority requisition to replace those damaged.

m. Reference item concerning procurement of herbicide for ground based defoliation operations, page 73, Section II, paragraph E5. Nonconcur. The current policy for stocking and issue of orange herbicide was established by agreement between the governments of Vietnam and the United States. Adequate supplies of orange herbicide are on hand, but because of its sensitive nature decentralized stockage is not advisable.

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n. Reference item concerning utilization of PSYOP resources, page 75, Section II, paragraph G1. Nonconcur. GVN province officials and provincial advisory teams have been directed by Change 1, MACV Directive 10-1, dated 10 July 1968 and GVN directives, to establish a PSYOP/CA coordinating committee in each province. Maximum utilization of these province level organizations will minimize the requirement for a PSYOP developmental center at Division Tactical Area (DTA) level.

FOR THE COMMANDER

W. C. ARNTZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG