

AD504330 UNCLASSIFIED

30 SEP 74

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED, HQ, AMERICAL DIVISION

AVDF HL

10 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969

I. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. Command

1. (C) Background The Americal Division continued extensive combat operations during the reporting period. Enemy contacts were light through moderate in the Tactical Area of Operational Interest (TAOI) until 23 February 1969 when a significant increase in contacts was noted as a result of the Post-Tet Offensive. After several heavy contacts the level gradually decreased throughout March and in April indications were that the enemy was training and refitting for a second increase in activity during the 10-19 May 1969 period.

2. (U) Command Changes.

a. General Officers. Brigadier General Edwin L. Powell, Jr., became the Assistant Division Commander (Support) on 1 May 1969, replacing Brigadier General Howard H. Cooksey. Brigadier General Wallace L. Clement was designated Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver).

b. Brigade Commanders. Colonel Jack L. Treadwell assumed command of the 11th Inf Bde on 28 March 1969 from Colonel John W. Donaldson.

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(downgraded at 3 year interval; declassified after 12 years. DOD Dir 5200.10

c. Battalion Commanders.

(1) 3d Bn, 1st Inf. Lieutenant Colonel Walter L. Pritchard, Jr., assumed command on 17 March 1969 from Lieutenant Colonel William J. McCloskey. LTC Pritchard was killed in action on 12 April 1969, and LTC George Ellis assumed command on 21 April 1969. Major Virgil W. Ogelsby took command in the interim.

(2) 4th Bn, 21st Inf. LTC Donald Hanson assumed command from LTC J. Godfrey Crowe on 20 March 1969.

(3) 5th Bn, 46th Inf. LTC Alfred Barnes assumed command on 15 March 1969 from LTC Ronald R. Richardson who became Americal Division G4.

(4) 1st Bn, 52d Inf. LTC William C. Stinson, Jr., was killed in action on 3 March 1969. LTC Reed Davis assumed command on 10 March 1969. Major Edward F. Neary took command in the interim.

(5) 723d Maintenance Bn. LTC Millard H. Singleton assumed command from LTC George A. Jones, Jr., on 1 March 1969.

(6) 26th Engineer Bn. LTC Mathew W. Hoey left on 4 March 1969. LTC Donald R. Swygert assumed command on 14 March 1969. Major James A. Rakowitz took command in the interim.

3. (U) Staff Changes.

a. Colonel John W. Donaldson, former commander of the 11th Inf Bde, became the Chief of Staff on 28 March 1969, replacing Colonel Jack L. Treadwell.

b. LTC Ronald R. Richardson became ACofs, G4, on 30 March 1969, replacing LTC David K. Lyon.

c. LTC Eli P. Howard became the Division Inspector General on 17 April 1969, replacing LTC Carroll E. Swain.

d. LTC Thomas G. Irwin became the Division Provost Marshal on 8 February 1969, replacing LTC Jode R. Wilson.

4. (U) The following distinguished persons visited the Americal Division during the reporting period:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
GEN ABRAMS, USA	COMUSMACV	5 Feb 69
BG DWYER, USMC	G3, III MAF	8 Feb 69
COL ATKINSON, USAF	DEP CO, OPNS 366 TAC FIGHTER	22 Feb 69
BG TERRY, USA	CG, USASTATCOM PACIFIC	25 Feb 69

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
BG RIENZI, USA	CG, 1ST SIG BDE	25 Feb 69
COL KINNE, USA	MACV CHEMICAL OFF	25 Feb 69
COL STONER, USAF	CO, RANCH HAND	25 Feb 69
GEN GOODPASTER, USA	DEP COMUSMACV	6 Mar 69
MG ODEN, USA	CG, USA AVN CTR	12-13 Mar 69
MG RAMSEY, USA	CG, AMERICAL (DESIGNATE)	12-13 Mar 69
LTG NICKERSON, USMC	CG, II MAF (DESIGNATE)	15 Mar 69
LTG MILDREN, USA	DEP CG, USARV	18 Mar 69
MG EWELL, USA	CG, 9TH INF DIV	24 Mar 69
LTG CASSIDY, USA	CHIEF OF ENGINEERS	23 Mar 69
BG ROBERTS, USA	DEP CofS (P&OPNS) USARV	24 Mar 69
LTG LEVELLE, USAF	DIR DEF EOMM PLANNING GP	28 Mar 69
BG RYDER, USA	ACofs, G1 USARPAC	30 Mar 69
LTG WALT, USMC	DEP COMDT USMC	2 Apr 69
BG POTTS, USA	J-2 MACV (DESIGNATE)	4 Apr 69
BG HAMRICK, USA	CHIEF, MEDICAL SER CORPS	4 Apr 69
MG KAUFMAN, USA	CG, 124TH ARCOM (RESERVE)	7 Apr 69
BG BOOTH, USA	CG, 81ST ARCOM (RESERVE)	7 Apr 69
COL (P) McCORD, USA	ACofs, G2 USARPAC	15-16 Apr 69
BG BAUTZ, USA	J-3 MACV (DESIGNATE)	15 Apr 69
BG BURDETTE, USA	CG, 1ST AVN BDE	15 Apr 69
MG GUSTAFSON, USA	PROVOST MARSHAL GEN	17 Apr 69
GEN ROSSON, USA	DEP COMUSMACV	22 Apr 69
MG MABRY, USA	CofS, USARV (DESIGNATE)	25 Feb 69

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
MG RAMSEY, USA	CG (DESIGNATE)	23-24 Apr 69
BG PIXTON, USA	CG, XXIV CORPS ARTY	29 Apr 69
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B. (U) Personnel.

1. (U) G1 Section.

The second G1/AG Conference was held on 17 March 1969. The conference was attended by S1 Adjutants of all the battalions and brigades. The conference was organized to inform individuals of problems encountered or expected within the personnel management area. Individuals attending felt that the subjects covered by G1/AG were informative and helpful. This conference will be conducted bimonthly in the future.

2. (U) AG Section.

a. Reenlistment.

(1) Reenlistment involves the activities required to retain the maximum number of qualified competent enlisted personnel in the Regular Army. In order to achieve this objective, in November 1968, this division started a vigorous command support of the reenlistment program. In addition, the Division Reenlistment Office attached two counselors to each major subordinate command. This enables the counselor to serve the company size units in their reenlistment effort, and maintain a timely schedule for follow-up on prospective reenlistments within each unit. The career counselor also assists in coordination of administrative processing between the units and the Division Reenlistment Office. This additional assistance has resulted in an increase of the First Term and AUS retention rate, and has enhanced the overall reenlistment effort within the division.

(2) In the month of March 1969, the enlistments/reenlistments totaled 80, surpassing the previous monthly high since the division has been reformed. The previous record was 76 which was obtained in September 1968.

b. Special Correspondence.

An intensive effort is being made to reduce the causes for complaints that result in correspondence received from Members of Congress. Major emphasis has been placed on a files reduction to eliminate unnecessary duplication of files.

3. (U) Finance.

a. The most significant activity during the period 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969 was an adjustment to the finance section manning level and the added mission of providing area finance service to non-organic

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Army elements located within the division zone of operation responsibility. USARV letter, 27 March 1969, subject: Finance Support of Non-divisional Personnel, allocated two officers and sixty enlisted positions to the division. These positions were informally withdrawn from MTOE 14-500E of the 192d Finance Section, previously located in Da Nang an providing area finance service in the I Corps area. In addition, fifteen more enlisted spaces are to be authorized as over strengths in the finance section. The addition of these spaces to MTOE 12-37G increased the finance section manning level from seven (7) officers and one hundred and four (104) enlisted personnel in MTOE 12-37G to a total of nine (9) officers and one hundred and seventy-nine (179) enlisted spaces. The added spaces were recognized as the personnel resource requirements to augment the division finance section TOE for the purpose of providing finance service to approximately 7,000 personnel assigned or attached above the basic division strength and approximately 3,000 non-divisional personnel in the division area. The concept of providing area support by utilizing organic finance elements nearest the non-organic units increases the responsiveness of finance service to such units. The prospect of close finance support has met with favorable reaction by the non-division elements to be supported.

(1) Through USARV assignment of personnel to the Division in excess of authorization during previous periods, the net personnel requirements to meet the new manning level were reduced to fifteen (15) people. On 28 March 1969, one officer and twelve (12) enlisted men were attached to and arrived at the division with two more people to be attached. Approximately 1,800 records accompanied these personnel for subsequent administration by the Americal Division Finance Office. The attached personnel are to be subsequently assigned to the division and requisitioning of personnel replacements against the authorized total of 188 personnel is to be a responsibility of the division. Total average accounts serviced by the finance section at 30 April 1969 was approximately 27,000.

(2) Interesting aspects of this augmentation involve the manner in which the spaces were added and the problem of equipment levels to support the added strengths. The added positions remain charged to over all USARV strengths but are only allocated to the division and not formally assigned by General Order or MTOE. The spaces thus allocated are a weak basis for requisitioning the necessary equipment. When acquired, the equipment will be regarded as excess to authorized property book levels which are based on TOE and will necessarily be considered as TA items.

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b. During the period, a military banking facility was opened to provide banking service to all military personnel in the area. Requested and sponsored by the Americal Division, the facility opened 22 March 1969. American Express Co, Inc, operates the facility in Chu Lai.

4. (U) Provost Marshal.

a. During the reporting period five (5) PW Collecting Points were operated. The five PW Collecting Points processed 1750 detainees; of these 56 were PW, 426 CD, 1182 IC, 37 returnees (Chieu Hoi), and 49 were detainees (MI of CI hold).

b. The 23d Military Police Company escorted a total of 2,789 convoy vehicles for 2,890 miles. These statistics do not include convoy escorts by the 11th Bde MP's.

5. (U) Surgeon.

a. Organization. With the addition of four new preventive medicine technicians (91S), the Surgeon's Office acquired a new capability for inspecting and instructing in Preventive Medicine.

b. Preventive Medicine:

(1) Malaria continued to be the most significant disease problem in the division, though rates were lower than during the previous reporting period. The February rate was 48 cases per 1000 per year compared to 19 for February 1968, 31 cases per 1000 per year in March, compared to 50 in April 1968. The percent of vivax cases continued to be high, between 60-75%.

(2) One hundred and eight-eight (188) individuals were trained in six Field Sanitation team classes during the three month period.

(3) Fourteen (14) aerial insecticide spray missions were conducted in the Americal AO during the report period.

c. Others:

(1) On 15 February 1969, the entire division was reorganized under the ROAD configuration. The medical company of each of the three former brigade support battalions was transferred to the 23d Medical Battalion as B, C, and D Companies. The 23d Medical Battalion, as expanded, remains under the command of LTC Henry A. Robinson, Jr, who also serves as the Division Surgeon.

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(2) On 4 April 1969, BG William Hamrick, Chief Medical Service Corps, visited the division and had personal interviews with all the MSC Officers in the division.

(3) The MEDCAP program has been implemented in accordance with new MACV Directives and is progressing satisfactorily.

6. (U) Morale and Welfare.

a. Postal Services. During the period of time covered by this report, HQ, USARV, conducted a Tri-annual Postal Inspection. The following remarks were a part of the official report of inspection:

"Improvement in the overall efficiency of APO 96374 was noted during this inspection as compared to previous inspection conducted by this headquarters. The establishment of a hospital mail section and the general improvement of APO directory service were particularly noteworthy."

B. Special Services. A musical troupe, the "Joint Chiefs of Staff," consisting of four enlisted men attached to Special Services from units of the Americal Division, has been formed as a local Command Soldier Show. The mission of this group is to provide entertainment to the troops at landing zones, fire bases, and isolated areas as an augmentation to the command Military Touring Shows and USO shows sponsored by HQ, USARV, SSO, as provided for in USARV Reg 28-11.

7. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

a. During the period: This section experienced during February 1969 a change of Chief Legal Clerks; also in March 1969 a change of Warrant Officers. Military Justice/Military Affairs still comprise the largest activity area. During the Quarter February - April 1969, this command tried 11 general courts-martial and received 124 special addition, 1,275 Article 15's were received for administrative review, corrections, logging, and forwarding to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, for file. Military Affairs Action for this quarter included 77 LOD's, 45 Article 15 appeals, 100 Reports of Survey, 49 Reports of Investigation, 66 elimination cases, and 21 Congressional Inquiries. Quarterly rates for general, special, and summary courts-martial during the period were 0.13, 1.88, and 0.21 respectively. These rates reflect the average number of cases per month per thousand troop strength.

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b. The Legal Assistance Section processed 2,781 cases during the quarter, including but not limited to tax, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills, and powers of attorney and general counseling, and advice regarding disciplinary action and administrative procedures.

c. This office continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Convention with strong emphasis on war crimes and detainee treatment, to each group of replacements processed through the Americal Combat Center.

d. During the quarter, 57 claims were received for payment for loss or damage of servicemen's property. Foreign claims are monitored at this headquarters for substantive and procedural completeness and forwarded to the Foreign Claims Commission for adjudication.

8. (U) Information Office.

a. Visits by civilian newsmen during the reporting period were very infrequent, and most of those who came to the division were interested in pacification stories. Operation Russell Beach entered the pacification and final phases approximately 10 February, and has drawn very little press interest since that date. A CBS-TV camera crew went to the Batangan Peninsula to cover the return of the refugees to their former homes, and another CBS crew and two AP representatives covered a refugee move from Tam Ky to Hau Duc. One operational problem arose concerning the pacification program. LTC Solomon, MACOI-C, requested a photo story on the return to the Batangan, but clearance officials at III MAF stated the refugee story should not be a topic for the military, and that we should leave coverage to civilian newsmen and CORDS representatives.

b. The Americal Division went under the ROAD concept 15 February, effecting several changes in the division information program. The division information office had several personnel slots removed, and now has an authorized strength as follows: Four officers (5505), one E8 Information Supervisor (71Q), seven Information Specialists (71Q), two Broadcast Specialists (71R), and one Clerk-Typist (71B). The brigades lost their organic information office slots, leaving only the two public information detachments at the 196th, and 11th Brigades, and the provisional public information detachment of the 198th Brigade. Each detachment is authorized two officers (5505), Two Information Specialists (71Q), and one Clerk-Typist (71B). Thus far the arrangement has caused no problems as the public information detachments were operating near full strength and the organic slots were not being used.

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c. During the past quarter, a biweekly newspaper, **The Southern Cross**, and a quarterly four-color magazine, **AMERICAL** were published. A "pull-out" centerfold, regarding the Pacification Program was included in the May issue of the magazine. **The Southern Cross** was presented a USARV Journalism Award for its outstanding command information features during January. No problems have been encountered in distribution.

d. Two subordinate units, the 5th Bn, 46th Inf, and the Division MID, have begun publication of mimeographed newsletters during this period. The unit newsheet of the 8th Support Battalion was discontinued due to reorganization.

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C. Intelligence.

1. (C) Enemy Situation
a. Quang Nam/Quang Tin

(1) For the first three weeks of February 1969, enemy forces were involved in scattered contacts and initiated attacks by fire against isolated LZ's, NDP's, fixed installations, and population centers. Main Force and NVA units continued to avoid contact with Allied Forces while they concentrated on resupplying and retraining for the coming Winter/Spring Offensive. Significant changes in enemy disposition during this period were noted the area of Tam Ky City and Base Area 117. The 70th and 74th MF Battalions moved into defensive positions approximately 14 km west of Tam Ky City; while the V-12 LF Company, the V-16th LF Sapper Battalion, and the 72d LF Battalion were located in the same vicinity, approximately 8 km west of Tam Ky City in order to coordinate upcoming offensive activities. The 3d Regiment, 2d NVA Division moved to a base camp approximately 3 km south of Base Area 117, from where it initiated movement toward the Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDG Camp. From 8 February to 21 February 1969, enemy forces significantly increased attacks by fire and light ground attacks again population centers, e.g. Tien Phuoc (D) HQ's, Que Son (D) HQ's/Que Son Market Place, Nui Lac Son (V), and Phuoc An (V). These attacks were thought to be an attempt to undermine the faith of the populace in the ability of the GVN to effectively protect them. During the first three weeks of February 1969, Allied Forces operating in the Quang Nam/Quang Tin (P) area accounted for a total of 273 enemy KIA. On 22 and 23 February 1969, the 2d NVA Division along with Local and Main Force units initiated the "K" Phase of the Winter/Spring Offensive with well coordinated attacks by fire and maneuver against fixed installations, LZ's NDP's, USSF/CIDG Camps, and population centers in the Quang Nam/Quang Tin (P) area. During this period LZ's Baldy, Bayonet, Hawk Hill, and Professional, the Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDG Camp, and the CLDC received attacks by fire. LZ's Baldy, Professional, and Bayonet, along with the Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDG Camp received ground probes coordinated with attacks by fire. Que Son (D) HQ's, Tien Phuoc (D) HQ's, Ly Tin (D) HQ's and Nui Lac Son (V) were among the population centers attacked on 23 February 1969. Que Son (D) HQ's and Tien Phuoc (D) HQ's were subjected to the heaviest attacks, with Que Son (D) HQ's receiving a mortar barrage followed by a ground attack, resulting in 34 VN civilians killed, 55 VN civilians wounded, and 17 VC KIA. On the afternoon of 23 February 1969, USSF and CIDG personnel from the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp accounted for 42 VC KIA while retaking and OP which had previously been overrun by enemy forces late on 22 February 1969. The unit in contact was identified as elements of the 2d Battalion, 3d Regiment, 2d NVA Division. This commitment by elements of the 3d Regiment, 2d NVA Division to the Tien Phuoc Area was an attempt to draw Allied Forces out of the Tam Ky City area, leaving the more

lucrative coastal areas vulnerable to attacks by Local and Main Forces elements. However, this feint was preempted by elements of the 1-1 Cav which accounted for a total of 238 VC/NVA KIA within an area 5 km south and 11 km west of Tam Ky City from 23 thru 27 February 1969. PW's captured during these engagements identified the 72d LF Battalion, 70th MF Battalion, and the V-16th LF Sapper Battalion as the units in contact. According to knowledgeable PW's, the enemy attack plan for Tam Ky City called for elements of the V-16th and 72d LF Battalions to capture Hill 38 (BT 278 2221). Other elements of the 72d LF Battalion were to capture Hill 14 (BT288 189) and Phuoc Tra (V) (BT274 200) in order to set up ambush positions from which they could attack Allied reinforcements moving out of the Tien Phuoc area along Highway 535 (Tien Phuoc Highway) to reinforce the besieged Tam Ky City. While the V-16th LF Sapper Battalion and the 72d LF Battalion were attacking the above positions, the 79th MF Battalion was to move in an easterly direction across the Tam Ky River, cross Highway 1 and proceed north moving on Tam Ky City from the east. As the 70th MF Battalion crossed Highway 1, towards Tam Ky City suppressive fire was to be employed from Hill 38 and the surrounding area by means of 75mm RR and mortar fire. Elements of the V-12 LF Company were to be deployed in the City to create disturbances and destroy the "Province Hall". From 24 thru 28 February 1969, LZ Fat City and Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDG Camp were subjected to intense mortar and rocket fire. On 28 February, LZ Ross was penetrated by an estimated VC Sapper Squad, identified by PW's as an element of GK-35 Sapper/Recon Battalion, 2d NVA Division. This penetration was not preceded by a mortar barrage which seemed to indicate a change in VC/NVA tactics. During the period of 23 to 28 February 1969, Allied Forces accounted for a total of 434 enemy KIA in the Quang Nam/Quang Tin (P) Area.

(2) From 1 thru 31 March 1969, the most significant enemy activity was concentrated within an area from 4 to 8 km south and west of the Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDG Camp, as elements of the 3d Regiment, 2d NVA Division fought from well prepared defensive positions. In many cases, these positions were constructed of concrete and one base camp was found which contained large concrete tunnel entrances. On 15 and 16 March 1969, in an area 2 km east of the Tien Phuoc USSF/CIDG Camp, elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade discovered 40 graves containing 152 NVA KIA from airstrikes and artillery fire. During the latter part of March, contact in the Tien Phuoc area subsided as the 3d Regiment, 2d NVA Division withdrew to the south after sustaining over 400 KIA. Following the failure of the attack on Tam Ky City in late February 1969, the remaining elements of the units involved in this plan (V-16th LF Sapper Battalion, 72d LF Battalion, 70th MF Battalion, and the V-12th LF Company) retreated to relatively secure areas. This was evidenced by the lack of enemy initiated contact in the Tam Ky area during the month of March 1969. From the period 1 to 31 March 1969, a total of 642 enemy were KiA by Allied forces operating in the Quang Nam/Quang Tin (P) area.

(3) The period in which the least amount of enemy activity occurring was during the first two weeks of April 1969 as enemy units successfully avoided major contact with Allied Forces. Contact was limited to light scattered engagements with LF units as Main Force and NVA units continued their withdrawal from the populated coastal areas. The first half of

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1969 witnessed the move of the 3d Regiment, 2d NVA Division from an area 1 Km south of Base Area 117 to its last known location, approximately 5 km south of New Hau Duc Resettlement Hamlet. Prior to the February 1969 Offensive, the 3d Regiment, 2d NVA Division operated in this general area indicating that the unit was carrying out extensive logistical activities. During the period 11-30 April 1969, small unit contact increased significantly in an area 2-8 km northeast of LZ Baldy as elements of the 1-1 Cav and 196th Infantry Brigade accounted for a total of 108 VC/NVA KIA. A PW captured during this series of engagements identified the F-105th LF Company as one of the units in contact. From 13 thru 25 April 1969, in the eastern edge of Antenna Valley AT 9235) to an area 10 km north of this position, a total of 36 VC/NVA were KIA by elements of the f/17th Cav, 196th Infantry Brigade, and ARVN's. In an area 6 to 11 km south of the Antenna Valley (AT9435), elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade accounted for a total of 22 enemy KiA in scattered contact. This increase of enemy activity in this area together with increased sightings of groups of NVA soldiers in the vicinity lends credence to the fact that elements of the 1st MF Regiment, 2d NVA Division were moving in a southerly direction. Increased reports have indicated that the 21st Regt, 2d NVA Division has moved out of Quang Nam/Quang Tin (P) into Quang Ngai (PP west of Base Area 121 possibly to give the 3d NVA Divisions reinforcements for a march on Quang Ngai City in May 1969.

b. Quang Ngai.

(1) The relatively low level of activity which prevailed through January continued during the first three weeks of February, with incidents being characterized by scattered harassing attacks by firs and moderate contact. Although there were no large contacts during this period, a total of 366 VC/NVA were killed. Sweep operations uncovered 14,700 lbs of rice, 7,650 lbs of grain, 750 lbs of corn, and 250 lbs of salt. In addition, three small base camps were disclosed in the following locations: BS 362 781, BS 357 785, and BS 763 333. Early in the month, the 22d NVA Regiment operated north of the Song Tra Khuc in the area southwest of LZ Buff(Stinson), then moved south to A 121 between 9-15 February. This movement into the base area was for resupply and final training for the coming offensive. The 2d MF Regiment, 3d NVA Division moved up from old BA 124 west of Duc Pho (D) HQ's into the area west of LZ Liz with the 97th Battalion, 2d MF Regiment moving further north to an area 7 km south of Nghia Hanh (D) HQ's, from which it withdrew back into the Song Ve Valley area after operating in the former area. Available intelligence continued to indicate that the main objective during the impending offensive was to be Quang Ngai City and installations around the City.

(2) Early in the morning of 23 February 1969, the enemy launched the first phase of the Winter/Spring Offensive with well-coordinate, almost simultaneous attacks by fire against all major LZ's, District HQ's, and some population centers. There were also enemy initiated ground attacks occurring on the first day, when sapper teams penetrated the perimeters of LZ Gator, LZ Buff, Hill

10, and the Duc Thach Refugee Camp, vic BS 7454. By the second day of the offensive, the 22d Regiment, 3d NVA Division had moved from BA 121.

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to take up attack positions near Quang Ngai City where elements of the 4th ARVN Regiment engaged the Regiment approximately 3 km southwest of the City resulting in 117 NVA KIA. The 22d Regiment HQ's with the 7th and 8th Battalions then pulled back into the southeast corner of BA 121 as the 9th Battalion, 22d Regiment relocated in an area approximately 6 km south southeast of Nghia Hanh (D) HQ's. For the next 7 days, the Regiment effected resupply and regrouping for another offensive push. The 22d Regiment, 3d NVA Division again moved east to take up attack positions around Quang Ngai City, as the Regiment made contact with ARVN troops vic BS 6567 and again withdrew to BA 121. On 12 March 1969, the 7th, 8th, and 9th Battalions, 22d Regiment started moving toward Quang Ngai City for the 3d time, and on 13 March, vic BS 7069, the 9th Battalion, 22d Regiment, 3d NVA Division contacted an AVN unit and again retreated back into BA 121. Scattered contacts with NVA on 7 and 8 Mar 69, approximately 4 km northwest of LZ Bronco, in which 16 VC/NVA were KIA, and another contact with the 2d MF Regiment, on 15 March in the same area, in which 33 NVA were KIA, revealed that the 2d MF Regiment had not moved to aid the 22d Regiment in attacking Quang Ngai City but had remained in the Duc Pho (D) area. During the week ending on 15 March 1969, other NVA, Main Force, and Local Force units moved for form a concentration along the Song Tra Khuc to the west of Quang Ngai City. The units forming this concentration were the 107th AA Battalion, the 120 MF Montagnard Battalion, and the newly formed 526th LF Sapper Battalion. It is felt that the enemy plan was to have these units attack Quang Ngai City from the north and west while the 22d NVA Regiment maneuvered to attack from the south. The 2d MF Regiment remained in the southeastern portion of Quang Ngai (P), applying pressure to Mo Duc and Duc Pho Districts to force a redeployment of Allied troops to protect bases in this area, thus hoping to make Quang Ngai City more vulnerable to attack from the units massed in BA 121 and along the Song Tra Khuc. On 22 March 1969, the 22d Regiment, 3d NVA Division moved in again to take up attack positions 5 km southwest of Quang Ngai City where it received intense artillery and air bombardment in contacts with Allied forces and was given the order to pull back into BA 121. The enemy continued to conduct attacks by fire on Allied installations and LOC interdiction along QL-1 through 28 March 1969, when the second phase of the offensive ended. From 23 February thru 28 March 1969, the enemy expended approximately 1,163 to 1,244 60/82mm mortar rounds, 20 120mm mortar rounds, 67 mixed rocket rounds, and suffered 653 KiA.

(3) Activity in Quang Ngai (P) dropped off considerably since 28 March 1969, characterized by light mortar fire, sporadic contact, and numerous mining and boobytrap incidents. The movement of units has substantiated a withdrawal of major enemy elements for the purpose of rest, resupply, and training in preparation for further offensive actions, as indicated by previous intelligence reports. The 22d NVA Regiment, 3d NVA Division remained in BA 121. On 15 April 1969, a platoon of sappers attacked a warehouse vic BS 623 725 using Bangalore torpedoes, grenades, satchel charges, and B-40 rockets, causing heavy damage to both the warehouse and its contents. A PW from the Quang Ngai City Force identified the unit

participating int the attack as the 506A LF Sapper Company, During the period from 14 to 18 April 1969, 8 scattered attempts were made to blow up bridges along QL-1, with 5 of the bridges receiving heavy to moderate damage. On

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April 1969, contact was initiated vic BS 7040 when a LoH received intense .50 caliber fire and crashed, and infantry was inserted resulting in 22 NVA KIA. Captured documents identified the unit as elements of the 93d Battalion, 2d MF Regiment. It is believed that elements of the Regiment moved into the lower Song Ve Valley following this contact as on 18 and 19 April 1969, vic BS6444, and additional 29 NVA were KIA. From there, the Regiment is thought to have withdrawn to the south to vic BS 6326. During the period from 29 March to 30 April 1969, there was a total of approximately 211 to 321 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire directed against Allied NDP's and installations. There was also a total of 362 VC/NVA KIA in the scattered contacts throughout Quang Ngai (P).

(4) Numerous agent reports have indicated that the period from 1 April to 10 May is the training phase of the current campaign, with NVA and Main Force units conducting training and resupplying while the Local Force units continue to harass Allied troops and installations. Indications are that the next phase of the offensive will start sometime between 10 to 19 May 1969 (19 May being Ho Chi Minhs' birthday).

2. (C) G2 Section: Summary of Significant Activities.

The G2 Section continued its normal intelligence operations for the past quarter. Project "Duffel Bag" continues to develop and expand since its initiation on 14 January 1969. Since that time there has been an average of 7 active sensor strings in the Chu Lai "Rocket Pocket". Plans were completed to cover other critical areas in the Americal TAOI; their execution will be dependent on equipment availability. It is significant to note that the employment of sensors has forced the enemy to take a longer more difficult route to rocket launching areas. The sensors have a unique intelligence collection capability in that the information always remains positive. Additionally, the sensor field allowed economy-of-force operations, releasing troops for deployment in other critical areas. A sensor field, contiguous to the Chu Lai Defense Command perimeter, is being installed and should be completed by next quarter.

3. (u) Military Intelligence Detachment: Summary of Significant Activities.

The MID Sections continued to provide timely and accurate intelligence reports. A noteworthy achievement for this quarter was the organization of the Kit Carson Scouts into a separate section under MID. This has substantially increased the effectiveness of the overall administration for the program.

D. Operations

1. (C) Operations Summary:

a. General: The Americal Division continued combat operations throughout the Tactical Area of Operational Interest (TAOI) during the period 1 February 69 to 30 April 69 with a significant increase noted in the level of contact as a result of the post-TET offensive and operations conducted on the Tien Phuoc - Tam Ky axis. During the reporting period, three named operations were terminated on 282400H February 69: Operations Fayette Canyon, Hardin Falls, and Vernon Lake II. During the reporting period, the Americal Division and 2d ARVN Division AP's were unified, creating one TAOI in which mutually supporting US/ARVN operations are conducted. As part of the boundary reorganization, the Oregon and Duc Pho AO's and the Chu Lai TAOR were discontinued on 18 March 69. Three new named operations encompassing the new Americal/2d ARVN Division TAOI were initiated: Operation Frederick Hill, conducted by the 196th Inf Bde, 1-1 Cav and 5th ARVN Regt is conducted in the northern Operational Zone (OZ); Operations Geneva Park conducted by the 198th Inf and 6th ARVN Regt in the central OZ; and Operation Iron Mountain, conducted by the 11th Inf Bde and 4th Regt in the southern OZ.

b. Major Engagements: During the reporting period, Americal Division forces were engaged in two major large unit contacts with VC/NVA elements vicinity Tien Phuoc SF/CIDG Camp and Tam Ky City. These operations were pre-emptive in nature for they were designed to destroy enemy troop formations and/or staging areas before large-scale attacks could be mounted against population centers.

(1) On 23 February 1969, the Tien Phuoc SF/CIDG Camp received a heavy attack by mortar/rocket fire as the VC/NVA post-TET offensive was initiated. Intelligence reports and the intensity of the attack indicated that large enemy troop formations were located in the area. On 25 February, elements of the 1-52d Inf maneuvered into attack positions SE of Tien Phuoc along the Song Bon Mier (River) in the NW sector of Base Area 117. For the next eight days, 1-52d Inf was in heavy contact with elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions, 3d Regiment, 2d NVA Division who occupied strongly fortified positions and bunker complexes on the high ground. On 6 March, 3-21st Inf maneuvered into position to the NW of the camp to move to the south, thereby attacking the NVA from the rear and interdicting their avenues of escape. On 9 March 69, after sustaining heavy casualties, the 1-52d Inf Battalion became OPCON to the 196th Inf Bde. 1-46th Inf combat air assaulted to LZ Professional and assumed OPCON of B and C Companies, 1-52d Inf. 2-1st Inf moved into positions north of the area occupied by the 1-46th Inf to add combat power to the attack. Systematic attacks

by the 2-1st Inf from the east, 1-46th Inf from the south and west, and 3-21st Inf from the north and west were highly successful. The enemy occupied well dug-in positions with overhead cover and trenches connecting alternate positions. Extensive use was made of tactical air strikes, organic artillery, gunships, and on several occasions, flame throwers. On 16 March 1969, A/3-21st Inf discovered thirty-five enemy mass graves in the vicinity of BT137157 near the Sui Binh An (Stream) containing 140 dead NVA soldiers. Slightly to the north, A Company discovered other graves containing twelve more dead enemy. On 19 March 69, the 1-46th Inf with three companies made a pre-dawn hasty river crossing to seal off the enemy avenues of egress. Initial contact was light but as the units advanced, they were engaged by dug-in NVA from distances of ten meters or less. As critical terrain was gained, the contact became light and it was apparent that enemy forces had evaded in small groups. A complete sweep of the area found many more bodies and weapons. Bunker complexes, base camp and cache areas were discovered and engineer support was required to destroy them. By 22 March 69, contact was reduced to sniper action, and Americal Division forces began to deploy out of the area. As a result of combat operations near the Tien Phuoc SF/CIDG Camp, the fighting effectiveness of two NVA battalions was severely diminished and the threat of them launching an attack against the heavily populated coastal plain was eliminated.

(2) On February 69, in the wake of the post-TET offensive, elements of 1-1 Cav deployed to Tam Ky City as intelligence reports indicated that attacks were to be launched by up to one infantry regiment composed of MF/LF units. Intelligence sources identified the enemy as the 70th MF Bn, the 72d LF Bn, the 74th MF Bn and V-16th LF Sapper Bn. On 23 February 69, following mortar/rocket attacks on Tam Ky City, MF/LF elements attacked Hill 38 (BT282225) overlooking approaches to the city and managed to drive off RF forces occupying the hill. A/1-1 Cav counterattacked and recaptured the hill. ARVN forces, accompanying the Cavalry troops, captured 15 VC and 25 individual weapons and were deployed to secure the hill. On the same day, south of Tam Ky near the municipal air strip, ARVN forces and one platoon from A/1-1 Cav engaged elements of the 70th MF Bn, killing several of the enemy and capturing the battalion commander of the 72d LF Bn. Under interrogation the Bn Commander, Nguyen Tuyen, revealed the enemy's basic plan, which was to capture Hills 38 and 14 overlooking the Tien Phuoc Highway and Tam Ky City. By doing so, they could ambush any allied reinforcements coming from the Tien Phuoc Area and still place supporting fires on Tam Ky City for the 70th MF Bn, which had maneuvered into the vic BT303170 planning to cross the Song Tam Ky moving NE and entering the Provincial Capitol from the SE. Reacting to this intelligence, B/1-1 Cave deployed into Pineapple Forest and conducted

extensive recon in force operations. C/1-1 Cav began intensive search operations south from the airfield targeting suspected enemy troop deployments in this vicinity. On 25 February 69, C Troop engaged an unknown size enemy force vic BT303180, north of the Song Tam Ky (River) and south of the airfield. Contact was made at 1630H and continued for five hours during which time C Troop was reinforced with elements of B Troop and Headquarters Troop. 4/5 ARVN Bn committed troops to the battle to reinforce the cavalry forces who were engaged with an enemy using an extensive trench-line system. At the conclusion of the battle, 157 dead NVA were left on the field and an untold number of weapons. As a result of this engagement, the threat to Tam Ky City was eliminated for a battalion-sized enemy force had been destroyed thereby forcing the enemy to withdraw into the mountainous region to the west.

(3) Both of the above pre-emptive operations were successful in terms of destruction of enemy base camps and staging areas, troop formations, and in denying enemy forces access to population centers along the coastal plain. The heavy casualties inflicted on the VCMF/NVA units blunted the post-TET offensive and prevented this offensive from realizing any of its objectives.

c. Summary of Operations:

(1) Terminated Operations:

(a) Operation Vernon Lake II: Operation Vernon Lake II was continued during February 69 with light contact reported as elements of 4-21 Inf and 3-1st Inf conducted saturation patrols and detailed search operations vicinity the Song Re Valley area (Western Quang Ngai Province, C/M BS4360) targeting the 2d Regt, 3d NVA Division. Air strikes and artillery were utilized to interdict routes of infiltration into the area and to destroy suspected base camps and staging areas. On 5 February 69, C, D/3-1st Inf operating vic BS4567 near the Song Tam Rao (River) found 5 VC killed by artillery, several destroyed huts and a small arms cache containing five individual weapons and some ammunition. Enemy forces tended to avoid contact with Americal forces until 23 February 69. At that time, with the launching of the post-TET offensive, FSB Cork received fifty 60/82mm mortar rounds, RPG rounds and a ground probe resulting in light casualties and damage. On 26 and 27 February 69, CC/3-1st, flying in the vicinity of the Song Tam Rao (River), found 5 VC killed by artillery and 5 more VC killed by machinegun fire from aircraft on a VR. On 28 February 69, Operation Vernon Lake II was terminated having successfully disrupted enemy staging areas in the Song Re Valley. Total results for Operation Vernon Lake II since its inception are as follows:

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<u>Friendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
23 US KIA	303 VC KIA(C)
110 US WIA(E)	152 NVA KIA(C)
48 US WIA(M)	173 DET
	1 PW/VC
	7 PW/NVA
	1 CH/VC
	1 CH/NVA
	57 CIV DEF
	104 IN CIV
	140 IWC
	5 CSWC

(b) Operation Fayette Canyon: Operation Fayette Canyon, conducted in conjunction with USMC Task Force Yankee's Operation Taylor Common, was concluded during February 69. This operation was designed to disrupt enemy base camps and staging areas vicinity the Nui Mat Rang Mountains and Antenna Valley, while USMC elements conducted combat operations on the plains northwest of the area interdicting routes of egress and engaging enemy units evading Americal forces. Americal forces, consisting of a two company Task Force from 2-1st Inf, conducted small unit searches and reconnaissance patrols reporting extremely light contact as enemy forces tended to avoid combat. On 23 February 69, operations in the Fayette Canyon area were suspended as Americal forces were withdrawn to secure population centers and counter enemy attacks on the coastal plain. On February 69, Operation Fayette Canyon was terminated. Results of that operation are as follows:

<u>Friendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
2 US KIA	89 VC KIA(C)
10 US WIA(E)	238 NVA KIA(C)
7 US WIA(M)	39 DET
2 MSF KIA	4 PW/NVA
6 MSF WIA(E)	2 CH/VC
	1 CH/NVA
	7 CIV DEF
	44 IN CIV
	56 IWC
	14 CSWC

(c) Operation Hardin Falls: Operation Hardin Falls, conducted by 1-1 Cav and GVN forces, was continued during February 69 in Thang Binh District (C/M BT1944). This operation was designed as a pacification operation with the mission of destroying local VC forces, rebuilding war damaged hamlets and villages, and maintaining the safety of the

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indigenous population while GVN authority was reestablished. 1-1 Cav, operating with RF and PF elements, had set-up FSB Fiddlers Green as a strong point from which to operate. As pacification proceeded rapidly, on 6 February 69, Fiddlers Green was turned over to GVN authorities and 1-1 Cav continued its mobile patrols. Under the protection of the Americal/Vietnamese forces, Revolutionary Development (RD) teams worked with the local people constructing homes, schools and roads. National Police Field Forces (NPFF) were used to continue the identification and elimination of VCI. Self government and the appointment of GVN officials proceeded rapidly. Contacts with enemy elements remained extremely light, even during the post-TET offensive. On 28 February 69, having successfully accomplished its mission, Operation Hardin Falls was terminated. Results of the operation since its beginning are as follows:

<u>Friendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
1 US KIA	78 VC KIA(C)
13 US WIA(E)	17 DET
1 US WIA(M)	2 CH/VC
	11 CIV DEF
	5 IN CIV
	6 IWC

(2) Continuing Operations:

(a) Operation Russell Beach: Operation Russell Beach, initiated on 13 January 69, continued throughout the reporting period. The cordon, manned by elements of 5-46th Inf, A/1-1 Cav, USMC BLT/26 and 2/6 ARVN Bn, continued its systematic search pattern until 6 February 69. As a result of the cordon operation, numerous trenchlines, bunker complexes, caches, and tunnel networks were uncovered and destroyed. A total of 11,960 people were evacuated from the Batangan Peninsula to the CHIC (Combined Holding and Interrogation Center), north of Quang Ngai City. On 9 February 69, Phase IV of the operation was initiated with the introduction of CAP teams (USMC) and the building of new roads and hamlets. After a careful screening of the population at the CHIC to eliminate VCI elements, the population was moved back onto the Batangan Peninsula. Elements of 5-46th Inf conducted security operations designed to secure the people from VC threats and prevent the reintroduction of VCLF units in the area. On 15 April 69, elements of the GVN began to be introduced to the area. Phase IV of Operation Russell Beach is continued to maintain an allied presence in the area and to provide security for the newly established hamlets and villages. Results of this operation are as follows:

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<u>Friendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
20 US KIA	148 VC KIA(C)
137 US WIA(E)	105 DET
13 US WIA(M)	2 PW/VC
25 USMC KIA	1 CH/NVA
77 USMC WIA(E)	30 CIV DEF
1 USMC WIA(M)	61 IN CIV
	54 IWC
	6 SCWC

(3) Operation by AO:

(a) Oregon AO: Americal Division Forces conducted combat operations in the Oregon AO from 1 February 69 to 18 March 69. During the first twenty days of the period, contact remained light and the Americal Division began a redeployment of forces in anticipation of another TET offensive. 1-1 Cav was designated as a reaction force for Tam Ky and Quang Ngai Cities in the event of enemy attacks, and selected elements of the 196th Inf Bde adopted a rapid deployment posture to reinforce areas threatened by heavy attack. On 23 February 69, the anticipated offensive was launched as a series of well coordinated attacks by mortar/rocket fire were launched against US/ARVN military installations and GVN population centers. LZ Baldy received 20 rounds of B-40 rocket and 32 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 2 US KIA, 7 US WIA(E) and 12 US WIA(M). LZ Professional received mortar fire and ground probes resulting in 1 US WIA(E) and 7 VC KIA(C). Other firebases and installations received mortar/rocket fire with light damage and casualties. Enemy initiated ground attacks were ill-coordinated and were turned back without achieving any success. As a result of this offensive and attacks against Tam Ky and Tien Phuoc SF/CIDG Camp, Americal Division Forces were committed in these areas and engaged enemy forces in two heavy battles (Ref Para D. 1b above). On 18 March 69, as part of a realignment of forces and redrawing of boundaries, the Oregon AO was terminated and its area incorporated into the operational zone of Operation Frederick Hill. Results of Operations in the Oregon AO during the period are as follows:

<u>Friendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
66 US KIA	617 VC KIA(C)
407 US WIA	445 NVA KIA(C)
	7 PW/VC
	4 PW/NVA
	171 IWC
	13 CSWC

(b) Chu Lai TAOR: Americal Division forces conducted combat operations in the Chu Lai TAOR from 1 February 69 to 18 March 69 reporting light contact with enemy forces. 1-6th Inf operated in the northern and central sectors of the TAOR securing lines of communications and bridge sites supporting Ly Tin District Headquarters, and conducted small unit patrols and ambushes to interdict mortar/rocket attacks by elements of the 78th VCMF (Rocket) Bn against Chu Lai Base. Starting on 23 February 69, with the commencement of the post-TET offensive and lasting for approximately one month, Chu Lai received eleven attacks by indirect fire. Only the attack on 23 March 69, when 6 A-4 fighters were destroyed, resulted in any major damage to the base and airfield. Operations by 1-6th Inf were credited with minimizing the effects of the attacks for constant patrolling, supported by elements of F Troop 8th Cav, forced enemy elements to operate from hastily prepared positions and precluded any exploitation of the attacks by enemy forces. In the southern Chu Lai TAOR, 4-21st Inf with elements of the 6th ARVN Regt conducted a pre-emptive operation in the Horseshoe (area north of the Song Tra Khuc River C/M BS2076) to deny 81st VCLF Battalion elements the use of the area as a base from which to launch attacks against Quang Ngai City. Beginning at the end of January 69, a series of coordinated combat patrols were conducted by the Americal/2d ARVN Division Task Force: 4-21st Inf, conducting reconnaissance in force and detailed search operations, swept from the north towards blocking positions held by 6th ARVN Regt forces. On 5 February 69, 4-21 Inf, supported by C/1 82d Arty, engaged and killed 26 VC operating north of the ARVN blocking positions. On 11 February 69, operations were terminated having removed the immediate danger of an attack on Quang Ngai. Contacts in the Chu Lai TAOR remained light during and after the post-TET offensive as enemy forces tended to limit their activities to attacks by indirect fire on US/FVN/ARVN installations. On 18 March 69, operations were concluded in the Chu Lai TAOR and its area incorporated into Operation Geneva Park. Results of operations in the Chu Lai TAOR for the reporting period areas follows:

Friendly
38 US KIA
220 US WIA

Enemy
289 VC KIA(C)
18 DET
78 IWC
31 CSWC

(c) Duc Pho AO: Americal Division forces conducted combat operations in the Duc Pho AO from 1 February 69 to 18 March 69 with emphasis placed on securing the heavily populated coastal plains using saturation patrolling and pre-emptive combat assaults into suspected VCMF/VCLF staging areas. Contact with enemy forces remained light during the

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first part of February as enemy forces tended to avoid contact. On 23 February 69, the post-TET offensive was launched with Quang Ngai, Mo Duc, and Americal Fire Support Bases receiving heavy mortar/rocket attacks. Damage resulting from these attacks were light on Americal fire bases and ground probes were quickly turned back. On 26 February 69, C, D/4-21st Inf and recon plat were deployed southwest of Quang Ngai City (vic BS5662) to conduct joint operations with ARVN elements interdicting approach routes to the city from Base Area 121. Enemy elements were encountered in a series of small unit engagements and prevented from approaching the city. From 4 March to 16 March 69, two large-scale pre-emptive operations targeting the 93d and 95th VCMF Battalions were conducted. Elements of 3-st Inf and 1-20th Inf, in conjunction with 6th ARVN Regt forces and 4th ARVN forces, conducted a series of detailed search operations and combat patrols along the coastland east of Mo Duc to locate and destroy elements of the 93d VCMF Battalion suspected of having infiltrated the area to utilize it as a base of operations for attacks on population centers. A series of sharp small unit contacts was fought resulting in over 50 VCMF killed and the destruction of fighting positions and supply areas. At the same time, 4-21st Inf launched a series of coordinated attacks against the 95th VCMF Battalion operating in the foothills of the Nui Tam Cap Mts. Small unit combat patrols were utilized to interdict routes of egress from the mountains to the coastal plain. Air strikes and artillery provided strong support for Americal ground troops and aided in the destruction of base camp areas and fighting positions. Contact was light throughout the operations as enemy forces tended to avoid engagement and withdrew back into the mountains. On 16 March 69, operations in the Duc Pho AO were terminated and its territory incorporated into the Iron Mountain OZ. Results of the operations in the Duc Pho AO during the reporting period are as follows:

Friendly
36 US KIA
264 US WIA

Enemy
305 VC KIA(C)
95 NVA KIA(C)
2 PW/VC
49 IWC
11 CSWC

(4)

(a) Operation Frederick Hill: On 18 March 69, Operation Frederick Hill was initiated by the 196th Inf Bde, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav and the 5th ARVN Regt in the northern sector of the Americal/2d ARVN Div AO. This operation was designed to secure population centers along the coastal plain and to conduct combat operations in the highlands to close with

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and destroy enemy troop concentrations, suspected base camps and routes of infiltration. Contact on the coastal plain remained at a low level as 1-1 Cav and ARVN elements continued area reconnaissance operations and detailed search operations in suspected enemy staging areas, notably Pineapple Forest and Barrier Island. Operating in the Mountainous region to the west, 196th Inf Bde and elements of the 5th ARVN Regt conducted two pre-emptive operations. The first operation was launched on 8 April 69, when a three battalion task force (2 US and 1 ARVN Bn) plus F Troop 17th Cav began combat operations designed to neutralize Antenna Valley and its surrounding mountain ranges and destroy troop formations of the 1st VCMF Regt. 1-52d Inf launched a series of coordinated attacks and began a steady maneuver to the south through the Nui Mat Rang Mountains. 4-31st Inf, operating south of Antenna Valley in the Nui Chom Mountains, began detailed search operations maneuvering north towards the Valley. F Troop 17th Cav, with 4/5 ARVN Bn, was deployed into the valley to conduct search operations in the valley itself and block routes of egress. Contact with the enemy forces was light as they tended to avoid combat. Small base camps and aid stations were uncovered and destroyed. On 21 April 69, operations in the vicinity of Antenna Valley were ended. On 25 April 69, 1-46th Inf with 2 companies from 4/5 ARVN Bn launched a three-pronged attack against the 3d Regt, 2d NVA Bn in the southern portion of Base Area 117. Two Americal Companies with one ARVN Company maneuvered southeast of the Song Tram River, one Americal Company with a recon platoon maneuvered south through the B Su Mountains along the 15' NS gridline; and one Americal Company and one ARVN Company maneuvered south along the 22' NS gridline through the Ba Su Mountains. Initial contact remained light and caches were uncovered in the course of detailed search operations. This operation, it is planned, will continue into May 69. Results of combat operations in the Frederick Hill OZ were as follows:

<u>Friendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
56 US KIA	564 VC KIA(C)
326 US WIA(E)	168 NVA KIA(C)
87 US WIA(M)	239 DET
	2 PW/VC
	1 PW/NVA
	3 CH/VC
	49 DIV DEF
	205 IN CIV
	108 IWC
	12 CSWC

(b) Operation Geneva Park: Operation Geneva Park, conducted by the 198th Inf Bde and 6th ARVN Regt, was initiated on 18 March 69 in the central

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sector of the Americal/2d ARVN AO to secure major lines of communication and locate and destroy enemy forces attempting to attack Quang Ngai and/or the Chu Lai Base complex. 1-6th Inf Bn was utilized for security missions in the rocket belt vicinity Chu Lai Base, targeting elements of the 409th and 78th VCMF Rocket Bns. Extensive small unit patrols and ambushes were utilized with a concentrated H & I (Harassing and Interdiction) program of pre-planned artillery strikes. Lines of communication were secured by roving patrols and mine sweep teams continued to operate to prevent interdiction of major highways. In the southern portion of the Operation Geneva Park OZ, 4-3d Inf, in conjunction with 2/6 and 1/6 ARVN Bns, conducted a pre-emptive operation from 4 April to 10 April 69, targeting suspected elements of the 81st VCLF Bn operating north of the Song Tra Khuc River. Operations began with combat air assaults by 4-3d Inf into the Horseshoe (C/M BS6376) where they joined with elements of the 2/6 ARVN Bn, operating on parallel axis, the combined Americal/ARVN force maneuvered west to the Nui Ne Mountains (C/M BS8079), reporting light contact as enemy forces avoided contact and evaded to the west. A second pre-emptive operation was conducted on the western Batangan Peninsula from 11 April 69 to 18 April 69 targeting elements of the 48th VCLF Bn suspected of attempting to infiltrate into the Russell Beach Area. B Co and recon plat/5-46th Inf combat air assaulted to vic BS6985 and BS7082 blocking the two major avenues of approach into the Batangan Peninsula proper. Elements of 1/5 and 2/6 ARVN maneuvered north from the Song Tra Khuc River towards the Americal positions. In two sharp small unit engagements, over 15 VC were killed and the threat to the pacification operations destroyed as the VC evaded from the area. For the remainder of the period, contact with enemy forces remained light as enemy forces avoided engagement with Americal troops. Results of combat operations in Operation Geneva Park during the period are as follows:

<u>Friendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
13 US KIA	159 VC KIA(C)
97 US WIA(E)	1 NVA KIA(C)
	100 DET
	1 PW/VC
	22 CIV DEF
	86 IN CIV
	17 IWC

(c) Operation Iron Mountain: Operation Iron Mountain, conducted by the 11th Bde and 4th ARVN Regt, was initiated and 18 March 69 in the southern sector of the Americal/2d ARVN Div AO and is designed to secure population centers along the coastal plain and to close with and destroy VCMF/VCLF forces and the 2d NVA Div operating in the

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western mountains. In order to accomplish this mission, the 11th Inf Bde and the 4th ARVN Regt conducted three large-scale pre-emptive operations designed to destroy enemy forces in suspected base areas before attacks against population centers could be launched. From 22 to 29 March 69, when the first operation was conducted, 4-21st Inf and A/1-1 Cav were engaged in maneuvers to protect Quang Ngai City from enemy assault. Two companies of the 4-21st Infantry combat air assaulted into Base Area 121, set up LZ Pepper (BS492725) and conducted reconnaissance in force operations to the east from Pepper to interdict infiltration routes to the coastal plain. A/1-1 Cav, with the remaining elements of 4-21st Inf conducted intensive search operations west and south of the city. Air Strikes and artillery fires were used to support the search operations and to break-up enemy troop formations. On 23 March 69, C/3-18th Arty vicinity of BS6061, near Nghia Hanh, engaged an estimated company sized force killing fifteen of the enemy and disrupting any attempts to maneuver north. On 24 March 69, A/1-1 Cav engaged an UNSEF vicinity BS636715 in a cane field south of Quang Ngai near the Song Bau Giang (River) and defeated an estimated battalion sized force. With the threat of enemy attack diminished for the present, operations were concluded on 29 March 69. From 30 March to 4 April 69, a second preemptive operation was conducted by 3-1st Inf with 4/4 and 3/4 ARVN Battalions moving to the plains northeast of Duc Pho targeting suspected elements of the 22d NVA Regiment and 97th VCMF Battalion who were thought to be massing for attacks on Mo Duc and Duc Pho. On 29 March 69, in a day long battle supported by gunships, TAC air and organic artillery, C/3-1st and D/3-1st Inf made heavy contact with an UNSEF northwest of Duc Pho vic BS8204 killing 11 NVA. Enemy forces withdrew from the area and contact lightened as Americal troops concluded operations by eradicating rudimentary enemy fighting positions. On 10 April 69, 4-21 Inf combat air-assaulted into the Song Ve Valley to conduct pre-emptive operations designed to destroy suspected enemy base camps and staging areas in the vicinity. Systematic searches conducted in the area resulted in the destruction of several small NVA/VCMF base camps. Extensive bombing strikes were used to support ground action. On 18 April 69, R/4-21st Inf vic BS3837 in the southeastern portion of the valley, engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 27 NVA. Scattered light contact continued until 21 April 69, when 4-21st Inf having carefully searched the Valley, concluded operations and maneuvered into the Nui Hoat mountains to continue searches and attacks on suspected enemy strongholds. At the end of April 69, 4-3d Inf moved into position south of the Song Ve Valley and initiated combat operations supporting 4-21st Inf operations to the northeast. Results of operations supporting 4-21st Inf operations to the northeast. Results of operations in Operation Iron Mountain during the period were as follows:

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<u>Friendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
33 US KIA	161 VC KIA(C)
179 US WIA(E)	141 NVA KIA(c)
51 US WIA(M)	230 DET
	1 PW/VC
	1 PW/NVA
	1 CH/VC
	69 CIV DEF
	130 IN CIV
	61 IWC
	4 CSWC

2. (U) Plans

a. The following plans, operation orders, and frag orders were in effect or initiated during the reporting period.

(1) OPCORD 1-69 (Russell Beach-MO DUC), 1-69A (Russell Beach-BATANGAN) were in effect. OPORD 2-69 (Contamination of Enemy LOC's), and 3-69 (Realignment of Division Forces/Boundaries) with change 1-4, were published and implemented during the period.

(2) OPLAN 3-68 (Non Combatant Emergency Relocation/Evacuation), 4-68 (Natural Disaster Relief), and 5-68 (Golden Valley), and 6-68 (Golden Valley Rehearsals), continued on a contingency basis. OPLAN 1-69 (Contamination of Enemy LOC's) was implemented as OPORD 2-69 effective 10 January 1969. OPLAN 3-69 (Troy), 5-6 (Short Title: R01MD), and 7-69 (Pierce Valley) were published and distributed during the period.

(3) There are no 1968 Fragmentary Orders in effect.

(4) Numerous Fragmentary Orders and Planning Directives have been published and have bearing on the operations listed in paragraph D.1.

3. (C) Movement:

a. At the beginning of the reporting period, Americal units were conducting combat operations as follows:

(1) 196th Inf Bde with 1-46th Inf, 3-21st Inf, 4-31st Inf and 2-1st Inf (-) conducted combat operations in the Oregon AO; 2 Co's 2-1st Inf continued operations in Operation Fayette Canyon.

(2) Task Force Cooksey conducted combat operations in the Chu Lai TAOR with 1-6th Inf and 1-52d Inf and continued Operation Russell Beach

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with A/1-1 Cav, USMC BLT/26, 5,46th Inf and 4-3d Inf.

(3) 1-1 Cav (-) conducted combat operations in the Oregon AO.

(4) 11th Inf Bde conducted combat operations in the Duc Pho AO with 1-20th Inf and 3-1st Inf; and continued Operation Vernon Lake II with 4-21st Inf.

b. Major movements of units during the reporting period were as follows:

(1) On 4 February 69, A/1-1 Cav was relieved OPCON Task Force Cooksey and returned to Hawk Hill.

(2) On 6 February 69, USMC BLT/26 was relieved OPCON Task Force Cooksey and returned to Da Nang.

(3) On 8 February 69, Task Force Cooksey was terminated and its assets reverted to 198th Inf Bde.

(4) On 23 February 69, the two company task force from 2-1st Inf was moved out of Operation Fayette Canyon when that operation was suspended.

(5) On 9 March 69, 1-52d Inf became OPCON to the 196th Inf Bde and conducted operations vicinity Tien Phuoc and, later, LZ Baldy.

(6) On 25 March 69, A/1-1 Cav became OPCON to the 11th Inf Bde and conducted operations vicinity of Quang Ngai City on 28 March 69, A/1-1 Cav was relieved OPCON 11th Inf Bde and returned to Hawk Hill.

(7) On 20 April 69, 1-52d Inf was relieved OPCON 198th Inf Bde and air moved to Operation Iron Mountain, returning to the control of the 11th Inf Bde.

4. (U) Organization:

a. During the reporting period the Americal Division reorganized under the ROAD concept. This reorganization was accomplished in three phases.

(1) Phase I. (15 Dec to 15 Feb 69) Planning and preparation for reorganization.

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e. A copy of the current troop list is attached as Inclosure 1.

5. (U) Training:

a. The Americal Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all assigned and attached individuals, through the grades of O-3, in the division. During the reporting period, 80 courses were completed and 3,964 personnel completed training.

b. 288 junior leaders completed the training conducted in the Americal Combat Leadership Course.

c. 45 personnel completed the Unit Reconnaissance Course training.

d. The following training was presented to students of the Combat Leadership Course by personnel of the 2d ARVN Division.

(1) Structure of the RVN Government, Province level and below.

(2) Structure of the RVN Military Forces.

e. The Combat Leadership Course conducted by the Combat Center was expanded during this reporting period. The course is now conducted four times quarterly for Combat units, and once quarterly for Combat Supprt units. The quota allocations have been increased to one per company. The present awards system continues in effect. The first three men in each class receive a promotion to the next higher grade, a plaque, and a Certificate of Completion to be placed in their 201 file.

f. A combat Leadership and Orientation Course for RF/PF junior officers is being established at the Americal Combat Center. This Course will be approximately two weeks in duration. The Program of Instruction consists of 96 hours of classroom instruction and practical work on subjects to be selected by the Combat Center and RF/PF officers and advisors. Of this instruction, 56 hours will be taught by Combat Center instructors and 40 hours by Vietnamese instructors. In addition to the instruction, two days will be programmed with orientation visits to combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

g. The Division is in the process of instituting a Sniper Training School to be conducted by the Americal Combat Center. Personnel of this Division selected to be school instructors will attend the Sniper School conducted by the 9th Infantry Division. Purpose of this school is to train qualified snipers for each Infantry company and to further enhance operations within the Division.

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Skipping pages of unit movements to Page 30

(2) Phase II (16 Feb to 2 April 69) Active reorganization phase.
(3) Phase III. (3 April to 3 May 69) Final review and adjustment phase.

b. Upon receipt of USARPAC GO 113, 10 February 1969, the following units were inactivated and assets transferred as indicated:

(1) 6th, 8th, and 9th Support Battalions of the Separate Infantry Brigades.

(a) Medical Companies of the Support Battalions were transferred to the 23d Medical Battalion.

(b) Supply Platoons of the Maintenance and Supply Companies were transferred to the 23d S&T Battalion.

(c) Maintenance and Parts Platoons and Company Headquarters of Maintenance and Supply Companies were transferred to the 723rd Maintenance Battalion to form three Forward Support Companies.

(2) The 11th, 49th, and 156th Signal Center Platoons were transferred to the 523d Signal Battalion and became the Forward Area Signal Center Platoons of that unit.

(3) The 406th TC Detachment and the 449th Signal Detachment became elements of the Transportation Maintenance Co of the 723d Maintenance Battalion.

(4) The 258th Personnel Services Company assets were transferred to the 23d Administration Company.

c. Infantry Battalions and Direct Support Artillery Battalions were reassigned from Separate Brigades to the Americal Division as required by the ROAD concept.

d. The following units were activated:

(1) Three Medical Companies in the 23d Medical Battalion.

(2) Three Forward Support Companies and a Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company in the 723d Maintenance Battalion (E Co).

(3) A forward Communications Company in the 523d Signal Battalion.

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6. (C) Close Air Support:

a. During the period 1 Feb 69, through 30 Apr 69, the Americal Division employed 2355 CAS and CSS missions, utilizing 3448 aircraft sorties. The increase over the 1909 mission and 3256 sorties for the previous quarter was principally attributed to the increased need for Close Air Support prompted by the post-TET offensive by Communist forces.

(1) CSS Missions: Combat Skyspots (CSS) missions were increased considerably in the Rocket Belt surrounding Chu Lai due to stepped-up rocket activity beginning in the latter part of February. Total missions flown during the period were 973 utilizing 794 aircraft sorties as compared to 626 missions and 716 sorties during the last reporting period. Skyspot effectiveness was enhanced by increased use of the A6 Aircraft, whose bigger payload provides several missions in one aircraft sortie. The USAF flew 36 missions utilizing 45 aircraft sorties, while the USMC flew 937 missions utilizing 749 aircraft sorties.

(2) Forward Air Controlled (FAC) CAS MIssions: A total of 1382 FAC Close Air Support (CAS) mission utilizing 2654 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the division, an increase over the previous quarters total of 1283 missions, and 2540 sorties. This increase was due primarily to the increased availability of immediate/divert aircraft to support ground forces in contact. The USAF flew 6 preplanned and 285 immediate/divert missions utilizing a total of 610 aircraft sorties, and the USMC flew 620 preplanned and 471 immediate/diverts, utilizing a total of 2044 aircraft sorties.

(3) Ordnance Expended: Total Ordnance expended by Close Air Support during the period was 6050 tons of bombs, 693 tons of napalm and 9396 rockets.

b. Arc Light Strikes were displaced over 13 different selected target boxes with a total of 1872 tons of bombs dropped. Arc Light Strikes disrupted VC/NVA offensives while still in the planning and staging phases, thus spoiling expected attacks against Americal Division units and coastal population centers.

c. Forward Air Controllers made the following bomb damage assessment (BDA) during the reporting period: 1342 structures destroyed, 738 bunkers destroyed, 136 weapons positions destroyed, 12 tunnels destroyed, 238 secondary explosions, 692 secondary fires, and 184 enemy killed by air strikes (KBAS). Damage observed was 50% greater than that of the previous quarter.

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7. Artillery - A separate ORLL for Division Artillery is submitted on the 15 of the month.

8. Aviation - A separate ORLL for Aviation (16th Combat Aviation Group) is submitted on the 15 of the month.

9. (C) Chemical:

a. On 10 Feb 69, OPLAN 1-69 was put into effect. The purpose of the plan was to slow the advance of NVA forces into the Tien Phuoc area and canalize them through two killing zones through the use of persistent CS. The Division Chemical Section and the three Brigade Chemical Detachments dropped 738 drums of persistent CS on 31 targets along the lines of communication to the south and west of the Tien Phuoc Valley. Two routes were left open and killing zones established along these routes.

b. On 9 March 69, the 3-21st Inf Bn was in heavy contact with well fortified NVA forces east of Tien Phuoc. On 10 Mar 69, the 27th Cml Det dropped 70 E-158 Tactical CS Cluster Bombs on the enemy position. This was immediately followed by artillery fire and air strikes. When the 3-21st Inf Bn moved into the enemy position, they found a very well fortified position and 12 NVA bodies. On 16 Mar 69, 35 graves with 140 NVA bodies, killed by artillery and air strike about a week prior, were just west of this enemy position.

c. During the period 14 Mar - 29 Apr 69, the 87th Cml Det Contaminated 14 suspected rocket launching sites and one enemy Op in the "Rocket Pocket" west of Chu Lai, with persistent CS.

d. On 26 Mar 69, the Division Chemical Section, the 87th Chemical Detachment, and the 90th Chemical Detachment, under control of the Division Chemical Officer, dropped 496 drums of persistent RCA CS on an area east of LZ Snoopy. Up to this time, LZ Snoopy has been receiving daily mortar attacks from this area, and the purpose of the drop was to contaminate the area to the extent that it would be extremely difficult for enemy forces to operate in the area. Mortar fire from this area ceased.

e. During the period 15 Apr - 18 Apr 69, the 27th Chemical Detachment defoliated a large area in the 2d ROK Marine Brigade AO using the AGEVENCO helicopter borne spray apparatus. Throughout the operation, the aircraft, which was supported by two gunships, received sporadic sniper fire and on 18 April 69, the spray apparatus was put out of commission and the helicopter damaged by a command det mine.

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f. During the period 1 Feb - 30 Apr 69, the Division Chemical Section, the 27th Chemical Detachment, the 87th Chemical Detachment and the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the following chemical activities:

(1) 2,888 drums of persistent CS were dropped for terrain contamination.

(2) 349 E-158 Tactical CS Cluster Bombs were employed.

(3) 48 Airborne Personnel Detector missions were run.

(4) Approximately 3,050 acres were defoliated using 12,220 gallons of defoliant.

10. (U) Engineer:

a. Activities for the quarter (Feb 69-Apr 69) consisted of organic engineers devoting primary effort to direct combat support of the Americal Division, while non divisional engineer units continued to commit 70 to 75 per cent total effort to the improvement of Lines of Communication (LOC).

b. QL-1 continues to receive priority horizontal effort in the Americal TAOI, with four engineer battalions committed to the route. September 1969 is the projected completion date for upgrading QL-1, to include complete paving in the Division AO. Engineer Battalion disposition within the TAOI remains essentially the same as last reporting period.

(1) 19th Engineer Battalion (Combat): Augmented with the 137th Light Equipment Co. (LE) the 73d Const Spt Co.: I/II Corps boundary to BS740525.

(2) 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) augmented with the 630th Light Equipment Co (LE) and the 511th Engineer Co (Panel Bridge), minus one bridge platoon: (GS Americal Division) BS 740525 to BT 520044 (Chu Lai Main Gate).

(3) 9th Engineer Battalion (USMC): BT 520044 to northern boundary Americal TAOI.

(4) 104th Engineer Battalion (ARVN): Provides occasional assistance to the 9th and 39th Engineer Battalions for LOC improvement.

(5) RMK/BRJ Contractors: QL-1 upgrade and paving from BT 520044 to BS 644733.

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(6) MCB 58: QL-1 maintenance from BT 520044 to BINH SON.

c. Engineer operations in the TAOI consisted generally of the following:

(1) The 19th Engineer Battalion (Combat) continued to devote maximum effort to mine sweeping, upgrading and maintaining QL-1 as defined in Para 10a(1) above. The remainder of the Battalion relocated into the Americal TAOI during April 1969. Their disposition is as follows:

(a) HHC, B CO, and D CO; LZ DEBBIE.

(b) A CO and 137th Engineer Company (LE); LZ MAX

(c) C CO and 73d Engineer Company (CS); LZ LOW BOY

(d) Prior to April 1969, HHC and B CO were located at LZ ENGLISH North, in II Corps. Construction support is provided by the 73d Const Spt CO operating its asphalt crusher section at LZ LOW BOY and by the 137th LE CO located at LZ MAX. The 19th Engineer Battalion OZ has been characterized by extremely heavy enemy action thru LOC interdictions as well as ambushes and sniping during the reporting period.

(2) The 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) utilized one combat engineer line company to minesweep QL-1 between Chu Lai and BS 638774 and maintain the section of QL-1 between BS 596927 and BS 638774. Two combat engineer line companies plus their construction support augmentation were employed to minesweep, maintain and upgrade (less paving) QL-1 between BS 650717 and BS 740525. Estimated date of completion for the upgrade is 30 June 69.

(a) On 28 Feb 69, D CO, was relieved of their mission on HL 535, and relocated to Chu Lai. After a week standdown, the company constructed LZ GOLDIE as a base of operations for the upgrade of QL-1 south of Quang Ngai. By mid March 69, CO D, the 639th LE CO, the HQ and one Platoon of the 511th Panel Bridge CO and a crusher section were established and operating from LZ.

(b) At the end of the reporting period, the 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat) was disposed generally as follows: HHC and CO A, Chu Lai, CO B, LZ DOTTIE; CO C, LZ SNOOPY; CO D and construction augmentation units at LZ GOLDIE.

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(3) The 9th Engineer Battalion (USMC) continued work on upgrade of QL-1 to include paving, from the Chu Lai Main Gate to the Song Ba Ren. On 14 Mar 69, paving was completed between Tam Ky and Chu Lai; EDC for the remainder of the road is 30 Sep 69.

(a) Their disposition at the end of the reporting period included the HQ Co, Service Co, and on plus line Co's at Chu Lai. (Two platoons of C Co returned to Chu Lai from Da Nang in late April 69. C Co had been sent to Da Nang on 20 Jan 69 to accomplish urgent vertical construction for II MAF.)

(b) A Co, 9th Engineer Battalion, remained at Hill 10 (1 platoon at Hawk Hill) and D Co remained at LZ BALDY.

(4) The 104th Engineer Battalion (ARVN) supported LOC improvement by committing effort on QL-1 near Tam Ky and Quang Ngai, by assisting US Engineer units with various tasks. The upgrade of HL 533 by the 104th Engineer units with various tasks. The upgrade of HL 533 by the 104th Engr Bn is progressing slowly; approximately 8 KM have been completed. The 104th Engineer Battalion did provide total engineer support to three convoys from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc during the reporting period and did a very effective job.

(5) RMK/BRJ Contractors are currently upgrading, to include paving between Chu Lai and Quang Ngai. (The equivalent of two Combat Engineer Co's are committed to the project.) Paving has been completed to BS 625850 and their EDC for threat section is 31 July 69. RMK/BRJ is currently scheduled to pave QL-1 from Quang Ngai south to Mo Duc. (The portion of the road being upgraded, less paving, by the 39th Engineer Battalion.

(6) MCB 58 attached with maintenance of QL-1 between Chu Lai and Binh Son, to include permanent repairs to the Binh Son Bridge.

(6) MCB 58 attached with maintenance of QL-1 between Chu Lai and Binh Son, to include permanent repairs to the Binh Son Bridge.

(7) The 26th Engineer Battalion (Combat) conducted more separate operations during this quarter than any preceding reporting period. Significant examples are:

(a) Tra Bong Road I: The battalion was tasked to move Battery A, 3/18th Arty into Tra Bong (vicinity BT 345884). The Tra Bong road, long in disuse and heavily interdicted by the enemy, required placement of culverts and tactical bridging. The weather deteriorated during the period into a severe monsoon storm, with continuous heavy rains. The road opening was conducted in two concurrent phases. Airmobile equipment from the Equipment Platoon, HHC, 26th Engineer Battalion was lifted into Tra Bong to work eastward to meet the engineer force from B

Co moving westward from QL-1. During the operation, an APC with mine roller attachment which was being field tested, was destroyed by a mine. (Evaluation report on the mine roller, (Ensure 202) was forwarded to HA Americal Division on 24 Jan 69, the report was forwarded to USARV. Co B sustained three KIA and thirteen WIA from mines, and attacks on their Night Defensive positions (mortars, RPG's, and Small Arms). An engineer element from Co D remained at Tra Bong to construct gun pads, emplacements, bunkers and roads for the Artillery. Inclusive dates for the road opening operation were 2 -11 Jan 69.

(b) Operation Russell Beach: Co B, 26th Engineer Battalion deployed two platoons on 13 January 1969 in support of Phase I of the operation. On platoon supported the Infantry with demolition and mine sweep teams. The other platoon remained in reserve and in support of fire base LZ SOUTH and opening of LZ MINUTEMAN on 6 February 1969. Co B destroyed 11,500 meters of tunnels during this phase of the operation. Casualties totaled three KIAs and four WIA (Clearing Land Mines). On 2 March 69 land clearing operations commenced in the Russell Beach Area (Batangan Peninsula) in support of the 1969 Pacification Program. Two D5 dozers were airlifted to the Cape on 2 Mar 69 and Co B again moved elements into LZ MINUTEMAN to support the operation, including construction of 4 1/2 KM of roads. On 5 March 1969, two D7 dozers and one CEV (C Co) were landed by LCU on the BATANGAN Cape to relieve the small D5's. Clearing of 855,000 sq yds for resettlement of refugees was completed on 19 March 69. Casualties as a result of a bouncing mine during this phase were three KIA. At the completion of the clearing, the Battalion was directed to open HL 522 from LZ MINUTEMAN west to QL-1 to provide overland access to the resettlement areas. The road work commenced on 22 March 69 but was delayed until 27 March 69 due to insufficient security forces. The road was completed on 30 March 69. The CEV (C Co) struck a mine on the last day, destroying the dozer blade beyond use, and wounding (Minor) the driver. Casualties totaled three WIA for this phase, two of which were due to a claymore mine on 23 March 69. Operations conducted by the Battalion in the Russell Beach OZ/Batangan Peninsula spanned a period of 2 1/2 months. Casualties totaled six KIA and seven WIA. Confirmed enemy kills credited to the Battalion were seven VC KIA. Three were taken by small arms fire by Co B, and four were credited to the 165mm demolition gun on the C Co CEV.

(c) Hiep Duc Road: On 11 March 69, in conjunction with the 1969 Pacification Program, the battalion commenced opening the route from LZ ROSS south to Route HL 534 and thence west to Hiep Duc. The operation progressed smoothly, terminating on 13 March 69. No enemy activity occurred. On 28 March 69, the road was sept to pass the first VN supply convoy. Two platoons of Co D were attached to Co A for the sweep.

Final road sweep during the reporting period was conducted 28 April 1969 (again two platoons from Co D were attached to Co A). The VN convoy passed without incident.

(d) Antenna Valley (Base Area 116): On 5 April 1969, one platoon of Co A moved out along Rt 536 from LZ ROSS northwest toward Antenna Valley to open the road for passage of maneuver elements of the 196th Inf Bde into Base Area 116. The road passes over a range of mountains between LZ ROSS and Antenna Valley proper. Considerable dozer and demolition work was required to widen this portion of the road because of the boulders, rock and earth slides which had choked the roadway during years of disuse. The Engineers remained with maneuver elements and returned to LZ ROSS on 20 April 1969. On this day on the east side of the pass into Antenna Valley, a D7 dozer was completely destroyed by a mine. The Battalion sustained 15 WIA during this operation.

(e) Tra Bong Road II (OPN CINNAMON RD): On 21 April 1969, Co B began upgrading of HL 529 to pioneer (fair weather) standards. In addition to the road upgrade work, 100m on each side of the road is being cleared in selected areas. This operation, which is currently in progress, was 50% complete at the end of the reporting period. Nightly probes and daily sniper activity have caused considerable slow down of work; the enemy has actively mined the road, but with little success. To date, the Battalion has sustained four WIA.

(f) Gaza Strip (Van Ha): Co C, in support of the 11th Inf Bde, moved two D7 dozers (HQ CO) and a CEV (Co A) by LCU to Van Ha to conduct clearing operations. This area has long harbored enemy elements and its destruction denied him a base area. The landing was made over an excellent beach in calm seas and was completely successful. The area covered 3/4 of a square kilometer and would have required considerable time to completely clear. Since time was short, it was decided to concentrate on destruction of bunkers and trenches before the equipment, Engineers and Infantry were extracted by sea and air on 19 April 69. 305 bunkers and uncounted lengths of trenches were destroyed. No casualties were incurred.

(g) Fire Base Support: The Battalion has been continuously committed to support of tactical operations. New fire bases have been mainly in the 11th Inf Bde and 196th Inf Bde OZ's. Co A has participated in opening of LZ RYDER, LZ YOUNG, LZ SIBERIA, and LZ IKE and continuing support of LZ WEST, LZ CENTER, LZ PROFESSIONAL, LZ ROSS, and LZ BALDY. Co C has opened LZ PEPPER, LZ SAN JUAN HILL, LZ JEFF, and is now in the process of clearing LZ CORK and LZ AMY. Co B has opened LZ SOUTH, LZ PROFESSIONAL and LZ MINUTEMAN. Support has continued on LZ BUFF, Hill 270,

LZ GATOR and LZ BAYONET. Co D, in general support has opened Artillery bases at LZ CINDY, LZ CRUNCH, and TAM KY AIRFIELD (8" Battery). All fire bases not accessible by road have required airmobile equipment to support the company operations. A total of 26 airlifts of the small Case 450 tractor and 13 airlifts of the D5 tractor (one sortie of CH54 and one sortie of CH47) were conducted. Aviation support was outstanding thru the reporting period.

(h) Bridge Operations: The Bridge Co (Co E) participated in Tra Bong II, by installing and removing by air, a 50' SS Bailey Bridge and two 38' dry spans. On 23 Feb 69, the enemy initiated a "Post-TET Offensive", by heavily interdicting QL-1. One span and one intermediate pier of the large bridge at Binh Son Across the Song Tra Bong were blown. Co E first installed a 278' M4T6 Float Bridge and immediately commenced construction of a 160' DT Bailey Bridge. The Bailey was completed on 4 March 69, and M4T6 removed the same day. On 30 March, the 278' M4T6 was again emplaced at the Binh Son Site to serve as a bypass while permanent repairs could be accomplished by MCB 58. 130' of M4T6 Float Bridge was recovered on 7 April 69, from bridge 412 on QL-1 south of Quang Ngai (BS 573036). This bridge had been in place since June 1968.

d. LOC Interdiction continued at a high rate.

(1) Casualties/damage by mines and other LOC interdictions. See Summary at end of section (P.42)

(2) During the period 23 Feb thru the end of the reporting period, a "Post-TET Offensive" was conducted by the enemy in varying degrees of severity. In addition to attacks on major installations, major bridges received damage as follows:

<u>BRIDGE#</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
396	BS 852322	29 Mar 69	Burned
397	BS 843327	2 Apr 69	Burned
398	BS 840330	27 Feb 69	Attempted to blow south abutment-blew crater and 1/2 of roadway
399	BS 814359	10 Apr 69	Blew stringer and roadway
400	BS 813363	24 Feb 69	Blew stringers and south span
		27 Feb 69	Blew center span

<u>BRIDGE #</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
403	BS 736533	17 Apr 69	Blew south span
404	BS 728556	10 Mar 69	Partially blew center span
405	BS 707617	23 Feb 69	Partially blown
406	BS 706618	23 Feb 69	Partially blown
409	BS 691646	16 Apr 69	North span and pier damaged
410	BS 685658	24 Feb 69	Damaged
411	BS 674677	23 Feb 69	Destroyed by Demolition
416	BS 623865	23 Feb 69	South span blown
417	BS 609904	24 Feb 69	Damaged by demolition
418	BS 596927	23 Feb 69	2 north spans, 1 pier blown
419	BS 593933	16 Apr 69	3 north spans, 2 piers blown
421	BS 568978	23 Feb 69	Destroyed by demolition
429	BT 276261	24 Feb 69	Destroyed by demolitions
434	BT 225347	25 Apr 69	North abutment and 2/3 of roadway blown
435	BT 813363	23 Feb 69	2 spans damaged by demolitions

(a) Bridges QL1-396, 397, 398, 399, and 400: The 19th Engineer Battalion opened the route at these points by upgrading bypasses. There are no immediate plans to replace bridges with semi-permanent structures.

(b) QL1-403: Existing span was temporarily repaired by the 39th Engineer Battalion on 17 Apr 69, to pass one-way traffic; repaired completely to pass 2 way traffic on 18 Apr 69, class 50/55.

(c) QL1-404: Initially repaired by the 39th Engineer Battalion on 11 Mar 69, by replacing damaged stringers and decking to open the bridge to class 35 one-way traffic. The 39th Engineer Battalion continued repairs on damaged span until 26 Apr 69, when bridge was opened to 2 way

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traffic class 50/50.

(d) QL1-405 and 406: Bridges are short span bridges which are not constructed above the high water mark. These bridges have been temporarily replaced by culverts, pending reconstruction at required elevations by the 39th Engineer Battalion.

(e) QL1-409: Initially repaired by the 39th Engineer Battalion by placing a 160' DS Bailey Bridge over one intermediate pier which was damaged when the span was blown. Traffic resumed on 19 Apr 69. There are no immediate plans to replace existing Bailey Bridge.

(f) Bridges QL1-410, 411, 416, 417. Bypasses were upgraded by the 39th Engineer Battalion to allow 2 way traffic. These bridges have good dry weather bypasses, and will not be rebuilt immediately.

(g) QL1-418: Bridge was initially replaced by a 278' M4T6 float bridge by Co E, 26th Engineer Battalion. After repairs to bridge abutment, the M4T6 was replaced by a 160' DT Bailey Bridge. Permanent repairs are now being accomplished by MCB 58.

(h) QL1-419: The 39th Engineer Battalion immediately repaired the existing bypass to accommodate one-way traffic. The bypass was restored to 2 way traffic the following day.

(i) QL1-421: Was repaired by MCB 58 using culverts to construct bypass. Bypass opened to 2 way traffic on 24 Feb 69.

(j) QL1-429: The 9th Engineer Battalion (USMC) repaired and upgraded bypass to two way traffic. New bridge EDC 6 May 69.

(k) QL1-434: Restored to use by 9th Engineer Battalion by placing a 60" M6 bridge (class 60).

(l) QL1-435: Opened to traffic by repair of existing bypass. New bridge to be constructed by the 9th Engineer Battalion (USMC) when equipment and manpower are available.

11. (C) Signal:
a. Intelligence and counterintelligence: During the reporting period, there were fifteen (15) compromises of the Americal Division SOI. These compromises resulted in eleven (11) major changes in the Division SOI.

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b. Inspector General: On 25 April 1969, the Division Signal Office received a courtesy inspection from the Inspector General.

c. Information: During the reporting period, the Americal Division Photo Section received four (4) cameras from the Central Post Fund, and one EKL-4 film dryer through normal supply channels.

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CASUALTIES/DAMAGE BY MINES AND OTHER LOC INTERDICTIONS

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS	QL1	583	535	534	HL523	536	HL514	533	L5B	HL522	531	529	527	521	586	Total
Minor Damage	3	5				1				1						10
Combat Loss	2	1														3
VEHICLES																
Minor US	11	18												1		30
Combat Loss	6	18														24
VN Vehicles	5	1														6
ENGINEER EQUIPMENT																
Minor	1									1						2
Combat Loss	1					1										2
PERSONNEL																
WIA (US)	58	2	45			3	7	2	1	6	3	4	4	7	3	153
WIA (VN)	24		5									1				31
KIA (US)	7		14			4								1		30
KIA (VN)	43		3						1							47
TOTAL MINE INCIDENTS	120	1	46	2	3	2	4	3	1	2	2	2	2	1	9	200
(Those found and destroyed - plus those causing incidents).																
Road Barriers	20		15													
Culverts Blown	21		1													
Bridges Blown	21															

Summary of damage (from P.38)

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2. (u) Services Division.

a. Advance planning to obtain areas and arrange for construction of cantonment and flight line facilities for D Troop 1-1st Cavalry Squadron began formally 1 Mar 69. An area on the east Chu Lai airfield was obtained for a flight line when an A4 Squadron from Mag 12 vacated the area. 9th Engineer Battalion (Marine) was tasked by II MAF to expand the existing hardstand and construct revetments to accept the Troop helicopters. This portion of the project was completed on 28 Apr 69. The cantonment area, to be located west of the 737th Transportation Company area and north of the 63d Transportation Company area, was started by the 9th Engineer Bn on 21 Apr 69. Expected completion date is 10 June 69. The advance party arrived in Chu Lai on 25 Apr 69 and began erecting a temporary cantonment to accept the entire unit which is scheduled to arrive between 1 and 6 May 69.

b. Real estate acquisition started for the anticipated move of a Light Maintenance Company into the Americal OZ between 10 and 14 May 69. The unit's requirements for cantonment and work facilities are to be submitted to the Sub-Area Base Development Board. An area to become available in the Logistical Support Unit #3 (Marine) is being considered and will be requested. Temporary facilities will be provided until formal approval is obtained in the LSU 3 open storage area.

c. Significant logistical support was provided to US and ARVN forces within Southern I Corps in support of the realignment of forces. The major efforts undertaken during this period were the construction of joint TOC's by the three Brigade/Regiments, new construction for ARVN troops required where US and ARVN were to be collocated, fire base construction such as the reconstruction of LZ Buff and those required due to artillery moves, and relocation of the refuel point at LZ Dottie.

3. (U) Supply Division

a. During March and April the 1st Bn, 14th Arty and the 3d Bn, 82d Arty received the new M102 105 Howitzer. The 6th Bn, 11th Arty is expected to exchange their M101 Howitzers for the new M102 during the next quarter. The M102 is a lightweight howitzer with extended range capable of firing 360 degrees. The M102 is air transportable and air dropable.

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B. The division has started an upgrade and standardization program. The program, originating at USARV, is directed toward replacing all nonstandard A-items in the area of mobility equipment, i.e., trucks, trailers, and tankers. Completion time for the program has not been established, however, it is expected to extend over a minimum of 12 months.

4. (C) Maintenance Division

a. (U) Project STRIP, a program to identify and retrograde excess material, continued during the quarter. The USARV STRIP Team headed by Colonel Stanley Tesko visited the Americal Division in early April. The team reviewed the progress being made by the DSU's of the division. The division thus far has identified and retrograded over 1.4 million dollars worth of excess material and is awaiting disposition instructions on an additional 1900 lines. The program is a valuable tool in purging the division supply system at a time when, due to ROAD reorganization, an accurate assessment of stocks and supplies on hand is essential.

b. (C) the M16 chrome barrel/black barrel exchange program is approximately 75% complete with current on hand figures indicating 15,137 chrome barrel weapons on hand and 5,517 non-chrome barrel weapons on hand.

c. (U) The Americal Division CMMI Team conducted 14 courtesy and 18 record inspections (17 receiving satisfactory ratings) during the period 1 February 69 to 1 May 69. The 723 Maintenance Bn conducted 116 roadside spot inspections during the same period. An improvement in the overall maintenance posture of the division has been noted by the CMMI Team and the roadside inspection team.

d. (U) The USARV sling inspection team visited the division on 15 Mar 69. The purpose of the visit was to inspect the sling equipment and cargo netting within the division. On site inspections were conducted at various fire bases throughout the division area of operation. Identification of unserviceable sling equipment was made, and valuable techniques on proper rigging procedures, and preservation of on-hand equipment was offered. The visit was beneficial in that unserviceable equipment found was subsequently destroyed and new sling gear obtained. An active preventive maintenance program is now being conducted within the division to maintain and prolong the life of assets now on hand.

5. (U) ROAD Reorganization.

a. ROAD reorganization from the standpoint of logistics was completed during the quarterly reporting period. Although problem areas were encountered, this reorganization/standardization was accomplished in a timely logical manner, and without adverse effect on the mission. Supplies continued to flow, and maintenance and other service functions continued to be performed without interruption.

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b. As a result of ROAD reorganization the following was noted in the logistical field:

(1) More Accurate Equipment Data. A necessary step in realigning the division equipment under ROAD was to review and compile equipment data at all levels. As a result of this review, the division was able to establish more definitive guidelines concerning what constitutes a valid substitute for an authorized item of equipment, and now has a more accurate overall picture of the division assets.

(2) More Realistic Assessment of the Division's Maintenance Status and Effectiveness of its program. The lateral transfer of equipment between units and the resulting examination of the equipment with regard to its maintenance status has made it possible to realistically assess the effectiveness of the divisions maintenance program. Prior to laterally transferring equipment with moving parts, it was necessary to account for missing parts, and to insure that all organizational maintenance was performed. These inspections brought to light that the maintenance was only partially successful in some units. With this knowledge division was able to offer suggestions for improvement in these units. In other cases these inspections aided in identifying equipment that was beyond the repair capability of the unit.

(3) The Amount of Non-Divisional Support Increased. The loss of the support battalions which were organic to each brigade prior to reorganization has caused a reduction in organic supply and maintenance personnel as well as a loss of the support battalions equipment. The division is now supported to a greater degree by the 1st Logistical Command.

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F. Civil Affairs/Civic Action

1. (U) Organization

a. During the reporting period the G5 office underwent a major reorganization. The status of the PSYOP section changed from that of a separate entity, with its own operations and administration section to an integral part of the G5, merging operations and administrative functions with that of the civic action section.

b. This merger enables the ACofS, G5 to exercise closer supervision of PSYOP activities and to integrate the PSYOP and civic action effort in support of the Pacification Program.

2. (C) Operations

a. Operation Golden Fleece continues as part of the program to deny vital resources to the VC. The primary responsibility for resource denial is given to the GVN with assistance from ARVN/FWMAF. US/FWMAF provided a protective screen for harvesters in GVN controlled areas upon request. Despite the fact that lack of rainfall reduced the spring harvest considerably, 242,450 lbs of rice were captured, evacuated, and turned over to province and district officials. An additional 68,040 lbs of rice was destroyed to prevent its use by the VC. Operation Golden Fleece is expected to continue for an indefinite period.

b. Tet Celebration. During the period 17-19 Feb 69, units of the division as well has Navy and Marine units in the Chu Lai area held Tet (Lunar New Year) parties. The purpose of the parties was threefold:

(1) To develop a feeling of cooperation and unity between FWMAF and the Vietnamese people.

(2) To acquaint the American troops with the meaning and significance of Tet in the Vietnamese culture.

(3) Humanitarian - assist needy Vietnamese. Planning for this program began in December with units planning parties, requesting candy, plastic bags, rice, and Tet booklets. Through coordination with III MAF some 25,000 12-page booklets explaining the history and significance of Tet were distributed to Americal troops.

c. Refugee Movement. The resettlement of refugees is an integral part of the 1969 GVN Pacification Campaign. The GVN authorities at Quang Ngai and Quang Tin indicate that 70,000 refugees have already been resettled. Significant moves during this period include the resettlement of the Batangan Peninsula by 12,000 Vietnamese, as well as the opening up of new areas in Hau Duc and Hiep Duc. This office acted as coordinator

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with Province Headquarters in providing transportation and food supplies for the refugee program.

d. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Materials. Transportation of CORDS materials from the Sand Ramp, NSAD Chu Lai, to Quang Ngai and Tam Ky continued to be significant. During the period Division Transportation continued to provide truck support which made this coordination possible. In early April Quang Tin Province assumed responsibility for the shipment of its own supplies from NSAD. The following supplies were shipped during the reporting period:

Cement	742 pallets
Roofing Tin	39 pallets
Rebar	24 pallets

3. (C) Civil Affairs/Pacification

a. This division supports the GVN Pacification Program throughout Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces as well as Que Son District of Quang Nam Province.

b. Pacification Campaign - 1969. On 1 Feb 69 the Government of South Vietnam began its Pacification and Development Campaign for 1969. The key to the success of Pacification 69 according to President Thieu is "community spirit" or concretely, cooperation among the GVN, the people, and supporting agencies. The specific goals of this campaign are:

- (1) Security for 90% of the population.
- (2) Eliminate VCI.
- (3) Organize More Peoples Self Defense Forces.
- (4) Establish Local Governments.
- (5) Rally more Hoi Chanhs.
- (6) Increase Propaganda and Information Efforts.
- (7) Resettle Refugees.
- (8) Stimulate Rural Economy.

c. The Americal Division stepped up activity in support of the GVN Pacification Program to help the Vietnamese people become more self sustaining militarily, economically, politically, and sociologically.

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d. Results of the Pacification Program in the Americal area 1 February - 30 Apr.

(1) Security of Population:

(a) Quang Tin Province 61% secure.
(b) Quang Ngai Province 65%?secure.

(2) Over 500 significant VCI have been eliminated.

(3) Peoples Self Defense Forces:

	<u>Quang Tin</u>	<u>Quang Ngai</u>	<u>Que Son</u>
(a) Organized	4,035	10,580	1,113
(b) Trained	575	4,775	1,071
(c) Armed	834	1,057	103
(4) Elections have been conducted in 42 villages and 254 hamlets.			
(5) Hoi Chanhs 1 Feb - 30 Apr.			
(a) Quang Ngai	146		
(b) Quang Tin	367		
(c) Que Son	19		
(6) Refugees Resettled 1 Feb - 30 Apr.			
(a) Quang Tin	16,857		
(b) Quang Ngai	66,736		

(7) Vietnamese Information Services: Most districts now publish weekly newspapers; also at province level newspapers and magazines are published. Radio programming has increased and Cultural Drama Teams perform in targeted pacification areas. The 198th Bde provides PSYOP articles to the Binh Son and Ly Tin Districts for inclusion in their newspapers.

(8) Stimulate Economic Development: Both Quang Ngai and Quang Tin which historically exported rice now are importing regions. In an effort to promote self-sufficiency in this field IR-8 rice has been introduced throughout the AO. In Quang Ngai Province progress is continuing on a

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sugar mill which upon its completion in March 1970 will employ 3,000 Vietnamese. In addition each province has considerably enlarged the coastline open to fishing.

e. Another significant method of supporting Revolutionary Development is medical civic action. During this period, in accordance with (new) instructions from the USARV Surgeon, all units participating in this program have submitted their programs for coordination and approval by the Division Surgeon and G5. Results during the reporting period accomplished by selected units are listed below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VISITS</u>	<u>PATIENTS</u>
11th Bde	101	3,751
196th Bde	44	2,653
198th	76	8,681
1-1st Cav	14	3,635
DIVARTY	65	1,759
26th Eng	10	1,155
1st CAG	945	94,542
MAG 12	215	4,662
MAG 13	49	3,637

f. A third method of supporting the GVN Pacification Program is voluntary contributions. These contributions are normally used to assist specific individuals, families, or groups of families. The collection and distribution of these resources is completely administered by the units concerned. The following items and amounts were contributed.

Money	\$7,513.00
Clothing	3,536 lbs
Soap	6,137 lbs

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E. Significant Recent DEvelopments:

(1) This Operating period has seen a major reorganization of civil affairs activities in the Chu Lai area and the advent of a coordinated effort to better acquaint ourselves with the needs of the immediate area around Chu Lai Base.

(2) As a result of this realignment direct OA responsibilities have been assigned to the following villages:

Ky Chanh - MAG 12	Binh Thang - 5-46th Bn
Ky Khtong - 26th Eng	Binh Nghia - DIVARTY
Ky Sanh - 1-6th Bn	Binh Sa - MAG 13
Ky Lien - 9th Eng	Binh Thanh - 1st CAG
Ky Ha - MASS-3 & 9th Eng	Binh Phuong - MCB-58
Ky Hoa - 6-56th Arty	Cu Lao Re - MCB-58
Ky Xuan - DISCOM	

h. Ly Tin Community Relations Council.

(1) To insure close cooperation and coordination between Vietnamese officials and the American units involved in civic action projects, and to foster better Vietnamese - American relations in the local Chu Lai area, a Community Relations Council has been created.

(2) This council is composed of the Ly Tin District Chief and the village chiefs of Ky Chanh, Ky Hoa, Ky Thuong, Ky Ha, Ky Sanh, Ky Xuan, and Ky Lien. Regular American attendees include the Americal G5, Ly Tin District Advisor, Americal Provost Marshal, C. O. Chu Lai Defense Command, Americal Division Chaplain, Chu Lai Industrial Relations Officer, C. O. 6th CA Platoon, 29th CA Co, and civic action representatives of tenant units at Chu Lai Base. Meetings are held on a bi-monthly basis with the site alternating between the Americal Officers Club and the Ly Tin District Headquarters.

(3) Significant accomplishments of this council so far include a lessening of incidents along the perimeter of Chu Lai Base, the establishment of a uniform curfew in the neighboring villages, decreasing black market activities, prostitution, and marijuana traffic.

4. (U) Psychological Operations - Organization

The addition of an intelligence Sergeant gives the PSYOP section and internal capability to ferret out intelligence that is of PSYOP interest from various reports and agencies and disseminate this information to subordinate units via PSYOP Intelligence Reports. He works closely with the G2 Order of battle section to obtain and record locations of enemy units, unit oriented vulnerabilities and data on key personnel. His functioning also assists in development of more credible propaganda and realistic target analysis.

5. (C) PSYOP Activities Jan - Apr 69

a. Leaflets. There were 124,881,000 leaflets dropped on 2,044 targets within the division area of operations during the reporting period.

b. Loudspeaker broadcasts. Broadcasts operations are broken down in three main categories: Aerial, Ground, and Waterborne. During the reporting period, 342:00 hours aerial, 949:50 hours ground, and 26:30 hours waterborne were broadcasted. This represents a significant gain over the previous quarter in ground broadcast hours, much of which involved face-to-face communication, generally acknowledged to be the most effective of delivery media. Increased usage of HE (Combat Loudspeaker) Teams in support of combat operations, which reflects increased command recognition of PSYOP values, loudspeaker missions scheduled in conjunction with GVN efforts in support of the Pacification Plan 1969, and the advent of battalion loudspeaker teams are the main underlying reasons for this increase.

c. Movies. During the period, 533 movies representing 272:25 hours were visually presented to 66,163 Vietnamese. These figures are down from last quarter due in part to monsoon weather and the enemy offensive, which caused GVN officials to postpone scheduled showing, thereby reducing the possibilities of attacks initiated due to the gathering of large numbers of people into a small area, and which also limited movement of the HE (Audio Visual) teams in some areas. Once security was firmly established in a given hamlet, GVN officials were quick to resume abilities to defend the area and to demonstrate to the people the GVN viability and stability.

d. Propaganda Initiated by Americal Division: During the reporting period, 38 leaflets and 5 tapes were initiated by the Division. This propaganda included quick reaction rallier leaflets which contain a picture of the Hoi Chanh and his hand written message stating his is receiving good treatment and urging his comrades to also rally, and leaflets and tapes exploiting known enemy vulnerabilities such as high malaria rate, immediate exploitation of battle losses, and personalized appeals to specific names individuals. This type of propaganda is always more effective when it is addressed to specific units. Division G2 has materially

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assisted in the development of this propaganda by providing current information on request. Another example of propaganda initiated by the Americal Division was a series of rewards leaflets promoting the Voluntary Informant Program utilizing characters rather than words in an effort to enhance understandability among the illiterate audience. This series deviates from the usual approach of "Cash for Information/Munitions", which implied a mercenary approach of buying loyalty, by implying that it is the patriotic duty of the informant to assist his government by providing information about VC activities and turning in munitions, that in so doing, he is also protecting himself and his family and that as a reward for his demonstrated patriotism, his government will provide him with money with which he can purchase food and clothing. This series of leaflets was initiated by the 196th Infantry Brigade PSYOP Section and was so well received by the Propaganda Development Center at the 7th PSYOP Center in DaNang that it is presently being used by other divisions throughout ICTZ.

6. (C) PSYOPS Support of Major Operations

a. During this period, four major operations terminated. They were: Phase III of Russell Beach (terminated 9 Feb), Vernon Lake II, Fayette Canyon and Hardin Falls (all terminated 28 Feb).

b. In that all of the above operations were in their terminal phases during the reporting period, little PSYOP support was reflected. Although the bulk of significant PSYOP support of these operations were conducted during the previous reporting period, the following summaries reflecting the entire operations are offered:

(1) Russell Beach: PSYOP support for this operation was characterized by dissemination of propaganda and information oriented to facilitate evacuation of the operation areas through leaflet, aerial broadcast and ground broadcast media. In addition, propaganda exploiting specific vulnerabilities, with considerable emphasis on the Chieu Hoi Campaign, was disseminated throughout the operation. Availability of a helicopter for PSYOP during the initial stages of the operation proved to be a valuable asset in assisting population control and affording maximum opportunity to quickly exploit vulnerabilities and respond to requests from tactical units. PSYOP support for the Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC) included primarily one HE (audio/visual) team and a liaison element composed of one officer and interpreter to interview refugees, develop propaganda, and forward requests for materials and reports from Quang Ngai Province officials. It is felt the orderly evacuation of 11,960 refugees from the operational area, the acquisition of 32 Hoi Chanhs and the confinement of 257 VCI, 157 VCS and 104 PW's.

(2) Operation Hardin Falls: This was a combined operation involving elements of the 1-1st Cav, 2d ARVN Div, and REgional Forces of Quang Tin Province, and was conducted in conjunction with the Accelerated

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Pacification Campaign. PSYOP activities were primarily conducted by personnel from the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), and were characterized by extensive face-to-face communications, which contributed to the acquisition of 59 Hoi Chanhs during the operation. PSYOP support was limited to movie team activities and moderate leaflet and aerial broadcast missions.

(3) Operations Vernon Lake II and Fayette Canyon: Operations Vernon Lake II, In Quang Ngai Province, and Fayette Canyon, in Quang Nam Province, were designed to find, fix, and destroy elements of the 3rd NVA and 2d NVA Divisions respectively. PSYOP support for these operations was characterized by dissemination of propaganda oriented to specific units exploiting known vulnerabilities of battle losses, food, medicine shortages, malaria sickness, superiority of allied fire power, disillusionment of cause, deceit of leadership and failure to achieve success. In addition, B-52 strikes in the areas were exploited by appropriate leaflet drops, adding to the effectiveness and success of the operations.

7. (C) PSYOP Support of Campaigns

a. Chieu Hoi Campaign:

(1) Hoi Chanhs by sector Feb - Apr 69.

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Total</u>
Quang Nam (Que Son, Duc Duc, and Duc Xuyen Districts - Feb, Que Son only for Mar and Apr)	44	3	9	56
Quang Tin	93	137	119	349
Quang Ngai	54	38	49	141
TOTAL	191	178	177	545
Ralliers to Americal Forces	23	18		

(2) During the reporting period, 62,206,000 leaflets, 136:25 hours aerial, 208:45 hours ground and 6:30 hours waterborne broadcasts supported this campaign.

(3) the number of Hoi Chanhs rallying within the Division AO during this period represents the highest quarterly totals on record. The bulk of ralliers (349) came from Quang Tin Province, where the 3rd Party Inducement Program has had extensive coverage and is successfully employed. The 3rd Party Inducement is essentially the payment of monetary rewards to

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any Vietnamese citizen, to include members of RVNAF, National Police, Cadre, Kit Carson, APT's, former Hoi Chanhs or private citizens, who induce a VC/NVA to rally under the Chieu Hoi Program.

Rewards are not paid to the rallier himself unless he, in turn, qualifies by inducing another VC/NVA to rally. Amounts paid are based on the relative importance of the rallier, and there are established amounts for each position. Eligibilities for awards are determined by a council made up of various provincial officials. Approximately 87% of the ralliers in Quang Tin Province were as a result of 3rd Party influence. Of the total number of 3rd Party Inducement Ralliers in ICTZ, 95% of them were in Quang Tin Province.

(4) During March, 56 Hoi Chanhs rallied in Hiep Duc District, Quang Tin Province. Intensified PSYOP efforts, mainly in the form of ground broadcast teams from 4-31st Infantry brigade, supporting the GVN efforts to reestablish governmental control in that area were listed by Hoi Chanhs as primary reasons for decisions to rally.

(5) Interviews with Hoi Chanhs revealed underlying causes instrumental in persuading them to rally to the GVN include:

- (a) Continued food shortages.
- (b) Malaria sickness.
- (c) Allied operations.
- (d) Allied firepower.
- (e) Disenchantment with cause.
- (f) Severe battle losses.
- (g) breakup of units/cells and breakdown of discipline due to battle losses and defections.

(6) Many ralliers related incidents of punishment and reprimand by cadre if caught reading PSYOP leaflets. They also stated that biggest deterrent to rallying is the belief, as portrayed by Political Cadre, that ralliers will be tortured and shot subsequent to exploitation.

b. Rewards Campaign:

(1) During the reporting period, efforts expended supporting this campaign included 15,888,000 leaflets, 18:05 hours aerial, 207:15 hours ground and 1:00 hour waterborne broadcasts.

(2) The rewards campaign, in general, offers monetary compensation

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for information concerning enemy activities or for munitions, arms, etc. Extensive emphasis on this campaign and refinement of collection procedures have resulted in continued success of the Voluntary Informant Program.

(3) Number of Informants Feb - Apr 69

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Total</u>
26th Eng Bn	0	0	3	3
11th Bde	293	398	220	911
196th Bde	257	431	314	1,002
198th Bde	24	48	374	446
39th Eng Bn	146	71	60	277
1-1st Cav	0	1	3	4
TOTAL	720	949	974	2,643

(4) Total Payments (\$VN) Feb - Apr 69

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Total</u>
26th Eng Bn	0	0	1,200	1,200
11th Bde	100,700	501,480	191,300	793,480
196th Bde	152,395	276,600	227,415	656,410
198th Bde	17,000	61,550	449,655	528,205
39th Eng Bn	512,400	288,900	172,200	973,500
1-1st Cav	0	500	500	1,000
TOTAL	782,495	1,129,030	1,042,270	2,953,795

(5) A significant increase in VC munitions in form of booby traps, emplaced mines, 82mm mortar rounds, Chi Com grenades, bangalore torpedoes, satchel charges, etc., being turned in under the VIP has been noted.

(6) This campaign has been expanded to include payment for information leading to the elimination of VCI. On 21 April, an informant led elements of the 4-31st Infantry to vic AT 9627 where they captured two prominent VCI and killed three others.

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c. Pro-GVN campaign

(1) During the reporting period, this campaign was supported with 6,067,00 leaflets, 8:20 hours aerial, 359:45 ground and 12:30 hours waterborne broadcasts.

(2) During the Tet period, specially prepared leaflets and aerial tapes were flown throughout the AO. In addition, the broadcast team actively supported the Tet activities of Tam Ky District by incorporating their assets into those of the ARVN and VIS agencies in Tam Ky. This included three night broadcast missions from a helicopter in which they broadcast stories of Tet, traditional music of Tet and propaganda speeches. The Quang Tin Province Chief and Tam Ky District Chief flew with the team to broadcast personalized Tet messages.

(3) Significant progress is being made in Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, in upgrading the effectiveness and activities of the VIS. Previously, the district relied heavily on the PSYOP assets and personnel of the 198th Inf Bde to organize and conduct PSYOP within the district. Recently, all planning, organizing, and operation is being conducted by the VIS, with the 198th PSYOP being called on for support and supplementation as a portion of the total program rather than as the whole program. It is encouraging to note that the VIS is using their own equipment primarily, and are calling for US assets only as a supplement.

(4) Increased emphasis has been placed on PSYOP support of MEDCAPS and civic action projects in an effort to exploit tangible evidence of GVN concern for the people and their desire to better the health and living conditions of the people.

(5) A concentrated effort has been made to inform US Forces arriving in-country of the pertinency and practical usage of PSYOP in Vietnam. During this period 75 classes have been presented to 5,886 new arrivals to the division. The instruction, conducted at the Combat Center, covers the basic orientation of in-country PSYOP with emphasis being given to the participation of the individual soldier in the Chieu Hoi and rewards campaigns.

(6) Realizing that the average soldier needs periodic reindoctrination on PSYOP doctrinal guidance and aims, and exposure to Vietnamese culture to better understand the people, classes to units, TV announcements, articles in organic publications, posters in the Service Clubs and helicopter broadcasts have been utilized in an attempt to inform Americal soldiers of PSYOP values and create a meaningful interest in the Vietnamese people.

d Anti VC/Anti NVA Campaigns:

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(1) PSYOP support of these two campaigns has included 31,005,000 leaflets, 112:50 hours aerial, and 137:15 hours ground broadcasts.

(2) PSYOP support of these two campaigns is characterized by printed and spoken propaganda designed to reduce morale, and encourage rally/surrender through exploitation of known enemy vulnerabilities. Attempts are made to utilize unit oriented propaganda to lend credibility to the messages. Also included is propaganda targeted at the local populace which is designed to diminish the image of the VC/NVA and enhance that of the GVN.

(3) During the reporting period several instances of loudspeaker and movie teams being apparent targets of mortar attacks, sniper fire, and ambushes indicate a recognition by the VC/NVA of the effectiveness of allied propaganda.

8. (C) Enemy Propaganda

a. Leaflets, handbills, posters, and banners have been found periodically throughout the AO during the reporting quarter. A considerable number have been in English and were directed at the US soldier. Several leaflets had pictures of anti-war demonstrations in the US and urged the soldier to refuse to fight. Frequently they stated that non-intervention meant safety, and offered to assist any defectors in reaching their homeland through the Third Party country of their choice. Propaganda has also been targeted at the Negro soldier urging him not to fight and referring to prejudices existing in the US and to Martin Luther King's murder.

b. On three separate occasions in March, soldiers at LZ Liz were targets of VC broadcasts. These broadcasts, in reasonably understandable English, told members of the 1-20th Infantry that they would be defeated and offered them an opportunity to "Chieu Hoi". The promised the soldiers \$500 if they would defect and bring their weapons and offered transportation to the country of their choice.

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A. Personnel.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Unit Reenlistment Personnel.

a. Observation. It was noted that unit commanders and unit reenlistment personnel were not thoroughly familiar with the basic reenlistment facts to include options, benefits, and advantages; and that unit commanders were not knowledgeable of proper interviewing techniques and were not conducting the timely interviews as required by paragraph 14, USARV Reg 601-201.

b. Evaluation.

(1) The unit commander's reenlistment interview is the most important single item in the Army Reenlistment Program, but it is often the most misunderstood. Knowledge of the Army, its advantages and benefits, and knowledge of how and when to interview or counsel an individual concerning reenlistment, is of utmost importance to everyone today. A successful reenlistment program cannot be built on, or around, a hit-or-miss, spur-of-the-moment basis. A successful program depends on a systematic approach, adequate preparation, and a strong desire by the individual conducting the program to do a good job. In this respect, it is very important that unit commanders and unit reenlistment personnel have an excellent working knowledge of the Army, its benefits and advantages, and last but not least, the proper methods of interviewing personnel who come from all walks of life.

(2) A class has been recently started at the Americal Division Combat Center for all company grade and senior noncommissioned officers newly arriving in country. This class will give them an idea on how to conduct a reenlistment program and also some basic knowledge of the Army's options, benefits, and advantages. This class serves on more purpose; it makes them reenlistment conscious before they get to other unit.

(3) A Reenlistment Guide for Unit Commanders has been implemented by the Americal Division Reenlistment Office. This unit commander's guide gives the commander basic information about reenlistment which enables him to conduct an efficient reenlistment program within his unit. Some of the information in the guide include minimum DA objectives, interviews, recording of information, who is eligible/ineligible for reenlistment, and periods of reenlistment.

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c. Recommendation. That continued emphasis be placed on the reenlistment program at unit commander level and commanders keep fully informed of the benefits, options, and advantages of an Army career.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Reduction of Congressional Correspondence Received.

a. Observation. A sound command emphasis program could perhaps reduce Congressional inquiries by eliminating complaints within the chain of command.

b. Evaluation. Previously a monthly report (Americical Form 3) was prepared by the Special Correspondence Section and submitted to the Chief of Staff through the Adjutant General's Office. This form lists the number of inquiries received by unit and type complaint.

(1) An Americical Circular will be published monthly with Americical Form 3 as an Appendix. The first circular was published in April 1969.

(2) Each commander down to the battalion level can now see exactly how many and what type complaints were made within his unit. He can take proper steps to eliminate recurrence of these complaints.

c. Recommendation. Command level assessment of the causes of complaints which result in Congressional inquiries should be utilized to correct problems before they become the subject of Congressional inquirers.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Files Simplification and Reduction.

a. Observation. Case files contained more than one copy of replies, penciled notes, and were not uniformly assembled to permit rapid access to desired information.

b. Evaluation. A system was devised to assemble all cases on the day of dispatch in a prescribed uniform manner eliminating unnecessary papers. Old cases are being screened as time permits. The Work Progress Record is the top most document of each file. The final reply is the next document. Normally with these two items on top, no further searching of the file is necessary.

c. Recommendation. Strict emphasis be maintained on the files reduction program.

4. (U) SUBJECT: usarv DIRECT COMMISSION PROGRAM.

a. Observation. Prior to 1 February 1969, only two applications had been received, processed, and forwarded to Headquarters, USARV. It was apparent that the program required additional emphasis.

b. Evaluation. The following administrative procedures were incorporated to revitalize the program:

(1) Publicity was increased, to include daily bulletin fliers and AG Newsletter items. The eligibility and application processing requirements were presented in a briefing at the March Division G1/AG Conference.

(2) A letter signed by the Commanding General was sent to each major subordinate commander, battalion commander, and commanders of units reporting directly to this headquarters directing them to personally interview recipients of the Silver Star or higher to identify possible candidates. The letter also explained the program, presented the eligibility criteria, and solicited the cooperation of the commanders to insure that potential officer material be encouraged to apply for a direct commission in the US Army under the USARV Direct Commission Program.

(3) Procedures were adopted to identify applicants and to expedite the processing of applications. All processing is to be completed by the AG personnel Actions Branch appointment clerks.

(a) Immediately upon identification of a potential applicant, the commander notifies the AG Personnel Actions Branch and relays the individual's name and organization.

(b) The potential applicant's 201 file is reviewed by the AG Personnel Actions Branch to ascertain if the individual meets minimum requirements for appointment.

(c) The unit is expeditiously notified by telephone of the results of the records check. If the individual is qualified, an appointment for an initial interview is scheduled. The applicant reports on the designated day to the AG Personnel Actions Branch and during the interview, he completes a penciled copy of DA Form 61, DA Form 160, and personal summary sheet. Also at that time a letter requesting detailed.

leadership recommendations is prepared for the applicant to hand carry to his commanding officer. The applicant is requested to obtain college transcripts, if applicable, and make arrangements to complete his physical examination.

(d) The AG Personnel Actions clerk proceeds to process the application by obtaining a true copy of DA Form 66, or DA Form 20, as applicable, and obtaining statement of NAC clearance, or has unit initiate new NAC at S2. He also checks Awards Branch for awards applicant may possess or which may be pending. Copies are made of appropriate citations. The clerk also insures that required statements of service obligation are signed by applicant.

(e) Within two weeks of receipt of the completed application, endorsed with the requested leadership recommendations, this headquarters convenes an officer review board. Board proceedings are forwarded with the complete application to CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHAG-PA(PS), for original processing. Subsequent to the incorporation of the procedures outlined above, 19 applicants have been identified and their applications have either been forwarded to Headquarters, USARV, or are in various stages of completion at this command.

c. Recommendation. That other commands in RVN give consideration to the procedures outlined above as a means of improving the results of the Direct Commission Program.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Off-Limits Violations.

a. Observation. Greater emphasis on increased enforcement in this area resulted in a substantial increase in the number of violators apprehended, and revealed the need to reduce unnecessary travel through off-limits areas.

b. Evaluation. The transporting by units of local national employees between the installation gates and homes of the employees resulted in daily passage through off-limits areas by US military personnel. This practice seriously reduced effective control over entry into off-limits areas and increased the risk of hostile or illegal activities, as well as the likelihood of clandestine entry into the installation. This practice was stopped. Units may now provide transportation to local national employees only between the installation gates and places of work. It is expected that the security of individuals and the installation will be enhanced by this program.

c. Recommendation. That authorizations to travel through off-limits areas be constantly reviewed to eliminate any unnecessary travel and to enhance security of US Forces.

6. (U) SUBJECT: Control and Identification of Marijuana and Harmful Drugs Continues to Require Special Instruction to Unit Personnel.

a. Observation. The program of educating unit personnel in the control and identification of marijuana and harmful drugs has become more effective due to increased interest on the part of unit commanders in requesting and scheduling classes.

b. Evaluation. During this period, approximately two hundred (200) classes of this nature have been conducted. Personnel receiving this instruction range from unit commanding officers to young privates just arriving in Vietnam.

c. Recommendation. That general adoption of this type of educational program should be considered as a means for reducing marijuana and drug problems.

7. (U) SUBJECT: Combined Control of Drug Traffic.

a. Observation. During this period, a combined National Police Field Force and Military Police program of enforcement was instituted in an attempt to strengthen control over marijuana and drug traffic.

b. Evaluation. Thus far the combined force has conducted raids in villages which have resulted in the confiscation of considerable amounts of contraband and the arrest of five (5) Vietnamese by the NPFF's.

c. Recommendation. Utilize such combined forces to significantly decrease the purchase and use of marijuana and drugs by US personnel.

8. (U) SUBJECT: Religious Coverage for Jewish Personnel.

a. Observation. In the past, the maximum number of Jewish Chaplains assigned to Vietnam has been five. Distribution has been one in each Corps area and one in the Saigon - Long Binh area. At the present time there are four Jewish Chaplains in Vietnam. Americal Division Jewish Chaplain support comes through the Jewish Chaplain assigned to the XXIV US Army Corps. Obviously, if the success of a Jewish Chaplain, failure would be assured. At the request of the Division Chaplain, USARV permitted the assignment of a Jewish Chaplain's assistant to the office of the Division Chaplain. The primary mission of this enlisted assistant is to coordinate the Jewish program, conduct Jewish Sabbath Services, act as liaison between the Jewish Chaplain at XXIV US Army Corps, and recruit Jewish Lay Leaders at brigade level where practical.

b. Evaluation. The Americal Division has a highly successful Jewish program. This has been achieved principally through the functional plan described in paragraph 1a. The success of this plan is verified by the following statistics taken from the quarterly Chaplains Religious Activities and Character Guidance Report (DA Form 16-1):

	<u>RELIGIOUS SERVICES</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
(1) 1st Qtr, FY 69	15	156
(2) 2nd Qtr, FY 69	33	322
(3) 3rd Qtr, FY 69	39	404

c. Recommendation. That continued effort be made to provide adequate religious coverage to all personnel and that all available resources be identified and utilized to achieve this goal.

9. (U) SUBJECT: Scheduling of General Court-Martial Cases.

a. Observation. All general court-martial cases were tried at one time during each month so that a Law Officer from the judicial station in Saigon would only have to travel to Chu Lai once a month and return. Due to the number of general court-martial cases, court members and counsel were continually in court for as long as seven or eight days. This resulted in court members being absent too long from their primary duties and counsel were not able to properly prepare trials that were to be held during the latter part of the trial session.

b. Evaluation. The current system of trying only two or three cases at a time has proven more effective, even though a Law Officer is required to make additional trips each month. Once it is concluded that counsel will be prepared for trial by a certain date, immediate arrangements should be made to obtain a Law Officer. This practice results in a much more efficient utilization of manpower and time.

c. Recommendation. That Law Officers be provided for general court-martial cases as needed, i.e., when counsel have completely prepared their cases, and on a phased basis to preclude excessive continuous absence of court members from their primary duties.

10 (U) SUBJECT: Payment of Vietnamese Witnesses.

a. Observation. When Vietnamese witnesses are required to appear at trials, they are entitled by law to be paid for their services. Once the witnesses have departed the Chu Lai area, it becomes quite difficult to locate them and tender payment of witness fees. This was accomplished by appointing a Class "A" agent who would travel to the various villages and locate the witnesses and tender payment of witness fees.

b. Evaluation. A system of preparing all necessary vouchers for payment of witness fees during the last day of trial and having them hand carried to Finance for immediate payment is more practicable. The results in witnesses receiving their money promptly and man hours are not wasted by military personnel in trying to locate the witnesses at a later date.

c. Recommendation. That all witnesses be paid their witness fees on the last day of attendance at the trials by court-martial.

11. (U) SUBJECT: Equipment for Use of Court Reporters.

a. Observation. Recorder/Reproducers are used by court reporters in trials by general court-martial. These machines continually break down due to over-heating, caused by the electrical system in Vietnam and normal wear and tear. The present facilities for repairing recorder/reproducers is located in Long Binh, RVN. Upon breakdown of machine, it requires one person to hand carry the machine to Long Binh and return. On 3 February 1969, a machine was taken to the repair facility at Long Binh for repair; as of 3 May 1969, the machine has still not bee repaired. Two additional machines have also ceased to operate.

b. Evaluation. Personnel trained in the repair of court reporting machines should be assigned to a signal unit within each Division of the Army and a system established for obtaining repair parts for recorder/reproducers. This requirement will become more essential effective 1 August 1969, when additional court reporters are assigned to each general court-martial jurisdiction due t implementation of the Military Justice Act.

c. Recommendation. That qualified trained repairmen and facilities be established locally for repair of court reporting equipment. Failure to do so results in a loss of money and man hours to the military service.

B. OPERATIONS

1. (C) Subject: Local Security

a. Observation. On 10 Feb 69, Co D, 3d Bn, 1st Inf, conducting a combat sweep, stopped at a stream for the purpose of changing clothes, receiving rations, and performing normal personal hygiene. Following a two-hour halt, the company continued south and after having moved only 300 meters, they were engaged by a sniper. The result of the engagement was one US KIA.

b. Evaluation. The landing zone that D Co selected for resupply was open to enemy observation. Additionally, the unit remained near the landing zone for an extended period of time and subsequently continued moving without a change in direction. This gave the enemy adequate time to establish an ambush along a probable departure route from the landing zone.

c. Recommendation. Units being resupplied in the field should be careful to make the resupply period as short as possible and to select a departure route on a different axis than the one used to enter the resupply area.

2 (C) Subject: Deception

a. Observation. At 1700 hrs, 27 Mar 69, A Co, 3d Bn, 1st Inf, halted a combat sweep and established a false night logger position. At that location they were resupplied and ate their evening meal. After dark, they moved to a position approximately 500 meters away. At 2015 hrs the false position was swept by automatic weapons fire and received 60mm mortar rounds. Again at 2130 hrs, the same position received an additional 20 rounds of 60mm mortar. Had the unit remained in its original position, it would have undoubtedly sustained numerous casualties.

b. Evaluation. Deception plays an important role in the counterinsurgency environment. A US rifle company can be easily detected while conducting normal combat sweeps and saturating patrols. If a unit plans to remain in a fixed field location overnight, steps must be taken to conceal its plans to remain in a fixed position.

c. Recommendation. Units should always plan to establish a night logger position after dark in order to minimize the enemy's knowledge of their night defensive position.

3. (U) Subject: Quick Reaction

a. Observation. At 1245 hrs, 17 Apr 69, B Co, 123d Avn Bn (Aero Scouts) was conducting a reconnaissance mission when one of their LOH-6A's was shot down by enemy ground fire. The closest ground unit was D Co, 3-1 Inf, which began to move towards the downed aircraft

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5000 meters away. C Co, 3-1 Inf, however was near a landing zone and the decision was made to combat assault them in the vicinity of the action. Less than one hour and ten minutes after the incident, the company had completed the combat assault and was maneuvering against the enemy. Results: 22 NVA KIA, 2 .51 cal anti-aircraft weapons and one SKS rifle CIA; 3 US KIA and 2 US WIA.

b. Evaluation. The extremely fast reaction by US forces didn't give the enemy time to react. The 30 to 40 NVA manning the anti-aircraft positions did not have sufficient time to dismantle the weapons and consequently, elected to remain and fight as C Co attacked. Had the reaction time been longer, there is no doubt that the positions would have been empty when the US troops arrived.

c. Recommendation. That quick, decisive reaction to confirmed enemy locations be stressed to units at all levels.

4. (C) Subject: Coordinated Operations

a. Observation. From 10 to 13 Apr 69, 4th Bn, 21st Inf, conducted combat sweeps in the norther portion of the Song Ve Valley with moderately successful results. On 13 Apr 69, two companies left the valley conducting combat assaults in other areas while the remaining company and battalion reconnaissance platoon moved to the southern portion of the valley. On the following day, 14 Apr 69, two battalions of the 4th ARVN Regiment moved into the northern portion of the valley where the 4-21 Inf had been 36 hrs earlier. They immediately made contact with numerous VC/NVA elements resulting in 10 enemy killed the first day.

b. Evaluation. It is a well known BC or NVA tactic to follow as US unit, continually occupying areas where US troops have departed and thus gaining a certain amount of security. By moving with another unit into the area that the 4-21 Inf vacated and by doing so over land and from another direction, the enemy was surprised and caught unaware. This, his tactic of moving into an area following the departure of US troops was to our advantage rather than his.

c. Recommendation. Units should continually attempt to utilize small stay behind forces employing well placed ambushes. Whenever possible, operations should be planned so as to place a new unit into an area recently vacated by another unit.

5. (U) Subject: Control of Vietnamese soldiers during combined operations.

a. Observation. The 1-1 Cav Frequently conducts operations with GVN Forces where Vietnamese soldiers ride on the armored vehicles and dismount to search suspected enemy locations. During these operations the direction and coordination of the activities of Vietnamese troops is

impaired by the lack of direct communications between US and Vietnamese Commanders.

b. Evaluation. To some extent, this problem has been overcome through informal sessions where the unit interpreter instructs the Vietnamese in the techniques of mechanized infantry employment. Continuous use of the same GVN unit also simplifies the problem. Neither of these solutions is adequate, nor do they obviate the need for communication between the US Commander and the Vietnamese Commander at platoon level. Currently, one interpreter is assigned to each troop. He is unable to communicate with the Vietnamese operating with each of the platoons because of the distance involved and the rapidly changing combat situation.

c. Recommendation. That an interpreter be assigned to each cavalry platoon for use during combined operations.

6. (C) Subject: Movement through Mined Areas

a. Observation. Mines planted in likely avenues of advance retard cavalry squadron's ability to move rapidly in certain areas.

b. Evaluation. The enemy has successfully employed mines in stream crossings where vehicles use a few existing fords. Generally, the streams in this area are fordable only at certain well defined points, allowing the enemy an excellent opportunity to employ anti-tank mines. As a result, considerable time must be spent in clearing crossing sites during combat operations. An AVLB has been employed with combat elements, giving them the capability to cross streams at unfordable sites, thereby avoiding likely mined areas and increasing the rate of movement of the unit.

c. Recommendation. That information on this technique be disseminated to armored and cavalry units in Vietnam.

7. (C) Subject: Recovery of M113A1 ACAV1

a. Observation. Wet weather and soggy terrain pose many problems in recovering mired track vehicles.

b. Evaluation. If an ACAV M113A1 should become mired in a large, wet paddy, it may be out of reach of other ACAV's. Often, more than one vehicle becomes stuck and if an M88 or M578 recovery vehicle can not reach the area, then recovery becomes a time consuming problem.

c. Recommendation. If all other conventional vehicles recovery methods fail, a CH47 Chinook helicopter can be used to pull the vehicles out. Using a 50-75 foot tow cable, one effective method is to hook the cable to the lifting shackle on one side of the ACAV, run the cable through the pintle on the Chinook, and hook the other end of the cable to the lifting shackle on the other side of the vehicle. The helicopter pulls the vehicle forward and once the initial suction holding the vehicle in the mud is broken, the helicopter has no difficulty in towing the ACAV

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to dry ground.

8. (C) Subject: Cordon and Search of Villages

a. Observation. During cordon and search of villages, it was determined that the guerrillas and infrastructure received enough early warning to leave the village before the cordon was established.

b. Evaluation. To solve this problem, the technique of early morning airmobile assaults was devised. This consisted of lifting a force and landing them around the village to establish a cordon to prevent VC escape. The cordon was then reinforced with additional troop lifts. A thorough search of the village includes using Vietnamese Police, Scout Dogs and Vietnamese "Black Lists" to locate guerrillas and VCI.

c. Recommendation. A Reconnaissance of the target village was required to select several single aircraft landing zones as opposed to one multi-aircraft landing zone. This technique enables the troops to cordon the village immediately as they leave the aircraft. Gunships and C/C aircraft can provide additional coverage of the cordon until the remainder of the troops can be lifted into the area. This technique has proved valuable in capturing local VC and VCI, thus keeping the enemy off balance. The usually safe villages are vulnerable at anytime and no longer afford the VC security and rest.

9. (C) Subject: Perimeter Night Marking Devices

a. Observation. The use of 105mm casings for marking fire support bases at night have been found to be an excellent technique.

b. Evaluation. Marking of fire support base perimeters at night may be accomplished in many ways. Most lighting methods are costly, time consuming, and may be observed from outside the perimeter as well as from the air.

c. Recommendation. An effective means of marking a fire support base at night for the purpose of controlling gunships or other types of fire support, is to 105 mm casing filled with thickened gasoline (M-4 thickener). The shell should be buried in the ground, filled with gasoline, and covered with plastic. A trip flare placed on top of the casing can be ignited from inside the bunker, and if properly installed, the fuel will burn for one and one half hours. The marker is visible from the air but not from the outside of the perimeter.

10. (C) Subject: Defense against Sapper Attacks

a. Observation: On 19 Mar 69, the 4-31 Inf on LZ West was attacked by a Sapper Squad of nine men. The sapper Squad used normal tactics of stealth to approach and penetrate the perimeter, firing small arms in an attempt to spread confusion and panic and utilizing satchel charges,

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grenades, and RPG's, in conjunction with the small arms fire, to destroy as many bunkers and kill or wound as many US personnel as possible. The sapper squad attempted to escape while it was still dark. The sapper attack was successfully countered and friendly damage and casualties held to a minimum. Several US troops were wounded; however, none were killed. This compared favorably with enemy losses at eight killed and one captured. The enemy's failure to accomplish his mission is attributed to the alertness of the rifle company charged with the defense of LA, West early detection, the quick decisive commitment of the reaction force, and the rapid and effective use of illumination and artillery.

b. Evaluation. There are several problem areas encountered by friendly forces during sapper attacks:

- (1) Coordination and control
- (2) Illumination
- (3) Inability to maintain contact with the enemy by means of pursuit to completely destroy the attacking force.

c. Recommendations. (1) Conduct announced alerts on a recurring basis. Practice alerts and rehearsals as necessary to insure each man knows his job and can function with a minimum of hesitancy and confusion.

(2) Have a trained, thoroughly briefed and rehearsed reaction forces.

(3) Mortar sections should be prepared to fire illumination for any quadrant of a fire support base with a minimum of delay and confusion. Illumination remains the best way to take the advantage away from the enemy.

(4) Use all available means to effect early detection. These can include interdiction and ambush patrols, anti-intrusion devices, and ground surveillance radar. Early detection is the key to eliminating the element of surprise from a sapper attack.

(5) Have defensive fires plotted, and fired in on a regular basis to insure the best coverage of dead spaces and routes of advance and withdrawal.

(6) It is often extremely difficult to pursue the enemy when he makes his withdrawal. Combat Tracker Teams are useful in following blood trails and other signs.

11. (C) Subject: Clearing Enemy-Occupied Positions

a. Observation. It is common practice to clear enemy-occupied bunkers, foxholes, and small caves by throwing a M26 fragmentation grenade inside. Often the enemy will throw the grenade back out of the position, thus remaining safe and increasing the possibility of friendly casualties. It is usually not feasible to delay throwing the grenade after releasing

the pin to minimize enemy counter-action. Accordingly, an effort was initiated to eliminate or reduce the enemy capability to throw grenades back at friendly troops.

b. Evaluation. The best method considered, involved preceding the M26 grenade with a smoke-producing munition, either a smoke grenade, thermite grenade, or trip flare. The standard smoke grenade proved unsatisfactory due to its two-second delay and slow ignition which allowed the enemy time to throw it clear of his position before enough smoke was generated to blind him. The thermite grenade was found to be unsatisfactory due to its weight and inherent shortages in supply channels. The trip flare was found to be the best munition to precede the M26 grenade due to its instantaneous ignition, light weight, immediate smoke generation, and ready obtainability. The trip flare also blinds the occupant of the position momentarily and produces intense heat causing severe burns if the enemy endeavors to pick it up and throw it out of the position.

c. Recommendation. That trip flares be carried by personnel likely to come into contact with enemy-occupied positions and that the trip flares be thrown into enemy positions immediately prior to the insertion of a M26 fragmentation grenade.

12. (C) Subject: 31 areas along lines of communication into the Tien Phouc area were contaminated with CS on 10 Feb 69, to slow the advance of NVA forces on Tien Phouc and canalize them through killing zones. During the time from 10-23 Feb 69, no contacts were made with NVA forces in the Tien Phouc area, and 25 NVA were killed in the two killing zones.

b. Recommendation. Persistent CS can and should be used to discourage use of LOC's and slow and canalize enemy movements.

13. (U) Subject: Use of nonpersistent CS in support of troops in contact.

a. Observation. On 10 Mar 69, 70 E-158 Tactical CS Cluster Bombs, followed by artillery and air strikes were employed against heavily fortified NVA forces east of Tien Phouc.

b. Evaluation. Following this action, 152 NVA bodies, killed by artillery and air strikes, were found in the area. Nonpersistent CS can effectively be employed to make enemy troops leave fortifications so that they will be vulnerable to artillery fire and air strikes.

c. Recommendation. None.

14. (U) Subject: Contaminations of Rocket Launching Sites
a. Observation. One enemy OP and 14 suspected rocket launching sites west of Chu Lai were contaminated with RCA CS from 14 Mar - 29 Apr 69.

b. Evaluation. No rocket attacks on Chu Lai have occurred since the contamination started, however, no significant conclusions can be drawn from this since rocket attacks throughout the AO have greatly lessened during this time frame.

c. Recommendation. None.

15. (U) Subject: Contamination of Enemy Mortar Positions.

a. Observation. LZ SNOOPY was receiving daily mortar fire from an area east of their location. It was desired to reduce the enemy mortar fire through the use of RCA CS.

b. Evaluation. The area was heavily contaminated with CS, and enemy mortar fire from this area ceased. Area contamination with RCA CS can significantly reduce the likelihood of enemy use of a given area.

c. Recommendation. None.

16. (U) Subject: Helicopter herbicide spray

a. Observation. A technique for spraying herbicide over hostile areas, without becoming overly vulnerable to enemy fire, is needed.

b. Recommendation. In the future, when spraying areas which require numerous sorties, all available division chemical resources should be pooled to cut down on time over target and reduce the amount of time that gunship cover is needed. In addition, the target area should be interdicted with artillery y fire between sorties to keep enemy troops from planting command detonated mines.

17. (U) Subject: Land Clearing Operations in Mined Areas

a. Observation. Engineer forces conducting land clearing operations on the Batangan Peninsula encountered a considerable number of anti-personnel mines. D7 dozer operators are completely exposed and vulnerable to this type of mining.

b. Evaluation. The CEV is an excellent partner to work with the standard dozer. Buttoned up, the CEV precede the dozers pushing down large trees and traversing the area. Anti-personnel mines present are detonated by the CEV with complete safety to personnel and little damage to the vehicles. The Xenon search light must be removed to prevent damage.

c. Recommendation. That CEV's be used as described above for all instances where anti-personnel mines are a hazard to land clearing operations.

18. (U) Subject: Prefabricated Bunker Kits

a. Observation. Units have been utilizing bunker kits on forward fire bases with considerable success.

b. Evaluation. (1) By precutting and packaging bunkers, considerable time and engineer effort has been conserved. As an example, a squad can construct an 8'x8' bunker in one hour.

(2) Design has been standardized to provide a selection of most useful sizes. Sizes used are 8'x8', 8'x12', 12'x16', 16'x16', 16'x24', and 20'x32'. All dimensions are in four foot increments to conserve plywood and simplify construction.

(3) Care must be taken by using unit to deliver the kits intact to the fire base. If the kits are broken, pieces will be lost or stolen and the set of plans included with each kit may be lost.

(4) Thus far, utilization of the kits has been restricted to remote fire bases to conserve stockage. They have been successfully utilized at LZ CORK, MINUTEMAN, PROFESSIONAL, BUFF, DOTTIE, and OP ONE.

c. Recommendation. That prefabricated bunker kits be utilized whenever possible at remote fire support bases.

C. Intelligence

1. (C) SUBJECT: Use of Short Range Reconnaissance Patrols.
a. Observation: An OZ that is extremely large and contains no significant enemy units is very difficult to control. Company sweeps produce few results as the local enemy elements assume the role of farmer at the approach of US troops. Enemy activity is resumed once the troops depart.

b. Evaluation: Companies were required to provide three heavily armed thirteen man teams led by highly qualified NCO's. The teams were inserted by air or walked to selected OP's as unobtrusively as possible. Once on location, they directed artillery or used small arms on any VC sightings. By this method, enemy movement and activity was curtailed in a large area with a minimum number of friendly forces. Teams normally were inserted for four days or longer if intelligence warranted.

c. Recommendation: That friendly forces faced with a similar situation can form and effectively deploy reconnaissance/killer teams from organic assets.

2. (C) SUBJECT: CI Blacklist.

a. Observation: CI Section maintains a blacklist on VC infrastructure throughout the brigade area of operation. Such a blacklist is an effective tool in operating against VC infrastructure and also is a helpful reference during interrogation of detainees by the IPW Section.

b. Evaluation: An up to date comprehensive blacklist is necessary for effective operations against VC infrastructure. The maintenance of a blacklist requires a great deal of time.

c. Recommendation: That an intelligence specialist be assigned to each brigade whose sole function is to compile, maintain, and update an effective CI Blacklist.

3. (C) SUBJECT: Operations against the VC Infrastructure.

a. Observation: One of the most difficult problems confronting tactical elements is the identification of infrastructure personalities encountered in the field or transported to the detention facilities for screening. Best results are obtained when local GVN officials/DIOCC Representatives are available on site. Usually these officials are knowledgeable of the area and the population. Often they are able to identify subjects for interrogation.

b. Evaluation: Coordination with local GVN officials/DIOCC representatives eliminates unnecessary detention of innocent personnel and increased

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the probability that VC infrastructure will be detained.

c. Recommendations: That units effect timely liaison with local officials/DIOCC representatives and prospective target areas and coordinate combined population screening operations.

4. (U) SUBJECT: Necessity for Montagnard Interpreters.

a. Observation: Numerous Montagnard VCS were detained by Americal units during the last quarter.

b. Evaluation: Often it is difficult, if not impossible, for Americal interpreters to question Montagnard detainees effectively.

c. Recommendation: One interpreter who can speak local Montagnard dialects as well as Vietnamese should be assigned to the IPW Sections of divisions operating in Montagnard territory.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Transmission Security Violations.

a. Observation: The predominant transmission security violation noted during the past ninety (90) days has been the use of unauthorized codes.

b. Evaluation: Units utilize unauthorized codes because of the general feeling that KAC Codes take too long to encrypt and decrypt the information. Under the new instructions for the KAC-Q numerical code, the amount of time needed for encryption and decryption has been decreased.

c. Recommendations: That personnel be trained in the use of the KAC Codes in order that they be thoroughly familiar with the new procedures of encryption and decryption.

6. (U) SUBJECT: Losses of SOI's, SOI Extracts or KAC Codes.

a. Observation: During the past quarter there have been 14 losses of SOI's, SOI extracts of KAC Codes. Twelve of these losses occurred because the material was not secured to the responsible individual.

b. Evaluation: Each of these losses is a serious breach of security and could have been prevented.

c. Recommendation: That each individual having access to an SOI/KAC Code be thoroughly briefed on the need to secure these items to their person in order to avoid unnecessary loss, and on serious implications of losses.

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D. Logistics

1. (U) SUBJECT: Power Supply PP-4763

a. Observation: The power supply is equipped with a sensing device which compensates for power loss in a series circuit. The terminals of this devise are connected to the power output terminals and when they become loose and/or dirty they tend to arc. Continued arcing will damage the printed circuit and disable the power supply.

c. Recommendation: Care should be taken to insure the terminals are kept tight and free of dust and terminals tightened when required.

2. (U) SUBJECT: AN/GRC-142

a. Observation: Forward Area Signal Center Platoons are, by their mission, widely dispersed. MTOE 11-38 G provides no back-up RATT equipment.

b. Evaluation: The AN/GRC-142 contains no back-up equipment. Any portion of the radio that becomes deadlined causes the station to be off the air.

c. Recommendation: Change the authorized RATT equipment within the Forward Communications Company from the AN/GRC-142 to the AN/GRC-122.

3. (U) SUBJECT: AN/MGC-17

a. Observation: Forward Area Signal Center Platoons are, by their missing, widely dispersed. MTOE 11038 G provides no back-Communications Center equipment.

b. Evaluation: The MGC-17 provides (1) one TT-4 and (2) TT-76's. This configuration permits one receiving position and one poking/transmitting position. The second TT-76 is the only back-up teletype equipment provided. The climatic conditions in Vietnam usually cause one piece of this equipment to be in maintenance at any given time. The one authorized teletype maintenance repairman can not cover the three widely separated platoons (as much as 90 miles) on a timely basis.

c. Recommendations: That each MGC-17 authorized to the Forward Communications Company be augmented with an additional TT-76 and TT-4.

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E. Civil Affairs/PSYOP

1 (C) SUBJECT: Employment of Kit Carson Scouts for PSYOP.

a. Observation: Employment of Kit Carson Scouts as an integral portion of PSYOP Teams has resulted in more effective ground and aerial broadcasts and more credible face-to-face communication.

b. Evaluation: The addition of two Kit Carson Scouts to each HB (Combat Loudspeaker) team in the division has increased the teams' capabilities in supporting both tactical operations and pacification programs.

(1) Prior to this augmentation, the teams operated on a three-man concept: Team Leader, Assistant Team Leader, and ARVN Interpreter. The ARVN Interpreter conducted all broadcasts. The resultant broadcasts often lacked enthusiasm and realism as the ARVN Interpreter frequently did not possess the motivation necessary to conduct effective appeals in support of combat operations, and because he was not generally a native of the operational areas, did not understand the needs, customs, or idiosyncrasies of the people. Moreover, because of his impersonal approach, it often appeared that he had no real concern for the welfare of the people. The addition of the Kit Carson Scout allowed the interpreter to primarily translate between the Team Chief and the KCS, and the KCS handled the bulk of the broadcast duties. His former association with the VC/NVA was conducive to the emanation of believable, realistic, broadcasts directed to the enemy. Similarly, because the KCS is generally a former VC who was born and raised in the immediate area, his approach to the people quickly gains their attention and confidence and results in positive PSYOP. KCS's employed by PSYOP teams generally were Political Cadre when a member of the VC. Their previous training and their own firm convictions which caused them to rally to the GVN make them extremely effective communicators. Their sincere concern for the people frequently creates an atmosphere of confidence to the extent the people will frequently divulge information of intelligence value. In addition, the KCS ability to recognize evidence of VC influence in form of slight nuances of speech or unusual behavioral traits also provides more concrete assessment of a particular area. The KCS working with PSYOP teams has repeatedly demonstrated courage and coolness in combat situations, continuing to operate even though under fire.

(2) In recent months, maneuver battalions of the division had been equipping, training, and utilizing their own organic loudspeaker teams; thereby giving the battalion commander access to quick reaction PSYOP for tactical operations and affording him and additional agency with which to support pacification operations. Based on the experiences of the HB teams as related above, the addition of Kit Carson Scouts to these battalion loudspeaker teams would enhance their capabilities accordingly.

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c. Recommendation: That qualified Kit Carson Scouts be assigned to loudspeaker-equipped maneuver battalions for usage with organic PSYOP teams.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Inclosure
Amcal Div Trp list

HARRY S. TABOR
Colonel, SigC
Acting Chief of Staff

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DISTRIBUTION:

1-ACSFOR-DA (thru USARPAC)
2-ACSFOR-DA (thru USARV to DA)
2-CINCUSARPAC
3-CG, USARV
1-OCMH-DA
2-CO, 11th Inf Bde
2-CO, 196th Inf Bde
2-CO, 198th Inf Bde
2-CO, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
2-CO, Div Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn, 1st Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 3d Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 21st Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 20th Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 20th Inf
1-CO, 2nd Bn, 1st Inf
1-CO, 3d Bn, 21st Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 31st Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 6th Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 46th Inf
1-CO, 5th Bn, 46th Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 52nd Inf
1-CO, 6th Bn, 11th Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn, 82d Arty
1-Chemical Officer
1-Provost Marshal
10-CO, 3d Mil Hist Det

1-CO, 1ST Bn, 14th Arty
1-CO, 3D Bn 16th Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn, 18th Arty
1-CO, E Trp, 1st Cav
1-CO, F Trp, 17th Cav
1-CO, H Trp, 17th Cav
1-CO, 6th Spt Bn
1-CO, 8th Spt Bn
1-CO, 9th Spt Bn
1-CO, 123d Avn Bn
1-CO, 14th Avn Bn
1-CO, 16th Cmbt Avn Gp
2-TACP (ALO), Americal Div
1-CO, 26th Engr Bn
1-CO, 39th Engr Bn
1-CO, 523d Sign Bn
1-ACofS, G1
1-ACofS, G2
5-ACofS, G3
1-ACofS, G4
1-ACofS, G5
1-IG
1-II MAF LNO
8-CO, Americal Div Spt Cmd

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375
(1 JUL 1969)

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the ARmy, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters Americal Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning the USARV Direct Commission Program, section II, page 60, paragraph 4; concur. The method utilized by the Americal Division for processing applications and identifying and interviewing applicants for the USARV Direct Commission Program is highly commended. USARV will publish a command letter bringing this procedure to the attention of all commands as a proven method of processing applications of this nature.

b. (U) Reference item concerning Scheduling of General Court-Martial Cases, section II., page 63, paragraph a(9); nonconcur. The recommendation is not practical considering there are only three law officers which service the thirteen General Court-Martial jurisdictions in Vietnam. The evaluation indicates that two or three cases are being tried during each visit of the law officer under the current system. It should be noted that when two or more cases are tried consecutively by one court there is always the possibility that the court will be required to sit continually for as long as seven or eight days. An alternate solution would be for the Americal Division to have more than one General Court convened and this would permit cases to be referred alternately to these courts and would preclude court members from sitting on consecutive cases. The present arrangement makes it possible to get maximum utilization out of the few law officers with a maximum amount of travel and prevents court members from being absent too long from other duties. When each case requires two days travel, too little time is spent in court and too much on the road. An additional military judge has been requested to reduce the present undue burden on the military judge in Vietnam. Unit will be advised of the above comment.

c. (U) Reference item concerning Movement through Mined Areas, section II, page 67, paragraph b(6); concur. The evaluation discussion describes the basic concept for employment of the armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) in support of combat elements. Dissemination of this information is considered redundant as it is standard doctrine. Unit will be advised.

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d. (U) Reference item concerning Land Clearing Operations in Mined Areas, section II, page 71, paragraph b(17); concur. Land clearing operations are sometimes opposed by heavy anti-vehicular mines, which would defeat the combat engineer vehicle (CEV). The technique described was successful in the specific clearing operation described, but would not be applicable to all land clearing operations. No further action required.

e. (C) Reference item concerning CI Blacklist, section II, page 73, paragraph C3, Concur in the desirability of maintaining a blacklist on VC Infrastructure (VIC). Nonconcur in recommendation that an intelligence specialist be assigned to each brigade for the sole purpose of compiling, maintaining, and updating and effective CI Blacklist. The CI team attached to each brigade from the MI Detachment could easily accomplish this function. Coordination with Phoenix, DIOCC and PIOCC representatives will be necessary to maintain a current local blacklist. Unit will be advised. No further action required.

f. (U) Reference items concerning AN/GRC-142, section II, page 75, paragraph D(2) and AN/MGC-17, section II, page 75, paragraph D(3); concur. The ORLL does not provide sufficient information or justification upon which to base a valid evaluation of these recommendations for additional equipment authorization. The Signal Officer of the Americal Division has been advised to submit these requirements thru G3 channels as an MTOE action.

g. (U) Reference item concerning Employment of Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) for PSYOP, section II, page 76, paragraph E(1); concur. Employing KCS on loudspeaker missions can lend to the credibility of the propaganda directed against VC/NVA. When employed in their home provinces KCS can also lend to the effectiveness of loudspeaker operations through familiarity with the people and similar regional speech qualities. Unit commanders are able to use currently employed KCS on PSYOP missions as they consider appropriate. KCS may be assigned within an organization as the senior commander desires in accordance with USARV Regulation 525-9.

FOR THE COMMANDER

C.D. WILSON
1LT, AGC

Cy furn:
Americal Div

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HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
ASST AG

AMERICAL DIVISION TROOP LIST
(as of 30 April 1969)

2. HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION

HHC, Americal Division

1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
F Troop, 8th Cav
415th Sig Det
570th TC Det

26th Engr Bn
160th Engr Det

523d Sig Bn

23d MP Co

3d Mil Hist Det

USAMID (PROV)
52d MI Det
569th MI Det
635th MI Det
636th MI Det

328th RR Det

2, AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY

HHB, Div Arty
6th Bn, 11th Arty
1st Bn, 14th Arty
3d Bn, 82d Arty
3d Bn, 16th Arty
3d Bn, 18th Arty
1st Bn, 82d Arty
6th Bn, 56th Arty (LESS OPCON)
G Btry, 55th Arty (.50)
B Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Arty (OF Party and Metro Section)
251st Radar Det
252d Radar Det

3. AMERICAL DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

HHC and Band
23d S&T Bn
23d Med Bn
723d Maint Bn (-)
23 Admin Co
Co G (Ranger), 75th Inf
63d Inf Plt (CTT)
Americal Combat Center (PROV)

4. 16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP

HHC, 16th CAG (Cbt)
14th Combat Avn Bn
 71st Avn Co (Aslt Hel)
 174th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)
 176th Avn Co (Aslt Hel)
 534th Med Det
 756th Med Det
 14th Security Plt

123d Avn Bn (Cbt) (Inf Div)
 132d Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)
 178th Avn Co (Aslt Spt Hel)
 E Co, 723d Maint Bn

335th Trans Co

5. 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 11th Inf Bde
3d Bn, 1st Inf
4th Bn, 3d Inf
1st Bn, 20th Inf
4th Bn, 21st Inf
E Trp, 1st Cav

Inclosure 1 (Con't)

59th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
90th Chem Det
31st Public Information Det
327th Avn Det
Combat Weather Team 2

6. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196TH Inf Bde
2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
F Trp, 17th Cav
48th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
27th Chem Det
10th Public Information Det
Combat Weather Team 1

7. 198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 198th Inf Bde
1st Bn, 6th Inf
1st Bn, 46th Inf
5th Bn, 46th Inf
1st Bn, 52d Inf
H Trp, 17th Cav
57th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
87th Chem Det

8. NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

3d Plt, G Btry, 29th Arty, Searchlight (OPCON)

Inclosure 1 (Con't)

4th CA Flt
6th CA Plt
51st CA Plt
Det 3, 7th Psyop Bn (DS of Div)
USASSG, ACSI, DA
46th Engr Det
OL7, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF

9. Request notification of any changes/corrections be made to CPT Major, G3 DOT 493/3776.

FSB Buck AT806320, LZ Contor BT 050250, LZ Gimlet (BT858230, LZ West 990250, LZ Cacti BT060473, Polar Bear II AT939211, Baldy BT130449, LZ Ross BT028341, LZ O'Conner AT935243, Fat City BT 440077, LZ Lurch AT 926238, LZ Professional BT173076, LZ Bowman BT238140, LZ Pleasantville, Hawk Hill (BT224311, LZ Chippewa BS485 967, LZ Gator BS571963, LZ Sheryl BT302192, Hau Duc BT048043, LZ Buff BS539824, LZ Jane BS 660758, LZ Cork BS450612. LZ Gator BS571963, Hill 54 BT396143, Uptight BS726857, Chevy BS428714, Bronco BS450612, Quang Ngai Air Field BS605719, Minh Long (BS 458466, Bato BS555325, Dragon BS730529, Ha Thanh BS 428718, LZ Bulldog BS730528, Div Arty Hill BT51580399, Hill 10 BS 583722, LZ Pepper BS496716, LZ Dancer BS682402, LZ East BT 13102025