

AD388478

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Adjutant General
Washington, D.C. 20310

In Reply Refer to
AGAM-P (M) (4 Mar 68) For OT RD-t674263 7 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U).

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
MAJOR GENERAL, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

as

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 Americical Division Artillery
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-AT

27 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I

Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

1. Present Organization.

a. Assigned or attached elements.

Headquarters, Americal Division Artillery.

2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155mm Howitzer) (Towed).

3d Battalion, 16th Artillery, (155mm Howitzer) (Towed).

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery, (8" Howitzer/175mm Gun) (Self-Propelled).

OPCON

5th Marine Battery (Provisional).

1st Platoon 155 Gun Battery (Self-Propelled).

3rd Platoon, 8" Howitzer Battery (Self-Propelled).

Battery A, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm Howitzer) (Towed)

3d Platoon, Battery G (Searchlight), 29th Artillery

1st Platoon, Battery G (50 Caliber), 65th Artillery (Automatic Weapons).

b. At the end of the report period, the 16 searchlights of the 3d Platoon, Battery G, 29th Artillery were deployed in support of Americal Division units as follows:

FOR OT RD
T674263

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Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF LIGHTS</u>
1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)	4
3d Battalion, 82d Artillery, 196th Light Infantry Brigade	2
Chu Lai Defense Command	1
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery, 196th Light Infantry Brigade Area of Operations)	3
2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division	2
2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, (3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Area of Operations)	4

c. The four M55's (quad .50) of the 1st Platoon, Battery G, 65th Artillery (Automatic Weapons) are deployed under the Operational Control of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

2. Summary of Events.

a. With the redesignation of Headquarters, Task Force Oregon as Headquarters, Americal Division on 20 September 1967, Task Force Oregon Artillery became Americal Division Artillery. The division artillery continues to operate at the austere manning level originally set-up for the Task Force, but is scheduled to activate a normal Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, TOE 6-302E, in November.

b. Command inspections of the three artillery battalions comprising the division artillery were conducted by Division artillery Headquarters in preparation for impending AGI's. General format and checklists for the AGI were used for these inspections.

2d Battalion, 11th Artillery - 5 August 1967.
 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery - 12 September 1967.
 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery - 19 October 1967.

c. Annual General Inspections of the following units were conducted by the Americal Division Inspector General during the report period. Both battalions successfully passed their Annual General Inspections and were commended for the outstanding manner they were performing their primary mission and are in the process of correcting any deficiencies noted.

2d Battalion, 11th Artillery - 18-22 September 1967.
 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery - 23-27 October 1967.

d. All artillery units with Americal Division received the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC) and associated equipment in August 1967. A team from Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer/Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility Assistance Team, Pacific

conducted operator and maintenance courses for personnel of all artillery battalions during the period 21-25 August 1967. The equipment was issued on 25 August 1967, following completion of the course of instruction. Field artillery data computer has proven to be a reliable, effective time saving gunnery device, when operational. However, a deadline rate of 33% was experienced.

e. The Americal Division Artillery conducted a Fire Direction Course in August 1967, for Fire Direction Officers and Chief computers at both Battery and Battalion. The purpose of the course was to acquaint supervisory personnel with their responsibilities and to stress those gunnery techniques which are particularly applicable to Vietnam. The course has proven to be extremely beneficial. A second course will be conducted in December.

f. In August, Division Artillery requested survey support from Third Marine Amphibious Force to establish third order survey control within the division Tactical Area of Responsibility. Division Artillery has no survey capability. This request was forwarded to Military Assistance Command Vietnam which tasked the 509th Engineer Company to accomplish the survey. On 4 October a 27-man team commenced surveying 10 third order control points along Highway 1 from Chu Lai to Hill 63. Upon completion of the project a total of 13 third order survey points will have been established along Highway 1 in the Americal Division Tactical Area of Responsibility.

3. Operations.

a. The Americal Division Artillery in addition to exercising full command over the units listed paragraph d, supervise artillery techniques and two separate batteries. This artillery is spread laterally a distance of some 150 Kilometers. In addition to its primary mission of providing artillery fires for the Americal Division, the Division Artillery provides supporting fires, on a coordination and cooperation basis for the 2d Army Republic of Vietnam, the 2d Republic of Korea Marine Brigade, and for Special Forces Teams and United States Marine units operating in an adjacent to the Division Tactical Area of Responsibility.

b. During the report period Division Artillery provided supporting artillery fires for the following major operations of the Division:

Operation HOOD RIVER	2-13 August 1967
Operation BENTON	14-31 August 1967
Operation COOK	2-10 September 1967
Operation Wheeler	11 September 1967 (continuing)
Operation Wallowa	4 October 1967 (continuing)

1) HOOD RIVER

a) In coordination with the 2d Army Republic of Vietnam Division and the 2d Republic of Korea Marine Brigade, the Americal Division (then Task Force OREGON) conducted assaults in zone to destroy enemy forces and installations in the vicinity of Base Area 121.

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b) Division Artillery supported the operation with two 155mm howitzer batteries and one 8"/175mm gun battery in addition to direct support artillery. C Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155mm How) was moved by helicopter to firing position in vicinity of HA THANH CIDG Camp (BS393703) on 31 July 1967 to reinforce the fires of the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery. On 2 August 1967, B Battery, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8"/175mm gun) and C Battery, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm How) moved to firing positions in the vicinity of BS467870 to provide general support for the operation and to reinforce the fires of the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, C Battery, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery provided direct support for the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The artillery organization for combat was as follows:

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (-)	Direct Support - 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (+)	Direct Support - 196th Light Infantry Brigade
2d Battalion, 320th Artillery	Direct Support - 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division
2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) C Battery (OPCON to 2/320)	General Support/Reinforcing 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery Reinforcing - 2d Battalion 320th Artillery
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-) C Battery (OPCON to 3/18)	Reinforcing - 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery Direct Support - 2d Squadron(-), 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)	General Support Reinforcing- 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery

2. BENTON

a) Americal Division (then Task Force OREGON) conducted offensive operations to locate and destroy enemy forces, installations and facilities in and around Base Area 117.

b) Division Artillery supported the operation with three 155mm howitzer batteries and one 8"/175mm gun battery in addition to direct support artillery. On 11 August 1967, C Battery, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery moved to the Tien PHOUC CIDG Camp (BT 104149) and on 14 August 1967 was placed under OPCON of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The artillery organization for combat was as follows:

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (-)	Direct Support - 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.
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3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (+)	Direct Support - 196th, Light Infantry Brigade
2d Battalion, 320th Artillery	Direct Support - 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division
2d Battalion, 11th Artillery	Reinforce - 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-)	General Support Reinforcing
A Battery	Reinforcing - 3d Battalion 82d Artillery
Howitzer Battery 2d Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Reinforcing - 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery
B Battery	Reinforce 3d Bn, 18th Arty
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)	General Support Reinforcing- 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery
B Battery	Reinforce 3d Bn, 16th Arty

3) COOK

a) The Division supported Vietnamese elections by: (1) Conducting aggressive cordon and search operations within assigned TAOR's (2) Providing distant security by search and destroy and screening tactics for polling sites established within areas of responsibility, (3) Providing logistical air support to Republic of Vietnam Air Force, when necessary, within restrictions required by US policy, (4) Providing ground or heliborne company size ready reaction forces, on order, to areas deemed appropriate due to displacement of Government Vietnam forces during the election period.

b) Division Artillery conducted an accelerated H&I program on areas containing enemy infiltration routes and likely areas for rocket/mortar firing sites. The operation was supported from the normal (permanent) artillery positions except for a provisional 4-howitzer battery from the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery which on 4 September 1967 was moved to HA THANH (BT130201) to reinforce the 2d Battalion, 320th Arty. Organization for combat was as follows:

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (-)	Direct Support - 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (+)	Direct Support - 196th Light Infantry Brigade
2d Battalion, 320th Artillery	Direct Support - 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division

2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (+)

General Support - 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery and 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery with 1 battery each.

3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-)

Reinforcing - 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery

General Support/Reinforcing 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery

4) WHEELER

a) On 10 September 1967, Americal Division commenced a 9? battalion offensive and security operation, in three phases, to destroy enemy base camps fortifications and enemy forces operating in terrain west of TAM KY and along Route 1 between TAM KY and Hill 63. Operation continues.

b) Division Artillery supported the operation as follows:

C Battery, 3d Battalion, 16 Artillery displaced to the TIEN PHOUC Special Forces Camp (BT105144) on 10 September 1967 to provide reinforcing fires for the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery. The battery moved again on 26 September 1967 to AT9921830 to continue it's mission of reinforcing the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, returning to TIEN PHOUC on 19 October 1967. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (-)

Direct Support - 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (+)

Direct Support - 196th Light Infantry Brigade

2d Battalion, 320th Artillery

Direct Support - 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division

2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (+)

Reinforcing - 2d Battalion 9th Artillery

3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-)

Reinforcing - 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery

C Battery

Reinforcing - 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)

General Support Reinforcing- 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery

5) The Americal Division conducted offensive operations in the HIEP DUC - QUE SON Valley to locate and destroy North Vietnamese/Viet Cong main and local force units and provide security to Province Headquarters TAM KY

and engineer elements along Highway 1 between TAM KY and Hill 63 (BT132453). The 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was added to the Americal Division force for the operation. The operation continues.

b) Division Artillery supported the operation as follows:

A Battery, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery displaced to Hill 29 (BT224311) on 14 October 1967 to provide General Support Reinforcing fires for the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery. A platoon of B Battery, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (2-175mm guns) displaced to Hill 29 on 2 October 1967 and the 8" platoon was displaced to Hill 63 (BT 139444) on 26 October 1967 to provide General Support Reinforcing fires for the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery. Along with the direct support artillery of the brigades, the Division Artillery was also augmented by one 155mm Battery (A Battery, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery), a four piece provisional Marine battery and by a section (4-M55MG) of G Battery, 65th Artillery, all of which were placed under OPCON of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (-)	Direct Support - 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
3d Battalion, 82d Artillery	Direct Support - 196th Light Infantry Brigade
1st Battalion, 21st Artillery (+)	Direct Support - 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (+)	Reinforce - 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery	Reinforcing - 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery Reinforcing - 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery Reinforcing - 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)	General Support Reinforcing- 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery with one Battery

4) Administrative and Tactical Moves: None.

1. Logistics.

a. Item: Calibration of Artillery Tubes.

Discussion: Due to the manner in which artillery is utilized

In Vietnam, i.e. with a 6400 mil firing capability, it is highly desirable that valid velocity errors be obtained for each piece. Artillery units at present must rely on comparative VE's obtained from several registrations made in conjunction with concurrent metros. This method requires considerable time and computation and gives only a comparative VE. In addition, the large volume of firing requires the VE's be recomputed on a continuing basis. Calibration support was requested of the 1st Logistical Command in July 1967. Calibration of the artillery weapons of the Americal Division is now scheduled to begin in late November 1967.

Observation: There is an urgent requirement for calibration of artillery tubes on a recurring basis. VE's will enable artillery units to deliver more accurate fire and preclude errors which could lead to serious accidents or incidents.

b. Item: Field Artillery Data Automatic Computer (FADAC).

Discussion: The introduction of FADAC has proven extremely beneficial. Speed and accuracy of computation has increased. The ability to compute metro and VE data, and to provide independent checks of firing data has also improved. The system has proven fairly rugged, but down time has been excessive due to lack of spare parts. ASL's and PLL's computed in CONUS have not proven entirely satisfactory in this theater. Demand data is being compiled for FADAC's by the 188th Maintenance Battalion and other support organizations.

Observation: The FADAC has proven itself to be a reliable, effective, time saving and rugged device. An adequate flow of spare parts will greatly increase the number of operational FADAC's.

c. Item: Lack of Heavy Lift Capability.

Discussion: A new high percent of artillery moves and of ammunition resupply must be performed by helicopter aircraft made available to Division. To move a stripped 155mm battery to a forward fire base, Division Artillery must depend on the U.S. Marines for CH-53 aircraft or on CH-54 aircraft which are assigned to U.S. units in adjacent CTZ. A case in point was C Battery, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery on 17 October 1967 located at a forward fire base. For two successive days all efforts to extract that battery using borrowed CH-53 aircraft failed due to limited availability of these aircraft and their limited capability to lift a 155 howitzer. The fire base was attacked for three of the last four days losing 5 killed and 17 wounded in one attack which penetrated the perimeter of Battery A, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery. The third day, after a combat essential mission had been declared at the highest level, a CH-54 aircraft was finally provided by the 1st Air Cavalry Division to the Americal Division for the extraction of this firing Battery. Extraction of other elements on the fire base had been declared pending availability of a heavy lift helicopter, jeopardizing a sizable force.

Observation: The Division must have immediately available a heavy lift aircraft capability to enable the proper deployment and employment of medium artillery in the counterinsurgency environment of Vietnam.

d. Item: Resupply of Artillery Ammunition During Heavy Rainfall Periods.

Discussion: On 8 October 1967 a total of fourteen and one half inches of rain fell in a 24 hour period. Extensive damage was done to MSR's as a result flooding and washing. Consequently available ammunition stocks at certain firing positions reached an unacceptably low level. Insufficient helicopter were available to maintain the ASR's at the firing positions. For a period of three days to six days in some areas, 50 percent of all ammunition resupply of artillery units in the Americal TAOR was by rotary wing aircraft, often over long distances. The Problem was further complicated by a shortage of slings and associated equipment. Inclement weather on 10 October was deemed too hazardous to fly at all. While available ammunition stocks never reached a critical level, H and I fires were curtailed and should any ground unit have become heavily engaged, requiring heavy prolonged fire support, this situation could have become critical in a very short while. Difficulty and possible tragedy was averted primarily by judicious stock-piling of ammunition at the gun positions to the maximum extent possible. In addition artillery firing elements were positioned in mutually supporting positions with some in close proximity to ASP's.

Observation: During period of heavy rainfall, which often closes MSR's and restricts flying, the demands placed on artillery are increased. It is therefore imperative that sufficient stocks of artillery ammunition are available during these critical periods. This can be accomplished in two ways: First, by stockpiling at a predetermined level, adequate quantities of ammunition to meet any foreseeable contingencies, and second, by having an immediately responsible aircraft capability during periods of favorable flying weather. This should be accomplished without having to curtail H and I fires which take on a greater significance during periods of reduced visibility.

SECTION III RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Logistics.

a. That calibration teams be made available to artillery units of a Division on a recurring basis.

b. That as soon as sufficient demand data has been determined, new ASL's and PLL's for FADAC's be authorized and placed in the maintenance flow system that float FADAC computers and test sets be made available in Vietnam, with an adequate stockage of spare parts, to enable deadline rates for computers to be held at 8% or less.

c. There must be immediately available, to the division, either organic or in support sufficient heavy lift capability to enable division artillery to properly plan for the helicopter deployment of medium artillery

in support of infantry maneuver units. This must also include the ability to resupply these units.

MASON J. YOUNG, JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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AVDF-GC (22 Nov 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION, APO San Francisco
96374, 5 January 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. (U) Forwarded herewith is subject report of the Americal Division
Artillery.

2. (U) This headquarters concurs with the observations and comments
contained in subject report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

KAZUTO KAWABATA
Capt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (22 Nov 67) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, Americal Division Artillery (GLLA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference items concerning calibration of artillery tubes, page 7, paragraph 1a; and page 9, paragraph 1a: Concur. The Radar Chronograph, M36, is scheduled for issue to Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, during the 3d Quarter, FY 68. The chronograph will enable the unit to make timely and accurate Velocity Error (VE) measurement. Department of the Army must approve the USARV proposed Mission Plan and direct release of chronographs for issue in SEA.

b. Reference item concerning field Artillery data automatic computer, page 8, paragraph 1b; and page 9, paragraph 11b: Concur. Additional spare parts stockage and float items for FADAC are tentatively scheduled for issue to DSUs, GSUs and depots during the 3d Quarter, FY 68. When issued, responsiveness of the supply system will be greatly improved. DA must approve the revised USARV Mission Support Plan prior to release of FADAC items for issue in SEA.

c. Reference item concerning heavy lift capability, page 8, paragraph 1c; and page 9, paragraph 1c: Concur. The desirability of having a heavy lift capability immediately available to the Division Commander is recognized. Due to the limited CH-54 assets available, heavy lift support is only available on a mission basis.

d. Reference item concerning resupply of artillery ammunition during heavy rainfall, page 9, paragraph 1d: Concur. Additional aviation support is available upon request, based upon requirements to support the tactical effort throughout RVN.

3. (U) A cop of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER

GROUP 4

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cy furn:

HQ, Americal Div Arty
HQ, Americal Div

D.E. TUMAN
Major AAGC
Asst Adjutant General

GPOP-DT (22 Nov 67)

3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 from HQ, Americal Division Artillery (UIC: WGLLAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 24 FEB 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG