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23rd Inf Div

Feb-Apr '71

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OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 23d Inf Div
(Americal) Period Ending 30 April 1971 (U)

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2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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15 May 1971

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(Americal), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division (Americal)
APO San Francisco 96374

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(Americal), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, DC 20310

Location: CHU LAI Combat Base (BT 555035), RVN
Reporting Officer: Major General James L. Baldwin
Collated by: Captain William H. Offutt Jr., 3d Military History Detachment
Map References: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets: 6538 I,
6539 I, II, III, IV; 6638 I, IV; 6639 I, II, III, IV, 6640 I, II, III,
IV; 6738 I, II, III, IV; 6739 I, II, III, IV; 6740 III; 6838 III, IV;
6641 I, II; 6540 I, II, III, IV; 6541 I, II, III, IV.

I. (C) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. (C) Background. The 23d Infantry Division continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest during the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971, with contact ranging from light to heavy in Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK and from light to moderate throughout the remainder of the 23d Infantry Division's AO. Operations IRON MOUNTAIN, FREDERICK HILL, GENEVA PARK, PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE and NANTUCKET BEACH were terminated effective 010600H March 1971. Effective 010601H March 1971 Operations FINNEY HILL (198th Infantry Brigade) and MIDDLESEX PEAK (196th Infantry Brigade) were initiated. Operation WASCO RAPIDS was initiated at 130600H March 1971 by the 198th Brigade and terminated effective 272400H March 1971. Task Force Burnett continued OPCODE to the 1st Marine Division participating in Operation HOANG DIEU. Operation HOANG DIEU was terminated on 30 November 1970. In support of Operation DEWEY CANYON, Control Headquarters XXIV Corps, the following units were placed OPCODE to the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division, effective 29 January 1971: 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry; 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry and 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery. HHC, 11 Infantry Brigade (-), 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery and 14th Combat Aviation Battalion were placed OPCODE to the 101st Airborne Division. OPCODE of all Division elements with the exception of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry was terminated effective 071700H April 1971.

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Effective 111430H April 1971 the 11th Infantry Brigade assumed responsibility for Operation FINNEY HILL. Using four Infantry Battalions the Brigade initiated combat operations to locate and destroy the VC Quang Ngai Provincial Headquarters and the 21st NVA Regiment. The 11th Brigade will assist the Mo Duc District Pacification Program by conducting combat operations in conjunction with the 4th ARVN Regiment, RF/PF forces to destroy VC/NVA forces and assist in rice denial. At 241500H April 1971 Landing Zone Maryanne (AS 961998) was transferred to the control of ARVN. On 26 April 1971 at 1745H the ARVN assumed control of Landing Zone Siberia (AT 901232). At 1645 on 27 April 1971, Fire Support Base Debbie (BS 872 324) was closed. 4-21 Infantry was relocated to Fire Support Base San Juan Hill (BS 634380). The ARVN assumed control of Landing Zone West effective 289010H April. Effective 291200H April 1971 Operation CAROLINE HILL was initiated by the 196th Infantry Brigade in Quang Nam Province. At 1201H, 29 April 1971, Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK came under the tactical control of the 198th Infantry Brigade.

B. Intelligence

1. (C) Intelligence Summary

a. Quang Tin (P):

(1) During the past six months, enemy activity increased slightly as the VC/NVA initiated two campaigns identified as the Winter-Spring Campaign (V-22) and the Spring-Summer Campaign (B-81). One of the primary objectives of these campaigns was to relocate the populace from GVN controlled areas to VC/NVA controlled areas. The campaigns failed to achieve this objective.

(2) During November and December, enemy initiated activity was light except for an occasional attack by fire and brief contacts with Allied units. According to agent reports, PW, and captured documents, this period was devoted to resupply and reindoctrination because severe weather conditions destroyed numerous food caches. The loss of these caches had a demoralizing effect on enemy personnel, forcing the VC/NVA to spend significant time rebuilding troop morale. During this time, reports indicated that the enemy was also preparing for a Winter-Spring Campaign which was to begin the first of the year.

(a) During January 71, enemy units in Quang Tin Province began final preparations for the Winter-Spring Campaign (V-22). The VC/NVA directed the campaign at outposts, refugee camps and resettlement villages in the eastern portion of the province.

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(b) There were three offensive phases of this campaign; 30 January to 6 February, 20 February to 26 February and 28 March to 3 April. As is usual in Quang Tin Province, each subsequent phase was more violent and more extensive than the previous one. On 1 February, the enemy launched the first phase of the V-22 Campaign throughout the province. The primary targets during this phase were RF and PF outposts in Thang Binh and Ly Tin Districts. In Thang Binh (D) Go Thong OP, Hill 198, Any Ly OP, and Thang Binh (D) Headquarters received ground attacks and/or attacks by fire. In Ly Tin (D) Hill 76, Hill 270, Fat City and Chu Lai Combat Base received attacks by fire and/or ground attacks. The majority of these attacks occurred on the morning of 1 February with the remaining attacks occurring throughout the week.

(c) Phase II of the Campaign began on 25 February when An Tan Bridge (BT498067) was attacked along with several outposts in Thang Binh (D).

(d) The most significant phase of the Campaign was the final phase which began on 28 March. It appears that the 28 March attack on FSB Maryanne (AS9699) was not part of the original plan; the enemy decided to eliminate Maryanne, which had been an obstacle to their supply corridors for sometime. The VC/NVA attacked several other targets such as RF/PF outposts and villages in an attempt to weaken the GVN's control of the populace.

(e) After the end of the Winter-Spring Campaign, the VC/NVA prepared for the Spring-Summer Campaign (B081) and began the campaign on 26 April. This campaign is a continuation of the VC/NVA policy of harassing GVN troops and installations in an attempt to convince the population that the government of South Vietnam is not capable of protecting them.

(f) The enemy in Quang Tin (P) conducted 90 attacks by fire, 221 ground attacks/contacts and 218 anti-aircraft attacks during the past six months. US troops accounted for 885 enemy killed during this period, and captured 108,987 pounds of rice, 12,505 pounds of corn and 34,700 pounds of salt.

(3) There are three units in Quang Tin (P) that are directly subordinate to MR-5; the 502d MF Sapper Bn, the 409th MF Sapper Bn and the 78th MF Rocket Company.

(a) The 402d Sapper Battalion, with a strength of approximately 240 men, is composed of six companies, one of which is a water sapper company. During the past six months, the Battalion has been operating along the Quang Tin-Quang Ngai (P) border. The battalion participated in the first

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and second phases of the Winter-Spring Campaign. On 1 February, the 402d attacked Hill 76 (BT452039) inflicting heavy casualties. On 25 February, probable elements of the water sapper company destroyed two spans of the An Tan Bridge (BT497066).

(b) The 409th Sapper Battalion is considered the most effective unit operating in Quang Tin (P). With a strength of approximately 260, this unit is capable of launching violent and sudden attacks. During the past six months, the headquarters has remained in and around Base Area 117, while subordinate elements have been reported throughout the province. On 14 and 15 January, the 77th ARVN Rangers engaged an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of BS1298 resulting in 22 NVA killed and many structures destroyed. According to documents found in the area, the unit contacted was probably the 409th's headquarters. The 409th has initiated one attack during this period. On 28 March, probable elements of the 409th attacked FSB Maryanne resulting in heavy casualties and extensive damage to the base. At present the battalion headquarters is believed to be located at BT2504.

(c) In October 1970, the 78th Rocket Company was reported to be a battalion size unit with a strength of 180 men. Captured documents have shown that the unit was downgraded to company size sometime after August 1970. The unit now has a strength of 90 and continues to target Chu Lai Combat Base. During the last six months, the 78th rocketed Chu Lai five times causing light casualties and doing little damage.

(d) The provincial units in Quang Tin (P) include three infantry battalions, the 70th, the 72d, and D-11; one combat support battalion, the 74th; and one sapper group, V-16.

1. The 70th Battalion, with a strength of 211 men, primarily trained and resupplied during the past six months. Allied units have engaged elements moving into Quang Nam (P) to pick up supplies several times. In December, the battalion reportedly asked the province headquarters for reinforcements because of losses suffered from these contacts. The battalion participated in several attacks during the Winter-Spring Campaign. The 70th's most recent attack occurred on 23 April when PF Outpost #216 (BT144454) received a mortar barrage which inflicted moderate casualties on the defenders.

2. The 72d battalion is considered to be the least effective battalion in the province. Since the first of November, it has lost two company commanders, two company level political officers and several platoon leaders. The loss of key personnel has prevented the unit from

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participating in the campaigns as effectively as it should have. The majority of the time the 72d has stayed near Phuoc Tan (V) (BT170175) where food caches and a surgical unit are located. At present an element of the unit is believed to be located near the Quang Nam-Quang Tin (P) border along with elements of the 70th and D-11 battalions. The headquarters is currently located near BT 1619.

3. D-11 Infantry Battalion is the least active infantry battalion in the province. There has not been a single enemy initiated incident that can be positively attributed to this battalion. In December, A PW from the battalion stated that elements of the unit consolidated with the Tien Phuoc (D) Forces and provided personnel to protect supply lines moving into Base Area 117 from the south. An allied initiated contact on 26 April near the Quang Tin-Quang Nam (P) border (BT1236) netted 42 VC killed, one of whom was identified as the XO of D-11. If these personnel were from D-11, the battalion is probably incapable of any major offensive activity. The battalion headquarters is currently held at BT 2010. However, elements of the battalion are in the norther border area.

4. The 74th Heavy Weapons Battalion is the provincial artillery unit and reportedly has elements supporting the three local force infantry battalions. There has been only a limited amount of information concerning this battalion during the reporting period. The 74th Bn provides 122mm rocket support to the infantry battalions. The battalion headquarters is currently held at BT1821.

5. Since January 1971, captured enemy documents have indicated that the V-16 Sapper Company has combined with V-17 Sapper Co to form the V-16 Sapper Group. Both units are still operating in their normal AO, one in the northern portion of the province and the other in the central portion, but they now have a central headquarters. The only contact with either of these units occurred on 6 April when the 2d Sapper Co (V-17) attacked an outpost in Que Son (D), Quang Nam (P) BT0832). Other than this contact, the units have remained inactive. The 1st Company is currently held at BT2212 and the 2d Company is unlocated near the northern province border.

(4) Significant incidents during this period include:

On 4 November at BT104318 an UNSEF fired 20 rounds 82mm mortar and 15xB-40 rockets resulting in three civ KIA and three civ WIA (E).

On 14 November at BT075325 PF #154 engaged an estimated 75 VC resulting in 2 PF KIA, 1 PF WIA (E) and 29 VC KIA.

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On 15 November at BT 311118 - BT306117 RF #132 engaged an UNSEF resulting in 24 VC KIA, IWC, and 6 CSWC.

On 30 November at (UL)BT5105 - (LR)BT5503 an UNSEF fired 18X122mm rockets at Chu Lai Combat Base resulting in 7 US KIA, 4 US WIA(E), 3 VN civ WIA(E) and a dispensary destroyed.

On 24 December at BT049127 the 77th ARVN Rangers engaged an UNSEF resulting in 20 NVA KIA and 1/120mm mortar captured.

On 25 December at BT206250 the 4-5th ARVN received 30 rounds of mortar fire resulting in neg cas.

On 4 January 1971 at BT247255 an UNSEF fired 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 PF WIA(E).

On 14 January at BS125996 the 77th ARVN Rangers engaged an UNSEF resulting in 12 NVA KIA, 17 IWC and 1,000 lbs of military equipment captured and 4,000 lbs of rice destroyed.

On 15 January at BS129998, the 77th ARVN Rangers engaged an UNSEF resulting in 10 NVA KIA, 1x60mm mortar and 4 IWC.

On 17 January at BS096984, the 77th ARVN Rangers engaged an UNSEF resulting 15 NVA KIA, 58 IWC and 11,000 lbs of rice destroyed.

On 26 January at BT143426, RF and PF elements raided a VC meeting resulting in 14 VC KIA, 5 Detainees, 60xB-40 rockets and 1xB-40 rocket launcher captured.

On 1 February at BT 173417 Thang Binh (D) Hqs received five 122mm rockets resulting in 2 VN Civ WIA.

On 1 February at BT452039, an UNSEF fired an unknown amount of B-40 rockets and conducted a sapper attack against Hill 76, manned by R/5-46th Inf and Ly Tin PF resulting in 5 VC KIA, 5 US KIA, 8 US WIA, 6 PF WIA, and 1 VN Civ WIA.

On 1 February at AS890958 - AS900960, C/1-46th found 1x.51 cal mg, 15x7.62mm MGs, 198xSKSs, 49xAK-47s, 3xK-44 rifles, 3000 rds SA ammo and 6x57mm RRs.

On 2 February Chu Lai Combat Base received 15x122mm rockets resulting in 3 US WIA(M), and 1 VN Civ WIA(E).

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On 6 February at BT149124, an UNSEF fired an unknown amount of mortar fire at PF #100 and #203 resulting in 1 PF KIA, 14 PF WIA and 10 VC KIA.

On 6 February at BT433064 fifty VC/NVA engaged Ranger Teams Maine and Texas with small arms and automatic weapons resulting in 5 US WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M).

On 11 February at AS906934, C/1-46 found 33xAK-47s, 16xSKSs, 6x140mm rockets, 133x60mm rounds, 5000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 107xbatteries and 6000 ft commo wire.

On 12 February at AS900936, an UNSEF fired automatic weapons at C/1-46th Inf resulting in 2 US KIA, 8 US WIA.

On 20 February at BT250420 an UNSEF fired small arms and threw hand grenades at PF #160 resulting in 3 VN Civ KIA, 12 VN Civ WIA and 2 VC KIA.

On 25 February at BT497066 an unknown type of explosive destroyed one pier and two spans of the An Tan Bridge (BT4906).

On 26 February at BT174232. an UNSEF fired 30 rds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire and then conducted a ground probe resulting in 9 RF WIA.

On 2 March in An Tan (BT4906) an unknown type explosive detonated in the An Tan Theater resulting in 20 Civ WIA(E).

On 8 March at BT2923, Tam Ky airport (BT3221) received 6x122mm rockets resulting in 6 Civ WIA and 2 houses destroyed.

On 19 March at BT229230 two unknown type mines detonated resulting in 1 RF KIA, 21 RF WIA and 2xM-34 trucks destroyed.

On 23 March at BT535036 Chu Lai Combat Base received 12x82mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 US WIA(E).

On 24 March at BT173097, 4/5 ARVN found 8000 rounds small arms ammunition, 10x82mm rounds, 9xB-40 rockets.

On 28 March at AS961998, an UNSEF fired 60 rds of 82mm mortar, small arms and conducted a sapper attack against the CP/1-46 (FSB Maryanne) resulting in 30 US KIA, 82 US WIA(E), 12 VC KIA, and 1x155 How destroyed.

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On 23 April at BT144454 and UNSEF fired 20-30 rds of 82mm mortar at PF #216 resulting in 2 PF KIA, 2 PF WIA(E), 23 VN Civ WIA(E) and 4 VC KIA.

On 26 April at BT122020 RF #744 and #258 engaged an UNSEF resulting in 30 VC KIA.

On 26 April at BT1236 Biet Laps PF engaged an UNSEF resulting in 1 PF KIA, 3 WIA(E), 42 VC KIA, 14 IWC and 1 CSWC.

b. Quang Ngai (P)

(1) The situation in Quang Ngai (P) at the end of April is not significantly different from the situation at the end of the last reporting period (31 Oct 70). The VC/NVA have failed to extend their power base beyond the mountains in the western half of the province. The GVN has increased its authority in the populated lowlands by relocation of people from VC controlled areas to GVN controlled areas. Hamlets were built to accommodate the movement of refugees.

(2) In early January, enemy forces in Quang Ngai (P) made plans for the Winter-Spring Offensive which began in late January and continued through the first part of April. The campaign consisted of three offensive phases: Phase I 30 January to 6 February 71; Phase II 21-28 February 71; and Phase III 28 March to 3 April 71. A second campaign, the Spring-Summer Offensive (B.81) began 24 April 71, and is expected to continue into early June. During both campaigns, the largest enemy attacks were against RF/PF and ARVN posts scattered throughout the province. The VC continued to use penetration tactics against GVN controlled areas with major emphasis on New Life Hamlets, Chieu Hoi Centers, and ARVN Training Centers. Their mission was to liberate all civilians from GVN control and have them returned to VC controlled hamlets and villages. Terrorist attacks became frequent during the campaigns as the VC attempted to destroy the peoples' faith in the GVN ability to defend them.

(a) Politically, the VC continued to strengthen the infrastructure in villages and hamlets. Emphasis was on training, proselyting, propaganda and obtaining pledges of loyalty from the cadre.

(b) Disruption of pacification activities was a major goal of the Winter-Spring Offensive of V.22 campaign. Sapper tactics were used simultaneously with internal disruption within the villages. The enemy used hit and run tactics against RF/PF and ARVN units, while the majority of contacts with US forces were indirect fire attacks and US initiated

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attacks. Ground contacts resulted from reaction to Allied operations around base areas, cache sites, and transportation corridors.

1. The first notable attack of the V.22 Campaign occurred on the morning of 1 February (see para (4)). Subsequent attacks were on OP's in Son Tinh, Mo Duc and Duc Pho (D). The attacks appear to have been well planned by district and provincial forces, with limited assistance in execution from the 21st Regt. The Thach Tru OP (BS765547), Nui Ong OP and refugee camp (BS612734), Thiet Truong OP (BS734524), Nui Deo OP (BS707605), Chau Me OP (BS750507), OP Pax (BS693538) and OP Woodstock (BS621618) were all hit during the first phase with the heaviest concentration of incidents occurring in Mo Duc (D).

2. Phase II of the V.22 Campaign began on 28 February and was considerably less intense than Phase I. Targets in Mo Duc and Son Tinh (D) were again the hardest hit.

3. Phase III of the V.22 Campaign was the most intense. A comparison of the number and size of attacks by phase is shown below.

	1-2 February	2-4 March	28 March-3 April
Total attacks by fire	27	14	36
Attacks of over 20 rounds of indirect fire	5	0	7
Total Ground attacks/contacts	18	7	39

Although attacks by fire occurred in at least eight different areas of the province, the largest number of reported incidents occurred in Son Tinh and Mo Duc (D). During Phase III OP#1 (BS517778), LZ Stinson (BS538824), Nui Deo OP (BS776535), and OP Woodstock (BS621618) were attacked.

(c) During the past six months, there were 253 attacks by fire, 434 ground attacks/contacts, and 306 anti-aircraft incidents. US forces accounted for 1,203 enemy KIA in Quang Ngai (P).

(d) The enemy continued heavy use of the Nuoc Ong, Dak Drinh, Song RE and Dak Selo transportation corridors. Visual reconnaissance revealed heavy use of trails along these rivers and heavy sampan traffic. APD missions recorded patterns of hot readings along both sides of these rivers prior to the start of both campaigns. The enemy also developed agricultural areas in the mountain valleys in the western portion of

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province. Most enemy units faced severe supply problems as a result of Allied operations in these areas and unit production teams were employed for the purpose of achieving self-sufficiency. Allied rice denial operations were effective. More than 204,000 pounds of rice was captured during this reporting period. Eleven of the rice caches contained amounts in excess of one ton.

(3) In Quang Ngai (P), four units are directly subordinate to MR 5 Headquarters.

(a) The 21st NVA Regiment is the largest and potentially the most combat effective unit in the province. With three subordinate infantry battalions and 11 support companies, including anti-aircraft, mortar, and sapper companies, the regiment could inflict heavy casualties and damage on any target in its AO. At the beginning of April, the 21st NVA Regimental CP was located in north central BA 128 while the 60th Battalion was in northern Minh Long (D) and the 70th and 80th Battalions were in the vicinity of the Son Ve Valley. Elements of the 21st Regiment were responsible for the attacks on OP Woodstock (BS621618), PF 109 (BS678612), and for the forced landing of two aircraft in the Song Ve Valley.

(b) The 406th MF Sapper Battalion has been held in southern part of former base area 118 (BS3754) during the entire reporting period and has initiated three significant attacks, two of which occurred during attack phases of the campaigns. On 25 February at OP Midway (BS520887), a unit of the 406th Bn mounted a ground attack under cover of mortar fire resulting in 35 VC KIA no friendly casualties reported. On 24 April, probable elements of the 406th attacked LZ Honey resulting in 72 ARVN casualties and 19 VC KIA. The 406th Bn is considered to be the most effective sapper unit in the province.

(c) The 403d NVA Sapper Battalion, currently held along the Duc Pho-Ba To (D) border, remained inactive throughout most of the reporting period. This unit failed to mount any significant attacks. The 403d concentrated entirely on small-scale contacts and attacks by fire on targets around Duc Pho (D) Headquarters.

(d) The Quang Ngai (P) Force controls two NVA Battalions, three Local Force Battalions, and 17 Local Force Companies, and is directly subordinate to MR 5.

1. Of the five battalion size elements, the 48th LF Bn is probably the most active, initiating attacks on OPs and FSBs in the Son Tinh and southern Binh Son (D) area. It is possible that an element of

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the 107th Heavy Weapons Battalion supports the 48th. Units of the 48th Bn were reported to be providing security along the Son Giang, and targeted against Allied installations in both eastern and western Son Tinh (D) during all attack phases of both the V.22 and B.81 campaigns.

2. The 107th NVA Heavy Weapons Battalion dispersed elements throughout the northern half of the province during this reporting period. The Unit Headquarters is held in the northern Nghia Hanh (D) (BS5467) and was probably responsible for the mortar and rocket attacks on Quang Ngai City. One element of the 107th operated in western Son Tinh (D) in support of units of the 406th and 48th battalions. Since the 107th is the only unit in the province with a confirmed 122mm rocket capability, this element probably conducted the 27 April rocket attack on Dottie.

(4) Significant incidents during this reporting period include:

On 6 November at BS657575, C/1-20 Inf found and evacuated 2400 lbs of rice.

On 6 November at BS850350, R/4-21 Inf found and evacuated 4000 lbs of rice.

On 30 November at BS461814, an UNSEF fired 82mm mortars, B-40 rockets, and conducted a ground attack which penetrated the perimeter of FSB Honey. Results were 1 ARVN KIA, 6 ARVN WIA, 24 VC KIA.

On 1 December at BS498828, D/1-52 found and evacuated 6000 lbs of rice, 3000 lbs was evacuated and 3000 lbs destroyed.

On 9 December at BS690965, PF #01, 02, 22, 53, engaged and UNSEF resulting in 25 VC KIA, 13 IWC, 6 unknown type rockets captured.

On 16 December at BS533428, 70th ARVN Rangers found and destroyed 11,000 lbs of rice.

On 1 February at BS592762, and estimated VC/NVA platoon fired 105x82mm mortar rounds and an unknown amount of small arms and initiated a sapper attack against PF #155 resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 5 VC KIA.

On 15 February at BS362801, D/1-52 Inf found and evacuated 4800 lbs of rice and 3500 lbs salt.

On 16 February at BS3622801, D/1-52 found and destroyed 2270 lbs of salt.

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On 16 February at BS578845, C/1-52 Inf found and destroyed 6800 lbs of spoiled rice.

On 17 February at BS362800, D/1-52 Inf found and evacuated 4700 lbs of salt.

On 19 February at BS522858, C/1-52 Inf found and evacuated 2460 lbs of rice.

On 24 February at BS678612, an UNSEF fired 110x rounds 82mm mortar and an unknown amount of B-40 rockets at PF #109 resulting in 4 PF WIA.

On 24 February at BS621618, an UNSEF engaged PF #711 resulting in 7 RF KIA and 47 NVA KIA.

On 25 February at BS520887, an estimated 60 VC fired an unknown amount of mortar rounds and conducted a ground attack against RF #713 resulting in 4 RF KIA, 35 VC KIA.

On 5 March at BS615610, an estimated NVA Bn fired on R/4th ARVN resulting in 2 ARVN KIA, 24 NVA KIA.

On 13 March at BS624545, an UNSEF fired intense .30 and .51 cal at a UH-1C aircraft forcing it to land. The aircraft was later recovered.

On 13 March at BS6254, an UNSEF fired heavy .51 cal at a OH-6A aircraft resulting in a forced landing. The aircraft was later recovered.

On 19 March at BS564762, a reported VC/NVA Bn fired an unknown amount of mortars, B-40 rockets and small arms at 1-6 ARVN resulting in 16 ARVN KIA, 2 ARVN WIA, 35 ARVN MIA of which 34 later returned.

On 20 March at BS418809, an UNSEF ambushed 3/6 ARVN resulting in 28 VC KIA.

2. (C) G2 Section: Summary of Significant Activities.

a. On 1 April 1971, USARV approved a MTOE for the Division Surveillance Platoon (Target Mission Force) of HHC, 23d Inf Div authorizing six (6) officers and sixty-six (66) enlisted men. As of 30 April 71, the Surveillance Platoon had an assigned strength of four (4) officers and sixty-six (66) enlisted men. The Surveillance Platoon continues to operate as previously reported. Sensors employed include 336 radio linked and 67 line sensors which are monitored from eight sites in the AO. All Phase I

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monitoring equipment and sensors have been replaced with Phase III equipment. On 20 April 71 the first US/ARVN combined sensor monitoring site was established at LZ Dragon. During the reporting period, the Surveillance Platoon began sensor orientation training for personnel of the division rifle companies. As of 30 April, 19 rifle companies had received orientation training. Since 1 November 1970, 3109 intruders were detected and 914 reactions were initiated.

b. Aerial reconnaissance missions continue to obtain timely information on enemy locations and infiltration routes. During the reporting period 147 Infrared missions, 171 APD missions, 215 Photo missions and 1440 VR missions were flown.

3. (C) Military Intelligence Company: Summary of Significant Activities.

a. Counterintelligence Section.

(1) During the reporting period, there were four reportable incidents of sabotage, subversion or espionage.

(2) Investigations concerning Vietnamese Nationals showed an increase during this reporting period as compared to the last period. During the reporting period, the CI Section conducted 226 investigations, as compared to 217 last reporting period. Of this number, 83 involved separate investigations of prostitutes apprehended for unlawful entry onto Chu Lai Base.

(3) The following CI services were provided:

Announced CI Inspections	14
Unannounced CI Inspections	11
Courtesy CI Inspections	26
Miscellaneous Investigations	153
PSI	26
AGI	25
DAME assist	126

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(4) During the reporting period, the CI Section Case Officers conducted 223 source meetings and turned in 926 Information Reports. During the previous reporting period, there were 113 source meetings and 461 Information Reports prepared.

Information Evaluation

Month Rating	1	2	3	4	5	6	Unrated	Total
Nov	0	32	96	19	2	8	5	162
Dec	0	35	135	15	0	7	6	198
Jan	0	20	76	12	1	12	1	122
Feb	0	42	82	9	0	6	0	139
Mar	0	36	70	11	2	14	2	135
Apr	0	37	98	18	0	6	14	173
TOTAL	0	202	557	84	5	53	28	929
%	0	21.7	60.3	9	.4	5.6	3	100

b. Interrogation Section.

(1) During the reporting period the IPW Section interrogated and classified 1,382 detainees. The breakdown of detainees by classification in comparison to the previous reporting period reveals that there were significant decreases in all categories except the Unclassified and Returnee. The increase in the returnee category reflects the fact that the IPW Section has interrogators working at the Chieu Hoi Centers.

	<u>May 70 - Oct 70</u>	<u>Nov 70 - Apr 71</u>
PW/NVA	77	50
PW/VC	202	121
Civil Defendant (CD)	1,477	595
Innocent Civilian (IC)	482	147

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	<u>May 70 - Oct 70</u>	<u>Nov 70 - Apr 71</u>
Unclassified	26	43
Returnee	94	426

(2) Three hundred (300) man days were spent in support of tactical operations during which interrogation teams worked directly with units in the field. Of these 300 man days, 287 were spent in support of the 11th Bde during operations in the Dong Ha area.

(3) Information gained from 62 interrogations resulted in responses by tactical units. The breakdown by classification of detainees providing useful information is as follows:

Returnee	9
PW	25
CD or IC	28

Tactical units reacted to such information as location of food and weapons caches, identification of VCI, rocket and mortar firing positions and enemy base areas.

c. Imagery Interpretation Section.

(1) With the end of the monsoon, aerial surveillance and reconnaissance increased throughout the 23d Infantry Division's AO.

(2) During the reporting period, the II Section conducted the following missions:

Visual Reconnaissance Missions	85
Hand-held Photography Missions	15
Infrared Missions	95
Photo Missions	153

(3) In addition, the II Section completed several special projects such as fire support base studies, trail studies and photo mosaics.

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d. Order of Battle Section.

(1) The Order of Battle Section made no major operational changes during the current reporting period. The only significant changes dealt with the Order of Battle input for the 23d Infantry Division Weekly Intelligence Summary and the G-2's Weekly Intelligence Briefing. The formats of both now more clearly reflect trends in enemy activity.

(2) During the reporting period, the Order of Battle prepared four special projects:

(a) A "TET" Study completed 22 January compared enemy preparations and activities for TET in 1971 with preparations and activities prior to TET in 1968, 1969, and 1970.

(b) A Personalities Handbook published on 5 February listed all reported enemy personalities, by unit and position, in the 23d Infantry Division's AO.

(c) An AKA Handbook on 14 February listed all reported AKA's for enemy units in the 23d Infantry Division's AO.

(d) An Anti-Aircraft Study was completed on 25 February. This study gave an analysis of enemy anti-aircraft capabilities, as well as the patterns and intensity of anti-aircraft fire within the TAOR for the period 1 July to 4 December 1970.

e. LUC LUONG 66 Scout Section (C)

(1) Luc Luong 66 Training Center graduated two (2) classes of 28 and 9 scouts, respectively, during this period. A class was not conducted during the month of April because the 23d Infantry Division hired scouts who had been released by marine units that were redeploying.

(2) During the past reporting period one Scout received an ARCOM with V device. Terminations (84) during the past six months were for the following causes:

(a) 13 Unsatisfactory performance

(b) 35 Excessive AWOL

(c) 10 KIA

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- (d) WIA
- (e) 10 Resigned
- (f) 13 Other

4. (C) Co G (RANGER), 75th Infantry: Summary of Significant Activities.

During the period, there were 94 long range reconnaissance patrols conducted within the Division AO including 79 area reconnaissance missions, 11 observation post missions, two search and attack missions, and two special missions. In 63 sightings, the patrols observed 234 enemy personnel. Results were 22 enemy KIA, 2 US KIA, and 27 US WIA. Patrols adjusted artillery on suspected enemy locations on numerous occasions with unknown results.

5. (C) Enemy Units Locations and Movements: Based on PW interrogations, documents, and other reliable sources, the following are the locations of major enemy units in the 23d Infantry Division TAOI:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CATAG</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
MR-5 HQ	(C)	650	Unlocated
2d NVA Div HQ	(C)	200	Unlocated
GK-30 NVA Signal Bn	(C)	275	Unlocated
GK-31 NVA AA Bn	(C)	250	Unlocated
GK-32 NVA RR Bn	(C)	200	Unlocated
GK-33 NVA Mortar Bn	(C)	350	Unlocated
GK-35 NVA Sap/Recon Bn	(C)	340	Unlocated
GK-37 NVA Trans Bn	(C)	200	Unlocated
GK-38 NVA Medical Bn	(C)	200	Unlocated
GK-40 NVA Engineer Bn	(C)	200	Unlocated
1st MF Regt HQ	(C)	125	Unlocated
40th MF Bn	(C)	238	Unlocated
60th MF Bn	(C)	170	Unlocated
90th MF Bn	(C)	300	Unlocated
3d NVA Regt HQ	(C)	150	Unlocated
1st NVA Bn	(C)	109	Unlocated
2nd NVA Bn	(C)	350	Unlocated
3rd NVA Bn	(C)	200	Unlocated
21st NVA Regt HQ	(C)	510	BS4249
60th NVA Bn	(C)	150	BS5263
70th NVA Bn	(C)	120	BS5847
80th NVA Bn	(C)	120	BS6353

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CATAG</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Quang Tin (P) Forces			
70th LF BN	(C)	211	BT1226
74th LF Hvy Wpns Bn	(C)	233	BT1821
402d MF Sapper Bn	(C)	246	BS4296
409th MF Sapper Bn	(C)	269	BT2504
D-11 LF Bn	(C)	174	BT2010
V-16 LF Bn	(C)	80	Unlocated
1st Co	(C)	30	BT2312
2nd Co	(C)	50	Unlocated
72d LF Bn	(C)	220	BT1619
C-7 LF Co	(C)	19	BT1615
C-9 LF Co	(C)	12	BT1528
V-12 LF Co	(C)	45	BT1823
V-14 LF Co	(C)	22	BT3012
V-15 LF Co	(C)	15	BT2048
V-18 LF Co	(C)	20	BT2712
74th LF Co (V-20)	(C)	64	BT3808
78th MF Rocket Co	(C)	90	BS4099
Quang Ngai (P) Forces			
403d NVA Sapper Bn	(C)	270	BS8030
107th NVA Hvy Wpns Bn	(C)	250	BS5368
40th NVA Sapper Bn	(C)	190	BS7044
120th LF Montgrd Bn	(C)	300	BS2763
406th LF Sapper Bn	(C)	400	BS4382
38th LF Bn	(C)	160	BS7848
48th LF Bn	(C)	200	BS5886
C-18 LF Co	(C)	20	BS6459
T-18 LF Co (V-20)	(C)	30	BS7285
C-19 LF Co	(C)	18	BS7459
21st LF Sapper Co	(C)	70	BS5780
P-31 LF Co	(C)	15	BS6290
C-45 LF Co	(C)	40	BS7058
K-51 LF Wpns Co	(C)	10	BS7090
72Z LF Co	(C)	40	BS5681
C-65 LF Co	(C)	30	BS7371
81st LF Co	(C)	40	BS5565
95th A LF Sapper Co	(C)	20	BS6399
95th B LF Sapper Co	(C)	40	BS5191
120th LF Sapper Co	(C)	30	BS8928
G-212 LF Co	(C)	70	BS5130
G-219 LF Co	(C)	40	BS7843

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CATAG</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
506th A LF Sapper Co	(C)	65	BS5377
506th B LF Sapper Co	(C)	50	BS5675

C. Operations.

1. Major Engagements: During the six month reporting period Division forces were involved in only one major engagement with enemy forces. The majority of the operations were pre-emptive in nature to offset enemy initiated actions against pacified areas. The most significant ground contact was an enemy initiated attack by small arms, rocket and mortar fire followed by a ground sapper penetration of the perimeter barrier at Fire Support Base Maryanne at about 0155H, 28 March 1971. As a result of the brief but fierce engagement 12 NVA/VC were killed. United States losses were reported as 30 killed and 82 wounded. One 155mm howitzer was destroyed and one 155mm howitzer was damaged. The saturation employment of satchel charges by the enemy caused extensive damage to the command bunker, communications bunker, fighting positions and individual sleeping bunkers.

2. Operations by AO:

(a) Operations FREDERICK HILL, conducted by the 196th Infantry Brigade in close cooperation and coordination with the 5th ARVN Regiment, continued combat operations to increase the overall effectiveness of the pacification operations near the coastal areas and the destruction of Main Force and NVA units operating in the western portion of the combined TAOR until 010600H March 1971 at which time the Operation was terminated. Contact ranged from light to moderate throughout the period 1 November 1970 to 1 March 1971. At about 1332H on 2 Nov, B/1-46 Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of AT941010 resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 3 IWC. 2 US were WIA (E). On the 3d of November at 1425H FAC called in an air strike at AT845216 resulting in 5 NVA KBA. Recon platoon, 2-1 Inf detonated an M26 booby trap on 6 November in the vicinity of BT055397 resulting in 3 US WIA(E). At 1000H on the 6th of Nov, C/1-46 found (7) graves at BS021989, bodies were KBA. In Operation HOANG DIEU, vic BT031397, on 8 Nov, Recon platoon 2-1 Inf received a ground attack resulting in 7 US WIA(E). Fire was returned with artillery and small arms with unknown results. D/1-46 engaged an unknown size enemy force on the 10th of Nov at BT228112 resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. There were no major contacts reported in the Frederick Hill AO until 180830H, when a patrol from D/1-46 Inf detonated an unknown type booby trap resulting in 5 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M) (BT223124). At 1630H on the same day B/3-21 Inf engaged 5 NVA

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vic BT182133 resulting in 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC and 5 US WIA(E). A/4-31 found 1 82mm mortar tube with base plate, 3 7.62mm light machineguns and 1 RPG launcher vic AT809280. The day of 25 November proved very successful for C/1-46. While on a patrolling mission they found a weapons cache consisting of 28 individual weapons and 6 crew served weapons vic BT189134. Late in the afternoon of the 26th of November D/1-1 Cav had a LOH receive small arms fire from 5-10 NVA. The unit then engaged the area vic BT182079 resulting in 5 NVA KIA. In light and scattered contacts on 27 November, 196th Brigade reported 1 NVA KIA with 1 IWC. Friendly casualties were 6 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M), all from the detonation of booby trapped ammunition. In a report submitted at 280945H November from field location vic BT194130 C/1-46 Inf found 3 VC KBA and 1 75mm recoilless rifle. In a series of small unit engagements on 30 November in the Frederick Hill Ao, 7 NVA soldiers were KIA with 1 US WIA(E). During the first six days of December light activity prevailed throughout the AO. Totals for this period were 17 VC killed, 8 NVA killed, 7 individual and 1 crew served weapons captured, 3 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Elements of B/2-1 Infantry encountered an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of BT174193 on 11 December. Results of this contact were 1 NVA KIA, 1 NVA WIA and 4 IWC. There were no US casualties. Scattered contacts on the 12th and 13th of December in the Frederick Hill area resulted in 11 VC KIA and 14 US WIA with 13 IWC. Light and scattered skirmishes prevailed on 19 December. There were no significant contacts during this period. At 231600H December, A/1-46 detonated a booby trap (BT165177) resulting in 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA(E). In the vicinity of AT804296 at 241105H December, elements of D/2-1 engaged an unknown size enemy force and sustained 4 US WIA(E) with enemy casualties unknown. All friendly elements in the AO ceased offensive operations at 241800H December 1970 in compliance with Christmas Truce Period directives. At 251801H December 1970 units resumed offensive operations. While supporting ground operations on 29 December 1970, 116th Avn engaged the enemy in two separate contacts at BT169190 resulting in 8 NVA KIA. At AT928171, F/8th Cavalry engaged 7 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA. Elements of A/4-31 detonated an unknown type booby trap on 31 December resulting in 1 US KIA and 10 US WIA(E). At 311800H December 1970 Division elements assumed a defensive posture for the New Years Truce Period. Defensive patrolling and defensive ambushes were employed. Division units resumed offensive operation at 011801H January 1971. On 1 January 1971 the 196th Brigade soldiers engaged 4 VC resulting 4 VC KIA and 2 IWC. There was light and scattered action throughout the AO until 7 January 1971 when B/2-1 was engaged with a command detonated mine in the vicinity of AT924373 with 4 US WIA(E). R/2-1, patrolling in the vicinity of BT124087 on 9 January 1971, was ambushed by 10 NVA. The results of the fire fight were 5 NVA KIA, 4 IWC and 4 US WIA(E). At 1245H C/1-46 engaged 5 NVA (BT134075). Results of this action were 5 NVA KIA, 6 IWC

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and no friendly casualties. Again at 1830H C/1-46 operating at BT130083 engaged 5 NVA. The results of the action in the AO during 1-9 January 1971 were 37 NVA/VC KIA, 22 IWC with friendly casualties of 5 US WIA(E). On the 11th and 12th of January C/2-1 in 4 contacts in the vicinity of AT9137 reported 4 NVA/VC KIA and 2 IWC, while suffering casualties of 2 US KIA. C/1-46, on the 13th and 14th, in 4 contacts in the vicinity of BT1707, netted 4 NVA/KIA, detained four and captured two weapons. On 15 January, C/3-16 Artillery, firing from Hau Duc, netted 10 VC KBA in the vicinity of BS129988. Action was light until 18 January when a USAF air strike resulted in 5 NVA KIA at ZC1733203. A patrol from D/3-21 detonated a booby trapped hand grenade on 19 January in the vicinity of BT033213 resulting in 4 US WIA(E). There was light contact on the 20th. Total results for the period 11-20 January were 30 VC and 18 NVA KIA with 9 IWC, US casualties were 2 US KIA and 10 US WIA(E). During the last ten days of January reports from the units ranged from "no contact" to very light contacts. Total results for this period area as follows: 21 NVA/VC KIA; 9 IWC; 1 US KIA; 20 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). The first day of February proved fruitful for C/1-46 while operating in the vicinity of AS890958, finding a weapons cache consisting of 222 IWC and 18 CSWC. In a sizable contact on 9 February, A/3-21 Infantry engaged a 10 man VC patrol vicinity of BT069291 resulting in 3 VC KIA, 4 IWC, while suffering 2 US WIA(E). Operating in the area of AS913946 on the morning of 11 February, D/1-46 Infantry was ambushed by and UNSEF which resulted in 2 US KIA, 4 US WIA(E); 3 US WIA(M). Later on the same day, C/1-46 Inf uncovered another cache of weapons at AS906934, resulting in 50 IWC. At about 121645H February C/1-46 was engaged by an UNSEF vicinity AS900936, resulting in 2 US KIA; 7 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Enemy casualties were unknown. Results for the period 1 through 14 February were: 52 NVA/VC KIA; 292 IWC; 18 CSWC; 17 US KIA; 30 US WIA(E) and 10 US WIA(m). The detonation of two booby traps on 16 February by elements of A/3-21 while operating in the vicinity of AT945242 resulted in 9 US WIA(E). On 20 February in the early afternoon A/3-21 was engaged by hand grenades and small arms fire in the vicinity AT993289 while on a search and clear operation. US casualties were 1 KIA; 8 WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Enemy casualties were unknown. D/1-46 Infantry while operating at AS588951 on the same day detonated an unknown type booby trap causing 3 US KIA and 2 US WIA(E). Light and scattered contacts were reported throughout the AO from 21 through 28 February. Results of all actions during the period 15 through 28 February were: 81 NVA/VC KIA; 20 IWC; 4 US KIA; 35 US WIA(E); 10 US WIA(M). Operation FREDERICK HILL was initiated effective 18001H March 1969 and was terminated effective 010600H March 1971. The results of Operation FREDERICK HILL for the reporting period are:

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US

33 KIA
234 WIA(E)
20 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

519 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
2352 DET
40 PW/VC
14 PW/NVA
11 RTNEE/VC
4 RTNEE/NVA
170 CIV DEF
64 IN CIV
529 IWC
35 CSWC

Cumulative results of Operation FREDERICK HILL are:

US

572 KIA
3251 WIA(E)
659 WIA(M)
2 MIA

ENEMY

7514 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
2352 DET
93 PW/VC
40 PW/NVA
99 RTNEE/VC
12 RTNEE/NVA
1075 CIV DEF
1112 IN CIV
1848 IWC
192 CSWC

(b) Operation GENEVA PARK, conducted by the 198th Infantry Brigade and the 6th ARVN Regiment was initiated effective 180001 H March 1969 with the mission of securing the major lines of communications and the destruction of enemy forces posing a threat to Quang Ngai City of the Chu Lai Combat Base complex was terminated at 010600H March 1971. During the reporting period contacts and engagements varied from light to moderate. D/4-31 in a light engagement on 3 November at BS451971 at 1435H accounted for 3 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. On the 5th of November D/5-46 made contact during a combat assault (BT295137) with 3 VC KIA and no friendly casualties. On 4 November in the early morning hours B/1-52 Inf engaged 4 VC. Results of the contact were 3 VC KIA, 2 MAM detained. A tracker dog team was used and followed a trail to a spider hole where 1 VC was found. He had been wounded in the earlier contact. On 6 November a convoy carrying a chassis for a 175mm gun was moved by road from Binh Son to Tra Bong without incident. On 8

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November R/5-46 made contact at BT414033 with 6 VC. Results of the action were 5 VC KIA. At 0820H on the same day B/1-52 detonated a booby trapped 105mm round resulting in 3 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). D/1-46 was placed OPCON to the 198th Infantry Brigade effective 101730H for operations west of Ky Tra. At 1830H on 12 November A/5-46 (BT244124) received 12 60mm rounds resulting in 6 US WIA(E). Numerous minor contacts throughout the AO resulted in 10 10 VC and 1 NVA KIA. On 13 November gunships from 116th AHC made two engagements, one at 0830H vic BS564788 resulting in 5 VC KBG/S and the other at 2030H vic BS558790 resulting in 3 more VC KBG/S. A/5-46 suffered 7 US WIA(E) on 20 November when a booby trap was detonated at BT393092. On 22 November D/1-52, while on an Eagle Flight, teamed up with 174th Avn and engaged an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of BS495793. Results of the contact were 11 VC KIA and 7 IWC. No major engagements were reported from 23 November through 6 December. Results of small engagements during this period were : 18 VC KIA, 2 NVA KIA, 3 IWC, 7 US KIA, 23 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). At 0350H on 11 December, while conducting a night raid vicinity of BS492824, D/1-52 accounted for 3 VC KIA and 1 IWC. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA and 1 WIA(E). Later the same date D/1-52 engaged 12 VC at the same location and as a result of the contact 10 VC were KIA, 5 IWC and 7 VN detained. There were no friendly casualties. During the period 7-19 December 1970 the 198th Brigade reported a total of 32 VC/NVA KIA and 17 IWC while suffering a loss of 3 US KIA and 30 US WIA. On 20 December 1970 in two scattered engagements, B/1-52 operating in the vicinity of BS494838, engaged 2 VC in a bunker, killing both. An hour and a half later B/1-52 engaged 4 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA. There was light and scattered action throughout the AO during the period 21 December through 241800H December, at which time Division units assumed a defensive posture for the Christmas Truce Period. Results of engagements for the period were: 15 VC/NVA KIA, 2 IWC and 2 US WIA(E). At 251801H December 1970, Division units resumed offensive operations. There were no contacts reported on Christmas Day. Relative quiet prevailed throughout the AO until 31 December when elements of C/1-52 in the vicinity of BS547844 detonated a Bouncing Betty mine which required aero-medical evacuation for 4 US soldiers. The period from Christmas Day through the end of the year was marked by very light activity throughout the AO. Totals for the period 25-31 December 1970 were : 4 VC/NVA KIA and 11 US WIA(E). There were no contact reported on the first day of 1971 and very light activity was reported in the GENEVA PARK area for the first five days of the New Year. On 6 January 1971, activity picked up with A/5-46 finding a weapons cache at BT340098 consisting of 3 IWC and 2 CSWC. At 1030H, in the same location, a booby trap was detonated resulting in 1 US WIA(E). One hour earlier at BT366048 B/5-46 engaged 4 VC which resulted in 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. At 1745H, C/1-52 on a search and clear mission, engaged and killed 1 VC. At 071045H January, C/1-52 operating at BS559823,

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engaged 1 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 VN detained and 1 US WIA(E). Activity again picked up on 9 January. In a series of scattered engagements, 1-52 accounted for 9 VC/NVA KIA. At 1400H, at BS555868, C/1-52 found 6 fresh graves and at BS555822, C/1-52 engaged an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 3 VC KIA. During the action a booby trap was detonated causing 2 US WIA(E). The results of the actions from 1-9 January were: 18 VC/NVA KIA, 4 IWC, 2 CSWC, 1 US KIA, 12 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). At 1415H vic BT336077 on 11 January, B/5-46 detonated an unknown type booby trap that resulted in 1 US KIA and 8 WIA(E). On the same day at 2015H Ranger teams Maine and Michigan from G/75 Rangers received SAF and hand grenades, forcing the unit to be extracted by McGuire rigs from a hot LZ. US casualties for the contact were 1 US KIA, 1 WIA(E) and 3 WIA(M). Action was light on the 13th, but on 14 January, C/5-46 detonated a booby trapped hand grenade vic BT328094 at 1445H, resulting in 4 US WIA(E). On 15 January at 0930H an element of G/75 Rangers engaged 3 VC vic BS451951, resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2 IWC and 1 US WIA(M). There was light contact on 16 January. On 17 January at 0110H at BS553791, A/1-52 engaged and killed 6 VC, with 2 IWC after the US element had received M79 fire from the enemy force. The same day at 0207H R/1-52 detonated an unknown type booby trap that resulted in 8 US WIA(E). In two contacts later in the day at 1305H and 1550H C/1-52 killed 6 VC with 1 IWC while detaining 1 VC suspect. The 198th Brigade reported light contact in Operation GENEVA PARK on 18 January. On 19 January D/5-46 had 6 US WIA(M) in a contact with an unknown size enemy force vic BT340075 at 1230H. During the period 11-20 January, the 198th Brigade reported enemy losses as 29 VC and 1 NVA KIA, 1 detainee, 6 IWC and 1 CSWC. US casualties during the same period were 1 KIA, 34 WIA(E), and 7 WIA(M). Quiet prevailed throughout the AO from 21-26 January with reports of no contact being rendered by the majority of the maneuver elements. On 27 January while searching in the vicinity of BS355807, D/1-52 engaged an unknown size force and accounted for 4 NVA KIA, 2 IWC and 2 VN detained. There were no friendly casualties. Again, quiet returned to the AO with reports of light and scattered contacts until D/1-52 broke the silence on 30 January. During a search and clear mission at BS358795, a 3-10 man enemy force was taken under SAF. Results of the fire fight disclosed 4 NVA KIA with no friendly casualties. Results of all contacts for period ending 31 January 1971 were: 22 VC/NVA KIA, 12 IWC, 1 US KIA and 8 US WIA(E). On the 1st day of February R/5-46 came under intense mortar and SAF while working in the vicinity of BT452938 and suffered 5 US KIA and 8 US WIA(E). Enemy casualties were not determined. On 3 February in a series of minor engagements 198th Brigade reported a total of 9 VC/NVA KIA while suffering no friendly casualties. An unknown type booby trap detonated by elements of C/5-46 at BT431055 resulted in 4 US WIA(E). Operating in the Geneva Park AO on the same day, elements of G/75 Rangers engaged an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of

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BT433064. In the fight that followed the Rangers suffered 5 US WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M) while enemy casualties were unknown. In a brief skirmish on 12 February at BS563810, A/1-52 was engaged by an unknown size enemy force and took 5 US WIA(E). Enemy losses were unknown. From 13 February through 24 February there was very little activity in the AO. On 25 February D/1-52, while operating in the vicinity of BS287605, received SAF and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 US WIA(E). There were no enemy casualties reported. The results of all contacts and engagements for the month of February were 68 VC/NVA KIA, 33 IWC, 1 CSWC, 7 US KIA, 60 US WIA(E) and 19 US WIA(M). Initiated at 180001H March 1969, Operation GENEVA PARK was terminated effective 010600H March 1971. The results for Operation GENEVA PARK for the reporting period are:

US

26 KIA
225 WIA(E)
32 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

334 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
1350 DET
24 PW/VC
4 PW/NVA
6 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
146 CIV DEF
124 IN CIV
112 IWC
5 CSWC

Cumulative results of Operation GENEVA PARK are:

US

231 KIA
1564 WIA(E)
232 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

2337 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
1353 DET
45 PW/VC
22 PW/NVA
49 RTNEE/VC
3 RTNEE/NVA
879 CIV DEF
640 IN CIV
532 IWC
49 CSWC

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(c) Operation IRON MOUNTAIN, conducted in Quang Ngai Province by the 11th Infantry Brigade in close coordination with the 4th ARVN Regiment, concentrated on the security of major lines of communications and through constant combat operations and civic programs was instrumental in furthering the goals of pacification throughout the combined TAOR. Operation IRON MOUNTAIN was terminated effective 010600H March 1971. In the first week of the reporting period the 11th Infantry Brigade had no major contacts. A total of 6 NVA and 2 VC were reported killed. At 081400H November (BS622528), D/4-3 found 11 graves. Bodies bore evidence of having been killed by artillery. On 10 November in a series of minor engagements throughout the AO, 6 VC and 4 NVA were reported killed. US casualties were 6 US WIA(E). There no further significant contacts in the IRON MOUNTAIN AO until 19 November, vic BS769557, when an unknown type booby trap was detonated and resulted in 5 US WIA(E). Isolated and light contacts continued throughout the AO until the early morning hours of 22 November when C/4-3 had three mechanical ambushes detonate vic BS606474 which resulted in a total of 10 VC killed and the capture of assorted clothing, equipment and documents. Later the same day R/3-1, while searching bunkers and military structures in the vicinity of BS582757, detonated an 82mm mortar round resulting in 4 US KIA, 3 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). C/1-20 detonated an unknown type booby trap at 031250H December while operating in the vic of BS735600 which resulted in 5 US WIA(E). From 23 November through 6 December, in a series of small unit engagements, the 11th Infantry Brigade reported a total of 39 VC KIA, 4 NVA KIA, 10 IWC, 2 US KIA, 36 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). There were light and scattered contacts reported by the 11th Infantry Brigade from 7 through 10 December. On 11 December, C/4-3, while on patrol, uncovered a weapons cache vicinity BS 622458. The cache consisted of 3 81mm mortar tubes, 5 7.5mm French machine guns, 2 M1 rifles, 2 French automatic rifles, 1 French rifle, 1 M2 Carbine and 2 PRC-10 radios. At BS515705, on the same day, A/3-1, while searching a tunnel complex, found a cache consisting of 1 BAR, 2 K44 rifles, 1 M1 Carbine and 1 SKS rifle. On 16 December elements of F/8 Cav, operating in the vicinity of BS753446, engaged 5 VC which resulted in 5 VC KIA with no friendly casualties. Totals reported by the 11th Brigade for the period 7 through 19 December were 32 VC/NVA KIA, 29 IWC and 8 CSWC. Friendly casualties were 1 KIA, 17 WIA(E), and 4 WIA(M). Activity was light throughout the AO and was characterized by small scattered contacts until 24 December 1970, when R/4-21 came under sniper fire at BS813329 and suffered 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). Enemy casualties were unknown. At 1800H, 24 December, Division units assumed a defensive role for the twenty-four hour Christmas Truce Period. Units engaged in defensive patrolling and ambushes during the truce period. There were no contacts reported on 25 December 1970. Division units resumed offensive operations at 1801H, 25 December 1970. A mechanical ambush set out by C/4-21 at

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BS819339 was detonated at 1855H, 26 December 1970 and resulted in 3 VC KIA. A booby trapped hand grenade at BS519752 was detonated by an element of A/3-1 and resulted in 1 US WIA(E), the only US casualty of the day. Light and scattered contacts prevailed through 31 December 1970. From 1800H, 31 December 1970 until 1801H 1 January 1971, all Division units observed the New Years Truce Period. Necessary defensive patrols and defensive ambushes were conducted. The period from 20 December through 31 December resulted in the following: 46 VC/NVA KIA, 10 IWC, 10 US WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M). Of the 46 enemy KIA, 31 KIA were credited to aviation elements, artillery fires and Ranger activities. There were no contacts reported in the first three days of 1971. In a minor skirmish on 4 January at BS704555 C/1-20 engaged 2 VC. As a result of the action, 1 VC was KIA and 2 IWC. On 5 January R/1-20 teamed up with 174th Aviation and C/6-11 Artillery and, in a fire fight at BS763580, engaged an unknown size enemy force. The results were 7 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. There were no US casualties. At 1220H, 8 January 1971, C/4-21, operating in the vicinity of BS752360, detonated two 105mm artillery rounds. The resulting explosion caused 2 US KIA and 12 WIA(E). On 10 January at BS724435 in the late afternoon R/1-20 engaged an enemy force resulting in 5 NVA KIA with no US casualties. Results of all engagements and contacts for the first ten days of January were reported by the 11th Infantry Brigade as: 29 VC/NVA KIA, 4 IWC, 2 US KIA, 18 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). The 11th Brigade reported light contact on 11 January. The following day 174th Avn gunships flying in support of a B/1-20 contact engaged and killed 4 NVA and captured 4 individual weapons in the vicinity of BS640523 at 1015H. The same day at 1015H in the vicinity of BS756429 R/1-20 detonated a booby trapped 105mm round resulting in 3 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). The 11th Brigade reported light contact until 14 January when A/4-3 found 5 individual weapons in the vicinity of BS522396. The following day at 1500H D/4-3 found 5 individual weapons in the vicinity of BS637459. Also on the 15th at 1745H, C/4-3 engaged 4 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA. On 16 January B/123 Avn in two contacts engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 13 VC KIA, the first contact was at 1200H vic BS293576, the other at 1405H vic BS278499. The same day a USAF air strike at BS298556 resulted in 5 VC KIA. ON 17 January a vehicle from 723d Maintenance was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force vic BS917173 that resulted in 2 US KIA and 1 US WIA(E). The 11th Brigade reported light action on the 18th, 19th and 20th of January. Total results for the period 11-20 January were 49 VC and 7 NVA KIA with 17 IWC. US casualties reported during the period were 3 US KIA, 13 US WIA(E) and 4 US WIA(M). While operating in the vicinity of BS401499 on 23 January, B/123 Avn engaged 8 VC which resulted in 8 VC KIA. Again on 25 January B/123 Avn, in three unrelated contacts accounted for a total of 20 NVA/VC KIA. At 1125H vicinity BS500381, 3 NVA were KIA, at 1415H BS258581 7 NVA were engaged resulting in 7 NVA KIA. Two hours later at

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BS392376, B/123 Avn engaged 16 NVA resulting in 10 NVA KIA. Working the area vicinity BS830430, 26 January, B/123 Avn engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 9 VC KIA. A/4-21 had a defensive mechanical ambush detonate at BS877246 which resulted in 5 NVA/VC KIA. As a result of an air strike against an unknown size enemy force vicinity BS299561, FAC reported a total of 5 NVA KBA/S. Contacts were light to moderate during the period 21-31 January with the 11th Infantry Brigade reporting a total of 65 VC/NVA KIA, 6 IWC, 27 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). Two contacts were reported for the first two days of February. B/123 Avn on 3 February in the vicinity of BS735596 engaged 15 VC. As a result of this contact B/123 reported 12 VC KIA, 2 detainees and 2 IWC. After four days of no contact being reported, C/6-11 Artillery on 8 February reported that an M34 truck vehicle detonated a thirty-five pound mine at BS780425 which resulted in 5 US WIA(E). B/123d Avn engaged 7 VC/NVA at BS283473 on 19 February 1971. Results of the engagement were 7 VC/NVA KIA. While on a search and clear mission, 21 February at BS675592, elements of B/1-20 detonated a booby trap that resulted in 2 US KIA and 7 US WIA(E). On 22 February, at BS713558, D/1-1 Cav reported a contact with an unknown size enemy force. Final results of this fire fight were 13 VC/NVA KIA. There were no friendly losses. A/1-20 suffered 4 US WIA(E) as a result of detonating a booby trapped 105mm artillery around on 24 February while operating in the area of BS689501. Working with B/1-20, D/1-1 Cav engaged 6 VC/NVA in the early evening of 28 February at BS732442. Credits for the engagement are 3 VC/NVA KIA by D/1-1 Cav, 2 VC/NVA KIA by B/1-20. US forces reported negative casualties. Cumulative results for all contacts and engagements for period 1-28 February 1971 are as follows: 126 VC/NVA KIA, 27 IWC, 5 CSWC, 3 US KIA, 53 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). Operation IRON MOUNTAIN was initiated effective 180001H March 1969 and was terminated at 010600H March 1971. Results of Operation IRON MOUNTAIN for the reporting period are:

US

36 KIA
232 WIA(E)
24 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

497 KIA (CONF)
123 KIA (PROB)
2573 DET
15 PW/VC
4 PW/NVA
1 RTNEE/VC
2 RTNEE/NVA
38 CIV DEF
76 IN CIV
128 IWC
12 CSWC

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Cumulative results of Operation IRON MOUNTAIN are:

<u>US</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
440 KIA	4466 KIA (CONF)
2326 WIA(E)	123 KIA (PROB)
532 WIA(M)	2573 DET
0 MIA	96 PW/VC
	41 PW/NVA
	20 RTNEE/VC
	5 RTNEE/NVA
	1550 CIV DEF
	1146 IN CIV
	1130 IWC
	94 CSWC

(d) Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE, initiated at 291200H June 1970 in the open terrain in the northeastern portion of the 23d Infantry Division, was ideally suited for the employment of armor. The responsibility for the AO was entrusted to the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry with F Troop, 17th Cavalry attached. Through constant combat operations, the operation proved to be highly successful. The operation was terminated at 010600H March 1971. During the reporting period, 1 November 1970 - 1 March 1971, contact was light to moderate with numerous encounters with anti-tank mines and casualty producing booby traps. No contact was reported in the PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE AO on the first and second day of the reporting period (1-2 November). On 3 November, a mechanical ambush was detonated at BT115449, resulting in 1 VC KIA. On 8 November a convoy departed Tam Ky and arrived at Tien Phuoc without incident. An ACAV from E Troop 1st Cavalry detonated a 70 lb mine at BT143299 at 091715H November resulting in 4 US WIA(E). Again at 10100H November (BT239192), a second E Troop ACAV detonated a 100 lb mine resulting 5 US WIA(E) and the combat loss of the ACAV. At 1840H on 12 Nov vic BT240215, an RPG round hit a M113A1 resulting in 6 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). The vehicle was moderately damaged. A Sheridan from A Troop, 1st Cavalry detonated an 80 lb mine at 13182H Nov (BT178140) resulting in 5 US WIA(E). The M551 was a combat loss. No contact was reported in the PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE AO until 20 Nov at which time C/1-1 Cav detonated a 75 lb petna mine resulting in 5 US WIA(E) and a M113A1 declared a probable combat loss. The detonation occurred vic BT209209. There were no further significant events in the AO during the period 20-29 November.. During this period, small unit contacts resulted in 8 VC KIA, 6 IWC and 5 US WIA(E). On 30 November at BT205220 an ACAV from C/101 Cavalry detonated an anti-tank mine resulting in 8 US WIA(E), 2 US WIA(M) and the ACAV (M113A1) being declared a combat

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loss. Again on 2 December at 1415H vic BT118250, F/17 Cav detonated a mine resulting in 4 US WIA(E). There were no other significant engagements in the AO until an ACAV from C/1-1 Cavalry detonated an anti-tank mine at BT240227 on 7 December resulting 2 US KIA, 14 US WIA(E) and 8 US WIA(M). On 11 December, in two separate incidents, C/1-1 detonated two anti-tank mines. The first occurred at 1853H in the vicinity of BT2229232 and resulted in 5 US WIA(E) and moderate damage to a Sheridan tank. At 2010H in the same location, another mine was detonated resulting in 2 US WIA(E). Results of scattered contacts for the period 12-19 December were 1 US WIA(E) and 3 IWC. There were no significant engagements in the PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE AO from 19 December through 241800H December. There were no contacts reported in the AO from 24 December through 30 December. On 31 December at 1025H, while conducting a reconnaissance in force (BT213243), F Troop, 17th Cavalry detonated a booby trapped 81mm mortar round resulting in 11 US WIA(E). There were no contacts or engagements reported for the first five days of January 1971. At 0930H, 6 January 1971, B Troop, 1-1 Cavalry, while participating in a reconnaissance in force, vicinity BT215278, detonated a nitro starch mine causing 3 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). On 8 January 1971, activities increased as C Troop, 1-1 Cavalry made three separate contacts in the vicinity of BT176228, BT173230 and BT178228. Results of these contacts were 4 VC KIA, 1 IWC, 2 detainees and no friendly casualties sustained. At about 2130H, E Troop made contact at BT210482 and accounted for 2 VC KIA and 1 IWC, again with negative friendly casualties. Total results for all engagements for the period 20 December 1970 through 10 January 1971 were 16 VC/NVA KIA, 2 IWC and 20 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). During the period 11-20 January action was light in Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE with the exception of 13 January. At 1205H on the 13th, in the vicinity of BT179249, an M113A1 from B/1-1 Cav detonated an 80 lb nitro starch mine that resulted in 4 US WIA(E). An hour later the element received a hand grenade from an unknown size enemy force that resulted in 2 US WIA(E). Total results for the period 11-20 January were 2 VC KIA with 2 IWC and 2 VN detained. The above represent the only US casualties for 11-20 January. During the period 21 through 31 January 1971, the 1-1 Cavalry reported negative contact except for the following: On the 22d, B Troop had a mechanical ambush detonate which resulted in 1 VC KIA. On the 25th, F Troop, 17th Cavalry reported a mechanical ambush had been detonated with 2 NVA KIA. The 196th Inf Bde assumed responsibility for Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE effective 260900H January 1971. The totals of all contacts for the period were 1 VC and 2 NVA KIA. On 1 February, D/1-1 Cavalry engaged 1 VC in the vicinity of BT198330 resulting in 1 VC KIA and 4 IWC. The AO was unusually quiet during the period 21 January through 14 February. Total results for the period 1 through 14 February were as follows: 5 NVA/VC KIA and 7 IWC while friendly casualties were 2 US WIA(E). The period from 15 February through 28 February saw

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an increase in the activities in the PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE Area of Operation. The most significant action occurred on 15 February when F Troop, 17th Cavalry, searching in the vicinity of BT239479 engaged and killed 6 VC, with 3 IWC and no casualties sustained by the US element. At coordinates BT234464, on 22 February 1971, F Troop, 17th Cavalry engaged and destroyed one enemy bunker. A ground sweep confirmed 2 NVA KIA and 4 IWC. F/17th Cavalry reported no friendly casualties. F/17th Cavalry engaged 6 VC, (BT422064), 28 February 1971 resulting in 6 VC KIA and 3 IWC. There were no friendly casualties. Total results of reported contacts, 15 February through 28 February 1971 are as follows: 17 NVA/VC KIA; 10 IWC and 10 US WIA(E). Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE was terminated effective 010600H March 1971. The results of Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE for the reporting period are:

US

2 KIA
113 WIA(E)
11 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

70 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
207 DET
2 PW/VC
3 PW/NVA
1 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
45 CIV DEF
25 IN CIV
31 IWC
0 CSWC

Cumulative results of Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE are:

US

20 KIA
278 WIA(E)
24 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

261 KIA (CONF)
3 KIA (PROB)
207 DET
8 PW/VC
5 PW/NVA
8 RTNEE/VC
1 RTNEE/NVA
117 CIV DEF
107 IN CIV
95 IWC
3 CSWC

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(e) Operation NANTUCKET BEACH conducted in the 198th Infantry Brigade TAOR on the Batangan Peninsula by elements of the 1-6 Infantry and the 6th ARVN Regiment to further enhance the pacification program of the GVN was terminated effective 010600H March 1971. Contact remained light and scattered as numerous casualty producing booby traps and mining incidents were reported. There were no significant activities in the NANTUCKET BEACH area for the first 16 days of the reporting period. In an engagement with 5 VC on 17 November 1970, B/1-6 Inf operating in the vic of BS718832 reported 4 VC KIA and 1 IWC. On 18 Nov, D/1-6 Inf at BS698865 engaged 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA, 4 IWC and 3 US WIA(E) and 5 VC detainees. No contact was reported in the AO until 21 November when an element of C/1-6 Inf operating in the vic of BS660871 detonated an unknown type booby trap resulting in 2 US KIA. In light and scattered contacts during the period 21-27 November, 1-6 Inf reported a total of 2 US KIA and 4 NVA/VC KIA. Quiet reined throughout the AO until 010340H December when C/1-6 Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force at BS669945 and accounted for 9 VC KIA with 1 IWC. Totals for all scattered contacts during the period 28 November through 6 December were 15 VC KIA, 3 IWC, 1 US KIA, 4 US (WIA(E)), and 1 US WIA(M). During the period 7 through 19 December, the 1st Bn 6th Infantry reported a total of 10 VC/NVA KIA, 7 IWC and 5 US WIA(E). There were no significant contacts reported during this period. While on patrol on the morning of 20 December, A/1-6 Inf detonated an 82mm mortar round booby trapped with a pressure release firing device in the vicinity of BS644896 resulting in 6 US soldiers WIA(E) and 2 US soldiers WIA(M). No significant contacts were reported in the AO from 21 December 1970 through 30 December 1970. There were no contacts reported on 24-25 December during the Christmas Truce Period. Division units resumed offensive operations at 1801H, 25 December 1970. On 31 December, elements of D/1-6 while operating in the vicinity of BS679881 received small arms and M79 grenade fire sustaining 3 US WIA(E). At 1800H 31 December, the Division again assumed a defensive posture for the twenty-four hour New Years Truce period. Defensive patrols and ambushes were utilized to negate any truce violations reported in the Nantucket Beach AO. At 1801H, 1 January 1971, until 1310H, 5 January when D/1-6 engaged 10 VC at BS673894. Results of the fire fight were 1 VC KIA, 1 IWC and 4 US WIA(E). No contacts were reported on the 6th of January. D/1-6 detonated an M26 hand grenade in the vicinity of BS674894 on the 7th of January. 6 US soldiers were wounded by the detonation. While operating in the area of BS720845, A/1-6 Infantry engaged 7 VC on the 9th of January and accounted for 6 VC KIA and 2 US WIA(E). Total results for all engagements for the period of 20 December 1970 through 10 January 1971 were 8 enemy KIA, 7 IWC and 19 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). On 11 January two contacts resulted in the death of 3 VC and 1 IWC. The first contact occurred at 0505H when R/1-6 in the vicinity

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of BS682897 had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in 1 VC KIA with 1 IWC and the other when A/1-6 found 2 VC KBA in the vicinity of BS726854. There was no contact on the 12th and 13th. On the 14th of January at 0918H in the vicinity of BS685882, A/1-1 Cav detonated a booby trapped hand grenade resulting in 3 US WIA(E). The following day D/1-6 at 1130H in the vicinity of BS654884 engaged and killed 2 VC. Light contact was reported during the 16th through the 19th of January. On 20 January A/1-1 Cav detonated two booby traps in the vicinity of BS682933 which resulted in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). Total results reported by the 198th Brigade for the period 11-20 January in Operation NANTUCKET BEACH were 13 VC KIA with 1 IWC, 13 VN detained, 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). At about 1820H on 21 January, D/1-1 Cavalry inserted the "Blues" (Aero Rifle Platoon) at coordinates BS622972 where they engaged an UNSEF. The outcome of the contact was 13 VC KIA, 2 VN detained and 2 IWC. There were no friendly casualties. The following day, 22 January, D/1-1 again made contact and a sweep of the same area and found 6 IW. D/1-6, at 251715H January on search and clear mission (BS657891) detonated a booby trapped "Bouncing Betty" anti-personnel mine that caused one US KIA and two US WIA(E). As a result of all contacts, 1-6 Infantry reported the following totals for the period 21 through 28 January: 16 NVA/VC KIA, 11 IWC, 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA(E). There was very light contact reported for the first six days of February. Mechanical ambushes accounted for 2 VC KIA during this period. On the 7th, C/1-6 made contact at three separate locations, 071150H, (BS703881), 071510H (BS738842), 07165H (BS752840). At the first location C Company engaged 6 VC and as a result 1 VC was KIA, 1 VN detained WIA and 3 IWC with no US casualties. At the last two locations, C Company elements detonated two booby traps that resulted in 7 US WIA(E). At 0830 hours 8 February, while reconning an area (BS689894) H Troop, 17th Cavalry tripped a booby trapped mechanical ambush and suffered 3 US WIA(E). There were no significant contacts reported until 20 February when D/1-6 Inf detonated a booby trapped can of penta. The resulting explosion caused 5 US WIA(E). There were no further significant events through the end of February. Cumulative totals for all contacts during the month of February were as follows: 6 VC/NVA KIA, 6 IWC while friendly casualties totaled 27 US WIA(E). Initiated at 0601H on 23 July 1969, Operation NANTUCKET BEACH was terminated effective 010600H March 1971. Results of Operation NANTUCKET BEACH for the reporting period are:

US

5 KIA
86 WIA(E)
4 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

91 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
579 DET
16 PW/VC

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US

ENEMY

0 PW/NVA
13 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
72 CIV DEF
29 IN CIV
48 IWC
0 CSWC

Cumulative results of Operation NANTUCKET BEACH are:

US

ENEMY

51 KIA
588 WIA(E)
63 WIA(M)
0 MIA

630 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
579 DET
36 PW/VC
2 PW/NVA
21 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
346 CIV DEF
268 IN CIV
207 IWC
5 CSWC

(F) Operation FINNEY HILL was initiated effective 010600H March 1971. Tactical Commander was Commanding Officer, 198th Infantry Brigade with the mission of continuing aggressive combat operations to insure the security of major lines of communications and supply as well as operations to increase the level of security of the pacification operations being conducted along the coast in the SE portion of the TAOR. At BS286638, 1 March 71, D/1-52 Infantry received 10 60mm mortar rounds resulting in 4 US WIA(E). The enemy casualties are unknown. D/1-52 engaged an NVA squad at BS290585, 4 March and accounted for 4 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. There were no friendly casualties. Light and scattered contacts were reported until 6 March when C/3-1 Infantry operating in the vicinity of BS528720, detonated a booby trapped 8" round and suffered 2 US KIA and 4 US WIA(E). B/123d Aviation on 8 March engaged and killed 5 VC in the area of BS324801. On 11 March at BS572817, elements of B/26th Engineers detonated a mine that resulted in 2 US KIA and 6 US WIA(E). Minor and scattered engagements were reported by the 198th Brigade until 201100H March 1971 at BS367792 when C/1-52 Infantry engaged an UnSEF. Results of this action were: 12 NVA KIA, 2 IWC and 1 US WIA(M). Cumulative results for Operation FINNEY

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HILL for the first twenty days of operations (1-20 March 1971) are as follows: 99 NVA/VC KIA, 15 IWC and reported US casualties were 7 US KIA, 55 WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M). C/1-52 Infantry engaged in a fire fight with a squad sized unit at BS382802 on 24 March 1971. Results of the action were 5 VC KIA and 1 US WIA(E). In a contact with 30 NVA on 28 March at BS390802, C/1-52 Infantry reported 12 NVA KBA and 3 NVA KIA. At BS571419 on 30 March 1971, A/4-21 Infantry sustained 4 US WIA(E) when elements detonated a booby trapped hand grenade. Results for the period, 21 through 31 March 1971 were reported as: 73 NVA/VC KIA, 19 IWC while US losses were 27 WIA(E) and 4 WIA(M). At 020103H April, at BS480708, elements of A/3-1 Infantry received small arms fire and hand grenades that resulted in 7 US WIA(E). Enemy casualties were unknown. At about 1255 hours the same day, D/1-20 Infantry received small arms and mortar fire in the vicinity of BS682507. US casualties were reported as 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA(E). Again, enemy casualties were unknown. At 1430H on the 3d day of April while working in the vicinity of BS358783, D/1-52 received small arms and B-40 rocket fire. The outcome of this action was reported to be 6 NVA KIA and 5 US WIA(E). Total results of all engagements for period 1-7 April were 72 NVA/VC KIA, 7 IWC, 3 US KIA, 32 US WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M). At 2150H, 7 April LZ Bronco received two rounds of unidentified indirect fire resulting in 3 US WIA(E) and 4 US WIA(M). On 111500 April, a UH-1H on a resupply mission for A/1-20 at BS628523 received small arms and indirect fire causing the aircraft to burn and explode. There were 6 US KIA, 7 US WIA(E) and combat loss of 1 UH-1H helicopter. In the subsequent ground attack on A/1-20's position 2 NVA were killed and 1 IWC. US casualties were 5 US KIA and 2 US WIA(E). Effective 111430H April the 11th Infantry Brigade assumed responsibilities for Operation FINNEY HILL and resumed control of 3-1 Infantry, 1-20 Infantry and 4-21 Infantry Battalions. Light and scattered contacts prevailed through 15 April 1971. Cumulative results for period 8 through 15 April 1971 are: 35 NVA/VC KIA, 8 IWC while US casualties were reported as: 13 KIA, 20 US WIA(E) and 7 US WIA(M). At 171415H April 71, B/3-1 working in the vicinity of BS476726 detonated a booby trapped hand grenade resulting in 3 US WIA(E). There were no contacts reported on 19 April. On 20 April, B/3-1 while searching an area in the vicinity of BS447738 detonated a pair of booby trapped hand grenades. The resulting explosion inflicted serious wounds to 4 US soldiers. Again, on 21 April elements of D/4-21 tripped a booby trap of unknown type and suffered 4 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). The incident occurred at BS553429. At coordinates BS791319, 231455H April, elements of C/4-21 while on a search and clear mission sustained 7 US KIA and 12 US WIA(E) when an undetermined size booby trap was detonated. Operating in the vicinity of BS497699 at about 9020H 29 April 1971 D/3-1 Inf while

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searching a tin roofed structure uncovered a cache consisting of 100 individual weapons and 27 crew served weapons of various types and manufacture. D/1-20 Inf at 301940H April 1971 engaged an UNSEF. 4 VC/NVA were KIA as a result of the encounter. There were no US casualties sustained. The engagement occurred in the area of BS921485. The cumulative totals for all actions reported for the period 16 through 30 April 1971 for Operation FINNEY HILL are as follows: 40 VC/NVA KIA, 107 IWC, 27 CSWC while US losses were reported as 7 KIA, 38 WIA(E) and 7 US WIA(M).

US

31 KIA
177 WIA(E)
24 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

327 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
47 DET
2 PW/VC
3 PW/NVA
0 RTNEE/VC
1 RTNEE/NVA
22 CIV DEF
13 IN CIV
163 IWC
28 CSWC

(g) Effective 010600H March 1971, Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK was initiated under tactical control of Commanding Officer, 196th Brigade. In conjunction and close coordination with the GVN forces in the combined TAOR, emphasis is on continuous and aggressive combat operations, to increase the level of security of pacified areas along the coastal plains and to destroy main force and NVA units operating in the western portion of the AO, and to assist in rice denial operations. At 010955H, a 5 ton vehicle from A/26 Engr, BT015324, detonated a 40 pound land mine resulting in 3 USWIA(E). At 1310H vicinity BT016330 a second 5 ton vehicle from A/26 Engr Detonated a 40 pound mine resulting in 2 US WIA(E). On 4 March 1971 F/17 Cav, while operating vicinity BT177248, received 4 RPG rounds and 5 81mm mortar rounds. Friendly casualties were 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA(E). At 040705H in the area of AT818273, R/4-31 engaged 6 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA and no friendly casualties. On 5 March D/3-21 detonated a booby trapped 5 pound can of petna while searching vicinity BT215238. Detonation caused 4 US WIA(E). On 10 March A/4-31 suffered 4 US WIA(E) when a booby trapped hand grenade was detonated at AT970307. On 12 March at BT294115, B/5-46 detonated a booby trapped hand grenade resulting in 5 US WIA(E). Light and scattered contacts were reported until 16 March when C/4-31 engaged 6 VC at AT996296. 5 VC were KIA and 3 IWC with no friendly losses. D/1-46 found a weapons cache at BS096957 on 20 March consisting of 15 IWC. Results

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of all contacts for the period 1 March through 20 March are 68 VC/NVA KIA, 15 IWC, 2 CSWC, 1 US KIA, 52 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). On the 21st of March while patrolling in the vicinity of BT227134/230138, A/5-46 engaged an UNSEF that resulted in 5 VC/NVA KIA and 6 VN detained. US forces sustained no losses. There were no significant contacts reported until 280155H March when LZ Maryanne received a mortar and sapper ground attack. Elements of CP group, C Company, Recon and Mortars, 1-46 Inf were engaged by an UNSEF which succeeded in breaching the perimeter. Results of the attack are as follows: 12 VC/NVA KIA, 30 US KIA, 82 US WIA(E), 1 155mm Howitzer destroyed and 1 155mm Howitzer damaged. On the morning of 31 March at BT240473 elements of F/17 Cav engaged an enemy force of unknown size. During the fire fight, 11 VC/NVA were KIA. There were no friendly casualties. Results of operations for the last ten days of March were reported as: 76 VC/NVA, 14 IWC, 1 CSWC, 35 US KIA, 96 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). While conducting a search operation on 1 April in the vicinity of AS961998, D/1-46 found and arms cache consisting of 5 IWC and 1 CSWC. F/17 Cav operating in the vicinity of BT204517 found seven graves on 5 April and credited the kills to B/3-82 Artillery. On 7 April, at BT213 492, elements of F/17 Cav detonated a mine resulting in 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). Cumulative results for the period 1-7 April were reported by the 196th Brigade as being: 23 VC/NVA KIA, 8 IWC, 1 CSWC, 24 US WIA(E) and 4 US WIA(M). Light and scattered contacts were reported through 10 April. Effective 111430H April, the 198th Brigade terminated its activities in Operation FINNEY HILL and in conjunction with the 196th Brigade commenced participation in Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK. In a series of unrelated and scattered engagements on 13 April US forces suffered 6 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Enemy casualties were not determined. At BT205505, 15 April, elements of F/17 Cav detonated a booby trapped 60mm mortar round. There were 3 US WIA(E). In all reported engagements for the period 8 through 15 April there were 21 VC/NVA KIA, 8 IWC, 19 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). At 161730H April, C/5-46 had a mechanical ambush detonate in the vicinity of BT255081 resulting in 3 VC/NVA KIA and 2 IWC. In the 198th Brigade TAOR R/1-6, while patrolling in the vicinity of BS457893, detonated a 105mm round booby trapped with a trip wire firing device which resulted in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). In the 196th Brigade area of operation F/8 Cav at AT966525 received SAF resulting in 3 US WIA(E). Light and minor engagements were reported throughout the AO until the early morning of 21 April when H/17 Cav in night laager in the vicinity of AT966530 received two unknown type explosions at 0015H. 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA(E) were sustained and one M113A1 was declared a combat loss. At 0900H, 22 April E/1-6 detonated an M16A1 mine in the vicinity of LZ Professional which resulted in 12 US WIA(E). E/1-1 Cav at AT967556 engaged an UNSEF on 23 April and received credit for 4 VC/NVA KIA and 1 IWC. Two hours earlier at 1235H, A/1-6 engaged 5 NVA/VC at BT387006 and

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was credited with 4 VC/NVA KIA. In the 196th Brigade AO at LZ Stinson at 240545H April, Hq Co, 1-52 Inf received 30-40 60mm mortar rounds resulting in 7 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). At 241200H April in the vicinity of BS 355777 A/1-52 received an attack by fire with SAF, RPG and B40 rockets. US casualties were 8 US WIA(E). Enemy losses were not determined. 25 April marked the high point of activity in the combined 196th and 198th Brigades AO when in a series of sharp contacts the Brigades reported 15 VC/NVA KIA, 3 IWC and 1 CSWC while US losses were 2 KIA, 14 WIA(E) and 10 WIA(M). At 251610H, BS350784, A/1-52 received SAF and B40 rocket fire causing 5 US WIA(E) and 9 WIA(M). Return fire accounted for 2 NVA/VC KIA. at 1825H, 25 April at AT965523, A/2-1 received and returned an intense volume of small arms fire from an UNSEF. The fire fight resulted in 6 VC/NVA KIA and 1 US KIA with 5 US WIA(E). At BS577895 on 26 April a convoy from 23d S&T Bn received SAF resulting in 4 US WIA(E). F/17 Cav on 270820H April, detonated a land mine at BT035395 which resulted in the combat loss of an M113A1 with 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). In the vicinity of BS353798 at 281315H April, D/1-52 engaged 4 NVA. When the contact was broken, a sweep of the area revealed 4 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. On the last day of the reporting period, 30 April, at BS348773, A/1-52 received SAF and two rounds of B40 rockets, inflicting serious wounds to 5 US personnel with 2 US suffering minor wounds. At 0825H, 20 April, at the same location, A/1-52 had received a similar attack by fire resulting in 5 US WIA(E). Total results for period 16 through 30 April for Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK were reported as: 76 VC/NVA KIA, 20 IWC, 3 CSWC, 6 US KIA, 102 US WIA(E) and 19 US WIA(M). Cumulative totals for Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK for the reporting period were:

US

45 KIA
295 WIA(E)
44 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

274 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
118 DET
10 PW/VC
3 PW/NVA
4 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
61 CIV DEF
9 IN CIV
83 IWC
7 CSWC

(h) Effective 130600H March 1971, the 198th Infantry Brigade initiated Operation WASCO RAPIDS with the mission of targeting against the 21st Regiment, 2d NVA Division operating in the vicinity of Nui Nhan (BS6554),

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Nui Co (BS6348) and the 38th Local Force Battalion in the vicinity of BS6947. On the afternoon of 13 March, vicinity BS670588, elements of A/3-1 sustained 4 US WIA(E) when an unknown type booby trap was detonated. For the first eight days of the operation (13-19 March 1971) light, minor and scattered contacts prevailed throughout the AO. In two separate contacts on 20 March 1971, B/1-20 engaged 1 VC in the vicinity of BS670497, resulting in 1 VC KIA. Later, at 1540H, vicinity of BS669501, B/1-20 engaged 7 VC with SAF and artillery resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 VC KBA. Cumulative results for this period were 8 VC/NVA KIA, 10 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). There were no contacts reported from 21 through 27 March 1971. One individual weapon was found during this period. Operation WASCO RAPIDS was terminated effective 272400H March 1971. Total results from the entire operation are:

US

0 KIA
10 WIA(E)
3 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

11 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
0 DET
0 PW/VC
0 PW/NVA
0 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
0 CIV DEF
0 IN CIV
1 IWC
0 CSWC

(i) Operation CAROLINE HILL was initiated effective 291200H April 1971 under tactical control of the 196th Infantry Brigade, and in conjunction and coordination with GVN forces, to conduct unilateral and combined operations in support of current campaign plans with priority on the pacification and resettlement of the lowland area west of Da Nang and Hoi An, destroy Base Areas 112 and 127, secure Da Nang from ground, mortar and rocket attacks, support rice denial operations and provide support to RVNAF in providing reaction forces for relief of Border Defense Bases in the TAOR. On the first day of the operation there were no contacts reported. H/17 Cav, operating with Task Force 23d Cav, detonated an unknown type booby trap in the vicinity of AT930550 which resulted in 3 US WIA(E). In one of a series of light and scattered engagements on 30 April 1971, D/3-21 uncovered a weapons cache (AT962429) consisting of 34 individual weapons. Results of all contacts for 30 April 1971 were reported as 3 VC/NVA KIA, 34 IWC and 2 US WIA(E). Cumulative totals for Operation CAROLINE HILL are:

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US

0 KIA
5 WIA(E)
0 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

3 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
1 DET
1 PW/VC
0 PW/NVA
0 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
0 CIV DEF
0 IN CIV
35 IWC
0 CSWC

3. (C) Plans

a. The following OPLANS and OPORDS were in effect of initiated during this reporting period:

(1) OPORD 9-70 (Fall/Winter Campaign). OPORD 11-70 (Rice Denial) was published on 4 November 1970.

(2) OPLAN 4-69 (Golden Valley); OPLAN 8-69 (Emergency Relocation and Evacuations); OPLAN 14-69 (Reinforcement of NMR 1) was superseded on 22 April 1971; OPLAN 1-70 (Security for Visits of HRO); OPLAN 3-70 (Defense of Major Cities); OPLAN 5-70 (PW Recovery Operations); OPLAN 8-70 (Egress/Recap) was published on 16 November 1970; OPLAN 9-70 (Civil Disturbance) was published on 20 December 1970; OPLAN 17-70 (Typhoon Tropical Storm); OPLAN 1-71 (Reinforcement of MR 2, 3 & 4) was published on 21 January 1971; OPLAN 2071, 3-71 & 4-71 (Reinforcement of NMR 1) were published on 22 April 1971.

b. Numerous Fragmentary Orders applicable to Operations FREDERICK HILL, GENEVA PARK, NANTUCKET BEACH, IRON MOUNTAIN, PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE, MIDDLESEX PEAK, FINNEY HILL AND LAMSON 719 have been published.

c. Monitoring of the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) continued through January 1971.

4. (U) Organization

a. Chu Lai Defense Command was relieved from attachment to HQ and Hq Co and Band, Americal Division Support Command and attached to Hq and Hq Co, 198th Infantry Brigade effective 12 November 1970.

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b. The 635th MI Co was attached to the 23d Inf Div Spt Cmd effective 20 December 1970.

c. The 116th Avn Co (AHC) was attached to the 23d Inf Div effective 1 Jan 71 and further attached to the 14th Cbt Avn Bn effective 1 Jan 71.

d. Btry D, 1st Bn 82d Arty was attached to 3d Bn, 18th Arty effective 23 Jan 71.

e. Co C, 23d S&T Bn (PROV) was activated effective 26 Jan 71.

f. Trp F, 17th Cav was relieved from attachment to Hq and Hq Trp, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav and attached to Hq and Hq Co, 196th Inf Bde effective 26 Jan 71.

g. The 116th Avn Co (AHC), 176th Avn Co (AHC) and 178th Avn Co (AHSC) were relieved from attachment to 14th Cbt Avn Bn and attached to 123d Avn Bn effective 29 Jan 71. Effective the same date, Trp F, 8th Cav was relieved from attachment to 123d Avn Bn and attached to 14th Cbt Avn Bn.

h. Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV) and Spt Co, 23d S&T Bn (PROV) were activated effective 27 Feb 71 and assigned to the 23d Inf Div Spt Cmd, OPCON to the 11th Inf Bde, on the same day.

i. Effective 27 Feb 71, the following attachments were made: 2d Bn, 1st Inf relieved from attachment to 196th Inf Bde and attached to 11th Inf Bde; 3d Bn, 1st Inf, 1st Bn, 20th Inf and 4th Bn 21st Inf relieved from attachment to 11th Inf Bde and attached to 198th Inf Bde; Hq Btry, 6th Bn, 11th Arty relieved from attachment to 6th Bn, 11th Arty and attached to 11th Inf Bde; Btry C, 6th Bn 11th Arty and Btry A, 3d Bn, 82d Arty relieved from attachment to 23d Div Arty and attached to Hq Btry, 6th Bn, 11th Arty; Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV) and Spt Co, 23d S&T Bn (PROV) attached to Co B, 723d Main Bn; Co B, 723d Maint Bn relieved from attachment to 723d Maint Bn and attached to Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV); Co B, 23d Med Bn relieved from attachment to 23d Med Bn and attached to Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV); Btry C, 1st Bn, 14th Arty relieved from attachment to 1st Bn, 14th Arty and attached to 3d Bn 82d Arty; Co C, 26th Engr Bn, Forward Support Plt, Co B, 523d Sig Bn and MI Det, 635th MI Co relieved from attachment to 23d Inf Div Spt Cmd and attached to the 11th Inf Bde; Btry A, Btry B and Btry D, 6th Bn, 11th Arty relieved from attachment to 6th Bn, 11th Arty and attached to 1st Bn, 14th Arty; 5th Bn, 46th Inf relieved from attachment to 198th Inf Bde and attached to 196th Inf Bde; Trp H, 17th Cav relieved from attachment to 198th Inf Bde and attached to 11th Inf Bde.

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j. The 59th Inf Plt (Scout Dog) was relieved from attachment to 11th Inf Bde and attached to 196th Inf Bde effective 1 March 1971.

k. The 1st Plt, 23d MP Co was relieved from attachment to the 11th Spt Bn (PROV) effective 15 March 1971.

l. Effective 19 March 1971, Co B, 23d Med Bn was relieved from attachment to the 11th Spt Bn (PROV).

m. Btry B, 1st Bn, 14th Arty relieved from attachment to 3d Bn, 82d Arty effective 1 April 1971.

n. Co 2, Co G, 75th Inf (PROV) was activated and assigned to Co G, 75th Inf effective 1 April 1971.

o. Effective 10 April 1971, the following attachments were made: 2d Bn, 1st Inf relieved from attachment to 11th Inf Bde and attached to 196th Inf Bde; 3d Bn, 1st Inf, 1st Bn, 20th Inf and 4th Bn, 21st Inf relieved from attachment to 198th Inf Bde and attached to 11th Inf Bde; 5th Bn, 46th Inf relieved from attachment to 196th Inf Bde and attached to 198th Inf Bde; Hq Btry, 6th Bn, 11th Arty and Btry A, 3d Bn, 82d Arty relieved from attachment to Hq Btry, 6th Bn, 11th Arty; Co B, 723d Maint Bn relieved from attachment to Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV); Btry C, 1st Bn, 14th Arty relieved from attachment to 3d Bn, 82d Arty; Btry A, Btry B and Btry D, 6th Bn, 11th Arty relieved from attachment to 1st Bn, 14th Arty, Co C, 26th Engr Bn, Forward Support Plt, Co B, 523 Sig Bn and MI Det, 635th MI Co relieved from attachment to 11th Inf Bde.

p. Effective 11 April 1971, Task Force 23d Cav (PROV) was activated and attached to the 196th Inf Bde.

q. Effective 11 April 1971, Trp H, 17th Cav was relieved from attachment to the 11th Inf Bde and attached to the 196th Inf Bde and Trp E, 1st Cav was relieved from attachment to 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav and attached to the 196th Inf Bde.

r. The 59th Inf Plt (Scout Dog) was relieved from attachment to the 196th Inf Bde and attached to the 11th Inf Bde effective 12 April 1971.

s. The following inactivations were effective 23 April 1971: Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV), Spt Co, 23d S&T Bn (PROV) and Co C, 23d S&T Bn (PROV)

t. Effective 30 April 1971, Trp F, 17th Cav was relieved from attachment to the 196th Inf Bde and attached to the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav.

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5. (U) Training

a. The Division Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all individuals through the grade of O-3 who are assigned or attached to the Division. During the reporting period, 135 courses were completed for 9312 personnel.

b. The Division Combat Center completed 4 Combat Leadership courses for 148 students and 4 Support Leadership courses for 111 students.

c. Four Unit Reconnaissance courses were completed, graduating 102 personnel.

d. The Division Sniper School graduated four classes totalling 97 students.

e. Training of Territorial Forces Junior Officers continued. Eight classes were conducted during the reporting period with a total of 181 RF/PF Junior Officers completing the course.

f. The Division Combat Center continued support of a Mine and Booby Trap Mobile Training Team that conducted classes on countering enemy mines and booby traps for units of the Division.

g. A Sapper Infiltration Demonstration Mobile Training Team was established to provide training pertinent to the techniques employed by sappers when penetrating perimeter wire. As of the end of the reporting period, 943 personnel on various Division Fire Bases had received this training.

h. The Division Support Command continued to conduct a monthly PLL Clerks course for all elements of the Division. A total of 173 personnel attended this course.

i. The Division Support Command also conducted its monthly TAMMS course during the reporting period with a total of 148 students attending.

j. The 16th Combat Aviation Group conducted 6 CH-47 Sling Loading classes for units of the Division during the reporting period.

k. Three Mobile Training Teams were established to provide training for ARVN during the reporting period. These were the Demolition MTT and the Mechanical Ambush MTT established by Division Support Command and the Anti-Tank Weapons MTT established by the 198th Inf Bde. As of the end of

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the reporting period, 720 students had received demolitions training, 53 mechanical ambush training and 1000 anti-tank training.

i. On 9 Nov 70, "Project Buddy" was establishing by the Division Support Command to provide on-the-job training to members of the I Corps Area Logistics Command (ARVN) in various skills related to the logistics field. To date, 91 ARVN personnel have completed training.

j. A Helicopter Gunship Control Mobile Training Team was formed to provide instruction to ARVN units in the technique of helicopter gunship control. To date, 200 personnel have received this training.

k. On 28 April 1971, a Dust-Off Procedures Mobile Training Team was established to provide US units with instruction in dust-off procedures to include the use of the jungle penetrator.

l. The 23d Infantry Division Artillery conducted 9 six-day classes in Advanced Fire Direction Techniques for Division Artillery personnel.

m. The 23d Infantry Division Artillery also conducted 4 five-day Reconnaissance Sergeant courses during the reporting period.

6. (C) Close Air Support.

a. During the period 1 November 1970 through 30 April 1971, 477 Close Air Support (CAS) and 155 Combat Skyspot (CSS) missions for a total of 632 air missions utilizing 1,046 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the 23d Infantry Division. This is a decrease from 2,958 missions and 3,927 aircraft sorties during the previous six month period.

(1) CSS Missions flown

During the reporting period, 155 CSS missions, using 244 aircraft sorties were flown. The USAF flew 76 missions using 139 sorties; the RAAF flew 44 missions using 46 sorties; the USMC flew 25 missions using 31 sorties; the USN flew 5 missions using 10 sorties; and VNAF flew 5 missions using 18 sorties. This is a decrease from the previous six months period when 1,444 CSS missions using 1,034 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the Division. The large decrease can be attributed to removal in September, 1970 of the Marine ASRT Sky Spot Control Facility from Chu Lai and a significant decrease in the number of Marine A6A Beacon missions allocated during the last three months.

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(2) CAS Missions

During the reporting period 477 CAS missions, using 802 aircraft sorties, were flown. The USAF flew 169 missions using 349 sorties; the RAAF flew 147 missions using 147 sorties; the USMC flew 85 missions using 150 sorties; the USN flew 21 missions using 45 sorties; and VNAF flew 55 missions using 111 sorties. This is a decrease from the previous six months period when 1,514 CAS missions, using 2,415 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the Division. The large decrease can be attributed to bad weather during the first three months of the reporting period, the 23d Division's low TAC Air priority during Operations LAMSON 719 and 720, and the general decreasing availability of TIC Air due to unit withdrawals from RVN, notably the Marine air wing which was removed from Chu Lai.

(3) Ordnance Expended

A total of 1,720 tons of bombs were dropped during the period, of which 130 tons were Napalm. The decrease from 11,578 tons for the previous six months is in proportion to the decrease in the number of missions delivered.

b. There were no Arc Lights flow in support of the 23d Infantry Division in the last six months.

c. Bomb damage assessments made by forward air controllers (FAC's) during the period included the following: 900 structures destroyed, 359 structures damaged, 922 bunkers destroyed, 168 bunkers damaged, 52 secondary explosions, 55 secondary fires, 7 bridges destroyed, 15 bridges damaged, 7 .51 positions destroyed, 12 .51 cal positions damaged, 6 fighting positions and 19 tunnels destroyed, 4 caves collapsed, and 49 enemy killed by airstrikes (KBAS).

7. (C) Artillery: Division Artillery continued to provide fire support for the Division throughout the Division's area of operations. In order to provide appropriate fire support to the maneuver elements of the Division, frequent moves of artillery firing elements were necessary. Artillery operations during the period are as follows:

a. The direct support unit of the 196th Infantry Brigade remained the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery. B Battery, 1-14 Artillery with four howitzers remained attached to the battalion for the entire period. A Battery, 3-82 Artillery was detached from the battalion and attached to 6-11 Artillery during the period 1 March to 8 April. C Battery, 1-14 Artillery located at Fat City (BT440077) and Ky Tra (BT316089) was attached

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to 3-82 Artillery from 1 March to 8 April. The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery relocated from Hawk Hill (BT231315) to Da Nang on 25 April.

(1) Two howitzers of A Battery started the period at Baldy (BT133453) in support of Task Force Burnett which was engaged in a joint operation with elements of the 1st Marine Division in Quang Nam Province. The other four howitzers of the battery moved from Young (BT188158) to Hawk Hill (BT225312) on 1 November upon completion of their mission in support of 2-1 Infantry. On 2 November A Battery moved four howitzers to Baldy to increase the support of Task Force Burnett. On 10 November the battery moved four howitzers from Baldy to Casey Jones (AT998516) in support of Task Force 2-1 Infantry which was OPCON to the 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. On 1 December two howitzers were moved from Baldy to Hawk Hill, having completed their mission in support of Task Force Burnett. On 2 December the battery moved four howitzers to Crest (AT816386) from Casey Jones in support of 2-1 Infantry upon completion of the joint operation with the 1st Marine Division. On 13 December the two howitzers at Hawk Hill were moved to Maryanne (AS961998) to support elements of 1-46 Infantry operating in the vicinity of that fire base. On 19 January, the four howitzers at Crest were moved to Marge (BT186051) in support of 2-1 Infantry. On 24 January the two howitzers were displaced from Maryanne to Young in support of 1-46 Infantry in a combined operation with RF/PF from Quang Tin Province. On 1 March the two howitzers at Young and four howitzers at Marge were moved to Chu Lai Combat Base in preparation for movement to Quang Tri Province in support of Operation LAMSON 719. Upon closing at Chu Lai, the battery was attached to 6-11 Artillery and moved by road on 2 March to Dong Ha (YD205605). On 8 April the battery returned to Hawk Hill after termination of Operation LAMSON 719. After refitting, the battery moved to Hill 151 (AT935474) on 13 April, where they remained at the end of the period.

(2) B Battery started the period with all six howitzers at Center (BT050250). On 7 November two howitzers were moved to Young (BT188158) in support of operations of 1-46 Infantry and 3-21 Infantry south of the fire base. On 13 December two howitzers were moved back to Center as they were replaced by four howitzers of B Battery, 1-14 Artillery at Young. On 20 December the battery moved two howitzers to New Hau Duc (AS051049) in support of a combined operation of 1-46 Infantry with 4th Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment. On 24 December the howitzers were displaced back to Center upon termination of the combined operation. On 29 December two howitzers of B Battery moved from Center to Baldy (BT133453) in support of 4-31 Inf. On 12 January the two howitzers moved from Baldy to Hawk Hill (BT225312) by road and were airlifted to Center the following day; the 4-31 Infantry operation in Quang Nam Province having been completed. On 15 January B

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Battery moved three howitzers to Carole (BT158081) in support of a combat assault of 2-1 Infantry in the vicinity of Marge (BT186051). These howitzers returned to Center on 19 January when the support of 2-1 Infantry was provided by A Battery, 3-82 Artillery from Marge. On 24 January, three howitzers were moved from Center to Hawk Hill in support of F Troop, 17th Cavalry, which was attached to the 196th Brigade. On 14 February one howitzer was moved back to Center from Hawk Hill to provide additional fire support to 3-21 Infantry. On 24 February two howitzers were moved from Hawk Hill to Grunt (AT957111) to support 1-46 Infantry operations in the Phuoc Chau Valley. On 1 March two howitzers were displaced from Center to Young to support elements of 3-21 Infantry, replacing A Battery of the 3-82 Artillery. On 17 March 1-46 Infantry closed its operations in the Phuoc Chau Valley and the battery moved the two howitzers from Grunt to Maryanne (AS961998) in continuation of its support of 1-46 Infantry. On 24 March two howitzers returned to Center from Maryanne. On 27 March two howitzers were moved from Center to Baldy to provide support for F Troop, 17th Cavalry. On 3 April the two howitzers at Young were moved to Hawk Hill and then to Baldy on 5 April. On 12 April two howitzers from Baldy and two from Center were moved to Hill 510 (AT946404) in conjunction with the Division's TAOI expansion into Quang Nam Province. The remaining two howitzers of the battery were moved from Baldy to Hawk Hill on 18 April and 22 April they moved to Hill 65 (AT880580). At the end of the period the battery remained split with four howitzers at Hill 510 and two at Hill 65.

(3) At the beginning of the period, C Battery provided support for 4-31 Infantry from Siberia (AT903232) with the battery consolidated at that location. On 7 November two howitzers were moved to Young (BT188157) OPCON to B Battery 3-82 Artillery in support of elements of 3-21 Infantry and 1-46 Infantry operating south of the fire base. On 20 November two howitzers were moved from Siberia to Pratt (AT822262) in support of 4-31 Infantry. On 4 December the two howitzers of C Battery OPCON to B Battery 3-82 at Young were airlifted back to Siberia when they were replaced by B Battery, 1-14 Artillery. On 15 December 4-31 Infantry operation in the vicinity of Pratt were completed and the two howitzers at Pratt were moved back to Siberia. On 25 January C Battery moved two howitzers from Siberia to West (AT990250) to expand their support of 4-31 Infantry. On 26 April the battery headquarters and four howitzers were moved to Da Nang to prepare for future operations. The remaining two howitzers of the battery were moved from West to Da Nang on 27 April, consolidating the battery at that location. On 30 April, the battery headquarters and the six howitzers were moved to Hill 350 (AT837757) where they remained at the end of the period.

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(4) B Battery remained attached to 3-82 Artillery and provided support to 1-46 Infantry throughout the period. The battery started the period based at Maryanne (AS961998). On 4 December, the battery moved two howitzers to Young (BT188158) in support of 1-46 Infantry and the other two howitzers from Maryanne followed on 13 December to Young. On 24 January the battery moved back to Maryanne continuing to support 1-46 Infantry. On 17 March the battery moved its four howitzers at Maryanne to Mildred (BS024978). On 31 March the four howitzers at Mildred were moved back to Maryanne in support of 1-46 Infantry and elements of the 5th ARVN Regiment. On 23 April the battery headquarters and the four howitzers were moved from Maryanne to Hill 270 (AT865582) continuing to provide direct support to 1-46 Infantry.

b. The direct support unit of the 198th Infantry Brigade remained the 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery. Four howitzers of B Battery remained detached from the battalion and attached to 3-82 Artillery throughout the period. During the period 1 March to 11 April, C Battery of the battalion was detached and attached to 3-82 Artillery. During this same period, the battalion had A, B and D Batteries, 6-11 Artillery attached, thereby controlling the fires of five batteries.

(1) A Battery (with two howitzers from B Battery, 1-14 Artillery Attached) continued to provide support to 1-6 Infantry from split positions. At the beginning of the period, four howitzers were located at Bayonet (BT558003) and four howitzers at Dottie (BS630853). On 23 December two howitzers were moved from Bayonet to Tam Ky (BT292232) to provide artillery coverage for Division convoy to Da Nang taking troops to see the Bob Hope Show. These howitzers returned to Bayonet on 25 December following closure of the convoy back to Chu Lai in the late evening of 24 December. Two howitzers were moved from Dottie to a field position (BT568000) on 19 January to provide support for eagle flights of 1-6 Infantry, and returned to Dottie on the same day. On 17 February two howitzers were moved to Ha Thanh (BS385698) to provide support for 1-52 Infantry. On 1 March two howitzers were displaced by road from Dottie to LIZ (BS753432) to provide support to 1-20 Infantry, when C Battery, 6-11 Artillery was displaced to support Operation LAMSON 719. On 6 March the two howitzers at Liz were deployed to Snoopy (BS705613) where they remained until 31 March when they returned to Dottie. At the end of the period, the battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at Bayonet, two howitzers at Dottie and two howitzers at Ha Thanh.

(2) C Battery provided support for 5-46 Infantry throughout the period. Initially, the battery was evenly split with the headquarters and three howitzers at Fat City (BT440077) and three howitzers at Ky Tra (BT316089).

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On 21 April the fire base at Ky Tra was closed and three howitzers were moved to Professional (BT173077) where they remained at the end of the period.

(3) At the beginning of the period, D Battery provided support to 1-52 Infantry from Stinson (BS538824) with four howitzers and two howitzers were located at Nui Pho Tinh (BS648936). On 8 November the two howitzers at Nui Pho Tinh returned to Stinson upon completion of operations in that area. On 25 December two howitzers were moved from Stinson to Cindy (BS342882); these two howitzers closed back at Stinson on 7 January. On 17 January three howitzers were displaced from Stinson to Cindy to support elements of the 1-52 Infantry operating south of the fire base. At the end of the period, the battery continued to operate from split locations with the battery headquarters and three howitzers at Stinson and the remaining three howitzers located at Cindy.

c. The 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery continued to provide direct support to the 11th Infantry Brigade at Bronco (BS812396). During the period 1 March to 8 April, HQ and C Batteries, 6-11 Artillery were attached to the 11th Infantry Brigade and deployed in northern MR 1 in support of Operation LAMSON 719. During this period of attachment to 11th Brigade, A, B and D Batteries of the battalion were attached to 1-14 Artillery. The HQ while A Battery, 3-82 Artillery was attached to 6-11 Artillery. The HQ and C Battery returned to Division Artillery control on 9 April and resumed direct support of the 11th Infantry Brigade on 11 April.

(1) A Battery continued to provide support of 4-21 Infantry from split locations. At the beginning of the period, the battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at Debbie (BS869319) and two howitzers at Charlie Brown (BS928220). On 13 February the battery moved two howitzers from Debbie to a field location (BS25340) in support of 4-21 Infantry. The following day these two howitzers returned to Debbie upon completion of the operation. On 31 March the two howitzers at Charlie Brown were moved to Snoopy (BS705613) upon turn-over of Charlie Brown to the Quang Ngai Regional Forces. On 14 April two howitzers were moved from Debbie and two from Snoopy to Tiger (BS478476) in support of 4-3 Infantry. On 22 April the two howitzers at Debbie were moved to Bronco (BS812396) to support 4-21 Infantry and in preparation for closing Debbie as a US fire support base. Upon termination of the 4-3 Infantry operation west of Tiger, the four howitzers and battery headquarters displaced to Crunch (BS534515). At the end of the period the battery continued to operate from split locations at Crunch and Bronco.

(2) B Battery provided support to 4-3 Infantry at the start of the

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period with four howitzers located at OP George (BS470866) under the OPCON of the 1-14 Artillery and two howitzers and the battery headquarters at San Juan Hill (BS634380). The four howitzers at OP George reverted to 6-11 Artillery control on 2 November and were returned to San Juan Hill. On 7 November two howitzers were moved to Crunch (BS535515) to support operations in that area. The two howitzers moved from Crunch back to San Juan Hill on 17 December. On 13 January two howitzers were moved from San Juan Hill to Ba To (BS556326) to support a combined US/ARVN operation in the area. The two howitzers at Ba To returned to San Juan Hill on 12 February upon completion of the combined operation. The battery was attached to 1-14 Artillery on 1 March and then on 6 March three howitzers were moved from San Juan Hill to Liz (BS757432) to provide support to 1-20 Infantry. Also on 6 March the battery FDC was moved to Bronco (BS812396) to facilitate control of the two firing elements. The three howitzers at Liz and the FDC at Bronco returned to San Juan Hill on 9 April to support 4-21 Infantry.

(3) C Battery provided support to 1-20 Infantry from split locations at the beginning of the period. The battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at Liz (BS753432) and two howitzers were located at Snoopy (BS708610). On 7 November the two howitzers at Snoopy were moved to Dragon (BS730529) and returned to Snoopy on 14 November. On 1 March the six howitzers and battery headquarters moved to Chu Lai and on 2 March road marched to Dong Ha Combat Base (YD235695) to prepare for Operation LAMSON 719.

On 6 March the battery moved to FSB C-2 (YD135645) to support 1-61 Infantry. On 7 April the battery moved back to Dong Ha Combat Base in preparation for movement back to the Division AO. The battery rotated sections and equipment to Bronco (BS812383) for refitting and on 15 April moved two howitzers to Snoopy. At the close of the period, the battery was continuing to Support 1-20 Infantry with four howitzers and the battery headquarters at Liz and two howitzers at Snoopy.

(4) D Battery provided support to 3-1 Infantry from split locations at the beginning of the period. The battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at FSB 411 (BS539731) and two howitzers were located at Nghia Hanh (BS616642). On 6 November the two howitzers at Nghia Hanh were moved to FSB 411. On 30 December two howitzers were moved from FSB 411 to Minh Long (BS534515) to support 3-1 Infantry operations in that area. Two howitzers were moved from FSB 411 to OP Warrior (BS555634) on 23 January and returned to FSB 411 on 25 January. On 26 April the two howitzers at Minh Long were moved from Minh Long to FSB 411, consolidating the battery at that location at the end of the period.

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fires to 3-82 Artillery in the FREDERICK HILL AO and direct support to 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry in the PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE AO at the beginning of the period. The battalion was relieved of the mission of direct support to 1-1 Cavalry on 29 January at which time they provided reinforcing fires to 3-82, 6-11 and 1-14 Artillery. On 13 April the battalion was relieved of the reinforcing mission to 1-14 and 6-11 Artillery. The battalion headquarters and fire direction center were located at Chu Lai at the beginning of the period and moved to Da Nang on 15 April 1971, in conjunction [sic] with the TAOI expansion of the Division into Quang Nam Province.

(1) A Battery provided both direct support fires and general support/reinforcing fires from split locations at the beginning of the period. The headquarters and three howitzers located at Hawk Hill (BT225312) provided direct support to 1-1 Cavalry. The remaining three howitzers at West (AT990250) provided general support/reinforcing fires to 3-82 Artillery. On 23 January 1971, one howitzer at West was moved to Hawk Hill in preparation for movement to the southern part of the Division AO to replace 1-82 Artillery elements which were preparing for participation in Operation LAMSON 719. On 25 January two howitzers were moved from Hawk Hill to Dottie (BS630853) to provide reinforcing fires to 1-14 Artillery.

On 26 January two howitzers of the battery were moved from Hawk Hill to Snoopy (BS708610). On 18 March the two howitzer crews at West were exchanged with crews from B Battery at Debbie (BS869319). This was done to facilitate future operations. On 11 April the battery headquarters and six howitzers road marched to Rawhide (AT880580). On April 13th two howitzers

were moved from Rawhide to Hill 510 (AT946404) and on the following day four howitzers and the battery headquarters were moved from Rawhide to Hill 151 (AT935474). At the end of the period, the battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at Hill 151 and two howitzers remained at Hill 510.

(2) B Battery initially provided general support/reinforcing fires with the battery evenly split between Tien Phuoc (BT102140) and Maryanne (AS961998). On 23 January, one howitzer was moved from Maryanne and one from Tien Phuoc to Hawk Hill (BT225312) and the other two howitzers from Maryanne were moved to Hawk Hill on 24 January. On 25 January two howitzers were moved from Hawk Hill to Debbie (BS869319) and on 26 January two howitzers were moved from Hawk Hill to Fat City (BT440077). These moves were made for the purpose of replacing 1-82 Artillery which was preparing for participation in Operation LAMSON 719. On 18 March, the two howitzer crews at Debbie were exchanged with crews from A Battery at West (AT990250). On 12 April the two howitzer crews at Fat City were exchanged with crews from C Battery at Siberia (AT903232). These exchanges resulted in the battery then being split between Tien Phuoc, West and Siberia. On 25 April the two howitzers at Siberia were displaced to West and Tien Phuoc. At

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the end of the period, the battery continued to operate from split locations with the headquarters and three howitzers at Tien Phuoc and three howitzers at West.

(3) C Battery initially provided general support/reinforcing fires with the battery consolidated at Pleasantville (BS027977). On 29 December two howitzers were moved to Siberia (AT903232) to provide additional support to the maneuver forces operating from that fire base. On 20 March the battery moved two howitzers from Pleasantville to Maryanne (AS961998) to increase the fire support available from that fire base. On April the battery exchanged personnel between Siberia and Fat City (BT440077) to C Battery to facilitate future operations. On 13 April the two howitzers at Fat City were moved to Rawhide (AT880580) in connection with the TAOI expansion. The two howitzers at Maryanne were displaced to Baldy (BT130459) on 22 April in support of Task Force 23d Cavalry. On 24 April the battery headquarters and two howitzers moved from Pleasantville to Rawhide and then on 26 April the two howitzers at Baldy were moved to Rawhide, consolidating the battery at that location. At the end of the period, the battery remained consolidated at Rawhide.

e. The 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery provided general support/reinforcing fires to 1-14 Artillery and 6-11 Artillery in the central and southern portions of the Division at the beginning of the period. The battalion headquarters and operations center were initially located at Hurricane (BT537033). The battalion headquarters and headquarters battery, A, B and C Batteries were detached from the Division Artillery during the period 30 January to 8 April and attached to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in support of Operation LAMSON 719). (This period will be covered in a separate report). Upon return to the Division Artillery, the battalion headquarters and operations center again located at Hurricane where they remained at the end of the period.

(1) A Battery reinforced the fires of 1-14 Artillery from Fat City (BT440077) with four howitzers and from Dottie (BS680853) with two howitzers. On 25 January the two guns at Dottie moved to Fat City, consolidating the battery at that location. On 26 January the battery moved to a staging area at Hurricane (BT537033) in preparation for participation in Operation LAMSON 719, and departed Chu Lai on 29 January. Upon return from the operation in northern MR 1 on 8 April, the battery refitted at Hurricane and deployed to Dottie on 11 April and to Fat City on 13 April where they remained at the end of the period.

(2) B Battery reinforced the fires of 1-14 Artillery with two howitzers at Stinson (BS539834) and provided reinforcing fires to 6-11 Artillery from

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Snoopy (BS708610) with four guns. On 24 January the two howitzers at Stinson were moved to Snoopy to consolidate the battery at that location. On 6 January the battery moved to a staging area at Hurricane (BT537033) in preparation for participation in Operation LAMSON 719 and departed Chu Lai on 29 January. Upon return from the operation in northern MR 1 on 8 April, the battery refitted at Hurricane. On 11 April two howitzers were moved to Snoopy. Two howitzers were deployed to Stinson on 14 April and two more howitzers were emplaced at Snoopy the same day. At the end of the period, the battery remained split with the headquarters and four howitzers at Snoopy and two at Stinson.

(3) C Battery reinforced the fires of 6-11 Artillery with its headquarters and four howitzers at Liz (BS757432) and two howitzers at Debbie (BS869319). On 25 January the two howitzers at Debbie moved to Liz to consolidate the battery there in preparation for future operations. On 26 January the battery moved to a staging area at Hurricane (BT537033) in preparation for movement to northern MR 1. The battery departed Chu Lai on 29 January for participation in Operation LAMSON 719. Upon return from this operation on 8 April, the battery refitted at Hurricane until 11 April when two howitzers were moved to Debbie. The four remaining howitzers and the battery headquarters moved to Liz on 18 April. On 22 April the two howitzers at Debbie were moved to Bronco (BS812396). At the end of the period, the battery remained split with the battery headquarters and four howitzers at Liz and two howitzers at Bronco.

(4) D Battery (8 inch) provided reinforcing support to both 1-14 and 6-11 Artillery from Dottie (BS630853) and Bronco (BS757432) at the beginning of the period. On 6 November the howitzers at Dottie were moved to Fat City (BT440077) to conduct an artillery raid on a bunker complex west of the fire base. Upon termination of the raid on 7 November, the two howitzers were moved back to Dottie. On 8 December the two howitzers at Dottie were moved to Bronco to increase the supporting fires for 4-21 Infantry operating to the southwest of the fire base. These two howitzers returned to Dottie on 10 December upon termination of the operation. On 20 and 21 January the two 8 inch howitzers at Bronco were converted to 175mm guns, making the battery a composite 8 inch howitzer/175mm gun unit. The battery consolidated at Dottie on 21 January and departed for Ross (AT037343) on 22 January and closed there on 23 January after an overnight stop at Hawk Hill (BT225312). Upon closing at Ross, the battery was attached to 3-18 Artillery for all purposes. On 15 February the battery departed Ross and closed at Rawhide (AT880580) on 16 February at which time they became OPCON to the 11th Marine Regiment of the 1st Marine Division. The control of the battery was returned to the Division on 16 April. At the end of the period, the battery remained at Rawhide providing general supporting fires in the 196th Infantry Brigade AO in Quang Nam Province.

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f. The 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery provided general supporting fires for the 23d Infantry Division TAOI with hits headquarters and fire direction center at Chu Lai.

(1) A Battery supported operations in the 198th Infantry Brigade AO from Cindy (BS342882). It also provided support to ARVN Border Ranger unit operations in the areas of Tra Bong and Ha Thanh.

(2) B Battery continued to support operations in the 196th Infantry Brigade AO from Tien Phuoc (BT102140). The battery also provided fire support to the ARVN Border Ranger unit operating from Tien Phuoc. On 25 March the battery moved one 8 inch howitzer and one 175mm gun to Pleasantville (BS051049) to conduct an artillery raid. The battery fired primarily in the area south of Maryanne (AS961999). On 28 March the battery moved an additional 175mm gun to Pleasantville to give added fire power to the raid. The two 175mm guns and one 8 inch howitzer returned to Tien Phuoc on 8 April upon successful completion of the raid. The battery expended a total of 697x8 inch and 841x175mm rounds during the raid.

(3) C Battery continued to provide general supporting fires in the 11th Infantry Brigade from Crunch (BS534515) and additionally provided support to the ARVN Border Ranger units at Minh Long, Ba To, and Gia Vuc.

g. Counter Mortar Radar Detachments:

(1) The 251st FA Detachment (CM Radar) was initially located at Fat City (BT440077) to provide detection coverage for the Northern Rocket Pocket of Chu Lai Combat Base. The detachment moved to Op Nui Vong (BS702601) on 22 April to provide countermortar coverage for that OP and surrounding area. The detachment also participated in registrations for artillery units which were in range of both positions occupied during the period.

(2) The 252d FA Detachment (CM Radar) remained at Sugar Mill Hill (BS613735) for the entire period. The operation of the radar continued to be combined effort with personnel from the 2d ARVN Division Artillery participating. The detachment provided countermortar detection coverage in the Quang Ngai City area and assisted 2d ARVN and 23d Infantry Division Artillery units within range to conduct registrations.

h. Ground Surveillance Radar Section:

(1) The AN/TPS-25 radar section organic to the HHB, 23d Infantry Division Artillery continued to provide surveillance from OP 1 (BS516778).

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During period when the section's primary radar was nonoperational, it was augmented by an AN/PPS-5 radar.

(2) The 271st FA Detachment (Radar) remained at OP 3 (BS754421) during the entire period. It enjoyed a successful record of detecting attempted infiltration into the districts of Mo Duc and Duc Pho.

i. Meteorological Stations:

(1) The meteorological section of 3-18 Artillery remained at Chu Lai during the period, providing metro data for the artillery units located in the north and central coastal areas of the Division AO.

(2) The meteorological section of 3-16 Artillery remained at Tien Phuoc (BT102140), providing metro data in the northwestern portion of the Division AO.

(3) The meteorological section organic to HHB, 23d Infantry Division Artillery remained at Bronco (BS812396) and continued to provide metro data for artillery units operating in the southern portion of the Division AO.

8. (U) Aviation. A separate ORLL for Aviation will be submitted by the 16th Combat Aviation Group for this reporting period.

9. (C) Chemical. During the period 1 November 1970 - 30 April 1971, the Division Chemical Section, 27th Chemical Detachment, 87th Chemical Detachment of the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the following chemical activities.

a. 110 drums of persistent CS were dropped for terrain contamination.

b. 37 E-158 tactical CS Cluster Bombs were employed for temporary denial of terrain to the enemy.

c. 200 Airborne Personnel Detector missions were flown.

d. 16,500 gallons of contaminated fuel were used to defoliate FSB's.

e. 753 55 gallon drums of thickened fuel were dropped on spider holes, bunkers, and suspected mine fields.

f. 2408 pounds of persistent CS were seeded into the perimeter wire of Chu Lai Combat Base.

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10. (C) Engineer.

(1) Activities for the period consisted of the divisional engineer effort being devoted primarily to direct combat support of the division, while non-divisional units devoted primary efforts to the construction of secondary LOC's and operational support construction.

(2) LOC Program

(a) QL-1

1. A major repair effort was required to repair flood damage caused by monsoon rains in November and December. To insure continuous traffic, the 26th Engineer Battalion provided and installed 136 ft of M4T6 dry span, 70 ft of Bailey bridge, and 90 ft of M4T6 float bridge. The 39th Engineer Battalion repaired 11 bridges and installed 9 culverts. During the period Jan - Mar 71, permanent shoulder repair on QL-1 was performed by NCR 32 from the northern AO border to Tam Ky, and from Tam Ky south to the Song Ve River by the 82d ARVN Engineer Battalion.

2. Enemy Interdictions. The enemy interdicted QL-1 by blowing three culverts and damaging three bridges. The culverts were only blown half way across in all cases, the road was immediately passable. Repairs were easily made by the 39th Engr Bn within three days. Circumstances and the ensuing repairs for each of the damaged bridges are described as follows:

(a) On 25 Dec 70, an enemy sapper unit was detected by PF security forces approaching bridge I-B-90 at BS596927. One VC was killed and a 18"x18"x12" explosive charge was captured. One explosion was set off which lightly damaged a pier column. Approximately 2 ft of concrete flaked off to the steel reinforcing bars. The column was immediately repaired by the 39th Engr Bn.

(b) On 30 Jan 71, an enemy sapper unit slipped in among PF security forces on bridge I-B-96 at BS642746 and destroyed or damaged four columns located on the same side of a pier. Bridge capacity was reduced to class 30 and traffic was restricted to one lane. Temporary repairs were made by the 39th Engr Bn by construction of two Bailey piers on either side of the damaged pier. The 26th Engr Bn supported the operation by providing two M4T6 rafts. Repairs were completed on 5 Mar 71. MPW was tasked to conduct permanent repair of the pier and is presently awaiting allocation of funds.

(c) On 25 Feb 71, a timber pile pier on bridge I-B-87 at BT487067 was blown and the adjacent spans dropped, thereby creating a 75 ft gap.

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On the following day, the 26th Engr Bn installed 90 ft of DS Bailey bridge to open the bridge to traffic. One day later, the 26th Engr Bn installed 315 feet of M4T6 float bridge at the same site, followed by the removal of the Bailey bridge. Beginning 3 Mar 71, the 39th Engr Bn built a new pier and reconstructed the two spans. Work was completed on 14 Mar 71, at which time the float bridge was removed by the 26th Engr Bn. This was a classic example of two engineer units combining respective capabilities to rapidly solve an enemy interdiction.

(d) Repair of potholes. With the opening of the RMK hot mix plant at Chu Lai in March, the MPW departments of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces conducted a vigorous program in repairing potholes on QL-1. The section of QL-1 from Quang Ngai city south to the MR2 border remains to be accomplished.

(e) Secondary LOC's. Beginning 1 Feb 71, the 39th Engr Bn initiated its 1971 road construction program, which calls for 85 km of all weather roads. To date about 15 km are complete with the exception of a sand-asphalt surface treatment. The 26th Engineer Bn concentrated on constructing dry weather roads in support of pacification programs in each province. Approximately 33 km of dry weather road have been completed. A more detailed narrative of each road constructed by the 26th Engr Bn may be found in para B(3). Work on Rte 529 to Tra Bong commenced with the 103d ARVN Engr Bn constructing a 63 foot class 30 timber trestle bridge at BS537884.

(3) Land Clearing.

(a) Clearing operations continued in the Batangan by the 59th Land Clearing Company, 118th ARVN Land Clearing Company and the 26th Land Clearing Team. Due to tactical requirements, in support of pacification, the 26th LCT was moved to the Ky My area of Quang Tin Province in early April 71. The 59th LCC then assured the 26th LCT's mission of clearing in the vicinity of LZ Stinson where work is still continuing.

(b) On 25 Jan 71, the 118th ARVN LCC departed to northern MR1 in support of LAMSON 719. On 27 Jan 71, one platoon (10 dozers) of the 59th LCC redeployed to Khe Sanh to provide land clearing support in that area. Upon completion of that mission they were placed in support of the 101st Abn Div and are not expected to return until 15 May 71.

(c) Statistical results by area are indicated below:

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<u>AREA</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ACRES</u>	<u>BNKRS</u>	<u>TRENCHES & TUNNELS (m)</u>	<u>MINES & B/T's</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Batangan	59 LCC	7,624	77	13,424	78	720 lbs/rice 20 lbs/salt
	26 LCT	2,118	83	1,013	13	20 lbs/rice
	118 LCC	<u>346</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>590</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>300 lbs/rice</u>
		10,088	163	15,027	93	
<u>AREA</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ACRES</u>	<u>BNKRS</u>	<u>TRENCHES & TUNNELS (m)</u>	<u>MINES & B/T's</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Stinson	59 LCC	810	6	2,100	3	
	26 LCT	<u>674</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>7</u>	
		1484	18	2,125	10	
Ky My	26 LCT	718	9	250	18	
	TOTAL	12,290	190	17,402	121	1040 lbs/rice 20 lbs/salt

(4) Airfield Rehabilitation.

(a) Tien Phuoc. Following flood damage at the end of Oct 70, the 39th Engr Bn conducted extensive repairs of the runway. Damaged matting removed and new matting was installed on the runway and the parking apron. Additionally, the runway ditches were repaired to improve drainage. On three occasions from Feb to Mar 71, the 39th Engr Bn had to conduct welding repairs on matting that had become loose.

(b) Tra Bong. The airfield was closed by the 39th Engr Bn 1-14 Jan 71 for repairs. Potholes in the runway and parking apron were filled with a soil cement mixture accompanied by welding repairs on 9-11 April 71.

(c) Tam Ky. A soft spot was repaired by the 39th Engr Bn in Nov 70.

(d) Minh Long. Welding repairs were made by the 39th Engr Bn in Nov 70.

(e) Ha Thanh. During the period 1 Nov 70 - 21 Jan 71, NCR-32 resurfaced

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the airfield with M8A1 matting. From 11-18 April 71, the 2d ARVN Engineers conducted welding repairs.

(f) Ba To New. NCR 32 constructed a new airfield at this location during the period 16 Oct 70 to 16 Mar 71. Difficulties due to weather and transportation problems impeded progress.

(g) Duc Pho. In Dec 70, the 26th Engr Bn repaired several soft spots under the runway and parking apron.

(5) 26th Engr Bn Operations.

a. Combat Engineer Support.

(1) Minesweeping.

(a) Daily minesweeping of Liz, Fat City, Hawk Hill, and the Sniper Range access roads continued. With training provided by B/26, the responsibility for the daily sweep of the Liz access road was turned over to the 1/20 Inf on 6 April.

(b) In support of division and province convoys, B/26 periodically swept route 529 from Binh Son to Tra Bong, and D/26 assisted the 39th Engr Bn in the sweep of route 533 from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc. Additional minesweeps were conducted by B/26 on the Stinson access road to resupply the 59th LCC, and on the Ky My road to resupply the 26th LCT.

(c) In conjunction with the 26th Engr Bn's road construction program, minesweeps were conducted each morning on the Nui Lac Son to Center road, the Ky My road, the Tien Phuoc to Pleasantville road, and the Stinson road.

(2) LZ Preparation. Engineer Alpha and Bravo LZ/PZ preparation teams cleared three LZ's at Nui Don Da (BT282120), Annette (AT965476), and Hill 510 (AT945405). Two more LZ's are now in progress at Hill 350 (AT812757) and Hill 848 (BS417925). All of the above LZ's were swept for mines and booby traps and the surrounding area cleared for fields of fire.

(3) Tactical Wire Installation. From 5-18 Nov 70, E/26 installed 800 meters of the 23d Inf Div's improved tactical wire system to strengthen the perimeter in Subsector IV. From 24-25 Jan 71, E/26 with personnel support from B/26, D/26 and the 198th Inf Bde installed 1000 meters of tactical wire around the beach POL farm. In February, D/26 installed 2200 meters of tactical wire around the other POL farm at the south end of

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the post and installed 1100 meters of chain link fence around the Chu Lai power plant. An additional 2100 meters of tactical wire were installed around the battalion's perimeter by D/26.

b. Land Clearing.

(1) Phase I - Batangan. During this operation from 14 Nov to 22 Dec 70, the 26th LCT cleared 706 acres, and destroyed 167 meters of tunnels 490 meters of trenches, 20 fighting positions, and 16 bunkers. Dozers detonated 9 anti-personnel mines.

(2) Phase II - Batangan. Following a maintenance stand down, the 26th LCT returned to the Batangan during the period 7 Jan to 21 Feb 71, and cleared 1,412 acres. Sixty seven bunkers, 4 fighting positions, 306 meters of tunnels, and 50 meters of trenches were destroyed. Fourteen anti-personnel mines were detonated.

(3) Stinson. In conjunction with road building, 26th LCT cleared 674 acres during the period 11-30 Mar 71. Twelve bunkers and 25 meters of tunnels were destroyed. Seven anti-personnel mines were detonated.

(4) Phase I - Ky My. To support the construction of three PF outposts, the 26th LCT cleared 204 acres from 4 to 8 Mar 71. No enemy positions were found. Eight anti-personnel mines were detonated.

(5) Phase II - Ky My. Returning to Ky My on 6 April 71, the 26th LCT began clearing the priority one area of the 1971 land clearing program. Statistics on this operation will be reflected in the next ORLL report.

c. Road Construction.

(1) Center Access Road. From 15 Feb to 28 Mar 71, A/26 upgraded 15 km of dry weather road from Ross to Center. A thirty foot 60" CMP was installed between Ross and Nui Lac Son. Two small bridges were redecked with PSP and a 50 foot timber bridge was built between Nui Lac Son and Center. One and one half kms of new road were constructed up the side of the mountain to the fire base. On 4 April 71, equipment and supplies belonging to the 3-21 Inf were extracted using this road.

(2) HL 586 - Ky My Road. To support pacification and resettlement in Quang Tin Province, A/26 upgraded 10 km of dry weather road on HL 586 to the vicinity of BT182221 and constructed two access roads to PF OP's on Hills 35 and 173. A 90 ft DS Bailey bridge was built at BT263253 to bypass a damaged Eifel bridge. Work continues on repairing the Eifel bridge.

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(3) HL 527 - Stinson Road. During the period 16 Feb to 4 April 71, B/26 upgraded 10 km of dry weather road to Stinson. On 48" and eight 36" CMP culverts were installed. Progress was greatly hampered by enemy mining and sniper activity.

(4) HL 518. Between 5 Nov and 24 Dec 70, B/26 repaired HL 518 to FSB 411 for division convoys. One 48" CMP culvert was installed, pot holes were repaired, and the road was ditched and crowned.

(5) HL 525. During the period 8 to 28 Feb 71, B/26 repaired HL 525 in the Batangan to support resupply of the 26th LCT. One 48" CMP culvert was installed and 973 cubic yards of laterite were spread and compacted.

d. Tactical Bridging Support.

(1) QL-1. During the month of November, two tropical storms flooded the division area and washed out a number of bridges on QL-1. Throughout the month, E/26 was tasked to perform bridging missions. On 1 Nov 70, E/26 installed a 38'4" fixed span at bridge #104 and a 23'4" fixed span at bridge #105. E/26 supported C/26 on 4 Nov by building a 70' DS Bailey at bridge #99C. On 9 Nov, E/26 installed a 45' fixed span at bridge 99C. Also on the same day, E/26 removed the 38'4" fixed span at bridge #104. The following day E/26 removed the 70' DS Bailey and the 45' fixed span at bridge #99C. On 28 Nov, E/26 installed a six float normal M4T6 at bridge #106. On 4 Dec, this float bridge was removed. On 31 Dec, a 30' fixed span was placed at bridge #88. On 25 Feb, E/26 provided personnel and technical assistance to B Co for the construction of a 90' DS Bailey at bridge #87. On 27 Feb, E/26 with elements of D/26 and B/26 constructed a 315' M4T6 float bridge at the same site and then removed the 90' DS Bailey. The float bridge was removed on 14 Mar 71.

(2) HL 529. A 60' DS Bailey was installed at BS537883 on the 26th of Dec to facilitate construction of a timber bridge by the 103d ARVN Engr Bn. The mission was accomplished by a combined force of E/26 and one plt from the 103d ARVN Engrs. This bridge was removed by the 103d ARVN Engr Bn on 16 March. On 6-8 April, E/26 and the 103d ARVN Engr Bn installed four dry spans to open the road for a division convoy on 10 April 71.

(3) HL 586. A 90' DS Bailey was installed at BT263253 by E/26 and A/26 to bypass a damaged Eifel bridge.

e. Fire base/OP Construction.

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(1) LZ Marge. From 16-27 Jan 71, A/26 reopened LZ Marge. The project included clearing field of fire, digging a communications trench, preparing four gun pads, and constructing a helipad and a lookout pad.

(2) LZ Professional. The project commenced 21 April with B/26 providing the effort. To date construction has included 8 living bunkers, an ammo bunker, 5 gun pads, and aid station, and an interior road. Work is still in progress.

(3) During the period Dec 70 to Feb 71, C/26 constructed seven OP's at Legionnaire, Warrior, Woodstock, Wink, Pax, Frag, and Patty for eventual turnover and occupation by PF forces. Engineer effort consisted of pushing up defensive berms, laying tactical wire, and building and installing bunkers.

(4) Fire base Upgrade. Upgrade of existing fire bases during this period included bunker construction at West Siberia, Maryanne, San Juan Hill, and Dottie and interior road construction at Liz, Fat City, Bronco, and Hawk Hill.

(5) Mess Hall and Shower Point Construction. In Dec 70, a survey was conducted to examine mess hall facilities at all the fire bases in the division's TAOI. Results showed that a number of these facilities had deteriorated or were non-existent. As a result, five 20'x64' bunker halls were constructed at Stinson, Ky Tra, Center, Maryanne, and West; and four above ground 40'x60' mess halls were built at Dottie, Liz, 411 and San Juan Hill. In addition, seven showers were built at West, Maryanne, Dottie and Stinson (2), Liz and 411. One shower remains to be installed at San Juan Hill.

(6) Refuel/Rearm Points. To support Division and ARVN operations in the western portion of the AO, rearm/refuel points were constructed at Rawhide, Tra Bong, Tien Phuoc refuel point and Minh Long (Rearm point) Scope of these projects included building four 20'x22' helipads at each point, an ammo bunker for the rearm point, and three to four 30'x35' berms for the POL bladders.

f. The Battalion disposition at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

- (1) HHC, B Co, D Co, E Co, - Chu Lai.
- (2) A Co, - Camp Purdue, Da Nang.
- (3) C Co. - FSB Bronco

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D. Logistics.

1. (U) General: The period 1 November - 30 April 1971 was highlighted by continued support of forward fire support bases under adverse monsoon conditions, phase down of monsoon stockage on fire support bases and preparation for the dry season. Continuous emphasis was required to take advantage of those period of good weather to restock forward supplies depleted during bad weather. Extended periods of bad weather which would not permit resupply by sea placed the Division in a critical position on Class III and Class V on three occasions. Emergency resupply by surface was required. Continued emphasis was placed on reduction of excesses and turn-in of unneeded equipment to facilitate eventual phase down. Support of a major operation (LAMSON 719) by elements of the Division taxed the logistic system of the Division to the maximum. Careful management of reduced assets of men and materiel was required to insure adequate support of all forces. Plans were made and coordination effected to support the move of the 196th Infantry Brigade from Quang Tin to Quang Nam Province. In the very latter part of the period redeployment planning was revived with staff responsibility being vested with the ACofS, G4.

2. (C) Services Division. a. Class I.

(1) Batteries: Effective 1 November 1970 subordinate units in the Division were suballocated BS-30's and BS4386's. On 12 Jan 71, BA-1100's were suballocated. The initial allocations were based on end item density but weighted in favor of combat units. The suballocation has had three major readjustments since then, raising further the proportion of batteries going to combat units.

(2) The major problem in implementation was failure of the supporting supply system to deliver the required number of batteries during November and December. Division requirements have been met since December. The Division's allocation has been raised as shown below:

	<u>BA-30</u>	<u>BA-4386</u>	<u>BA-1100</u>
May 1970	43,008	8,000	N/A
June 1970	44,000	15,000	N/A
April 1971	48,400	15,800	800

It is adequate for the Division's current operations.

b. Class III. (1) The Division continued to operate under a allocation system for Mogas and Diesel fuel controlled by XXIV Corps. The allocation for Mogas has increased slightly over the last three quarters and that of

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Diesel fuel has dropped 20%.

(2) The Division has not had much difficulty staying within its allocation. With the movement of the 196th Brigade to Da Nang, there should be a further drop in POL consumption as the convoy requirement is reduced.

(3) Probably the most sensitive problem in Class III was the shortage of trioxan bars during the rainy season. Throughout the Division, two bars were desired per meal, combat individual - one to heat the meal and one to heat a beverage. Shipment consistently fell short of this requirement in spite of repeated requests. The advent of the dry season has alleviated the problem.

c. Class IV. (1) Beginning with the past six months control allocated Class IV items passed from USARV to the Support Commands. The immediate effect was a 72% cut in the Division allocation of plywood and small size lumber. After justification was given to Da Nang Support Command, the allocations were raised to 103% of the original allocation.

(2) The allocation is sufficient for all necessary construction within the Division, however in-country shortages and lack of shipping limit the amount actually received. The Division was allocated 4,000 coils of concertina per month. This in itself is insufficient at current usage rate but the Division has sufficient concertina on hand for operations. If usage rate continues at the current level, ACofS, G4, will seek a higher allocation.

(3) The fire base mess hall project and the joint OP construction project were the biggest users of lumber during the past six months and necessitated special requests to insure that the Division would have enough material on hand to continue other projects.

d. Class V. (1) The number of ammunition items under allowable supply rate (ASR) has decreased during this quarter to seven items. Supply from Da Nang to Chu Lai and from other ASP's to Da Nang has caused shortage in M18A1's without accessories and 155mm propellant charges. The latter was brought to light by a records error in ASP105. The Da Nang Support Command ACofS, Ammunition is taking action to eliminate these problems.

(2) The Management Operating Rate (MOR) was initiated with the 24 December - 24 January Class V Allocation period. The MOR differs from ASR in that it is a management guideline, not an absolute limit on expenditure. Good Class V management should keep a unit below the MOR unless operational requirements force it above that figure.

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(3) The deciding factor as to whether an MOR or ASR is employed is the depot stockage. Above 40 days the MOR applies; for 40 days or below the ASR is used. This varied somewhat depending on the status of incoming shipments.

e. The 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry represented the Division in Corps competition for the Phillip A. Connelly Award. The unit was selected to represent XXIV Corps on 22 Dec 70. On 12 Jan 71 a USARV Team inspected the mess, awarding a score of 81.25. On 20 Jan 71 it was announced by USARV the 4th Bn, 3d Inf was one of the two finalists that will be inspected by USARPAC during 26-29 Jan 71. The USARPAC Team arrived on 27 Jan 71. 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry was chosen as the USARPAC representative in the Department of Army Competition. The DA Team is scheduled to arrive 17-20 May 71.

(4) (U) Supply Division, a. Preparation for the monsoon season continued as well as resupply to maintain monsoon stockage levels. At the end of the monsoon season, stockage levels were drawn down to normal operating levels. The success of continuous logistical support during the monsoon season was directly attributed to the prior preparations taken.

b. Preparations were also initiated for the approaching dry season. Submission of requisition and stockage of water storage containers, dust control products, fuels, insect control measures and preventative maintenance requirement were initiated.

c. A provisional Light Truck Company was organized and equipped from Division assets and assigned to the 23d S&T Bn. This Company operated in support of LAMSON 719 in conjunction with Da Nang Support Command units. A new Provisional Ranger Company was also organized and equipped from within Divisional assets. All equipment for both of these provisional units was obtained by cross levelling from all Divisional units. Cross levelling of 1/4 ton and 3/4 ton vehicles within the Division was accomplished and approved operating levels established. This insured an equal distribution of available 3/4 and 1/4 ton vehicles to meet operation requirements.

d. Logistical support for units committed to LAMSON 719 was accomplished by expedited supply actions to fill critical shortages, cross levelling of existing Division assets and redistribution on hand and received equipment and supplies. DISCOM furnished a Forward Support Element (FSE) with the 11th Bde at Dong Ha as well as Division Liaison Team personnel at Quang Tri for Division units OPCON to the 1/5 Inf, and the 101st Div. The FSE provided support for all classes of supply from within the established logistical channels. Aviation logistical support was provided by DSU elements

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of 16th CAG. Prior coordination and planning with XXIV Corps, 101st Div and Da Nang Support Command was highly effective and insured continuous logistical support. Visits by personnel of the ACoS, G4 and DISCOM maintained contact with forward units.

e. M203 Grenade Launchers replaced the M79's on hand in the Division. Due to the change over from Qui Nhon Depot to Da Nang in November 1971, issue of supplies and equipment was extremely curtailed for three (3) months due to the loss of a large quantity of requisitions. These requisitions were re-established but TOE and stockage quantities were continuously short until March 1971. By means of expedited supply action, command correspondence and personal liaison, critical shortages were satisfied.

f. Self Service Supply Center (SSSC) items were continuously in short supply: insect repellents, insecticides, paper products, plastic wire, paper, stencils, printing ink, mess hall cleaning supplies, office supplies and locks. In March 71 all of these shortages were eliminated and normal shortage of supplies were maintained except for locks.

g. Continued emphasis was placed on the identification, accountability and disposition of excess. The Division Asset Reduction Team identified property valued at \$2,676,838.00. This equipment was placed on accountable records or laterally transferred to satisfy unit shortages. Accountability for previously unreported equipment valued at \$564,199.00 was established IAW the Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Program (VARP). Equipment valued at \$1,760,318.00 was reduced from authorization levels under the provisions of USARV Reg 310-32 Turn-in of Unneeded TOE/MTOE. 311 Reports of Survey were processed on equipment valued at \$729,208.00.

h. Thru the continued conduct of the monthly G4/S4 Conferences, an exchange of information and problem areas between the Division logistical elements and the unit S4 proved highly beneficial. The ACoS, G4 also conducted two (2) Logistics Orientation Classes for newly assigned unit supply and maintenance officers and NCO's. These orientation classes were presented to acquaint newly assigned supply and maintenance personnel with the logistics procedures within the Division as well as the logistical support provided by non-divisional units.

5. (U) Maintenance Division. a. The 23d Infantry Division CMMI Team conducted 13 courtesy and 21 record inspections during the months of Nov to Dec. Two (2) units received a satisfactory rating on the second inspection. Effective 31 December AR 750-8 and USARV Reg 750-8 were suspended. The CMMI has been changed to Command Maintenance Management Assistance.

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The annual visit is now a tool to be used by the commander in improving the overall readiness of his unit. Since the change, the team has made 17 courtesy visits and 13 follow-up assistance visits.

b. The 100% M16A1 Muzzle bore erosion check was completed on 29 Nov. 22,252 weapons were inspected with 2,531 barrels changed.

c. During the half year the division retrograded a total of 599.1 serviceable tons excess and 1997.6 unserviceable tons excess which amounted to a 46.468 million dollar estimated value shipped.

d. Effective 1 December repair parts support was shifted from Qui Nhon Depot to Da Nang Depot. Demand data was lost in the shift and the Division lost 80% of its outstanding requisitions. This resulted in a repair parts shortage which lasted for two months. Strict coordination must be made by depots to insure this does not happen on future changes.

e. 773 M203's were received in this Division in November on a one for one switch with M79's. A maximum effort was placed to secure all the M79's and return them to Depot. In late March 617 additional M203's were received. In late April 523 more M203's were received. The exchange program is continuing.

f. Project Scrub was conducted with a DA Civilian Team visiting the Division to "scrub it clean" of all excess. The team classified 67 lines, 147 tons, amounting to a value of \$411,000.00.

g. Excessive amounts of electronic equipment was deadlined for lack of repair parts. A maximum effort was placed with the ADC(S) talking with the DCG/Material USARV to obtain the parts. The majority of the parts have been obtained, but some still remain to be received.

6. Division Support Command. a. 23d Support and Transportation Battalion.

(1) The Battalion mission throughout the reporting period continued at a scope larger than normally intended Division Supply and Transport Battalion level. This is directly a result of the size of the 23d Infantry Division.

(2) The Motor Transport Company underwent far reaching changes within the reporting period. A light cargo platoon was converted into a medium stake and platform platoon. This change enhanced the capability of the Battalion to perform "line haul" missions within the Division area of

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operations. The Motor Transport Company logged over 60,000,000 ton miles during the period. Cargos consisted of Classes I, II, III(Bulk) and IV to Fire Support Base Hawk Hill and Fire Support Base Bronco. Bulk Class III was carried to Quang Ngai, while Tien Phuoc received Classes II, IV and V. The line haul missions consisted of convoying Class II and IV from the US Army Depot Da Nang to the Division Base Camp at Chu Lai.

(3) In keeping with the general reduced combat sweeps in the Division AO, tactical convoys to forward areas were on the marked decrease. Khe Sanh and Tien Phuoc were however visited by the convoys of the 23d Supply and Transport Battalion. Of particular interest was the sending of a detachment from the 23d Supply and Transport Battalion to the 11th Infantry Brigade at Dong Ha for support of the Brigade's efforts during Operation JEFFERSON GLENN.

(4) The supply portion of the mission was also represented during "Jefferson Glenn". Dong Ha became an FSE and the 23d Supply and Transport Battalion provided Class I, II, IV and III supply as well as bath service.

(5) The highlight of the reporting period however was the formation of a completely unique company sized organization known as "C" Company 23d Supply and Transport Battalion. With the requirements as a result of LAMSON 719, the Battalion organization was increased to include this "fourth" unit. The assets required in both equipment and personnel were brought together from numerous organizations within the Division, organized and committed to the support of the ARVN incursion into Laos. This unit was formed from 23d Infantry Division assets on 25 January 1971, and within 48 hours, deployed to augment the movement of various 11th Infantry Brigade and 16th CAG units to Quang Tri and Khe Sanh. Company C was attached to the 39th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for the duration of Operation LAMSON 719 and transported essential supplies along QL9 from FSB Vandergrift to Khe Sanh. Until its withdrawal on 3 April 1971, the unit's 48 five ton cargo vehicles had transported more than 500 million ton miles. On 8 and 9 April 1971, Company C again assisted 23d Infantry Division elements to return to Chu Lai and Duc Pho. Its mission completed, Company C was inactivated on 23 April 1971.

b. 23d Medical Battalion.

(1) During the reporting period six operations were supported: FINNEY HILL, MIDDLESEX PEAK, FREDERICK HILL, IRON MOUNTAIN, GENEVA PARK and JEFFERSON GLEN. Only JEFFERSON GLEN involved the relocation of units assigned to this battalion. The move of B Company to the north in support of the 11th Infantry Brigade was accomplished by motor convoy. D Company

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likewise moved into the facility vacated by B Company. Vehicles organic to the battalion were used and no outside assets had to be requested.

(2) The greatest difficulty encountered in the redeployment was assembling equipment needed by B Company to meet possible contingencies in the new area of operations. The adverse impact of the retrograde program was felt at this time. Units of the battalion had turned-in items not used regularly in a semifixed environment, which consequently, reduced their ability to function fully in a field location. A shortage of vehicles which allowed only two of the four companies to be one-hundred per cent mobile was one of the larger problems. By careful redistribution and by maintaining only minimum transportation assets at the two static companies, the task of moving two entire companies was accomplished. The lack of common repair parts such as carburetors, wheel bearings and master cylinders, needed to put deadlined vehicles into use, compounded the situation.

(3) The need for coordination between division level and army level medical services in operations such as JEFFERSON GLEN was definitely required but not established. The medical company that deployed with the 11th Brigade was not gainfully employed in its supporting role to receive casualties because of the proximity of a surgical hospital. Patients were overflowed to the hospital by helicopter ambulances. In view of this situation the medical company was made available to augment personnel resources of the hospital and to expand patient care facilities. The company was not, however so utilized by the hospital.

(4) Effective 1 April, Headquarters and A Company, 23d Medical Battalion assumed the mission of providing division level medical service to the 198th Infantry Brigade. This task had been performed by D Company. This added to A Company's basic mission of providing unit level medical service to divisional units operating in the division rear area.

E. Civil Military Operations.

1. (U) Organization

a. During the reporting period, the following officer personnel were assigned to the G5 section: LTC Bobby G. Evans, G5; MAJ Frank T. Peterlin, Deputy G5; MAJ Humberto F. Olivers, Deputy G5; CPT Charles M. Mochow, Asst CA Officer; CPT Luis R. Lizardi, Quang Nam (P) Liaison Officer; 1LT James M. Murphy, Asst PSYOP Officer and 1LT Daniel J. Boccolucci, Administration Officer.

b. On 19 April 1971, the 6th Platoon of the 29th Civil Affairs Company

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was released from direct support of the 23d Division and returned to its parent organization at Da Nang.

2. (U) Operations.

a. Community Relations: In an effort to maintain and constantly improve US/VN relations, the 23d Division continues its active sponsorship of and participation in Friendship Councils. The Friendship Council membership is composed of representatives from the military and civilian communities and meets each month for discussion of mutual problems which, if ignored, could seriously damage US/VN relations. Each brigade and the Division Headquarters currently sponsor a Friendship Council.

b. Accident Reaction Teams: In order to quell US/VN confrontations which often erupt as a result of highway traffic accidents, the 23d Division has established Accident Reaction Teams for the purpose of effecting rapid solatium payment and claim settlement. Each major subordinate command and the Division Headquarters has a team, the composition of which is as follows:

(1) Major Subordinate Command

Claim Investigator

Solatium Payment Officer

Interpreter

(2) Division Headquarters Team

ACofS, G5

Provost Marshal

Foreign Claims Commissioner

Interpreter

c. MEDCAP II: As one of the most widely practiced and well received programs being conducted, the MEDCAP is fully supported by the units of the 23rd Division. MEDCAP results during the reporting period are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MEDCAPS</u>	<u>TREATED</u>
11th Bde	448	24,490

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MEDCAPS</u>	<u>TREATED</u>
196th Bde	732	16,892
198th Bde	195	32,286
1-1 Cav	247	3,327
DIVARTY	377	28,596
26th Engr Bn	56	2,465
DISCOM	44	2,135

d. Police Substations: Construction of National Police Substations throughout the Division's TAOI has been emphasized as a project of high priority as they will introduce a new measure to territorial security and Gvn influence to interior areas. Continuing coordination is being made to turn excess SEA Huts over to province authorities for construction of the Substations.

e. Civic Action Materials: In support of civic action projects throughout the TAOI, civic action materials are given to province officials when these materials are not available through ARVN or GVN channels. Major materials donated during the reporting period are as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Health and Medical Supplies	7,031
Lumber	54,800 bd feet
Roofing Tin	798
Cement	111 bags

f. Refugees: The refugee population in the Division's TAOI continues to be a cause for concern, but through a concerted US/ARVN/GVN effort, the refugees are being resettled into new areas. The refugee count in the Division's TAOI as of 31 December 1970 is as follows:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Quang Nam	5,019

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<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Quang Tine [sic]	18,299
Quang Ngai	18,090

3. (C) Civil Affairs Pacification

a. Population Security: Following is the status of population in A & B rated hamlets within the Division's TAOI as of 31 March 1971:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>% POPULATION A & B</u>	
Quang Nam	302,600	50.3%
Quang Tin	263,100	64.8%
Quang Ngai	365,600	49.7%

b. Peoples Self Defense Force: Following is the status of the PSDF within the Division's TAOI as of 31 March:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>TRAINED</u>	<u>ARMED</u>
Quang Nam	152,318	136,057	12,236
Quang Tin	95,780	95,780	13,532
Quang Ngai	107,440	91,810	17,505

c. During the reporting period, the number of Hoi Chanhhs returning to GVN control within the 23d Inf Div TAOI are:

<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
293	496	303	161	126	75*

*Statistics include Quang Nam Province

d. VCI are considered to be neutralized when they are (1) killed, (2) rallied, (3) captured and sentenced for a period of at least one year. VCI neutralized within the 23 Div TAOI during the reporting period are:

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<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
261	350	287	221	200	381*

*Statistics include Quang Nam Province

4. (U) PSYOP Activities (Nov 1970 - Apr 1971)

a. Leaflet dissemination missions

(1) By 9th SOS aircraft.

<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
466	454	987	1,684	1,972	1,953

(2) By organic resources.

<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
161	442	481	404	305	406

b. Leaflets disseminated by campaign (Thousands)

(1) By 9th SOS aircraft.

<u>CAMPAIGN</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Chieu Hoi	5,667	4,365	9,722	26,580	21,126	27,875
Pro-GVN	837	136	2,032	1,125	225	140
Anti-VC/NVA	596	408	512	225	1,033	2,302
Rewards	240	331	340	2,492	4,209	2,273
Resources Denial	1,067	690	1,600	2,288	833	725
Family Reunion	200	170	300	185	300	307

(2) By organic resources

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<u>CAMPAIGN</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Chieu Hoi	2,653	7,811	6,915	6,748	2,444	3,444
Pro-GVN	86	202	632	502	324	152
Anti-VC/NVA	759	1,011	555	1,055	480	1,160
Rewards	1,234	1,108	1,770	1,690	1,200	1,910
Resources Denial	800	486	320	335	165	1,160
Family Reunion	2,697	2,062	1,196	1,410	340	232

c. Tape broadcast missions:

(1) By 9th SOS aircraft.

<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
358	269	673	972	1,325	1,271

(2) By organic resources.

<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
250	525	503	533	575	591

d. Tape broadcast time by campaign:

<u>CAMPAIGN</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Chieu Hoi	5:30	4:10	35:00	42:00	18:15	37:00
Pro-GVN	1:00	:55	1:35	1:30	1:00	1:55
Anti-VC/NVA	:35	:40	1:20	1:05	15:30	10:15
Rewards	1:05	1:00	7:00	7:35	15:30	10:15
Resources Denial	1:25	:25	2:00	1:30	1:50	1:05
Family Reunion	2:00	1:00	7:20	2:30	1:10	2:35

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(2) By organic resources.

<u>CAMPAIGN</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Chieu Hoi	14:20	49:40	47:10	35:45	25:10	53:20
Pro-GVN	1:15	2:30	:50	:50	4:45	:45
Anti-VC/NVA	5:45	11:00	3:15	8:15	7:45	11:05
Rewards	2:00	7:05	16:00	10:30	9:55	15:55
Resources Denial	:20	2:25	2:00	1:30	1:00	10:55
Family Reunion	12:05	12:10	9:35	8:20	3:35	2:15

e. Ground loudspeaker broadcasts:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Missions	52	61	57	76	63	70
Broadcast hours	113:30	147:10	124:30	189:30	146:00	201:20
Leaflet disseminated (Thousands)	991	1,264	11	1,106	244	1,410

f. Artillery leaflet dissemination:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN*</u>
Number of rounds fired	404	321	135
Leaflets disseminated (Thousands)	201	193	85

*Artillery missions terminated on 20 January 1971.

5. (U) Recent significant PSYOP results.

a. During the reporting period considerable emphasis has been placed on combined PSYOP with the 2d ARVN Division and with Vietnamese district officials in Quang Ngai Province. In January, an ARVN officer

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from G5, 2d ARVN Division was attached to the PSYOP branch, G5, 23d Inf Div to train in the targeting and operational techniques of the PSYOP program. In addition he was trained in the use of the U1H-6 loud-speaker system which is used in conjunction with the organic helicopter. Beginning in January, the Quang Ngai Province PSYOP Advisor coordinated combined PSYOP missions with Vietnamese district officials and the PSYOP Branch, G5, 23d Inf Div. Since January, periodic combined missions have been conducted with Vietnamese officials from Son Tinh, Binh Son, Tu Nghia, Ba To, Mo Duc and Duc Pho Districts.

b. On 17 Nov, a Montagnard VC nurse rallied to a PF outpost in northern Tu Nghia (D), Quang Ngai (P). A special tape was developed exploiting her and used in the area for the next week. During that week an additional 9 Montagnards rallied in the vicinity where the missions had been conducted.

c. Extensive land clearing, night operations and shortage of food and medical supplies set the stage for a lucrative target for PSYOP exploitation in the Batangan Peninsula. From 3 Dec to 28 Jan an intensive campaign was conducted in this area. In addition to normal PSYOP resources, a special O2B aircraft was assigned on a daily mission to the 198th Inf Bde. The 7th PSYOP Bn attached a loudspeaker (HB) team to the 1st Bn, 6th Inf to support friendly ground operations. As returnees came in, they would be used to broadcast to their comrades which proved to very effective. Upon completion of the campaign, 92 Hoi Chanhs had returned to GVN control.

d. A similar intensified program was conducted in Son Tinh (D), Quang Ngai (P) west of LZ Stinson during the period 1-15 Jan. The early-word broadcast was used extensively and a total of 12 Hoi Chanhs returned to GVN control.

e. It was found that all audio-visual (HE) teams' missions had to be coordinated at the district level, normally through the District Senior Advisors. In order to facilitate this coordination, the 23d Inf Div released control of the HE teams on 7 Feb to the Province PSYOP Advisors in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The teams are still available for support of 23d Inf Div units on a special mission basis by coordination with Det 3, Co B, 7th PSYOP Bn.

f. On 1 Feb, a Montagnard guerilla rallied to the Son Ha District Headquarters in Quang Ngai Province. Upon interrogation, he revealed that the NVA were recruiting local Montagnard guerrillas for replacements in main force units in the lowlands. Also morale of the Montagnard was low because of artillery harassment and small unit operations. Tapes were produced exploiting this intelligence using the Montagnard Bru dialect.

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These tapes were used in conjunction with both organic and 9th SOS aerial missions in Son Ha District. During the period 1-15 Feb, 55 Montagnards local VC rallied to the GVN.

F. (U) Personnel.

1. Provost Marshal.

a. A Military Police Selective Enforcement Team (Strike Force) composed of six (6) Military Policemen was initiated on 1 Feb 71 for special operations to include traffic enforcement, AWDL apprehension and perimeter security. The use of traffic mirror boxes was initiated and highway QL#1 was marked with white stripes to facilitate the use of aerial observation and detection of speeders. Extensive publicity was utilized to inform the command of the program. The Strike Force is employed to conduct extensive shakedowns at exit gates and surveillances of the Chu Lai perimeter with special emphasis on the interdiction of local nationals attempting to enter the base through the perimeter.

b. During the last quarter of 1970 the 23d Military Police Company experienced critical personnel shortages in military policemen which reduced the capability of mission accomplishment. Division resolved the personnel shortage by authorizing qualified personnel in other MOS's to be reassigned to the 23d MP Co. Minimum qualifications required a GT of 100, record of good conduct, and volunteer for duty. On 24 and 25 December, sixty-five individuals were officially transferred to the Company, bringing its authorized manning level to 110% strength. Because 95B MOS replacements were not available this policy continued until 31 Mar 71.

c. USARV General Order 1294, dated 19 Apr 71, attached the 300th Military Police Company to the Division to conduct Military Police operations in support of the Division and to operate Combined Police Stations in the Division area of operations. Prior to its attachment the 300th Military Police Company participated in Operation Dewey Canyon II, providing road security and convoy escort on Highway QL#9 between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh.

d. On 15 Jan 71 the Provost Marshal, in cooperation with Quang Tin PSA, formulated a Joint Narcotics Suppression Team composed of ARVN CID, National Police and 23d Infantry Division CID. This team, recently augmented with National Police from Quang Ngai Province, has conducted eight joint raids, resulting in the seizure of nearly 2300 vials of heroin, 1700 marijuana cigarettes, 1750 grams of loose marijuana, over 1000 Binocetol and Immenocetol tablets, over \$1,000,000 NV [sic->VN] and various quantities of other drugs and narcotics.

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e. In March 71, the Provost Marshal assumed responsibility for road security and convoy escort on QL#1. The 23d MP Co. received all V-100 divisional assets, achieving 100% of equipment authorized (10 armored cars). Road clearance operations are conducted daily at dawn doubled since 1 March and now include secondary roads to Tien Phuoc and Tra Bong.

f. On 1 Mar 71, one squad, 1st Platoon, 23d MP Co, in direct support of the 11th Infantry Brigade, moved from LZ Bronco, RVN, to Dong Ha Combat Base, RVN, participating in Operation DEWEY CANYON II. Members of the squad operated the Brigade POW Collection Point, operated joint patrols with the 300th MP Co and developed a VIP program on QL#9.

f. On 1 Mar 71, one squad, 1st Platoon, 23d MP Co, in direct support of the 11th Infantry Brigade, moved from LZ Bronco, RVN, to Dong Ha Combat Base, RVN, participating in Operation DEWEY CANYON II. Members of the squad operated the Brigade POW Collection Point, operated joint patrols with the 300th MP Co and developed a VIP program on QL#9.

g. Statistics revealed significant increase in the traffic accident rate within the division area of operations. In 1970 there were a total of 534 traffic accidents investigated by the Military Police. These resulted in 312 injuries and seven deaths. Through the first 3 months of 1971 there were 128 accidents and 76 injuries and 12 deaths. In an effort to halt these high rate, the Provost Marshal developed and executed a two-phase campaign of publicity and enforcement during the month of April which the CG designated Traffic Safety Month. In addition to increased traffic enforcement (368 moving violations cited in April), Vehicle Safety Inspection Checkpoints were initiated, resulting in over 300 vehicles cited for defective equipment. The enforcement effort succeeded in reducing accidents 50% although the number of injuries were not significantly reduced due to one serious accident which alone accounted for eight injuries and one death.

h. On 26 April 71, 2d Platoon, 23d MP Co, redeployed from LZ Hawk Hill to Da Nang in direct support of the 196th Inf Bde, completing the move on 7 May 71. The Platoon operates joint patrols with Co B, 504th MP Bn, at the Hoa Vang District Combined Police Station, operates two vehicle/pedestrian gates at Camp Reasoner and operates Civilian Employee Processing Gates at Camp Reasoner.

j. On 25 Feb 71 work was initiated to construct a new Processing Complex at Gate #1 to facilitate control of vehicles and employees. Located astride MSR 7 adjacent to Civilian Personnel Office, the complex is expected to be completed by 30 May 1971.

2. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

a. During the period Military Justice/Military Affairs continued to comprise the largest activity area. During the period, this command tried 10 general courts-martial, 36 special courts-martial in which a bad conduct

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discharge was authorized, and 287 special courts-martial; also received were 299 special courts-martial and 7 summary courts-martial for supervisory review from subordinate commands. In addition, 2226 Article 15, UCMJ, proceedings were received for supervisory review and forwarding to USAPSSC, Ft Benjamin Harrison, Indiana and 130 Article 15, UCMJ, appeals received for review and advice. Military Affairs actions during this period included 127 Line of Duty determinations, 99 Reports of Survey, 209 Reports of Investigation, 138 Elimination proceedings, 40 Congressional Inquires, 846 POW/Detainee Classification reports, and 10 Collateral Investigations for review and forwarding to Department of the Army

b. Rates per thousand for general, special (BCD), special, and summary courts-martial during this period were: .41, 1.46, 11.62, and .33 respectively.

c. The Legal Assistance Branch processed 5467 cases during the period, including but not limited to, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills, powers of attorney, income tax, citizenship, general counseling, and advice.

d. This office continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Conventions, with strong emphasis on war crimes and detainee treatment, to each group of replacements processed through the 23d Inf Div Combat Center and to the Combat Center Leadership Course. Instruction is also given on the Military Justice Act of 1968. In addition, unit instruction to include search and seizure is provided on an on-call basis to officers and senior noncommissioned officers.

e. During the period 251 claims for damages to servicemen's property were paid totalling \$50,955.22. Foreign claims are now adjudicated at this headquarters, since establishment of Foreign Claims Commission #419 in February 1971 at Chu Lai, RVN, and 48 foreign claims were paid totalling 3,212,500 \$VN.

f. During this period this section has presented 119 classes on Drug Abuse at the Combat Center and at the various units to promote the Drug Amnesty Program and awareness of the problems of drug abuse.

3. (U) Division Chaplain.

a. Character Guidance Regulation 600-30 was revised.

b. Civic Action Programs - continued to assist the Catholic and Protestant orphanages in An Tan and the Catholic school and orphanage in

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Binh Son. \$3,072.10 was donated from the Chaplains Fund to aid Vietnamese orphanages, schools and churches.

c. Cardinal Cooke visited the Division AO 23 December 1970.

d. Dr. Hoffman of the Lutheran Hour visited the Division AO 22 December 1970.

e. Chief of Chaplains Major General Sampson visited the Division Ao 10 and 11 January 1971.

f. Four distinguished church leaders visited the Division AO 27 January 1971. Dr. C. Edward Brubaker - Chairman, The General Commission on Chaplains and Armed Forces Personnel, Robert James Marshall - President, Lutheran Church in America, Robert Verelle Moss, Jr. - President, United Church of Christ, William Phelps Thompson - Stated Clerk, the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.

g. A total of six chaplains were deployed in support of Operation LAMSON 719. Adequate religious coverage was provided. Even though 1-1 Cavalry has no authorized chaplain space, a chaplain has been attached to them because of their mission.

h. Area religious coverage has been emphasized during the last quarter. This provides better coverage in a highly mobile situation.

i. The Division Combat Center was host to Jewish Passover Services for Military Region I on 9-11 April 1971. Facilities were adequate and the program was successful.

j. The USO sponsored an ecumenical Sunrise Service on 11 April 1971. Attendance was good.

4. (U) Surgeon.

a. During the reporting period three drug suppression teams were formed from the Division resources. Each team is lead by an officer with a background in psychiatry, psychology, or sociology. There are also two former drug users on each team. They visit all the fire bases and OP's in the Division AO to consult with assigned personnel.

2. The malaria statistics for the period are as follows:

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u># CASES</u>	<u>RATES*</u>	<u>RATE VIVAX*</u>
NOV	109	52.3	24.5
DEC	95	43.7	19.2
JAN	94	45.1	18.4
FEB	50	26.5	12.2
MAR	92	44.1	17.8
APR	152	76.2	33.5

* Rate is expressed as cases per 1000 per year.

The fall in the malaria rates during November to February monsoon season in the usual pattern seen during this period. It reflects the decreased mosquito population as well as the parasite's ability to reproduce in the body of the mosquito at lower temperatures.

c. During the period, an amnesty program was instituted for drug users. From 1 January 1971 to 30 April 1971, 387 persons were granted amnesty. During this same time frame, 83 failures were documented.

5. (U) Information Office.

a. News Releases (1 Nov 70 - 30 Apr 71)

Division IO	258
11th Inf Bde	133
196th Inf Bde	127
198th Inf Bde	124
DIVARTY	<u>10</u>

Total	652
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b. Photo Releases (1 Nov 70 - 30 Apr 71)

Division IO	442
11th Inf Bde	51
196th Inf Bde	70
198th Inf Bde	19
DIVARTY	<u>7</u>
Total	589

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c. Published Releases/Photos

Army Times	Releases	50	Photos	11
Stars & Stripes	Releases	45	Photos	10
		—		—
	Total	95		21

d. Correspondent Support (1 Nov 70 - 30 Apr 71)

TOTAL: 116

e. Significant Activities (1 Nov 70 - 30 Apr 71)

- (1) Calley Deposition 26 Oct - 3 Nov 70 (All Major News Media)
- (2) Flood Damage 2 - 8 November 1970 (DASPO)
- (3) Fragging Incidents: 11-17 January 1971 (CBS)
18-25 January 1971 (CBS)
12-18 April 1971 (Overseas Weekly)
- (4) Land Clearing: 18-25 January 1971 (SEAPIC)
8-14 February 1971 (SEAPIC)
- (5) Pacification: 15-21 March 1971 (Australian Broadcast Company)
12-18 February 1971 (British Broadcast Company)
- (6) FSB Maryanne 29 Mar - 4 Apr 71 (ABC, CBS, NBC, AP, UPI, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, L'Express)
- (7) Calley Verdict: 29 March - 4 April 71 (ABC, CBS, NBC, AP, UPI)

6. (U) Command Changes.

a. The following command changes have been made during the time frame 1 November 1970 through 30 April 1971:

(1) Generals.

- (a) MG James L. Baldwin assumed command of the 23d Infantry

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Division, vice MG Albert E. Milloy on 23 November 1970.

(b) BG B. K. Gorwitz assumed duties as Assistant Division Commander/Support, vice BG R. L. Atteberry on March 1971.

(c) BG J. C. McDonough assumed duties as Assistant Division Commander/Maneuver, vice BG T. C. Mataxis on 21 April 1971.

(2) Colonels.

(a) COL G. P. Tilson assumed command of DISCOM on 5 March 1971, vice COL P. B. McDaniel.

(b) COL W. W. Goodwin assumed command of the 11th Inf Bde on 7 March 1971, vice COL J. L. Insani.

(c) COL C. R. Smith assumed command of the 198th Inf Bde on 19 March 1971, vice COL W. R. Richardson.

(3) Lieutenant Colonels.

(a) 6th Bn, 11th Arty, LTC G. E. Hobbs assumed command from LTC R. H. Kleinfelder on 2 November 1970.

(b) 2d Bn, 1st Inf, LTC H. G. Watson assumed command from LTC A. H. Coleman on 4 November 1970.

(c) 3d Bn, 1st Inf, LTC J. B. Luke assumed command from LTC C. J. Landry on 10 November 1970.

(d) 14th Aviation Bn (CBT), LTC J. F. Rutkowski assumed command from LTC D. E. Boyle on 14 November 1970.

(e) 3d Bn, 82d Arty, LTC R. C. Martin assumed command from LTC F. M. Zabcik on 29 November 1970.

(f) 1st Bn, 82d Arty, LTC W. P. O'Brian assumed command from LTC R. F. James on 5 December 1970.

(g) 123d Aviation Bn (CBT), LTC M. Vissers assumed command from LTC J. C. Orr on 10 December 1970.

(h) 1st Bn, 20th Inf, LTC T. W. Brogan assumed command from LTC G. P. Lynch on 14 December 1970.

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(i) 5th Bn, 46th Inf, LTC E. E. Passmore assumed command from LTC J. R. Henry on 19 December 1970.

(j) 1st Bn, 6th Inf, LTC J. E. Sawey assumed command from LTC F. F. Woerner on 9 January 1971.

(k) 4th Bn, 21st Inf, LTC V. B. Sones assumed command from LTC R. A. Witter on 12 January 1971.

(l) 3d Bn, 18th Arty, LTC F. P. Mulvey assumed command from LTC R. C. Schmidt on 18 January 1971.

(m) 723d Maintenance Bn, LTC. S. J. Crabtree assumed command from LTC J. E. Harris on 18 January 1971.

(n) 3d Bn, 16th Arty, LTC E. B. Johnson assumed command from LTC T. J. Lightner on 25 January 1971.

(o) 3d Bn, 21st Inf, LTC L. W. Roberts assumed command from LTC C. P. Saint on 19 February 1971.

(p) 26th Engineer Bn, LTC T. Sands assumed command from LTC H. V. Dutchyshyn on 1 March 1971.

(q) 23d Medical Bn, MAJ T. Bowen assumed command from COL Krekorian on 4 March 1971.

(r) 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav, LTC G. L. Breeding assumed command from LTC Burnett, (MIA) on 9 March 1971.

(s) 4th Bn, 31st Inf, LTC H. S. Mitchell assumed command from LTC W. G. Hammill on 27 March 1971.

(t) 1st Bn, 46th Inf, LTC C. J. Tate assumed command from LTC W. P. Doyle on 30 March 1971.

(u) 1st Bn, 20th Inf, MAJ J. S. Peppers assumed command from LTC T. W. Brogan on 14 April 1971.

(v) 4th Bn, 3d Inf, LTC J. S. Shannon assumed command from LTC A. F. Coast (NBD) on 27 April 1971.

(2) The following staff changes have been made:

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(a) Colonels. COL W. R. Richardson assumed duties as Chief of Staff on 3 April 1971, vice A. R. Clark.

(b) Lieutenant Colonels and selected Majors.

(1) MAJ C. E. Hess assumed duties as Division Chemical Officer, vice CPT Owens on 3 November 1970.

(2) LTC R. J. Barnhart assumed duties as Division Adjutant General, vice LTC J. M. Eubanks on 10 December 1970.

(3) LTC T. S. Robinson assumed duties as Division Inspector General, vice LTC R. Black on 12 December 1970.

(4) CPT Griscom assumed duties as Acting Division Information Officer, vice MAJ Gabella on 31 December 1970.

(5) LTC I. Moss assumed duties as Division Chaplain vice LTC T. R. Pope on 10 January 1971.

(6) MAJ R. D. Baily (JR) assumed duties as Division Information Officer vice CPT Griscom on 12 January 1971.

(7) LTC A. B. Pursell assumed duties as ACofS, G2, vice LTC. R. S. Holmes on 21 February 1971.

(8) MAJ T. Bowen assumed duties as Division Surgeon vice COL E. A. Kreherian on 4 March 1971.

(9) LTC B. G. Evans assumed duties as ACofS, G5, vice MAJ R. A. Murchison on 27 March 1971.

(10) MAJ O. L. Breck assumed duties as Acting ACofS, G1, vice LTC C. J. Tate on 30 March 1971.

(11) LTC M. T. Rogerson assumed duties as ACofS, G1, vice MAJ O. L. Brock on 27 April 1971.

(12) CPT Griscom assumed duties as Division Information Officer vice MAJ R. D. Baily (JR), on 28 April 1971.

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II. Section II, LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observation, Evaluation,
and Recommendations (U).

A. (U) Personnel.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Formation of a Joint Narcotics Team.

(a) OBSERVATION: The burgeoning narcotics problem involving servicemen in Vietnam should rate number one priority in our enforcement effort. The enforcement effort should continue to be directed at the source of supply.,

(b) EVALUATION: The Joint Narcotics Team has proven effective. With continued emphasis and support it can continue to be so. The increased cooperation on the part of the National Police and ARVN CID has given the program the impetus it needs to be effective particularly in limiting and eliminating the source of supply.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis be given to this activity concentrating particularly on the source of narcotics and distributors soliciting narcotics addicts.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

2. (U) SUBJECT: Personnel Problems During Special Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The sudden build-up for Combat Operation LAM SON 719 brought about a serious accountability problem for this headquarters.

(b) EVALUATION: In most cases, less than 24 hours notification of the need for personnel of a particular MOS was given to a battalion. In this short period of time, the needed MOS's had to be screened, the companies had to be notified, and the individuals concerned had to report to their new assignment location. Also, on account of this, almost every individual was moved without orders which further added to the accountability problem. It was not easily discernible whether the lost personnel were on TDY or had been assigned to another unit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that a thorough study be conducted prior to a special operation as to the personnel requirements and the classification of those participating in the operation.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

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(U) Intelligence

B. (U) SUBJECT: Sensor Emplacement.

(a) OBSERVATION: Before closing down a fire base, additional sensors were emplaced to monitor any activity that might occur after the base was abandoned. After all friendly elements departed the fire base, the sensors were activated and artillery was fired on the positions with unknown results.

(b) EVALUATION: Since most fire bases are usually located on prominent terrain features or near major infiltration routes, it is important to deny their use to the enemy after it has been closed down by friendly forces. The use of sensor devices in this manner provides timely intelligence and when combined with artillery fire has proved very effective.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That additional sensors be employed and monitored after closing out fire bases. The enemy usually moves into abandoned fire bases shortly after friendly troops have departed. By combining sensors and responsive artillery fire when activations occur, the use of abandoned fire bases can be denied to the enemy.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

2. (U) SUBJECT: Airborne Personnel Detector Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Airborne Personnel Detector continues to be used throughout the division as an intelligence source concerning enemy locations and activities. The usual reaction to positive readings sensed by the APD is artillery fire. The results of this reaction are unknown. Also, missions have sometimes been interrupted when visual sightings are made so that both gunships could engage the target.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to exploit positive readings immediately, while still continuing the APD mission, a Visual Reconnaissance (VR) OH-6A helicopter was added to the standard APD team on several missions. The VR OH-6A would follow approximately 300 meters behind and to the left of the APD OH-6A helicopter and investigate positive readings detected by the APD helicopter. The OH-6A while searching the area, would be under the protection of one of the gunships while the rest of the team continues the mission. Immediate reaction to confirmed readings is attained without compromising the primary mission of the APD to gain intelligence data throughout the entire designated area.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an additional OH-6A helicopter be included on all APD missions to act as a VR helicopter in order to visually confirm positive readings sensed by the APD.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

3. (C) SUBJECT: Draft Deferments For Luc Luong 66 Scouts.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 23d Infantry Division is experiencing problems due to expired draft deferments for Luc Luong 66 Scouts. MACV policy requires that applications for new draft deferments be submitted four months prior to expiration of previously granted draft deferments. After submission many applications are misplaced or ignored resulting in many scouts having expired draft deferments. The scouts are then subject to apprehension by ARVN personnel and are frequently taken into custody.

(b) EVALUATION: The present draft deferment policy is producing problems. Apprehension by ARVN cost the government money since the apprehended scouts are still entitled to pay while in this status. In addition, a great deal of time is wasted in trying to locate scouts who have been apprehended. Further, the morale and efficiency of the scouts is effected because they are subject to apprehension.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend other units consider sending a representative to Saigon monthly for the purpose of hand carrying deferment applications.

The 23d Infantry Division MI Company did this in March 1971 and received 75 new draft deferments. This effort significantly increased the effectiveness of the Luc Luong 66 Program.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

4. (C) SUBJECT: Volunteer Informant Program (VIP)

(a) OBSERVATION: Expenditures under the VIP Program for the 3d Quarter of Fiscal Year 71 were down from the previous quarters. Users of the VIP funds were provided with a quarterly ceiling not to be exceeded without the division's prior approval. The ceiling was more than sufficient, as less than 30 percent of available funds were spent during this quarter. During the period there were always sufficient funds on hand for advance to using units. No funds were frozen as in the past when VIP Officers were suddenly assigned to field duties or evacuated without being able to clear their account beforehand. Placing VIP funds under control of Battalion and Brigade S-2's achieved more control of the funds and placed more emphasis on gaining intelligence. The S-2's have maintained excellent coordination

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with the Class "A" Agent Officer and have solved many potential problems. It is anticipated that there will be an increase in the VIP expenditures during the last quarter of Fiscal year 71; however, total expenditures for the year are not expected to equal the amount budgeted by MACV.

(b) EVALUATION: There has not been an increase in the amount of intelligence information collected through the VIP Program, because emphasis has been on purchasing ammunition rather than on intelligence collection. With the unit S-2's controlling the funds, the division has been able to stabilize prices paid for ammunition and redirect the program toward intelligence collection.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) Commanders and their respective S-2's be advised of the status of VIP funds at least quarterly. This information should be based on feeder data submitted by the Class A Officer, ICF.

(2) The program continue to be administered through the Brigade's S-2 and intelligence channels.

(3) Continue to brief newly assigned S-2's and intelligence personnel on their responsibility to obtain maximum intelligence for the VIP dollar and not to accept receipts contrary to appropriate regulations and guidance from the Division Class "A" Agent Officer.

(4) The Class "A" Agent be informed in advance of any contemplated moves of units or VIP Officers so that he can take action to continue the availability of funds for the respective units.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

(5) (C) SUBJECT: Update Trail Study Data Base

(a) OBSERVATION: The Imagery Interpretation Section was assigned the task of updating a trail study in the western portion of Quang Tin Province near the Laotian border. The mission presented a problem because the area was large (400 sq km), and predominately overcast with a 3,000 to 5,000 foot ceiling. It was also desirable that the number of photographs be kept to a minimum.

(b) EVALUATION: Previously used methods of employing high performance aircraft for photographing trails for study have proved ineffective due to the difficulty in following the trail from the air. In addition, the altitude required by high performance aircraft is such that they cannot operate in areas where low cloud cover predominates. The Imagery Interpre-

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tation Section solved the problem by employing an Army Mohawk OV1-A aircraft equipped with a KA-30 camera and three inch lens. The photography provided by the three inch lens produced a scale (1:24,000) too small to make a detailed analysis of the trails even though the trails were visible. To acquire larger scale photograph, trail segments were selected from the small scale photograph and flown with the KA-30 camera using a 12 inch lens. The 12 inch lens provided a scale of 1:1000 enabling the Imagery Interpretation Section to complete its mission with a minimum number of photographs and without the use of a tactical air reconnaissance high performance aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the solution found by the 23d Infantry Division Imagery Interpretation Section be considered by other units.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

C. (U) Operations.

1. SUBJECT: Security of Night Defensive Positions

(a) OBSERVATION: Often times, platoon elements would endanger themselves by allowing their established LP's and ambush point personnel to withdraw to the platoon laager when daylight had arrived.

(b) EVALUATION: Consistent morning ground fog would provide the enemy with excellent cover to achieve positions within RPG range of the laager, and the enemy seemed to know of the habit of the ambush or protective position personnel to retire to the platoon laager at first light.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Security personnel, regardless of weather conditions or visibility, should remain in position until the platoon is prepared for movement and the order is given for withdrawal from these positions.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This recommendation is now standard tactical procedure within the unit.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Protective Devices.

(a) OBSERVATION: The placement of protective devices (i.e. trip flares, mechanical ambushes) prior to dusk, often proved to be wasted effort.

(b) EVALUATION: In many instances it was suspected that the enemy

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had observed the emplacement of these devices. Occasionally wires had been cut or safety pins had been replaced.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Although more difficult and dangerous, the emplacement of these devices when visibility is reduced, should be considered.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

3. (U) SUBJECT: Ambush Tactics.

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to recent changes to small units ambush tactics, units have been able to deceive the enemy and gain a decisive advantage.

(b) EVALUATION: By breaking units down into half platoon size elements and practicing good camouflage and carefully choosing the ambush position, some units have increased friendly initiated contacts by 50% and the number of enemy killed by 65%. By employing these tactics, plus restricting movement during daylight hours to early morning or late afternoon and enforcing strict noise discipline, units achieved a marked increase in tactical success.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units place increasing emphasis on small unit operations which are characterized by stealth when moving into the ambush site and strict noise discipline.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

4. (U) SUBJECT: Hot Weather Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the dry season heat can prove to be a hindering factor in the conduct of operations. On one recent operations a rifle company was able to move only 500 meters during one day because they had to carry three heat casualties along with them. The company was carrying the usual combat load of three day's rations, water, ammunition and field equipment normally carried during the monsoon season.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to be effective while conducting hot weather operations, the combat load has to be lightened and the temperature considered when planning troop movement in the field. Squad size patrols with light gear have proved to be more effective during hot weather.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To lighten the combat load, only the bare essentials should be carried. If the tactical situation permits, resupply should be on a once-a-day basis, rather than every three days. Each man should carry

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two extra canteens of water and a sufficient supply of salt tablets, Movement in the field should be done during the cool hours of the morning and late afternoon - commensurate with the tactical situation.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: That this lesson learned be included in unit SOF's for hot weather operations.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Counter Mortar Fire Plan

(a) OBSERVATION: The intensity and frequency of enemy indirect fire can be reduced by a thoroughly rehearsed, well planned, counter mortar fire plan.

(b) EVALUATION: Counter mortar target grids are cleared several times daily. 81mm mortar and 4.2" mortar tubes are layed on the cleared grids when not firing missions. Rounds are prepared with charges cut. At the first indication of enemy indirect fire attack the counter mortar grids are fired. Return fire response was cut to as little as four seconds on one occasion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This system will work in any situation where counter mortar grids can be pre-cleared and kept cleared for instant response.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

6. (U) SUBJECT: Indirect Fire with a Quad .50.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of the Quad .50 as an indirect fire weapon brought about a significant increase in the deadline rate for machine gun mounts.

(b) EVALUATION: The Quad .50 was designed for direct fire at aircraft targets. When used for indirect fire, the weapon must be locked in firing position causing excessive stress on the firing circuit. This causes parts in the mount to wear out prematurely and increases the replacement rate for these parts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders employ the Quad .50 for indirect fire only when absolutely necessary.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Commanders of fire bases which have a Quad .50 employed, have been informed of the problem and it has been recommended to them that the Quad .50 not be used for indirect fire when other systems are available.

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7. (U) SUBJECT: Vehicle Readiness

(a) OBSERVATION: Self-propelled howitzers in isolated bases seldom have reason to displace. When required to displace, mechanical failures are frequently experienced because limited movement of the howitzers does not give a true measure of the vehicle's capability for sustained road marches.

(b) EVALUATION: Road marches could be completed more successfully if a better evaluation and assurance of mechanical condition were known.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That self-propelled artillery units be required to road march on a periodic basis to better evaluate the mechanical condition of the vehicles.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Periodic, unannounced road marches will be directed by this headquarters as well as units conducting short marches on a periodic basis within security limitation.

i. (U) SUBJECT: Flame Drops to Clear LZ's and Booby Traps.

(a) OBSERVATION: Booby traps and mines continue to be a hazard to U.S. Forces. Forward CP's and LZ's are sometimes overgrown with foliage. Flame drops have been conducted against these targets.

(b) EVALUATION: The flame effectively clears small areas of mines and booby traps and assists in clearing away brush and vegetation. This has been helpful for clearing LZ's and forward CP's. The 14 drum flame rack continued to be an effective means of dropping the drums when conducting a flame drop.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the division continues to utilize flame for these missions.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

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9. (U) SUBJECT: Mine Incident Maps.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is an accepted fact that the enemy repeatedly mines the same sections of roads.

(b) EVALUATION: Awareness of this tactic and knowledge of those sections the enemy mines, can be extremely helpful in countering enemy road mining.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Mine incidents should be plotted on a map (preferably 1:50,000) to gain information on those sections of a road encountering heavy mining. Prior to initiating a minesweep mission, the minesweep team should be thoroughly briefed and cautioned to pay particular attention to these sections.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

10. (U) SUBJECT: Concrete Fords.

(a) OBSERVATION: At the conclusion of the past monsoon season, many culverts washed out on secondary roads. These roads remained impassable until engineer effort was made available for their repair.

(b) EVALUATION: Although culverts are easy to install and provide a reasonable answer to certain drainage situations, they are subject to being washed out during the monsoon season where the volume of water and the ensuing current far surpasses the capacity of the culvert.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Shallow but wide water crossing often dictate the construction of concrete fords. They are permanent in nature and are in general easier to construct than timber bridges. They, of course, become impassable during the flood highpoint, but require little if any maintenance when the water subsides.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

11. (U) SUBJECT: Method of Plotting APD Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: Field experience has shown that when the APD OH 6A flew into niches on top of a ridge line, some enemy base camps were (note-document appears complete, but sentence was not completed)

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(U) SUBJECT: AN/PRS - 7, Non-Metallic Mine Detector Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many personnel involved in mine sweep operations lack confidence in the new AN/PRS 7 non-metallic mine detector.

(b) EVALUATION: The AN/PRS-7 non metallic mine detector has a completely different mode of operation than the P-153/158 metallic mine detectors. It will produce a signal only when the search head is in motion. The volume of the signal is dependent upon the rate at which the area is swept and the size of the object to be detected.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Minesweep personnel should be constantly retrained on the AN/PRS-7 mine detector with emphasis given to the two characteristics mentioned above. Lanes containing various types of enemy mines and ordnance should be used. Once an individual has understood the detector's mode of operation and has become attuned to its signal, confidence will be rapidly gained.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

F. (U) Logistics.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Maintenance of the APD

(a) OBSERVATION: The downtime of the APD during the previous reporting period had been excessive due to rotary valve failure. This type of maintenance was only authorized at Direct Support level. A lapping stone was obtained so that this maintenance could be performed at division level.

(b) EVALUATION: This downtime has been reduced somewhat due to more responsive maintenance, and the performance of the APD enhanced by the use of a rotary valve lapping stone. By using this lapping stone, the rotary valve's surface is improved and therefore prevents flaking which causes false readings.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this type maintenance continue to be performed at user level.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

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discovered on high plateaus.

(b) EVALUATION: Most of these high plateaus are difficult to fly into and some tight maneuvering on the pilots part may be necessary. The mission controller could make the maneuver easier if he directs the OH-6A gradually up the ridgeline which the OH-6A is flying parallel to. In this way the OH-6A helicopter will have the proper altitude to fly into the high plateau without sacrificing air speed, thus becoming more vulnerable to enemy fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When running an APD mission, the mission commander should carefully consider investigating high plateaus on top of ridgelines and plan the course of the mission accordingly.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

11. (U) SUBJECT: Defoliation of FSB's Using Contaminated Fuel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many FSB perimeters are heavily overgrown with elephant grass and foliage. Contaminated fuels have been used to defoliate vegetation growing in the perimeter wire of FSB's. The fuel is sprayed from a surfaced based rig onto the vegetation and then ignited.

(b) EVALUATION: Fair to good results have been obtained using this scorching method of defoliation. However, it is time consuming do to the large quantity of fuel required.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That defoliation by contaminated fuel be continued where required.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

D. (U) Organization: None

E. (U) Training.

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2. (U) SUBJECT: Contingency Bunker Material.

(a) OBSERVATION: Construction of advanced fire support bases is often hampered by the effort associated with the acquisition and preparation of materials for bunkers.

(b) EVALUATION: Once a decision is made to construct a fire support base, it is imperative that the engineers have bunker material readily available in order to react immediately to the requirement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: By standardizing bunker sizes, the Divisional Engineer Battalion has instituted a "Bunker Contingency Plan." The smaller airmobile bunkers are constructed in the rear areas and are held ready for immediate hook out. Components of larger bunkers are cut and stored in packets to facilitate on site assembly. As timbers are committed, additional material is drawn to replenish existing stocks. Additionally, the precut and preassembled bunker set concept lends itself to continual relocation, thereby reducing future material requirements.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

3. (U) SUBJECT: Maintenance of Small Arms and Generators

(a) OBSERVATION: Infantry battalions are not authorized trained armorers at company level and have no ready resources for inspection and repair of small arms. Also, there is a lack of trained generator repairmen at lower unit level. The necessary program of preventative maintenance needed to keep generators working in this climate cannot be accomplished without trained generator repairmen.

(b) EVALUATION: With a lack of skilled arms and generator repairmen readily available to the infantry battalions, much valuable time may be lost in evacuating weapons and generators from the field to support maintenance facilities. In order to prevent this problem this unit has developed a small arms technical assistance team. When units are refitting in a rear area the team inspects and repairs all weapons. This reduces the number of weapons failures in the field due to worn parts and reduces significantly the number of weapons turned in to support maintenance shops. To improve the number of technically qualified generator repairman, units select personnel who are to be generator operation on the separate fire bases. These operators are then sent to the supporting unit's generator shop and trained in all aspects of generator operations and repair. This has reduced the rate of generator failure throughout the division.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all forward support facilities adopt similar programs to assist field units in the maintenance of vital equipment.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

4. (U) SUBJECT: Mobility.

a. OBSERVATION: The present static situation of many support units has resulted in neglect of mobility requirements and capabilities.

(b) EVALUATION: Support units must maintain a high degree of mobility if they are to be capable of supporting ground operations in RVN. In many instances, units have constructed shelters for equipment in order to protect it from the weather. Often, however, rapid movement of the equipment could be accomplished only by destruction of the shelter; a situation that could result in damage to the equipment itself. In addition, a considerable amount of equipment has been secured in place, by imbedding base plates and standards in concrete. While this practice serves also to discourage pilferage, rapid movement of the equipment would be extremely difficult. Many units have neglected to write effective loading plans, or have not modified existing plans to reflect changes in equipment or available transport to attempt to load a large amount of support equipment without adequate loading plans would result in delays that could have serious consequences.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Shop van equipment should be maintained in the van to the greatest extent possible and work performed there. Ground mounted equipment must be installed in such a way that a rapid disconnect capability exists. Loading plans should be accurate and up to date. Personnel with the responsibility of readying equipment for movement must have a sound working knowledge of the unit's loading plans.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

G. (U) Communications: None.

H. (U) Materiel: None.

I. (U) Other:

1. (U) SUBJECT: Physicals.

(a) OBSERVATION: Physicals for individuals being processed for administrative discharges were taking too long to complete.

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(b) EVALUATION: Both commanders and personnel themselves were being penalized by having a decentralized physical examination procedure. As many as four separate locations had to be visited to fulfill the requirements of the governing regulation. The average time needed to complete one physical was in excess of seven days.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a centralized physical examination station be set up.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Effective 22 April 1971, a centralized physical examination station was initiated. Once each week all personnel pending discharge under the provisions of AR 635-200 or 635-212 will be processed in a single day.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Medical Evacuation

(a) OBSERVATION: Through habit, units have grown entirely dependent upon air for casualty evacuation.

(b) EVALUATION: In many instances, in the just completed operation, because of the mountainous terrain and high altitude, morning ground fog or inclement weather would make it virtually impossible to complete a "DUST OFF". Valuable time, was often wasted waiting to see if the aircraft could perform.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When organic tracked medical vehicle is not with a unit, one of the units vehicles should be designated as an emergency evacuation carrier. This should be especially stressed when the Battalion/Squadron field aid station is within a reasonable distance.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Unit has included this into tactical SOP as a standard practice.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM R. RICHARDSON
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

AVDF-HL

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1-CO, 3d Bn, 82d Arty
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1-CO, 1st Bn, 82d Arty
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5-ACofS, G3
1-ACofS, G4
1-ACofS, G5
1-Chemical
1-Engineer
1-Signal
1-Aviation
1-Provost Marshal
1-Staff Judge Advocate
1-Information Officer
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DA, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, APO 96349 12 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division and concurs with the report except as indicated in paragraph 2 below.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Formation of a Joint Narcotics Team," page 86, paragraph IIA1: Concur. A command wide Joint Narcotics Detachment has been established within USARV under control of the 8th Military Police Group. One team from that organization works in Military Region 1. They are presently expanding their activities in coordination with Vietnamese authorities and US Forces military police. The endeavor has thus far proven quite successful. Continuing emphasis is being given to this activity.

b. Reference item concerning "Sensor Emplacement," page 87, paragraph IIB1: Nonconcur. Item is not valid. The 23d Infantry Division's Sensor Officer has been questioned regarding the item. He stated he had requested the item be deleted from the ORLL and it had been published through an administrative error.

c. Reference item concerning "Indirect Fire with a Quad .50," page 92, paragraph IIC6: Nonconcur. A quad .50 machinegun battery attached to XXIV Corps Artillery has been asked about problems encountered while employing the weapon system in the indirect fire mode. That unit reports no significant problem with the gun mounts caused by indirect firing. This headquarters has recommended the reporting unit coordinate with the Corps Artillery machinegun battery to determine if the reasons for component failure can be attributed to causes other than indirect firing.

d. Reference item concerning "Vehicle Readiness," page 93, paragraph IIC7: Concur. The same problem has been identified by other self-propelled artillery units in Military Region 1.

e. Reference item concerning "Mine Incident Maps," page 94, paragraph IIC9: Concur. Every possible method or procedure for countering the enemy's mine/booby trap threat should be stressed.

AVII-GCT (15 May 71) 1st Ind 12 JUN 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division
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f. Reference item concerning "Concrete Fords," page 94, paragraph IIC10: Concur. However, no recommendation is apparent. Concrete fords are good structures in certain cases. A given type of drainage structure should not be preslected because good engineering design considers factors peculiar to each given situation.

g. Reference item concerning "Maintenance of the APD," page 96, paragraph IIF1: Nonconcur. Observation states that this type of maintenance is only authorized at DS level. To perform this maintenance at the user level, the DS unit must insure that personnel and equipment are available at the user level and must provide the required training and supervision to insure that the required repairs are correctly performed.

h. Reference item concerning "Maintenance of Small Arms and Generators," page 97, paragraph IIF3: Concur. The use of contact teams and special maintenance programs is standard practice (FM-29-22). Using units having a particular problem should contact their support unit for assistance.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. H. SMITH
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

AVHDO-DO (15 May 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division
(Americal), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 27 JUN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operation Reports-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division (Americal) and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GEDDES, F. MACLAREN
CPT. INF
Acting Asst Adjutant General

GPOP-FD (15 May 71) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 23d Infantry
Division (Americal), Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 27 OCT 1971

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed with the following comment: Reference paragraph '2b 1st Indorsement: Rationale for nonconcurrence is based on that the recommendation did not include pertinent limiting factors, e.g., closed fire bases are in effect returned to GVN control and emplacement of sensors will have to be cleared through GVN channels; sensor readout capabilities may be lost when line of site characteristic is negated when friendly units depart fire base areas.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. MAH
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

AVDF-HL

15 May 71

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 23d Infantry Division
(Americal), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

23D INFANTRY DIVISION TROOP LIST (AMERICAL)
(as of 30 April 1971)

1. HEADQUARTERS 23D INFANTRY DIVISION

HHC, 23d Infantry Division

1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry (-)
F Troop, 17th Cavalry

26th Engineer Battalion

523d Signam Battalion
COMSEC CONTACT TEAM #2

23d Military Police Company

300th Military Police Company

328th Radio Research Company

3d Military History Detachment

OL E, 5th Weather Squadron, USAF (-)

2. 23D INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY

HHB, Division Artillery

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery

1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (-)

3d Battalion, 16th Artillery
Battery D, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery

1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (-)

3d Battalion, 82d Artillery
Battery B (-), 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery

Inclosure 1

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Battery G, 55th Artillery (.50 Cal)

251st Field Artillery Detachment

252d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

271st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

3. 23D INFANTRY DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

HHC, and Band

23d Medical Battalion

23d Supply and Transport Battalion

723d Maintenance Battalion (-)

23d Administration Company

635th Military Intelligence Company

Company G, 75th Infantry (Ranger)

63d Infantry Platoon (Combat Tracker Team)

23d Infantry Combat Center (PROV)

4. 16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP

HHC, 16th Combat Aviation Group

14th Combat Aviation Battalion

71st Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)

116th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)

132d Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter)

174th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)

176th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)

178th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter)

534th Medical Detachment

756th Medical Detachment

123d Aviation Battalion (Combat) (Infantry Division)

Troop D, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry

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(Americal), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

Troop F, 8th Cavalry
Company E, 723d Maintenance Battalion

335th Transportation Company
362d Aviation Detachment

5. 11th INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 11th Infantry Brigade

3d Battalion, 1st Infantry

1st Battalion, 20th Infantry

Task Force, 23d Cavalry (PROV)

E Troop, 1st Cavalry

H Troop, 17th Cavalry

59th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

31st Public Information Detachment

90th Chemical Detachment

327th Aviation Detachment

Combat Weather Team 1

6. 196th INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196th Infantry Brigade

2d Battalion, 1st Infantry

3d Battalion, 21st Infantry

4th Battalion, 31st Infantry

1st Battalion, 46th Infantry

Company 2, Company G, 75th Infantry (Ranger) (PROV)

48th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

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10th Public Information Detachment

27th Chemical Detachment

7. 198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 198th Infantry Brigade

1st Battalion, 6th Infantry

4th Battalion, 3d Infantry

5th Battalion, 46th Infantry

1st Battalion, 52d Infantry

57th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

87th Chemical Detachment

Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)

8. NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

Detachment 3, 7th PSYOP Battalion (Direct Support of Division)

USASSG, ACSI, DA

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(U) Distinguished Visitors.

The following is a list of distinguished personnel who visited this command during the reporting period.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
2 Nov	COL Freitag and COL Wallace	MACV IG Team
2 Nov	GEN Walt	ACMC
2 Nov	LTG McCutcheon	CG, III MAF
2 Nov	BG Haynes	Legislative Asst, HQMC
3 Nov	BG Herring	CG, 834th Air Division
3 Nov	BG Schraeder	CG, 18th Engr Bde
6 Nov	COL Healy	CO, 5th Special Forces Group
7 Nov	LTG Sutherland	CG, XXIV Corps
9 Nov	MG Baldwin	DCG, XXIV Corps
11 Nov	BG Hemingway	USARV Avn Officer
11 Nov	COL Ramos	SA, Quang Ngai Province
11-12 Nov	BG Hume	DCS (P&O), USARV
12 Nov	MG Baldwin	DCG, XXIV Corps
12-13 Nov	MG Hodson	TJAG
12-13 Nov	COL Persons	USARPAC SJA
12-13 Nov	COL Newman	USARV SJA
12-13 Nov	LTC (P) Sneed	Office TJAG, DA
13-14 Nov	COL Jones	US Army Recruiting Command
14 Nov	COL Dickenson	DCPG, DA
15 Nov	LTG Clarke	Chief of Engineers, DA
15 Nov	MG Noble	CG, USAECV
17 Nov	MG Baldwin	DCG, XXIV Corps
20 Nov	LTG Sutherland	CG, XXIV Corps
21 Nov	MG Baldwin	DCG, XXIV Corps
22 Nov	COL Hayward	Military Asst to LTG Ewell, Senior US Military Advisor US Delegation Paris
23 Nov	GEN Abrams	COMUSMACV
23 Nov	LTG Sutherland	CG, XXIV Corps
24 Nov	LTC Grahm	Chief, CMOD DCSOPS USARV
25-27 Nov	Mr. Snoderly	Director, Service to Military Installations, SE Asia HQ
27 Nov	LTG Daly	KBE, CB, DSO, Chief of the Aust. General Staff

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
27 Nov	MG Fraser	CBE, Commander, Aust. Force Vietnam
27 Nov	COL Clark	OBE, Commander, Aust. Army Training Team, RVN
2 Dec	MG Bolton	Dir OPS, ODCSOPS, DA
2 Dec	COL Sniffen	Deputy STANO Systems Manager
3 Dec	Air Commodore Spurgen	DFC (RAAF)
4 Dec	BG Sweeney	CG, Da Nang Support Command
4 Dec	COL Mathias	CofS, Quin Nhon Support Command
4 Dec	COL Thoung	CO, I ALC
4 Dec	COL Pulaski	SA, I ALC
5 Dec	BG Wolfe	Chief, ASA Pacific
5 Dec	COL Lansford	CO, 509th RR Group
5-6 Dec	COL Hammock	Military Judge
7 Dec	BG Wittwer	USARV Provost Marshal
7 Dec	COL Swanson	CO, 504th MP Bn
7 Dec	BG Joslyn, USMC	CofS, III MAF
7 Dec	BG Miller	Outgoing CofS, III MAF
7-12 Dec	Mr. Smith (GS-15)	Chief Liaison Officer to the Vietnamese Red Cross for the American Red Cross
8-9 Dec	Dr. Tarr	Director of Selective Service
9-10 Dec	COL Jamieson	Office of SEATO HQ
10-12 Dec	COL Vaught	Sr US Army Combat Develop- ment Command Liaison Officer Vietnam
15 Dec	MG Toan	CG, 2d ARVN Div
15 Dec	COL Ramos	SA, 2d ARVN Div
15 Dec	COL Day	Incoming SA, 2d ARVN Div
15 Dec	COL Meinzen	ACofS, G3, XXIV Corps
16 Dec	Mr. McCarthy	Office of the Special Asst to the US Ambassador to Vietnam
20 Dec	LTG Sutherland	CG, XXIV Corps
21 Dec	Dr. Hoffman (GS-18E)	Lutheran Hour Preacher, and of the Lutheran Layman's League
23 Dec	COL Day	SA, 2d ARVN Div

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
23 Dec	Cardinal Cooke	Military Vicar to Catholic Armed Forces Pers
23 Dec	LTG Sutherland	CG, XXIV Corps
24 Dec	MG Noble	CG, USAEVC
24 Dec	BG Schraeder	CG, 18th Engr Bde
24 Dec	COL Mason	XXIV Corps Engr
24 Dec	COL Loi	Province Chief, Quang Ngai Province
24 Dec	Mr. Cushing	PSA, Quang Ngai Province
24 Dec	MG Foster	CG, 1st Signal Bde
24 Dec	BG Foster	DCG. 1st Signal Bde
25 Dec	Admiral McCain	CINCPAC
25 Dec	Ambassador Koren	Political Advisor to Admiral McCain
25 Dec	Rear Admiral Voris	PACOM Surgeon
30 Dec	LTG Robertson	CG, III MAF
30 Dec	BG Bernstein	MACV Surgeon
2-3 Jan	REP Lowenstein	D-New York
6 Jan	BG Sweeney	CG, DNG Sup Cmd
6 Jan	LTG Sutherland	CG, XXIV Corps
6 Jan	GEN Weyand	DEPCONUSMACV
6 Jan	BG Hill	CG, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)
10-11 Jan	MG (Chaplain) Sampson	Chief of Chaplains, US Army
11 Jan	Members of the House Armed Services Committee	
12 Jan	COL Handley	CONARC Liaison Tng Team
12 Jan	COL Godwin	USAINTS
12 Jan	COL Achee	USAAVNS
12 Jan	COL Olentine	USAES
12 Jan	COL Leu	USACGSC
13 Jan	MG Woolwine	Asst Dep CG for Materiel, USARV
15 Jan	BG McGuire	USARV DCSOPS Designated
15-16 Jan	GEN Abrams	COMUSMACV
19 Jan	COL Day	Sr Adv, 2d ARVN Div
22 Jan	Mr. Mcklen	Dep Chief Adv, British Defense Ministry (09 Equiv)
22 Jan	COL Brandenburg	USA, DCPG, LNO

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
23 Jan	BG Hill	CG, 1st Bde, 5th Inf (Mech)
25 Jan	MG Milloy	DCG, XXIV Corps
26 Jan	BG Meyer	CG, 1st Avn Bde
26 Jan	BG Hemingway	CG, XXIV ARTY
26 Jan	BG Smith	ADC/S, 101st Abn Div
27 Jan	REV Dr. Brubaker	Chairman, Gen Commission on Chaps and Armed Forces Pers
28 Jan	MG Milloy	DCG, XXIV Corps
2 Feb	LTG McCaffrey	DCG, USARV
3 Feb	BG Sweeney	CG, DNG Sup Comd
6 Feb	MG Seneff	Dep Proj Dir
10 Feb	MG Noble	CG, 18th Engr Bde
12 Feb	MG Milloy	DCG, XXIV Corps
12-13 Feb	MG Bowley	USAF, Dep C/S, MACV
14 Feb	BG Sweeney	CG, DNG Spt Comd
15 Feb	COL Rovegno	Dep, 509th RR
15 Feb	MG Fraser	CO, Australian Forces
16 Feb	COL Bachus	Dep CO, 45th Engr Gp.
16 Feb	COL McIntyre	CO, 45th Engr Gp.
18 Feb	MG Milloy	DCG, XXIV Corps
19 Feb	COL Day	Sr Adv, 2d ARVN Div
20 Feb	COL Yonge	SDSLO HQ, Australian Forces, RVN
22-23 Feb	BG Whelan	MC, Spec Asst to Surg Gen
22-23 Feb	BG Hays	Chief Army Nurse Corps
22-23 Feb	COL Smith	Nurse Consultant, USARV
22-23 Feb	COL Fisher	Army Nurse Corps
22-23 Feb	COL Barrett	Med Consultant, USARV
22-23 Feb	COL Noel	CO, SAMECOMV
23 Feb	BG Collins	Chief of Mil Hist, DA
27 Feb	MG Toan	CG, 2d ARVN Div
1 Mar	BG Gorwitz	Incoming ADC/M
4 Mar	MG Toan	CG, 2d ARVN Div
5 Mar	Mr. Hardin (GS 18)	Spec Asst for Sea Matters to the Secy of the Army
5 Mar	COL Shattuck	Office Dir of Defense Research & Eng
5 Mar	COL Petty	STANO Officer, OCASFOR
8 Mar	COL Nutting	DCO Opns, 1st Bde, 5th Inf (Mech)
11 Mar	BG Schraeder	CG. 18th Engr Gp.

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
12 Mar	COL Bowen	USARV Psychiatric Consultant
12-13 Mar	COL Freeland	XXIV Corps, G3
16 Mar	COL Dong	Chief of Staff, MR I
18 Mar	BG Bernstein	MACV Surgeon
21 Mar	BG Sweeney	CG, DNG Sup Comd
22 Mar	COL Day	SA, 2d ARVN Div
27 Mar	MG Hughes	MC, Chief Surg, RON
27 Mar	COL Noel	USARV Surg, RON
28 Mar	MG Toan	CG, 2d ARN Div
29 Mar	BG Schraeder	CG, 18th Engr Bde
30 Mar	COL Rolfe	Australian Military Attache
30 Mar	COL Leary	Commander AATTV
1 Apr	GEN Weyand	DEPCOMUSMACV
2 Apr	BG Wittwer	USARV Provost Marshal
2 Apr	CHAP (COL) Stegman	USARV Staff Chaplain arrived for RON
2 Apr	COL Day	PSA, Quang Ngai
2 Apr	COL Cam	DCO, 2d ARVN Div
3 Apr	COL Day	PSA, Quang Ngai
4 Apr	MG Widdecke	CG, 1st Marine Division
6 Apr	LTG Sutherland	CG, XXIV Corps
6 Apr	COL Bachus	Incoming CO, 45th Engr Gp.
6 Apr	COL McIntyre	Outgoing CO, 45th Engr Gp.
7 Apr	BG Bernstein	MACV Surgeon
8 Apr	COL Day	PSA, Quang Ngai
9 Apr	Bob Wilson (R-CA), Jack Brenkly (D-GA), Harold Reynolds (D-NM), C.W. Young, (R-FLA), and Lloyd D. Spence (R-SC)	Members House Armed Services Committee
10 Apr	LTG Corcoran	Chief of Staff, CINPAC
10 Apr	COL Mickel	Exec Asst to C/S, CINPAC
13 Apr	Sen Stevens	R - Alabama
13 Apr	COL Leary	Secy to Army Rep
13 Apr	COL Barton	USAF, IDASC
13 Apr	BG Smith	ADC/S, 101st Abn Div
13 Apr	MG Tarpley	CG, 101st Abn Div
15 Apr	MG Schraeder	CG, 18th Engr Bde
16 Apr	LTG McCaffrey	DCG, USARV
20 Apr	MG Campbell	USAF Cmdr PACEX
20 Apr	BG Brofft	USAF, Chief AAFES

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
20 Apr	Mr. Pond	Asst to Chief AAFES
20 Apr	Mr. Davis	Asst to Cmdr PACEX
20 Apr	COL Perkins	USAF Commder VRE
20 Apr	MG Toan	CG, 2d ARVN Div
21 Apr	BG McDonough	Incoming ADC/M
23 Apr	Mr. Daly	President World Airways
27 Apr	MG Milloy	DCG, XXIV Corps
27-30 Apr	LTC Schopper	O of SGS, DA
28 Apr	COL Day	PSA, Quang Ngai
29 Apr	BG Cooper	DCG, USARV Engr

UNCLASSIFIED

HQ, DAFD, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310

Operational Report - Lessons Learned Hqs., 23d Inf Div (Americal)
Period Ending 30 April 1971 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

CG, 23d Inf Div (Americal)

14 March 1972

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