

of course, and are therefore all the more worthy of notice in a reference work of this nature.

One always wishes some of the entries were fleshed out to provide still richer detail, particularly those on such participants as Clark Clifford, Anna Chennault, and Walter Lippmann, among others. Surely John Foster Dulles should have received a longer essay. Charles de Gaulle's crucial role in putting pressure on American policy makers by his rhetoric—which made dissent from the war respectable in conservative circles—and by his attacks on the Fort Knox gold reserve—which sent the American “establishment” into a spin—is hardly discussed. And there are one or two (other reviewers could find more, I am sure) striking omissions, such as Joseph Alsop, who, some would say, scared Lyndon B. Johnson into the war by his caustic criticism of appeasers, but these are minor complaints indeed and do not detract much from the usefulness of the volume.

It is pleasing to read juxtaposed accounts of American and Vietnamese veterans of the war. In both cases, readjustment was difficult, and the Vietnamese in “substantial numbers” also turned to drugs and alcohol to deal with memories and personal problems in war's aftermath. Readers looking for information about, and lessons of, the Vietnam War will find answers to both here.

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*More than a Soldier's War: Pacification in Vietnam.* By Edward P. Metzner. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. xiv, 201 pp. \$29.95, ISBN 0-89096-666-4.)

Along with the Ugly Americans that appeared all too frequently during the Vietnam conflict were some Good Americans. Edward P. Metzner was one of the latter. Trained as an artillery officer, he served four tours in Vietnam, mainly in Mekong Delta provinces, as a pacification adviser. He became deeply committed to the cause of South Vietnam, which he judged an honorable one; he learned the language and eventually married the country's national women's tennis champion. A model

adviser, he worked well with his Vietnamese counterparts, displaying patience and understanding in the most trying circumstances.

Metzner confirms the generally held view that the pacification program was a case of too little and too late. Serving his second tour in 1967–1968, he watched with dismay as the body count became the measure of success in the war. “The U.S. military was out of touch with Vietnamese realities in general,” he believed, “and with the goals and objectives of the political conflict in particular.” For Metzner, the key to victory was to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people. The pacification program occupied the central role in this struggle, helping South Vietnamese officials demonstrate that life under the Saigon government was superior to life under the Communists.

Metzner documents both the strengths and the weaknesses of the pacification effort. At times he assisted provincial leaders who were genuinely concerned about improving the conditions of the people. He found other officials who were venal and corrupt. Metzner did the best that he could in both circumstances. Overall, he considers his own efforts to have been “moderately effective.”

By the time Metzner returned to Vietnam for his fourth tour in January 1972, the United States was retreating from the battlefield. The pacification program, however, was finally beginning to produce results, with the villagers in the Delta turning away from the Communists. But this came too late. A major North Vietnamese military offensive in 1975 crushed a Saigon government that had been fatally weakened by its “precipitous abandonment” by Washington.

Readers interested in such controversial aspects of the pacification effort as the Phoenix program will find no mention of it in this volume. Also, one misses the moral ambivalence and personal insights found in the superb memoirs of David Donovan (*Once a Warrior King*, 1985), a junior officer who headed a mobile advisory team in the Delta. While Metzner's experiences contribute to a more balanced view of the pacification effort in Vietnam, one suspects that there were too few like him.

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