

The Madlangbayan and Alvarez families, from the respective municipalities of General Tria and Dasmariñas, are the case studies for the book's second half. The similarity between these two families is that four generations ago the patron of each family owned property (up to 15 hectares). The author details how the majority in each family eventually become landless tenant farmers. Land only goes so far when dividing it among numerous children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren. By the fourth generation, most members of these families eke out an existence through tenant farming and service-oriented endeavors, becoming beauticians, jeep drivers, and carpenters. Several have sought work in the Middle East. McAndrew explains that for these two families the panacea of overseas employment has led to sorrow rather than economic security.

What makes *Urban Usurpation* so timely is the current struggle in Cavite between developers and tenant farmers (see Rigoberto Tiglao's "The Dictator's Curse," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 30 May 1996, 159(22):40-41). McAndrew explains how developers, land owners and the courts have changed the livelihood of Cavite families. Without land, these individuals are forced to make a living by joining the ubiquitous transportation and store-front businesses. There are a few tenant farmers who are trying to fight for their land use rights. The author notes that this opposition to big money and government is consistent with past revolts Caviteños initiated or in which they participated. These include the 1745 agrarian uprising, the 1896 Revolution, and the Tanguan and Sakdal movements earlier this century.

For all its detailed research and scholarship, McAndrew's work reads as a tragic novel. The poor always lose. They lost when the Spaniards set up *encomiendas* and land grants. They lost during the 1896 revolt. Now, the landless Caviteños's enemies use contracts, banks, and developers to push them aside. The most McAndrew offers for a better future is noted in his final paragraph: "No doubt real progress towards the realization of ecologically sustainable development will come to Cavite when citizen groups are able to seat their representatives in government" (p. 197). Until then, without a rural uprising that will make the courts and the country take notice, Cavite's landless population will continue to lose the little they have.

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*More Than a Soldier's War: Pacification in Vietnam.* By EDWARD P. METZNER.  
College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. xiii, 201 pp. \$29.95.

The title of this book is slightly misleading; it is a memoir, not a study of pacification. Edward Metzner, a recent graduate of the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, went to Vietnam in 1964 as a psychological warfare officer, and was attached to the ARVN Seventh Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta. He had to learn from the Vietnamese officers of the division and from his own experiences; he comments that the training and briefings he had been given beforehand had been "useless." He did learn, however, during this and three later tours in Vietnam; he was there for a total of about seven years between 1964 and 1974. A four-month course in the Vietnamese language helped with the learning process, though as he comments, it would have helped more if he had it in 1964 rather than 1969. During his last tour he married a Vietnamese woman.

Metzner never had a command in Vietnam. Most of his time was spent as an advisor at the province level in various parts of the Mekong Delta, though he also spent a few unhappy months in 1967 working at the corps level in the Central Highlands; the worst problem there was the relentless pressure to make all reports on pacification optimistic. Finally, from March 1973 to August 1974 he was in Saigon, handling American liaison with the Vietnamese Joint General Staff and various other matters.

For the most part the war in which he was involved was conducted by provincial forces, with some support from American aircraft and helicopters. His descriptions of the sorts of battles fought by these forces, very seldom described in detail in books by Americans, fill an important gap in the literature of the war.

There was less use of heavy weapons on both sides than in the big-unit war farther north. Metzner often preferred to keep things that way. When B-52 strikes became available for targets in the southernmost parts of South Vietnam, Metzner for a considerable period avoided their use in his province, because he could not trust the intelligence information that would be used to select the targets. Finally he approved some, though far fewer than the province chief had wanted. When two battalions of U.S. troops were sent into Chuong Thien province in 1968 to attack Viet Cong base areas that the provincial forces had been too weak to deal with, Metzner felt no enthusiasm. He says the U.S. troops were not able to do much that was useful against the enemy base areas either, and for a while they profoundly offended the local peasants by public nudity in their camp.

Some of the Vietnamese officials with whom Metzner worked were excellent; some were incompetent, blatantly corrupt, or seemed to have worked out accommodations with the Communists to avoid combat. Metzner was able to influence their behavior in some important ways, but he never seemed to have had much impact on corruption, and he knew he would never be able to persuade them to abandon their reliance on fixed outposts in the countryside, which Metzner considered self-defeating.

Metzner is definitely a "hawk," and in some places his attitude biases his account. Thus, he conveys an impression that violations of the Paris Accord in early 1973 were essentially all committed by the Communist side, and when he protests the cutbacks in U.S. shipments of ammunition and other military aid to Saigon after 1973, he conveys a misleading impression that the Communist forces enjoyed a far more generous supply of ammunition in this period. But on the issues at the center of this book—Metzner's descriptions of his work as an advisor, and of the Vietnamese and American organizations he worked with—his account is enormously valuable.

*More than a Soldier's War* is recommended both for specialists and for general readers; if a paperback edition appears, this reviewer may well adopt it as a supplementary text in an undergraduate course on the war.

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*Singapore: The Global City State.* By GEOFFREY MURRAY and AUDREY PERERA. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. xiii, 285 pp. \$55.00.

This volume is the second in a Pacific Rim business series (the first was on China) to help businessmen set up their presence on the island. To this end, all the basic business data are given: there are chapters on the often-repeated "economic miracle"