

CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

1967 Year End Report

The Chieu Hoi Program is intended to complement military, economic and political efforts toward victory. This brief report outlines its major contributions in 1967, its problems and its plans for 1968.

I. ACCOMPLISHMENTS

a. Returnees

During 1967, a total of 27,178 Viet Cong/NVA returned to GVN control under the Chieu Hoi Program. Of this number, 17,671 were military Viet Cong, or the equivalent of two enemy Divisions. During the same period of time, 91,595 Viet Cong/NVA were killed or captured by all the friendly military forces in Vietnam together. Thus the number of Viet Cong/NVA eliminated through the Chieu Hoi Program was equal to about one-fifth of the total of all enemy forces killed or captured by military action. Of course, these statistics are complementary, not competitive, since military pressure was a principal cause of defection under the Chieu Hoi Program. Nevertheless, Chieu Hoi added the equivalent of an additional two Divisions to the total enemy military losses, and had we been obliged to eliminate these 17,671 on the battlefield, our side would have lost more than 3,000 additional dead.

There were also 7,886 returnees in the "political" category during 1967. Research by Rand Corporation concerning the composition of 43,000 ralliers between July 1, 1965 and June 30, 1967 demonstrated that 60% of the "political" category was composed of infrastructure cadre or party organization workers. Thus in 1967, there were some 4,731 returnees in these two categories.

The year 1967 saw an increase of 6,936 over 1966, or 34%. The following is a statistical comparison of 1967 and 1966 performances by region and category:

<u>1967</u>				
<u>Region</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Political</u>	<u>Other Elements</u>	<u>Total</u>
I	1,420	932	160	2,512
II	3,728	3,044	396	7,168
III	5,670	1,839	545	8,054
IV	6,853	2,071	520	9,444
Totals	17,671	7,886	1,621	27,178

<u>1966</u>				
I	1,087	578	69	1,734
II	5,244	3,498	326	9,068
III	2,697	872	144	3,713
IV	3,971	1,417	339	5,727
Totals	12,999	6,365	878	20,242

b. Intelligence Exploitation

Unfortunately no present reporting system collects the statistics which would adequately demonstrate the great contribution of Chieu Hoi ralliers in the intelligence field. A few dramatic examples will have to serve:

--An NVA Sergeant/Squad Leader rallied with his weapons on 2 November 1967 in Kontum Province. He voluntarily gave precise and priceless information of the impending enemy attack at Dak To, including details as to enemy plans, unit strength and location, which permitted the US Fourth Division to dispose its forces in an optimum manner to defeat the enemy.

--Operations such as Cedar Falls and Manhattan were mounted very largely on the basis of information supplied by Hoi Chanh.

--On 14 June 1967, acting on the basis of information provided by a rallier, ARVN 21st Division killed 202 of the Viet Cong "Tay Do" Battalion, took 14 prisoners and many crew-served weapons.

These are but a few examples. In addition, a majority of the large enemy weapons caches seized by friendly forces have been pointed out by Chieu Hoi returnees, with major recent examples in Quang Tin, Dinh Tuong and Phuoc Tuy.

c. Tactical Utilization

Chieu Hoi Division promoted and assisted in the establishment of the Kit Carson Scout Program in 1966. The Program has now proven its value and is expanding. The following table shows actual strength of Kit Carson Scouts as of December 31, 1967:

I Corps	-	142
II Corps	-	32
III Corps	-	50
IV Corps	-	<u>23</u>

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This total compares with a total of 17 on board as of 1 January 1967, for an increase of 230. The contribution of the Kit Carson Scouts is demonstrated in detail in the MACV J2 Study of Tactical Exploitation of PWS and Hoi Chanh dated 1 December 1967. For one example, G2 1st Marine Division reports:

"From 1 November 1966 to 20 September 1967, 1st Marine Division Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) brought in 138 detainees; captured 103 VC and NVA; killed 44 VC and NVA; located 44 caves; functioned as "tunnel rats" in clearing 16 tunnels; collected 17 weapons;

located 190 mines, booby traps and grenades; found 8 supply caches and 1 weapons cache; led 3,228 patrols; made 86 psyops aerial broadcasts; brought in 3 returnees and taught 93 hours of instruction to U.S. Marines."

During one fire fight, a Kit Carson Scout personally killed, by Marine count, 31 NVA regulars and led four wounded Marines through heavy fire to safety. There have been numerous instances of scouts detecting enemy ambushes, saving lives of U.S. troops, etc.

Based on reports from all U.S. military units using Kit Carson Scouts throughout Vietnam up to 1 December 1967, there has not been a single case of redefection, desertion or treachery.

d. National Reconciliation

In 1967, efforts to persuade the GVN to institute a policy under which more priority would be given to Chieu Hoi and the Program would be made more attractive to higher-level VC/NVA cadre met with initial success when the then Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky issued the National Reconciliation Proclamation on April 19. This provided only a clear and official affirmation of GVN policy; implementation was another question. Still, some substantial steps have since been taken:

--More than 1,100 Chieu Hoi ralliers have been accepted by the Revolutionary Development Program.

--Two ex-VC Lieutenant Colonels have been appointed Directors General of the Chieu Hoi Ministry. (Their rank is such that they have participated, for example, in such protocol functions as seeing President Thieu off at the airport, to the consternation of some of the old-time GVN functionaries.)

--Chieu Hoi has been raised to the status of a separate Ministry with one of the bright and influential "inner circle" group as its new Minister.

This initial progress made in the difficult area of National Reconciliation in 1967 should permit much greater progress in 1968.

e. Program Performance

1. Funding

<u>1967 Budget (VN\$)</u>	<u>Percentage Spent by 31 Dec 67</u> (both US Title 32 and GVN National Budget)	<u>1966 Budget</u> <u>Percentage Spent by 31 Dec 66</u> (Approx. 95% obligated and later spent)
950,000,000	85% (94% obligated)	31%

2. Construction of Chieu Hoi Centers

The Chieu Hoi Program undertook to more than double the 1966 capacity of Chieu Hoi Centers in 1967. This involved construction programs in all Provinces, at the Regions and at the National Center in Saigon. Construction is a difficult program area in Vietnam, but objectives were substantially achieved, as follows:

Summary:

Total Chieu Hoi Center Capacity as of 1 January 1967 - 3,105

Total Capacity as of 31 December 1967 - 6,610

Increase- 3,505
Percentage- 112.9%

<u>Breakdown:</u>	<u>Capacity</u> <u>1 Jan 67</u>	<u>Capacity</u> <u>31 Dec 67</u>	<u>Increase</u>
Region I	310	765	455 (146.7%)
Region II	1,000	2,020	1,020 (102%)
Region III	785	1,945	1,160 (147.7%)
Region IV	<u>1,010</u>	<u>1,880</u>	<u>870</u> (86.1%)
	3,105	6,610	3,505

Since total programmed new capacity was 7,505, the added capacity of 6,610 represented a program completion of 88%.

3. Armed Propaganda Teams

The number of personnel in Armed Propaganda Teams was more than doubled during 1967. During much of the year little progress was made in arming the APTs, but during the last quarter official JGS and MAP authorization was obtained and the bottleneck is being substantially broken.

APT Strength

	<u>1 Jan 67</u>	<u>31 Dec 67</u>	<u>Number Armed</u> (as of 30 Nov)
1,324 (National Total)	I Corps	378	216
	II Corps	549	316
	III Corps	707	299
	IV Corps	857	530
	Saigon	173	36
	National Total	<u>2,664</u>	<u>1,397</u>
	Increase	100.1%	

II. MAJOR PROBLEMS

a. Current Low Returnee Rate

The returnee figures for the four quarters of 1967 were:

1st quarter - 10,746	3rd quarter - 5,443
2nd quarter - 7,399	4th quarter - 3,590

Until the beginning of the fourth quarter, the pattern was "normal," with the high Tet returns inflating the first quarter and at the same time lowering the inventory of would-be defectors, followed by a quick slump and gradually declining plateau during the summer. But in 1966 the last quarter saw a dramatic rise in returnees, while in 1967 the decline continued ever more sharply. What were the factors involved?

First, political change in the GVN characterized by a series of elections, by confusion on the GVN side and a wait-and-see attitude on the VC side, and by some loss of program momentum not fully regained as yet.

Second, the raking over and diminishing of potential defector pools in areas formerly productive of returnees, such as Binh Dinh and Phu Yen. Once a new area has been brought under pacification and the initial flush of returnees has come in, the Chieu Hoi Program will gradually tend to liquidate itself even as other pacification indicators rise.

Third, a change in the character of military operations by comparison with 1966. Whereas a year ago we were beginning to mount new operations in highly populated Provinces, and specifically hitting areas long under VC domination (with operations such as Operation Irving in Binh Dinh, Cedar Falls in Binh Duong) more recently the major confrontations with the enemy tended to occur in scarcely-populated regions near the borders--as at Dak To and Loc Ninh.

Fourth, the proportion of NVA in the enemy's forces has risen, and NVA seldom defect, having no home in the South to return to and being under tighter discipline in any case.

Fifth, VC control measures have improved, as we know from ample captured documents.

Sixth, widespread speculation about negotiations and peace has been reinforced by deliberate VC propaganda that there will be a coalition government after Tet.

Seventh, the new GVN has not yet developed an image of demonstrable and aggressive forward motion. There are many favorable signs, but the GVN has not yet shown demonstrable signs of replacing the ostensible VC revolution with a better one of its own.

Eighth, the VC winter-spring offensive has seen a sharp rise in VC activity, particularly in III Corps and IV Corps, and the enemy has had a more favorable psychological posture in many areas during the last quarter of 1967.

All of the above are objective environmental factors which radically affect the Chieu Hoi rate.

b. Effectiveness of GVN Program Administration

What should be done is usually quite clear in a program in Vietnam, but execution is another matter, and execution obviously depends upon the availability of highly motivated, well trained GVN administrative personnel. Such people are in scarce supply, and often cannot be had at the excessively low salaries paid. Until steps are taken to raise the pay of civil servants, inefficient performances will continue and corruption will be inevitable. In program terms this means that allowances to returnees will sometimes be paid late (or perhaps not at all), reports will not be filed, funds will not be drawn down, ralliers will be treated un-intelligently, and the image of the GVN will suffer--and all this despite the best efforts of GVN supervisors and Free World advisors.

c. Vietnamese Attitudes Toward Chieu Hoi Returnees

If the acceptance of ralliers by the GVN, initially, and by the community thereafter, were more imaginative and generous, the Program would greatly benefit. Many obstacles stand in the way of the returnee looking for a job, and little public enthusiasm has yet been marshalled behind more active inducement campaigns to persuade Viet Cong to rally. All of these attitudes and reluctances are understandable but, despite slow progress, the problem remains.

d. Resettlement

As stated, the returnee must be helped to find a job and reenter Vietnamese society. The principal categories of available jobs are three: GVN positions, military contractor jobs, and private employment. We expect considerable progress in the first category to continue in 1968. Regarding the second, the MSS clearance requirement is still an unsolved problem, because the returnee cannot normally find the sponsors required by present regulations and cannot pay the "squeeze" money customarily required by MSS officials. The outlook for private employment is brighter. We foresee continued acceleration in the issuance of permanent ID cards, and have suggested to both US and GVN authorities a procedure which, if implemented, would rapidly assure more employment of returnees by private firms. (This would be to require private contractors to hire a certain percentage of ralliers (and veterans and refugees) as a precondition for qualification as bidders on US or GVN-financed contracts. To date much interest has been expressed but no concrete action taken on US or GVN sides.)

III. 1968 PROGRAM

a. General Targets

The 1968 program target will be 30,000 returnees, plus an additional 30,000 contingency to be provided for in the budget. These targets are based on the following reasoning: It has become clear in 1967 that massive returnee rates can only be expected when new areas and new populations are "opened up" and transferred suddenly from VC to GVN control. As pacification thereafter consolidates itself in an area, the Chieu Hoi rate will inevitably decline. During the last quarter of 1967 major confrontation with the enemy was taking place nearer the country's borders and away from the heavily populated areas. These factors argue for a conservative Chieu Hoi target. On the other hand, should the enemy's structure become so undermined as to cause a substantial collapse of will and organization, then these conservative projections would have to be revised, because a new situation would have come into being. For this reason the contingency budget provision for an additional 30,000 is required.

b. Specific Targets

1. Recruit, train, arm, equip and operate 75 Armed Propaganda Companies. (Target increased from 69 at the specific instance of the new GVN Chieu Hoi Minister.)
2. Press for increased use of Chieu Hoi returnees in tactical and intelligence operations by US and GVN forces. Goal for the Kit Carson Program throughout Vietnam is 1,800 scouts by the end of CY 1968.
3. Continue to support the use of returnees by the Revolutionary Development and other GVN civil programs.
4. Improve vocational training in the Chieu Hoi centers and at on-the-job sites.
5. Help find jobs for returnees.
6. Construct reception and holding facilities at 118 Districts throughout Vietnam.
7. Improve political training in the centers.
8. Continue improvement in the normal elements of the Chieu Hoi program, namely inducement, reception and interrogation, training, tactical use, resettlement and follow-up.

c. 1968 Budget

US Dollar Support

Commodities	838,000	GVN Nat'l. Budget	245,000,000
Personnel	<u>637,000</u>	US Aid (Title 32)	1,000,000,000
		Trust Fund	97,000,000
Total US	\$1,475,000	Special Fund	<u>50,000,000</u>
		Total - VN	\$1,392,000,000

d. Personnel (Chieu Hoi Advisory Personnel in Country)

<u>On Hand as of 31 Dec 1967</u>	<u>1968 Program</u>	<u>Increase</u>
US - 21	34	13
TCN - 39	40	1
VN - <u>72</u>	<u>116</u>	<u>44</u>
132	190	58

The above personnel increases will permit adequate staffing of the advisory program. On the GVN side, there are some 1,615 employees on the rolls of the Ministry as of 31 December 1967, not counting Armed Propaganda Team members. Substantial new recruiting is expected in 1968. Emphasis will be placed on improving quality as well as numbers.