

CHIEU HOI DIVISION

Sector Plan, 1968

Revised date:
31 December 1967

I. Relationship of Chieu Hoi to Overall U.S. Strategy

A. U.S. objectives, briefly stated, are to defeat Communist aggression in South Vietnam and help to build a viable South Vietnamese nation.

B. The Chieu Hoi Program contributes directly to these objectives. It assists in the defeat of Communist aggression (1) by diminishing the numerical strength of the enemy; (2) by causing dissension within enemy ranks; (3) by saving lives on the Free World side; (4) by turning returnees around against the enemy; and (5) by increasing the manpower pool available to the GVN. Carrying out these five objectives represents the broad courses of action of the Chieu Hoi Program in its contribution to U.S. policy. All are inherent in the Chieu Hoi Program and of equal priority.

To illustrate the foregoing, the following facts should be noted. In 1966 all the Free World armed forces in Vietnam killed or captured 67,406 Viet Cong or NVA. During the same period 20,242 Viet Cong eliminated themselves from enemy ranks by coming in under the Chieu Hoi Program. Chieu Hoi is, of course, no substitute for military action; but it is an invaluable complement to it. Of the 20,242, some 13,000 were armed, military Viet Cong. To have eliminated these men on the battlefield by military means would have cost Free World forces more than 3,000 dead. As of December 31, 1967, 27,178 returnees had come in to the Program, implying a saving of approximately 4,000 lives on our side during 1967 alone.

Finally, with the Chieu Hoi Program serving as both a manpower pool and a catalyst, returnees are providing increasingly valuable intelligence information, and are serving with U.S. forces as scouts and guides, notably in the "Kit Carson" and similar programs. One example of Chieu Hoi returnees' contribution took place in May 1967 when two ex-Viet Cong led a U.S. 1st Division patrol safely through a heavily-mined area to recover:

370 small arms	400 hand grenades
297,625 small arms ammo	270 mines
3500 mortar rounds	100 time bombs
90 recoilless rifle rounds	100 lbs. TNT
500 rifle grenades	367 rifles
20 tons of rice	

More recently, a returnee provided U.S. forces with the enemy's battle plan in detail just prior to the Dak To battle, constituting an inestimable contribution to our victory.

As regards the building of a viable Vietnam, the Chieu Hoi Program makes available a valuable pool of able-bodied manpower from among the more than 74,000 who have rallied to the GVN since inauguration of the program. Several returnees have already been elected as village and hamlet chiefs or council members. More than 2,500 are employed by the Ministry of Chieu Hoi. Some 32 were recently hired by the Ministry of Social Welfare and Refugees. Many thousands more will be employed when security clearance procedures are simplified. Already more than 1,100 have been enrolled in the Revolutionary Development Program.

A special impetus has been given to the utilization of Chieu Hoi returnees by the National Reconciliation Proclamation of April 19, 1967. This program is seen by the GVN as an upward extension of Chieu Hoi, designed to appeal to the middle and higher level Viet Cong leaders, as well as to make Chieu Hoi a true all-GVN policy instead of merely the program of one Ministry alone. Finally, since the war can only end in reconciliation of the warring Vietnamese factions, Chieu Hoi and National Reconciliation are steps toward this ultimate goal, and are valuable in keeping this option always open even during the hostilities and bitterness of war.

II. Analysis of Problem Areas

All U.S.-supported programs in Vietnam must, by definition, operate within a Vietnamese social, political, cultural and economic context. U.S. aid is like a fire-hose, the nozzle of which is Vietnamese performance. Pressure can increasingly be "put in the line," but the efficiency of the nozzle determines how much water comes out.

In this sense, Vietnamese motivation and administrative capability are the only problems of ultimate concern which face the Chieu Hoi Program, and the key to both is personnel. Even 50 highly motivated and competent Vietnamese officials added to the Chieu Hoi Program could double the quality of the program within 90 days. Unfortunately, the existing GVN Chieu Hoi staff of approximately 1,615 throughout Vietnam (not counting Armed Propaganda Teams) is inadequate both in numbers and quality. A prime reason for this has been that GVN civil service salaries are too low to attract competent people; and the problem of low salaries is related to the second major problem, namely corruption. Action taken and to be taken: See Sectoral Strategy, Section III.

Under the Chieu Hoi promise, the returnee is entitled to various allowances, such as 200 piastres per month for pocket money while in the Center; 1000 piastres as separation pay when he returns home; 30 piastres per day for food; scaled payments for weapons he brings in with him, etc. He also receives either 1000 piastres or two suits of clothes. In fact, the underpaid GVN officials often tend to make ends meet by cheating on returnee allowances.

For example, only one suit of clothes worth 500 piastres will be delivered and the remaining 500 piastres will "disappear." In other cases there may be no deliberate intent to cheat returnees but the Province officials are slow in releasing funds, and the result is the same. Action taken and to be taken: See Sectoral Strategy, Section III.

Another general problem area lies in the fact that the Chieu Hoi Program can only sell the GVN image that exists. The Vietnamese ruling establishment is still dominated by the more educated elite and the bourgeoisie left behind by the French and by the new urban rich. There is still an inadequate concern for the welfare of the rural peasant and worker. In this respect the Viet Cong have a more revolutionary image, whatever their ultimate intentions may be. Unless the GVN's "revolution" is as sincere and authentic as that of the enemy, little appeal can be made to Viet Cong on an ideological or political level. This explains in part why present psyops largely concentrates on fears, hardships, etc., and why the more motivated Viet Cong only rarely return under the Chieu Hoi Program.

A further Vietnamese problem relates specifically to Chieu Hoi, and this is the attitude of suspicion toward returnees within the GVN and among the population which inhibits the resettlement and reintegration of returnees. This attitude is compounded by feelings of resentment whenever any extra advantages are offered to ex-Viet Cong as an inducement for their return or to facilitate their beginning a new life.

Related to this, a major specific problem is that of finding jobs for returnees. Indeed, if increasing numbers of returnees come in who are not successfully reintegrated into Vietnamese economic life, the result could be extremely counter-productive to the Program and to the war effort.

Action Taken and to be Taken: See Sectoral Strategy, Section III.

On the U.S. side, the feelings of suspicion or resentment against Chieu Hoi returnees are much less, but a constant troop information and education effort is needed because of the rapid turnover of U.S. military personnel on one-year tours. U.S. security regulations definitely inhibit the employment of returnees as laborers, drivers and in other non-sensitive positions. It is indeed anomalous that a Vietnamese who was a nationalist Viet Minh in the war against the French will find difficulty passing an Embassy security clearance while a former employee of the colonial regime will have no difficulty. The problem is obviously greater for ex-Viet Cong.

On the U.S. program side, Chieu Hoi encounters few difficulties. Adequate dollar and piastre resources were provided in 1967 and, hopefully, will be again in 1968. The program is constantly improving its staff in both quantity and experience.

III. Sectoral Strategy

A. Program objectives in 1968 include the following:

1. To bring in, receive and resettle 30,000 Viet Cong, with contingency preparations for 30,000 additional. Of the 60,000 returnees, 22,000 are projected for IV CTZ; 18,000 for III CTZ; 15,000 for II CTZ and 5,000 for I CTZ. (The high target of 60,000 returnees is predicated on an assumption that more extensive military pressure will be brought to bear on the enemy than heretofore. If pressure remains at existing levels only, then the target should be 30,000.) Budgetary support for a 60,000 target program will be required in the order of US\$ 1,400,000 and VN\$ 1,000,000,000. The goal of 60,000 returnees has been set for 1969, based on similar assumptions.

2. To recruit, train, equip and operate 75 Armed Propaganda companies.

3. To press for increased use of Chieu Hoi returnees in tactical and intelligence operations by U.S. and GVN forces. Specifically, the Kit Carson program should be expanded to a target of 1,800 by the end of CY 1968. If that target can be met, an expansion of the Kit Carson program is envisaged for CY 1969.

4. To support increased use of returnees by MORD and other GVN civil programs.

5. To expand and improve vocational training for Hoi Chanh to make it easier for them to find jobs, and to contribute to relief of manpower shortages in South Vietnam.

6. To help find jobs for Hoi Chanh.

7. To construct reception facilities in key Districts throughout the country, supplementing the 1966 construction at Province level.

8. To assure adequate arms for the Armed Propaganda Teams.

9. To provide adequate budgetary, personnel and logistic resources to support the above purposes.

10. To press for continued improvement in administrative efficiency on both GVN and U.S. sides.

Discussion:

The Chieu Hoi Program throughout Vietnam has the following essential phases:

1. Inducement (Psyops)

This means persuading the Viet Cong to come in. Leaflets are prepared by JUSPAO and by the GVN. They are dropped by Air Commando units. Armed Propaganda Teams composed of ex-Viet Cong go out to contested areas to talk to the people. Airborne loudspeakers broadcast appeals to return made by Hoi Chanh. Letter-writing campaigns are organized. The Inducement Program is a good example of close cooperation between the GVN element and U.S. civilian and military teams all contributing to a common end.

Within the overall inducement effort the Chieu Hoi Program specifically supports the GVN Armed Propaganda Teams. Their mission is to contact the population in disputed areas, including Viet Cong families, to induce Viet Cong to return to the GVN side. The APTs are the most effective single inducement tool available to Chieu Hoi.

CY 1968 Target - 75 Companies (5,550 Hoi Chanh members)

CY 1969 Target - 75 Companies (5,550 Hoi Chanh members)

2. Reception

This involves building and staffing Reception Centers, providing food, clothing and allowances for returnees (called "Hoi Chanh"). There is now a Center in each of the 44 Provinces and three separate cities--Danang, Cam Ranh and Vung Tau--and a National Center in Saigon. Additional Centers are near completion in each of the four Regions.

In CY 1968 the main emphasis of construction activity will shift from the Province level (where construction or expansion of Centers will have largely been completed in 1967) to the District level. Most returnees usually turn themselves in at District level. There they are held for initial questioning and until arrangements are made to move them forward to the Province. Facilities for holding need to be constructed or improved.

CY 1968 Target - 118 District holding facilities

CY 1969 Target - 118 District holding facilities

3. Activity Program (Training)

This primarily involves political reindoctrination, and new programs of vocational training and literacy training, to help returnees get jobs after their two months in the Center. During CY 1967, 78 new political instructors were hired by the GVN to improve the political reorientation of returnees. Also, the services of Education Consultants Ltd. have been utilized to supplement on-going vocational training programs.

CY 1968 Target - 100 political instructors

CY 1969 Target - 100

4. Tactical and Intelligence Utilization

The greatest value of the Chieu Hoi Program used to be the drain of manpower from the Viet Cong. Today this advantage is already surpassed by the benefits obtained from the tactical and intelligence exploitation of returnees. Many of the successful military operations now being conducted by U.S., GVN and FVMAF forces are based on information supplied by Hoi Chanh. As one example, the entire enemy battle plan in detail was provided to U.S. forces by a returnee before the major battle of Dak To in November 1967. As a result U.S. forces were repositioned in time to inflict a severe defeat on the enemy. Also, U.S. and other Free World forces are increasingly using Hoi Chanh as guides on patrols, for psyops, to identify Viet Cong, and for other purposes. The Kit Carson Scout program of the U.S. Marines (originally adopted by the Marines at the suggestion and with support of the Chieu Hoi Program) is a dramatic case in point. Under review at high GVN levels is a proposal to form ARVN companies composed only of Hoi Chanh. Like the Kit Carson scouts, these units would function outside the purview of the Chieu Hoi program as such, but the Chieu Hoi program has a catalytic role in its promotion of such activities and also provides the recruitment pool.

CY 1968 Target - 1,800 Kit Carson Scouts (non-USAID funded)

CY 1969 Target - 1,800 Kit Carson Scouts

5. Resettlement

This involves finding jobs for returnees when they leave the Center, or in making available special hamlets where they can settle. We are hoping for major breakthroughs in this difficult area in 1968, which in turn will persuade more Viet Cong to come back to the GVN side.

During 1967 the GVN was persuaded to issue instructions from both the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Labor urging Province Chiefs and Mayors to set up employment committees to help find jobs for returnees. Also, the assistance of AID and Embassy personnel concerned with manpower problems was enlisted to promote greater employment of returnees by U.S. agencies or U.S. contractors in non-sensitive jobs. Stumbling blocks exist in the security clearance procedures now required by both GVN and U.S. sides. The implementation of the Provincial employment committees, streamlining of security clearance procedures and provision of more U.S.-related jobs will all require increasing attention during CY 1968. Although quantitative targets are difficult to assign in this area, we have established the following:

CY 1968 - 9,000 placements

CY 1969 - 15,000 placements

6. Follow-up

What happens to returnees when they go back to civilian life? Many volunteer for the GVN armed forces, many go back to being farmers, many get jobs in urban centers. But we do not have accurate enough statistics. Such surveys as have been conducted show only a 1% return to the Viet Cong; and even this may reflect inability to find a niche in the GVN economy rather than any preference for the Viet Cong.

GVN procedures are already clear regarding follow-up of ex-returnees. When they leave the Province Centers to return to a District, notification is sent to the District officials. The District Chieu Hoi representation is supposed to keep track of the returnees and submit a monthly report to Provinces. In fact, such reports are rarely submitted and inadequate contact work is done. General improvement in GVN personnel and administration is the only solution on the GVN side. On the U.S. side, spot surveys have been conducted by such groups as Simulmatics, Inc. or JUSPAO teams. The Chieu Hoi Program does not have personnel to conduct such surveys, and it is not recommended that such activity be encompassed within the USAID-funded program. U.S. Chieu Hoi personnel will, of course, attempt to ensure improved GVN performance in this area.

7. Administrative Support

The GVN late in 1967 took steps to recruit ARVN reserve (retired) officers to provide the added strength in both quantity and quality which the Chieu Hoi Ministry needs. To date, 86 candidates have come forward and 14 have been accepted. Target for CY 1968 - 50 ARVN retired officers.

On the U.S. side, personnel requirements will increase from 21 direct hire Americans in CY 1967 to 34 in CY 1968. There will continue to be a requirement for Imprest Funds in Saigon and in the field to cover unforeseen or emergency expenditures connected with the Chieu Hoi Program.

8. Field Planning

These six essential phases of Chieu Hoi remain the same in all Provinces. Thus Province plans will be structured around these phases and will only differ as to specific local problems and conditions. The planning approach will be to assume an overall returnee total of 30,000 plus 30,000 contingency for CY 1968. This figure is pro-rated among the various Provinces

(and Regional Centers) in accordance with experience factors derived from 1967 results and with anticipated military operations planned for 1968 as follows:

Region I	-	2,500	plus	2,500	contingency
Region II	-	7,500	plus	7,500	contingency
Region III	-	9,000	plus	9,000	contingency
Region IV	-	11,000	plus	11,000	contingency

B. Additional Comments on Courses of Action to Overcome Problems Noted in Section II.

The Ministry of Chieu Hoi has undertaken in 1967 a plan to hire ARVN reserve officers. More than 80 dossiers were under review by October 1, 1967, and 14 had been selected by the end of the year. (See paragraph 7, above)

As regards corruption, the Ministry has taken disciplinary action in a number of cases, but there is no solution for the problem as a whole short of reexamining the wage scales throughout the GVN civil service and also breaking the present system of "squeeze" emanating from Corps Commanders through Division Commanders and Province Chiefs and weighing on lower-level officials and on the population as a whole. We can press for greater discipline within the Chieu Hoi service, but this will be only a partial solution.

The problem of engendering a greater "revolutionary concern" in the Vietnamese ruling classes obviously greatly transcends the Chieu Hoi Program. Within the program, the increasing creation of a sense of morale and concern for the returnees is possible to a certain extent. The general attitudes of suspicion toward returnees can only change slowly as more and more publicity is given to valuable services performed by them on behalf of Free World forces. As regards U.S. attitudes towards Chieu Hoi, a continued program of troop information and education is required. Obstacles presented by U.S. security clearance requirements will have to be dealt with as individual cases arise.

CHIEU HOI SECTOR PLAN

I CORPS ANNEX

I. Corps Situation:

Most of the problems which continue to confront the Chieu Hoi Program in I Corps require for their solution the immediate and positive intercession of other GVN military and civilian agencies. The local Chieu Hoi administrative machinery, left alone, cannot solve such problems as they are clearly beyond their assigned limits of authority and responsibility.

II. Corps Strategy:

1. Push vocational training and provide MSS clearances and ID cards to Hoi Chanhs.
2. Arm, train, and develop APTs into effective operational units. Provide mobility and quick reaction capability to APTs.
3. Provide adequate Center physical facilities.
4. Continue to provide health and welfare welcome kits to Hoi Chanhs.
5. Improve VN Chieu Hoi administrative capability.
6. Augment CORDS Chieu Hoi staff.
7. Stimulate psyops agencies for continued troop dissemination, and break the veil of indifference of ARVN, GVN and local population towards Chieu Hoi. If the suggested psyops effort is pursued vigorously and in earnest, this will without doubt consequently catalyze the intelligence and tactical exploitation phase of the Program.
8. Tie-up Chieu Hoi psyops activities closely with III MAF Psyops, 244th Psyops, and CORDS Psyops.

CORDS Psyops training capability in developing local cultural drama teams will be tapped in our projected organization of purely Hoi Chanh drama teams.

CHIEU HOI SECTOR PLAN.

II CORPS ANNEX

I. Corps Situation:

Under the present tactical conditions existing in II Corps, it is estimated that the CTZ will receive approximately 7,850 returnees during CY 1968. II CTZ planning and budgeting, however, takes into consideration that increased military pressure on the enemy in 1968 will increase the returnee rate. With this in mind, Corps planning includes contingency preparations for up to 15,000 Hoi Chanh.

II. Corps Strategy:

A. Recruitment, Training, Equipping Armed Propaganda Teams

It is recommended that the following Provincial APTs be increased to the stated number of authorized men:

1. Phu Yen	Additional Platoon
2. Binh Dinh	"
3. Binh Thuan	"
4. Darlac	"
5. Khanh Hoa	"
6. Regional Center	One Company
7. II Corps	"

It is anticipated that the company proposed under 7/ above, would be comprised only of NVA to be deployed anywhere in II Corps to support propaganda missions directed at NVA units. This should be a separate budget item at the Regional level.

B. Kit Carson Scouts

Funds should be made available for the training of up to 300 Hoi Chanh who wish to participate in the Kit Carson Scout Program. The need for a centralized and uniform training program is all too apparent in light of past practices.

C. Vocational Training

Funds should be provided for vocational training courses to be held at the Regional Center. Such training will be in the nature of more sophisticated skills than those presently provided at the Province level, i.e. maintenance of shop equipment, vehicle repair, welding, etc. The Regional Center will also be used to consolidate training courses where the number

of Hoi Chanh who wish to participate at the Province level is too small to warrant the costs involved.

D. Employment of Hoi Chanh

Funds should be allocated for an additional Ministry employee at the Regional level whose sole purpose will be to coordinate employment opportunities for Hoi Chanh.

E. Construction of Reception Facilities at District Level

The construction of processing centers at District level should be undertaken in 1968. This would enable District Cadre to begin immediate processing and exploitation of Hoi Chanh in those districts which will be experiencing a large number of returnees at any one time.

F. Special Funds

The Emergency Construction Fund should be continued in 1968 to provide for the situations which cannot be handled by Ministry financing. A special fund should be created for each of the Regional Advisors who may draw against it for any reason they deemed appropriate in support of the Chieu Hoi Program.

CHIEU HOI SECTOR PLAN

III CORPS ANNEX

I. Corps Situation:

All provinces in III CTZ, with the exception of Vung Tau, have Chieu Hoi advisors. Nine of the eleven provincial advisors are TCNs. Each province in II CTZ has a permanent Chieu Hoi center. In addition, the Regional Chieu Hoi Center is under construction in Bien Hoa Province, adjacent to the provincial center.

III CTZ received 8,054 returnees in 1967. The goal of CY 1968 is to induce, re-indoctrinate, train and resettle 9,000 former VC into Vietnamese society, with contingency planning and budgeting provided for up to 18,000 returnees.

II. Corps Strategy:

1. Coordinate with Psychological Operations Division to explore causes of defection, and to expedite dissemination of timely Chieu Hoi propaganda.

2. Guide provincial advisors toward establishing District Reception and Administration Centers as funds and personnel become available.

3. Assist advisors in the acquisition and disbursement of allowances, food, and clothing to the Hoi Chanh.

4. Attempt to determine the vocational needs of the Hoi Chanh, by area, and provide training accordingly.

5. To coordinate with interested agencies to maximize the tactical and intelligence information obtainable from Hoi Chanh.

6. Seek greater assistance for Hoi Chanh attempting to be assimilated into society.

7. Investigate the possibilities of obtaining follow-up data on Hoi Chanh from other interested GVN agencies pending acquisition of adequate personnel in GVN Chieu Hoi.

8. Accurately reporting the Chieu Hoi Program to higher headquarters.

CHIEU HOI SECTOR PLAN

IV CORPS ANNEX

I. Corps Situation:

Some problems have been encountered in IV Corps concerning arming and training of APTs and securing quick release of funds for immediate utilization of propaganda information. These are local problems which are slowly being resolved through pressure on the GVN at province level. MACV 52 advisors have an important role in terms of tactical and intelligence utilization derived from the Chieu Hoi Program, since there is only a minor military commitment by the US in IV CTZ. The Kit Carson program is limited in IV CTZ also due to the low US troop commitment.

II. Corps Strategy:

The Program objectives in 1968 include the following:

- a. To bring in, receive and resettle 11,000 Viet Cong with contingency preparations for up to 22,000 returnees. While the contingency figure may seem unrealistic as it is three times the projected figure for 1967, it is anticipated that it may result from more extensive military pressure being brought to bear on the enemy.
- b. To recruit, train, equip and operate 29 Armed Propaganda platoons.
- c. To construct reception facilities in key districts.
- d. To support increased use of returnees by MORD and other GVN programs.
- e. To expand and improve the Chieu Hoi vocational training program and fully support it with US-furnished tools, equipment and instructors where necessary so as to facilitate job placement for released Hoi Chanh.
- f. To set up employment agencies in each province for use by all jobless, including Hoi Chanh, Refugees and Veterans.
- g. To increase the use of Hoi Chanh in tactical and intelligence operations by both GVN and US forces, it is intended to expand the Delta version of the Kit Carson Scout Program to an establishment figure of three scouts per district or a total of two hundred and seventy scouts, not counting those employed directly by the US 2nd Brigade at My Tho.