

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS

MACCORDS-CH

19 October 1967

Mr. Paul G. Wankowicz  
Provincial Operations Division  
VN/IDFO  
Department of State  
Agency for International Development  
Washington, D. C. 20523

Dear Paul:

Sorry not to have answered sooner your letter of September 19. I am in general agreement with your memorandum. I attach no importance whatsoever to the change in "cost-effectiveness" ratio between 1966 and 1967. Our instructions from Mr. Komer were categorical on this subject. He said, in effect, that if we could bring in twice as many Hoi Chanh by spending ten times as much money, it would still be the cheapest bargain in Vietnam. You make the same point in different language in your memorandum.

You are also correct in saying that the Chieu Hoi and National Reconciliation Programs have not yet reached the heart of the enemy's structure. This can only be done when the GVN side presents a package so attractive as to outshine the visions with which the enemy hard-core is indoctrinated. Almost by definition, we bring in the people who do not need to be reached on a high ideological level, but who can be reached on the basis of more pragmatic motivations. You would be wrong, however, if you inferred from this that the defection of the lower-level types does not seriously disturb the enemy's organization. Even a low-level VC may have high-level intelligence to report. It is SOP that when a defector comes in, the VC unit must immediately move. Any organization can be seriously crippled by the loss of its "Indians," even if the "Chiefs" remain intact. And the few "Chiefs" we get--Lieutenant Colonels and Majors--cause immense damage to the enemy. Operation Cedar Falls last January was based primarily on the intelligence of Lt. Col. Chuyen, who was in my office yesterday.

Concerning Education Consultants Ltd., they are extremely useful in on-the-job training situations such as expediting the construction of Chieu Hoi Centers in IV Corps. Their defect--or rather the defect in their contractual relationship with USAID--is that in straight training situations they have no equipment, transportation, logistical support or anything except personnel to bring to the situation. If the training is in motor

mechanics, they have no motors to take apart. If the training is in welding, they have no welding equipment. On the other hand, if there is a great pile of cement, roofing, lumber, etc. on site, they can help a great deal in showing the Hoi Chanh how to build a building. This is a concise statement regarding Education Consultants Ltd. As to the future, we have two regional centers already open. We have intended to set up a real vocational training program in the centers--one at Can Tho and one in Bien Hoa. We would ask Education Consultants Ltd. to conduct training there. But if they have no equipment, or no money in the contract to buy equipment, they will not be able to do the job. That is the long and short of it. Obviously, we would like to see the job done and think Education Consultants Ltd. is as good a vehicle to help us as any other of which we are aware. I might add we are not aware of any alternatives.

I now enclose some papers for you. These are: (1) Latest version of "Sector Plan" for 1968 CAP; (2) My presentation to General Westmoreland of August 27; (3) Copy of the Lybrand report as requested by you; (4) Copy of memorandum dated June 20, 1967 referring to the Lybrand report; (5) Most important, copy of report prepared in Thua Thien which rather devastatingly refutes one allegation of the report.

God knows, we produce enough paper around here. If you want to be inundated, we could send you a lot more. Please give my regards to Vince Puritano, Jerry French and any of the old gang. Looks like I should be seeing you in January on home leave in any case.

All the best.

Sincerely,

OGDEN WILLIAMS

5 Encls. a/s