

February 21, 1968

Chieu Hoi Ministry

Inspectorate

R E P O R T

by the Inspectorate about the survey of the overall situation resulting from the "Tran Hung Dao" Campaign launched in Go Cong, Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong.

To
THE MINISTER OF CHIEU HOI
S A I G O N

This is to report to you the following:

The Inspectorate has formed a joint delegation made up of itself, the supreme command of Armed Propaganda and CORDS/Chieu Hoi Division and sent it to Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong and Kien Hoa to survey the general situation there from January 31 to date following the launching of a campaign called Tran Hung Dao Campaign designed to thwart the VC general offensive.

I.- GENERAL SITUATION IN LONG AN.

On February 17, 1968, a Chieu Hoi Ministry delegation went to Long An to represent this ministry in the ceremony of decorating meritorious fighters in the anti-communist drive.

Accomplishments of the Chieu Hoi Service in Long An:

The chief of this service is very worthy of being a leader. He was very clever in directing the provincial Chieu Hoi agency personnel and the Armed Propaganda Company as well to fight off the assaults launched by VC regular forces on the Chieu Hoi Center in Long An province on February 16, 1968.

Chieu Hoi personnel and cadres have a very high morale and are staunchly anti-communist and this caused our enemy's fiasco in their attempt on the Chieu Hoi elements in Long An.

Results:

a.- Concerning human lives and weapons:

Friendly forces: No losses

Enemy forces: 3 dead left behind

2 POWs

1 Czech-made light machine gun

1 B.40

3 AK.47

400kg of TNT

b.- Concerning installations:

The Chieu Hoi Service office was lightly damaged by some shells which exploded in its vicinity.

The installations of Chieu Hoi sub-services are unhurt.

c.- Rewards:

All the Chieu Hoi Service personnel were given a reward in cash of VN\$150,000.00 by the Assistant to the Minister.

The Sector commander awarded 25 PsyWar medals which were presented in a ceremony held on February 17, 1968 in Long An.

Suggestion: It is recommended that the Minister reward the Province Chief concurrently Sector Commander with a PsyWar medal, first class, for his active assistance of the Chieu Hoi.

II.- SITUATION IN DINH TUONG.

On February 18, 1968, the delegation went to Dinh Tuong to survey the situation there, which is as follows:

a.- Concerning Chieu Hoi installations:

All the offices of the Chieu Hoi Service, Sub-Services and Centers are unhurt.

b.- Concerning human lives:

The sole victim is the chief of the Chieu Hoi Sub-Service in Chau Thanh district, Dinh Tuong province, who was killed by the VC at home on February 2, 1968 as he tried to break through their siege. His body was buried by Armed Propaganda members 3 days after his death.

He is still single and is survived by his father who lives in Binh Dai district (Kien Hoa). The CH Service is trying to get in touch with his next of kin to inform them of his death and starts making the papers required for delivery of his death gratuity.

c.- The morale of Chieu Hoi and Armed Propaganda personnel.

As regards their morale, the personnel in question are very praiseworthy for their staunch anti-communist attitude. Although all of them have been thrice attacked and terrorized by the VC, their morale has improved, their hatred of the enemy increased and they are more vigilant in the defense of the installations.

This has been confirmed and warmly praised by the chief of Dinh Tuong province.

III.- SITUATION IN GO CONG.

On February 20, 1968, the delegation went to Go Cong to survey the general situation there, which is as follows:

a.- The courageous anti-communist attitude of Armed Propaganda cadres in Go Cong province has been warmly lauded by the province chief as well as by friendly administrative and military agencies.

In particular, the Armed Propaganda Company is presently the key rangers' unit in the province and the most dependable unit because it has fought to defend the city as well as to prevent VC armed forces from infiltrating into its vicinity from February 4 to date. Through their prevention and interception actions, the presence of an enemy force estimated to be the size of two companies ~~was spotted~~ and pertaining to VC Regiment 514 ~~at a place~~ was spotted at a place about 2 kilometers from Go Cong city on Feb. 19, 1968 at 10 A.M. Immediately, the Armed Propaganda Company maneuvered to encircle the enemy and called in airstrikes against enemy positions. As a result, enemy troops had to disperse and failed in their attempt to break into Go Cong city.

Results:

On enemy side: - 17 dead left behind

- 60 VC were drowned when 2 sampans transporting them were sunk by gunfire
- 1 machine gun M.60
- 1 mortar 60mm
- 1 grenade launcher M.49
- 3 Czech-made light machine guns
- 15 AK.47
- 3 carbines M.1

b.- Concerning human lives and weapons:

On friendly side: As of February 20, 1968, there has been no

casualties and losses in weapons.

On enemy side: From February 4 to date, 12 enemies have rallied to our side and surrendered 1 AK.47.

c.- Concerning Chieu Hoi installations:

So far, none of them has been hurt.

Suggestions: The delegation has decided that the Chieu Hoi Service chief and the commanding officer of the Armed Propaganda Company would meet to examine and evaluate the services rendered by Chieu Hoi cadres and Armed Propaganda personnel for recommendation of rewards for incentive rewards. The list of recommended rewards would be submitted subsequently.

The province chief suggested that Mr. Nguyen Van Bao who has commanded the Armed Propaganda Company for over 7 months without pay be officially named commander of this company. This has been brought to the Minister's attention by the Armed Propaganda Commander in Saigon, who solicits a decision on the matter.

In addition, it is requested that the Armed Propaganda be authorized to recruit another 2 platoons to increase its strength so that it can have adequate capability to carry out propaganda and proselytizing activities now that the enemy in Go Cong area is considerably influenced by the Chieu Hoi armed propaganda.

IV.- SITUATION IN KIEN HOA.

Also on February 20, 1968, the delegation went to Kien Hoa province to assess the general situation there, which is as follows:

a.- The morale of Armed Propaganda and Chieu Hoi personnel:

As regards the morale of Chieu Hoi and Armed Propaganda personnel in Kien Hoa, the province chief has highly praised them for being very active in propaganda operations and voiced his deep confidence in the Chieu Hoi Service Chief, who proved able in handling the Chieu Hoi task as well as in the defense of the installations. Though being in an emergency created by the enemy blockade of the city, he has disguised himself as a civilian to perform repeated ammunition resupply missions for the Chieu Hoi Center located 2km away from the city to permit the ralliers in the Center to hold out against enemy attacks.

The morale of the AP Platoon manning the Chieu Hoi Center is proven by their heroic fighting to hold the VC in check three times despite the latter's use of heavy weapons.

Moreover, another AP platoon has been formed to follow the enemy closely for propaganda activities under the guidance of the chief of Chieu Hoi Service, which has helped curb enemy activities.

b.- Chieu Hoi installations:

The Chieu Hoi Service office, one of the provincial administration buildings, was totally wrecked by bombs and rockets as it was occupied by the VC for 3 days. All documents and files therein and equipment as well were destroyed by fire.

Other installations such as those of the Chieu-Hoi Center and Chieu Hoi Sub-services are unhurt.

c.- Human lives and weapons:

No losses have occurred as of February 20, 1968.

Only 6 families suffered from the hostilities. These are the families of the CH Service chief and of 5 CH cadres whose homes have been burnt down or totally wrecked. In this connection, the delegation has instructed the CH Service to issue them relief supplies based on the relief criteria set by the Chieu Hoi Ministry.

Suggestions: The Province Chief and the Chieu Hoi Service Chief have suggested that another 2 Armed Propaganda squads be developed to

have adequate capability to meet the requirements of war in Kien Hoa.

As for equipment, it is recommended that the Minister reconsider the allotment of weapons to Armed Propaganda companies in view of their weak firepower. Due to lack of crew-served firearms, Armed Propaganda personnel have been seriously handicapped in their activities close to the enemy.

LOI NGUYEN TAN

MSD/TS/TUY