

1. INTRODUCTION - Subject: The Chieu Hoi Program, and pacification in VN as I see it. (reported by John Arthur)

- Important questions - during or after talks.

- On the record - not claimed but measures the reality.

2. Chieu Hoi is an example of a pacification operation in VN.

It was considered one of the most successful.

- I will attempt to show why Chieu Hoi succeeded, and by inference, how other pacification programs can succeed.
- I will also show the problems Chieu Hoi faced and faces, and which also affect other programs adversely.

3. Description of Chieu Hoi and its results

- Origin - Started in 1963 by Laurel Kirk in USAID.

Based on Philippines. Sold to GVN

Purpose - To weaken the VC, strengthen GVN - to save lives by giving many an alternative to joining or fighting.

Phases - (a) Inducement (b) Reception at 51 centers in the 6-8 weeks (c) Training (d) Resettlement
(e) Follow up - any CH advisor knew & reported on this format.

Results - Since 1963 more than 100,000 released.

- Since July 1966 - March 69 more than 65,000, of whom 45,000 military or 5-6 VC Divisions.

- Saved 9000 lives on US + GVN side.

- Tactical win - Kitt Canyon program

X - VN has now adopted program as their own.

- Cost \$8 million re. y. 1967-69
($1\frac{1}{2} + 6\frac{1}{2}$ million)

4. Why did the Chinese Hi Program Succeed? Some of its features are:

- a. A concept of inherent validity and relevance - a good idea, a good product, therefore viable
- *. Clear operational doctrine - cf. Vietnam development program.
- + Recognition of fact that success of any pacification program in VN depends on Vietnamese performance.
 - Therefore first priority given to working with the Vietnamese. Also second priority and third priority. Fourth priority given to exchanging ^{knowledge} laundry with the other elements of US bureaucracy.
 - This Vietnamese priority expressed in close and continuing contact with Ministry at all levels
 - c.g. - Chinese Hi Minister made more field trips than any other, normally excepting R D Minister
 - Chinese Hi Div. acknowledged to have closest rapport of any CORDS Division. Cannot speak to USAID Div.
- c. Application of basic principles of how to influence VN behavior
- d. Recognition of truth that no program can work in VN, which requires VN performance, unless it is simple and clear.
- e. On US side, careful selection and handling of personnel.
 - Look for basic motivation potential - c.g. Peace Corps - young f80s in field spots. (personal interviews) (Don't bring with him)
 - Develop team spirit - maintain operational

needs.

- Frequent field trips. Semi-annual conferences
- Fight for your needs - Protect from layering.
Remove from Dyer if necessary. Protect Filipinos.
- Never overload anyone two men where one could do.
Better to overwork than underwork
- Give credit to the man in field who actually does the job - Give him recognition by name..

Conclusion These principles of "concentrating on Vietnamese target" and (2) on careful personnel selection.

Handling are essential to a successful rehabilitation effort. Obviously, one must fight for the program in the budgetary process etc.

5. Problems

- (1) External + Peculiar to China Hsi - VN attitude toward Hsi change. Attitude remains, but GVN has now fully adopted Chinese Hsi and would continue it without US support.
- (2) General problem of VN reformers. - Paid too low. Mobilized into military.
- (3) Internal Problems of US Organization
 - a. Increasing growth of ^{US} bureaucracy. of 1966 - 1969 (USMID, OCO, COZOS)
 - + The problem of jurisdiction - Functional v.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. General Pacification Overview

1. Problems in VN has always been the political - Admin vacuum in countryside and external military threat.
 - The external military threat has always been under control since 1965
 - The VN are doing more now to fill their internal political - Admin vacuum than since early days of Diem. Why? Self Preservation: They know US is leaving. Turning point of war was when Johnson decided not to run again.

Recommendation - Withdraw 10,000 ^{US} support troops now, etc.

b. Internal Organization on US side

1. Get COMUS civil elements out from under MACV control as soon as possible. Fight for this. Prevent historical myth from being created - Military took over but within assets etc.
2. Cut down on size of civilian establishment - starting with Regional (corps) level.
3. Plan now for a vigorous civil aid effort in VN after cessation of hostilities. Recruitment is possible
4. Reverse the trend of default of civilian responsibility