

February 10, 1971

Slide I

Some Perspectives on the VN Problem

and Its Solution

(1950-71)

1. Origins of U.S. Involvement - 1950

- a. Situation After World War II.
- b. The Cold War
 - Marshall Plan
 - Greece
 - Azerbaijan
 - Korea
 - ~~— Vietnam - 1950~~
- c. National Interest and National Ideals.

plan - too much pride?
badly carried out
Self-deception

Slide II A

2. Original Miscalculations on VN

- a. That elements left behind by the French were more viable than they, in fact, were.
- b. Over-confidence as to our ability to solve internal problems of other countries.

should have been -
order + economic
prosperity

3. The Nature of the Problem in Viet-Nam

- a. The political and administrative vacuum left behind by the French.
- b. The example of An Giang - where Hoa Hao filled local vacuum.
- c. The Diem experiment - further destruction of power of village.

Slide
4. Causes of Past U.S. Failure in Viet-Nam

a. Failure to take it seriously and face squarely soon enough.

Examples:

1. Failure to assess situation realistically. Big power

complex. Creating reality like airfields.

2. Failure to organize US effort. Separate agency programs.

3. Failure to give local security highest priority before 1965.

4. Inadequate guidance of military effort after 1965.

5. Rapid rotation policy.

6. Ineffective use of leverage.

Slide → Basic Errors in Strategy

SLIDE VI

5. Turning Points of the War (1967-68)

a. Organization of CORDS — importance indicated below.

b. Tet 1968 - VC lost moral capital, lost best cadre. People did not rise up. GVN gained confidence. Became politically possible to have national mobilization. War became more one of NVN aggression.

c. Significance in VN of President Johnson's withdrawal (Big brother may no longer be around).

6. Present Situation and Policy

a. Situation — vastly improved - Why?

Answer: (1) Main force war won (1965-68).

(2) Support given to RF/PF (Role of CORDS) - achievement of territorial security.

(3) Better management (Role of CORDS in CPDC).

b. Policy enemy's - U.S. is kicked but SVN is not. So get U.S. to withdraw in such manner as to pull down SVN or way out.

U.S. (1) Negotiations if possible (but don't hold your breath)

US Offer - Mutual withdrawal

Free elections

Hanoi position - U.S. withdrawal

Coalition Government

Initial suspended cease fire in place
Indochina peace conference
Withdrawal of US forces主持
Political settlement on self determination
Immediate release of prisoners by
both sides

(2) Vietnamization - or de-Americanization.

(3) Withdrawal of U.S. — desirable politically at home and operationally in VN, if not too fast (Example of Vinh Kim).

GVN (1) Fill the vacuum in the countryside - from bottom up.

— Restore power to village by elections, budget, control.

— PSDF - a political program. - Popular mobilization
- Express against classes & organizations
- GVN officials must be more noble.

— Local Security - RF/PF, Phung Hoang.

— They them Province councils, later election of Province Chiefs.

— Land Reform - max. 15 hectares, total 900,000 hectares.

(2) Organize country from top down

— People's Information Program.

— National elections.

7. Conclusions

a. Outcome still not certain.

Favorable factors: — GVN much stronger at all levels.

— Enemy main forces were decimated, but

NVN population could generate 130,000 per year.

— GVN instinct of self-preservation now involved.

— Growing GVN confidence after Cambodia. *less after*
loss

— VC unpopular.

— More efficient US leverage - because GVN
self-preservation involved.

Unfavorable
Factors:

— Continued bickering in Saigon.

— Continued corruption.

— ARVN leadership.

— Misconduct in Cambodia.

— Economics.

— October Presidential elections?

Prediction - 50/50 -

GVN much stronger

But - nature of country's mission is disturbed

g. Continued importance of US advisor role

internal difficulties among

SVN.

Future Prospects

Enemy -

(1) SVN is backed (2) organizes counter to the growth

(2) SVN is not yet backed - so every strategy is to get us to back SVN on way out.

SVN - (?)

Elections -

- Nature of every mission

- New with police and bombing, but

- Internal members of SVN

MAN population count 130,000 per base.

- GM think tank on self-blessing now involved

- GM continuing to GM constituencies like Cambodians, etc.

- AC members

- More efficient US leverage - because GM

self-blessing involved

- Continuing dispersion to regions

- Continuing corruption

- ARVN leadership

- Misconduct in Cambodians

- Economic

- Ongoing redesigning of elections

- GM think tank

- Oct 1972 -

- GM think tank

- GM think tank