



Some Perspectives
on the
Viet - Nam Problem
and
its Solution
1950 - 1971

ERRORS IN BASIC STRATEGY

1. PRE - 1965

- Failure to give priority to local security

2. POST - 1965

- COMMITMENT OF MASSIVE MILITARY POWER WITHOUT ADEQUATE GUIDANCE ON MODUS OPERANDI



2. VIET-NAM

a. Fill the Vacuum in the Countryside - from Bottom Up

Examples: -- Restore Power to Village by Elections,
Budget, Admin Control

-- PSDF - Arm the Population

-- Local Security - RF/PF, Phung Hoang

-- Village and Province Councils

b. Organize Country from Top Down

-- People's Information Program

-- National Elections



I. ORIGINS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT (1950)

- a. Situation after World War II
- b. National Interest & National Ideals
- c. The Cold War
 - Marshall Plan
 - Greece
 - Azerbaijan
 - Korea
- d. Viet-Nam (1950)



II. Initial Miscalculations

a. That VN Elements Left Behind by French Were More Viable Than in Facts They Were.

- Existence of Genuine Nationalist Groups
- But Divided, Unorganized
- After Independence , no Clear Political Doctrine of Objectives
- Few Trained Cadre
- Contrast on Communist side
 - Continuity since 1930
 - Doctrine
 - Organization
 - Cadre

b. Over-Confidence as to Our Ability to Solve Internal Problems of Other Countries.



III. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

- a. The Political and Administrative Vacuum in the Countryside
 - Example of An Giang
 - The Diem Experiment
 - Further Destruction of Power of Village



IV. Some Causes of Past U.S. Failures in Viet-Nam

a. Failure to Take it Seriously Enough Soon Enough

Examples: -- Failure to Assess Situation - Why?

-- Rapid Rotation Policy - Why?

-- Failure to Train our own People or Vietnamese
Civil Service - Lack of Cadre

b. Failures of Organization for Counterinsurgency

c. Ineffective use of Leverage

d. Era of the "Blank Check"

e. The Lost Revolution (1963-64)

f. Failures of Communication



V. THE TURNING POINTS OF THE WAR

1967-1968

- a. Organization of CORDS
- b. Tet - 1968
- c. Significance in Viet-Nam of President Johnson's Withdrawl



VI. Present Situation and Policy

A. Situation -- Vastly Improved - Why?

- 1. Winning of Main Force War (1965-68)**
- 2. Support Given to RF/PF**
(Role of CORDS in Territorial Security)
- 3. Better Management**
(Role of CORDS in CPDC)

B. Policy

- 1. U.S.**
 - (a) Negotiations if Possible**
 - (b) "Vietnamization" (De-Americanization)**
 - (c) Withdrawal - Desirable Politically in U.S.,
and Operationally in Viet-Nam**