

We were there not more than a day, and we went back out in the field, and I got malaria the next day while we was in the field.

Q. Do you remember whether, when you got out of the helicopter at Landing Zone Dottie--you and other, were you met by a colonel who talked to you briefly about what happened at My Lai (4)? Do you remember anything like that?

A. We were met by somebody. There always is on an operation like this, but he didn't talk to us. He may have talked to MEDINA and the uppers but I didn't talk to him or know that he was milling among the people.

Q. We've had evidence that the brigade commander, Colonel HENDERSON, got the men together in a group when they came back and asked them some questions about what had happened that morning in My Lai (4). Were you present at such a group?

A. Not that I can remember. I mean, I'm not saying I wasn't because it could have even been a company formation.

Q. No. This was a group of men coming back.

A. I don't remember talking to anybody.

Q. Did you ever know that there was an investigation about what happened at My Lai (4) that morning?

A. Yes. I heard about it, but it was mostly rumors because on the 20th, I went to the hospital with malaria and didn't come back for a month. That was just 2 days after we completed the operation and to the effect of anybody coming around and talking to anybody, I wasn't really available.

Q. Captain MEDINA told us that shortly after the operation, on 16 March, he called the company together and told them there was an investigation going on, and that while it was going on they should not talk about what happened at My Lai (4)?

A. I was present. So, that would have to be the 18th, or the 19th, or even the 20th, because I believe the morning of the 20th is when we left for the field.

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Q. But, this was after you got back from the field or could have this been before when MEDINA talked to the company?

A. It could even have been before--I don't think it's possible, because we had a half way formation or a meeting there, before we were lifted out, and I remember him saying something--in fact, I am not sure he was addressing the company or a few, but I remember him talking, and saying something at the LZ, where we was getting picked up.

Q. We've had one witness indicate that he assembled the company in the field and told them about the investigation. Most of the witnesses said that this took place at Landing Zone Dottie, but they are not sure.

A. I believe it took place at Dottie, but I can't say for sure one way or the other.

Q. You think hard and see if you can remember what he told the company?

The hearing will be recessed.

(The hearing recessed at 1235 hours, 16 January 1970.)

(The hearing reconvened at 1236 hours, 16 January 1970.)

MR WEST: The hearing will come to order.

RCDR: All present when the hearing recessed are again present.

You are reminded that you are still under oath.

A. Excuse me?

RCDR: You are reminded that you are still under oath.

A. Oh, right.

MR WEST: I had asked you Mr. BUNNING if you could recall as best you can what Captain MEDINA told the company?

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A. Right, the briefing as far as I can remember, was at Dottie was not a real lengthy one, but it was like an informal briefing. He did say in effect that there would be some type of investigation probably. Just like you stated a minute ago, he said that we weren't supposed to say too much if anybody asked questions to kind of put it down, to this effect, from what he was telling us. In other words, the less we tell them and the less said the better off everybody is.

Q. Afterwards did anybody ever talk to you and ask you any questions about it?

A. No, like I say, I was in the hospital for 30 days right after and to my knowledge, from what I asked other guys when I got back from the hospital--from what they had said there was an informal type of investigation, and somebody did ask some people some questions and there was nobody definitely saying, "Well they asked me questions and I told them this". I was just concerned a little bit about what did come of it, but from what they said, nothing did come of it.

Q. Are you sure that someone told you that somebody asked him questions? I ask this because up to now we have not been able to find anybody in the company who was asked any questions by anybody about what happened at My Lai (4).

A. Like I say, it's possible, and it's possible too that a guy who was asked questions doesn't want to admit it. I know I wasn't there, like I say, when I came back, nobody that I talked to said that he was asked questions. He said that there was an investigation and this was all I got and I didn't talk to but two or three guys. You have your own few, your own little group, so it's possible that there really never was an investigation either formal or informal where they did ask the people.

Q. Apart from this did anyone ever tell you to keep quiet about what happened at My Lai (4)?

A. Other than this possible formation?

Q. Other than the briefing by Captain MEDINA?

A. No, not that I know of.

Q. I want to ask you some general questions, if I may Mr. BUNNING. What was the attitude of the men of Charlie Company towards the Vietnamese people. Now, in a way you've given some information on this. Telling how some of the men treated the Vietnamese women in the villages that you came to, but in general how did the men of Charlie Company feel toward the Vietnamese? Did they like them or dislike them?

A. Well, in my opinion most of them didn't want to be there in the first place and after seeing their buddies get knocked down, and all this, very few of them had any like or desire for them at all. And then there was a few, we had-- which most people always cussed, which is considered the hippy class and that's the only place I ever seen a hippy in the good, because a hippy is still a non-violent man over there too, a hippy. I myself have nothing to do with the hippies, but that is one thing that I did notice over there, that the people who were put in the hippy class. There the guys that got all the long hair, and all this kind of stuff, generalized into the hippy class. Most of them were pretty well peace-loving people. They weren't violent, well, I can remember one guy. I know I could recognize his name on the list, it starts with a D. Anyway he was from these people and when we went into a village this man would go in and set down right with the people. Everybody else would be going through tearing everything apart, and this guy wasn't for this stuff, and he would go in, and he would sit down, and he would try to communicate with these villagers, and be friendly, and there were several other ones.

I even did it to a certain degree, and mainly not to be friendly, or anything, just to learn their ways, to see what they were doing, and how they do everything. Because in certain ways they were friendly and they would show you how they grind their rice, and how everything worked, and they would be quite nice, but this doesn't last long. Not when you got four or five guys being friendly, and talking in four or five different hootches, and here on the other side, you've got these real aggressive guys that are beating guys trying to question them, and guys are raping women and stuff like this. You can't be nice and bad and still come out on top. The bad is always going to override the nice, no matter how nice you are. A little bit of bad is all it takes. I would say generally that more of the people, most of them in our company, had no good for Vietnamese. The fact is some of them considered--they didn't even consider them human, almost.

Q. That was one thing that I was trying to figure out.

A. That is not a majority that doesn't consider them human. In my opinion that would be a minority, but then it breaks to where the people--that the Vietnamese are no good to them because, well, any man that goes over there, like most of them, there put over there. Very few of them ask to go over there and you've got one thing on your mind and that's to get back home. You've got 12 months and you're home. You've got to live for 12 months and that's it. You got to live for 12 months or get a nice wound. Most people--you consider yourself generally first and so yourself is worth more than other people's lives, you think. I would rather see a Vietnamese die than me die if I had to make a choice, although it is a poor choice to make but human nature, nobody wants to die or be killed.

Q. Let me ask you the question in another way? You say that some of the members in the company considered the killing of Vietnamese just not the same as killing an American. It wasn't as bad as killing an American.

A. I would say, yes, to that degree. I didn't see it overly shown, that the Vietnamese were plain nothing, but it was there, and some considered them that way as plain nothing. Killing a Vietnamese was just killing an old dog or something.

Q. In other words perhaps a man that was back home who wouldn't be able to kill an American could kill--

A. (Interposing) Yeah, but still any person--just like when I killed that girl. I'd been over there quite awhile before I killed her, and she is the only one that I knew I killed. Because there was one guy on one side of the hootch shooting and I was on the other side. And it was pitch dark and I saw an object running and we were hollering "halt," "dung lai" and all this kind of stuff. And we could even hear a radio before we got there and sounded like they were transmitting messages and everything, and to begin with at night there is supposed to be no movement out there at all, in these free-fire zones. Anything out there is free game, but we came in on this hootch and almost had it surrounded and on them, except that one guy bumped into a water trough or something inside there, and it made



a little bit of noise, and this girl came walking out to us. I was point and as soon as I saw her coming, everybody was out and it was pitch dark, and she came out of a little room walking to us, and it was pitch dark, and you could see her and she couldn't see us. She got that close to me--within 2 feet of me. I could have reached out and touched her, and she got out there, and everybody was on the ground, and she was standing out there looking over the top of us, and she starting talking Vietnamese, and she talked for maybe 15 or 20 seconds. It seemed like a long time--not too long, but she said quite a few words, and all of sudden you could just see it, because I could see it. I was twisted like this. Her face wasn't 3 feet away from me, hardly. We weren't really laying. We were in a real low squatting place where we could still move if necessary, and all the time I had the gun pointed on her, because I didn't know what she was going to do.

But anyhow, all of sudden she just froze, and she sensed that something was wrong, and she just turned and ran and I wasn't quick enough. I couldn't grab her and knock her down. She ran right into the hootch which was only 50 feet away from us, sir, 75 at the most. It wasn't very far, we were right on it almost, and she ran right into it just screaming and hollering and through the sides of this you could see these men jumping up, and you could see that these were young men, active, and they jumped up, and everything, ran out the back. Well, I ran to the right, and came around to the left, and when we got back out there we just started shooting, and I saw an object up there. It was pitch dark. It wasn't but 40 or 50 feet away from me, and you could see something moving, and I just went like that twice, and I don't know even which time I got here, when I hit her. I didn't even know it was a female at the time. We just saw somebody running out of there that we definitely knew was enemy, and so then we turned on our flashlights after that.

Meantime, I was back at the beginning with MCBREEN. He was trying to get the red lens out of the flashlight, to get the white lens in, because we had the red lens to read our map to get out where we were headed for and a red lens doesn't do too good when you're trying to shine it on somebody. He didn't get his light on until after the shooting was really done. And the rest of them all got out in a little tunnel out in the back underneath the hedgerow. This whole house--we walked around it one and a half times before

we found our way into it. It had a hedgerow growing around it, and the hedgerow was almost 100 foot from the house at almost all points, and it was completely enclosed by hedgerow. You couldn't even get through and of course at night you can't see really good, and at the end where they got out--we finally got to the front and you had to zigzag to get in. You just didn't walk in and so we knew we were getting into something hot probably, because they had it pretty well figured which house to be in, which was safe for their cover. When we came to the front like that, and they ran right out the back, and there's a little tunnel where they got down, and the other side they knocked up some brush, and off they go and gone they are. Just like that, and the only one we got was that one girl, and that's the only person that I know of that I killed over there. But like I was saying you were saying that the guy can kill one and not think nothing of it. It didn't bother me at all that I killed her because I guess, probably in my mind, that I had done right because--

Q. (Interposing) Well, it was in the heat of an operation.

A. Yeah. We're over there fighting a war, and that was enemy, and that was who was killing us, so in killing just the supporters, and she was a young girl, 21, 22 years, by just killing supporters and stuff in the My Lai incident, that's something else to me. That takes somebody--a lot of guys like I say like SCHIEL and all these other guys. They're looking for rank. Somebody higher tells them to do something. The more they do, the more they think they're going to get, and me, I'm the other way around. I had 2 years to serve and I didn't care whether I came out an E-1, and when HODGES told me to shoot them I just literally told him, "I'm not going to do it."

Q. Did the men understand about obligations to protect prisoners of war and noncombatants? Do you remember any instruction on this point in the company?

A. Well, we don't get this instruction before every operation, but we get this instruction back here in the state and we--most of us went over there, and we got most of the special training. Most everybody now that goes over there, at least I understand, they've got a week of training--over there, they've got a week of training, before they're assigned to a company, but we went over there as a whole unit, but we were told all this. I don't know whose briefings--I think it came from higher. I think that everybody takes a week to

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go through, they just kind of took us around and gave us in one day when we first got over there.

Q. I wanted to ask you a few more general questions. After My Lai (4) did the missions given the company change any or were they about the same they were before?

A. The same. You couldn't tell any difference, it was just an operation out in the field, and you had certain grid coordinates, and your operation to go through certain grid coordinates, and end up on top of this little hill at another grid coordinate, and all operations are just the same. Most everything is like you said before, search and destroy, search and clear. All of ours as far as I know, were search and destroy operations. There wasn't things destroyed all the time, because there was nothing to destroy--just considered destroyed.

Q. You were searching for VC primarily?

A. Yeah, right. On several operations we were sent into special places where we did make contact with the NVA, but other than that we were in these areas--our primary fighting was VC and that's who we were looking for.

Q. The newspapers in November had some stories about the possibility that some of the men in Charlie Company in My Lai (4) that morning were under the influence of marijuana.

A. Yea, I read that in that paper.

Q. Did you know anything of this?

A. There was quite a bit of that used. Now, I would not say in my opinion, because I never touched it, but there was quite a bit of it used, and on this operation nobody to my knowledge was touching it. Nobody was under enough influence that it did effect them one way or another. The guys that did use it used it all the time anyhow or quite often. They tried clamping down on it, but what can they do. You've got to have 75 percent of the people trying to stop it, instead of 30 percent of the people trying to stop it. They don't know who is doing it, or who is not doing it. You've got your own little clans. Nobody is going to squeal, because you've got your own life to think about. They used it. They call it "dieng cai dau" over there, or pot, or whatever it is. I don't know whether it was true marijuana that they were getting, but this is what the Vietnamese sold to them and they used it quite widely as far as



I know all the time, I was over there except maybe for the first couple of months. It wasn't hard to get, just learning what to say, to who, and they would get it for you.

Q. But in your opinion it played no part in that action?

A. It played none whatsoever, that I could at all judge, because they didn't have an exceptionally big blow-out before the thing and everybody get high or drunk, or nothing on it, because most of the time they can't get enough of either one of them. They can get enough pot but they can't get enough beer. Most of them will mix it and it gets them pretty high. They had no big thing going before this operation.

Q. I was going to ask you three questions about My Lai. The first was, "What happened?", the second was, "Why did it happen?" Those two questions I think you have pretty well answered already. In your opinion, I take it, what happened was ordered. The men carried out their orders. I think you are aware Mr. BUNNING that this incident did not become widely known until November 1969. As a matter of fact by a man named RIDENHOUR who I don't believe had been in the company but who knew a number of men in the company. He wrote a letter to the Secretary of Defense, and a number of people in the Congress, and as a result of that, an investigation was started in April 1969. In fact the investigating officer was Colonel WILSON, who is here with us, and he is heading up another interrogation team, and it's been under investigation ever since then. But it was not reported officially in the way many events in the battlefield were reported. Do you have any idea why this was?

A. Why it was not reported?

Q. Yes.

A. Why events occurred or why the operation was not reported?

Q. The killing of civilians.

A. I've got a news article right at home written by The Army Times or one of the Army papers that just said that we went through there and killed 128 enemy. That was what

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was reported. Somebody said the reporter was on the ground. The CID man I believe did but I didn't know of any on the ground.

Q. That's right, a man named ROBERTS from the PIO detachment from brigade.

A. He probably went with Captain MEDINA or with one of the headquarters sections. I didn't even know that he was on the ground. I was told that there was a newsman because we were told that we were going to have a newsman. I was told that there was one in the helicopters above us, and I was told that the thing originates in all the stories he writes. I know that you probably have a file where they wrote things like 128 killed and so many weapons and stuff, and from what I gathered that originated from just what he was told. Was ROBERTS the one that wrote this?

Q. Yes.

A. He was on the ground?

Q. He was with--

A. (Interposing) It was my opinion that he was in the air.

Q. No, he was with MEDINA's command group most of the time. Early, right after the landing, he went out with some men of the 3d Platoon down south to Highway 2 and then he came back and moved generally with Captain MEDINA and the command group. There was a photographer named HAEBERLE with him.

A. You see, what it would be then probably, when they came through, all they would see is the bodies. Most of the hootches would be burned, and you don't even see half the bodies when the hootches are burning. And they probably wrote what they were told, that this was enemy controlled and that these were probably all enemy. That could be put over quite easily.

Q. Apart from that, do you have any opinion why the word about this didn't get out?

A. Through them or through us?

Q. Through official channels or through the men of the company?

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A. Through the men of the company, as general as I can get it, the people were told not to say or write your Congressman or anything on this kind of stuff. Because, I believe at the time BERNHARDT who worked with RIDENHOUR over there, to get this thing started--that's where RIDENHOUR got his information. I believe he was going to try to write a Congressman or something because he definitely was against all this, but he was warned not to from what I gather, and not in a company briefing or anything, it just got around. It was not safe writing home to Congressman or anybody and they know who write to Congressman. They'll get back to him and chances of getting knocked off is too easy, because I've had them at least five guys come to me and just plain told me, "Leave us alone or we'll kill you."

I've seen another guy over there, talk to HANSEN, a guy that was our squad leader over there at first. We only had like another week left in the field. This guy takes his gun, takes it off safety, points it right at this head and says: "You just leave me alone or I'll kill you right now". Just like that, from here to the wall over there--20 or 30 feet away. And I'm sitting right in the direct line of fire, if he misses he's going to get me, because we're right on a thing. This is the thing. You get somebody that will get a gun up on a guy and say: "Get off my back, I'm killing you." What are you going to do.

Q. Did you know a man named RAYNOR who came into the company after My Lai (4)? He was a sergeant.

A. He didn't come into our platoon did he? Do you have what platoon he came in? The name does sound familiar, but I don't think he was in our platoon.

Q. No, I don't believe so either.

A. We had a couple--

Q. (Interposing) He may have been in the 1st Platoon.

A. We had a couple of sergeants come in, I know, we starting getting our replacements around the 22nd or 23rd because on the CID company roster they had all the first replacements listed as being present. At least they were on the list as being in the company on the 16th which they were not, which were all of our first replacements and they came from what I understood, a day or two after I left because I left the 20th.

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Q. RAYNOR had an experience somewhat like this. He said he was threatened. He said he found no discipline--

A. What was he trying to do?

Q. He was trying to establish a little discipline.

A. I guarantee you, you won't establish no discipline if you're not fair, that is for sure. You can ask some of the members, the guys, when I became squad leader, under me. Because we had a good squad going, and I was fair to my men, because I believe in being fair, and every man in my squad would tell you so. Because I didn't give nobody a bunch of dirty details in a row and something that was real bad came up, I did it myself. You have to earn respect.

Q. You had a squad in the 2nd Platoon did you?

A. About the last month and a half or so, I was over. I made squad leader finally. I was still an E-4. Still was when I got out, but the rank was pretty poor in lots of situations. I never bucked for rank because I'm not interested in it. They pay you so little that it doesn't matter if they pay you another 50 or 60 dollars a month. It's so little to begin with. That they might as not even pay you, but anyway this could happen. I don't know if he was what we called "instamatics" or not, and if he was I know of no "instamatics"; one that goes to NCO school and comes right over there wearing stripes. I know of no "instamatics" that ever got respect from anybody because, like Lieutenant BROOKS when he came and took over our platoon he said, "All right men, you guys know the ropes, I don't, teach me." We get these "instamatics" they come in there--we've been there 5 or 6 months, breaking our backs. We get an "instamatic" who has been in Vietnam for 2 weeks and he knows it all. He's going to tell us how to do it, and if this man, that you're talking about is an "instamatic" and is this way, he will not get respect, or discipline, or anything from his men.

Q. This man was on his third tour in Vietnam. He came in--

A. (Interposing) Yeah, his third tour as infantry or third tour as what?

Q. Yes, third tour in Vietnam in the infantry. He liked the infantry.

A. I don't see how anybody could last that long in the infantry.

Q. The platoon that he came into and I don't believe it was the 2d Platoon--

A. (Interposing) It wasn't because I would recognize him if he was.

Q. He said there was just no discipline, and when he tried to impose some discipline--

A. (Interposing) You've got to win the men's confidence, that's first and you've got to prove yourself a man, before you get it from any of them that I knew of.

Q. Maybe that was the problem. He said in effect he was threatened.

A. I wouldn't doubt, because it is possible, because nobody comes in--well, we've had a couple of "instamatics" as it was, and all an "instamatic" would do was to bounce around from squad to squad, because they could not find a home in any squad, because nobody in the squad will put up with them. Finally, they just break them down and make them team leaders and put somebody else as squad leader, and here you got a PFC or an E-4 as a squad leader, and an "instamatic" E-5 pulling the job of a team leader. Because for one thing they are not qualified and some of them you get are "gung ho" and "hotheaded" and everything else. And they know it all or at least they think they do, and I for one don't threatened to kill anybody, but I for one being as big as I was flat told people where to go. If I didn't like what they told me to do I told them I didn't like it. In fact they even told Lieutenant BROOKS one time. It's quite a lengthy story so I won't say it. I really respected Lieutenant BROOKS. He really was a good man.

Q. Let me ask you this, now, the men didn't talk about what happened in My Lai (4), the word got around that they didn't talk, do you think in back of this was Captain MEDINA's influence? That people did what he told them to do?

A. Yeah, one thing you've got to admit, I don't know how well you know MEDINA yet or not, for a CO I haven't yet

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seen a better man than him. That man looked out for his men, and he did his men right. If you did wrong, I mean to tell you you knew it and you knew it but good. He's a mean man in that respect, but he did his men right and what he did he probably felt was right. He told the men not to write home because he probably didn't want anything to get started from it, really. But probably, most of the influence would have come from him not to write, although I wouldn't say the threat of being killed came from him.

Q. I gather that you weren't around Captain MEDINA at any time during this operation against My Lai (4) --

A. (Interposing) I never saw him until we got to our overnight position.

Q. Did you hear any reports that he had killed people during the operation?

A. No, I don't know what he did, or nothing. I really don't have any knowledge of what he did, and I've got none of what Lieutenant CALLEY did and his platoon because they were over there on our complete left flank. I was as far away from CALLEY and his platoon as I could be, and then when we went to our own village, we were over there by ourselves.

Q. I see you had a high opinion of Captain MEDINA as a company commander?

A. Yeah, I got my tail chewed out real good by him one time, and I mean to tell you, I remember it today. But as a company commander, this man may have done wrong, and no doubt he had done wrong, telling us to kill all these people, but for a man and for an officer-- and I really don't have much use for the Army--I kind of hate to say it in front of all these Army people here, but anyhow, he was one heck of a good man. He really was. He knew his stuff as far as that came, and he knew how to get things done, and he never did his men, either as a whole or as an individual, wrong unless he deserved it. I don't think there was a man in the company, that doesn't shake when he walks up to talk to you, because you just know he's a mean man. You picture him as--but it takes this to maintain control really, and maintain respect and everything else, because he had it.

There were a few people no doubt that hated him. You've always got this but--

Q. (Interposing) Are you telling me that Charlie Company was a pretty rough outfit and it took a strong man to command it?

A. Definitely, yeah, it was especially after I talked to everybody else, after I got out of the hospital even, when I had malaria and got shot and was in the hospital. Everyone else that I talked to, you know they--and the way their men acted. I talked to them and they said they never had one rape incident in the whole platoon. None of the men were vulgar, or rough, or anything like this and it surprised me quite a bit, and I don't know why our guys were, really. Why our company would be so bad or whatever you want to call it, over everybody else.

Q. I think we have just about finished the primary part of the interrogation. I wish after lunch you'd get with Major ZYCHOWSKI if you would and he'll go through the map again with you and perhaps we can mark up a photograph to indicate the path that the platoon followed and note some of the places where the principle events occurred. He'll also ask you some questions about training, a few documents. Before we recess is there anything that you can think of that you know that might help us in our inquiry which we haven't covered in the questioning?

A. No, I really can't--unless you've got another question. We've pretty well discussed everything.

Q. After you go back home, if you come across any letters that you wrote at the time describing things that might have happened, that might throw some more light on the events of that day or anything to do with an investigation or a coverup, we would appreciate hearing from you. Apart from that I want to thank you very much for coming. I know it was a lot of trouble for you. It's difficult for you in view of your business in accordance to time.

A. If the chickens had gone out--if they had, I would not have been able to come.

MR WEST: All right. We thank you.

A. Okay, thank you.

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MR WEST: The hearing will be recessed.

(The hearing recessed at 1308 hours, 16 January 1970.)

(The hearing reconvened at 1325 hours, 16 January 1970.)

MAJ ZYCHOWSKI: Hearing will come to order.

RCDR: The following named person is present: MAJ ZYCHOWSKI.

Q. Mr BUNNING, I remind you that you are still under oath.

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. BUNNING, before you is an aerial photograph of My Lai (4) and the surrounding areas (Exhibit P-1).

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to have you tell me and designate on the map the approximate locations of the landing zone where you landed.

(Witness indicates the position on the photo.)

Number 1 will be the approximate area of the landing zone.

(MAJ ZYCHOWSKI marks the location of Exhibit P-1 which is later received in evidence with annotations as Exhibit P-170.)

A. From the landing zone we moved on a rough line from a trench or a little hedgerow.

Q. You went through the trench line or hedgerow here (indicating)?

A. It's both; it's vegetation and also a small trench like thing.

Q. At the briefing, were you shown the boundaries that would be between the 1st and 2d Platoons?

A. No, there is no real boundary and it was not in the original briefing. It was in the smaller size briefing of the platoon or squad.

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Q. In other words, the village of My Lai was split in the center between the two platoons?

A. Right.

Q. If I recall, you were on the second lift?

A. That's correct, I believe it was on the second lift.

Q. From the landing zone you went up to the northwestern part of My Lai (4), is that correct?

A. Right. We were on the left and the 1st Platoon was on our right.

Q. Where did you go?

A. Up here, and at the very beginning I was one or two men from the end (indicating).

Q. You were down on the outer edge of the village?

A. Right.

Q. How far down did you go?

A. (Indicating) Approximately right here.

Q. You followed the trail?

A. Yes.

Q. You zigzagged all the way through the area?

A. Yes.

Q. Starting from the northwestern part of the corner where you first entered the village, would you explain some of the things that you had seen?

A. Well, like we said previously--

Q. (Interposing) I'm concerned about your route and the things you saw as you went through the village.

A. As we started moving through the village or right as we--just before we really moved, there were five or six people shot.

(BUNNING)

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Q. Where would that be?

A. That would be in mostly here and here (indicating).  
It was right before we got into the village.

Q. Was this a group?

A. No, single people working in their fields.

Q. People scattered throughout the area?

A. Yes.

Q. Continue on.

A. And we moved on in, and that is when Sergeant HODGES told me that I had to start shooting, and that is when I told him that I would not, and I was assigned here (indicating) to the complete left flank. And from there I was on the complete edge of the village all of the way. This is when a couple of kids, three kids come running out hollering, "chop chop," and were shot down.

Q. You saw them shot?

A. Yes, they were about 30 or 40 feet from the front of the man who shot them.

Q. Did you see who shot them?

A. No.

Q. (Marking Exhibit P-170) Number 2 will be the approximate area where Mr. BUNNING saw the three children shot.

A. We moved on and there were several more killings. And then we went on, and people being shot, and we were probably right in this area here (indicating), when I heard and saw SCHIEL say, "I don't want to shoot them, I don't want to shoot them, but I have to, because we are ordered to," and that was about in this location here (indicating).

Q. Approximately, how many were killed in this area?

A. About 9 or 10 men, women, and children were killed.

(BUNNING)



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Q. (Marking Exhibit P-170) Point number 3 will be the approximate location where Mr. BUNNING saw the 9 or 10, men, women, and children shot.

A. We continued moving on from there (indicating) and it was probably in this location about here (indicating) where somebody hollered that somebody was getting away to the left. And that is when Sergeant HODGES and I ran out to see and so we could get a clear view, and we saw a man, and Sergeant HODGES was shooting and he told me to shoot, and I shot a clip on full automatic, and after that HODGES shot him, and knocked him down.

Q. Would you continue from there, Mr. BUNNING?

A. From there we continued on to the end of the village (indicating).

Q. This is now at the northern edge of the village?

A. Right. From there we got word that gunships had shot down these two people to our north.

Q. Other than points 2, and 3, did you see any other groups of bodies, people that were killed?

A. Not really groups of people, but there were random killings, between point 2 and 3, and quite a few more 15 or 20 more, between point 3 and the end of the village.

Q. These were scattered?

A. Right, scattered people that I saw shot, and there were none in big groups, or piles.

Q. At the end of the village then, you proceeded where?

A. At the end of the village--that is when we got the word that the gunships had knocked down to enemy with weapons to our north--and from there we went north 300 or 400 meters to approximate there (indicating). There was some hedgerow or some trees, I think it would be this area right here (indicating).

Q. (Marking P-170) Number 4 will be the approximate area where the two VC with weapons were found.

A. From there we went west, into this other village, here (indicating).

(BUNNING)

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- Q. This village is north of My Lai (4) then?
- A. Yes, and we went into right into the side here or on this front part (indicating).
- Q. As you were going into the village, what happened?
- A. As we first moved in, first of all they started putting groups of people together, some of the guys did, and that is when ROSCHEVITZ shot with the M-79 into the group of quite a few people, it was about 20 people.
- Q. Were these people grouped together?
- A. Yes, they were grouped.
- Q. Who gathered them there, do you recall?
- A. Mostly everybody gathered them there together, but ROSCHEVITZ was going to see how his M-79 was going to work on people, or how effective it would be if he shot into the group at a close distance. After he shot a couple of rounds into them, everybody else that was there killed them off.
- Q. How far away was he from the point where he fired his M-79 to the place from the group was setting?
- A. I'd say from 80 to 100 feet.
- Q. Do you know if these were men, women and children?
- A. Right, men, women and children.
- Q. (Marking Exhibit P-170) Point 5 will be the approximate location where Mr. BUNNING observed ROSCHEVITZ fire a M-79 into a group of people.
- A. At point 5 is where HODGES and the other rape took place also.
- Q. (Indicating) This is where you observed the people being raped then, is that correct?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Could you explain who these were again?

(BUNNING)

A. One was Sergeant HODGES and the other was the little hootch and the other was the one girl at one time.

From here (indicating) we moved north in direction through the village. The whole village north and from here (indicating) we moved to the west a little bit, at least I did, because I was still mostly on the left-hand flank.

Q. As you were going northward toward the center of the village, what happened?

A. Well, we received word to cease firing, to quit killing all of the people.

Q. This is where you received the order to stop the killing?

A. Right.

Q. Who gave this order?

A. It came to us from Lieutenant BROOKS, but was of Captain MEDINA.

Q. (Marking Exhibit P-170) Point 6 will be the approximate area where Mr. BUNNING heard the order to stop the killing.

A. From here (indicating) I was still on the outside of the village as we circled it and we continued around the village. And just collecting up the people that were left in the village and holding them all as we went. And I went to approximately here; and from here (indicating) to the end of the village we started back to the front, and we went this approximate route here (indicating).

Q. Prior to leaving the village, did you observe anything else?

A. Yes. From point 6 to the end of the village just before we left the village, I don't recall the exact location I saw a couple more rapes, also.

Q. You couldn't give the approximate area where this happened then?

(BUNNING)

A. No, not close enough, to really say.

Q. In other words, from point 6 until you exited, you did observe a couple more rapes then?

A. Right.

Q. What happened at the end of the village?

A. When we got to the end of the village to my knowledge Lieutenant BROOKS said to turn loose these people, which was approximately 30 and then at that time we turned these people loose and we continued, and we started to go back to the northeast corner of My Lai (4).

I believe this is the time we ate and so we stayed here while we ate.

Q. While you were eating, did you set up a perimeter?

A. Right, we always do that when we stop and we had a perimeter here with our platoon being on the northern corner at the end of My Lai (4).

Q. The northern corner of My Lai (4)?

A. Right.

Q. (Marking Exhibit P-170) Point 8 will be the approximate location where you ate lunch, is that right?

A. Right.

Q. Approximately what time did you eat lunch there, Mr. BUNNING?

A. I cannot recall the exact time, but it would be a late lunch. It would be 1 o'clock.

Q. While you were at this northern corner of My Lai, did you marry up with the other company?

A. Yes, I know we joined back with part of our company, I don't know which companies it was, since I was on this corner way over here (indicating).

Q. After you ate lunch, where did you go?

A. Well, after we ate lunch, we moved in an easterly direction for several hundred meters where we made our overnight position.

Q. As you left the village of My Lai (4), did you observe any other bodies, groups?

A. No, that route we took out of there, I did not observe any more bodies.

Q. While you were eating lunch here or before, or any time, did you observe any helicopters landing in the east side of the village?

A. I cannot remember. I stated to the CID, I said I don't, but I really cannot recall any helicopters landing.

Q. Mr. BUNNING, is there anything else that you can recall that you perhaps forgot and can recall now of any other incidents that occurred that you have not already told us about?

A. No, that is all that I can think of as what happened. I cannot think of anything else that is important.

Q. I showed you a number of pictures prior to our plotting your route on this map. Am I correct in saying that other than the one picture of Captain MEDINA you cannot identify any other photos and associate them with some part of the map?

A. No, because most everybody in these photos here were not in my platoon and I cannot identify them as definite places.

Q. You cannot identify any other photographs other than the one of Captain MEDINA (Exhibit P-8)?

A. I recognize DUSTIN on photograph P-14.

Q. There is nothing else then that you can tell us that sticks in your mind?

A. No, that is about it.

(BUNNING)



Q. Mr. BUNNING, if the photograph and the route that you have taken and the events that you have listed here are correct, I'd appreciate it if you would sign your name at the top left-hand corner.

(Witness signs the aerial photo)

A. Right.

Q. The photograph that Mr. BUNNING has just signed is entered as Exhibit P-170.

Mr. BUNNING, you had mentioned in your prior testimony that you remember a person's name starting with a G. I show you a roster here (indicating) of C/1/20. Would you look through this roster and see if you can identify that person?

A. Yes, this man is right here (indicating), GARFOLO.

Q. Would you explain who GARFOLO was?

A. The man who I mentioned before, who was the hip-  
pie and he was a real good guy, and when we went into the  
villages, and all he would do is talk to the villagers  
and try to make friends with all of them.

Q. Mr. BUNNING, if I recall correctly, you joined the unit in Hawaii?

A. Yes.

Q. You mentioned something about training in your prior testimony. I would like to get a little more information. Did you receive any training on the prisoners of war and the handling of noncombatants?

A. It was not really a training course, because when I joined the unit, it was getting ready to move to Vietnam right then, but during the small briefing or briefings, we were told--it was either in Hawaii--we were told quite extensively on mistreatment and how to handle prisoners and all of this properly.

Q. You did receive training in handling PW's and noncombatants?

A. Not training, but a briefing on how to handle them.

(BUNNING)

Q. This would be a lecture type class?

A. Yes, a lecture type class.

Q. Did you also receive this training when you arrived in Vietnam?

A. Like I said, it was either Hawaii or Vietnam.

Q. Mr. BUNNING, I show you Exhibit M-2 which is a Xerox copy of a card which is entitled "Nine Rules" and I ask you to look at it and tell me if you have ever seen or received one of these cards?

A. We received the card. We received a card like this or stating the same thing. I'm not sure whether it was exactly this card or not, but we did receive a card stating the same thing. I'm not sure whether it was exactly this card or not, but we did receive a card stating the same thing.

Q. Was there any further discussion on these cards after you received them?

A. Well, the only instructions that I recall, we were told this is the way we were to conduct ourselves over there. We were also told that we are in a foreign country and we are a guest over there and it was all explained quite well to us.

Q. I further show you a copy of an Exhibit M-3 which is entitled the "Enemy in your Hands" and again would like you to tell me whether you have seen or received this type of a card?

A. Yes, I do recall receiving a card with this on it. Although, at the time, I do not recall these phrases being on it, but we had a card or copy of such a thing, stating these things.

Q. You are talking about the key phrases that would be on the back of the card that were in English and Vietnamese?

A. That's correct.

Q. Did you ever receive any other card or instruction about key phrases such as the ones listed here?

(BUNNING)

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A. Not to the best of my knowledge, I never had any. We had quite a hard time learning them all. However, we were told the major ones like "dung lai" for halt and we were told a couple of other ones which I cannot recall at this time.

Q. You did receive a card similar to this?

A. Yes, it may not have been this one, but we did have a card stating this information.

Q. Mr. BUNNING, this concludes this portion of the interview. Is there anything else you can recall that might be of some assistance to General PEERS?

A. No, not really. We have pretty well covered it as far as I know. I cannot think of anything else important other than what was already discussed.

MAJ ZYCHOWSKI: We appreciate your coming here today and the information that you have given to us.

The hearing will be recessed.

(The hearing recessed at 1426 hours, 16 January

1970.)

(BUNNING)