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Committee meetings would resume and continue on a planned monthly basis. The chairman pointed out that the term ICEX has been changed to PHOXNIX which translates Phung Hoang in Vietnamese. The Prime Minister has issued various instructions through Vietnamese channels relative to the attack against the infrastructure which established Phung Hoang Committees at all levels from national level to district. The chairman pointed out that the instruction is in the form of a proclamation rather than a directive. Directives in support of these proclamations have not as yet been issued however they are expected shortly. In closing, the chairman commended I Corps PSCOMM/Phung Hoang progress and operational success commenting that such successes have been noted and commented on by Saigon. The chairman gave a brief summary of items on the agenda then called upon Major Thompson to lead the discussion.

4. Major Thompson gave a short explanation of the DIQCC using charts depicting DIQCC organization. He pointed out that the DIQCC was a Vietnamese coordinating center belonging to the district chief, and named the basic contributors to the DIQCC along with the various units that serve as reaction forces. Major Thompson then spoke on the PIOC (Province Intelligence Coordination Committee) explaining that the committee is composed of chiefs of various intelligence organizations. Each province also should have a permanent office of the PIOC composed of representatives of various intelligence agencies. The function of the center is to act as a central focal point for all intelligence activity and operations directed against key VC political cadre. In the day-to-day operation of this center the permanent office of the PIOC maintains a message center (to receive and distribute intelligence), a VC infrastructure section, a VC CB section and a source evaluation section (to avoid duplication and better evaluate information from the same source). Lt. Col. Hand asked if the PIOC had established a source registry. Major Thompson replied that this was not the case; that sources were carded to determine whether or not the same source was supplying information through several agencies thus avoiding false verification. Mr. Mustakes pointed out that there was a central source registry in Saigon and urged that it be used.

5. Mr. Anders then took the floor to speak on improving the relationship between the 2 function (intelligence) and the 3 function (operations). The key to operational aspects of PHOXNIX is to better develop coordination and cooperation between intelligence and operations. Mr. Anders emphasized there were many obstacles standing in the way of operations such as: availability

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of forces for cordon and search operations; TAOB limitations; complexity of involvement with respect to the implementation of combined operations; etc. Mr. Enders further stated that where districts should conduct continuous "cordon and search" operations this rarely happens primarily because search and destroy operations take priority in the 3's mind over VCI operations. The 2's must sell the 3's on such operations if priorities are to be reversed.

Mr. Enders stressed another factor that hinders the operational side of PHOENIX, namely interagency rivalries. This could be reduced by common involvement and a desire to forget existing rivalries for the common cause and think operationally. Mr. Enders mentioned: special police is reorganizing and arranging for more personnel to work against the VC infrastructure; hamlet projects are coming along well with the aid of aerial photographs; DIPOCs are beginning to accumulate adequate intelligence data bases which should be exploited operationally.

Mr. Enders noted that in provinces where permanent offices of PIPOCs are operational, there is a marked increase in operations. He used Quang Ngai Province as an example, where PHOENIX/Quang Ngai is well organized and functional evidenced by 65 political cadre presently in the Quang Ngai PIC. On the other hand, other provinces where permanent PIPOC are nonfunctional no comparable anti-infrastructure accomplishments exist.

6. Major Thompson addressed the committee to review facts and figures regarding the I Corps PHOENIX Program. There are presently 82 DIPOCs and 5 PIPOCs in I Corps. By May there will be 43 PHOENIX advisors in I Corps. The forecast for 1963 is for a sizable build-up in I Corps to include the addition of one advisor (captain) at each province. Major Thompson stressed that PHOENIX is not an organization and there was no "chain-of-command" from Saigon down to DIPOCs. PHOENIX personnel are assigned to the MACV team receiving administrative support from them.

7. Lt. Col. Worley then addressed the committee explaining how the Revolutionary Development (RD) Program relates to the PHOENIX program. There are 149 RD teams in I Corps. RD has representatives at the DIPOC though no billet has been established through formal RD channels. Each RD team has one individual charged with collecting intelligence from each RD team. At present a training session is being organized in Quang Nam Province; G-2 IIX MACV is preparing the lesson plan. The problem to date is that presently no Vietnamese instructor is available to present the course, however as soon as one is available a course will be initiated for the purpose of outlining intelligence collection and reporting

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procedure suitable for DIOCC purposes.

8. Mr. Berlejung next came forward to speak on the proposed Danang City Intelligence Coordinating Committee (CICCC). During his presentation Mr. Khol, Mr. Vinh, Mr. Phat and Mr. Cong arrived. The Vietnamese guests were welcomed and Mr. Berlejung began again with Mr. Kieu translating. Mr. Berlejung stated the CICCC is not a military command structure thus must depend on mutual cooperation of all participants to accomplish objectives. Mr. Berlejung explained he has talked to the DNSB advisor who in turn discussed this concept with the Combat Police who are basically in agreement with the CICCC idea. Col. Hiep, DNSB Commander, promised a room to house the CICCC Operation Staff. The Mayor, who officially heads the CICCC, gave tentative approval to the CICCC as presented by Mr. Berlejung and should shortly call a meeting to assign various responsibilities in getting this center started. Mr. Berlejung stated, "We don't need the problems of Tet to point up the need of the CICCC in Danang City. The CICCC can get an indication as to what might happen, and because of the large number of Vietnamese, U.S. and allied troops in the city, the center can also provide enough coordination to prevent shooting at each other in the streets. PHOCNIX is basically a sound program, but needs the cooperation and contribution of everyone to assure mutual success."

Lt. Col. Veal asked what the present chain-of-command was for operations in the city. Mr. Berlejung answered that the responsibility for security of the city was presently Col. Hiep's. Lt. Col. Veal continued by asking how the chain-of-command was broken down. Lt. Col. Froede, SA/DNSB, answered that the city was divided into military districts with military units that run operations in the city closely coordinating with the police.

Mr. Berlejung continued by saying he had coordinated with Lt. Col. Gambardella, head of Armed Forces Police (AFP) in Danang and in I Corps, in plans to set up a CICCC and Combined Operations Center (COC).

Mr. Khol, the Region I Special Police Chief, observed that DIOCCs are operating in districts, but the establishment of comparable centers in provinces and cities has resulted in some difficulties. Mr. Khol received a directive from Saigon outlining the Phung Hoang organization. In this directive, it was indicated that a later directive on how to direct the Phung Hoang program would follow. As of this date no further directive from Central Office in Saigon has been forthcoming, even though a cable has been

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sent to the Central Office. Directives are needed to establish a unified program of operation, for Phung Hoang must operate the same in every province. Mr. Khoi observed that the establishment suggested by Mr. Borkjung is different than that in other provinces and he felt there will be more differences in the near future. He stated for example the PIOC in Thua Thien Province is located at police headquarters. If the Danang CIOCC is located at NWSB, the CIOCC will have a different organization than if such were located at police headquarters. Mr. Khoi stated he realized Phung Hoang is a sound program but believed we should wait for further directives in order to set up the program uniformly and consistently from top to bottom.

Mr. Mustakos stated that Mr. Khoi's observations were quite valid and requested Mr. Euders to give the latest information from Saigon on the status of directives.

Mr. Euders stated that Saigon has a National Phung Hoang Committee similar to that at I Corps. This committee has two sub-committees working on directives concerning the organization of Phung Hoang throughout Vietnam. It is proposed that there will be both a committee and a permanent intelligence coordinating center established in each corps, province, city and district. Col. Trung of NACC recently visited I Corps. Based on this visit, he is in the process of drafting directives detailing the ideal organization of Phung Hoang Centers. Mr. Euders stated that there would be only one permanent intelligence coordinating office in each province. This center will serve a dual function: 1) Collect and collate all tactical OB intelligence. 2) Collect and collate all VC infrastructure intelligence concerning VC organization and key VC political cadre. This center would operate on a 24-hours basis and would be located near the tactical operations center responsible for reacting to this intelligence. Mr. Euders stated directives will be coming shortly, however we should push ahead and establish Phung Hoang Centers at district, province and also in the city since our survival depends on how well we coordinate intelligence.

Mr. Euders reviewed Phung Hoang activities before and after Tet. Before the Tet offensive, we did not have intelligence that indicated the VC plan to attack all provinces simultaneously, however, despite this fact, during the Tet offensive most districts and provinces in I Corps were on 100% alert. In some cases, information available at province and district was adequate and timely enough to warrant this alert indicating the intelligence collection mechanism in districts and provinces where DIOCCs and PIOCAs are located enabled local forces to be in position ready

for the attack. During the Tet period centers continued to pass intelligence throughout I Corps. Mr. Enders stated it was his opinion that DIPOCs and PXOCs are doing a fine job of collating tactical information. After the Tet offensive, numerous VC were surfaced and eliminated through this same mechanism. Quang Ngai rolled up 65 members of a city intelligence net. Even in Hue, many VC suspects were captured in the wake of troop action. In general, I Corps did a commendable job when compared to other corps areas as evidenced by the degree of success. Along these lines many directives are being modeled after I Corps Phung Hoang concepts. Mr. Enders stated he hoped we will not lose the momentum gained and that we continue to motivate and initiate more and more operations against key VC political cadre.

Mr. Mustakos took the opportunity to present his understanding of Phung Hoang aims. Phung Hoang has the mission of developing sufficient information at the lowest possible level where action can be taken, so that the time-lag between receipt of information and reaction is as short as possible. With this concept of blending acquisition and action, Phung Hoang is not an organization to gather and process information for higher levels; this function is already being well handled by the S-2. As information moves from district to corps, it is collated and an intelligence picture evolves at corps. G-2 I Corps and G-2 IXI MAC have this mission. Phung Hoang should make no effort to set up a third organization. Phung Hoang must be geared to the lowest possible level, so that immediate action can be taken at that level; this has been the secret of success in I Corps.

At 1600 hours the chairman called for a short break before reconvening to discuss Phung Hoang problem areas. The chairman stated organization of sub-committees as scheduled on the agenda would be handled personally by phone and through individual meetings at a later date.

9. The meeting resumed at 1610 hours with a discussion of problem areas in the Phung Hoang Program.

10. The Civil Detainee problem was the first topic. Civilian jails were full at the outset of Tet, and there is now an agreement with the public safety people in Saigon regarding the movement of **DETAINÉES** from I Corps to Con Son Island. To review, Mr. Garza states that this week 516 **CDs** were transferred from Quang Ngai to Con Son Island. Con Son is becoming overcrowded, however they are working to expand their facility. If things go according to plan, we may be able to ship some **CDs** out of

Thus Thien next week. The Vietnamese are doing all they can to process these people and get them ready for Con Son. The chairman remarked he suspected I Corps initiative in moving **CDs** was picked up by other corps areas which has added to the problem of overcrowding Con Son Island. In sum, I Corps has sent some 1,500 **CDs** to Con Son, but since field programs against VCI are doing so well I Corps prisons continue to be overcrowded. Much of this difficulty can be attributed to the large number of unprocessed prisoners. In many provinces, innocent civilians are still being held because local police have been unable to conduct investigations with their limited resources. An effort is currently under way to expand holding facilities in order to increase screening capability before sending **CDs** to province. Mr. Mustakes urged those who represent larger capturing elements to encourage the passage of as much **CD** information as possible to the holding units; this would somewhat resolve confusion and prolonged holding of innocent people. The overall problem would be greatly reduced if innocent civilians could be screened out at the lowest possible level.

The chairman asked if there were any comments on the Civil Detainees problem. Major Thompson noted that prior to Tet we had photographed and carded all **CDs** in Hue. When many were later picked up, they were directly sentenced thus eliminating a lot of red tape, time and effort.

Capt. Jones asked about proposed new holding facilities at district. Who will provide facilities and security? Mr. Khoi interjected that the difficulty facing Special Police detention at district is a jail for political interrogation. There is also no fund to cover **CD** food expenses, thus only a brief interrogation at district is possible before **CDs** are passed on. Mr. Mustakes stated that the problem would be brought to Saigon's attention.

The chairman mentioned that the Special Police are augmenting their district staff and intend to build small holding areas. The chairman asked if Mr. Khoi wanted to comment on a recent class he attended on Special Police augmentation at district. Mr. Khoi stated that in the last few weeks, the National Police have opened a course for 650 policemen picked from graduates of the Police Training Center. They would receive additional Special Police training and then be assigned to the various districts in I Corps.

11. The chairman next turned to the question of Psy Ops at province. Maj. Gardner from III MAF Psy Ops said that anything

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the committee desires regarding Psy Ops would be backed all-the-way.

Mr. Mustakeo emphasized that there is a considerable Psy Ops element at Corps with printing presses, broadcasting and other Psy Ops capabilities. Some Phung Hoang operations have used this Psy Ops capability to prepare areas for Chieu Hoi or operational exploitation. The chairman recommended and encouraged such further use in the future.

Mr. Sanders mentioned that Quang Ngai was trying to organize a rewards program aimed against various key members of VC political organizations such as province committees, district committees, etc. He then asked how Psy Ops support along these lines could be solicited. Maj. Gardner said it was simply a matter of contacting the district Psy Ops representative who would pass it to province for Psy Ops support and action.

Mr. Noel remarked that the Special Police were willing to publicize information but need photographs to put on leaflets along with rewards. The chairman noted that in the absence of photographs, identification hints could be utilized to produce what often proves to be a close facsimile of the actual picture.

12. The next item of discussion related to the Citizens Incentives Awards Program. Currently there are a number of such programs in existence. Mr. Mustakeo suggested that committee members present who either run or are familiar with such programs pass this information to their people in the field. There is an effort being initiated at J-2 MACV Saigon to consolidate all these programs. Programs along these lines can be expected in the coming months. Lt. Col. Noel added that J-2 was working to establish a unified program of incentive rewards.

13. The chairman then turned the attention of the committee to the final problem area, "Reaction to Intelligence."

The chairman stated that since Phung Hoang is not an organization, our achievements are based upon the mutual understanding of problems and a mutual effort to resolve them. Each of us has not only the responsibility of collecting intelligence, but also the responsibility of explaining to the operational elements what is necessary to exploit this intelligence.

Mr. Mustakeo then asked for comments on problems encountered in persuading operational elements to react properly. Lt. Col. Noel said the biggest problem is giving the action agency accurate intelligence along with a proper evaluation since reaction elements

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must pick and choose amongst volumes of intelligence. Maj. Thompson commented that in discussing PIGOCs and the PIGOCs source evaluation cards were mentioned. This system will only work if the action unit sends feed-back on attached intelligence evaluation sheets so that various sources can be properly evaluated.

Mr. Enders stated there appears to be a problem in communicating with operational action elements. He continued that we must sell the Phung Hoang concept to action elements since we must compete with tactical type operations in winning the backing of such action elements. Mr. Mustakos agreed that this was a classical problem, but unlike the military, Phung Hoang has its own reaction forces namely PGB and HPFF. Furthermore, and quite successfully, we have used PGBs in the attack against VCI. We have used them effectively though their role could be improved. There are 800 PRUs in I Corps, and the success of this unit is evidenced by the following statistics: 305 VC captured, 135 killed, 266 wounded. The kill ratio is 19:1. There are also other reaction units available to district chiefs.

14. The chairman presented a chart showing Phung Hoang programs in I Corps called the Plan Report. This report gives the number of specific VCI killed, captured or rallied. This reporting program started around the end of January 1968. The chairman urged all present to encourage counterparts to contribute to this weekly report so that such statistics could be furnished to Saigon.

15. The chairman thanked everyone for attending then adjourned the meeting at 1700 hours.