

DRAFTS OF REPORTS  
MADE IN 1962

CONCERNING ADVISING &  
TRAINING OF VIETNAMESE  
RANGER UNITS.

REPORTS MADE BY MAJOR  
C.K. NELSON II CORPS RANGER  
ADVISER (SEP 1962)

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MAGTN-IIIC-3

Ranger Advisors

G-3

Ranger Advisor

13 September 1962

THRU: G-3 Training

The Ranger Advisory effort appears to be inadequate in relation to its operational effort and number of companies. There are 3 Officers for 61 companies. Two Officers and 3 NCOs are assigned to the 30th Special Battalion these figures are out of balance with the number of U.S. Advisors per regular ARVN Company. It is generally conceded that the Rangers are one of ARVN's finest small unit offensive forces. It has also been advanced that small unit actions are essential to carry the war to the Viet Cong. Furthermore experience has indicated that units with American Advisors have produced better results. In order to assist further an already effective Ranger effort more U.S. Advisors are needed with the Ranger Companies. The concept would be to assign Lieutenants and Captains to Division Headquarters and let them operate out of there. The Division Ranger Advisor could give them Advisory responsibility over 2 or 3 companies for continuity purposes. They would go out for 5 or 6 days on operations and then come back to a US Advisory compound to rest and write up reports. The important thing is that one officer staying with one Ranger company for one year would be impractical. Suggest that this matter be brought up at the Senior Advisors Conference 17 Sep 62.

CHARLES K. NULSEN JR  
Major, Infantry  
Ranger Advisor

AS AN EXAMPLE, IN THE 31<sup>ST</sup> T2 THERE ARE 27 RIFLE  
(3 REGIMENTS INCLUDING SUPPORT PERSONNEL)  
COMPANIES, WITH AN ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF 5,771 OFFICERS AND MEN  
AS OPPOSED TO 36 RANGER COMPANIES WITH AN ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF  
4,429 OFFICERS AND MEN. THE DIVISIONAL ADVISORY EFFORT CONSISTS OF  
27 OFFICERS, 18 NCOs AND 6 BM RATED OPERATORS. THE RANGER ADVISORY  
EFFORT CONSISTS OF ONE DIVISIONAL ADVISOR AND 2 OFFICERS AND 3 NCOs  
ASSIGNED TO THE 30<sup>TH</sup> SPECIAL BATTALION. IN THE 32<sup>ND</sup> & 33<sup>RD</sup> T2s THE 30

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/DRAFT/

SUBJECT: Trip to 30th Special Battalion, Phuoc Binh (Song Be), Phuoc Long  
TO: <sup>G3</sup> ~~Senior~~ Advisor  
III Corps

1. The undersigned with Major Baldwin, Airborne/Ranger Advisor ARVN Field Command, visited the 30th Special Battalion, Phuoc Binh, Phuoc Long Province, 28-31 August 1962. The purpose of the visit was to become acquainted with the conditions under which the 30th Battalion operated and trained, and evaluate the status of training and practicality of operational concepts.

2. We were met at Song Be airstrip by Capt Bacon, ~~American~~ Ranger Training Advisor assisting Major Hayes the Senior Advisor, and Major Primm the Sector Advisor. We stayed with Major Primm near the Province Chief's Headquarters and residence. During the three days we had extensive conversations with Major Hayes, Capt Bacon, Lt Rogarty and <sup>the</sup> NCO's attached to the Ranger Training Team. We also talked with the 30th Special Battalion Commander and his Company Commanders; we visited the Province Chief, Lt Col Diem, and talked with Major Primm and his staff. In addition to these conversations, we observed training, inspected billets and saw many of the Province Chief's civic action programs.

3. In previous reports submitted by Major Hayes, most of the difficulties encountered in training centered around the

Province Chief, Lt Col Diem, usurping the perogatives of the Bn Commander, Capt Nhu, and sending the Ranger Companies out on operations of questionable value under his personal control to the detriment of training and <sup>proper</sup> chain of command procedures.

~~From my observations~~  
~~As a result of investigation~~, I believe that there are three main obstacles to training of the 30th Ranger Battalion.

a. <sup>(first)</sup> The battalion was initially designed to conduct operations in Viet Cong territory for extended periods (10 days to 3 weeks) under control of a higher headquarters (division or corps).

~~The battalion as constituted was organized from 4 ranger companies that had been in Phuoc Long province under control of Lt Col Diem. The only outside element was battalion headquarters and headquarters company and the battalion staff.~~

~~In my judgement it was <sup>geometric to suppose</sup> ~~unrealistic to think~~ that one province chief would give up 4 of his 6 ranger companies to train an experimental ranger battalion. In other words, there was an error made in the original formation of the battalion.~~

b. Secondly, the indications from the Sector Advisor, Major Primm, <sup>points out the</sup> ~~that~~ neither he nor the Province Chief were ever briefed on the concept of the ranger battalion, and furthermore they were <sup>AT THE LAST MINUTE</sup> ~~never~~ notified of the purposes and arrival of the MAAG training team headed by Capt Bacon and later augmented by Major Hayes. The failure to coordinate and later to lay the ground work with the proper people in the province was <sup>a</sup> perfect setting for irritations that followed.

Thirdly, there appears to be a personality clash between Major Hayes on one side and Major Primm and LtCol Diem on the other. The personality clash has its roots in the aforementioned events. Major Hayes, in my judgement, is one of the finest combat officers in the United States Army. He is a volunteer to Vietnam and is <sup>IN A ONE DAY CLASS AT MAAC</sup> ~~TRAINING~~ dedicated to his task of training the 30th Battalion. ~~This was~~ <sup>TO</sup> given him as his only mission. He also is concerned over an apparent lack of appreciation of basic field leadership principles on the part of LtCol Diem. For instance LtCol Diem reportedly does not brief the battalion or company commander before a mission, does not issue instructions through the chain of command, and has an apparent disregard for the welfare of his ~~troops~~.

On the other hand, LtCol Diem is equally zealous in his work and without a doubt has one of the finest community programs underway in Vietnam. He struck me as being aggressive, enthusiastic and competent. He sees his mission as building up his province to withstand Viet Cong military and economic pressures. As the ~~won~~ with the responsibility, he uses all means at his disposal to protect his people and defeat the Viet Cong, this includes using the four ranger companies that Major Hayes is trying to train ~~AS A BATTALION~~. LtCol Diem has a fine working relationship with the Montagnards. It is through these mountain <sup>tribemen</sup> that he is able to ~~get~~ <sup>OBTAI</sup> nable intelligence <sup>INFORMATION</sup> for his operations. Although occasionally the ~~intelligence~~ <sup>INFORMATION</sup> he receives is old or misleading, the Sector S2 Advisor told me that most of the missions are ~~successful~~ because of <sup>THE</sup> accurate <sup>INFORMATION</sup> ~~intelligence~~ <sup>FROM</sup> ~~OF~~ THE MONTAGNAUD sources.

Because of Major Hayes' aggressive pursuit of the training mission and LtCol Diem's equally aggressive program there is an inevitable personality clash. It was reported to me that LtCol Diem told his Vietnamese officers that Major Hayes was the only American he "hated". Major Primm, Sector Advisor, supports his counterpart, LtCol Diem. While I was in Phuoc Binh there was very little communication between Major Hayes and Major Primm and LtCol Diem.

4. In spite of these obstacles there is some training being done and the American advisory team is gaining valuable experience. It is my opinion that even if the personality clash ~~is~~ <sup>PERFORMING WELL AND</sup> eliminated (and there are some indications that a mutual respect is building up between Major Hayes and LtCol Diem) and <sup>WILL BE</sup> proper orientation ~~is~~ <sup>STILL</sup> given to the Province Chief, the 30th Special Battalion will not be able to operate as originally intended. <sup>IN ESSENCE</sup> ~~THE BASIC DIFFICULTY STEMS FROM AN UNREALISTIC PLANNING CONCEPT THAT~~ ~~BECAUSE IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT LTCOL DIEM TO GIVE~~ ~~AWAY 4 OF HIS 6 RANGER COMPANIES~~ ~~FROM LTCOL DIEM'S CONTROL~~ ~~WOULD HAVE LTCOL DIEM GIVE UP 4 OF HIS 6 RANGER COMPANIES.~~

5. I recommend that an effort be made to reconstitute the 30th Special Battalion at a different training site. It was believed by both Major Primm and Major Hayes that LtCol Diem would release the Battalion staff, headquarters and headquarters company and one company (possibly the 340th) toward rebuilding a new 30th battalion. If three other provinces would contribute one company each, a new battalion could be formed and placed under III Corps control at a training center such as Trung Lap. It is also recommended that the same training team continue in the

mission. Major Hayes and Capt Bacon have gained valuable experience and have the support of Capt Nhu, the battalion commander.

CHARLES K. NULSEN JR

Major, Inf

III Corps Ranger Advisor

**MEMO ROUTING SLIP**

NEVER USE FOX APPROXIMATE DISTANCES  
CONCURRENCES OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1. NAME OF UNIT 2. CLASS (CIVIC, MILITARY, POLITICAL, ETC.)	3. ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	4. DATES	5. GROUPS
2			12/15
3			INFORMATION
4			DEFENSIVE ACTION
5			NOTIFICATION
6			NOTIFICATION
7			NOTIFICATION
8			NOTIFICATION
9			NOTIFICATION
10			NOTIFICATION

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However, the *Deva* may interrogate the *Yogis* as to what they have done to deserve such a punishment. If the *Yogis* are unable to give a satisfactory answer to what the *Deva* asks, then the *Deva* may inflict a punishment on them.

FROM THE EDITOR

## MAJOR NEWS

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DD 06-30 95 READING, MASSACHUSETTS

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MAGTN-IIIC-3

Weapons modification Project.

LtCol Ladd  
III Corps

LtCol Sawbridge      10 Sep 62  
III Corps              Maj Nulsen/b/50426

1. The last report concerning the testing of the 100 modified M-1's indicated that 50 had been issued to the 7th Division on 30 July and 50 would be issued to a specific ranger company on 8 or 9 August. The 50 issued to the 7th Division have been in Division Headquarters Company until this date. They will be issued on 11 September to a company in the 2d Bn, 12th Regt. The 50 issued to the CMD were turned over to the 310th Ranger Company and their testing program is complete. The official ARVN report will not be completed until results from the 7th Division have been received. However, Major Nulsen, III Corps project officer, has talked with Captain Tuan, C.O. 310th Ranger Company, and Captain Tru, CMD ranger commander; and they indicated that their report will contain the findings in para 3.

2. The test criteria was simply that ARVN issue 50 weapons and the officers and NCO's observe for four weeks their use and accuracy during operational periods. The 310th went on operations during their four week test period and most of men fired their weapons each time.

3. The following points were made by Capt Tuan and Capt Tru to Major Nulsen.

a. None of the soldiers used their slings when they fired their weapons during offensive operations. The speed necessary for reaction firing prohibited their taking time to use the sling. As a matter of fact, it was pointed out during these discussions that some Vietnamese Commanders have the soldiers take off the sling so that the weapons will be carried at the ready during combat operations. However, it was also brought out that during defensive periods the sling could possibly be used to gain more accuracy.

b. It was pointed out that lowering the sling swivel tended to unbalance the weapon while the soldier carried it at sling arms. This caused the weapon to slip around and force the butt to the front, which was rather annoying during approach marches.

c. These comments indicate that the sling modification causes an inconvenience while carried at sling arms and does not directly affect the accuracy of fire during combat operations, since it is not used. However at least one important aspect should be brought out.

MAGTN-IIIC-3

SUBJECT: Weapons Modification Project.

10 September 1962

Except for the initial testing at Quang Trung in 1961, ARVN forces have not had any range training with the modified sling. If the modified sling were used universally in training during both KD range firing and field firing exercises, practice in using the slings would promote certain techniques and confidence in the weapon that cannot be determined at this stage in testing. There may also be a certain psychological advantage gained if the ARVN soldier feels that the weapon has been modified to fit his needs.

4. To date, the indications are that ARVN will conclude that the modification does not significantly add to combat firing effectiveness. It is recommended that we wait for official report, due sometime in October, and weigh their specific findings against the advantages listed above as well as the results from the Quang Trung testing.

JOHN J. SAWBRIDGE  
LtCol, Infantry  
Chief Eng Branch