

DRAFTS OF REPORTS
MADE IN 1962

CONCERNING ADVISING &
TRAINING OF VIETNAMESE
RANGER UNITS.

REPORTS MADE BY MAJOR
C.K. NULSEN III CORPS RANGER
ADVISED (SEP 1962)

MAGTN-IIIIC-3

Ranger Advisors

G-3

Ranger Advisor

13 September 1962

THRU: G-3 Training

The Ranger Advisory effort appears to be inadequate in relation to its operational effort and number of companies. There are 3 Officers for 61 companies. Two Officers and 3 NCOs are assigned to the 30th Special Battalion. These figures are out of balance with the number of U.S. Advisors per regular ARVN Company. It is generally conceded that the Rangers are one of ARVN's finest small unit offensive forces. It has also been advanced that small unit actions are essential to carry the war to the Viet Cong. Furthermore experience has indicated that units with American Advisors have produced better results. In order to assist further an already effective Ranger effort more U.S. Advisors are needed with the Ranger Companies. The concept would be to assign Lieutenants and Captains to Division Headquarters and let them operate out of there. The Division Ranger Advisor could give them Advisory responsibility over 2 or 3 companies for continuity purposes. They would go out for 5 or 6 days on operations and then come back to a US Advisory compound to rest and write up reports. The important thing is that one officer staying with one Ranger company for one year would be impractical. Suggest that this matter be brought up at the Senior Advisors Conference 17 Sep 62.

CHARLES K. NULSEN JR
Major, Infantry
Ranger Advisor

AS AN EXAMPLE, IN THE 31st T2 THERE ARE 27 REGIMENT COMPANIES (3 REGIMENTS INCLUDING SUPPORT PERSONNEL) WITH AN ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF 5,771 OFFICERS AND MEN AS OPPOSED TO 36 RANGER COMPANIES WITH AN ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF 4,429 OFFICERS AND MEN. THE DIVISIONAL ADVISORY EFFORT CONSISTS OF 27 OFFICERS, 18 NCOs AND 6 EM RADIO OPERATORS. THE RANGER ADVISORY EFFORT CONSISTS OF ONE DIVISION ADVISOR AND 2 OFFICERS AND 3 NCOs ASSIGNED TO THE 30th SPECIAL BATTALION. IN THE 32nd & 33rd T2s THE

4 COPIES
OK

/DRAFT/

SUBJECT: Trip to 30th Special Battalion, Phuoc Binh (Song Be), ^{PHUOC LONG} PROVINCE

TO: ^{G3}
~~Senior~~ Advisor
III Corps

1. The undersigned with Major Baldwin, Airborne/Ranger Advisor ARVN Field Command, visited the 30th Special Battalion, Phuoc Binh, Phuoc Long Province, 28-31 August 1962. The purpose of the visit was to become acquainted with the conditions under which the 30th Battalion operated and trained, and evaluate the status of training and practicality of operational concepts.

2. We were met at Song Be airstrip by Capt Bacon, ~~American~~ Ranger Training Advisor assisting Major Hayes the Senior Advisor, and Major Primm the Sector Advisor. We stayed with Major Primm near the Province Chief's Headquarters and residence. During the three days we had extensive conversations with Major Hayes, Capt Bacon, Lt Fogarty and ^{the} NCO's attached to the Ranger Training Team. We also talked with the 30th Special Battalion Commander and his Company Commanders; we visited the Province Chief, Lt Col Diem, and talked with Major Primm and his staff. In addition to these conversations, we observed training, inspected billets and saw many of the Province Chief's civic action programs.

3. In previous reports submitted by Major Hayes, most of the difficulties encountered in training centered around the

Province Chief, Lt Col Diem, usurping the prerogatives of the Bn Commander, Capt Nhu, and sending the Ranger Companies out on operations of questionable value under his personal control, to the detriment of training and ^{PROPER} chain of command procedures.

^{FROM MY OBSERVATIONS}
~~As a result of investigation,~~ I believe that there are three main obstacles to training of the 30th Ranger Battalion.

a. ^{FIRST} The battalion was initially designed to conduct operations in Viet Cong territory for extended periods (10 days to 3 weeks) under control of a higher headquarters (division or Corps). ↑

↪ The battalion as constituted was organized from 4 ranger companies that had been in Phuoc Long province under control of LtCol Diem. The only outside element was battalion headquarters and headquarters company and the battalion staff. ↑

↪ In my judgement it was ^{OPTIMISTIC TO SUPPOSE} unrealistic to think that one province chief would give up 4 of his 6 ranger companies to train an experimental ranger battalion. ^{WHEN THERE IS A CONSTANT NEED TO USE THEM ON OPERATIONS} In other words, there was an error made in the original formation of the battalion.

b. Secondly, ^{POINTED OUT TIME} the indications from the Sector Advisor, Major Primm, ~~were~~ that neither he nor the Province Chief were ever briefed on the concept of the ranger battalion, and furthermore they were ^{ONLY} ~~never~~ notified ^{AT THE LAST MINUTE} of the purposes and arrival of the MAAG training team headed by Capt Bacon and later augmented by Major Hayes. The failure to coordinate and later to lay the ground work with the proper people in the province was ⁿ perfect setting for irritations that followed.

Third~~ly~~, there appears to be a personality clash between Major Hayes on one side and Major Primm and LtCol Diem on the other. The personality clash has its roots in the aforementioned events. Major Hayes, in my judgement, is one of the finest combat officers in the United States Army. He is a volunteer to Vietnam and is dedicated to his task of training the 30th Battalion. ^{IN A ONE DAY BRIEFING AT MAAG} ^{+ TRAINING} ~~THIS~~ was given ^{TO} him as his only mission. He also is concerned over an apparent lack of appreciation of basic field leadership principles on the part of LtCol Diem. For instance LtCol Diem reportedly does not brief the battalion or company commander before a mission, does not issue instructions through the chain of command, and has an apparent disregard for the welfare of his troops.

On the other hand, LtCol Diem is equally zealous in his work and without a doubt has one of the finest community programs underway in Vietnam. He struck me as being aggressive, enthusiastic and competent. He sees his mission as building up his province to withstand Viet Cong military and economic pressures. As the ~~work~~ with the responsibility, he uses all means at his disposal to protect his people and defeat the Viet Cong, this includes using the four ranger companies that Major Hayes is trying to train ^{AS A BATTALION}. LtCol Diem has a fine working relationship with the Montagnards. It is through these mountain ^Stribesmen that he is able to ^{OBTAIN} ~~get~~ valuable intelligence ^{INFORMATION} for his operations. Although occasionally the ^{INFORMATION} ~~intelligence~~ he receives is old or misleading, the Sector S2 Advisor told me that most of the missions are ^{SUCCESS} ~~successful~~ because of ^{THE} accurate ^{INFORMATION FROM} ~~intelligence~~ ^{OF THE} MONTAGNARD sources.

Because of Major Hayes' aggressive pursuit of the training mission and LtCol Diem's equally aggressive program there is an inevitable personality clash. It was reported to me that LtCol Diem told his Vietnamese officers that Major Hayes was the only American he "hated". Major Primm, Sector Advisor, supports his counterpart, LtCol Diem. While I was in Phuoc Binh there was very little communication between Major Hayes and Major Primm and LtCol Diem.

4. In spite of these obstacles there is ^{PERFORMING WELL AND} some training being done and the American advisory team is gaining valuable experience. It is my opinion that even if the personality clash ^{WERE} ~~was~~ eliminated (and there are some indications that a mutual respect is building up between Major Hayes and LtCol Diem) and ^{WERE TO BE} ~~if~~ proper orientation ~~is~~ given to the Province Chief, the 30th Special Battalion ^{STILL} will not be able to operate as originally intended. ^{IN ESSENCE} THE BASIC DIFFICULTY ~~STEMS FROM AN UNREALISTIC PLANNING CONCEPT THAT~~ ~~BECAUSE IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT LT COL DIEM TO GIVE AWAY 4 OF HIS 6 RANGER COMPANIES.~~ ~~FROM LT COL DIEM'S CONTROL.~~ ~~UP 4 OF HIS 6 RANGER COMPANIES.~~ WOULD HAVE LT COL DIEM GIVE UP 4 OF HIS 6 RANGER COMPANIES.

5. I recommend that an effort be made to reconstitute the 30th Special Battalion at a different training site. It was believed by both Major Primm and Major Hayes that LtCol Diem would release the Battalion staff, headquarters and headquarters company and one company (possibly the 340th) toward rebuilding a new 30th battalion. If three other provinces would contribute one company each, a new battalion could be formed and placed under III Corps control at a training center such as Trung Lap. It is also recommended that the same training team continue in the

mission. Major Hayes and Capt Bacon have gained valuable experience and have the support of Capt Nhu, the battalion commander.

CHARLES K. NULSEN JR

Major, Inf

III Corps Ranger Advisor

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS,
CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1 NAME OF UNIT 1st Clt Aerial	INITIALS	CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE	COORDINATION
2		FILE
		COORDINATION
3		NECESSARY ACTION
		NOTED AND SHOWN
4		REPLY
		REPLY

REMARKS

I am having another meeting with them and the Wednesday morning. At that time I am going to examine the notified and get more details of the methods they used to evaluate the combat tests. As a result of this talk I will be able to determine whether I think it will be worthwhile to wait for the results of the 7th Division.

The important thing is to notify Col. Bortner that the final evaluation report to General Englebert will be later than 15 September.

However, after my meeting on Wednesday morning I maybe able to recommend that it is not necessary to wait for the final results of the 7th Division testing.

OK

FROM NAME OF UNIT MAJOR NIELSEN	DATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	TELEPHONE

DD

FORM 1

95

Replaces DA Form 100-10, 100-11, 100-12, 100-13, 100-14, 100-15, 100-16, 100-17, 100-18, 100-19, 100-20, 100-21, 100-22, 100-23, 100-24, 100-25, 100-26, 100-27, 100-28, 100-29, 100-30, 100-31, 100-32, 100-33, 100-34, 100-35, 100-36, 100-37, 100-38, 100-39, 100-40, 100-41, 100-42, 100-43, 100-44, 100-45, 100-46, 100-47, 100-48, 100-49, 100-50, 100-51, 100-52, 100-53, 100-54, 100-55, 100-56, 100-57, 100-58, 100-59, 100-60, 100-61, 100-62, 100-63, 100-64, 100-65, 100-66, 100-67, 100-68, 100-69, 100-70, 100-71, 100-72, 100-73, 100-74, 100-75, 100-76, 100-77, 100-78, 100-79, 100-80, 100-81, 100-82, 100-83, 100-84, 100-85, 100-86, 100-87, 100-88, 100-89, 100-90, 100-91, 100-92, 100-93, 100-94, 100-95, 100-96, 100-97, 100-98, 100-99, 100-100

GPO: 1954 O-20-2

MAGTN-IIIC-3

Weapons modification Project.

LtCol Ladd
III Corps

LtCol Sawbridge
III Corps

10 Sep 62
Maj Nulsen/b/50426

1. The last report concerning the testing of the 100 modified M-1's indicated that 50 had been issued to the 7th Division on 30 July and 50 would be issued to a specific ranger company on 8 or 9 August. The 50 issued to the 7th Division have been in Division Headquarters Company until this date. They will be issued on 11 September to a company in the 2d Bn, 12th Regt. The 50 issued to the CMD were turned over to the 310th Ranger Company and their testing program is complete. The official ARVN report will not be completed until results from the 7th Division have been received. However, Major Nulsen, III Corps project officer, has talked with Captain Tuan, C.O. 310th Ranger Company, and Captain Tru, CMD ranger commander; and they indicated that their report will contain the findings in para 3.

2. The test criteria was simply that ARVN issue 50 weapons and the officers and NCO's observe for four weeks their use and accuracy during operational periods. The 310th went on operations during their four week test period and most of men fired their weapons each time.

3. The following points were made by Capt Tuan and Capt Tru to Major Nulsen.

a. None of the soldiers used their slings when they fired their weapons during offensive operations. The speed necessary for reaction firing prohibited their taking time to use the sling. As a matter of fact, it was pointed out during these discussions that some Vietnamese Commanders have the soldiers take off the sling so that the weapons will be carried at the ready during combat operations. However, it was also brought out that during defensive periods the sling could possibly be used to gain more accuracy.

b. It was pointed out that lowering the sling swivel tended to unbalance the weapon while the soldier carried it at sling arms. This caused the weapon to slip around and force the butt to the front, which was rather annoying during approach marches.

c. These comments indicate that the sling modification causes an inconvenience while carried at sling arms and does not directly affect the accuracy of fire during combat operations, since it is not used. However at least one important aspect should be brought out.

MAGTN-IIIC-3

10 September 1962

SUBJECT: Weapons Modification Project.

Except for the initial testing at Quang Trung in 1961, ARVN forces have not had any range training with the modified sling. If the modified sling were used universally in training during both KD range firing and field firing exercises, practice in using the slings would promote certain techniques and confidence in the weapon that cannot be determined at this stage in testing. There may also be a certain psychological advantage gained if the ARVN soldier feels that the weapon has been modified to fit his needs.

4. To date, the indications are that ARVN will conclude that the modification does not significantly add to combat firing effectiveness. It is recommended that we wait for official report, due sometime in October, and weigh their specific findings against the advantages listed above as well as the results from the Quang Trung testing.

JOHN J. SAWBRIDGE
LtCol, Infantry
Chief Eng Branch