

Personal Copy

COMMENDATIONS RECEIVED BY  
COMRIVPATFOR COMRAIDS

COMMENDATION	DATE AWARDED	COMMAND	PERIOD COVERED
Presidential Unit Citation <sup>1</sup>	14 JAN 1968	SEAL Team ONE	16 JUL 66 - 31 JUL 67
Presidential Unit Citation <sup>2</sup>	27 JUN 1968	Delta River Patrol Group	9 MAY 66 - 30 JUN 67
MERITORIOUS Unit Citation <sup>3</sup>	6 AUG 1968	Task Group 116.7	3, 4 and 5 AUG 67
Navy Unit Commendation <sup>4</sup>	9 OCT 1968	Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron 3	1 JUL 67 - 2 MAR 68

References:

1. Commander Naval Operations Support Group, Pacific ltr to Secretary of the Navy (Board of Decorations and Medals) Ser 0326 of 23 DEC 67
2. Commander River Patrol Force ltr to Secretary of the Navy (Board of Decorations and Medals) Ser 084 of 3 OCT 67
3. Commander River Patrol Force ltr to Secretary of the Navy (Board of Decorations and Medals) Ser 019 of 9 FEB 68; Chief of Naval Personnel ltr Pers-G-25-LB/djm of 6 AUG 68 and Commander River Patrol Force ltr to Chief of Naval Personnel (Pers-G25) Ser 476 of 2 DEC 68
4. Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam ltr to Secretary of the Navy Ser 3161 of 12 AUG 68 and SECNAV message 092340Z OCT 68

1968 RIVER PATROL FORCE HISTORY  
FM: CRPF  
TO: CNO (OP-09B9)

CTF116/102 : bi  
5750  
SA: 031  
26 FEB 69

Signature (s)

PERSONNEL CASUALTIES - 1968

<u>KILLED IN ACTION</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
LT John L. ABRAMS	HAL-3 DET 1	14 JUL
QMC Franklin E. ANDERSON	RIVDIV 543	1 SEP
LT Jack BERKFBILE	RIVDIV 552	23 NOV
AMS3 Lloyd A. CONE	HAL-3 DET 7	8 MAY
QMG3 Thomas J. CRAGHEAD, JR.	RIVDIV 535	4 FEB
EW3 Carl R. CRONE	USS HUNTERDON COUNTY	12 SEP
LT William E. DENNIS, USN	RIVDIV 535	21 JUN
BMI Scott G. DELPH, USN	RIVDIV 535	21 JUN
ENPW Westely G. DOTY	USS HUNTERDON COUNTY	12 SEP
YN1 Oliver E. DURHAM, USN	RIVDIV 531	27 NOV
EN2 Thomas C. ELDRIDGE, USN	RIVDIV 573	13 DEC
LCDR Arthur J. ELLIOT, USN	RIVRON 57	29 DEC
ADR2 Eugene T. FRALEY, USN	SEAL TM2 DET ALFA	21 JAN
SM1 Ralph L. GREEN, USN	RIVDIV 533	18 SEP
ABH1 Jan D. JAMISON, USN	RIVDIV 551	1 SEP
SN Roy B. KIRTH, USN	SEAL TM 1 DET GOLF	5 JUN
LT Carl KOLLMEYER, USN	RIVDIV 511	5 MAY
QMG3 Ronald R. LAKE, USN	RIVDIV 513	24 MAR
EN3 Steve D. LEDFORD, USN	RIVDIV 514	8 APR
EN2 David J. LEHMAN, USN	RIVDIV 534	16 DEC
BMI James "C" R. LEWIS, USN	RIVDIV 573	13 DEC
BMI George P. PROFFER, USN	RIVDIV 513	24 MAR
BMI Arthur O. PRINDENGAST, USN	RIVDIV 513	24 MAR
ABH2 Roberto RAMOS, USN	SEAL TM 2 DET ALFA	29 OCT
AME3 Raymond D. ROBINSON, USN	HAL-3 DET 1	14 JUL
ENS James H. ROMANSKI, USNR	HAL-3 DET 1	14 JUL
AME2 Clarence T. RISHER, III, USN	SEAL TM2 DET ALFA	31 JAN
EN3 Ronald SAPORITO, USN	RIVDIV 511	5 MAY
QMC Theodora SMITH, USN	RIVDIV 593	8 NOV
WO-1 Eugene S. PINNIN, USN	SEAL TM 1 DET GOLF	20 AUG
EN3 Daniel D. WEBB, USN	RIVDIV 534	7 MAR
QMG2 Mitchell A. WERTZ, USN	RIVDIV 514	7 JUN
AMS3 Dennis M. WEBBE, USN	HAL-3 DET 1	14 JUL

Total Killed in Action, 1968 -- Thirty-Three

Enclosure (2)

DIED OF WOUNDS

	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
MM1 Joseph A. ALBRECHT	SEAL TM 2 DET ALFA	2 AUG
4MG3 Dell R. CLAIBORNE	RIVDIV 523	8 JAN
BMC Daniel GUEST	RIVDIV 522	29 AUG
BMI Louis C. SCHLOTE	RIVDIV 511	16 APR

Total Died of Wounds, 1968 -- Four

DIED NOT AS A RESULT OF HOSTILE FIRE

GMG3 Marcus E. CLINE	RIVDIV 535	26 JUN
SFP2 David E. DEVINE	SEAL TM 1 DET GOLF	5 MAY
LTJG John D. GOLLANON	HAL-3 DET 2	30 JUN
BMI Walter G. POPE	SEAL TM 1 DET GOLF	29 APR
ETN3 James K. SANDER	SEAL TM 1 DET GOLF	22 NOV
GMG3 Jimmie M. THOMPSON	RIVDIV 571	8 DEC

Total Died not as a result of Hostile Fire, 1968 -- Six

WOUNDED IN ACTION

Total Wounded in Action, 1968 -- 43

Enclosure (2)

GAME WARDEN LOCATOR - 31 <sup>Dec '68</sup> ~~January 1969~~

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>Designator</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Admin</u>	<u>Staging Site</u>
CTF 116	COMRIVPATFOR/ COMRIVPATFLOT FIVE	Binh Thuy	
CTG 116.0/ CTG 194.6/ CTG 194.9	COMRIVPATFOR/ COMRIVPATFLOT FIVE	Binh Thuy	
CTG 116.1/ CTU 194.6.0	COMRIVRON 51	Binh Thuy	
CTU 116.1.1	COMRIVDIV 511	Binh Thuy	
CTU 116.1.2	COMRIVDIV 512	HUNTERDON CTY	
CTU 116.1.3	COMRIVDIV 513	Binh Thuy	
CTU 116.1.4/ CTU 194.6.1	COMRIVDIV 514	Binh Thuy	Rach Sai
CTU 116.2.6	CO USS HUNTERDON COUNTY		
CTU 116.2.8	OinC HAL 3 Det 1	HUNTERDON CTY	
CTU 116.2.9	OinC HAL 3 Det 7	Binh Thuy	
CTG 116.3	COMRIVRON 53	My Tho	
CTU 116.3.2	COMRIVDIV 532	My Tho	
CTU 116.3.3	COMRIVDIV 533	My Tho	
CTU 116.3.4/ CTU 194.9.2	COMRIVDIV 534	YBGM 18	Tra Cu
CTU 116.3.5/ CTU 194.9.3	COMRIVDIV 535	YBGM 18	Tuyen Whoa
CTU 116.3.8/ CTU 194.9.8	OinC HAL 3 Det 4	Dang Tan	
CTU 116.3.9	OinC HAL 3 Det 6	Dang Tan	
CTG 116.5	COMRIVRON 55	YBGM 16	
CTU 116.5.1	COMRIVDIV 551	Mobile Base II	

Enclosure (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CTU 116.5.2	COMRIVDIV 552	YRBM 16	
CTU 116.5.4	COMRIVDIV 554	JENNINGS COUNTY	
CTU 116.5.5	COMRIVDIV 574	YRBM 16	
CTU 116.5.6	CO USS JENNINGS COUNTY		
CTU 116.5.8	OinC HAL 3 Det 5	YRBM 16	
CTG 116.6	OinC SEAL Team Det Alfa	Binh Thuy	
CTU 116.6.0	OinC SEAL Team Det Golf	Binh Thuy	
CTU 116.6.1	SEALS Det A 4th Pltn	Vinh Long	
CTU 116.6.2	SEALS Det G "C" Pltn	Vinh Long	
CTU 116.6.3	SEALS Det A 5th Pltn	My The	
CTU 116.6.4	SEALS Det A 6th Pltn	Nha Be	
CTU 116.6.6	SEALS Det G "A" Pltn	Sa Dec	
CTU 116.6.7	OinC MST 2	Binh Thuy	
CTE 116.6.7.1	MST 2 Det Alfa	Binh Thuy	
CTE 116.6.7.2	MST 2 Det Bravo	Vinh Long	
CTE 116.6.7.3	MST 2 Det Charlie	My The	
CTE 116.6.7.4	MST 2 Det Delta	Nha Be	
CTE 116.6.7.6	MST 2 Det Foxtrot	Sa Dec	
CTG 116.7		YRBM 20	
CTU 116.7.1	COMRIVDIV 571	YRBM 20	
CTU 116.7.2	COMRIVDIV 572	YRBM 20	
CTU 116.7.3	COMRIVDIV 573	Sa Dec	
CTU 116.7.9	OinC HAL 3 Det 3	Vinh Long	
CTU 194.9.0	COMDIVRON 57	HARNETT CTF	Enclosure (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CTG 116.8	CO HAL 3	Vung Tau	
CTG 116.9	COMSSZRIVPATGRU	Nha Be	
CTU 116.9.1	COMRIVRON 59	Nha Be	
CTE 116.9.1.1	COMRIVDIV 591	Nha Be	
CTE 116.9.1.2	COMRIVDIV 592	Nha Be	
CTE 116.9.1.3/ CTU 194.9.5	COMRIVDIV 593	HARNETT CTY	
CTE 116.9.1.4	COMRIVDIV 594	Nha Be	
CTE 116.9.1.6/ CTU 194.9.2	COMRIVDIV 515	YRBM 18	Tan An
CTE 116.9.1.7/ CTU 194.9.4	COMRIVDIV 553	HARNETT CTY	Hiep Hoa
CTE 116.9.1.8	COMRIVDIV 531	Nha Be	
CTU 116.9.2	COMINDIV 112	Nha Be	
CTU 116.9.3	COMINDIV 113	Nha Be	
CTU 116.9.8	OinC HAL 3 Det 2	Nha Be	
CTU 194.9.9	CO USS HARNETT COUNTY		
CTU 194.9.6	TF 117 Det A Units	HARNETT CTY	
CTE 194.9.6.1	CO USS ASKARI		

Units not assigned to River Patrol Force:

Assigned to CTF Clearwater

COMRIVDIV 521	Mobile Base I, I CTZ
COMRIVDIV 543	Cua Viet, I CTZ

Enclosure (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Location of Floating Bases:

USS JENNINGS COUNTY	Bassac River near WS 400 860
USS HUNTERDON COUNTY	Bassac River near XR 350 650
USS HARNETT COUNTY	Van Co Dong River near Ben Luc
Mobile Base I	Tan My Lagoon, I CPZ
Mobile Base II	Mekong River near Tan Chau
YRBM 16	Bassac River near Chau Dec
YRBM 18	Van Co River near XS 850 550
YRBM 20	Co Chien River near Vinh Long

Enclosure (3)


CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATIONS HIGHLIGHTS

On 24 May 1968, Commander Task Force 116 assumed operational control of the Communication Center located at Binh Tuy. Prior to this, the operational control was vested in the Naval Support Activity Detachment, Binh Tuy.

On 1 June, 1969, Commander Task Force 116 commenced message broadcasting to all mobile GAME WARDEN units.

MESSAGE TRAFFIC TRENDS - 1969



Enclosure (4)

## MAJOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED - 1968

In 1968, the COMRIVPATFOR Intelligence Staff maintained several plots of enemy activity compiled from all available sources.


Intelligence reports and actual discoveries of installations, caches and troop locations were plotted (in addition to locations of enemy initiated fire fights.) A six month pattern analysis of this information revealed that the Viet Cong don't set patterns. However, very discernible trends were noted. Favored crossing areas, crossing security procedures and base camp areas were exposed. At the end of 1968, the study plot was loaned to the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, for exploitation.

In support of the overall mission of River Patrol Force, the Force Staff has maintained an updated local Viet Cong Infrastructure Blacklist which the patrols utilize in screening suspects. This has resulted in the captures of several VCI.

Of significance during 1968 was the ability of the IV Corps Intelligence Community (All intelligence agencies in IV CTZ) to analyze all information through the newly established Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), and forward all units of the "August Offensive". Indicators were noted and appropriate warnings disseminated. With this joint effort, the River Patrol Force Intelligence Staff has been able to provide a more accurate situation estimate and ideally, will be able to prognosticate any future major offensives.

Enclosure (5)

1. The following schematic illustrates the command relations for the River Patrol Force:



NOTE: Refer to Enclosure (3) for unit and location.

Enclosure (6)

4. Research and Development Evaluation and Tactics. In an attempt to facilitate detection of enemy movement, particularly at night, several new concepts of operations have been evaluated. These include the Silenced Outboard Motor (SOM), Remote Underwater Detection Device (RUDD), and the DUCKBLIND Experimental Communications System. Tactics are being developed in the use of the L&SC to augment patrol units as a preliminary feasibility study for the development of a Quiet Fast Boat (QFB). Tactical innovations include the voluntary use of Hoi Chanhs (Returnees) with PBR patrols by CTG 116.3; the similar Chien Hoi Integration Program (CHIP) employed by CTG 116.2; and the use of PBR crewmen and National Police in civilian craft to apprehend VC tax collectors and finance cadre. (See 30 September item in enclosure (9)). The significance of this type of operation is that the watercraft used to surprise the VC - the Q-Boat if you may, is voluntarily provided by the Vietnamese owner and occasionally is manned by its regular Vietnamese crew.

#### Assessment of Events

1. The so called "Third Offensive" is judged to have commenced on the night 20 - 21 August; however, other than a great increase in attacks by fire (ABF) and a few small ground probes, this offensive did not reach the proportions of either the First (TET) or Second (5 May) offensives. Since 21 August, the enemy order of battle has remained nearly constant in the vicinity of GAME WARDEN Bases: Binh Thuy - Can Tho, six main force and one local force battalions; Sa Dec, two local force battalions; Vinh Long, two main force battalions, one My Tho, two local force battalions. Intelligence indicates that the MR II and MR III battalions are at reduced manning level when compared to pre-TET levels, and that the training levels are similarly reduced. Prior to the so called commencement of the "Third Offensive", enemy activity was at an unusually low level and there are indicators that increased friendly ground and air operations have taken their toll on the enemy.

2. The rainfall experienced during the Southwest Monsoon has not been up to the anticipated level; therefore, the flooding of the Western Delta and Plain of Reeds has not been as great as in previous years, though it is sufficient to inundate large areas which now must be assumed to be open for possible infiltration.

3. The enemy certainly possesses the capability of mounting increased action in the Mekong Delta region. The possibility that he may be deferring such actions until late October or early November, and then concentrating his efforts against U. S. installations in an effort to influence the U. S. elections and to precipitate effects on the negotiations in Paris cannot be discounted. The River Patrol Force is continuing its efforts in all phases of operations and is conducting close liaison with the Senior Advisor IV Corps to coordinate efforts with other IV Corps operations and is actively participating in the planning of proposed future Corps-wide operations.

PERIOD: 1 OCTOBER 1968 through 31 DECEMBER 1968:

Evaluation of Progress (Operation GAME WARDEN)

1. Population and Resources Control. The primary mission of the River Patrol Force, to interdict enemy infiltration, is achieved through population and resources control. The operations being conducted in support of Operation SEA LORDS have taken many RIVPATFOR units off the major rivers of the Delta. Accordingly there has been a corresponding decrease in numbers of contacts detected and number of persons checked as was expected when removing these units to less dense areas of population and traffic. By assiduous use of previous experience and tactical intelligence, Task Group Commanders have positioned their remaining patrols to counter the enemy in the most active areas. This has balanced somewhat the decrease in detections and search and is believed to be the best solution possible under the above circumstances. Additional measures include increased use of "black-lists" which provide a selective basis for detaining personnel particularly VCI, during routine patrols. They are effective when used carefully as evidenced by the large number of blacklist detainees obtained by TG 116.5 in the Hong Ngu areas. Finally, increased US/GVN emphasis on island campaigns such as the Can Tho crossing corridor and Dung Island complexes deny the enemy trans-river staging areas and thus decrease his capability to move necessary supplies and personnel.

2. Waterway security

(a) A portion of TF 116 support of SA IV CT2 is directed toward insuring major waterways are open to friendly commerce. With GAME WARDEN units providing normal patrol surveillance and a fast reaction force to counter enemy initiated engagements, principally on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers, no significant incidents have occurred in the Delta involving logistics shipping. Some attacks have been initiated on the Long Tau shipping channel, however quick reaction by TG 116.9 coordinated with VN ground units discourages such attacks and reduces their effectiveness.

(b) Enemy mining attempts continue to be a formidable threat as evidenced by the minings of the Westchester County on 1 November and TMLC 4 on 15 November. It should be noted that these minings did not occur during waterway transit. Also, aggressive anti-mining and anti-swimmer/sapper tactics by GAME WARDEN afloat bases have prevented success of such attacks on these units during the reporting period. Alert santry watches combined with mine/swimmer countermeasures have thwarted enemy mining attempts on GAME WARDEN afloat/support bases.

(c) GAME WARDEN efforts extend also to major trans-delta canals. The Cho Gao canal, the major waterway between III and IV Corps, has been cleared by TF 117 units and is now frequently transited by river patrol units. However, the difficulty of clearing the major trans-delta waterways is substantiated by the hard put resistance of enemy units to the current clearing operation along the MANG-THIT-NICOLAI Canal. A major factor in successful opening of these waterways is the positioning of numerous effective outposts along the banks providing security through aggressive operations. This can only be achieved through an earnest GVN effort.

3. Psychological Operations and Civic Action. Increased emphasis on psychological operations, coupled with the expansion of operations, particularly SEA LORDS, resulted in a record quarter for loudspeaker broadcast hours and Hoi Chanhs rallying to River Patrol Force units. Loudspeaker hours were up 100% with a record high of 886 hours recorded in November, while the rally rate increased 250% with a high of 30 Hoi Chanhs received in October. PSYOP loudspeaker broadcasts continued to utilize weekly news tapes and emphasize such topics as the Chieu Hoi and Volunteer Informant Programs. In addition, the populace was targeted with themes on the Paris peace talks and the bombing halt. Intelligence personnel, captured documents and returnee interviews continue to attest to the effectiveness of these broadcasts. In conjunction with the Accelerated Pacification Campaign to upgrade 1000 hamlets in South Vietnam, numerous MEDCAP were conducted in the target hamlets. In all cases, the Vietnamese hamlet and village officials were enthusiastic with these visits and several officials submitted written requests for additional MEDCAPS in the future. Typical of the GAME WARDEN Civic Action projects was the rebuilding of the fire-razed outpost in October. (OTG 116.1 msg 260333Z OCT 68 refers).

4. Research and Development Evaluation and Tactics. As the enemy develops his tactics against GAME WARDEN forces, research and development of new equipment and revised force employment is required to counter his efforts.

(a) The Duffle Bag special communications system is being employed to a greater extent for the increased tempo of operations in III CTZ. The transition from the experimental to operational phase has been made and reasonable success is anticipated.

(b) Newly developed tactics such as combined ASPB/PBR patrols have proven effective as operations are expanded into narrower interways. The increased security offered by the additional firepower of the ASPB is substantial. Additional tactics developed include the joint PBR/ASPC patrol with embarked troops as an ambush reaction force. This tactic affords another means of countering enemy initiated incidents.

(c) Beach Jumper Unit ONE, Detachment DELTA has employed high power speaker systems for daily PSYOP coverage in the Rach Gia area utilizing Seewolf and ASPB platforms. Detachment DELTA is also engaged in special operations in support of TU 116.1.4.

#### Evaluation of Progress (Operation SEA LORDS)

##### 1. Vinh To Canal Campaign.

(a) Objectives: To interdict enemy infiltration of arms, personnel, and equipment from Cambodia across the Vinh To Canal into the IV CTZ of South Vietnam and to further establish OVN presence and enforce established curfews.

(b) Progress: Based on intelligence reports received and the psychological impact on the enemy and the local populace, established by our presence in the area, the accomplishment of our objectives on the Vinh Te canal is proceeding favorably. As a result of the patrols the enemy has had to attempt to establish new routes of infiltration upsetting the status quo heretofore enjoyed. Early in the operation three major encounters with the enemy were experienced (November 18, 21, 23). It is believed an attempted crossing was prevented on the 23 November encounter; however, no arms caches or supplies have been discovered thus far in the operation. A SEAL platoon was assigned to gather intelligence and establish listening sites, but they had very little contact with practically no new intelligence of the area. Midway in the operation the Cambodian government issued instructions to tighten up on its border security due to a suspected ICG inspection; this may also have accounted for the low infiltration activity during the latter stages of the operation. Due to the present low water state, 117 units (ASPB'S/MIC'S) have terminated operations in the area (21 December). PBR's are maintaining patrols on the canal, however they are extremely limited in their field of fire due to the high banks. The operation has been further degraded by the ever present problem throughout the operation of obtaining troops for vital bank security and anti-ambush reaction. Future operations in this area should be commenced early in the wet season, taking full advantage of the period of time when the water level is high.

## 2. Operation Giant Slingshot.

(a) Objectives: Through extensive patrols on the Song Van Co Tay and Song Van Co Dong, units will interdict and disrupt enemy infiltration of war materials from Cambodia to base camp sites in III and IV CTZ. Units will also promote and develop coordinated USN/AVN operations to react and discourage enemy countermeasures to river patrols. GVN curfews will be enforced in order to assist interdiction efforts by preventing the intermingling of VC infiltrators with friendly indigenous peoples during night conditions when detection capabilities are restricted. Finally, USN forces will pursue an active psyops program, to strengthen the GVN influence over the local populace.

### (b) Progress:

1 The operation, as initially instituted, has been rapidly expanded to include a force of 50 PBR's, 32 assorted RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT, two EBM, and three afloat support bases. Although patrol lengths total 63 miles on the Van Co Dong and 59 miles on the Van Co Tay, effective utilization of assets precludes the enemy the use of these rivers for the lateral movement of materials. An area familiarisation improves and tactical intelligence becomes more readily available, crossing traffic will likewise be hampered considerably.

2 Coordination and cooperation between US/WN forces has increased at an extremely favorable rate. Considering the dissimilar terrain and multitude of operations within the objective area, it is rewarding to note that not one accident has occurred from mutual interference. Ground reaction forces, albeit CIDG, ARVN, or U. S. troops, for the most part are readily available. Similarly, air and artillery support are well coordinated and quickly answer calls for assistance. Even more significant has been the results achieved by these joint operations in detecting and recovering enemy weapon caches. (CTG 194.9 msgs 221300Z DEC 1968 and 241214Z DEC 1968 are typical examples of these endeavors.)

3 Reported sightings substantiate that little night traffic has been encountered on these waterways. This is probably attributable to the numerous night air operations throughout the area.

4 Patrol units are conducting daily PSYOPS speaker broadcasts, leaflet, handouts, and VN flag distributions. PSYOPS efforts, despite numerous engagements, are continuing to increase and rising influence on the populace is expected.

### 3. Rach Gia Campaign.

(a) Objectives: By joint USN/USAR/VNN/ARVN/VNMC efforts, to wrest the area from the enemy, establish GVN presence and control, and to prevent enemy infiltration across and along the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen canal. To aid pacification of the area by conducting psychological operations and enforce curfew as established by local GVN officials.

(b) Progress: Since the VC initiated Tet offensive 1968 until early November 1968 that portion of the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen canal lying in Kien Giang Province was almost entirely controlled by the enemy. During the first week in November one Battalion of Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) supported by units of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), Coastal Surveillance Force and River Patrol Force swept the canal ridgeline of enemy presence in any magnitude. The major threat being removed, the VNMC and the bulk of the MRF proceeded to other objectives on 6 November passing operational control to Commander River Patrol Force. At this time the interdiction Phase commenced with 10 PBR's, 1 LHBT, 2 ASPB's, 2 ATC, 1 Moniter, 1 CCB, 2 PCF's, 1 SEAL platoon, 2 companies of RF troops and 1 company of ARVN Engineers. As boat patrols, troop sweeps progressed and three new RF outposts were established, the enemy was not able to conduct his normal tactic of proceeding in the van of advancing troops and returning at his leisure to his original positions upon their extraction. The heavily bunkered West bank and numerous landmines and booby traps along the east bank of the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen Canal have been neutralized by ARVN engineers and RF troops in joint USN/VNN/ARVN operations. Several enemy arms and stores caches have been discovered.

Enclosure (7)

and seized, thereby denying their use to the communists. These strikes were made possible only by continuous liaison and an excellent US/VN rapport. River traffic during daylight hours is ever increasing as more and more people are reestablishing homes within this highly desirable area. Hamlet development is presently approaching pre-war levels with families establishing permanent residence along approximately three-fourths of this canal lying within Kien Giang Province. A portion of the remainder is being visited only during the day but as more outposts are established hamlet development will continue. River traffic by civilian and military craft, though subject to enemy ambush, is relatively secure by day and comparable to most other regularly patrolled waterways throughout Vietnam by night. Curfew hours are rigidly enforced to deny the enemy use of darkness. Intelligence sources indicate that there has been an increased detection of traffic along the coastal shores of Kien Giang Province thereby indicating that there may well be an effect upon the infiltration route across and along this canal. By moving along the shoreline in shallow water where MARKET TIME forces cannot patrol, infiltration could proceed undetected. On 22 December, an NVA Chieu Hoi claiming to be a high-ranking officer in the U-Thanh 10 Battalion stated that there was a thirty day build-up of supplies destined for the Mekong Delta located Northwest of this major canal. This backlog could in part be attributed to the presence of USN/GVN efforts along this canal.

#### 4. Can Tho Crossing Corridor Campaign.

(a) Objectives: To interdict enemy movement through the Can Tho Crossing Corridor, and to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure and communications-liaison network on the islands contained therein, by imposition of a stringent blockade in conjunction with GVN sweep operations on the island complexes.

(b) Progress: The operation was conducted from 22 October to 29 November in three stages. An intensified patrol plan was conducted from 22 October to 11 November and was followed by a blockade of the corridor. The final stage commenced later on 11 November and combined the landing of troops in conjunction with the blockade. The following results were indicated in discussions with the Fourth Riverine Area Advisor, Fourth Riverine Area Intelligence Officer, and the U. S. Army RF/PF Advisor residing on Cu Lao May Island: Interrogation of detainees taken during the operation (as reported by NIO Vinh Long 201026Z December 1968) provided information on previous commo-liaison units, strengths, and tactics. There is no evidence that the VC will not use this area for crossing again, however reports from the RF/PF Advisor on Cu Lao May Island indicate that approximately 120 VC previously based on the island have departed the area. Routine commo-liaison routes were altered during the operation and indications are that the stringent blockade prevented any large scale crossing. The establishment of the outpost

on the southern tip of Cu Lao May Island in the path of the previous commo-liaison routes, along with aggressive RF/PF night ambushes and patrols should greatly inhibit any further VC use of the area as a routine crossing point. One of the most notable aspects of this operation was the development and execution of a well coordinated joint USN/VN campaign.

#### Assessment of Events.

1. GAME WARDEN operations and TF 116 involvement in SEA LORDS Campaigns have been a contributing deterrent to enemy efforts to extend control in the III and IV CTZ. This has been achieved by various tactics which include:

(a) River Patrol Forces have to some degree denied the enemy free movement not only on major waterways, but on tributary canals and rivers that were once considered VC controlled areas. Interdiction efforts cannot always be inductively determined since enemy desired and finally accomplished movements are never completely available for analysis. But the resistance the enemy has displayed toward the expansion of TF 116 operation areas does in some degree evidence the enemy's reaction to the present and potential pressure exerted on his movements. As a direct result of TF 116 efforts, GVN outposts have been reoccupied, new outposts constructed, and outpost personnel have commenced a more aggressive attitude. The increase in GVN influence, interdiction of enemy resupply routes, and positive action of friendly units can only have a deleterious affect on the enemy.

(b) As evidenced by the increasing Chieu Hoi rate, the aggressive psyops program conducted by this Force continues to lessen the once dominating VC influence over the people.

(c) River Patrol Force continues to promote coordinated joint USN/VN operations. The success of the Rach Gia campaign has vividly demonstrated the importance of ground force support. Availability of ground units to participate in sweeps, bank security, and reaction forces has significantly enhanced GVN presence thereby encouraging people to reinhabit homes on the Rach Gia/Long Xuyen Canal. Although troops lack training, the continuous support and encouragement of US/GVN officials has advanced their participation. It is considered imperative that troop availability be a part of each combined interdiction and pacification effort.

(d) By using tactical intelligence this force strikes the heart of the enemy's organizational structure. The acquisition and selective use of enemy blacklists compiled by local district/sub-sector officials has permitted TF 116 units to detain many top ranking officials.

2. While GAME WARDEN efforts thwart the enemy's ability to move his troops and material and weakens his domination over many areas, he retains the ability to direct coordinated attacks on this Force as well as other U. S. and friendly world military forces. Any changes to the enemy's overall strength during this report period cannot be accurately judged.

3. The assessment of operations cannot be concluded without addressing those problem areas that detract from operational success.

(a) The broadening spectrum of GAME WARDEN operations has substantially increased requirements for air mobility. The necessity for increased visual reconnaissance of new operational areas, and the prominent need of air assets for night SEAL insertion/extraction demands readily available inherent air assets. Paucity of air assets reaffirms previous requests for three UH-1D or UH-1E to support GAME WARDEN operations.

(b) Communications not only in the SEA LORDS Campaigns but also among remnant GAME WARDEN bases can seldom, if ever, be considered adequate. Expansion of forces into enemy controlled areas where reactions are imminent necessitates continuous two way communication to insure fast reaction of support forces. The sensitive areas this Force operates in and the need for rapid transmission of pertinent information to higher authority further substantiates this communication requirement. A detailed study of communications capabilities needs is certainly in order.

References: (a) COMNAVFORV COMF Ltr 3410 Ser: 0564 of 13 September 1968

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STATISTICS - 1968

I. PSYOP loudspeaker hours vs. number of ralliers (Hoï Chanks) received by RIVPATFOR units.

<u>QUARTER</u>	<u>LOUDSPEAKER HOURS</u>	<u>HOI CHANKS</u>
FIRST	506	1
SECOND	570	15
THIRD	940	21
FOURTH	2,003	67

II. Man days spent on civic action (8hrs/man day) - 2219.

III. Value of supplies contributed from military resources for civic action. . . . . 2,620,300 \$VN

IV. Voluntary contributions for Civic Action . . . . . 296,025 \$VN

V. MEDCAPS Conducted. . . . . 187

VI. VN treated by MEDCAPS. . . . . 35,270

VII. MEDEVACS. . . . . 1,852

ANNEX A

MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUBMISSIONS

Enclosure (5)