

Ref to 005

CONFIDENTIAL

1 APRIL 1969

CURRENT OPERATIONS BRIEF

LAST OCTOBER, WE HAD ACHIEVED A LEVEL OF OPERATIONS THAT INCLUDED

A TIGHT COASTAL SURVEILLANCE SEAL, GOOD PATROL BOAT COVERAGE OF THE

MAJOR RIVERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM, AND IMPROVED MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE

OPERATIONS. AFTER CAREFUL SCRUTINY OF THE U.S. NAVY ASSETS ENGAGED IN

THESE 3 ROLES AT THAT TIME, IT BECAME APPARENT TO US THAT SOME OF OUR

CRAFT COULD BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED IN NEW OPERATIONS THAT WOULD ENHANCE

THE NAVY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAND CAMPAIGN. OUR CONCEPT OF EXPANDING

NAVAL OPERATIONS WAS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE DESIRES OF GENERAL ABRAMS

WHO DIRECTED THAT GREATER ATTENTION BE GIVEN TO THE INTERDICTION OF

INFILTRATION IN THE IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE.

IT THEN BECAME FEASIBLE TO COMMENCE : FOR THE FIRST TIME, COORDINATED

OPERATIONS AMONG THE THREE TASK FORCES IN THE DELTA. THUS IT WAS THAT

OPERATIONS SEA LORDS WAS INITIATED. "SEA" STANDS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA AND

"LORDS" REPRESENTS LAKE-OCEAN-RIVER-DELTA-STRATEGY. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE

OPERATION ARE SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE (PAUSE). THE NEXT SLIDE SHOWS THE AREA

OF OPERATION WHICH, AS YOU CAN SEE, IS IV CORPS--THE HEART OF SEA LORDS

OPERATIONS Blank HIGHEST PRIORITY WAS GIVEN TO THE INTERDICTION OF THE VIET

CONG INFILTRATION ROUTES FROM CAMBODIA. THIS REQUIRED THE EMPLOYMENT

OF ELEMENTS OF ALL OF OUR MAJOR OPERATIONAL COMMANDS IN THE CONDUCT OF

STRIKE OPERATIONS ALONG THE CANAL SYSTEMS BETWEEN THE BASSAC RIVER AND

THE GULF OF THAILAND (2) FOR INTENSIFIED UPPER MEKONG RIVER PATROLS

AND (3) FOR SECURING THE SEAWARD APPROACHES TO THE DELTA CANAL SYSTEM

FROM THE GULF OF THAILAND.

SEA LORDS WAS INITIATED AS A PRECURSOR TO THE DRY SEASON CAMPAIGN

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NOW UNDERWAY IN IV CORPS AND DUE TO TERMINATE ON 1 JUNE. DEPUTY

COMNAVFORV, RADM FLANAGAN, HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO SUPERVISE OPERATION

SEA LORDS. DESIGNATED "FIRST SEA LORD" OR CTG 194.0, RADM FLANAGAN

IS PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN CAN THO WITH THE SENIOR ADVISOR, IV CORPS.

10 THE NEXT SLIDE IS A COMPOSITE OF ALL OF OUR OPERATIONS IN THE DELTA

AREA (PAUSE TO TRACE THE TRANSITION OF TRADITIONAL TASK FORCE

OPERATIONS INTO SEA LORDS OPERATIONS). OPERATIONS SEA LORDS, WHICH

BEGAN ON 18 OCTOBER 1968, ENCOMPASSES A WIDE VARIETY OF ACTIVITY BY

LARGE AND SMALL TASK ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT IV CORPS AND IN PART OF III

CORPS. THROUGH INLAND RIVER RAIDS BY OUR MARKET TIME SWIFT BOATS,

FOR EXAMPLE, SEA LORDS IS AIMED AT HARASSING THE ENEMY IN HIS ONE-TIME

SANCTUARIES THROUGHOUT THE CA MAU PENINSULA AND AROUND THE PERIPHERY

OF IV CORPS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME INTERDICTING THE INFILTRATION OF

SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL FROM CAMBODIA.

14C 103 IN ADDITION TO THE RIVER INCURSIONS BY SWIFTS, OUR FIRST INTERDICTION

BARRIER BEGAN ALONG THE RACH GIA-LONG XUYEN CANAL IN A SEA LORDS

COMPONENT OPERATION CALLED SEARCH TURN. BECAUSE OF THE PBR AND VN RF

PATROLS IN THE AREA, THIS ZONE IS BEING RESETTLED BY VIETNAMESE WHO

VACATED THEIR HOMES DURING LAST YEARS' TET. _____ BOATS ARE CURRENTLY

ASSIGNED TO SEARCH TURN. THE SECOND SEA LORDS INTERDICTION LINE WAS

P ALONG THE VINH TE CANAL AND GIANG THANH RIVER NEXT TO THE CAMBODIAN

BORDER, INTO WHICH WE EXPANDED IN MID-NOVEMBER. SINCE THEN WE HAVE

REGULARLY OPERATED PBRs, PCF AND AN ARMORED TROOP CARRIER BOAT LANDING

AND SUPPORTING VIETNAMESE GROUND TROOPS ALONG THE WATERWAY TO HELP

INTERDICT INFILTRATION COMING OUT OF CAMBODIA, AS CLOSE TO THE BORDER

AS POSSIBLE. WE ARE NOT DELUDING OURSELVES INTO BELIEVING THAT OUR

BOATS HAVE COMPLETELY HALTED THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES ACROSS THE BORDER;
HOWEVER, THE SUCCESSES WE HAVE ACHIEVED HERE ARE: FIRST, WE HAVE MADE
IT DIFFICULT FOR THE ENEMY TO OPERATE ON THE CANAL. NO LONGER CAN HE
MOVE SUPPLIES IN THIS AREA WITH IMPUNITY. SECOND, OUR PIONEERING
EFFORTS HAVE BROUGHT ATTENTION TO A PREVIOUSLY NEGLECTED AREA. ALL
OF THIS RESULTS IN MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE ENEMY TO RESUPPLY
HIS TROOPS IN IV CORPS. THE VNN SINCE 28 JANUARY HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN
MINESWEEPING OPERATIONS ON THE VINH TE AND ON 8 FEBRUARY THIS
OPERATIONAL AREA WAS RENAMED " TRAN HUNG DAO" DUE TO THE LARGE COMMITMENT
OF VNN FORCES TO THE OPERATIONS. BESIDES OUR RIVER PATROL BOATS
AND SWIFT BOATS PATROLLING THE RACH GIANG THANH AND VINH TE CANAL,
THERE ARE NOW 27 VNN JUNKS, 4 VNN LANDING CRAFT MINESWEEPERS, PERSONNEL
FROM TWO VN COASTAL GROUPS TOTALLING 122, 25 VNN SEALS, 15 U.S. SEALS.

THE U.S. NAVY IS CONTRIBUTING 9 PBRs, 2 SWIFT BOATS, 1 ATC AND IS

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MANNING A GROWING SENSOR FORCE. THIS SLIDE SHOWS THE RECENT RESULTS

OF THE TRAN HUNG DAO OPERATION.

14
SO IT WAS THEN THAT THE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF THE COORDINATED

EFFORT BY THE THREE U.S. NAVY TASK FORCES AND THE VIETNAMESE NAVY

IN THE INITIAL PHASE OF OPERATION SEA LORDS LED US TO LOOK AT OTHER

AREAS WHERE A COMBINED EFFORT MIGHT BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED.

INTELLIGENCE INDICATED THAT ENEMY INFILTRATION WAS MOVING OUT OF

THE PARROTS BEAK AREA ACROSS AND DOWN THE VAM CO DONG RIVER INTO THE

WESTERN APPROACHES TO SAIGON. ANOTHER INFILTRATION ROUTE COMES OUT

OF THE PARROTS BEAK AREA DOWN AND ACROSS THE VAM CO TAY RIVER INTO

DINH TUONG PROVINCE, AND ANOTHER DOWN THE BO BO CANAL. ON 6 DECEMBER

AN OPERATION ENTITLED GIANT SLINGSHOT WAS INITIATED TO HELP GROUND

FORCES INTERDICT AND DISRUPT THESE INFILTRATION ROUTES BY APPLYING

25
ANOTHER INTERDICTION LINE ON THE WATERWAYS. THIS IS NOT ONLY A

COMBINED U.S./VIETNAMESE NAVY OPERATION INVOLVING ELEMENTS OF THE

THREE NAVY TASK FORCES, THE VIETNAMESE NAVY'S RAG'S, BUT ALSO U.S.

ARMY AND ARVN TROOPS. THE OBJECTIVES OF GIANT SLINGSHOT ARE SHOWN

HERE (PAUSE). THE OPERATION HAS BEEN CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH

COMMANDING GENERAL, TWO FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM, SENIOR ADVISOR IV

CORPS, AND THE CNO OF THE VIETNAMESE NAVY.

ORIGINALLY, THE ESTIMATED LENGTH OF THE OPERATION WAS TO HAVE BEEN

THREE MONTHS BUT WE SEE IT CONTINUING NOW FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE.

OUR OPERATION IS A PATROL/TROOP ARTILLERY-HELO REACTION FORCE EFFORT

ALONG THE VAM CO TAY AND VAM CO DONG RIVERS. THE INTERDICTION

OBJECTIVES OF GIANT SLINGSHOT ARE BEING ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH AGGRESSIVE

INVESTIGATION AND SEARCHING OF ALL WATER CRAFT MOVING ALONG OR ACROSS THE
PATROLLED SECTIONS OF THE RIVER AND BY THE ENFORCEMENT OF GVN
ESTABLISHED CURFEWS. THIS IS BEING DONE BY ELEMENTS OF TF 116 AND
TF 117. THE VNN RAG AND OTHER TF 117 ELEMENTS ARE SUPPORTING
REACTION FORCES, PROVIDING HEAVY FIRE POWER AND TROOP LIFTS WHEN NEEDED.
COMMANDING GENERAL TWO FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM, AND SENIOR ADVISOR IV
CORPS ARE PROVIDING AIR COVER IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CORPS AREAS.
OTHER FRIENDLY AIR IN THE AREA ARE ON CALL ON A NOT-TO-INTERFERE
BASIS. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BOATS IN THE SLINGSHOT OPERATION TODAY IS
WHICH INCLUDES 25 VNN RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT.

IN ORDER TO ADJUST TO THIS DRAMATIC GROWTH IN SLINGSHOT PATROL
FORCES, IT WAS NECESSARY TO PULL PERs OUT OF THE TF 116 AREAS IN THE

RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE AND THE LOWER PORTIONS OF THE MEKONG RIVER

SYSTEM. THOSE GAPS WERE THEN FILLED BY TF 115 SWIFT BOATS. THE

ADDITION OF THE VNN RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT WAS ALSO A SUBSTANTIAL

CONTRIBUTION TO GIANT SLINGSHOT FORCES.

14 LOGISTICS SUPPORT WAS INITIALLY PROVIDED BY A MOBILE SUPPORT

BASE WHICH WAS RELOCATED FROM THE HAM LUONG RIVER IN THE DELTA TO

TAN AN. TEMPORARY LOGISTICS SUPPORT WAS MADE AVAILABLE AT THUY DONG

(SOMETIMES CALLED TUYEN NHON) SPECIAL FORCES CAMP ON THE VAM CO TAY AND

TRE CU SPECIAL FORCES CAMP ON THE VAM CO DONG. AUSTERE LOGISTICS,

CONSISTING SOLELY OF EMERGENCY STOCKS OF AMMUNITION, FUEL, AND FOOD

WERE MADE AVAILABLE AT MOC HOA ON THE VAM CO TAY, AND GO DAU HA ON

THE VAM CO DONG. LATER ON, A RIVER PATROL FORCE LANDING SHIP TANK,

PLUS A REPAIR SHIP FROM THE MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE WERE SHIFED INTO

THE SLINGSHOT AREA AND ANCHORED AT BEN LUC. YRBM 18 HAS ALSO BEEN

ADDED FOR THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF CRAFT ON THE VAM CO TAY

CONSIDERING THAT WE ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO CONDUCT THE SLINGSHOT OPERATION FOR ONLY THREE MONTHS, THESE LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS, ALTHOUGH THIN AND VERY AUSTERE ESPECIALLY IN THE UPPER LOCATIONS OF BOTH RIVERS, APPEARED SATISFACTORY, HOWEVER, IT WAS DECIDED THAT GIANT SLINGSHOT REQUIRED A MORE PERMANENT STATUS. THIS WAS BECAUSE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES DISCLOSED THAT OUR PATROLS ON THE VAM CO DONG WERE QUITE SERIOUSLY THWARTING THE ENEMY'S ATTEMPTS TO MOVE ACROSS THE RIVER. THE U.S. CG II FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM INDICATED TO US THAT OUR PATROLS ARE DRAWING THE ENEMY OUT AND ENABLING HIS FORCES TO FIX AND DESTROY THE LARGER ENEMY UNITS. (PAUSE). A SEMI-PERMANENT LOGISTICS SUPPORT STRUCTURE ASHORE BECAME MANDATORY WHEN THE RISK OF ATTACK ON OUR SHIPS BY ROCKETS OR

MORTARS INCREASED. SOMETHING BETTER THAN THE THIN, EXTREMELY

AUSTERE LOGISTICS SUPPORT WE INITIALLY HAD WAS DEMANDED. WE ARE NOW

BUILDING A SUPPORT BASE ASHORE AT BEN LUC WHICH SHOULD BE COMPLETED

BY MAY 10TH. THERE WE WILL LOCATE A DETACHMENT OF 500 MEN FROM

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY SAIGON. THIS WILL BE THE CENTRAL LOCATION FOR

ALL GIANT SLINGSHOT SUPPORT. SMALLER DETACHMENTS OPERATING OUT OF BEN

LUN ARE BEING SET UP IN OTHER LOCATIONS ALONG BOTH RIVERS. THE

OUTLYING BASES ALONG THE VAM CO TAY & VAM CO DONG RIVERS ARE CALLED

ADVANCED TACTICAL SUPPORT BASES AND ARE LOCATED NEAR CIDG OR RF/PF BASES.

MEANWHILE, AS WE BUILD OUR SUPPORT BASES ALONG THE RIVERS, THE ENEMY

HAS BEEN AGGRESSIVELY ENGAGED IN TRYING TO ELIMINATE OUR MOBILE

SUPPORT ASSETS - PARTICULARLY THE LST AT BEN LUC - WITH HIS FREQUENT

FIREFIGHTS.

THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF SLINGSHOT WAS TO PROVIDE A SINGLE COORDINATED BARRIER CONSISTING OF BOAT PATROLS, TROOP SWEEP OPERATIONS, HELO GUNSHIPS, AND ARTILLERY. SINCE JANUARY, AS A RESULT OF EFFORTS OF ALL SERVICES, A SERIES OF MULTIPLE BARRIERS HAVE COME INTO PLACE. SENSORS AND DESTRUCTORS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN CRITICAL AREAS. AIR PATROLS HAVE BEEN ADDED. A JOINT INTERDICTION CENTER HAS RECENTLY BEEN SET UP AT DUC HOA NEAR THE VAM CO DONG TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION AND UTILIZATION OF ALL INTELLIGENCE SO THAT REACTION TIMES CAN BE GREATLY REDUCED.

[Handwritten mark] HERE ARE SOME RECENT RESULTS OF GIANT SLINGSHOT (PAUSE). THE ADJACENT *[Handwritten mark]*

[Handwritten mark] SLIDE, REFLECTS LAST WEEKS RESULTS IN TERMS OF FIREFIGHTS SHOWN AS RED *[Handwritten mark]*

DOTS AND AMMO CACHES LOCATED AT THE GREEN ARROWS. THIS HAS BEEN THE MOST

ACTIVE OF OUR INTERDICTION PATROL AREAS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN ALL OF THE

SEA LORDS OPERATIONS THERE HAVE BEEN _____ FIREFIGHTS OF WHICH _____

CAME FROM GIANT SLINGSHOT. THUS FAR FRIENDLY FORCES HAVE UNCOVERED _____

CACHES WEIGHING _____ TONS. NEARLY 25% OF ALL NAVFORV PATROL CRAFT ARE

ASSIGNED TO THIS OPERATION.

2/1 fall
GIANT SLINGSHOT WAS ORIGINATED AS A SHORT TERM OUTGROWTH OF OPERATIONS

SEA LORDS, BUT, AS WE HAVE SHOWN, HAS DEVELOPED INTO A MUCH LONGER AND

FAR-REACHING OPERATION. THREE OTHER OPERATIONS HAVE ALSO DEVELOPED FROM

OUR SEA LORDS OPERATIONS. THESE WERE BOLD DRAGON IX, SILVER MACE, AND

BARRIER REEF. ONE OF OUR OBJECTIVES IN OPERATION SEA LORDS WAS TO

CONDUCT HARASSING RAIDS INTO THE RIVERS ON THE COASTAL PERIPHERY OF IV

CORPS. THESE RIVERS HAD BECOME VC HAVENS AND PRIOR TO SEA LORDS THE VC

24 OWNED THESE RIVERS. THE SWIFT BOAT RAIDS FROM TASK FORCE 115 UP MANY OF

THESE RIVERS, SHOWN ON THE LEFT SLIDE, CHANGED ALL THAT. THESE RAIDS

MUST HAVE BEEN HURTING THE ENEMY, ESPECIALLY IN THE CUA LON/BO DE RIVER

COMPLEX. HIS REACTION THERE, IN ADDITION TO HEAVY ENGAGEMENTS ALMOST

EVERY TIME OUR BOATS WENT INTO THE BO DE, WAS THE TREMENDOUS EFFORT HE

EXPENDED IN ERECTING NINE BARRICADES IN THE CUA LON RIVER TO KEEP OUR

BOATS OUT. THIS WAS A DIFFICULT TASK SINCE THE RIVER IS ABOUT 900 METERS

WIDE AND 30 FEET DEEP. THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE BARRICADES INITIATED

TWO OTHER OPERATIONS. THE FIRST WAS BOLD DRAGON IX. THIS WAS A SEAL

OPERATION WHICH COMMENCED ON 8 DECEMBER IN THE LOWER CA MAU PENINSULA.

IT WAS INITIATED TO GATHER ON THE ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE AND MODUS OPERANDI

IN THE AREA, WITH A SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE OF RECONNOITERING THE BARRICADES

IN THE CUA LON RIVER AND THEIR DEFENSES. THIS INTELLIGENCE WAS TO BE USED

IN A FOLLOW-UP OPERATION, NICKNAMED SILVER MACE, WHOSE OBJECTIVE WAS THE

DESTRUCTION OF THE BARRICADES, AND BUNKERS ALONG THE BANKS. BOTH VN SEALS

AND U.S. SEALS PARTICIPATED IN THE OPERATION WHICH HAD A HIGH SPEED TRANSPORT

AND AN LST PROVIDING SUPPORT. DURING BOLD DRAGON IX, THE SEALS

CONDUCTED 16 OPERATIONS WITH RESULTS AS INDICATED.

AS I STATED EARLIER, ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF BOLD DRAGON IX WAS TO

GATHER INTELLIGENCE ON THE BARRICADES IN THE CAU LON RIVER FOR OPERATION

SILVER MACE. ~~SILVER MACE WAS CONCEIVED TO REMOVE THESE BARRICADES AND~~

REOPEN THE RIVER FOR PCF OPERATIONS AND HOPEFULLY FOR EVENTUAL PACIFICATION

OF THE LOWER CA MAU.

IN THE FIRST EMPLOYMENT DURING THE VIETNAM WAR OF RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT

FROM SEAWARD, THESE BOATS WITH ONE COMPANY OF MOBILE STRIKE FORCE TROOPS

EMBARKED MOVED FROM CAN THO THROUGH RACH GIA WHERE THEY MET WITH THE

REPAIR SHIP, SAYTR, AND MADE A LONG SEA TRANSIT DOWN THE WEST COAST TO A

POINT OFF THE CUA LON RIVER. MEANWHILE, ANOTHER GROUP OF TG 117.2 SAILED

FROM CAN THO DOWN THE BASSAC RIVER TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA WITH A SECOND MSF

COMPANY AND A 30 MAN UDT/EOD TEAM TO MEET WITH THE RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT.

THE OPERATION BEGAN ON 19 DECEMBER WITH DIVERS PLACING CHARGES ON THE FIRST OF THE SEVERAL BARRICADES WHILE MSF UNITS PROVIDED SHORE SECURITY.

MEETING LIGHT RESISTANCE, THE SILVER MACE FORCES HAD COMPLETED CLEARING

THE RIVER OF BARRICADES BY THE MORNING OF 22 DECEMBER AND RETIRED FROM THE

AREA LEAVING IT OPEN FOR FUTURE SWIFT BOAT RAIDS. THE RESULTS OF SILVER

MACE ARE SHOWN HERE.

25 ON THE SECOND OF JANUARY, OPERATION BARRIER REEF COMMENCED (PAUSE). THIS

OPERATION CLOSED THE GAP BETWEEN THE GIANT SLINGSHOT PATROL AREAS AND THE

ORIGINAL SEA LORDS PATROLS ON THE RACH GIA-LONG XUYEN CANAL AND THE RACH

ALL GIANG THANH-VINH TE CANAL (PAUSE). THE PATROL AREA IS ALONG THE ONG LON-

LA GRANGE CANALS BETWEEN AN LONG ON THE MEKONG RIVER AND THUY DONG ON THE

VAM CO TAY, AND WAS ESTABLISHED TO HELP INTERDICT INFILTRATION ROUTES

FROM CAMBODIA INTO BASE AREA 470 WHICH CROSS THE CANAL SYSTEM.

15 I WOULD LIKE TO DESCRIBE A REPORT RECEIVED FROM A PRISONER OF WAR ON
ACTIVITY IN THE BARRIER REEF AREA. HE REPORTED THAT A BATTALION NUMBERING
250-300 ESCORTED AN ESPECIALLY ASSEMBLED HEAVY WEAPONS COMPANY THAT HAD
JUST RECEIVED A CHICOM 12-TUBE 107MM ROCKET LAUNCHER. ON 11 JANUARY, THE
BATTALION AND COMPANY BEGAN THEIR USUAL INFILTRATION ROUTE SOUTH OUT OF
CAMBODIA INTO SOUTH VIETNAM TOWARD THE PHUOC XUYEN CANAL AS INDICATED. THE
PRISONER OF WAR BELIEVED THAT THEIR DESTINATION MAY HAVE BEEN MY THO OR DONG
TAM. TO COUNTER KNOWN PBR UNITS IN THE AREA, A VC AMBUSH ELEMENT WAS SENT
AHEAD TO DESTROY THE BOATS. FORTUNATELY THROUGH INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, WE WERE
PREPARED FOR THEIR ARRIVAL. AT 0200 ON THE 11TH, THE EXPECTED FIREFIGHT
TOOK PLACE WHICH CAUSED THE CONVOY TO WITHDRAW BACK UP THE INFILTRATION
ROUTE. ON THE NIGHT OF 12 AND 13 JANUARY, THE CONVOY AGAIN ATTEMPTED TO
CROSS THE ONG LON CANAL AT THE SAME POINT. PBRs AND A VN TRAM CHIM AMBUSH
TEAM AGAIN ENGAGED THE ENEMY AT THAT TIME. WHILE THE BATTALION WAS ABLE TO

CROSS THE CANAL UNDETECTED, THE WEAPONS COMPANY AGAIN RETREATED. ON

THE 14TH, A VR PILOT SPOTTED THE COMPANY MAKING A TURN TO THE SOUTH AND

DELTA BLACKHAWK AIR TOOK THE ENEMY UNDER FIRE.

OF THE 37 MEN IN THE COMPANY PLUS ADDITIONAL PORTERS AND LABORERS,

ONLY 1 SURVIVED. THE RESULTS ARE SHOWN IN THE 2 BOXES AT LEFT.

AF
THE INTERACTION WITH THE ENEMY BY OUR MULTIPLE BARRIER RESOURCES---

AIR, GROUND, BOAT, PLUS THE VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR OF INTELLIGENCE JUST

010
DISCUSSED IS A FINE EXAMPLE OF TEAMWORK.

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THIS COMPLETES THE NAVFORV BRIEFING.