

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Get all the teams coordinated on teaching boarding & search procedures and river tactics.
2. No base defense - final week -
(Board & Search - support on the posts, medivac, canals, landing parties)
3. PBR & Helicopter & SEAL coordination - (1) one instructor go on TAD
4. Language should be last before going in-country.
5. No JEST - Not worth the time
6. Need for lower rated men to have more practice on Radio Telephone Procedures.
7. More instruction on .50 Cal., M-60 & more instruction on cleaning weapons, field stripping, instinctive firing - Eliminate Dry range firing, weapons not on the boats.
8. More time spent on Trouble Shooting - Support Group does most of hull maintenance
9. Drop Magnetic Compass instruction.
10. Recommend all RivDiv COI's in CTF 116 be standardized.

RECOMMENDATION

1. Recommendation #1 - Request you submit detailed procedures on Boarding and Search for as many different situations as you can anticipate. Include such basics as position of cover boat, duties of each crew member during boarding and search operations, methods of approach for various size craft, what constitutes an evasion, and extra precautions taken boarding suspicious craft ie. - a curfew violator. Also include any encountered or expected VC techniques for destroying a PBR during a boarding and search operation.
2. Recommendation #2 - A. Concur with recommendation to thoroughly cover boarding and search support of post (which is what the stand-by boats are supposed to do when the base is harassed), Medevac, canal incursion and landing parties. A doctrine for canal incursion and landing parties is, however, lacking information on pre-arranged fore support, air cover, RAG and friendly ground force support are needed. For PBR landing parties: (a) How far from shore do the crews normally penetrate? (b) What type of opposition would likely be encountered? ie, sniper, booby traps, AW's. (c) How is coordination made between the landing party and its covering boat? (d) What emphasis should be placed on these facets of PBR training?
B. Disagree with recommendation to do away with base defense for the following reasons: (1) Base defense does not lessen the training in PBR tactics. The patrols are primary with only the off duty crews manning the perimeter. Instead of sleeping the crews are required to defend their base. This places a psychological and physical strain on the students

that closely approximates the dulling effect of boredom on long patrols.

(2) As previously mentioned base defense does give the students an exercise post defense. (3) The base defense exercise teaches the students to sortie at the first sound of attack. This is a standard procedure, recently employed in Binh Thuy, Nha Be, My Tho and Sa Dec when these areas came under attack. (4) The disregard for base defense is a reflection of tunnel vision. On special operations that have taken place in the past such as the blocking force for Deck House V, and the Plain of Reeds operation and at times when LST's have been unable to provide support facilities PBR crews have been placed in a base defense situation. At these time PBR's were staged from VNN coastal group bases or special force camps. On one occasion in Feb 67 six PBR's operating from CG 36 were subject to a mortar and claymore attack. Just because it hasn't happened on your watch don't believe it can't happen.

3. Recommendation #3 - Concur completely. If any practical experience indicates more profitable ways of employing our forces please forward guidelines.

4. Recommendation #4 - Concur. Steps are being taken to correct this.

5. Recommendation #5 - Concur.

6. Recommendation #6 - Concur.

7. Recommendation #7 - Concur. This command is at present investigating the instinctive firing technique for modification of our weapons course. The course now includes 4 hrs of classroom work in .50 Cal. disassembly and reassembly, 18 hours underway firing both blank (6 hrs) and live

(12) hrs along with practical cleaning and maintenance work after each firing. Blank firing and maintenance and cleaning are also done on the final battle problem. Does experience indicate a need for more training?

8. Recommendation #8 - Concur. The Engineering course has been revised to reflect this requirement. No practical application of hull maintenance is being taught. Instruction now consists of a movie and a discussion to acquaint the student with hull maintenance problems. The savings in time is applied to trouble shooting instruction.

9. Recommendation #9 - Disagree with the recommendation to drop magnetic compass instruction for the following reasons: (a) When the LST is out beyond the surf line it facilitates patrol navigation to steer compass headings to the river mouth. (b) On dark nights or in thunder showers knowing magnetic headings is an excellent back-up for the radar. (c) When a crew is operating in an unfamiliar area (such as I Corps) magnetic headings will have to be used until firm navigational check points can be established. (d) There is a recorded incident of a patrol leaving Binh Thuy enroute the LST in the river mouth. Somehow the patrol was turned around and ran aground near Long Xugen. A check of the compass obviously could have prevented this. Potter BM1 patrol officer May 67. (e) Since the variation in the Delta is so insignificant the magnetic compass can be used to obtain the observer target line when spotting artillery.

10. Recommend CTF 116 issue standard instructions for all Riv Div COI's and forward these guidelines to NIOTC. This will enable us to prepare a COI in consonance with those used in-country. The current disparity between various RivDiv COI's makes standardization difficult.