

# INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP

REFERENCE NUMBER  
OR IDENTIFICATION  
OF THE ATTACHED

TO Capt McRaney

ACTION  
For your information  
Initial and pass on  
For your comments  
Please handle  
Take up with me  
For your approval  
For your decision  
Investigate and report  
Bring up to date  
Draft reply  
For your file  
Note and destroy  
Please return to

REMARKS

LOOKS LIKE CAL IS  
TRYING TO SAY FOR  
PLEASE GIVE CALHOUN  
THE REQUESTED REPORT.

From

CP/2

Date

24 Oct 70

October 29, 1970

Capt. Calhoun;

You were right in assuming there was more to my maintenance delay than "flicking a switch" to restore the HF radio. The problem was there was no secondary AC power, and the HF radio was the least of my problems, no RMI, ADF, Tacan, etc.

The CAL people removed the AC relay cover in the left wheel well and rapped the relay, it reset and we were on our way. After our run-up we could not read the tower on VHF and had decided to return for VHF repair when a U.S. Air Force type volunteered that he read 5 by but Taipei was #10, seeing as how we read him loud and clear on VHF we departed Taipei using UHF and 25 minutes out the VHF set filled the cockpit with smoke so we turned it off and continued on to Vientiane sans VHF.

No real big problem except one large round chinese type who protestef to much I feel, but I'll be nice and not point out that the customs and CAL people were not as much a problem as our round one makes them out to be, and the stupid pilot not knowing how to turn on the HF makes nice reading but pure fiction I assure you. He bears watching if#is ever important to make an on time departure.

Sincerely,

Capt. John McRainey

CAPTAIN M<sup>C</sup>RAINEY VIA MFD-VTE.  
(REF: C123K 55-4576 TPE VTE FLIGHT)

THE DEPARTURE OF 55-4576 FROM  
TPE HAS A "FLAP" GOING \* THE "FLAP" IS  
CONTRACTURAL ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE  
AND DOES NOT DIRECTLY CONCERN US,  
HOWEVER ONE POINT WAS BROUGHT  
UP WHICH I BELIEVE ONLY YOU CAN  
CLARIFY.

.OGR RADIO MAINT PEOPLE SAY  
THAT THE FLICKING ON OF ONE SWITCH  
RESTORE YOUR RADIOS TO OPERABLE  
CONDITION. I HOPE I AM CORRECT IN  
SAYING THERE WAS MORE TO IT THAN  
THAT.

PLEASE GIVE ME A BLOW BY BLOW  
DESCRIPTION OF WHAT HAPPENED - GOOD  
OR BAD - INCLUDING (IF YOU CAN REMEMBER)  
THE WRITE UPS YOU PUT IN LOG BOOK  
DURING AND AT TERMINATION OF YOUR  
FLIGHT.

C.C. NATURALLY COVERS HIS "FACE"  
WITH REPORTS - SO - I WANT TO COVER  
OURS. THIS I CAN DO, BUT I MUST KNOW  
WHAT SWITCH WAS TURNED ON TO RESTORE  
THE COMMUNICATIONS.

3

THE UNDER LINED PORTIONS OF THIS  
REPORT ARE ALL THAT I'M PRIMARILY  
CONCERNED WITH.

YOUR COOPERATION WOULD  
BE APPRECIATED -

  
ADPD K22

TO: DFOD via MFP, S


21 October 1970

FROM: AMFP

SUBJECT: Delay Report, FRY/20 C-123K 55/4576

1. A telephone call from CAL Shop was received on 16 October afternoon indicating the aircraft was ready for delivery to our Company. After coordination with MAS, MIE and RSD and with the approval from DFOD, I replied to CAL Shop that the aircraft would be towed to civil ramp on Monday morning at 0700L for cargo loading so that it would be ready for ferrying back to VTF at 192300Z per DFOD 150132.
2. Upon receipt of DFOD 170300 which had rescheduled the aircraft to DTPE 190100Z, CAL Assistant OM, Mr. C. C. Yu, was contacted at 171130L. I discussed with him regarding the handling procedures and promised to see him in the afternoon for detailed discussion. At 1400L I went to CAL Shop to sign the receipt of the aircraft since there would be no one in CAL Shop Office on Sunday and the aircraft would suppose to depart on Monday morning at 0900L. After I had signed the receipt, I was told by CAL Shop that aircraft had already uplifted full tank fuel. Then, I met Mr. C. C. Yu at CAL Operations where I gave him the canned flight plan for TPE/HKG, the W/B form, flight performance data, OEI/index, etc.
3. The non-availability of our crew caused another reschedule of 55/4576 back to DTPE 192300Z per DFOD 180900Z. At 181630L, I called Mr. C. C. Yu again about the reschedule and asked him to relay such information to all concerned in CAL and TASCO.
4. On 19 October Monday morning, RSD called me that the aircraft had positioned at civil ramp for cargo loading. No sooner had I received crew list from MCSO than I called Mr. C. C. Yu to provide him with the firm FTD, the crew list, the crew passport number, the crew pick-up time and places, etc. and asked him to check with TASCO relative to cargo loading information. During that day, I also met PIC in Central Building. At his request, I provide PIC with FLIP, letdown charts, and a complete copy of SID and STAR for TPE and HKG as the flight kit was not available when the aircraft had ferried to TPE in September.
5. On 20 October, our Company car picked me up and sent me to CAL Operations at 0600L. While I was waiting at CAL Operations, I checked all flight documents and weather information prepared by CAL. The flight plan seemed OK, but the W/B was left blank because CAL Operations did not receive cargo weight information from TASCO. I asked the duty OD to check with TASCO for loading information. I waited there for ten minutes and the crew were still not present. Under the assumption that they might be at CAL Traffic Counter, I went to the Civil Terminal at 0615<sup>L</sup> where I met the crew at CAL counter. The CAL Traffic Agent gave me a copy of cargo manifest and told me that they had no idea about our ferry flight until very early this morning. Then, the Traffic Agent collected all crew names and prepared the general declaration. At 0635L we all went through the customs with some minor difficulties due primarily to the red tape of customs officials. PIC was the first one going through. I asked PIC to go with me to CAL Operations and told the rest of crew to go to the aircraft along with the CAL Traffic Agent. We reached CAL Operations at 0655L. PIC and I checked all flight documents again and I found the W/B manifest carried wrong loading information, approximately five to six hundred pounds less than the actual load. Since time was short and PIC said slight difference between

actual load and load on manifest would be insignificant, we let the W/B stated as it was and then went to CCAA office for filing ICAO flight plan at 0705L. We then went to the plane where we waited for 15 to 20 minutes for the customer to clear the aircraft. The aircraft taxied out at 1923<sup>34</sup>Z, with a delay of 34 minutes primarily due to CIQ and CAL traffic handling. While I was waiting for take-off, the aircraft taxied back at 2355Z with the complaint that all HF radio equipment were out. I told the crew to stay on board the aircraft until the CIQ officials cleared the aircraft and went to CAL Operations where I told the duty OD to send the flight disruption message, inform their traffic people for CIQ handling, and call CAL Shop for radio repair. The Shop replied they would not send mechanics free of charge as they considered the aircraft had already accepted by USAF and received by AAM. The duty OD suggested my visit to CAL Shop might be helpful. I went there immediately and met USAF representative and CAL Shop Customer Service people. The USAF representative was very kind and asked CAL Shop to render any possible assistance. After a short discussion, we went to the chief USAF representative where he decided to pay for the repair by using FORM 15. The USAF representative even indicated CAL could use any black box from the C129 fleet parked in the shop ramp to exchange for the bad equipment in our aircraft. Later, CAL Shop discovered that FORM 15 should be signed off by military personnel and such Form would not be applicable to our repair on the ground that our PIC is a civilian. While I was still discussing with CAL Shop, two radio mechanics were dispatched to our aircraft with our Company car. I insisted on the fact aircraft should be repaired immediately to meet the HKG FTA deadline and would decide later whether USAF or Air Asia to pay for the repair. While I was still discussing with CAL Shop, the radio mechanics returned with the saying that all HF radio equipment were good except the crew did not turn on the switch, I left CAL Shop and went to the aircraft immediately. On my way to the aircraft, I noticed the PIC had already started engine for takeoff without the assistance of ground mechanics from TASSCO. I signalled cut-off engine immediately. After engines had cut off, I told PIC aircraft must be cleared by CIQ again for take off and then went to CAL Operations to ask for flight plan refiling and CIQ clearance. The CIQ officials finally came along with CAL Traffic Agent after we had waited again for approximately 20 minutes. Traffic was heavy in the airport at that time. Our aircraft finally taxied out again at 0059Z. I waited again in the car to see our aircraft takeoff. Immediately followed after our aircraft were three aircraft, one CAL C-47, one CAF C-113 and one CAL DC-4. Our aircraft had waited and turned round and round at the runway end for more than 20 minutes and let the following aircraft go first. I was exhausted and mad at this time as I was suspicious the aircraft might taxi back again. Inasmuch as I was unable to obtain any information while I was waiting in the car, I decided to go to CAL Operations to find out what was wrong with our aircraft. The CAL OM told me their monitoring radio receiver was out so they were unable to provide me with any information regarding holding of our aircraft. While I was trying to call ATC, our aircraft finally took off at 0130Z, with a ground taxi time of 21 minutes.

  
C. C. Shih