

VIET-NAM

DOCUMENTS AND RESEARCH NOTES

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SHARPENING THE THIRD PRONG: AN INCREASE OF VIET CONG PROSELYTING

Background

The Viet Cong wage their struggle for "liberation" of South Viet-Nam with what they call a "three-pronged attack". The prongs are military struggle (đấu tranh vũ trang), political struggle (đấu tranh chính trị) and a proselyting mission (bình địch vấh). That the third of these has recently received particular emphasis is evidenced by a number of captured documents dealing with increased proselyting activities.

Proselyting is a technique of psychological warfare employed by the Viet Cong in an attempt to create discord and disaffection among a target audience. It seeks to persuade members of the audience to become aligned with the "revolution", or at least to remain neutral, or adopt an anti-war or disinterested attitude.

The proselyting effort is directed at two main targets. These are the "military" (binh), which includes the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces and the Free World Military Assistance Forces, and the "enemy" (dich), which is used in reference to civil officials of the Government of Viet-Nam.

Media used by the Viet Cong to convey their proselyting messages to these groups include their front associations, Liberation Radio, newspapers and other publications, loudspeakers employed for appeal to opposing forces, leaflets and posters.

The Viet Cong concede that the results of the proselyting program have been highly disappointing in the past. Few Vietnamese and no American troops are known to have responded by defecting to their side. This notwithstanding, they decided in mid-1967 to heighten the effort.

A political program which their National Liberation Front adopted in August signaled the decision for an increase, and calls for stepped-up proselyting were subsequently made part of the indoctrination which Viet Cong forces received in preparing for what they term the present Winter-Spring Campaign. New directives on proselyting were issued, new leaflets were distributed, and in other ways the effort was intensified.

Typical of the recent instructions is a directive drafted by the Military and Enemy Proselyting Section of a district in Quang Ngai Province in Viet Cong Military Region 5. This directive, dated December 1, 1967, was captured by the 4th U.S. Infantry Division in early 1968. It outlines the objectives and requirements of the proselyting program for the 1967-68 Spring Campaign and calls for an overall step-up of this program. The document admits the shortfall of the proselyting program in the first nine months of 1967, particularly noting its ineffectiveness with U.S. military personnel: "A great majority of the American troops have not yet understood our struggle to save our people's righteous cause and have not yet learned about our policy toward them. We have failed to motivate them to agree with our people's struggle."

The document cites a number of additional problems that must be dealt with. Among these are the failure to precipitate "military revolts", weakness of the proselyting task in the "urban and key areas", and failure to place the proper emphasis upon this task, as evidenced by the statement that "village and hamlet Party Committees have not yet fully recognized the role and the strategic mission of our military and enemy proselyting task and have failed in their position as leaders in carrying out that task." The document also admits to a shortage of "legal cadre" -- underground agents who live in the villages and hamlets -- and to a lack of coordination of the proselyting task with the military and political struggles.

Having discussed these shortcomings, the directive is explicit in laying out its objectives and requirements for the 1967-68 Winter-Spring Campaign. The objectives of this campaign are to "continue to destroy and disintegrate" the ideology of the RVNAF troops "with a higher degree of intensity", and to "create a broad anti-war movement" among the U.S. and "satellite" troops, and "develop their tendency to negotiate with us..."

The directive defines specific target audiences within the GVN and U.S. forces, calling for a focus of attention on Buddhists and officers in the former and upon young soldiers and Negro troops in the latter.

Five aims of military and enemy proselyting are defined. These are to attack and disrupt the enemy's ideology; attack and disintegrate his organization; stimulate an anti-war movement; create rifts between "U.S. and puppet troops", and inspire revolts within enemy units and promote defections.

The captured directive, which has been translated in full and follows this note, calls for special emphasis on these proselyting goals during the 1967-1968 season of Winter holidays.

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TOP SECRET [VC]

INSTRUCTIONS

MILITARY AND ENEMY PROSELYTING
SECTION S. 45

Military and Enemy Proselyting Mission and Activities in Winter and Spring of 67-68

I. Reviewing our military and enemy proselyting mission over the past nine months.

A noteworthy fact is that this year the U.S. imperialists are pouring a great many troops into our district. They have sent to our district additional well trained troops such as the 101st Airborne [Division], the 196th Light Infantry [Brigade] and a number of Marines to carry out their pincer tactics, hoping to destroy us and pacify our area, since they presently consider pacification their main task.

They have made use of extremely savage and cruel tactics and have used their artillery and aircraft to destroy many of our villages and people. They have also exterminated a great many of our people with their three "clearing" tactics. Concurrently they have activated their paywar and "open arms" activities, and they have stepped up their intelligence effort, their herding of the people and their drive to separate our district revolutionary forces from the people. Their actions are aimed at achieving their pacification goals. But, in spite of their cunning and underhanded plots, they are suffering from deadly defeats. In our district we have not let them pacify any area; on the contrary we have destroyed more than 8,000 American and puppet troops. We continue to control our liberated area. Through the recent struggles our people have been trained and hardened and are now very high spirited, while our city movement is developing strongly.

We are gaining in all fields of activity. In the past nine months, the victories achieved by our district in all fields were great. Those victories have a great strategic significance in our task of defeating the enemy's plans and placing him in a defensive and passive position. Those victories have also created many new capabilities of leading the revolutionary movement in our district toward a final victory.

Our military and enemy proselyting task has greatly contributed to the achievement of such brilliant victories.

Specifically:

(1) Our political attacks launched against the American and puppet troops have been relatively good and have achieved the following results:

We have disseminated:

- 20,000 leaflets written in South Korean
- 5,000 leaflets written in English
- 14,000 leaflets written in English on [three words illegible]
protecting our production of food
- 2,000 leaflets written in English on preserving the legal status
of our people
- 2,500 leaflets written in Vietnamese

We are also coordinating our activities with the political struggle to encourage people to launch face-to-face assaults and also to motivate the enemy troops to defect or cause dissension in their ranks. Thirty-seven troops and their families have deserted and taken part in the struggle.

Other methods of attack have also been developed.

All of these methods of attack have greatly disturbed our enemy's thinking, contributed to the lowering of the enemy's morale, and created conditions for our troops to destroy the enemy in many battles in rural and urban areas.

We have won over a number of enemy troops who share our people's views in the struggles. We have caused a number of enemy units and officers, including Americans, to develop certain pacifist and neutralist tendencies in their attitudes.

We have started to exploit contradictions that arise between the Americans and puppet troops and have recorded cases in which they refused to coordinate with one another while conducting raids and mopping-up operations.

(2) Task of disintegrating the enemy ranks. Even though we have met with many difficulties in the past nine months, with our outstanding effort and that of our people we have caused 37 enemy troops to defect.

(3) Our task of coordinating military and enemy proselyting with the political struggles has been successful and has inspired a three-front attack against the enemy with a result of great victories in each campaign.

The results that we have achieved are due to the fact that we have quickly understood our problems and made appropriate changes and have had the good leadership of our Party committee. In addition we have had the good support of the armed struggle movement of our people and have applied our greatest efforts and determination.

In spite of all of the above-mentioned achievements, when compared to our Party's political requirements, our enemy and military proselyting tasks still have shortcomings that require a quick settlement.

These problems are as follows:

[-Enemy] Military revolts are still too few and insignificant. The troops in our district have not yet been thoroughly briefed about such revolts. Our troops in all branches are in the same situation. We fail to develop military revolts at squad, platoon and company levels and have not yet succeeded in causing their larger organizations to disintegrate.

Our military and enemy proselyting task in the urban and key areas is still weak.

Our task of developing revolutionary strength in the enemy ranks, especially in the ranks of the district troops, in order to break the enemy grip in the hamlets and promote revolts in the rural areas, is also weak. Our effort to spark a revolution within the enemy's main forces, destroy his vigor and conduct uprisings is still poor.

A great majority of the American troops have not yet understood our struggle to serve our people's righteous cause and have not yet learned about our policy toward them. We have failed to motivate them to agree with our people's struggle.

These prevalent shortcomings have impaired our gains in the district in the past and will affect the realization of our hopes in the future.

The main cause of failure is that our village and hamlet Party Committees have not yet fully recognized the role and the strategic mission of our military and enemy proselyting task and have failed in their position as leaders in carrying out that task. Our people have performed their military and enemy proselyting task well, but there still remains a lot to do. They have not bravely approached their target audience and have not stepped up the movement into a most intensive one, attacking the enemy strongly and continuously.

Our military and enemy proselyting ranks are still weak, especially the ranks of our legal cadre [-underground agents]. Our legal cadres are still too few and are not available in some places. The offensive spirit of our military and enemy proselyting cadres wavers. The coordination with our political and armed struggles is still poor.

The people from all professions and all social strata have not yet played an active

part in the military and enemy proselyting task. Our guidance for certain branches still has weak points such as: inadequate emphasis on political thought, a failure to base our attacks on our political policy, a failure to educate and train our military and enemy proselyting cadres in an absolute revolutionary concept, a lack of awareness of the people, a lack of specialized techniques, a lack of enthusiasm in carrying out specialized tasks, etc. These tasks have not yet been performed well and have not been well coordinated with the military and enemy proselyting task and our political mission. We must strive to overcome these shortcomings in order to push forward our military and enemy proselyting task and mold it into an extensive movement to serve our two objectives -- destroying the enemy forces and causing a majority of the enemy forces to be disintegrated.

II. Present political situation and mental attitude of the enemy troops.

The puppet troops, whether they are stationed in the various posts, rural areas or in urban areas are becoming demoralized. Their defeatism is being strongly developed when they see that we are destroying many U.S., satellite and puppet units in separated outposts and in some of the cities. The decreasing morale and the laziness of the puppet local authorities are additional causes of decline in troop morale.

They are now frightened by the protraction of the war and are eagerly waiting for peace to be restored. After the repeated enemy defeats in the dry season of 66-67, they have shown neutralist and pacifist tendencies and no longer cooperate with one another in raids and mop-up operations. Their national consciousness is developing and their anti-U.S. actions are increasing. Signs of their agreeing with our people's struggle may be seen in many puppet units.

However, there are still puppet troops who do not believe in our policy, nor do they believe that we will be victorious in a relatively short time. Their escapism and fears of hardships keep them in the ranks of the puppet troops and greatly affect and limit their revolutionary actions.

The morale of the U.S. puppet and satellite troops (Marines, Green Dragons, Airborne) decreases swiftly, especially when they are defeated by us or when their momentum is crushed by our units. They are usually frightened by the thought of meeting us and they no longer dare to terrorize our people and conduct search operations as frequently as they did before. They no longer want to stay in Viet-Nam as they find it too dangerous. They eagerly await the expiration of their terms so they may return to their country. When the day comes that they can go home, they usually leave behind all that they have and organize great feasts to celebrate the expiration of their terms. In certain of their units some people have shown a desire to become neutral and have begun to look for us and accept our leaflets easily.

III. Our Military and Enemy Proselyting Task in Winter-Spring 67-68

(1) Our district Party Committee's resolution in November 67 has prescribed that our Party, Army and people are to: strive to destroy a large number of enemy troops (U.S. and puppet) and cause a large number of their forces to disintegrate; strive to defeat their pincers tactics in the third dry season; liberate all the rural areas that are still under enemy control; hold firm the liberated area; step up the struggle in the city and weak areas; and try to gain the sovereignty for our people.

In order to realize that policy, our military and enemy proselyting task now consists of concentrating all our forces to attack, destroy and disintegrate a large force of the enemy, to serve...../ sic /.

Concurrently with the task of concentrating our forces to achieve the two above objectives, our military and enemy proselyting task must be coordinated closely with our armed activities and our political struggles to oppose raids and enemy pacification attempts as well as to retain and continue to enlarge the liberated areas.

(2) Objectives of the operation

a. In regard to the puppet troops: continue to destroy and disintegrate their organizations and ideology with a higher degree of intensity. Special attention should be paid to the puppet main units, puppet units guarding cities, puppet district units and puppet units in key areas. Along with the task of continually causing these units to

disintegrate, we must develop disintegration of squads, platoons and companies. We must closely coordinate our activities with all other military actions and political struggles so as to totally defeat the enemy in our district. We must pay special attention to the 421st, 181st and 937th Civil Guard Companies.

Develop the insurrection within puppet forces. Accomplish at any price our mission of promoting military revolts in echelons ranging from platoon to company and of developing uprisings of puppet troops in district and key areas, with separated puppet officers siding with our people and taking part in our people's fighting. Create and promote the anti-war movement to a degree that could cause obstructions to the enemy in the implementation of his great operation plans. Develop internal disagreements among the enemy, and strongly develop pacifist and neutralist tendencies so as to neutralize the enemy's fighting spirit and limit to a maximum extent the enemy's effectiveness.

Organize a Worker-Peasant-Army coalition bloc to contribute to the implementation of our Party's policy when...../sic/ in cities and key areas.

b. In regard to U.S. troops and satellite troops

Create a broad anti-war movement, especially movements to refuse to go out on operations, or to ask to be sent to the rear, the cities or to the United States.

Develop their tendency to negotiate with us and be neutralist in regard to us.

When we launch attacks...../sic/ they will not interfere in our military matters.

(3) Battlefields and targets:

The battlefields for our military and enemy proselyting task are the cities, the rural areas near the cities and lines of communication. Thus we must position the bulk of our cadres in these areas to have them carry out the various activities of the military and enemy proselyting task. We must strive to build a strong force in the cities.

The common targets for our activities in the district are the three civil guard companies, all other technical arms of the puppet army, units in district and key areas, field police forces and other elements guarding the cities. Special attention should be paid to enemy officers (from the five types of troops) and the Buddhist troops. In regard to the U.S. we must strive to motivate the young soldiers and the Negro troops.

(4) Guidance for our military and enemy proselyting task:

We must develop to a high degree the effects of the five methods of military and enemy proselyting and then must closely coordinate such methods with the six methods of military struggle, six methods of political struggle, three methods of...../sic/.

The five methods of military and enemy proselyting are:

1. Attacking and disrupting the enemy's ideology. This method is aimed at disrupting the ideology of the enemy troops, decreasing his fighting spirit and causing the enemy troops to be neutralized.
2. Attacking and disintegrating the enemy's organization. This method is aimed at causing the enemy troops to desert and to develop a great disintegration.
3. Stimulating an anti-war movement and a movement to ask for repatriation. This movement shall strike at the morale of the U.S. troops and their allies who are frightened by death and have a great dislike for this war. Through the use of this method we must create a broad and intensive anti-war movement among U.S. troops as well as a movement to ask for quick repatriation.
4. Launching the enemy against the enemy. Contradictions may always be found in communications between U.S. troops and puppet troops as well as between officers and soldiers. We must exploit such contradictions to create discord and cause them to destroy one another. This method has been very effective in many places in the past.

5. Staging military revolts, using internal traitors, staging uprisings, promoting defections. Our troops must act in coalition with the peasants and workers to attack and destroy the enemy and realize the motto: "Uniting the soldiers, the peasants and the workers". Each of these methods has its own techniques. For example, the method of attacking politically to disrupt the enemy's ideology employs such means as leaflets, loudspeakers, handcarried letters, etc...

These five above-mentioned methods support one another and are closely related to one another in the implementation and development of the task.

While implementing the five methods of military and enemy proselyting, we must pay special attention to methods such as military revolts, use of internal traitors, neutralization and disintegration of the enemy's organization.

We must realistically serve the political mission of our Party.

We must centralize our guidances for the military and enemy proselyting task and step up its intensity in order to launch strong and continuous attacks against the enemy. We must also communicate this subject to our entire Party, Army and people from all walks of life. Then we must motivate all of our people to support the task of military and enemy proselyting. We must urge our people to change this task into a broad movement of the people in all our three areas to continuously attack the enemy and accomplish the following great missions:

- Disintegrating great forces of puppet troops.
- Motivating puppet troops in villages and hamlets and motivating brothers and sons of cadres, Party members and group members to return to us.
- Encircling enemy posts, forcing enemy troops to surrender or withdraw and striving to neutralize them.
- Motivating patriotic troops to stage military revolts and uprisings to publicly oppose the US aggressors and the Saigon puppet government.
- Motivating our people to rush forward and step up their face-to-face struggle against the US troops through their military and enemy proselyting task.
- We must fight and concurrently build our ranks to guarantee the accomplishment of the strategic mission set forth by our Party.

IV. A FEW SPECIFIC TASKS AND MEANS OF ACHIEVEMENT

(1) Stepping up the task of assaulting the enemy's ideology.

At first, we must consolidate and develop our ranks and our people's forces to carry out the task of attacking the enemy's ideology.

- Each village must have its encirclement team to encircle all enemy posts. This encirclement team must also carry out attacks on all three fronts. Then we must build strong legal ranks to fight the enemy. We must also build a strong people's movement to form a "belt" to attack the enemy.

- We must build our legal ranks to carry out our military and enemy proselyting task and launch rapid attacks against enemy areas when the opportunities arise or when we are required to.

- We must have legal ranks to oppose enemy raids on the spot and prevent the enemy from herding our people and carrying out their pacification activities. These troops must be under the control of the village military and enemy proselyting section. Our hard core cadres for the political struggles must also be the hard core cadres for the military and enemy proselyting task and must be controlled by the political struggle branch. The village must have a cell of hard core troops to swiftly attack the enemy.

- The district must have mobile troops to launch attacks against the enemy in his great bases. Other units shall reinforce the military and enemy proselyting people in cities.

The above-mentioned organizations must be formed and completed in November 67. (These missions have been disseminated in the meeting of the district Party committee in late November.)

- We must strongly develop and carry out all forms of political attacks. We must have many leaflets to carry out our military and enemy proselyting task. The district must print leaflets and all villages that have means of printing leaflets must also work on this. (In the case of special incidents, the district will prepare the theme of the leaflet and send it to the village people to print or write in order to achieve the mission promptly.) We must guarantee that each month, each enemy soldier shall receive two of our leaflets. In the case of enemy bases, we are to launch appeals with loud-speakers at least three or four times a month. We must also make use of a great many appealing letters and drawings. We must improve our leaflets written both in English and Vietnamese. In regard to special events such as military victories, enemy internal changes, holidays such as Christmas, the Lunar New Year and New Year's Day, we must employ strong, concentrated and extremely bold forms of attack. We must organize meetings between enemy officers and troops and ourselves and strive to persuade them by our speeches. When the opportunity arises we must closely coordinate with the armed activities and the political struggles to encircle the enemy and force him to surrender or withdraw.

- The armed forces must carry out political attacks, in addition to disintegrating the enemy in combat, capturing enemy troops and causing enemy troops to revolt on the battlefields.

- In regard to the guidances, all concerned must broadly disseminate documents such as point number 12 in the Front's political program and the letter from the Central Trung Bo Chapter of the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam urging enemy troops to stage uprisings, military revolts and serve as internal traitors. We must also issue as many leaflets as we can whenever a popular movement stages an uprising in a city. We must also broadly disseminate news of our victories.

- The villages designated to launch propaganda attacks aimed at disintegrating the puppet organization on local areas are as follows:

- Pho Thuan....Cau Giac
- Pho Van.....Tra Cau
- Pho Hiep ----- Ap Cung and Nui Dau
- Pho Cuong ----- My Trang
- Pho Hoa ----- An Thuong, Hoa Thinh
- Pho Ninh ----- Tra Cau, Ga Duc Pho, Le Van Duyet
- Pho Thach ----- Thach Bi, Da Heo
- The Pho Vinh area
- The city area
- Pho Trung and Pho Hiep shall attack Bai Dsu.
- The key mission of our district is the city and the Tra Cau areas.

(2) Make good use of the penetration agents

- One of our weak points which we have to solve now is our penetration activity. Some of our penetration agents do not yet have high determination, some have not yet become familiar with the organization and have not yet been thoroughly taught to be vigilant in their branch of activity and be prepared for missions in the days to come.

- With the exception of those agents with a strategic mission, we shall, in general, make use of all the other agents to carry out missions aimed at creating military revolts, uprisings and disintegration of enemy organizations.

- We must have a plan to make use of our agents. We must send them to networks that have few or no penetration agents to enable such networks to have enough strength to disintegrate enemy organizations.

- We must make good use of the penetration agents we have. We must strive to smuggle them into their areas of activity. Then, we must also recruit new agents so as to build a solid network within the enemy ranks. (This requirement must be met in November 1967).

- We must use our agents to serve the intensive activities of our military and political struggles. We must strive to build a network within the ranks of the enemy officers and transform this into an official network that will enable us to reach our objectives. Villages are to make use of penetration agents to serve [sic]

- We must strive to build a legal force to carry out our penetration activities and guarantee the fulfillment of such missions.

- The immediate objectives of the district are as follows:

Provide guidance for the military and enemy proselyting task in urban and key areas and closely observe the three Civil Guard Companies.

- Establish a network in the cities to disintegrate enemy organizations and serve [sic]

- Pho Ninh and Pho Hoa will launch coordinated and continuous attacks to harass and create confusion among the puppet troops and government to step up our movement.

(3) Enemy proselyting activity: Develop enemy proselyting belts in areas where enemy troops are numerous. Train legal agents who speak English to contact the target audience and motivate them. Instruct our agents that work in the enemy bases to contact the troops and motivate them to surrender. The armed forces must learn to speak English to carry out the task of capturing prisoners and teaching others how to capture prisoners.

- Secure the assistance of interpreters and puppet troops stationed in the same place with the US troops. Through the puppet troops and interpreters, strive to motivate the US troops and to oppose their terroristic acts.

- Actively carry out our enemy proselyting activities to restore and hold firm our people's control of areas which they had to leave before.

- Strive to motivate US Negro and young troops to contact us and surrender or accept work as agents for us.

- Strongly stress our propaganda activities and distribute as many leaflets as we can.

(4) Carry out the military and enemy proselyting task when [sic]

When the enemy begins to disintegrate [sic] our military and enemy proselyting task must guarantee the creation of a Worker-Peasant-Army Coalition Bloc to completely break down the enemy and struggle to have the major portion of the enemy troops side with the forces of the [sic]. Besides, we must also strive to quickly disintegrate the puppet ranks.

- We are to actively motivate the puppet troops to take to the streets and participate in our people's demonstrations, stage military revolts, destroy the tyrants and bring their units to the side of [sic]. We must also motivate the puppet troops who have joined the ranks [sic] to strive to influence other puppet units.

- We must actively strive to get the collaboration of units that do not wish to join the forces of the [sic]. We must also strive to neutralize other units and destroy all recalcitrant units that wish to oppose the forces of [sic]. Educate a number of officers and NCO's in contributing to the achievement of our Party's policy.

- In regard to the US troops, we must secure their neutral attitude and assure that they will refuse to interfere in any matter.

In order to be able to meet this, we should prepare in advance our cadres of local units, to have them work positively to consolidate our strategic organizations so they are ready when the time comes...and work with other popular organizations on plans to mobilize the masses for a march into the enemy posts and cities.

(5) Tasks to be performed in the rear

In order to accomplish our military and enemy proselyting task and support our forces in the front in fulfilling their mission of attacking the enemy, we must thoroughly understand the importance of that task.

- We must guarantee that people shall be well instructed in carrying out effectively the policy to be applied to war prisoners, defectors and militia members (to include the Americans). We must see that all mistakes in regard to such matters shall be avoided.
- We must also guarantee that our troops are supplied with enough propaganda documents to accomplish their propaganda task.

(6) Criteria for the district:

Totally destroy and disintegrate the organization and morale of the eight enemy platoons in our district.

- Eliminate the 150 enemy troops that are occupying the village.
- Eliminate the 1 civil guard company.
- Disintegrate 1 company of GVN regular troops.
- Secure many officers and interpreters to serve us when [sic]

The works are distributed among the villages as follows:

- Pho Thuan ----- one platoon
- Pho Van ----- acts in coordination with the district to encircle Tra Cau and disintegrate the enemy to build our internal network.
- Pho Ninh must disintegrate two platoons.
- Pho Hoa must disrupt two platoons.
- Pho Cuong must disrupt one platoon.
- Pho Hiep must disrupt one platoon.
- Pho Trung shall encircle Nui Dau.
- Pho Thach will disrupt one platoon.
- Pho Trung and Pho Hiep shall encircle Nui Day.
- Pho Vinh strives to win over one interpreter.
- Pho Phong strives to win over one interpreter.
- The city people must disrupt one enemy platoon and must secure the collaboration of two officers of Captain's rank to serve when [sic].
- Villages such as An, Nhon, Quang and Minh must have legal mobile cells to establish networks among the enemy troops who are still in the village or district. Each village should have at least three active agents.
- Each village must disrupt totally a unit of squad or platoon size.
- Each village must motivate a squad or platoon to stage military revolts or to act as internal traitors.

- Our officers and NCO's from units stationed in the villages must secure the collaboration of enemy cadres in the platoon level or the squad level.

- Motivate the class A liberated villages to have a clear cut concept in regard to the enemy. At least two thirds of these villages must have this concept.

- Build networks of internal traitors. We must have from three to five active agents in each platoon or company.

- Oppose the drafting of our youths. We must absolutely prevent the enemy from drafting our youths. We are to coordinate with the political struggles to carry out this task, and must use the youths as the main elements in the execution of this task.

- Guarantee our tasks in the rear. Guarantee that our people everywhere shall properly carry out the task of military and enemy proselyting and guarantee that they will always hold firm the situation and report and seek advice promptly. Continue to submit the monthly report. In special cases special reports must be made immediately. Guarantee effective communications from lower to higher levels to assure timely guidance.

- Criteria for para-military forces in carrying out the military and enemy proselyting task:

- Educate people to properly carry out their propaganda mission while fighting, execute properly the Party strategy and capture many prisoners. Quickly welcome all enemy troops who take part in our guerrilla activities and join us. Quickly accept the separated units and rapidly exploit the political value of their joining us. Actively encourage all separate units to stage military revolts on the battlefield. Urge local guerrilla forces and troops to take part in the task of encircling enemy bases and motivate puppet troops' dependents to take part in all of our fields of activity.

In brief, the villages must have all the specialized people for the branch serve the Party's strategic policy and serve our armed activities and political activities effectively to gain greater victories in the time to come.

(7) While operating /sic/ stage four offensive phases to launch political attacks against the enemy ranks using such means as internal traitors and dissemination of propaganda where US troops and puppet troops are stationed.

Phase 1: Motivate the puppet troops and cause them to be disrupted.

- Consolidate our organization, prepare our means, documents and plans and prepare to educate our troops to carry out their mission.

- Carry out the task of attacking the enemy morale with propaganda means using topics such as victorious news of our side and the righteous cause of our Front.

- Make use of our agents in the district to breach the enemy's grip and gain more control over the rural population.

Phase 2: Circulate more actively our news of victories and motivate the enemy troops more strongly. Organize propaganda campaigns lasting over three or four successive nights in which we shall publicize our news of victories and the revolutionary actions of certain puppet troops so as to speed up the disruption of the enemy ranks. Make active use of our agents operating in urban and rural areas. At places where the situation is favorable for us, we should strive to force enemy units to surrender. Motivate enemy troops to stage military revolts in villages and districts. Motivate our agents to stage uprisings.....with people in urban and key areas.

Phase 3: Circulate our news of victories even more intensively and strive to win the puppet troops over to our side. Endeavor to disrupt all units that are upset and confused.

- Strive to organize an attack phase lasting 5 to 7 nights to appeal to the puppet troops to rise up and stage military revolts in accordance with the appeal launched by the Central Trung Bo Chapter of the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam and with the two letters that will follow that appeal.

- Employ propaganda activities at Christmas time, New Year's and the Tet and announce our news of victories in all fields of activities when [sic]

- Organize enemy officers and NCO's to defect from their units and side with the [sic]

- Our mobile and legal units must go into action wherever US and puppet troops are found.

Phase 4: From [sic] concentrate our forces and start a propaganda campaign to motivate the enemy troops to quit their ranks on the occasion of Tet.

All other plans must be discussed beforehand. The phases for attacks against the enemy's morale to disrupt them are as follows:

From November 20th to November 25th, 1967

From December 1st to December 5th, 1967

From December 20th to December 25th, 1967

From December 25th, 67 to January 2nd, 1968

(8) A few problems regarding the guidance of these operations.

We are to closely coordinate our military and enemy proselyting task with the armed struggles and political struggle while carrying out our Party's mission.

- We are to concentrate our cadres and forces in strategic and key areas.
- We are to strongly develop the five methods of military and enemy proselyting.
- We must pay special attention to our forces that are in charge of the task of military and enemy proselyting, especially those that are in rural areas. We must pay attention to our legal military and enemy proselyting organization and cadres.
- We must reinforce the guidance of the Party chapter for people in charge of the military and enemy proselyting task and assure that Group members and Party members shall accomplish such tasks.
- Reinforce and closely coordinate the military and enemy proselyting task with all other activities.
- Be watchful of the political situation and the morale of the enemy troops especially in regular units stationed in urban and key areas.

Dec 1, 1967

For the Chief of the Military and enemy
proselyting section 845.

[Signature]

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TR. QUANG

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C. H. I. T. H. I

Nhiệm vụ công tác Bình Định và trong heat đông đông xuân 64-65

I - Kiểm tra hình công tác Bình Định và trong 9 tháng qua.

Đầu tiên của huyện ta hiện nay là bên ngoài Mỹ tăng quân vào đông, tăng nhiều quân đội Mỹ tinh nhuệ và cơ động như cũ 101, 196 bộ binh nhẹ, Thủy quân lục chiến do tiến hành chiến lược 2 gang kiểm tra tiêu diệt và bình định lấy binh định làm trọng tâm.

Với những thủ đoạn rất đa dạng và tàn bạo, dùng phi pháo đánh phá ác liệt, triệt hạ hàng loạt xóm làng, tàn sát hàng loạt quân chúng bằng chính sách tam quang của chúng. Di đối với việc chiến tranh tàn lỵ chiêu bài, chiến tranh giả điếu, rêu rạc dân, đẩy lực lượng Cách Mạng của huyện ta ra khỏi quần chúng nhân dân tiêu diệt để đạt được mục đích bình định nông thôn của chúng.

Án mưu của chúng rất thâm độc như vậy nhưng chúng vẫn thất bại. Khi hai huyện ta chúng không bình định được nên trái lại chúng bị tiêu diệt và làm mất hơn 8.000 quân Mỹ, ngụy, vàng giá phẩm ta vẫn giữ được, quần chúng qua đấu tranh được tập luyện và khi thế đứng lên, phong trào Thái Trăn phát triển khá.

Các mặt công tác thu được nhiều thành tích.

Thắng lợi trong huyện ta 9 tháng qua thật to lớn và toàn diện, sự y nghĩa chiến lược lớn trong việc đánh bại án mưu chiến lược của địch, đẩy địch đi vào thế phòng ngự chiến lược bị động... Tạo ra nhiều khả năng nơi để đưa phong trào Cách Mạng trong huyện ta giành thắng lợi cuối cùng theo phương hướng chiến lược của Đảng.

Thắng lợi do công tác bình định và của ta đã đóng góp một phần rất quan trọng.

Còn lại:

1- Công tác tấn công chính trị vào quân Mỹ, ngụy tương đối tốt và đã thu được kết quả.

- Tấn phát được: 20.000 truyền đơn Mặt Trận Tiến.

-----: 5.000 truyền đơn tiếng Mỹ

- - - - - + 14.000 truyền đơn tiếng Mỹ dùng dân hạn và báo vụ sản

xuất. - - - - - : 2.000 truyền đơn tiếng Mỹ để giữ thế hợp pháp cho quân chúng. : 2.500 truyền đơn tiếng Việt.

Kết hợp với đấu tranh chính trị của quần chúng trực diện tấn công vào đông M binh sĩ đào ra ngu 37 tên và gia đình binh sĩ ngụy đi đấu tranh.

Các hình thức tấn công khác cũng được phát triển.

Các hình thức tấn công được tác dụng vào tư tưởng binh sĩ địch, góp phần làm giảm sút tinh thần chiến đấu của quân địch, tạo điều kiện thuận lợi cho bộ đội ta tiêu diệt địch, thể hiện rõ rệt nhiều trận chiến đấu ở