

VIET - NAM

DOCUMENTS AND RESEARCH NOTES

Document Nos. 36-37

June 1968

NORTH VIETNAM'S ROLE IN THE SOUTH

Background

Since the fall of 1964 more than 200,000 North Vietnamese troops have been dispatched to South Viet-Nam. Most of these have since become casualties of combat or fallen prey to disease or other mishaps. As of April this year, however, it was estimated that there were well over 70,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in North Vietnamese Army units in the South and well over 15,000 in nominally Viet Cong units. The total North Vietnamese presence had increased to about 70 per cent of all the communist combat forces in the South.

These were statistics given by U.S. Ambassador W. Averill Harriman on May 27, 1968, at the fifth session of talks with representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Paris.

"Nothing is gained at this table or anywhere else in the world by North Vietnam's persistent attempts to...claim that there are no North Vietnamese troops in the South," Ambassador Harriman said in notes used at the meeting.

"If that claim were true -- and indeed no North Vietnamese troops were in South Vietnam -- then we would not be bombing the North, and we would not need to ask for restraint from North Vietnam. The DRV would be risking nothing by agreeing to restraint if there were in fact, no North Vietnamese troops in the South -- since in that case there would be nothing to restrain."

Ambassador Harriman supplemented his remarks by submitting a paper titled "The North Vietnamese Army in South Viet-Nam." The paper is reprinted below as Document No. 36 in this bulletin series. It traces the NVA build-up from "roots running back

to the immediate aftermath of Geneva" up to Hanoi's recent escalation of the war "with a strategy of indiscriminate attack upon the cities of South Viet-Nam."

About two weeks before Ambassador Harriman submitted his paper in Paris, the U.S. Department of State in Washington released a more detailed discussion of the same topic, a study entitled "Working Paper on the North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Viet-Nam". Reprinted below as Document No. 37, this study was based principally on data drawn from more than 100 captured documents, intelligence briefs and interrogation reports.

Treating Hanoi's political activities as well its military efforts in the origin, direction and support of the war in South Viet-Nam, the paper finds "the evidence appears conclusive that the North was the driving force in bringing about the conflict from 1959 onward and in raising it to its successive dimensions at all stages."

VIET-NAM DOCUMENTS & RESEARCH NOTES is issued as a research service by the United States Mission in Vietnam. It presents a selection of significant materials on Southern Viet Cong and North Vietnamese affairs. Copies of Vietnamese-language originals of all captured documents used and full texts of any translations abridged may be obtained on request from the Minister-Counselor for Information, American Embassy, Saigon, Vietnam

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

(Presented by Chief U.S. Delegate W. Averell Harriman at the May 27, 1968 meeting in Paris with North Vietnamese representatives)

Over 200,000 men have been dispatched from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam since autumn 1964. Most of these have become casualties of the combat or fallen prey to disease or other mishaps. As of last month, we estimated that there were well over 70,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in North Vietnamese army units in South Viet-Nam and well over 15,000 more in Viet Cong units. Even more are on the way. In recent months, the total North Vietnamese presence has increased sharply and shows signs of continuing to increase rather than decrease. Thus, since 1964 there has been a dramatic jump in the proportion of North Vietnamese army units opposing allied forces.

In December, 1964, organized North Vietnamese army units, as distinct from northern infiltrators in nominally Viet Cong units, comprised only a small portion of total Communist combat strength in South Viet-Nam. The organized North Vietnamese army unit strength began increasing sharply in early 1965. Today, North Vietnamese army troops account for approximately seventy per cent of the total combined strength in the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army combat forces. This pronounced increase in numbers of northerners has been accompanied by a growing dependence upon North Vietnamese army ordnance. Both Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army units operating in South Viet-Nam today are generally equipped with late model Chinese and Soviet small arms, mortars, and artillery. Moreover, the North Vietnamese army has recently introduced into South Viet-Nam Soviet manufactured armored vehicles.

Now, we can demonstrate that North Vietnamese presence in the South has roots running back to the immediate aftermath of Geneva, when Le Duc Tho and Le Duan, then as now, party chiefs in Hanoi, were in the Saigon region attempting to foment insurrection against the legitimate government in Saigon.

We know that as early as 1959 groups of infiltrators from North Viet-Nam arrived to open guerrilla bases north of Saigon in War Zones C and D. We have captured an official party history in that region which is explicit that, pursuant to a May 1959 decision of the governing Lao Dong party in Hanoi, a military campaign was launched the following autumn to overthrow the government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The role of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in these events constitutes aggression, and patent violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954. This was done, as I have pointed out, to undermine the progress which was being made in the South.

Building of a military apparatus in South Viet-Nam proceeded apace. Let me give a specific example. In 1961, the 271st and 272nd Viet Cong Regiments were formed in the Saigon area around cadres from North Viet-Nam; in 1964 the 273rd Regiment was created, similarly with cadres recruited and trained in North Viet-Nam. These units were the primary source of the insurgency in the regions north of Saigon.

Beginning in 1965, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam elected to introduce North Vietnamese troops into the region north of Saigon. In 1964, the 101st Regiment of the North Vietnamese army began movement into South Viet-Nam, arriving in northern War Zone D in 1965. In mid-1966, it was attached to the 9th Viet Cong Division for combat operations.

The 9th Division was repeatedly engaged in combat in which its units suffered casualties so serious that North Vietnamese officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers were required to fill its depleted ranks. Accordingly, North Vietnamese replacement troops were infiltrated into the South to replenish the Division.

In the major engagements in the autumn of 1966 and the spring of 1967, and through the attacks on Loc Ninh the following autumn, the 9th Division lost thousands more of its personnel. But still the flow of newly infiltrated troops continued, and though many of the newcomers were ill-trained, little more than cannon-fodder, the Division managed to participate in the Tet Offensive and the attacks of this month. In these most recent actions, formations of the Division were sharply repulsed enroute to Saigon.

Now, the process of again refilling the ranks is underway. But these units, the oldest of the Viet Cong regiments, can scarcely claim a local identity any longer. Now North Vietnamese army soldiers are in the majority in their ranks, and their leaders and their weapons are of the army of North Viet-Nam.

The infiltrators from North Viet-Nam destined for the Saigon region were assisted on route by the 559 Group, a special transportation unit of the North Vietnamese army organized in May 1959 and named for the decision to launch military operations. This unit has operated and expanded the infiltration routes through Laos into central and southern South Viet-Nam.

Over these routes, the North Vietnamese army, in mid and late 1964 deployed elements of its 325th Division into South Viet-Nam in flagrant violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords. The introduction of these and other elements of the 325th Division was part of a plan which aimed at cutting South Viet-Nam in half, and at securing a logistic support system which included not only the Laos trails, but also access to the coast. The plan involved the sending of arms into South Viet-Nam by sea -- again violating the Geneva Accords -- as evidenced by the sinking of an arms-laden 100-ton trawler in Vung-Ro Bay in February, 1965.

Captured documents and other information describing how the 325th Division attempted to carry out that plan indicate that it repeatedly suffered heavy losses in battle with allied forces, and repeatedly received large groups of replacement personnel infiltrated from North Viet-Nam. The 1st, 5th, and 3rd Division of the North Vietnamese army are now operating in central South Viet-Nam.

In the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam, the Communist combat forces are now almost entirely composed of North Vietnamese troops. At present, of 22 regiments under command of the army of North Viet-Nam in First Corps area, only one is a Viet Cong regiment -- and the disproportion of North Vietnamese army to Viet Cong personnel has grown markedly within the past six months. In January, 1968, at least 40,000 main force troops -- of your army and of the Viet Cong -- were operating in the First Corps area. These included three divisions of the North Vietnamese army commanding 13 of your army's regiments and one Viet Cong regiment. By March, 1968, main forces strength had grown to at least 60,000 including five of your army's divisions commanding 21 of your army's regiments and one Viet Cong regiment.

We are, then, prepared to provide evidence demonstrating the presence of the North Vietnamese army throughout South Viet-Nam. Cases we have cited are only part of the story. We have available a multitude of captured documents, as well as statements of North Vietnamese defectors. This evidence shows the utter falsity of the version of history you have tried to propagate, and establishes a very different sequence of dates in the escalation of the war in Viet-Nam from that you have given.

Thus, the insurgency does not date from 1961 as you stated; it goes back at least to 1959 when the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam dispatched subversive cadres into the South to carry out aggression against the people and government of South Viet-Nam. Likewise, your government deployed regular forces of the North Vietnamese army into South Viet-Nam.

Not only are there more than 85,000 North Viet-Nam army personnel in South Viet-Nam, but recently these forces have been employed in shameful attacks on the towns and cities of South Viet-Nam. In the offensive launched by your forces during the Tet holiday truce earlier this year, North Vietnamese army forces occupied the Citadel of Hue, one of the historical monuments of the Vietnamese people. Many thousands were left homeless as a result of these attacks. The murder of more than a thousand civilians in that city by North Vietnamese forces has already been described.

In the recent May offensive, North Vietnamese army forces were committed to the attack on Saigon, and though most of these forces were intercepted and defeated short of the city, the few that did reach the urban areas ejected the populace from their homes, and dug in, deliberately inviting counterattacks.

Attacks since March 31 directed against civilian lives and civilian homes have no military purpose. These attacks show beyond dispute the true attitude of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam for the people of South Viet-Nam -- a cynical and inhumane disregard for their well-being. North Vietnamese soldiers and Viet Cong have murdered unarmed civilians at Hue, slain other noncombatants, including reporters, in Saigon, and fired rockets and recoilless artillery at random into cities. The case is plain that it is North Viet-Nam which has been escalating the war with a strategy of indiscriminate attack upon the cities of South Viet-Nam.

WORKING PAPER ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
ROLE IN THE WAR IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

(Released by U.S. Department of State, May 1968)

- 0 -

This working paper discusses the role of North Viet-Nam in the origin, direction and support of the war in South Viet-Nam. It is based on the appended compilation of more than 100 verbatim captured documents, intelligence briefs and the whole or part of interrogations edited for security.* The information in this compilation goes as far as is now justifiable in the public interest. Obviously such a compilation cannot include information from sensitive sources who could be easily compromised under present wartime conditions. If such information were releasable, the paper would be considerably more conclusive. Nonetheless even with these limitations, it is believed that the paper and accompanying compilation are both useful and informative.

The footnotes to this paper are based largely on the material in the compilation. The nature of the material is, however, fully described in the footnotes so that the reader can get a fairly good idea of the kind of information involved even if he does not have the compilation fully before him.

Among the documents in the compilation, perhaps the three most important ones, captured within the past two years and of great interest to any student of this subject, are as follows:

- (a) CRIMP Document: A 23,000-word review of the "Experience of the South Viet-Nam Revolutionary Movement during the Past Several Years" which was written about 1963 by an unidentified Communist cadre and was captured by Allied Forces in early January 1966, during Operation CRIMP.
- (b) Le Duan Letter: A letter dated March 1966, presumably written by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Lao Dong / Communist Party of Viet-Nam / Central Committee and member of the Politburo; captured by units of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, January 21, 1967 during Operation Cedar Falls.
- (c) Talk of General Vinh: A talk by General Nguyen Van Vinh, Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese High Command and Chairman of the Lao Dong's Reunification Department, made before the Viet Cong Fourth Central Office (COSVN) Congress in April 1966. It was captured by U.S. Forces in Ninh Thuan Province in early 1967. The reader may find that the style of these and other documents is heavy and frequently hard to follow. These characteristics make close scrutiny of the texts and a knowledge of the historical context essential to their interpretation.

The following discussion of North Viet-Nam's role in the current war is in two parts. The first deals briefly with certain aspects of the setting in which the war started. The second outlines what can be said, on the basis of this documentary material, about the origins and evolution of the war.

I. The Setting of the War

This paper does not attempt to provide an account of the complex series of events that led up to the current war. However, there are two features of the Vietnamese political landscape in the period following the French decision to end the fighting in 1954 that require mention.

A. The Geneva Accords, 1954

The Geneva Accords constitute the first of these features. Although much has already been written about them, their most important practical effect was to create two separate international entities in Viet-Nam. That a separate national entity--South Viet-Nam--existed against which aggression could be committed is evident from the following facts:

* Appendices not included with this reprint.

1. Anyone reading the Accords will recognize that the establishment of the 17th parallel as a dividing line between North and South Viet-Nam, the provision for the movement of the Vietnamese people north or south of the parallel according to their political preferences, the postponement of general elections for two years, and the ambiguity as to how such election could be organized--all point to the conclusion that the country was being divided. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. makes this point in his book, The Bitter Heritage, when he says that the negotiations in Geneva "resulted in the de facto partition of Viet-Nam at the 17th parallel and the independence of Laos and Cambodia." As far back as 1955, South Viet-Nam was recognized, de jure, by 36 countries, and North Viet-Nam had full relations with 12 countries. Today the Republic of Viet-Nam has de jure diplomatic relations with 52 nations. North Viet-Nam has diplomatic relations with 24 countries, 12 of whom belong to the Communist bloc.

2. The situation had ample precedent in what had happened in Korea. There, the country had been divided at the 38th parallel, and remained so even though a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 recommended elections not later than the end of March 1948, to be followed by the convening of a Korean national assembly, and the formation of a national government.²

3. The Soviet Union, in 1957, proposed to admit North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, and the two Koreas to the United Nations as four separate states. In fact, Soviet spokesmen have specifically said: "The realistic approach was to admit that there were two States with conflicting political systems in both Korea and Viet-Nam."³ They later reversed their position regarding South Viet-Nam; the United States was opposed to the admission of both North Viet-Nam and North Korea.

4. The United States, for its part, indicated in 1954 that it would "refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the Geneva Accords. But it also stated that "it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid Agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."⁴

5. When President Kennedy wrote to President Ngo Dinh Diem on December 14, 1961, announcing a major increase in U.S. assistance to South Viet-Nam, he noted that "the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities in Hanoi." He further referred to the U.S. declaration of 1954: "At that time, the United States, although not a party to the Accords, declared it 'would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.' We continue to maintain that view."⁵

B. The Communist Apparatus in South Viet-Nam

A second feature of the Vietnamese landscape both before and since 1954 has been the existence of a Communist political and military apparatus in South Viet-Nam. Party documents captured by French forces during their war against the Viet Minh described the Communist organization of the period.

1. In the South, the apparatus was broadly divided between two regions, or "interzonea", and a special zone in the area of Saigon. Each of these zones originally reported directly to Communist Party headquarters in Hanoi. Interzone 5 (Trung Bo) encompassed the northern and central part of South Viet-Nam. Interzone Nam Bo consisted of the south and southwest, including the Delta. Province, district, town, and village cells reported to these "interzones".⁶

2. In 1951, when the Communist Party in the North was reconstituted as the Lao Dong Party, its apparatus in the South was reorganized under a six-man Trung Uong Cuc Mien Nam, or Central Office for South Viet-Nam (COSVN).⁷

3. The head of COSVN and senior Party representative in the South was Le Duan, an Annamite, who is now First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi. His deputy was Le Duc Tho, a northerner, who today is also a member of the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party. Le Duan and Tho appear to have had considerable independence of action in directing day-to-day military and political operations in the South, but remained answerable on broad policy questions to the heads of the Lao Dong Party in the North.⁸

4. The end of the war against France in 1954, and the establishment of North and South Viet-Nam, brought no significant change in the centralized control of the Party by

Hanoi. Although COSVN was phased out, its functions in the southern and southwestern provinces were assumed by the Regional Committee for Nam Bo. Hanoi took direct charge of party activities in Interzone 5, the northern part of South Viet-Nam.⁹

11. Origins and Evolution of the Current War

It was in this setting that the current war in South Viet-Nam started and evolved. Five major phases in this development can be readily identified. The evidence for each of the five phases and the inferences that can be drawn about the role played by North Viet-Nam are summarized below.

A. The Political Phase, 1954-1956

This was the period in which both Hanoi and Saigon were working to secure control over their respective parts of Viet-Nam. At the same time, although one cannot be certain about the precise numbers, approximately 900,000 people fled the North to the South; about 90,000 people chose to go North under the terms of the Geneva Accords.¹⁰ During these years, Ngo Dinh Diem -- first as Premier, then as President of South Viet-Nam -- undertook his campaigns to bring various dissident factions and sects under the authority of the Government of South Viet-Nam. Ho Chi Minh consolidated his power in the North, and North Viet-Nam, for its part, took the following steps with respect to South Viet-Nam:

1. Deputy Premier Pham Van Dong, at the closing session of the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, expressly stated that "We shall achieve unity. We shall achieve it just as we have won the war. No force in the world, internal or external, can make us deviate from our path..." Ho Chi Minh emphasized this determination the next day by calling publicly for a "long and arduous struggle" to win the southern areas, which he characterized as "territories of ours."¹¹

2. Hanoi did withdraw the bulk of its fighting men from the South. However, most of these "regroupees" were placed in special units. They formed into the 305th, 324th, 325th, 330th, and 338th Divisions of the North Vietnamese Army. At least until 1959, these divisions were reported composed entirely of South Vietnamese.¹²

3. Hanoi also left a small but experienced military force in South Viet-Nam. Although its exact size is unknown, in 1956 the U.S. military attache estimated it at about 5,000 men.¹³

4. In addition, and perhaps more decisive to long term Communist strategy, North Viet-Nam continued to maintain its political network in the South.¹⁴ Even in the first year after Geneva, it sent a small number of cadres across or around the 17th parallel.¹⁵ A notable arrival was General Van Tien Dung, then and since chief of staff of the North Vietnamese Army, who dropped abruptly from public view in the North for a period in 1955-56. Intelligence reports placed him in South Viet-Nam, where he was working to organize additional units of former Viet Minh cadres who had not gone North, and to prepare for future infiltration and expansion of the apparatus in the South.¹⁶

5. Most important of all, Hanoi ordered its apparatus in the South to go underground. As the CRIMP Document puts it: "The Party apparatus in South Viet-Nam...became covert. The organization and methods of operation of the Party were changed in order to guarantee the leadership and focus forces of the Party under the new struggle condition." A Party policy paper of the time defines as part of "the immediate mission of Nambo...the consolidation and reformation of Party organisms and popular groups on a clandestine basis, based upon vigilance and revolutionary procedures designed to safeguard our forces..."¹⁷

6. These orders were apparently obeyed. There are reports of Party meetings in 1956-57 to discuss a change of tactics, and Le Duan is represented as urging increased military action. "Our political struggle in the South will sometimes have to be backed up with military action to show the strength of our forces," he told a Party conference in the South on March 18, 1956. "Therefore we should increase our forces in the South and develop military action."¹⁸ Nonetheless, despite these outbursts, the apparatus seems to have followed the line of the Lao Dong Party through 1956, and to have worked for unification by political means; i.e., by subversion and all means short of resorting to open armed conflict.

It is clear from this evidence that:

1. Hanoi was indeed both committed and determined to bring the South under its control.

2. Hanoi was also willing to accept unification by way of the Geneva Accords, provided that it could manipulate these Accords so as to ensure victory for the Lao Dong Party and control of the South by the North.

3. Even so, the North Vietnamese leaders hedged their bets. They were willing to rely upon political means according to their own interpretation of the Geneva Accords. They left enough of their political and military apparatus in South Viet-Nam so as to weaken it from within and be able to take advantage of any elections should these come about. But they also were prepared to expand the apparatus in order to return to "armed struggle" or an all-out military effort if the political gambit failed. And, of course, the political gambit did fail.

Indeed, the period from 1954 through 1956 saw the consolidation of the Diem government in South Viet-Nam, and what has sometimes been described as a "miracle" of settling down and accomplishment, at least in relation to what may well have been North Viet-Nam's expectations of early collapse.

Moreover, the elections scheduled for July 1956 under the Geneva Accords never did take place. On this much-debated issue, the key points to recall are the fact that the Geneva Accords called for "free" elections and that, as all responsible observers at the time agreed, North Viet-Nam would not conceivably have permitted any supervision or any determination that could remotely have been called free. Hence, Diem refused to go through with the elections, and we supported him in that refusal.¹⁹

B. The Outbreak of the War, 1956-1959

The period from 1956 to 1959 is a particularly difficult one to characterize in a few words. In South Viet-Nam, despite earlier political and economic gains, President Diem was becoming increasingly repressive in his efforts to maintain his authority; in the process he undoubtedly contributed to growing, if relatively disorganized, opposition. In the countryside, peasant discontent was aroused particularly by his brother's excessive measures to ferret out Communist cadres; and urban discontent was aroused by his efforts to discredit and neutralize any opposition that went beyond mere dissent.

This dissatisfaction was exploited by the Communist underground apparatus which now became less reluctant to use overt means, and, in areas where its strength was relatively unchallenged by the Government, to resort to selective terrorism. Although statistics for the period are neither complete nor entirely reliable, a sharp rise in terrorism seems to have begun as early as 1957. It appears that by 1958 the Government was losing about 40 civilian officials and 40 military personnel per month, and it is widely conceded that an organized uprising against Diem got under way sometime between then and 1960.²⁰

What about the role of North Viet-Nam in this uprising? The evidence indicates the following:

1. There was considerable debate within the Communist apparatus in the South as to what strategy they should follow, given the failure to achieve unification by political means.

2. By 1958, according to the CRIMP Document, "the majority of the Party members and cadres felt that it was necessary to launch immediately an armed struggle in order to preserve the movement and protect the forces. In several areas the Party members on their own initiative had organized armed struggle against the enemy." Yet at the same time, there were others who were hesitant to push the armed struggle. "These people did not fully appreciate the capabilities of the masses, of the Party and of the movement and therefore did not dare mobilize the masses in order to seek every means to oppose the enemy." The Nam Bo Regional Committee leadership hesitated, "but the principal reason was the fear of violating the party line."²¹

3. During this period, the CRIMP Document reports that "the political struggle movement of the masses, although not defeated, was encountering increasing difficulty and

increasing weakness; the Party bases although not completely destroyed were significantly weakened, and in some areas quite seriously; the prestige of the masses and of the revolution suffered."²²

4. Meanwhile, Le Duan left South Viet-Nam sometime in 1957, emerged in Hanoi, and became First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party -- an indication that those favoring the armed struggle had prevailed.²³

5. In 1958, there is evidence that Hanoi took the first steps to organize the movement of men and supplies both through Laos and across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).²⁴

6. Then, in May 1959, the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party announced the decision for war against South Viet-Nam. Although the decision itself may have been taken earlier, the directive of the Politburo, again according to the CRIMP Document, "stated that the time had come to push the armed struggle against the enemy. Thanks to this...in October 1959 the armed struggle was launched." As described by the CRIMP Document, "it immediately took the form in South Viet-Nam of revolutionary warfare, a long-range revolutionary warfare."²⁵

7. By the end of 1959, more than 400 civilians had been murdered and another 579 kidnapped in South Viet-Nam.²⁶ Armed attacks had increased significantly in size, with company-strength Viet Cong units appearing in assaults on army outposts and patrols. In January 1960, a Viet Cong battalion some 500 strong successfully attacked an ARVN regiment.

The history that seems to emerge from these data is as follows:

1. Hanoi had committed itself publicly and irrevocably to a return to armed struggle in the South.

2. The southern part of the Communist apparatus had become restive with the political approach by 1956, and Le Duan in particular was persuaded that force would be required to bring about unification.

3. The Diem regime's trend toward repression made the "objective" conditions seem ripe for launching the struggle.

4. The Party apparatus was gradually reactivated into militant actions where local conditions permitted.

5. By May 1959, at the latest, Hanoi in effect declared war on South Viet-Nam and committed its political and military apparatus in the South to the struggle.

It is at least conceivable that Diem strengthened Hanoi's hand by virtue of the measures he was taking against both the dissident sects and the Communist apparatus in the South. It may even be that the sense of weakness felt by the leaders of Nam Bo, and Hanoi's fear that it would lose control over the apparatus, triggered the decision. But the fact is that Hanoi decided to reunify the country by force. Moreover, it appears to have had the only apparatus in the South capable of organizing and controlling an outbreak of violence of the magnitude that then occurred.

C. The Special War, 1959-1963

For the next four years, from the end of 1959 to the end of 1963, the Viet Cong engaged in what the CRIMP Document called a long-range revolutionary warfare against the Diem regime and its immediate successor. During those four years, the strength of the Viet Cong increased substantially, and a revolutionary apparatus emerged in South Viet-Nam that was ostensibly independent of North Viet-Nam.

What role did North Viet-Nam play in these developments? On the military side, there is the following evidence of Hanoi's activities:

1. The North Vietnamese authorities formed border-crossing teams in earlier 1959 to transport medicines, ammunition, food, and documents across the DMZ.²⁷

2. The Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party ordered the formation of the 559th Transportation Group to provide for the support of Viet Cong bases in the South. Founded

in May 1959, the 559th was placed directly under the Central Committee and in close liaison with the Ministry of Security, the Army General Staff, and the Logistics Bureau.²⁸

3. The 70th Battalion of the 559th, also formed in May 1959, was sent to the panhandle of Laos. Its responsibilities were to transport weapons, ammunition, mail, and supplies by way of 20 stations along the Laotian trails into South Viet-Nam. The battalion was also charged with guiding infiltrating groups, and with bringing the sick and wounded back to North Viet-Nam.²⁹

4. In June 1959, the 603rd Battalion was formed with a strength of 250 men. It was placed under the command of the Army General Staff and located near Quang Khe, a naval base in North Viet-Nam. It had the responsibility for clandestine maritime operations into South Viet-Nam.³⁰

5. In January 1960, a special training base for infiltrators became operational at a North Vietnamese Army base in Son Tay, northwest of Hanoi.³¹

6. The 324th Division, in Nghe An Province, was ordered to begin training infiltrators early in 1960.³²

7. During this same period, the Xuan Mai Infiltration Training Center was set up southwest of Hanoi in the former barracks of the 228th Brigade. Once in operation, it apparently was capable of handling several 1,000-man classes at one time.³³

8. Infiltration on a substantial scale began in 1959. At the end of 1960, Viet Cong Main Force strength was estimated at 10 battalions and 5,500 men. Regional and local guerrillas probably had a strength of about 30,000. By the end of 1963, Viet Cong Main Force strength had risen to 30 battalions and around 35,000 men. It is important to note that this figure represents only a fraction of the total Viet Cong political/military apparatus operating in the South. During this same period, infiltration is estimated to have proceeded at the following rates:³⁴

<u>Year</u>	<u>Confirmed</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Total</u>
1959-60	4,556	28	4,582
1961	4,118	2,177	6,295
1962	5,362	7,495	12,857
1963	4,726	3,180	7,906
	18,762	12,878	31,640

9. Until late 1963, most of these infiltrators were ethnic Southerners, veterans of the Viet Minh with years of military experience and training, who had regrouped to the North. They were preponderantly officers or senior noncommissioned officers; through 1961, a high proportion of them were members of the Lao Dong Party. They assumed command positions in the Viet Cong forces and also carried out a wide range of political assignments. They provided, in sum, the core of the Viet Cong military and political apparatus.³⁵

10. Prior to 1961, the Viet Cong had equipped themselves from Viet Minh caches of old French and American weapons, by the local manufacture of crude hand guns and rifles, and by capturing weapons from South Vietnamese units. Hanoi became an active supplier of weapons in 1961. At that point, modified versions of the French Mat-49 rifle began to appear on the battlefield. Their chambers had been reworked to use the standard Communist 7.62 mm cartridge, a technique which required factory tooling.³⁶

On the political side, the evidence about North Viet-Nam's activities is as follows:

1. On September 10, 1960, a resolution was adopted at the Third National Congress of the Lao Dong Party which highlighted the dominant role the North would play and stated guidelines for what was to become the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam (NLF). The resolution stated: "In the present state, the Vietnamese revolution has two strategic tasks: first, to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam; second, to liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country.... To insure the complete success of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam, our people there must strive to

establish a united bloc of workers, peasants, and soldiers and to bring into being a broad national united front directed against the U.S.-Diem clique and based on the worker-peasant alliance."³⁷

2. On January 29, 1961, Hanoi announced that the National Front for Liberation had been formed the previous month, on December 20. The principal function of the Front was to conduct overt propaganda campaigns. Even so, the Front committee leadership has included Lao Dong Party agents who directed the work.³⁸ One high-ranking member of the Front is apparently Major General Tran Van Tra of the North Vietnamese Army, a top Viet Cong commander and an alternate member of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee in Hanoi. He seems to use the alias of Tran Nam Trung.³⁹

3. Shortly after the foundation of the NLF, Hanoi announced that the insurgent forces in the South had been joined together in a "Liberation Army of South Viet-Nam" under the NLF. However, captured documents of 1962 state explicitly that "the present Liberation Army has been organized by the Lao Dong Party."⁴⁰ Other documents state that "the Liberation Army is...an instrument for the Party...for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam and the reunification of the Fatherland."⁴¹

4. In January 1962, Hanoi Radio announced that a conference of "Marxist-Leninist" delegates in South Viet-Nam had organized a "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP), which had immediately "volunteered" to join the NLF. However, documentation shows that in Hanoi's own words, "The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence; actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam, unified from North to South, under the direction of the Central Executive Committee of the Party, the chief of which is President Ho."⁴² The PRP's Central Committee was later stated to comprise of 30 to 40 high-ranking Communists, with the size and composition of the committee varying from time to time as members rotated to and from the North and between regions of South Viet-Nam.⁴³

5. Within this Committee, the real decision-making power lies in a select group of its highest ranking members, a standing committee known like its forerunner of the 1950's as the Trung Uong Cuc Mien Nam, or Central Office for South Viet-Nam (COSVN). The new COSVN was apparently formed in Hanoi after the Lao Dong Party Congress of 1960.⁴⁴ At that time, several Southern and Central Vietnamese were chosen to organize the COSVN, and were elevated to membership in the Lao Dong Central Committee. Since 1965 and perhaps earlier, COSVN and its military committee have been heavily weighted with North Vietnamese general officers. Political and military directives for the conduct of the war, captured by allied forces in South Viet-Nam, have consistently issued from Party and military organs and not from the NLF.⁴⁵

6. Hanoi has tried to conceal its role in the political and military campaigns in the South. A Southern party unit was reprimanded for copying and distributing a message from the North Vietnamese Ministry of Public Health to the party medical section in South Viet-Nam; this was considered a violation of party "secrecy regulations."⁴⁶ A party letter states: "The Central Party Committee directs that propaganda should rather praise nationalism, patriotism, revolutionary heroism and the role of the National Liberation Front. Indoctrination and propaganda referring to Uncle Ho, Party, class struggle, etc., should be conducted orally within internal organizations and among the people only."⁴⁷ Further, a recently captured cadre notebook for late 1967 indicates that: "The Central Headquarters of the Lao Dong Party and Uncle Ho Chi Minh have ordered the Lao Dong Party Committee in South Viet-Nam and the entire army and people of South Viet-Nam to implement a general offensive and general uprising in order to achieve a decisive victory for the Revolution within the 1967 Winter and 1968 Spring and Summer.... The above subject should be fully understood by cadre and troops; however, our brothers should not say that this order comes from the Party and Uncle Ho Chi Minh, but to say it comes from the Liberation Front."⁴⁸

The evidence on both the military and political side leads to the following conclusions:

1. From 1959 onward, Hanoi established an extensive organization for the training and infiltration of personnel, and at a later point major equipment, into the South.

2. The personnel infiltrated from the North between 1959 and 1968 provided the core and cutting edge of the Viet Cong military and political apparatus.

3. Hanoi established, from the outset, firm control over the direction and policy-making structure of the whole campaign against South Viet-Nam.

4. The National Liberation Front was established, in Hanoi, in December of 1960 in order to give the appearance of local leadership. In fact, the NLF has never been in charge of the political and military conduct of the war. The covert nature of the total apparatus, and the desire for outward appearances that it was totally indigenous to the South, did contribute to its ability to attract and hold local support in South Viet-Nam.

5. The evidence suggests that Hanoi hoped to avoid overt intervention in this period and was seeking to overthrow the Saigon Government and set the stage for unification through the Viet Cong, with only leadership and control from the North.

D. Expansion of the War, 1963-1965

The period from late 1963 to the end of 1965 is in some ways the most intriguing period of the current war. During those two years, which witnessed the downfall of the Diem regime, great political instability in South Viet-Nam, and an expansion of the war toward its current dimensions, both the United States and North Viet-Nam committed regular military units to the conflict. That Hanoi became overtly involved in the South during this period is generally recognized; exactly why and how is not so widely understood:

On this score, there is evidence to the following effect:

1. Hanoi probably took the decision to commit units of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) to the South as early as December, 1963. This was shortly after the overthrow of Diem (November 1, 1963); when it became clear that the overthrow of Diem had not produced any significant defections to the Communist cause whatever, Hanoi simply changed its anti-Diem propaganda line and intensified the struggle. The 9th Session of the Lao Dong Party's Third Central Committee held a meeting in December and, according to a captured document, "assessed the balance of forces between us and the enemy and set forth plans and guidelines to win special war."⁴⁹

2. Starting in early 1964, Hanoi began to develop its infiltration trails through Laos into an army-scale supply route, capable of handling continuous truck traffic to South Viet-Nam. A large group of North Vietnamese army construction battalions in at least three "Combined Forces" (Binh Trám 3, 4, and 5) was deployed in the area by 1964 to oversee the development of this road net.⁵⁰

3. Some regular NVA units are known to have begun preparing for infiltration as early as April 1964. Several prisoners from the 95th Regiment of the 325th Division have reported that their unit was recalled in that month from duty in Laos. Back in North Viet-Nam, the 95th underwent special military and political training for operations in the South.⁵¹

4. Hanoi also began to form new regimental-sized units for dispatch to the South. One of these, the 32nd Regiment, was activated sometime in the Spring of 1964, with personnel drawn from a number of established units. Trained draftees were added from the Son Tay and Xuan Mai infiltration centers which were in operation by 1961.⁵²

5. In October 1964, the first complete tactical unit of the North Vietnamese Army, the 95th Regiment, left the North. This was a new unit, with cadre drawn mainly from the 325th Division. It reached South Viet-Nam in December.⁵³ The 32nd Regiment left the North in September or October 1964, arriving between January and March, and a second regiment of the 325th Division, the 101st, had left North Viet-Nam by December 1964. All of these dates of departure were prior to the beginning of U.S. bombing of North Viet-Nam in February 1965. In short, the evidence does not support the claim, sometimes made, that the sending of regular North Vietnamese units was only in response to the U.S. bombing.

6. Between November 1964 and the end of 1965, a buildup of 33 NVA battalions (about 10 regiments) took place in South Viet-Nam. Of these, about three NVA battalions (2,000 men) had arrived by the end of 1964. By the end of 1965, the NVA already constituted about 30 per cent of the total Main Force operating in South Viet-Nam.⁵⁴

The following inferences can be drawn from this evidence:

1. Hanoi probably became dissatisfied with the failure of the Viet Cong, by itself, to capture South Viet-Nam.
2. It therefore decided to provide the increment of strength necessary to ensure seizure and control of the South. NVA regular units were to be the means to this end.
3. The relatively slow pace of the buildup is probably explainable in terms of poor transport and logistics, and the belief that time was on Hanoi's side.
4. Far from triggering the regular North Vietnamese buildup, U.S. actions were in response to it: the bombing of the North and the introduction of U.S. troops all followed not only the earlier movement of men and supplies from the North, but specifically came after regular North Vietnamese units had begun to be sent in quantity.

E. The Current Phase, 1965-1967

The past two years, from 1965 to the end of 1967, have been marked particularly by major clashes between U.S. and NVA units, by the heavy bombing of North Viet-Nam, and by continuing efforts, thus far abortive, to negotiate a settlement of the conflict.

Here again, there is considerable evidence regarding North Viet-Nam's role in this phase of the war:

1. By early 1966, NVA units were described by Hanoi as "the organic mobile forces of South Viet-Nam".⁵⁵
2. By the end of 1967, NVA strength in South Viet-Nam had risen to the point where its units constituted at least 45 per cent of the enemy Main Force. If one includes the NVA personnel who are in Viet Cong Main Force units, North Vietnamese troops now account for more than 50 per cent of the Main Force total.⁵⁶
3. Dependence on logistic support from North Viet-Nam has increased commensurately. From aerial photography and pilot sightings, it is estimated that more than 300 trucks are operating on the infiltration routes in Laos alone during the dry season.
4. Since 1964, the Viet Cong Main Forces have been extensively re-equipped with the latest Communist Chinese and Soviet automatic weapons. In addition to small arms, the Viet Cong Main Forces and the NVA units are now supplied with Soviet and Chinese heavy machine-guns, mortars, and rocket launchers. Modern Communist firearms have also been supplied to some of the local forces, although French, American, and homemade weapons still figure in the guerrilla arsenal.⁵⁷
5. As a result of the large NVA presence in the South, it has become necessary to explain their role to the rural populace of South Viet-Nam. Communist political cadres are told to say that "we are backed up by a large war area which is the heroic socialist North Viet-Nam. It constitutes a major factor for success...North Viet-Nam is a large and stable rear area for South Viet-Nam and is providing us everything we need, including soldiers." Recruits from North Viet-Nam are described as having been "assigned to South Viet-Nam to liberate this part of the country...."⁵⁸
6. Although the COSVN Military Affairs Committee supervises both Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army military activity, the North Vietnamese Army command in Hanoi has increasingly assumed direct control over military operations in the northernmost provinces of South Viet-Nam.⁵⁹
7. There is close consultation between Hanoi and COSVN before policy is decided, and the recommendations of the latter are influential. COSVN also has much leeway in applying the policy thus decided. But all basic matters are firmly reserved for direct decision by the Lao Dong Politburo -- specifically including the nature and continuation of the war, the diplomatic program of the NLF, and the peace terms described in the public statements of the Front.⁶⁰ This can be vividly seen in the Le Duan letter and the talk of General Vinh, both of which lay down strategic and negotiating policies extensively with hardly a reference to the NLF. No one who reads these documents can have any doubt of Hanoi's control.

8. Thus, Resolution 12 of the Twelfth Conference of the Third Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, passed in secret in December 1965, required that the "buildup of all types of forces was to be accelerated and the pace of battle increased."⁶¹

9. Thus, Resolution 12 also laid down the line about the relationship between fighting and negotiating. According to Le Duan's report of it: "At present the U.S. imperialists...are trying to force us to the negotiation table for some concessions... /but/ our strategy on negotiations must serve in a practical manner our concrete political aims. For this reason, the Party Central Committee has unanimously entrusted the Politburo with the task of carrying out the above strategy in conformity with the policy of our Party and on the basis of the situation between us and the enemy whenever necessary."⁶² The talk of General Vinh, discussing the same Resolution, reports the view of the Lao Dong Central Committee that "The future situation may lead to negotiations... while negotiating, we will continue fighting the enemy more vigorously. (It is possible that the North conducts negotiations while the South continues fighting, and that the South also participates in the negotiations while continuing to fight)... We must fight to win great victories with which to compel the enemy to accept our conditions...we will take advantage of the opportunity offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks, political struggle and military proselytizing."

The evidence for this phase of the war speaks for itself. It leaves no question but that Hanoi not only directs and controls the war in South Viet-Nam, but also plays the dominant role in the Main Force war.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing is intended as a meticulous summary of the releasable evidence of the North Vietnamese role in the conflict. While improved intelligence in the past two years makes it possible to document North Viet-Nam's role most completely for this period, the evidence appears conclusive that the North was the driving force in bringing about the conflict from 1959 onward and in raising it to its successive dimensions at all stages. Likewise, the evidence seems conclusive that Hanoi had every intention of taking control over South Viet-Nam by one means or another from 1954 onward.

Yet, this being said, it is important to add one final note. Although the evidence is substantial that native North Vietnamese and North Vietnamese-trained personnel, coming from the North, dominate the Communist apparatus in South Viet-Nam, one cannot preclude the possibility that individuals within the apparatus now question and may come to reject the line imposed by Hanoi and the Lao Dong Party. Reconciliation of all elements within South Viet-Nam is the declared policy of the South Vietnamese Government, which seeks also a determination of the political future of the South under Constitutional processes. Even as the United States must remain committed to assisting in resisting and bringing to an end the aggression from the North, its ultimate objective must be that the people of South Viet-Nam be free to work out their own system without external interference.

NOTES

1. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Bitter Heritage (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), p. 10.
2. William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Goblens, United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1956), pp. 176-177.
3. John Norton Moore, "The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam," in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January, 1967), pp. 1-34.
4. Statement by the Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, at the concluding Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954; Department of State Bulletin, August 2, 1954, pp. 162-163.
5. Letter from President Kennedy to President Diem, December 14, 1961; Department of State Bulletin, January 1, 1962, pp. 13-14.
6. A report on "The Expansion of the Party" and other matters by the Party Central Committee in 1948; Remarks on the Official Appearance of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, dated November 1951; "Report on the Work of Edification of the Party During the July/September Quarter of 1949"; "Principles and Organizational Structure of the Committee for Zones Occupied by the Enemy," March 12, 1949; "Resumé of Decisions Taken by the Permanent Central Committee of the Party Regarding the Organization of the Party in the Army"; Instructions dated August 13, 1949 to the Nam Bo Regional Committee.
7. "Decision to Create the Central Office for South Viet-Nam"; a Lao Dong Party document dated June 7, 1951.
8. See a 1961 intelligence summary, compiled during the Indo-China War, describing Le Duan's and Tho's positions.
9. Report of the interrogation of Tran Ba Bui after his capture in 1956. Intelligence summary from ralliers, cadres, infiltrated agents and captured documents; deals particularly with Nam Bo Region (southwestern provinces).
10. Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam (April 11, 1955 to August 10, 1955) (London: HMSO, 1955, 30, Appendix IV) C.f., B.S.N. Murti, Viet-Nam Divided (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 88-91; Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Praeger, Revised Edition, 1964), pp. 153-154, 358, uses the figure 860,000 from North to South; Fall Viet-Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 76. For estimates on movements from South to North, see Murti, op. cit., p. 224; R.P. Stebbins and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs, 1954 (New York: Harper and Bros., 1956), p. 285, quoted in Kahin and Lewis, United States in Viet-Nam (New York: Dial Press, 1967), p. 75; both the latter cite figures in excess of 100,000. The Viet Minh claim 140,000; e.g., Wilfred G. Burchett, Viet-Nam, Inside Story of the Guerrilla War (New York: International Publishers, 1965), p. 128. The 1965 White Paper gives the figure 90,000; U.S. Department of State, Aggression from the North (Department of State publication 7839, February, 1965), p. 11.
11. Ho Chi Minh, "Appeal made after the successful conclusion of the Geneva Agreements" (July 22, 1954). Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, Bernard B. Fall, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 272: "North, Central and South Viet-Nam are territories of ours. Our country will certainly be unified. Our entire people will surely be liberated." Also, Department of State, Intelligence Brief, August 5, 1954.
12. Interrogation of Le Van Thanh, Viet Cong signal platoon leader, in which five divisions were described that were composed of South Vietnamese who were regrouped in the North following the 1954 Geneva Accords.
13. U.S. Army Attache situation report, Saigon, July 1956.
14. Interrogation of a man who handled Viet Cong agents at the time of his capture in 1964; 1958 South Vietnamese counter-espionage report; Memorandum to All Provincial

- Committees from Eastern Interzone Committee, Lao Dong Party, obtained November 29, 1964; intelligence report of November 1955.
15. South Vietnamese counter-espionage report of 1958 giving details of DRV intelligence activities; and intelligence report of November 1955, noting the arrival of 50 experienced regroupes in South Viet-Nam in October 1965.
 16. Interrogation of Viet Minh cadre who deserted in 1956; document taken from a political officer with Communist forces in South Viet-Nam on November 27, 1956; description by a North Vietnamese of the Van Tien Dung/Pham Van Bach missions; summary of intelligence reports concerning Van Tien Dung and the Hoa Hao.
 17. The CRIMP Document; also a Viet Minh policy paper on strategy issued by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party to the Nam Bo Interzone, obtained in November 1954.
 18. Interrogation of Viet Minh cadre who surrendered in March, 1966, in which Le Duan's disgust with DRV policy toward the ICC and his eagerness to invade South Viet-Nam are described; see also a document taken from a political officer of communist forces in South Viet-Nam on November 27, 1956, in which Le Duan is reported to feel the time for a military struggle has come; see also a document issued by the Lao Dong Party Central Committee for guidance of cadres, probably dated late Spring 1956.
 19. A somewhat more detailed discussion of the election problem, including the contemporary comments of Senator John F. Kennedy and Professor Hans Morgenthau, will be found in "The Path to Vietnam," by William P. Bundy, published by the Department of State in the Fall of 1967.
 20. Robert Scigliano, South Viet-Nam: Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 138; Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 185-188. Denis Warner, The Last Confucian (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 154ff.
 21. The CRIMP Document.
 22. Ibid.
 23. Intelligence report, March 1, 1956; intelligence report, June 15, 1956; Radio Hanoi broadcasts of September 3, 1957 and October 19 and 30, 1957, describing Le Duan's activities.
 24. Interrogation of a Montagnard in Quang Tri Province, who turned out to be a Viet Cong agent, and infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in October 1961.
 25. The CRIMP Document; see also Party Communique, May 13, 1959, and Comments on Party Communique, May 14.
 26. See Table IV.
 27. Interrogation of member of North Vietnamese border-crossing supply team.
 28. Interrogation of two members of 603rd Battalion.
 29. Interrogation of a Senior Sergeant, Viet Cong, 5th Military Region, captured in Quang Ngai.
 30. Interrogation reports of Viet Cong agents dispatched by maritime infiltration unit of Hanoi's Directorate, captured in July 1961; intelligence summary based on interrogation of numerous Viet Cong agents, captured in June and July 1961.
 31. Interrogation of a Viet Cong communications cadre.
 32. Interrogation of Viet Cong infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in 1962.
 33. Interrogation of former North Vietnamese Army officers who surrendered in 1963; interrogation of former North Vietnamese Army officer who surrendered in 1963; interrogation of an officer of 1st Viet Cong Regiment, who turned himself in April 1963.

34. See Table I for infiltration data since 1959; Table II for growth of Main Force strength.
35. Summary of 19 interrogations of Vietnamese officers and senior non-commissioned officers who infiltrated into South Viet-Nam during the period 1959-1963; also interrogation of former North Vietnamese Army officers who surrendered in 1963.
36. Based on a technical analysis done at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in November, 1965.
37. Resolution of the Third National Congress of the Lao Dong Party, September 10, 1960. (Item H) It is sometimes alleged that the NLF had already been formed as early as March of 1960, in the southern tip of South Viet-Nam. However, if this had been so, it would surely have been enormously to the advantage of Hanoi to endorse the existence of a truly southern organization. Instead, the Resolution of September 1960 clearly speaks of future creation of an NLF, and the January 1961 announcement in Hanoi clearly states that such an organization was established, in Hanoi, in December of 1960. The allegation that there was any pre-existing NLF, formed in the South, has no evidence other than obviously self-serving later statements of NLF spokesmen abroad, and must, on any fair reading of the evidence, be dismissed as a myth.
38. Interrogation of cadre from Western Region Committee, captured in 1962; document turned in by a Viet Cong deserter who subsequently led GVN forces to a buried cache of Communist documents on training and propaganda.
39. Interrogation of Le Xuan Chuyen, former operations officer of the Viet Cong 5th Division, deserted in August 1966; background information on Le Xuan Chuyen.
40. Training bulletin, written in 1962 and captured in November, 1963.
41. "Regulations for the Party Committee System in the South Viet-Nam Liberation Army", a party document captured by the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade in March 1966.
42. Instructions from the Provincial Committee of the Lao Dong Party in Ba Xuyen to the Party's district committees concerning the formation of the new People's Revolutionary Party; dated December 7, 1961.
43. Interrogation of North Vietnamese Army Lt. Col. Le Xuan Chuyen, who defected in August 1966; states that the PRP is the same thing as the LDP and that the PRP directly controls the NLF.
44. Intelligence summary on Lao Dong Central Committee membership in COSVN, from interrogation of a party cadre arrested in 1967.
45. Interrogation of a Viet Cong officer who defected in the Spring of 1967; interrogation of Le Xuan Chuyen; document captured by U.S. 173rd Airborne in March 1966, entitled "Regulations for the Party Committee System in the South Viet-Nam Liberation Army", cited under Note 41; intelligence summary in Lao Dong Central Committee membership in COSVN, cited under Note 44.
46. Instructions to cadres, March 23, 1965, captured by the U.S. 503rd Infantry in September 1965.
47. Directive to Propaganda and Training Section, April 1966, captured by U.S. 1st Infantry Division in April 1966.
48. Party document instructing subordinate level party activists that the final phase of the revolutionary war is near, captured by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division in Quang Tin on November 13, 1967.
49. The Talk of General Vinh.
50. Interrogation of a North Vietnamese officer of a support regiment who was responsible for the transportation of supplies from Cambodia, through Laos, to Route 96.
51. Interrogation in 1965 of four North Vietnamese Army soldiers of the 325th NVA Division.

52. Interrogation of a member of the 32nd Regiment, North Vietnamese Army, captured by South Vietnamese forces in November 1965 in Pleiku.
53. See Table III.
54. See Table II for growth of Main Force strength.
55. "Letter of Division Party Committee to Youth Members", captured by USMC in Quang Tri in July, 1966.
56. See Table II for growth of Main Force strength.
57. See Table V.
58. Document to serve as a guide for the cadre, Party members and others in answering questions likely to be asked of them, captured by the US 199th Infantry Brigade in February, 1967; also, document on "Guidance for Handling of Recruits", captured by US 25th Division in February, 1967.
59. Interrogation of Viet Cong officer who defected in Spring of 1967 in which Viet Cong command organization in northern province of South Viet-Nam is discussed.
60. Intelligence report on command relationships between Lao Dong Party and COSVN from an intellectual proselyting cadre arrested in Spring 1967.
61. Le Duan letter.
62. Ibid.

TABLE I
INFILTRATION OF PERSONNEL FROM NORTH VIET-NAM
1959-1967 (first half)

YEAR	Confirmed (1)	Probable (2)	Possible (3)	Total (4)
1959-60	4,556	26		4,582
1961	4,118	2,177		6,295
1962	5,362	7,495		12,857
1963	4,726	3,180		7,906
1964	9,316	3,108		12,424
1965	23,770	1,910	8,050	33,730
1966	44,300	10,500	30,000	84,800
1967 (1st half)	20,700	5,100	14,100	39,900
TOTAL	116,848	33,496	52,150	202,494

- (1) A confirmed unit/group is one which is determined to exist on the basis of accepted direct information from a minimum of two prisoners, returnees or captured documents (any combination), in addition to indirect evidence.
- (2) A probable infiltration unit/group is one believed to exist on the basis of accepted direct information from one captive, returnee or captured document, in addition to indirect evidence.
- (3) A possible infiltration unit/group is one which is believed to exist on the basis of indirect evidence, even though no captive, returnee or document is available to verify the report or reports directly. This category was not listed separately before 1965.
- (4) The total does not represent all infiltration data on hand. Other information is held which, based upon the application of consistent criteria and the professional judgement of analysis, has been evaluated as insufficient to warrant inclusion in one of the above categories.

There is normally a long lead time between the infiltration of a given unit or group and the collection of sufficient intelligence to confirm the fact and time of the infiltration. In 1967, the infiltration has continued at a very substantial rate, but it will be some months before comparable figures for the year can be compiled.

TABLE II
EXPANSION OF COMMUNIST MAIN FORCE UNITS
IN SOUTH VIET-NAM
(end of year)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967 **
Viet Cong Battalions*	10	20	26	30	69	91	83	83
VC Main Force/Local Force Strength*	5,500	26,700	33,800	35,000	51,300	64,300	68,000	64,000
North Vietnamese Battalions					3	33	63	69
Strength of North Vietnamese Army Units					2,000	26,600	46,400	54,000

* These units do not include a substantial number of native North Vietnamese. Guerrilla forces are not included in these figures. It is important to note that these figures for Main Force units represent only a fraction of the total strength.

** End of third quarter.

TABLE III
INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY
REGIMENTS INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM
Sept 1964 - June 1967

Unit	Infiltration Data			No. of Prisoners on Which Confirmation Based	No. of Captured Documents on which Confirmation Based	Total No. Prisoners Taken From Each Unit
	Dep NVN	Arr SVN	Strength			
95th Regt	Oct 64	Dec 64	2,000	7	1	35
32nd Regt	Sep-Oct 64	Jan-Mar 65	1,800	4	4	53
101st Regt	Dec 64	Feb 65	2,000	3	2	13
18th Regt	Feb 65	Apr 65	2,000	5	2	43
22nd Regt	Jul 65	Sept 65	2,000	5	1	42
33rd Regt	Jul 65	Oct 65	2,000	2	0	53
250th Regt	Jul 65	Oct 65	1,000	2	2	13
6th Regt	Unk	Oct 65	1,500	7	1	18
21st Regt	Aug 65	Oct 65	2,000	7	3	37
66th Regt	Aug 65	Nov 65	1,500	6	1	34
18B Regt	Dec 65	Feb 66	2,000	4	1	62
24th Regt	Jan 66	Feb 66	2,000	3	0	19
95B Regt	Dec 65	Mar 66	2,000	2	1	17
141st Regt	Jan 66	Mar 66	1,500	6	1	10
88th Regt	Jan 66	Mar 66	2,000	5	0	22
3rd Regt	Feb 66	Mar 66	1,500	2	1	34
812th Regt	Jun 66	Jun 66	1,500	2	0	15
90th Regt	Jun 66	Jun 66	1,500	3	0	12
803rd Regt	Jun 66	Jun 66	1,500	2	0	7
165th Regt	Feb 66	Jul 66	2,000	1	3	1
52nd Regt	Mar 66	Jul 66	1,600	3	1	3
84th Arty Regt	Mar 66	Aug 66	1,200	1	3	1
5th Regt	Activated in SVN	Feb 67	1,800	0	2	0
95C Regt	Aug 66	Mar 67	1,550	1	2	1
29th Regt	Unk	Apr 67	2,200	3	1	6
368B Arty Regt	Unk	May 67	1,400	2	2	2
174th Regt	Jan 67	Jun 67	2,000	2	2	10

TABLE IV
ASSASSINATIONS AND KIDNAPPINGS
IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

	<u>1958</u>		<u>1959</u>	
	<u>Assassinations</u>	<u>Kidnappings</u>	<u>Assassinations</u>	<u>Kidnappings</u>
Jan	10	25	10	17
Feb	36	5	11	6
Mar	26	43	31	21
Apr	17	12	13	16
May	13	5	16	22
June	21	15	5	15
July	11	24	16	22
Aug	7	18	12	11
Sept	8	24	22	34
Oct	15	26	29	42
Nov	8	19	35	89 (incomplete)
Dec	<u>21</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>48</u> (incomplete)
	193	236	233	343
<u>1960</u>				
Jan	96	37		
Feb	122	72		

Source: Saigon Situation Report; January, 1960.

TABLE V
COMPOSITION OF VIET CONG WEAPONS
(in percentage)

	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>Soviet</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Homemade and Other</u>
<u>Viet Cong Main Force</u>					
1963	13	2	40	39	6
1964	28	4	38	25	5
1965	38	5	35	17	5
1966	51	7	24	13	5
<u>Irregular Forces</u>					
1963	0	0	14	63	23
1964	0	0	24	49	27
1965	1	0	35	37	27
1966	3	0	38	32	27
<u>TOTAL (Main Force and Irregular)</u>					
1963	7	1	28	50	14
1964	15	2	32	36	15
1965	21	3	35	26	15
1966	29	4	30	22	15
1967 (mid)	35	6	26	18	15
<u>North Vietnamese Army</u>					
1963	0	0	0	0	0
1964	0	0	0	0	0
1965	90	8	0	0	2
1966	80	18	0	0	2
1967 (mid)	80	18	0	0	2

Source: Defense Intelligence Agency Report, July 1967.