

St. Peter

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 Headquarters, 2d Squadron, (Aml), 17th Cavalry
 APO San Francisco 96383

AVDG-S.-3

ready to ^{to} Steenside

16 December 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations, ^{Lt. Dally} After Action Report, Operation Republic Square

Commanding General
 101st Abn Div (Aml)
 ATTN: AC of S, G-3
 APO San Francisco 96383

1. Name of Operation: REPUBLIC SQUARE
2. Dates: 29 Sep 69 - 7 Dec 69
3. Location: Ref map, RVN 1:50,000 6340I; 6341I-IV; 6342I-IV; 6440 I & IV; 6441 I-IV; 6442 I-IV; 6540 I & II; 6541 I-IV; 6542 III; 6640 IV; 6641 III & IV.
4. Control Hq: 101st Abn Div (Aml)
5. Reporting Officer: Commanding Officer, 2d Sqdn, 17th Cavalry.
6. Task Organizations: All subordinate units of 2nd Squadron, 17th Cavalry.
7. Supporting Forces:
 - a. HHT 2/17th Cavalry
 - b. A Trp 2/17th Cavalry
 - c. 332 TC Det
 - d. B Trp 2/17th Cavalry
 - e. 333 TC Det
 - f. C Trp 2/17th Cavalry
 - g. 507 TC Det
 - h. D Trp 2/17th Cavalry
 - i. L Co., 75th Infantry (Attached to 2/17th Cavalry)

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8. Intelligence:

During the reporting period terrain had little effect on the accomplishment of missions, however, due to the arrival of the monsoon season flying was reduced proportionally to visibility.

Enemy activities were confined to platoon size or smaller elements. Enemy fire on aircraft ranged from light caliber (7.62) automatic wpns to heavy caliber fire (12.7). On occasions when units were working near the Laotian border or near the DMZ aircraft were fired upon from other than the Republic of South Vietnam.

Sniffer missions, long range reconnaissance patrols, one cordon operation, artillery raids, and usual visual reconnaissance missions combined to give the division additional intelligence in developing areas of interest.

9. Mission: To perform reconnaissance and to provide security for the division or its major subordinate combat elements; to engage in combat as an economy of force unit; and provide limited air and ground anti-tank defense for the division; ranger operations; and air borne personnel detector (SALAD).

10. Concept of Operation: The air cav troops provided aerial reconnaissance; conducted first and last light along the piedmont, Camp Eagle, Camp Billy, and Camp Evans; supported sniffer missions; ranger operations; provided target acquisition; and BDA's for CavArty raids, arc lights, and sky-spots.

The ground Cav troop provided sweeps and ambushes in "B" sector of Camp Eagle, provided security for 326 engineers, and reaction forces for the long range reconnaissance patrols and other aerorifle platoons.

"L Co" provided long range patrols for the Squadron in areas of interest in the division reconnaissance zone.

11. Execution: A Troop stayed from Mai Loc from 29 Sep till 8 Nov 69 at which time the air cav troops of the Squadron rotated to Mai Loc on a weekly basis. The organic aero rifle platoon of the air cav troop provided downed aircraft stony and security for the tactical operations center.

Hunter-Killer teams, 1 LOH & 1 AH-1G, provided visual reconnaissance in an attempt to locate enemy infiltration routes and base areas.

The troops also rotated the mission of downed aircraft standby for the division and ranger missions which included ranger immediate reaction force, ready reaction force, and provided aircraft for overflights, insertions and extractions.

During the reporting period the Squadron provided target acquisition, first and last light, visual reconnaissance, bomb damage assessments, immediate reaction forces, security and screening missions, and Cav-Arty raids.

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Liaison officers with the Brigades and with Division provided clearances, airstrikes, and relayed spot reports and missions between the Squadron and Brigade and Division OC's.

12. Results:

a. All missions assigned to the Squadron were fulfilled unless weather or unforeseeable hinderances prevented their success. There were 1,939 spot reports.

b. Enemy losses are categorized as follows:

(1) KIA (OC)	108
(2) Captured	3
(3) Tanks Destroyed	85
(4) Hoaches Destroyed	358
(5) Wpns Captured	22 INC/2 CMC
(6) Munitions Captured or destroyed:	
(a) RPG Rds	3 Rds
(b) 122mm Rocket	2
(c) .51 Cal	800 Rds
(d) Explosives	76½ lbs
(e) 82mm	9
(f) 60mm	98
(7) Rice: 1580 lbs.	

c. Friendly losses included:

(1) KIA	2
(2) WIA	25

d. Body to weapon ratio (enemy): 4.5 : 1

e. Enemy to friendly killed ratio: 5½ : 1

13. Administration: None

14. Logistics: None

15. Chemical: None

16. Civil Affairs: None

17. Psychological Operations: None

18. Communications: None

19. Engineer: None

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20. Artillery: None

21. Army Aviation: None

22. Special Equipment and Techniques: Whenever one of the Air Cavalry Troops is employed in a reconnaissance role at some distance from base camp, the Aero Rifle Platoon moves with them and stages from a secure base, i.e., Mat Loc. This Maneuver provides for a faster reaction time in the event of down^{ing} or developing enemy intelligence.

Recently aircrews in this Squadron have been issued the URC-10 survival radio. The combination of the survival radio and the close employment of the Aero Rifle Platoon has given pilots greater confidence while flying missions near the border or DMZ.

23. Commander's Analysis: Liaison officers have proved a great asset when placed in Brigade and Division TOC's. The dissemination of information between Brigades, Division, and Squadron and Troops has been good and coordination for combined operations, which is essential, is handled with a minimum of difficulty.

During the course of this operation several problems came to light. The most serious of these being the lack of a standard command console for the Command and Control aircraft of the Air Cavalry Troop. The present systems being utilized are homemade systems and have proven very unreliable. The complexity of Air Cavalry operations should warrant the assignment of an AN/ACB-11 console to each Air Cavalry Troop to alleviate this problem.

Another problem encountered was complaints from the supported unit of the lack of support given. This was not based on our performance to accomplish our mission, which of course we did, but due to the commander's concern for the number of aircraft being provided on a daily basis. The comparative figures for this operation speak for themselves, but still the problem existed and was felt all the way to the ADC. This was mainly due to a complete misunderstanding of what assets troop units can supply on a daily basis to accomplish the mission. If all flyable aircraft are flown each day, the time will arise when the supported unit will be getting far fewer aircraft than the normal 4 LOH's, 4 AH-1G's, and 4 OH-1H's and 1 OH-1H command and control that each troop provides daily.

Senior commanders and their staffs, if not aviation qualified, should be educated as to the difference between flyable aircraft and mission ready aircraft, especially on view of the complexity of our present-day aircraft.

Supply functions were carried on as normal. Since the conception of the Squadron central issue facility, DX items have been handled with better efficiency and the results have been better supply economy.

Maintenance problems were average with spare parts not being readily available. Nearly every aircraft that is sent into periodic inspection has to be cannibalized in order to keep the rest flying. This is a practice

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which is necessary for availability but nevertheless compounds maintenance problems by increasing man hours and increasing down time for aircraft in P.E.

24. Recommendations: That in future operations with a duration of more than a month that the Troop and attached elements be moved completely into the new area of operations. This would save on aircraft time and improve the supporting capabilities of the maintenance detachment.

HERBERT L. VOSSLER

CPT, Armor

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