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AGDA (M) (9 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694203

17 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Infantry
Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:


ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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
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EAIDAT-OP

4 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 2d Infantry Division Artillery,
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RGS GSFOR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding General, 2d Inf Div APO 96224 ATTN: EAIDGC-O

Commanding General, 8th U.S. Army APC 96301 ATTN: EAGC-NH

CINCPAC, APO 96558, ATTN: CPCP-DT

TO: ACFOR, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. During the period ending 31 October 1969, battalions of the 2d Infantry Division Artillery participated in the following significant activities:

(1) 1st Battalion (HJ), 12th Artillery.

(a) Eighth Army Technical Proficiency Inspection, 5-7 August 1969.

(b) CINCPAC/USARPAC Nuclear Surety Survey, 9 September 1969.

(c) CPX Focus Lens (8th Army)

(d) FTX's in preparation for annual operational readiness test of firing battery.

(2) 1st Battalion (105mm How), 15th Artillery. One unit at a time, firing batteries of the battalion occupied selected field positions to support DMZ defensive operations (OPERATION LEAPFROG) as a part of the contingency plan. Firing batteries in rotation conducted Security and Counterespionage Operations South of the IMJIN River (SCCSI).

(3) 7th Battalion (105mm How), 17th Artillery. One unit at a time, firing batteries of the battalion occupied selected field positions to support DMZ defensive operations (OPERATION LEAPFROG) as a part of the contingency plan.

FOR OT UT

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DOD DIR 5200.10**

(a) Firing batteries in rotation conducted Security and Counter-espionage Operations South of the IMJIN River (SOCS-I).

(b) Participated in eight field training exercises.

(4) 5th Battalion (105mm How), 38th Artillery. One unit at a time, firing batteries of the battalion occupied selected field positions to support DMZ defensive operations (OPERATION LEAPROCK) as a part of the contingency plan.

(a) Firing batteries in rotation conducted Security and Counter-espionage Operations South of the IMJIN River (SOCS-I).

(b) Panoramic photographs of firing positions and assembly areas were taken to supplement reconnaissance.

(c) New area time adjustment procedures were used with the .520 100mm fuze.

(d) Annual operational readiness tests of firing batteries, 28-30 October 1969.

(5) 6th Battalion (155mm-8in How), 37th Artillery.

(a) Eighth Army Technical Proficiency Inspection, 8 September 1969.

(b) CINCPAC/USARPAC Nuclear Surety Survey, 9-11 September 1969.

b. Personnel trained as radar crewmen operated 30-inch Xenon search-light in support of the DMZ barrier defense.

Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

a. Lessons learned for the organic battalions included the following.

(1) 1st Battalion (105), 12th Artillery.

(a) Personnel: None

(b) Intelligence: None

(c) Operations: None

(d) Organization: At present, the battalion is organized under a modified TOC which provides for one firing battery headquarters while maintaining the personnel and equipment for two firing batteries with no corresponding reduction in the mission of general support. This places a severe restriction on the command and control system of a nuclear capable battalion

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RAIDAT-OP

4 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned 2d Infantry Division Artillery,
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

committed in support of the DMZ defensive operations on a very wide front. As an interim solution, firing units equivalent to a battery have been operating directly under the command and control of the battalion headquarters.

(1) Observation: As noted

(2) Evaluation: Effective command and control system of a nuclear capable unit is a vital link in the force structure which should be re-examined on a periodic basis. While the personnel strength ceilings impose reduction in force structure, it appears prudent to reconstitute the command and control elements of HJ batteries organic to infantry division committed in the DMZ defensive operations. Assigning KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the US Army) personnel to the HJ battalion, thereby allocating US personnel strength equivalent to a HJ firing battery headquarters, appears to be a solution which would satisfy the requirement.

(3) Recommendations: That KATUSA personnel be assigned to the HJ battalion, allowing for the reconstitution of two firing battery headquarters for the effective command and control procedures.

(e) Training: None

(f) Logistics: None

(g) Communications: None

(h) Material: None

(i) Others: The battalion was rated SATISFACTORY in the 8th Army TTE and for CIBCPAC/USARPAC Nuclear Surety Survey.

- (2) 1st Battalion (105mm How), 15th Artillery.

(a) Personnel: None

(b) Intelligence: None

(c) Operations: None

(d) Organization: None

(e) Training: Occupation of field positions in operational commitments in support of the DMZ defense provides excellent opportunities for integrated organizational training in a combat environment.

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- (1) Observation: As noted
- (2) Evaluation: None
- (3) Recommendations: None
- (f) Logistics: None
- (g) Communications: None
- (h) Material: None
- (i) Other: None
- (3) 7th Battalion (105mm How), 17th Artillery.
 - (a) Personnel: None
 - (b) Intelligence: None
 - (c) Operations: Security and Counterespionage Operations South of the BINH River (SCCSI).

(1) Observation: In keeping with the secondary mission of field artillery units to fight as infantrymen, elements of the battalion were deployed along a portion of the BINH River as infantrymen for security and counterespionage operations.

(2) Evaluation: SCCSI commitments provide excellent opportunities for maintaining proficiency in night observation and surveillance. However, the commitment is counter-productive in terms of maintaining field artillery proficiency.

- (3) Recommendation: None
- (d) Organization: None
- (e) Training: None
- (f) Logistics: None
- (g) Communications: None
- (h) Material: None
- (i) Other: None

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(4) 5th Battalion (105mm How), 38th Artillery.

(a) Personnel: None

(b) Intelligence: Use of panoramic photographs.

(1) Observation: Combat photographers equipped with 200mm lens were used to photograph artillery positions. Enlargement of photographs were used to supplement reconnaissance.

(2) Evaluation: Oblique photographs provide for the re-evaluation of the terrain which could be very valuable in supplementing reconnaissance.

(3) Recommendations: That commanders make wider use of panoramic photographs to supplement their reconnaissance.

(c) Operations: Use of the M564 MTSQ fuze setting factors for the M520 fuze.

(1) Observation: Use of the M564 MTSQ fuze setting tables published by Fort Sill in adjusting the height of burst of the M520 MTSQ fuze has proven successful in a limited evaluation. The use of the tables incorporating the area-time adjustment procedures using fuze quick until establishing a 100 meter bracket has significantly reduced the time required to bring effective fire on the target.

(2) Evaluation: Although the M564 MTSQ fuze has smaller HOB profile error and greater operational reliability, adjustment technique seems applicable to the M520 fuze.

(3) Recommendations: That tests be conducted to evaluate the possible adoption of the M564 MTSQ fuze delta-fuze setting table for the M520 MTSQ fuze.

(d) Organization: None

(e) Training: None

(f) Logistics: None

(g) Communications: None

(h) Material: None

(i) Other: None

(5) 6th Battalion (155mm-8in How), 37th Artillery.

(a) Personnel: 155mm howitzer special weapons personnel.

(1) Observation: It is noted that special weapons personnel for the 155mm howitzer batteries are not designated in the TOE. Because these personnel and positions are not identifiable in the TOE, some difficulties have been experienced in meeting requirements of AR 611-15 (Personnel Reliability Program), on a timely basis particularly in the personnel requisition program.

(2) Evaluation: Identifying positions requiring the qualifications of AR 611-15 would greatly enhance the personnel requisitioning system. This problem is very acute in a short tour area with rapid personnel turnovers.

(3) Recommendations: That a system be instituted to correlate the requirements of AR 611-15 and the TOE for 155mm howitzer battery organic to infantry division.

(b) Intelligence: None

(c) Operation: None

(d) Organization: As noted above in the personnel paragraph.

(e) Training: None

(f) Logistics: None

(g) Communications: None

(h) Material: None

(i) Other: None

b. Lessons learned for the 2d Infantry Division Artillery.

(1) Personnel: Searchlight operators.

(a) Observation: Radar crewmen assigned to Division Artillery operated six (6) 30-inch Xenon Searchlights along the MZ barrier fence in addition to the operation of assigned radars. The dual requirement has been met by co-locating radars & searchlights.

(b) Evaluation: The dual requirement places a disproportionate work load on the radar crewmen for operation & maintenance. Unless personnel trained and qualified in the operation of the searchlight are made available, the dual commitment has been the most feasible solution because of the similarity of the specialized tasks.

(c) Recommendation: That searchlight battery personnel be attached to division artillery units having requirements to provide searchlight support

Tom J. Perkins

TOM J. PERKINS
COL, FA
Commanding

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26 NOV 1969

TO: Commanding General, I Corps (Gp), ATTN: EACICT-O&T, APO 96358

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division Artillery.

2. Comments are as follows:

a. 2a(1)(d), page 3 - Concur that two firing battery headquarters should be reconstituted. However, assignment of KATUSA personnel would result in only a temporary solution to the problem. A request for MTOE change was submitted through channels by this headquarters on 18 October 1969.

b. Para 2a(3)(e), page 4 - 2d Infantry Division Artillery units were relieved of the commitment to provide personnel for operations along the IMJIN River by 2d Infantry Division OPRD 7-70 (KICKAPOO).

c. Para 2a(4)(b), page 5 - Concur.

d. Para 2a(4)(c), page 5 - Concur.

e. Para 2a(5)(a), page 6 - Concur.

f. Para 2b - Non-concur - There are no excess spaces within 2d Infantry Division available for MTOE action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JOHN R. FRANKLIN

CPT. AGC
ASST AG

CF: ACSFOR, DA

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DA, Headquarters I Corps (Group), APO 96358

TO: Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, ATTN: EAGO-MH,
APO 96301

(U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned from Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Division Artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Edward W. Ferrell

EDWARD W. FERRELL
Major AGC
Deputy Adjutant General

28 JAN 70

Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, APO 96301

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and forwarding indorsements. The following comments supplement the report.
2. (U) Reference item concerning 1st Battalion (HW), 12th Artillery: Organisation, page 2, para 2a(1)(d). Concur. The Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division can direct a change of KATUSA allocation and assignment from within the Division to satisfy this requirement. The reconstitution of the second firing battery headquarters will require a MTOE submission which is initiated by the requesting unit. The 18 Oct 69 submission referred to in para 2a of 1st Ind has not been received at this headquarters.
3. (U) Reference item concerning use of panoramic photographs, page 5, para 2a(4)(b). Concur.
4. (C) Reference item concerning use of the M564 MTSQ fuse setting factors for the M520 fuse, page 5, para 2a(4)(c). Nonconcur. Procedure if adopted would be of limited value since the M520 fuse is being phased out of the inventory. As stocks are exhausted the M564 fuse will be issued.
5. (U) Reference item concerning 155mm howitzer special weapons personnel, page 6, para 2a(5)(a). Concur. Unit personnel offices, in conjunction with unit commanders, may identify Human Reliability positions within the 155mm howitzer battery MTOE. This identification will allow requisitions to be T-coded with an identification that replacements must meet the requirements of AR 611-15.
6. (U) Reference item concerning searchlight operators, page 6, para 2b(1). There are not sufficient searchlight operator personnel available to support the 2d Infantry Division Artillery requirement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. L. KOWALSKI
CDR AGC
Asst AG

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GPOF-DT (4 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)

**SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 2d Infantry Division Artillery for
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS GSPOR-65 (R1)**

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4 FEB 1970

**TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310**

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



**C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG**

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 2d Infantry Division Artillery

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

CO, 2d Infantry Division Artillery

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13. ABSTRACT