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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-E

4 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned
Hq 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div - Period
1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

Commanding General
101st Abn Div
ATTN: AVDG-CC-H
APO SF 96383

CLASSIFIED BY CL 101
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON: 31 DECEMBER 1975

Section I. Significant Unit Activities - Requirements for this section rescinded by 101st Abn Div unclassified message 7-180A, AVDG-CC-H, dated 20 July 1969.

Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

- (1) Replacements:
 - (a) Observation: 3d Bde is receiving replacements with 11B MOS who have permanent profiles.
 - (b) Evaluation: These personnel are in-capable of performing their duties in their primary MOS, and are therefore of no use to the unit.
 - (c) Recommendation: It is recommended that medical records be screened and such personnel be assigned to units to where they can be properly utilized within their profiles.

(2) Personnel Information Roster:

- (a) Observation: Personnel Information Roster continues to contain numerous errors each month. Although the unit submits a corrected copy of the roster to the rear each month, corrections are not accurately reflected in subsequent rosters.
- (b) Evaluation: The monthly roster as of the end of a month is not received until the 20th of the following month by the unit. By this time still another incorrect roster has been published, even though the previous roster has been corrected and returned.
- (c) Recommendation: That each unit in the division submit a Personnel Information Roster on a preprinted form to the rear. This roster should be prepared at unit level and forwarded, rather than corrected at company level.

(3) Lack of Unit Patches:

- (a) Observation: Troop morale suffers from a lack of uniforms with 101st Airborne Division patches.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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1 August 1969

AVXG-CA-E

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(b) Evaluation: 101st Airborne Division patches could be sewn on fatigue jackets for issue by DISCOM super contact teams.

(c) Recommendation: That fatigue jackets be issued by DISCOM at unit stand downs with 101st Airborne Division patches and US ARMY tapes already sewn on.

(h) Lack of Barbers:

(a) Observation: Lack of sufficient personnel in combat elements precludes having troops assigned to duty as barbers.

(b) Evaluation: Civilian barbers are available through the PX system. Permanent arrangements should be made to have barbers available with super contact teams.

(c) Recommendations: That either;

1. Super Contact teams have barbers as an integral part, or;
2. The PX system make barbers available to combat elements on fire bases.

b. Operations:

(1) Use of Light Observation Helicopter (LOH)

(a) Observation: During recent operations the LOH has been particularly valuable in the evacuation of wounded from forward areas and for delivery of ammunition and other essential supplies to elements in contact.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the close proximity of the contact area to the position of attacking troops, LOH and MEDEVAC aircraft were not able to land safely in the LZ. The LOH with its great maneuverability and speed was able to get in and out of the forward LZ with little difficulty. Casualties were extracted from the forward LZ, by LOH, to a more secure LZ a few hundred meters away from the contact area. From there they were further evacuated by MEDEVAC aircraft. Ammunition, medical supplies and water were likewise shuttled by LOH from the secure LZ to the forward position.

(c) Recommendation: If a sustained contact is anticipated in a fixed area, it is imperative that a LOH LZ be cleared to the immediate rear of the attacking troops. The LOH will provide not only MEDEVAC capability, but will keep the troops supplied with ammunition and other combat essentials.

(2) Target Marking methods for C-47 gunships.

(a) Observation: During cloudy or misty nights it has been difficult to accurately direct the fires of the C-47 gunships. The aerial flares are not sufficient to light up a target, particularly when the wind carries the flare out of the target area.

(b) Evaluation: A more accurate means of target indication is necessary. The 81mm mortar is an effective system of marking targets for the gunships. The mortar is laid on the target and an illumination round is fired and fuzed so that it ignites just before impact and

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AVDG-CA-E

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1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

UNCLASSIFIED

continues to burn upon hitting the ground. In this manner, the gunship while illuminating a general area with its flares, is also aware of the specific target.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend targets for C-47 gunships, during conditions of adverse visibility, be marked with 81mm illumination rounds.

(3) Extraction of Rifle Companies:

(a) Observation: Very few LZ's were available within the area of operations.

(b) Evaluation: A rifle company must remain within a one hour distance from an LZ for immediate extraction, contingency plans, medevacs, resupply, and reinforcements.

(c) Recommendation: That all rifle companies cut a minimum of one LZ daily. This can be accomplished by the platoon providing security for the company CP, while the remaining platoons are conducting search and destroy or reconnaissance in force operations.

(4) Recon by Observed Indirect Fire:

(a) Observation: Maneuver elements encountered small NVA teams, usually employing delaying and harassing tactics creating casualties and time lost through deployment of the unit.

(b) Evaluation: Frequent reconnaissance by observed indirect fire reduces the probability of this type encounter and causes the enemy to move.

(c) Recommendation: Extensive use of recon by observed indirect fire on planned routes of advance and the use of Pink Teams to screen areas to immediate front and flanks of maneuver elements should be used. In addition to reducing this type of encounter, this benefits the ground commander in that he is able to engage the enemy with indirect fire quickly by shifting from recently fired targets. The use of observed fire; however, is essential in the effective use of indirect fire.

(5) Stay Behind Force:

(a) Observation: In efforts to maintain continual surveillance of friendly elements, small NVA units, usually two to three individuals, attempt to follow maneuver elements.

(b) Evaluation: By leaving a small "stay-behind" force set up in an ambush posture in the previous night's NDP, the enemy can be detected and destroyed.

(c) Recommendation: Elements should employ stay-behind ambushes whenever possible.

(6) Sapper Attacks: See Inclosure 6.

c. Training.

(1) Use of Organic Mortars:

(a) Observation: On some occasions direct support artillery has not proven responsive enough to provide immediate fire support for elements in contact. Due to clearance delays, computation delays, communication difficulties and other commitments, artillery is not always available on a few minutes notice.

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AVDG-CA-E

4 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned
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1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

UNCLASSIFIED

(b) Evaluation: There is a need for increased emphasis on organic infantry indirect support weapons. During both the fight at Airborne and Dong Ap Bia heavy, multi-unit, contacts fragmented artillery assets, decreasing their effectiveness. Mortars are available at all times and can follow closely the progress of friendly units, providing them instantaneous fire support especially if airmobile assets are used to keep the mortars mobile.

(c) Recommendation: All Infantry Battalions emphasize importance of fully utilizing mortars and training mortar crews in quick response and mobility.

(2) Employment of the 90mm RR.

(a) Observation: Many troops are not familiar with the operation and employment of the 90mm RR.

(b) Evaluation: The 90mm RR is excellent for use against the fortified enemy positions often encountered in the Bde AO. The HE or HEAT round effectively neutralizes bunkers, while the cannister round is useful in a recon-by-fire role and in FB defense.

(c) Recommendation: An accelerated program of practical instruction on the M67, 90mm RR should be implemented at rifle Co level in all Infantry Bn's.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Aerial Photography.

(a) Observation: Delay in receiving Aerial Photography.

(b) Evaluation: Hand held photography taken at Brigade level has been used extensively to plan LZ insertions, and to target enemy locations. Exposed film submitted for developing and printing at times has not returned within the required time needed for planning purposes. Often film submitted 2-3 days prior to an operation has returned 2-3 days after the operation has begun, and on occasion after the termination of the operation.

(c) Recommendation: That development of prints be given a high priority when requested for a NLT date due to tactical reasons.

(2) Airborne Personnel Detectors Readings.

(a) Observation: Airborne Personnel Detectors Readings are sometimes received too late for effective exploitation.

(b) Evaluation: Sniffer readings must be received at time of actual reading. In many cases a time lag will significantly reduce the value of the readings.

(c) Recommendation: That sniffer aircraft relay readings via FM radio directly to Brigade as soon as possible so that readings can be acted upon immediately.

4

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AVDG-CA-E

4 August 1969

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1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

UNCLASSIFIED

e. Logistics.

(1) Refueling of Logistics and Lift Helicopters:

(a) Observation: When conducting combat assaults and resupply operations in areas far from fixed installations, as much or more blade time is used travelling to and from refuel points as is spent in conducting the operations. During inclement weather, time spent flying to and from refuel points may mean the mission cannot be accomplished.

(b) Evaluation: Establishing a refuel point at the FB where units stage for combat assaults and unit resupply originates will eliminate excessive non-productive blade time and substantially reduce the time required to conduct these operations. Additionally, it allows units to take advantage of breaks in weather to effect their resupply.

(c) Recommendation: As combat units move forward and establish FB's, direct support helicopter units establish a forward refuel point at the FB from which resupply to units in the field will be effected.

(2) Maintenance:

(a) Observation: Spot painting of vehicles and equipment with brush when aerosol spray paint is unavailable produces an uneven and streaked finish.

(b) Evaluation: By using a hand operated insecticide atomizer and properly thinned paint, a smooth, quick drying finish can be applied using a minimum of paint.

(c) Recommendation: Hand operated sprayer be utilized whenever feasible for spot painting.

(3) The XM-571 Articulated Vehicle.

(a) Observation: Several problem areas were encountered with the XM-571 Articulated Vehicles. Of the five XM-571's assigned to the 3d Brigade, all five are deadlined. Three deadlined for rear drive shafts: one for services and 3d echelon maintenance, (replace transmission indicator, road wheel, and tighten tracks), and one has been wrecked, left front.

(b) Evaluation: Rear drive shafts have been a continuous maintenance problem. The parts are nearly impossible to obtain. Second and third echelon maintenance is very hard to perform due to the locations of the units. Repair parts continue to be a large problem as they are nearly non-existent. One repair parts are not in all cases interchangeable with other vehicles of same type and model. The lack of a tech-representative has impaired the operation and maintenance of the XM-571.

(c) Recommendation: That a larger supply of repair parts be made available within the supply channels for ENSURE or test items of equipment. That care be taken to assure all like items are 100% interchangeable. That a tech-representative be made available at least at Division level for any ENSURE item when maintenance of that item is required.

5 UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-CA-E

4 August 1969

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Hq 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div - Period
1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

(4) Use of saws for cutting LZ's;

(a) Observation: The necessity of cutting LZ's while operating in the mountains requires constant availability of chain saws.

(b) Evaluation: Fragile equipment and a lack of repair parts has resulted in a high deadline rate which has created a situation wherein supply does not equal demand.

(c) Recommendations:

1. That all Infantry units be authorized and issued two-man cross-cut saws.
2. That chain saws be immediately available at DSU for direct exchanges.
3. That stronger, higher quality chain saws be procured.

(5) Use of demolitions for cutting LZ's:

(a) Observation: Airmobile operations in mountainous terrain require LZ's to be cut at frequent intervals.

(b) Evaluation: Significant amounts of demolition, to include detonating cord, are used to clear LZ's. These items are presently in short supply.

(c) Recommendations:

1. Maximum use be made of masking tape to fasten C-4 to trees. This would eliminate much of the detonating cord used to cut LZ's.
2. That training be given and emphasis be placed on using electric blasting caps, WD-1 wire and claymore generators to save more detonating cord.
3. That C-4 be authorized as part of the Infantry's basic load.

f. Organization: See Appendix 1.

g. Escape, Evasion, and Survival: None.

hl. Other: CHEMICAL:

(1) Use of CS at Dong Ap Bia.

(a) Observation: Effectiveness of 105mm CS Artillery round was minimized due to the fact that the enemy was equipped with protective masks while defending his heavily-fortified bunker positions.

(b) Evaluation: The 105mm CS artillery round can be employed with a variable time (VT) or a Mechanical time (MT) fuse to obtain an air burst, allowing a more rapid build-up of an incapacitating concentration of agent. Thus the enemy will be allowed less time to don his protective mask. In the event that protective measures are taken, in spite of this more rapid build-up, the use of the 105mm CS artillery round over a more prolonged period of time (i.e., several

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AVDG-CA-E

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Hq 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div - Period
1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

hours) will harass the enemy, by forcing him to wear his protective mask and limiting his freedom of movement. The combat effectiveness of the enemy can thus be significantly reduced.

(c) Recommendation: 105mm CS Artillery rounds be fired exclusively with VT or MT fuzing; also that fire missions using these munitions be extended as necessary to maintain an incapacitating amount of agent over a prolonged period of time.

(2) Emplacement of Fougasse.

(a) Observation: Emplacement of 55-gal drums of Fougasse (weight 450 to 500 lbs) in mountainous terrain (i.e., on the perimeter of fire bases) by manual labor is slow, cumbersome, and dangerous for personnel involved in such emplacement.

(b) Evaluation: UH-1 type helicopters can be used very effectively to emplace fougasse in pre-determined positions. The emplacement can thus be accomplished easily, rapidly, and with considerably less hazard to personnel involved.

(c) Recommendation: Security units pre-positioning fougasse into the perimeter defense of their fire bases utilize UH-1 helicopters to aid them in the emplacement of the drums.

h2. SIGNAL:

(1) AN/VRC-46 Power Supply.

(a) Observation: Currently, Inf battalions utilize the AN/VRC-46 radio as a portion of the communications equipment in the battalion TOC. The problem is to provide an adequate power supply.

(b) Evaluation: The setup as originally employed is connected in the following manner:

A 1.5 KW 28 V DC generator is the primary power supply source. The generator is hooked to a pair of 1/4 ton batteries wired in parallel. The radios are hooked to the batteries. The problem arises when the system proves inadequate for the load. The insertion of 2 1/2 ton batteries in lieu of 1/4 ton and the addition of a second pair of 2 1/2 ton batteries wired in series to the first set effectively handles the situation. The batteries in this new setup are able to handle all peak loads placed on them.

h3. Civic Action: See inclosure #3.

h4. Engr Support: See Inclosure #4.

6 Inclosures

1. Task Organization
2. Strength Report and Roster of Key Personnel
3. Civic Action Report
4. Engineer Projects for Quarter
5. 3/5 Cav ORLL
6. FB Burchtagaden - Sapper Attack
7. Distribution


R. H. SIEBRIST
COL, INF
Commanding

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AVDG-GA-E

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1 May 69 - 31 Oct 69
Aug Oct

4 Nov 1969

DURING THE REPORT PERIOD

TASK ORGANIZATION FOR APACHE SNOW
(10 May - 7 June)

<u>3d Bde Control</u>	<u>1-506</u>	<u>2-501</u>	<u>3-187</u>
Bde Scty Plat	B/326 Engr (DS)		
Rcn 1-506	A/158 AHB (DS)		
A-2-17 Cav	B/158 AHB (DS)		
2-319 Arty (DS)	TACP 20 TASS		
C-2-11 Arty (GSR)	58th Sct Dog Plat		
C-2-94 Arty (GSR)	3d FSSE		
C-1-83 Arty (GSR)			

1st ARVN Regt

1-1 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 2-1 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 3-1 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 4-1 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 Battery 11 ARVN Arty (DS)
 Battery 34 ARVN Arty (GSR)
 1 LHO Party

3d ARVN Regt

1-3 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 2-3 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 3-3 ARVN Bn w/FO Party
 Battery 12 ARVN Arty (DS)

TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS
3 PHASES

8 June - 21 June PHASE I
 22 June - 8 July PHASE II
 9 July - 25 July PHASE III

PHASE I

<u>3d Bde Control</u>	<u>1-506</u>	<u>2-506</u>	<u>2-327</u>	<u>375 Cav</u>	<u>2-502</u>
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Scty Plat
 B(-)/1-506
 2-319 Arty (DS)
 A-2-17 Cav (DS)
 B/326 Engr (DS)
 B/158 AHB (DS)
 TACP 20 TASS
 3d FSSE

Trp 3/5 Cav C-2-327

3d ARVN Regt

1-1 Bn
 4-3 Bn
 2-3 Bn
 B-34 Arty
 A-42 Arty

Hand 1

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AVDG-CA-E

4 August 1969

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Hq 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div - Period
1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

UNCLASSIFIED

TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS

PHASE II

<u>3d Bde Control</u>	<u>1-506</u>	<u>2-506</u>	<u>2-327</u>
Bde Scty Plat B/1-506 2-319 Arty (DS) A-2-17 Cav (DS) B/326 Engr (DS) C/158 AHB (DS) TACF 20 TASS 3d FSSE	A(-)/1-506	C(-)/2-34 Armor TF Sec A, B Trp 3-5 Cav	

<u>3-5 Cav</u>	<u>3d ARVN Regt</u>
3/7 ARVN Cav C-2-327	1-1 Bn 4-3 Bn 2-3 Bn B-34 Arty

PHASE III

<u>3d Bde Control</u>	<u>1-506/3-3 ARVN</u>	<u>2-506/1-3 ARVN</u>
Co 2-506 Plat/Co/1-506 Bde Scty Plat A/2-17 Cav (DS) 2-319 Arty (DS) B/326 Engr (DS) C/158 AHB (DS) TACF 20 TASS 3d FSSE	Hac Bao Co	Co 1-506 (-)

<u>3-5 Cav</u>	<u>3d ARVN Regt</u>
3-7 ARVN Cav B/2-327 1/A/2-327 Co/3-3 ARVN Co/3-187	1-3 ARVN Hac Bao Co B/34 ARTY 3-3 ARVN 3-7 ARVN Cav

TASK ORGANIZATION (OPCON UNITS)
APACHE SNOW (10 May - 7 June)

9 May - 18 May	A/2-506 OPCON to 2d Bde
9 May - 8 June	2-501 OPCON to 3d Bde
9 May - 21 June	2-506(-) OPCON to 2d Bde
18 May - 21 May	A/2-506 OPCON to 3-187
18 May - 7 June	3-5 Cav OPCON to 2d Bde
21 May - 9 July	3-187 OPCON to 2d Bde

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AVDG-CA-E

4 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report & Lessons Learned
Hq 3d Bde 101st Abn Div - Period
1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

UNCLASSIFIED

TASK ORGANIZATION
MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS (8 June - 31 July)

8 June - 17 June
8 June - 9 July
8 June - 31 July
10 June - 28 June
18 June - 18 July
29 June - 10 July
2 July - 19 July
9 July - 13 July
9 July - 19 July
10 July - 24 July
10 July - 31 July
12 July - 26 July
13 July - 19 July
19 July - 31 July
19 July - 31 July
25 July - 31 July

2-502 OPCON 3d Bde
2-327 OPCON 3d Bde
3-5 Cav OPCON 3d Bde
B/1-506 OPCON 3d Bde Hqs
A/1-506 OPCON to 2-506
C/1-506 OPCON to 3d Bde Hqs
B/2-327 OPCON 3-5 Cav
A(-)/2-327 OPCON 3-187
A(-), B(-) 3-5 Cav OPCON 3-187
C/2-506 OPCON to 1-506
B/2-506 OPCON to 3d Bde Hqs
1-327 OPCON to 3d Bde
A/2-327 OPCON to 3-5 Cav
B/3-187 OPCON to 3-5 Cav
C(-)/2-34 Armor OPCON to 3-187
C/1-506 OPCON to 3-5 Cav

Doc 1

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AVDG-CA-B

4 August 1969

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Hq 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div - Period
1 May 69 - 31 Jul 69

UNCLASSIFIED

STRENGTH REPORT AND ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

1. Bde CO: COL J. B. Conmy Jr. 1 May 69 - 14 Jun 69
COL Robert H. Siegrist 14 Jun 69 - 31 Jul 69
2. Bde DCO: LTC Len M. Hanawald 1 May 69 - 17 Jun 69
LTC B. A. Arthur 18 Jun 69 - 29 Jul 69
LTC Howard G. Crowell 29 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69
3. Bn Commanders:
 - a. 1-506 Abn Inf: LTC James M. Bowers 1 May 69 - 30 Jun 69
LTC Arnold Hayward 1 Jul 69 - 11 Jul 69
MAJ Dale A. Burroughs 12 Jul 69 - 18 Jul 69
LTC Leon McCall 18 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69
 - b. 2-506 Abn Inf: LTC Gene T. Sherron 1 May 69 - 16 Jun 69
LTC Len M. Hanawald 17 Jun 69 - 31 Jul 69
 - c. 3-187 Abn Inf: LTC W. F. Honeycutt 1 May 69 - 9 Jul 69
LTC William K. Steinberg 10 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69
 - d. 2-319 Artys: LTC Wilford R. Harrell 1 May 69 - 6 May 69
LTC Niles J. Fulwyler 7 May 69 - 31 Jul 69
 - e. 3-5 Cav: LTC Thomas E. Carpenter III 1 May 69 - 26 Jun 69
LTC Joseph L. Hadaway 27 Jun 69 - 31 Jul 69

Incl 2

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