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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BATTALION (AIRMOBILE), 506TH INFANTRY
101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco 96278

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report, Minh Tay I (Pacify West I),
Cambodia.

Commanding General
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
ATTN: AG of S, G-3
APO 96383

1. Operation Minh Tay I (Pacify West I), Cambodia
2. Dates of Operation: ~~050000L~~ May 1970 through 182400Z May 1970.
3. Map of Cambodia and Vietnam, Sheets 6436I, IV; 6437II, III; 6536I, IV;
6537II, III; 6636I, IV; 6637II; 6736IV; 6737III.
4. Control or Command Headquarters: 4TH Infantry Division
5. Reporting Officer: LTC Joseph N. Jagers Jr.
6. Task Organization:

HQ TF 3-506 Abn Inf
HHC TF 3-506 Abn Inf
A Co TF 3-506 Abn Inf
B Co TF 3-506 Abn Inf
C Co TF 3-506 Abn Inf
D Co TF 3-506 Abn Inf
E Co TF 3-506 Abn Inf
D Btry 2-320 Artillery
1/D/299TH Engineers
1/HHC/326TH Engineers

7. INTELLIGENCE:

- A. TERRAIN: Cambodia (Base Area 702) (Area of Operation Center Sector
YA450540) Terrain consisted generally of reasonably flat land with
sparse tree growth except for ridges on top of hills where there was
single canopy and dense undergrowth. Hills ranged from 184 meters to
329 meters with the flat land being 110 meters at the lowest point.
Terrain presented no problems of movement to foot troops. The TONLE
SAN RIVER is the primary terrain feature on the Western Boundary of
Base Area 702.

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B. WEATHER: During the reporting period ceiling varied from 1,000 - 8000 feet and scattered visibility was generally 6 to 6 plus miles except during thunderstorms which decreased visibility to almost 2 miles. Winds varied from 6 knots to 15 knots with gusts to 30 knots during thunderstorms. Temperatures ranged from Highs of 88 degrees to 100 degrees with Lows ranging from 69 degrees to 72 degrees. Humidity varied from 75% to 85%. Heavy ground fog was experienced during the hours from 0200 to 0600H. Generally the ground fog burned off by 0830 - 0900 hours. Heavy rain showers occurred daily during the operation.

C. DECISIONS and PLANS ADOPTED with REASONS BASED on ENEMY SITUATION. Based on intelligence maintained at higher headquarters (Saigon), TF 3-506 was deployed into Cambodia (Base Area 702) to find, fix, destroy, and capture enemy personnel and equipment. Alternate LZ's had to be used to insert elements of the 3-506 due to heavy ground to air fire from primary selected LZ's. Initially, ground activity was moderate to light. Plans of engagement, pursuit and search were changed as the enemy situation changed. Enemy activity can best be described as that of a stay behind force, to delay friendly elements by sniper fire to company size elements.

D. ENEMY PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT LOSSES:

1. Killed in Action 80.
Killed in Action (Possible) 4
Prisoner of War 3
Detainees 0
2. Small Arms 729
Crew Served 67
3. Rice 530 Tons
4. Miscellaneous assorted documents; medical supplies; LWE; 10 bicycles; 2 transistor radios; and NVA gas masks

8. MISSION: TF 3-506 was to find, fix, destroy, and capture enemy personnel and equipment in Cambodia Base Area 702.

9. CONCEPT of OPERATION: TF 3-506 was deployed in Cambodia Base Area 702 seeking enemy forces and moving rapidly till finding them, then fixing them and bringing maximum combat power to bear on them.

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10. EXECUTION:

On 3 May 2200 hours TF 3-506 received a warning order to be prepared to move into Cambodia on 5 May 1970.

On 5 May at 1050H, C&O ship via YAH453 received SA fire from an enemy bunker complex. An airstrike was employed with unknown results. At 1300H, A/3-506 was combat assaulted to vic YA 404547 & was completed at 1338H. At 1330H, B/3-506 was combat assaulted from Fleiku to vic YAH04547 and was completed at 1350H. At 1355H, C/3-506 was combat assaulted from Fleiku to vic YAH04547 and was completed at 1420H. At 1400H, D/3-506 was combat assaulted from Fleiku to vic YAH04547 and was completed at 1420H. At 1430H, the Forward TOC at FSB Currahee at vic YAH04547 was operational and assumed control of all Tactical Operations of TF 3-506. At vic YAH15545, B/3-506, at 1710H engaged 2 VC/NVA on bicycles with small arms fire, which resulted in 1 VC/NVA KIA. The VC/NVA KIA was wearing khaki pants and white T-shirt. CIA'd were two bicycles, 1 transistor radio, 1 rucksack with poncho liner & personal letters. Second VC/NVA fled the area leaving a blood trail which was followed by B/3-506 resulting in 1 AK-47 CIA'd. At 1744H, B/3-506 received enemy small arms fire via YAH15545 resulting in negative friendly casualties.

On 6 May at 0937H, vic YAH15547, C/3-506 came in contact with an unknown size VC/NVA element. At 1010H gunships were on station in support of C/3-506 and were expended at 1033H. Resulting in 1 Friendly WIA, the WIA was Dusted-off by a LOH. While the LOH was making the pickup an enemy B-40 rocket round was fired, resulting in damage to the tail section. At 1132H, vic YAH354, B/3-506 received enemy small arms fire from a hootch complex resulting in 1 Friendly WIA. The WIA was Dusted-off at 1250H. 81 mm mortar fire was employed on hootch complex and a sweep of the area resulted in 1 VC/NVA KIA and 1-SKS Rifle CIA'd. At 1515H, 2 additional VC/NVA KIA were found & 2 SKS's CIA'd. At 1610H, vic YAH354, B/3-506 engaged 1 VC/NVA with small arms resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA, & 1 AK-47, & 4 rucksacks CIA'd. At 1415H, C/3-506 via YAH15547 found 2-300 rounds of AK-47 ammo and 4 bicycles which were CIA'd.

On 7 May at 0850H, vic YAH34560, B/3-506 followed commo wire, along a heavily used trail to a small village. B/3-506 received small arms fire from the village and returned fire, resulting in 1 US WIA and 2 VC/NVA KIA. The flank and rear security elements of B/3-506 engaged 2 VC/NVA resulting in 2 VC/NVA KIA. A total of 4 VC/NVA KIA, 3 SKS's, 1 AK-47, 5 rucksacks containing a large quantity of documents were CIA'd. The village in which the contact took place consisted of 3 hootches and 3 bunkers with overhead cover. At 1115H, vic YAH353, D/3-506 found 2 1/2 to 3 tons of rice, which was destroyed. At 1420H, vic YAH34520, D/3-506 found a base camp with 35 hootches & bunkers with 12" timbers. Base camp was large enough to hold approximately 350 men. At 1515H, D/3-506 engaged 4 VC/NVA with small arms fire in the base camp. Enemy returned fire resulting in 3 US WIA and 3 VC/NVA KIA and 1 POW WIA. A request for Dust-off and gunships to contact area of D/3-506. While gunships were expending they received enemy ground fire. An Airstrike was employed on known enemy locations at 1800H.

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On 8 May at 0817H, vic YAH4355h, B/3-506 made contact with 5 VC/NVA set up in an L-shape ambush. Enemy opened fire and fled with B/3-506 returning fire. At 0928H, vic YAH21519, log bird received enemy small arms fire with negative hits. Again at 1155H, the log bird received enemy ground fire vic YAH2357h receiving 1 hit sending the FM radio unoperable. At 1125H, vic YAH37521, D/3-506 found $\frac{1}{2}$ ton of rice which was destroyed. The Arty LNO engaged 1 VC/NVA from the helicopter resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA & 1 AK-47 CIA'd. Also 4 Airstrikes were put into the area of B/3-506 contact.

On 9 May at 1220H, vic YAH695h7, B/3-506 found and destroyed 9 hootches ranging in size from 10'x15' to 20'x30'. At 1255H, vic YAH770, 2 airstrikes were employed on suspected enemy locations. At 1340H, vic YAH39523, D/3-506 found and destroyed 20 hootches, 30 pigs, 50 chickens, 4 tons of rice. Captured were 4 SKS rifles. At 1415H, vic YAH41526, D/3-506 found 2 hootches (20'x40'x15') filled with rice estimated 520.8 tons, 4 SKS rifles, & 1 Chicom radio. At 1420H, vic YAH75470 the Utility Helicopter observed 4 green GP tents, with ammo boxes stored in the tents, several smaller tents were in the general area. At 1600H, vic YAH70575, B/3-506 was engaged by estimated 5 snipers resulting in 1 VC/NVA KIA. There was negative friendly casualties.

On 10 May at 0730H, vic YAH50531, D/3-506 found 1 mess hall (20'x15'x10'), 7 hootches with bunkers (5'x10'), chicom flamethrowers were CIA'd. At 0829H, vic YAH50531, D/3-506 engaged 6 VC/NVA resulting in 1 VC/NVA POW & 3 VC/NVA KIA, with 1 SKS CIA'd. At 0830H, vic YAH58540, B/3-506 found and destroyed 1 abandoned hospital complex with 40 hootches, 150 chickens, 50 pigs, 20 dogs, 2 ton of polished rice & 1 unknown type flintlock rifle. At 1102H, vic YAH50531, D/3-506 found 1 abandoned gas mask factory, 1 sewing machine for gas masks, 24 gas masks, pattern for gas mask, 1 air raid siren, & 1 Chicom flamethrower. At 1113H, YAH58540, B/3-506 was engaged by an unknown size VC/NVA force with negative results. At 1515H, vic YAH58540, B/3-506 was engaged by an unknown size VC/NVA force resulting in 8 US KIA, 28 US WIA with enemy losses unknown. At 1624H an airstrike was employed on known enemy positions vicinity YAH65h to relieve pressure on B/3-506. At 1850H, vic YAH73536, 1/A/3-506 was CIA'd to relieve pressure on B/3-506. During the initial insertion 1 helicopter was shot down resulting in 1 US pilot WIA, at vic YAH73536.

On 11 May at 0715H, vic YAH53540, B/3-506 engaged by an unknown size VC/NVA force with B-40's having negative results. At 0900H, vic YAH53540 D/3-506 linked up with B/3-506 and secured a Landing Zone for B/3-506 for extraction and the insertion of A/3-506. B/3-506 was airlifted to FSB Currahee closing at 1415H. A/3-506 was airlifted to vicinity YAH53540 closing at 1520H.

On 12 May at 1425H, vic YAH75h, 1 USAF Jet Fighter was shot down by enemy ground to air fire, both pilots ejected and were evacuated from crash site at 1500H. At 1510H, an airstrike was employed on known enemy positions vic YAH75h. At 1745H, vic YAH84550, C/3-506 engaged an unknown size NVA force resulting in 2 NVA/VC KIA and 1 US WIA. At 1805H, vic YAH84550, C/3-506 found a large weapons, ammo, medical supplies cache, (760 Small Arms, 65 CSW), other significant findings in the cache were 121 57 mm Recoilless Rifle rounds, 222 B-40 rounds; 20 75 mm Recoilless rounds, 525 82 mm mortar

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rounds; 147 rifle grenades; 35 Anti-Personnel Mines; 446 Chicom grenades; 84 B-41 rounds; 4 122 mm rockets; 160 60 mm mortar rounds; 2 Chicom Claymore mines; 7 US claymore mines; 8,100 rounds of small arms ammo; 155 pair of NVA binoculars, and assorted other NVA supplies.

On 13 May at 0845H, vic YAH61533, A/3-506 came under small arms fire from an estimated 4 NVA/VC resulting in 3 US KIA. Enemy casualties unknown. At 1125H, vic YAH67526, D/3-506 came under small arms fire resulting in 1 US KIA negative enemy casualties. 3/B/3-506 was airlifted to C/3-506 location to assist in securing the arms cache.

On 14 May at 1000H, A/1-12 became OPCON to TF 3-506 Inf and was inserted in- to C/3-506 location to assist in securing the weapons cache discovered by C/3-506 on 12 May 1970. At 1705H, vic YAH58528, A/3-506 engaged 1 NVA/VC at 50 meters with negative results. At 1425H, vic YAH74564, A/1-12 received small arms fire from estimated 1 NVA/VC sniper. Resulting in 1 US KIA & 1 US WIA, with negative enemy casualties. At 1810H, vic YAH78561, A/1-12 received heavy machine gun fire from an unknown size enemy element. A/1-12 returned fire and contact was broken at 2200H, results were enemy casualties unknown and 2 US KIA and 6 US WIA.

On 15 May at 0900H, vic YAH75558, A/1-12 engaged 1 NVA/VC results 1 enemy KIA & negative friendly casualties. At 1140H, vic YAH75558 while being ex- tracted A/1-12 was engaged by an unknown number of enemy, results negative enemy casualties and 1 US WIA. At 1300H, A/1-12 was detached from TF 3-506 Inf and returned to the control of the 1st Bn 12th Inf, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Division.

On 16 May at 1000H, TF 3-506 departed FSB Currahee closing on FSB Wildcat at 1700H inside Vietnam and began Operation Wayne Jumper.

On 17 May TF 3-506 Inf was alerted for movement by the Commanding Officer of 1st Bde, 4th Inf Division for movement to Ban Mo Thuot, RVN.

11. RESULTS: TF 3-506

a. TF 3-506 accomplished its mission to find, fix, destroy, and capture enemy personnel and equipment in Base Area 702 Cambodia.

b. Enemy Losses:

(1) Killed by Ground Units	80
(2) Killed by Army Air	0
(3) Killed by Air Force	0
	80 Body Count
(4) Captured: See Inclosure 1	

c. Friendly Losses:

(1) US KIA	9
(2) US WIA	39

d. Body to Weapons Ratio (Enemy): 80 NVA/VC KIA; 796 Weapons

e. Enemy to Friendly Killed Ratio: 80 NVA/VC KIA; 9 US KIA

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12. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT:

1. CONCEPT of SUPPORT:

- a. During the period 4 May through 16 May 1970 all logistical and transportation support to units and attachments of the 3D Bn, 506th Infantry were procured from the 4th Infantry Division Support Command LSA field trains facilities established at Plei Djereng. Air assets were supplied by practically every aviation source in the II Corps Tactical Zone of the Republic of Vietnam.
- b. Aviation assets were the only external support agencies provided this Battalion.
- c. All supplies were procured at the various supply point distribution points within the forward trains base at New Plei Djereng. These supplies were subsequently rigged and aurally delivered to the Fire Support Base (FSB) Currahee inside Cambodia utilizing CH 47 Chinook Aircraft. Delivery to field elements were made by UH-1 helicopters. The main supply route (MSR) was both a road and aerial route (An Khe to Pleiku to New Plei Djereng by vehicle and air delivery from this point). The air MSR exceeded 47 kilometers in many cases. This great distance created lengthy turn around times for the aircraft (45 minutes to 1 hour and 10 minutes), causing limited sorties per day, per aircraft. Due to refueling facilities being limited at the Plei Djereng trains airfield, many CH 47's were forced to refuel at Pleiku, thus increasing the air distance by an additional 35 to 40 kilometers in many cases one CH 47 would make only 5 sorties daily. Therefore, the most critical phase of the operation - aviation asset utilization - was limited at best as a result, many times the field and FSB elements were not resupplied simply because the logistical resources could not be delivered.

2. MATERIAL and SERVICES:

- a. Initially the logistical build up was too slow and too little. All vehicle transport of the 4th Infantry Division was utilized moving organic equipment and personnel, thus sacrificing movement of needed logistical supplies. Critical at the beginning of the operation was Class IV (bunker materials) maintenance facilities and Class V support. However, by the third day of the Operation most supplies were available in sufficient quantities. Water was the most critical item which this Battalion failed to deliver the field elements, a requirement of at least 1,100 gallons. We delivered on the average about 400 gallons daily. Limited air assets was the cause for this inadequacy.
- b. The following is a breakdown of supply utilization:

Class I:	Class A Rations	3,850 meals
	Class B Ration	16,610 meals

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Class III:	Mogas	675 Gallons
	Diesel	237 Gallons
	JP 4	4,500 Gallons
	30 Weight Lube Oil	55 Gallons
Class IV:	Lumber 4"x12"x12'	380 Pieces
	Lumber 12"x12"x12'	160 Pieces
	Sandbags	45,000 Each
	32" Engineers Stakes	450 Each
	64" Engineers Stakes	250 Each
	600 Penny Nails	100 Pounds
	Concertina Wire	8 Shelves
	Barb Wire	40 Rolls
Class V:	M-16 Ball	102,000
	M-60 7.62	72,000
	Cal .45	100
	M-79 Canister	66
	M-79 CS	50
	M-79 HE	1,700
	Grenade, frag	400
	M-79 Illum	61
	Deercan, CS	35
	Smoke, Green	85
	Smoke, Yellow	150
	Smoke, Violet	820
	M-72 Law	25
	Claymore, Without Device	300
	Claymore, with Device	100
	Trip Flares	638
	81 mm HE	5,280
	4.2 in HE	3,000

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13. Commanders Analysis:

a. (1) Item: Clearances of Supporting Fires:

(2) Discussion: While operating out of FSB Currahee in Cambodia, this battalion experienced several incidents where USAF fighter bombers and Army Aviation elements had been given clearances to fire in our AO by other units. On one occasion C Company had two WIA from gunships and shortly thereafter B Co had an airstrike put into its AO while the FAC did not know that ground troops were in the area. This error was caused by units out of our AO not knowing their exact location. On 14 May 1970 a unit CPCON to the 3-506 was in contact and being supported by artillery support from FSB Currahee. An end of mission was given to the artillery support because of close proximity to a friendly element outside of the 3/506 AO. When the unit was requested to furnish their location they were plotted 1800 meters to the SE of the artillery impact area. In reality this unit was 1800 meters to the NW and forced the fire support needed for the engaged unit to cease.

(3) Greater effort and control must be taken when employing supporting fires in an area such as Cambodia. The maps were inaccurate and this should make all individuals concerned with clearing fires more cognizant of their responsibilities. However units operating in such an area should constantly insure that their positions are completely accurate prior to giving fire clearances. Utilization of the helicopter can and does facilitate in locating positions in such a flat area as the SE SAN MASTIN. If there is any doubt, then prior to giving fire clearances all elements in the immediate area must be requested to mark with smoke prior to any USAF or Army Aviation fire support being placed on the suspected target.

b. (1) Item: Communications:

(2) Discussion: The distance from the Brigade Forward TOC to the maneuver battalions in the field was great and in some cases extended beyond the range of the sets involved. In such a case it is essential that a radio relay be established in the initial assault of combat elements to provide the needed communications. However, if conditions preclude this relay from being established an alternate means must be initiated to compensate for the lack of a ground relay. Again if this cannot be accomplished then the Command Net must be free of non essential traffic so that field battalions can make immediate communications to higher headquarters. After establishing FSB Currahee, communications were marginal and the nature of the enemy remained unknown. During the entire operation communications did not reach the standard that they must have. However, the non essential traffic that would tie up the command net was not reduced.

(3) Solution: Prior to the commitment of combat units to the field, provisions must be made to insure that immediate communications can be established and maintained with the maneuver battalions. One method is to establish a radio relay between the Brigade TOC and the Battalion TOC's. If this cannot be established, then the airborne relay must go into effect as soon as the Command and Control Helicopters depart the area of operations.

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Again if this is not possible, then the NCS must refuse to allow the non essential radio traffic to enter the net. If this is not accomplished then those units who might find themselves seriously engaged and unable to obtain the necessary support.

c. (1) Item: Pathfinder Support:

(2) Discussion: One of the major logistical problems of the Cambodian operation was the complete lack of natural water resources within that SE SAM MASIN area of operations. Most of the water in the area was of such a foul quality that the troops could not be expected to drink it. On two occasions the necessary water resupply was miss sent to another fire base. The Pathfinders who were controlling the operation of the Assault Support Helicopters had failed to provide the proper frequency and locations of elements. During the construction of the FS in the Flei Trap Valley, needless delay of resupply and miss utilization of CH-47's was caused by CH-47's being given improper call signs and frequencies.

(3) Solution: It is imperative that the Pathfinder on the P2 insure that he is giving the proper call sign, frequency and location of the element to be supported. If the aircraft FM has failed, then the ground units must be notified of this so that they can anticipate the problem. If necessary, marked maps of the field locations should be provided the pilots with directions and AZ already marked on the map with the Unit call signs and frequencies at the LZ. The cost of a map in comparison to wasted bladed time is marginal. The Pathfinders should have their entire operation mapped out the night prior to operation so as to facilitate a smooth movement of CH-47's. If all else fails then a responsible representative of the unit being supported should be on board the CH-47 to give the necessary guidance.

d. (1) Item: Aviation Resources:

(2) Discussion: It is understood that within Vietnam there are only so many resources to accomplish the mission. The operation in Cambodia taxed to the limit the resources of II Corps: (a) the distance that had to be traveled to reach operational area; (b) the maintenance difficulties incurred by the duration of the operation; and (c) the location of the unit maintenance facilities along the II Corps coast line. However, unnecessary complications arose in the control of these resources. When requesting gunship support of elements engaged with NVA elements, we did not receive call signs of the guns that were to support nor could we obtain accurate ETA's of such support. Often when we would receive this support, the time on station of the helicopters involved was negligible and did not assist in the overall operation. The distance from the Brigade Forward Air Strip to the battalions in the field was taken into consideration in requesting this support. But too often critical time was lost in requesting this asset and more often it was not able to support when it arrived in the contact area due to the lack of fuel or ordinance.

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Enemy Equipment Losses: Continued

c. EXPLOSIVES:

TOTAL:

Chicom Grenades	446
Rifle Grenades	147
Pull Type Blasting Caps	2700
$\frac{1}{2}$ lb Block TNT	75
Satchel Charge Blasting Caps	500
Chicom Claymore	2
AP Mine	35

d. MEDICAL SUPPLIES:

TOTAL:

Mercurial Sphygmomanometer	1
Microscope #201666	1
Blank Stationary (Boxes)	5
Bottle of Ink	1
Bag of String	1
Candles (18")	2
Reels of Film (16 mm - 197 Ft)	20
Cans of Film Developer	3
Surgical Equipment (Box)	1
Photographic Paper (Boxes of)	5
Box of Graph Paper	1
Cases of Medical Books	3
Weight Sets (Grams)	2
Packs of Plaster	3 $\frac{1}{2}$
Water Purifying Cans	4
Lantern	1
Fan for Heating Instruments	1
Grams of Dye	10
Cases of Glass Bottles (Different Sizes)	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
Box of Rubber Tubes	1
Part of a Scale	1
Spray Apparatus	1
Respiratory Apparatus	1
Measurement Scale	1
Case of Rubber Gloves	1
Small Stove	1
Box of Needles	1
Case of Mixing Equipment	1
Empty 1st Aid Cans	1000
Case of Pistol 1st Aid Bags	1
Shovels	2
Medicine Scale	1
Case of Hooks, Scissors, etc.	1
Case of Bicycle Generators & Light Bulbs	1
Cases of Gauge	10
Bundles of Gauge	15
Bundle of Cotton	1
Boxes of Surgical Dressing	2
Small Tin Pans	20
Cases of Dextran Injection Solutions	24

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BATTALION (AIRMOBILE) 506TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96278

SUBJECT: (G) Enemy Equipment Losses: (U)

15 May 1970

A. CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT:

a. WEAPONS:

	<u>TOTAL:</u>
82 mm Mortar Tubes	9
60 mm Mortar Tubes with Tripod	4
Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun (Cal 51)	2
57 mm Recoilless Rifle	2
Aircraft Machine Gun	1
Chicom Type 8-3	88
Russian Sniper Rifle	12
Mausser	1
Chicom SKS Rifle	69
Russian SKS Rifle	81
French Lite Machine Gun	22
Chicom Lite Machine Gun	11
Chicom Heavy Machine Gun	4
French (MAS) 36 (Cal 7.5)	2
Soviet Heavy Machine Gun (Type 54)	10
Chicom Modified Submachine Gun (7.62 mm)	55
Chicom Thompson Machine Gun	1
French Submachine Gun (9 mm)	33
AK-47 Rifle	9
Browning 9 mm	5
Spanish 1935 - J Pistol	1
German 9 mm Walther Automatic Pistol (P-38)	12
Soviet 7.62 mm Automatic Pistol (Model 1933)	122
Chicom Pyrotechnic Pistol	14

b. AMMUNITION:

	<u>TOTAL:</u>
122 mm Rocket Mortars	4
122 mm Warhead	1
75 mm Anti-Tank Recoilless Rifle Rounds	20
2-40 Rockets	222
1-41 Rockets	84
57 mm Rounds (22 Boxes)	121
82 mm Mortars (50 Boxes)	525
9 mm Pistol Rounds	1800
51 Caliber Rounds (Linked)	200
51 Caliber Rounds (Unlinked)	500
60 mm Mortar Rounds	160
80 mm Recoilless Rifle Rounds (Approx)	2

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(3) Solution: A tighter method of control must be made on the aviation assets at hand. They must not be dispatched on missions unless all parties realize their capability and their duration. If they cannot be made available immediately or within a reasonable time, then the ground unit must know. When the assets are dispatched, the ground unit must know the call sign and the frequency of the aviation unit. Further aviation assets should not be withdrawn from unit and dispatched to another ground unit until the time on station both fuel and ordinance has been determined. If this is not done, then two ground units lose the support that they need. Further ground units must understand the capability of the support at hand. Too often artillery can be used more effectively than can gun ship support.

e. (1)Item: Logistical Support:

(2) Discussion: An operation such as the one in Cambodia demands the utmost of logistical support and preparation for without it, the operation cannot meet the expectations that have been placed upon ground units. When the lines of communication are extended into an unknown area, these LOC's are not functional if they are not supported and improved upon. Again the problem is realized that there is a great dependence on the aviation support, but the aviation units must have knowledge of the ground requirements. All units should be self sustaining for the first three days in the field with Class I, V and limited Class III, but the unknown must be anticipated. The unknown in the 3/506th AO of the SE SAN area was water and the intense heat. However, after the initial three days, the assets were not timely programed into the area forcing the combat units to become dependent on the logistical arm. The logistical effort did not support the ground soldier. Because of the loose control of aviation support, the maximum effort to the search was greatly limited. Units securing LZ's in this triple canopy area would be restricted to that LZ until the support arrived. This forced the ground unit into a precarious position and limited the time devoted to the search.

(3) Solution: The logistical resupply of the ground units must be as carefully planned as the tactical plan. If it is not then the unit becomes the slave to the logistical effort and that should not be. The aviation assets must be judiciously allocated to support the committed unit as well as the next assaulting unit. If necessary, dedicated CH-47 must be allocated to the brigade. When the LOC are greatly extended, then the CH-47 must wholesale to FSB and the MH-1H must retail to the companies, as was done. But the CH-47, assets must be allocated so that the ground unit knows what to expect and when. SE SAN was unusual with respect to water, but it immediately pin points a solution to the water problem. A CH-47 will carry one water trailer and one fifty gallon blivet suspended beneath it. Units should be provided water resupply in the form of 500 gallon blivets. Each CH-47 can carry two blivets thus doubling the water available to the ground unit. It also reduces the maintenance required for alinging water trailers.

FOR THE COMMANDER


DAVID J. STASZAK
CPT, Infantry
Adjutant

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Enemy Equipment Losses: Continued

d. MEDICAL SUPPLIES:

TOTAL:

Pages of Unknown Solutions	2
Cases of Capsulae Olei Jacoris Piscis	2
Bottles of Santonini & Phenolphthaleini	200
Cases of Penicilline & 500,000 u.	10
1 ml. Injections-Quinini Dihydrochloridi	10
2 ml. Quinini Uritane	1000
Metal Can of Pills (unknown)	1
Bottle of Cleansing Powder	20
Cans of Chloromynatin (.25 grams)	25
Cases of Gacil Sulfas Siccus	2
Bottle of Neutral (2½ Liters)	2
Bottle of Arthrochin (.25 grams)	1
Bottle of HQ	1
Cases of Vitamin C	2
Cases of Vitamin D-1	2½
Case of Vitamin D-3	1
Cases of Vitamin C, D-1, D-2	10
Case of Sulfaguanidinum	1
Cans of Plasma	17
Bottle of Sunfatizon	1
Sacks of Liquor Methylis Violacei (8 ml)	2
Case of Nodonal (1 gr)	1
Bags of Plastics	3
Cans of Surgical Gauge	2
Case of Tabellae Callis Chlorinatae Fortis	9
Cases of Thahh Huyet Man	3
Case of Nikethanidi Injection	1
Case of Streptomycini Sulfas (1,000,000 u)	1
Bottle of Antivenum Serum - Cobra	1
Case of Spatein Sunfat	½
Case of Bandages	1
Case of Mixing Pipettes for Haemocytometer	½
Case of Myorelaxine	1
Case of Plasmucidi (Pamaquine)	1
Bags of Tabulettae Neoplaamochini	20
Cases of Dihydrostreptomycinum Sulfuricium Injection	1½
Bag of Aspirin	1
Case of Reserpin & Suprastin	1
Case of Moriamin P & P-2	1
Case of Iborianine (500 ml)	1
Case of Chloramine	1
Case of Cao Gan	1
Case of Chuor	1
Case of Mercurochrome	1
Case of Neosoung	1
Case of Ammoniaque	1
Cases of Dauparaphine	1
Case of DDT	2
Case of No Chong	1
Case of Acetysal	1
Cases of Chloroquinii Phosphoric	10

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Enemy Equipment Losses; Continued

Case of Kalii Permanganas	1
Case of Iodum	1
Case of Natrii Bicarbonas	1
Case of Histidini Monohydrochloridi Injection	1
Cases of Medicine Cans	13
Case of Sugar Cubes	1
Case of Natrii Chloridum	1
Case of Glucosum	1

c. Miscellaneous: TOTAL:

Solder (lb)	80
Binoculars	155
Makings for Chicoms (cases)	15
NVA Crowbars	7
NVA Truck Tires	4
NVA 82 mm Sights	3
Chicom Commo Wire (Rolls)	200
AK-47 Magazines	100
NVA Picks	50
NVA Shovels	2
NVA Wire Cutters	5
NVA Firing Devices	2
82 mm Mortar Base Plates	5
82 mm Mortar Bipods	8
60 mm Mortar Base Plates	5
Anti-Aircraft Mounts	3
Machine Gun Mounts	5
Recoilless Rifle Mounts	1
Machine Gun Barrels (Heavy)	14

B. RECOVERED U. S. EQUIPMENT:

a. WEAPONS: TOTAL:

US Springfield 1903 Rifle	1
US Aircraft Machine Gun (Mini-gun)	1
Browning Automatic (BAR)	8
US M-1 Rifle	1
M-1 Carbines (US)	90
M-2 Carbines (US)	8
M-16 Rifle (US)	9
M-79 Grenade Launcher (Single Shot)	2
M-79 Grenade Launcher (Pump Action)	1
Shotgun (Pump Action)	1
Smith & Wesson Pistol (.38 Cal)	3
US .45 Caliber Pistol	65

b. AMMO: TOTAL:

.30 Caliber rounds	1,600
M-60 rounds (linked)	3,000
M 18 .41 rounds	7
M-16 rounds	1,000

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Enemy Equipment Losses: Continued

c. <u>MISCELLANEOUS:</u>	<u>TOTAL:</u>
Browning Automatic Rifle Magazines	3
M-16 Rifle Magazines	50
US Starlight Scope	1

Cache Found By C Company, 3D BN (AMBL), 506TH ABN INF, 101ST ABN DIV on
121000Z MAY 1970 at vicinity YA475559.

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