

Parat June 25, 87

JUL 06 1987

T h u ờ ̣ B ả

Tôi (c̣ Nguyễn - Sơn - Việt (13-3-1939) - Đại úy cảnh sát, Tổng nghiệp Khố 2 Học Viện Cảnh sát Quốc gia - Nguyên là Đại tá Trưởn̄g CS/DC, Nha Nông không báo - Sau hơn 10 năm tù (27/6/75 - 13/9/87) Tôi được phóng thích về Saigon - Tôi cũng như đa số các chiến hữu của mình, phải sống bằng đôi đũa sắt: đập xiết lá, sửa xe đạp, bơm gas phụ gia đình t̄ng việc buôn bán vặt - v.v... Những vấn đề hy vọng được thoát khỏi chế độ c.s đang ngược đãi mình - bằng chứng trình ODL - tìm đến mọi cách để gỡ hồ sơ qua Bongkok. Những ngày này qua ngày khác sống trong trạng th̄ 1 giấc mơ chấp báo giờ l̄i - chuông l̄i, và sẽ giúp đỡ c̄o anh em, bạn bè để viết b̄n - Trước khi đặt chân lên đất Thái, Tôi cũng như bạn bè, các sĩ quan được phóng thích kỳ vọng ở các tổ chức VN hải ngoại, cũng như các cơ giúp đỡ khác có thể an ủi phần nào cho những người như chúng tôi: giờ đình tan nát, tù Tôi, cực khổ suốt hơn 10 năm trời.

Vậy Bả có thể giúp đỡ chúng tôi trong việc đình c̄o ở Hoa kỳ. Trong việc chúng tôi không có thực tế ở Mỹ. Trūng l̄p tôi cũng như 1 số anh em; có vợ ở US (những đó là lâu không có tin vì tự tôi chưa có con) - Bả là người đó r̄ng lâu ở bên đó chắc hẳn b̄n h̄u h̄n. Có thể nhờ ai để kiếm Sponsor cho mình. Vô không vì tôi - số ra sao. Mong Bả và l̄p b̄i có thể giúp

จดหมายอากาศ
AEROGRAMME



To Hs Khúc Minh Trú
FVN PPA DO, BOX: 5435
ARLINGTON VA 22205-0635
U.S.A.

BILLING INFORMATION - SENDER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

WUHT 07 SECOND FOLD HERE

from Nguyễn Sơn Việt CB. 401377 V#85 PO. BOX: 18
PANATNIKHOM, CHONBURY 20140 THAILAND



WAT PHRA THAT HARIPHUNCHAI
AT LAMPHUN PROVINCE



ELEPHANT ROUND-UP
AT SURIN PROVINCE

PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY AND IN ENGLISH

IF ANYTHING IS ENCLOSED THIS AIR LETTER WILL BE SENT BY SURFACE MAIL

WUHT 07 FIRST FOLD HERE

Đề chúng tôi trong buổi ban đầu. ở thời khắc
quê người.

Chúng tôi xin kính chào các anh và
bác.

Chúc bà thật công hạnh công tác mọi
mọi người tự nhiên chúng tôi đang mong chờ ở
bà.

Nguyễn Sơn Việt

7 Leiland 19/6/1987

Kính thưa Bà.

Tôi là LÊ THỰC LÂM. Số 72/15286-1, Cầu Thia,
mỹ CULUNH. Tôi được Lân kinh biết Bà và quý
tôi rất đã gọi hồ sơ cho quý hội như giúp đỡ phi
tên con ở Việt Nam.

Tôi cũng Lân kinh nhận được phúc đáp của
bà và quý hội. Nay tôi đã biết thoát khỏi
Cộng sản đến Thái Lan cuối năm 1986. Ở đây
gặp tôi dưới biển, nay nhận được phúc đáp của
bà cũng quý hội xin thông báo cho Bà và
Kính thưa Bà.

Thời gian qua, chúng tôi sống ở trại tỵ nạn ở tỉnh
nay được chuyển lên trại tỵ nạn ở Cao ủy đạo
Neach tỵ nạn đã làm hồ sơ lý lịch của tôi, đưa
phần đơn của CP Hoa Kỳ vào phòng vấn và chờ
phản hồi.

Đến Bà giúp ý kiến về việc định cư của chúng
tôi, lý do này chúng tôi sẽ được định cư phân
chúng theo diện Cựu Quân nhân & Lân kinh xin
Bà cũng quý hội liên lạc và giúp đỡ ở vấn
đề này để liên lạc bên việc định cư.
Tình trạng sống ở trại, chắc là quý hội đã biết
rõ, trong lúc này chúng tôi cần giúp đỡ về mọi
phương diện.

Trong khi chờ đợi sự giúp đỡ và quý hội, kính
vì Bà và quý hội nhận nơi đây. Công thank kính
hết lòng của chúng tôi, Cháu Bà, gia đình đã chờ
đợi bà về, gặp bà và may mắn trong việc giúp đỡ
đang ban Việt Nam

Kính thư
Lê Thực Lâm

Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, before the Institute for International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden, May 18, 1987.

It is somewhat of a challenge for an official of the U.S. Government to come to Sweden and deliver a talk on aspects of U.S. foreign policy. It is a challenge, I believe, not because we are in fundamental disagreement. On the contrary, I believe we are in fundamental agreement, but there are misunderstandings between us. The challenge, it seems to me, is to use this opportunity to make a contribution, be it ever so slight, to the efforts to clear up our misunderstandings.

There is, of course, one basic difference between your approach to world affairs and ours, which is directed by our relative size. Anyone who knows the American people well is aware of the fact that we do not particularly relish our position of leadership in the world. But our numbers—in terms of population, economic strength, and military power—have thrust a role on us from which we cannot escape. Our actions can powerfully affect the course of history. We must live with that fact and act accordingly.

Let me now focus on the specific topic of this talk: human rights as an aspect of foreign policy. In recent years we have become so accustomed to human rights discussions at the international level that we sometimes do not focus on the fact that the introduction of human rights into foreign policy debates is of very recent origin.

The concept of human rights, the notion that the powers of government are limited by the inherent rights of the individual, stems in its modern setting from the writings of the thinkers of the 18th century. But for two centuries the issue of human rights was deemed a matter of purely domestic concern, to be asserted by political groups within a given country in the context of demands for democratic government. Diplomats, even the diplomats of democracies, shied away from involvement in such matters. They continued to adhere to the notion that what a sovereign power does within its borders to its own citizens is not appropriately a matter of concern to other countries.

It was only in the wake of World War II that consideration came to be given to the idea that the issue of human rights should be elevated to the international level. Language to that effect was incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations. But it takes a long time for diplomatic traditions to die. The prevailing view after the adoption of the Charter was that the language contained therein was hortatory rather than operational. Nor did adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 effect an immediate change in this outlook. The barrier was finally broken a few years later, when the United Nations began to discuss the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa.

In retrospect it may not be surprising that, of all the human rights violators of that time, the United Nations would single out South Africa for special opprobrium. After all, the commitment to the cause of human

rights in the Charter had been prompted largely by Nazi atrocities, which had been based on a racist ideology. South African racist practices were uncomfortably reminiscent of Nazi prewar policies even if not of the wartime murders.

As it is, it took the United Nations a long time to progress beyond its single-minded attention to South Africa as the one domestic human rights violator. Other human rights violations were approached most gingerly until the Soviet bloc, after 1973, pounced on Chile, not really for violations of human rights but because of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The rest of us, who sincerely do believe in human rights, joined the effort because of that belief. Thus you can say that an East-West consensus was established even though there was a fundamental difference in motivation.

It was only toward the end of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s that the list of states subjected to comprehensive criticism in international fora was lengthened to include some as to whose inclusion there was no overwhelming majority consensus.

Beginning with the Belgrade followup meeting under the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the scope of discussion was, indeed, extended to include human rights violators within the Soviet bloc. The precedent set in the CSCE process was thereafter followed in the United Nations as well. Thus, only within the last 10 years can we speak of a full-scale, across-the-board discussion of human rights violations in international fora, discussions in which a good many

participating states have put aside the traditional inhibitions against such discussion.

In the United States the 1970s also witnessed the development of and, even more significantly, the application of a bilateral human rights policy, a human rights policy which would not only be reflected in speeches at international gatherings but in direct contacts between the United States and the country in question. The Congress of the United States passed a series of laws which linked human rights conditions in specific countries to specific actions by the U.S. Government. Statutory linkage was thus established to most-favored-nation status with regard to tariffs, U.S. governmental credits and credit guarantees, economic and military assistance, U.S. votes on loans from international banks, licenses for the export of equipment used by law enforcement agencies, etc.

In order that it be guided in voting on foreign assistance programs, Congress also enacted a law during the 1970s which required the State Department to submit an annual report reviewing human rights practices throughout the world, country by country. As I have just noted, the objective of the law was to provide the Congress with fuller information on the state of human rights in specific countries. However, this law had, in my opinion, a highly significant and perhaps totally unintended impact on the U.S. State Department.

It was decided early on that the first draft of a country human rights report was to be prepared by the U.S. embassy located in that country. This resulted in ambassadors appointing, in each of our embassies, persons responsible for the preparation of such reports. These persons became known, over time, as our "human rights officers."

Preparing a human rights report on a country such as, for example, Sweden is a rather simple task. It can be done quickly prior to the annual deadline set for the submission for such reports.

But the situation is vastly different in many other states. Where massive human rights violations take place, it may be necessary to have a full-time human rights officer. As the information on human rights violations will often not be readily available, the human rights officer will have to go out to look for it. This will necessarily mean that he must be in contact with persons not particularly well liked by the government in power. Here we have, thus, another break with tradition. Throughout the world in states in which human rights

violations occur, the U.S. embassy is consistently in touch with persons who are in disagreement with the policies of their governments. In many locations the U.S. embassy is the only foreign mission that is regularly in touch with these dissenting individuals or groups.

Though the reports are prepared only once a year, a human rights officer in a country which does have human rights problems must necessarily keep watch across the year. He will try to collect information on human rights violations so as to be able, when the time comes, to write a report that is both comprehensive and accurate. Keeping watch does not, in our State Department, mean writing notes to oneself for ready reference at the time the annual report is written. A Foreign Service officer responsible for a particular subject matter will tend to report on matters in his field as they develop. Human rights officers will, therefore, send telegraphic messages to Washington, which we usually call "cables," letting the State Department know about the latest developments in the human rights field in the country in question. He might even add a recommendation as to what we should do in light of the latest development. And so, day in, day out, throughout the year, there arrive at the State Department in Washington messages from embassies throughout the world, messages prepared by human rights officers, reporting on human rights violations.

Whether or not the embassies recommend specific steps to be taken in consequence of these human rights violations, a report of such a violation will cause the responsible officers in Washington to reflect on these developments and try to reach a conclusion as to what to do about the problem. Through this process, as you can readily see, the entire bureaucracy is sensitized to the human rights issue, sensitized to the point that it almost instinctively seeks to respond.

A report of a human rights violation will occasionally cause us to make a public statement critical of the violating country. In many other instances it will cause us to deliver a demarche or make a less formal representation in the capital of the country in question or with the country's ambassador in Washington or both. The latter type of practice has become known as "quiet diplomacy." Let me emphasize to you that quiet diplomacy concerning human rights can be quite forceful. The term "quiet" means in this context merely that we do not make a public statement on the

subject. Quiet diplomacy, I can assure you, is being pressed by the United States most actively and is a truly effective tool in advancing the cause of human rights.

I must emphasize that injection of human rights considerations into the practice of foreign policy in the United States has not meant that our national security concerns can or should be put aside or relegated to second place. Like every other country, we must, in the first instance, be guided by our need for self-preservation. As, because of our size and status, our security can be affected by developments anywhere in the world, security implications must necessarily be weighed in *all* our foreign policy moves. What might be needed to protect our security can and is on many occasions the subject of argument. However, few people will argue over the basic principle that we have a right to preserve our security.

Having made the point about the supremacy of national security concerns, let me add that the United States consistently subordinates commercial concerns to human rights considerations. Beyond that, I would say that there are times when we put security considerations at risk in order to advance the cause of human rights. This may be hard to believe, but I can think of a number of situations which would prove the correctness of the observation I have just made.

I recognize that not only this last remark but a good deal of what I may have said to you today runs counter to the description of American foreign policy methods and objectives as described in the media. Let me simply say that that is where our misunderstandings may start. I, for one, believe in and respect the idealistic motivation of Swedish foreign policymakers. As we share these motives, I believe there is a sound basis for dialogue between us and for action along parallel lines. Ambassador Newell [U.S. Ambassador to Sweden], too, fully subscribes to this belief. That is why he urged me to visit Sweden, and that is why I am here today. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • June 1987
Editor: Colleen Sussman • This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission; citation of this source is appreciated.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, \$300

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER



**POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA. 501**

**KHUC MINH THO
PRESIDENT
FAMILIES OF VN POLITICAL PRISONERS
PO BOX 5435 ARLINGTON STA
ARLINGTON**

26741 •

VA 22205