



HỘI GIA ĐÌNH TÙ NHÂN CHÍNH TRỊ VIỆT NAM
FAMILIES OF VIETNAMESE POLITICAL PRISONERS ASSOCIATION

P.O. BOX 5435, ARLINGTON, VA 22205-0635
TELEPHONE: 703-560-0058

Hội Đồng Quản Trị
Board of Directors

KHÚC MINH THƠ
NGUYỄN THỊ HẠNH
NGUYỄN QUỲNH GIAO
NGUYỄN VĂN GIỚI
NGUYỄN XUÂN LAN
HÉP LOWMAN
TRẦN KIM DUNG
TRẦN THỊ PHƯƠNG

Ban Chấp Hành T.U.
Executive Board

KHÚC MINH THƠ
President
NGUYỄN QUỲNH GIAO
1st Vice-President
TRẦN KIM DUNG
2nd Vice-President
NGUYỄN VĂN GIỚI
Secretary General
TRẦN THỊ PHƯƠNG
Deputy Secretary
NGUYỄN THỊ HẠNH
Treasurer

Cố Vấn Đoàn
Advisory Committee

HÉP LOWMAN
NGUYỄN XUÂN LAN

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS more than thirteen years have passed since the end of the Vietnam conflict; and

WHEREAS despite the release of some political prisoners over the past year, many remain imprisoned in Vietnamese Re-education camps and thousands of families do not know the fate of their loved ones; and

WHEREAS the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has signed an agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to assist in the reunification of families; and

WHEREAS despite General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh's public assertion that released prisoners who wish to leave Vietnam would be free to do, only very few have been allowed to leave; and

WHEREAS the United States has made it clear that it is willing to accept these prisoners; and

WHEREAS the Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has recently accepted a U.S. proposal to discuss this resettlement of Vietnamese released from "re-education camps." Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate,

That the Senate calls on the Vietnamese government to make public the names of all political prisoners held in re-education camps;

That the Vietnamese government immediately release all political prisoners still held;

That the Vietnamese government honor its commitment to allow the emigration of the all political prisoners, and

That, to implement resettlement promptly and efficiently, the Vietnamese government should establish a special program for processing the cases of those released from re-education camps as was done in the case of the Amerasian children.

Thach also indicated that both countries should develop direct trade links to bypass third parties such as Singapore. With the Chatchai administration's blessing, government-to-government trade ties may develop and expand quickly.

But the question is whether Thailand is willing to abandon its political objectives and security interests in Kampuchea for the economic benefits from expanding trade with Vietnam.

Judging from the new government policy, in the short run the answer is "Yes" although not unequivocally. The new government is determined to go ahead with expanding trade in the hope of establishing a new rapport with Hanoi, which could influence events in Kampuchea positively. It would not be a surprise if there is a softening in the Thai position on Kampuchea as well.

For one thing, the PM's foreign policy advisory team sees a need for more flexibility in the Thai foreign policy toward Vietnam as well as other Indochinese states, given the current regional atmosphere and the brighter prospect for a Kampuchean settlement. But whether the Foreign Ministry will see the same need is not clear.

However, both the Foreign Ministry and the PM's [prime minister] advisory team believe that a long-term structure of Thai-Vietnamese relations must be established to remove mutual distrust and pave the way for future peaceful coexistence.

For the time being, it seems Hanoi can continue this piecemeal approach to strike deals with Thailand. There is no danger in such manoeuvring if Hanoi thinks that this is the way to get out of Kampuchea and coexist with Thailand.

In the coming months a struggle may surface between Chatchai and Sitthi for initiatives on key foreign policy issues, specifically regarding Indochina, Thai-US relations (the copyright amendment), and Thai-Soviet relations. These are issues that can make or break Thai foreign policy because stark differences remained between various policy makers.

Gone are the days when Sitthi could formulate and implement foreign policy on his own and with colleagues who share similar thinking. Now Sitthi has Chatchai and the PM's policy advisory group to reckon with. Lest everyone not know, Chatchai is going for broke. And government parties want to be heard on every foreign issue that they have some interest in. Thailand's foreign policy and relations, particularly with regards to Indochina, will not be the same anymore.

Vietnam

U.S. General, Thach Exchange Letters on MIA's
BK3108011288 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
2300 GMT 30 Aug 88

[Text] On 5 August 1988, General John Vessey, special envoy of the U.S. President, sent a letter to Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach pointing out that the statements made by U.S. officials in late July 1988 only reflect the U.S. administration's longstanding viewpoint on relations with Vietnam. The U.S. side pledged to continue implementation of the agreements reached between the two sides in August 1987 in Hanoi and in June 1988 in New York, as well as its efforts to respond to Vietnam's humanitarian concerns.

Gen John Vessey requested that the Vietnamese side resume bilateral meetings to resolve issues concerning American MIA's and to continue the settlement of outstanding points so as to reach an early agreement on allowing for the resettlement in the United States of those already freed from reeducation centers.

On 27 August, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach sent a letter in reply to Gen Vessey. The letter reads in full as follows:

I have received your excellency's letter dated 5 August 1988. I share your concerns and worries, but I think that considering Vietnam's efforts to resolve American humanitarian issues, the United States' continuation of a hostile policy toward Vietnam does not contribute to creating a favorable atmosphere for relations between the two countries at this juncture.

On the other hand, the U.S. authorities' declaration that it will make the normalization of bilateral relations conditional upon the settlement of the MIA issue is at variance with the agreement between your excellency and myself.

As always, we hold that the settlement of humanitarian issues should be separated from political issues; and the best way is for both sides to shed an attitude of hostility and generate a favorable atmosphere for rapidly resolving these issues.

With the desire that the U.S. Government will adopt a suitable attitude and in response to your excellency's concerns, I would like to inform your excellency that the Vietnamese side agrees to let the U.S. side participate in joint investigation and survey activities as concerns the issue of American MIA's, and is prepared to hold meetings of specialists from the two sides to discuss specific plans from 9 to 12 September 1988.

In particular, regarding the resettlement of those freed from reeducation centers, I am of the opinion that due to major differences and an unfavorable atmosphere, it is still impossible to organize a second meeting of specialists.

I want to reaffirm once again that I greatly respect the agreements between your excellency and myself and highly appreciate your efforts to forget the past and look to the future for the long-term interests of both peoples. For this reason, the use of your excellency's influence and prestige to persuade the U.S. Government to create a favorable atmosphere for the realization of the recent agreements between your excellency and myself will be useful.

On the same day, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach also sent a letter to U.S. congressmen who are concerned about these issues.

Nguyen Co Thach Interviewed on Cambodia Issue
BK3108050688 Hanoi VNA in English 1703 GMT
30 Aug 88

[Text] Hanoi VNA-OANA Aug 30—Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach today granted an interview to VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY on the Kampuchea issue.

Following are questions and answers:

Question 1: Can you give your evaluations of the development following the Jakarta informal meeting (JIM) and the prospect for the settlement of the Kampuchea issue?

Answer: The declaration on the withdrawal of 50,000 Vietnamese volunteer troops from Kampuchea, JIM's conclusion on two key issues of the Kampuchea question, the results of the Harare meeting of nonaligned countries' senior officials and the realities in Kampuchea have opened up a prospect for the resolution of the Kampuchea issue in the near future. At present, there are three possibilities. Firstly, there will be an overall solution to both the internal and international aspects of the Kampuchea issue; secondly, there may be partial solutions, first, the international aspect of the Kampuchea issue and second, the internal aspect; and thirdly, Vietnam will withdraw all its troops by 1990 without any political solution. We prefer an overall political solution or a partial one to none. But, that depends on the other side.

Question 2: Would you please speak in details about the prospect for the settlement of the international aspect first, and the internal one later.

Answer: All the concerned parties have basically agreed upon key points of the international aspect, namely:

1. The timetable for the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops is linked with the end of arms supply for the opposing Khmer forces and the end to the interference in Kampuchea's internal affairs.

2. Foreign countries respect an independent, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea.

3. Countries agreed that there will be an international commission to supervise the implementation of agreements on the international aspect. On these two timetables, some countries proposed nine months following the signing of the agreement while, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and Vietnam proposed that the earliest time should be in late 1989 and the latest one will be the first quarter of 1990. Prince Sihanouk proposed two phases: the first phase is in June 1989 and the second one is in late 1989. The difference in this matter is not big and it can be solved through negotiations. All concerned parties are unanimous in Kampuchea's future status, namely, independence, neutrality and non-alignment.

On the international supervision organization, the difference is whether there will or will not be an international force to disarm the Pol Pot force, to prevent a war among the four Kampuchean factions and to organize a general election. The question of an international peace-keeping force only concerns matters of Kampuchea's internal affairs and does not concern matters of the international aspect of the Kampuchea issue.

Kampuchea's internal affairs must be solved by the Kampuchean sides themselves without foreign interference. Foreign countries should respect agreements reached between the Kampuchean parties. Here, there are many complicated problems which could not be solved promptly. Therefore, the settlement of the international aspect first then the internal aspect later becomes the most possible reality. There were precedents for resolving the international aspects first in the settlement of the Lao issue in 1961-62 and the Afghanistan issue in 1988 though there are similarities and differences as well in the Lao, Afghan and Kampuchean issues.

We hold that if the international aspect is settled first, the Kampuchea issue will no longer be the difference between countries in the region but longer be the difference of Kampuchea. [sentence as received] If so, this will benefit the safeguarding of peace and the development of friendship and cooperation in Southeast Asia, thus conforming to the long-term interests of all nations in the region.

Question 3: What's your view about some idea which rejected JIM's conclusion on two pivotal things for the settlement of the Kampuchea question and which proposed the prevention of two dangers: firstly, the return of the genocidal Pol Pot regime and secondly the single rule in Kampuchea by the People's Republic of Kampuchea?

Answer: The question of the genocidal Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea has existed for 13 years now, even before the emergence of the Kampuchea issue. From 1975-78, the Pol Pot clique was used as a tool to perpetrate a genocide which killed three million Kampuchea, to invade Vietnam and threaten other neighbouring countries. At that time, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva and western countries condemned the crimes committed by the genocidal Pol Pot regime. From 1979-81, after Vietnam, exercising its legitimate right to

DRAFT

1609147

RESOLUTION

114

WHEREAS more than ~~thirteen~~ years have passed since the end of the Vietnam conflict;

WHEREAS despite the release of some political prisoners over the past year, many remain imprisoned in Vietnamese re-education camps and thousands of families do not know the fate of their loved ones;

WHEREAS the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has signed an agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to assist in the reunification of families;

WHEREAS despite General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh's public assertion that released prisoners who wish to leave Vietnam would be free to do, only very few have been allowed to leave;

WHEREAS the United States has made it clear that it is willing to accept these prisoners;

WHEREAS the Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has ^{recently} accepted a U.S. proposal to discuss this resettlement of Vietnamese released from re-education camps. Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate

That the Senate calls on the Vietnamese government to make public the names of all political prisoners held in re-education camps;

That the Vietnamese government immediately release all political prisoners still held;

That the Vietnamese government honor its commitment to allow the emigration of the all political prisoners, and

That, to implement resettlement promptly and efficiently, the Vietnamese government should establish a special program for processing the cases of those released from re-education camps as was done in the case of the Amerasian children.

Resolution

WHEREAS more than thirteen years have passed since the end of the Vietnam conflict; and

WHEREAS despite the release of some political prisoners over the past year, many remain in Vietnamese education camps and thousands of families do not know the fate of their loved ones; and

WHEREAS the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has signed an agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to assist in the reunification of families; and

WHEREAS despite General Secretary Nguyen Van Link's public assertion that released prisoners who wish to leave Vietnam would be free to do, only very few have been allowed to leave; and

WHEREAS the United States has made it clear that it is willing to accept these prisoners; and

WHEREAS the Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has recently accepted a U.S. proposal to discuss this resettlement of Vietnamese released from "re-education camps:" Now, therefore, be it

the Resolved by the Senate,

That the Senate calls on the Vietnamese government to make public names of all political prisoners held in re-education camps;

That the Vietnamese government immediately release all political prisoners still held;

That the Vietnamese government honor its commitment to allow the emigration of all political prisoners, and

That, to implement resettlement promptly and efficiently, the Vietnamese government should establish a special program for processing the cases of those released from re-education camps as was done in the case of the Amerasian children.