

1/9
South Viet Nam

A GREAT VICTORY

WINTER 1966 — SPRING 1967

**SOUTH VIET NAM
A GREAT VICTORY**

(14)

10/10/68

South Viet Nam

**A GREAT
VICTORY**

WINTER 1966 — SPRING 1967

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE
HANOI — 1967

CONTENTS

Publisher's note.	7
Communique of the Présidium of the Central Committee of the S.V.N.N.F.F.L.	9
Commentary by a L.A.F. Commentator.	26
Appendixes.	49
— Outstanding exploits in Winter 1966 - Spring 1967	
— Enemy losses increased between two dry seasons	
— Forty-nine battalions and squadrons wiped out in Winter 1966-Spring 1967	
— Forty-four L.A.F. attacks on enemy airfields and bases in Winter 1966-Spring 1967	
Western press opinion.	66

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

In Winter 1965-1966, with more than 700,000 American, puppet and satellite troops, 2,300 aircraft, 1,200 artillery pieces and 1,400 tanks and armoured cars, the U.S. aggressors unleashed their first "strategic counter-offensive" in South Viet Nam, attempting to retrieve their losing position there. We gave an elaborate account of the outcome of the said counter-offensive in A bitter dry season for the Americans published in 1966.

To turn the tide of the war in their favour the Americans launched another "strategic counter-offensive" in Winter 1966-Spring 1967 with well over one million U.S., puppet and satellite troops, 4,300 aircraft, 2,300 guns and 3,300 tanks and armoured vehicles. The result of this ambitious enterprise is presented in detail in this booklet.

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE
HANOI — JUNE 1967

COMMUNIQUE

OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOUTH VIET NAM NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION

ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS

RECORDED IN WINTER 1966 - SPRING 1967

In mid-May 1967, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation met in an enlarged session under the chairmanship of President Nguyen Huu Tho to assess the brilliant achievements recorded in all fields by our armed forces and people following the "Determined to fight and defeat the American aggressors in Winter 1966 - Spring 1967" Appeal issued by the Presidium in October 1966.

The conference heard a report by a representative of the High Command of the Liberation Armed Forces on the great exploits achieved by our armed forces and people in the military field and in the struggle against the enemy's "rural pacification" plan, a report by a representative of the Women's Federation for Liberation on the movement of political struggle and persuasion

work among enemy troops in Winter 1966-Spring 1967, a report by a representative of the Peasants' Association for Liberation on the consolidation and extension of the liberated areas, and a report by a representative of the Saigon-Cholon Front Committee on the struggle of the Saigon people during the past period.

After discussion the conference unanimously reached the following conclusions :

1 .

In Winter 1966-Spring 1967, the American imperialists tried their hardest to carry out new wicked and perfidious designs.

In the dry season of 1965 - 66, they had concentrated both American and puppet forces on destroying our forces, our regular units in particular. Now they launched a "two-pronged" offensive : military attacks aimed at annihilating our armed forces, and "rural pacification" aimed at destroying revolutionary bases and the guerillas. At the same time, they conducted frenzied air and naval attacks on the North while continuing to peddle their unwanted wares : "unconditional peace negotiations".

To achieve these purposes, American troops, which numbered over 200,000 in the 1965-66 dry season, were brought up to over 440,000 towards the end of the 1966-67 dry season. War means were also increased. By the end of 1966, the number of aircraft had increased 1.5

times, to nearly 3,500 ; that of tanks and armoured cars three times, to nearly 2,300 ; that of ordnance 2.5 times, to 1,600 guns ; that of war vessels nearly 5 times, to 230. Thus, more U.S. troops were sent to battle in South Viet Nam than at the peak of the Korean war and with far greater firepower.

The American troops were to "search and destroy" our regular units, while the puppet troops were to cope with our regional and guerilla forces and give support to "pacification cadres". With those forces, unceasing operations of unprecedented savagery were conducted : three of army-corps size, over 60 of division and hundreds of regiment and battalion size.

The Americans and their puppets had hoped that with their overwhelming superiority in effectives and firepower they would be able to achieve their ends : to destroy our forces, both regulars and guerillas, bring our people to their knees and build up a "position of strength" for future designs.

But, as pointed out in the Appeal issued by the Front in Winter-Spring, "the American aggressors are both reactionary and stupid. They have not understood the invincible strength of such a people as ours, who are possessed of unbending heroism, iron determination and great fighting experience". The armed forces and people of South Viet Nam dealt stunning blows at the enemy and won repeated, all-sided and great victories in all theatres. The initiative was firmly in their hands right from the beginning and their victories grew even more resounding towards the end of the campaign.

II

According to still incomplete figures, in the seven months of the Winter-Spring campaign our armed forces and people put out of action 175,000 enemy troops, among them 70,000 American aggressors, 15,000 South Korean, Australian, New Zealand and Filipino satellite troops, and 90,000 puppet troops. We entirely destroyed 49 enemy battalions, including 27 infantry battalions (8 American, one South Korean and 18 puppet), 16 armoured squadrons (15 American and one puppet), five artillery battalions (all American) and one engineers' battalion (puppet). We entirely annihilated 225 infantry companies (71 American, 9 South Korean and 145 puppet), five artillery companies and 352 platoons belonging to various arms and services. We shot down or destroyed on the ground 1,800 aircraft, destroyed 1,785 armoured cars and 2,200 other military vehicles, sank or set afire 100 river craft, destroyed 340 artillery pieces, razed 200 military posts to the ground, destroyed six military sectors and blew up about 270 bridges, big and small. Particularly worthy of note were the exploits recorded by the armed forces and people of Tay Ninh, Quang Tri and Thua Thien.

The enemy, for their part, achieved none of the objectives of their "counter-offensive". Not only did they fail to annihilate the Liberation troops and the guerillas, they also sustained the heaviest losses ever. Not only did they fail to "pacify" any of the free areas, they also received crushing blows in their rear areas, and regions under their temporary control had shrunk. Not only did they fail to consolidate the puppet army and

administration, but the morale of the puppet troops sank to an unprecedentedly low level, while the Americans were in no higher spirits and their flunkies were seeking to cut each other's throat. Not only did they fail to hinder the support extended by our Northern compatriots to the South Viet Nam revolution, but the armed forces and people in both zones of our country were fighting in closer co-ordination than ever against the common enemy of the nation. In the world, the banner of sham "peace" was torn to rags and the American leaders despised by the people everywhere. When the dry season drew to a close, the situation of the Americans and their lackeys was even worse than at the end of the 1965-66 dry season. The second dry season "counter-offensive" of the American aggressors had suffered pitiful defeat at the hands of our people and armed forces.

The victory won by our people and armed forces in Winter 1966-Spring 1967 assumed an extremely important meaning. While the 1965-66 dry season victory had proved that our armed forces and people were capable of defeating the American aggressors militarily, that of the 1966-67 dry season allows us to assert that the latter's total military defeat has become inevitable.

Following our 1966-67 dry season victory, our strategic initiative has not only been firmly maintained, but also been brought to a higher level. Our forces have disarrayed the enemy's disposition of troops in the whole of South Viet Nam and thrown confusion into their operational and defence plans.

In Winter 1966-Spring 1967, our troops grew up by leaps and bounds. The more our regular units fought on, the more powerful and skilful they grew: this remark

applied to infantry, artillery, the engineers corps and all other arms and services. Our regional forces grew more mature: battalion-size enemy forces were wiped out in seventeen provinces. The guerillas in particular fought fiercely everywhere, compelled the enemy to spread their troops thin along communication lines, penetrated deep into their rear areas, destroyed enemy posts or forced their garrisons to evacuate them. In the fight against Operation *Junction City*, actions by the guerillas and regional forces in northern Tay Ninh accounted for half the number of enemy troops put out of action, two-thirds the number of planes downed and half the number of armoured vehicles destroyed. Wherever the Americans went, "belts for the annihilation of U.S aggressors" took shape. The belt at Rach Kien in Long An province was set up the very day the enemy arrived and in the first month of the year put out of action 1,466 American and 150 puppet troops. That at Binh Duc in My Tho province put out of action 900 troops in two months, among them 704 Americans.

Enemy communications were subjected to constant harassment. A large number of helicopters had to be used by them for liaison between provinces and districts, not only in the mountain regions but even in the Mekong delta. It was in the 1966-67 dry season that we laid the greatest ambush on road — in Quang Nam — where 200 enemy vehicles were destroyed, and also the greatest ambush on river — in Ben Tre — where 1,000 enemy troops were put out of action. Our forces penetrated deep into the enemy's rear, their airfields at Da Nang, Chu Lai, Bien Hoa, Soc Trang, Tra Noc, etc. were subjected to repeated raids. The ammunition depot

at Long Binh was attacked four times; a deep thrust was made against the American Hawk missile site at Da Nang; during a military parade in the centre of Saigon, the reviewing stand was shelled by our artillery.

III

While foiling the enemy's "military offensive" pincer, our armed forces and people also dealt crushing blows at their other pincer — "rural pacification".

"Rural pacification" held an extremely important place in the new strategic plans of the Americans and their flunkies. To this aim they devoted 90 per cent of the puppet troops and many American and satellite units, 40,000 "pacification cadres", hundreds of millions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs and shells. U.S. President Johnson personally presided over the working out of the plan, held firm control over its implementation and dispatched cunning confidential agents to South Viet Nam to direct "pacification" work.

But the "rural pacification plan" had been elaborated after the pitiful failure of all previous "pacification" schemes, starting with the "strategic hamlet" plan in Ngo Dinh Diem's time; the puppet troops' fighting power was sagging and the puppet administration thoroughly corrupt.

On our side, the people, especially in the countryside, had been thoroughly tempered in the struggle against previous enemy operations. They were full of resolve not to submit and of great fighting experience against

all enemy schemes. That was why the enemy's "pacification plan" met with serious setbacks right at the beginning.

At the same time as the enemy conducted savage operations to round up the people, wantonly shelled and bombed vast areas often comprising many villages, and sprayed concentrated toxic chemicals on vast regions, they used large amounts of money and goods to try to lure and deceive the people and buy them over.

To counter this twofold manoeuvre, our people and armed forces resolutely meted out severe punishment to all enemy personnel engaged in mop-ups and round-ups. From December 1966 to February 1967, according to still incomplete data, we wiped out about 5,000 "pacification cadres" while thousands of others deserted. Most of the rest were demoralized and thrown into confusion.

Enemy forces engaged in rounding up the people not only ran into attacks by the guerrillas but also met with stiff resistance by the people themselves. At Ben Suc, they forcibly took the people away by plane and river craft, but the latter subsequently returned to their native places. In Binh Dinh, the people of a hamlet were driven away no less than 12 times, but each time they fought to return to their former places. In spite of savage terror, our compatriots clung to their villages and lands and resolutely stayed on to till their fields and fight the aggressors. When enemy attacks grew particularly fierce, they dispersed in neighbouring areas where they launched widespread guerrilla warfare, eventually returning to their villages to till their lands and resist the enemy on the spot. All enemy attempts at terror were resolutely

opposed. The villagers stopped the hands of enemy soldiers who tried to set fire to their houses, wrested back possessions taken away from them, and, whenever the soldiers killed someone, staged protest demonstrations which shook towns and cities and were approved of by even puppet troops. Barehanded, they drove away helicopters, as in Long An and Quang Ngai, and armoured cars, as in Quang Nam, Long An and Ben Tre.

While opposing the enemy's "rural pacification plan" our armed forces and people made deep thrusts into temporarily enemy-controlled areas and mobilized the people there, causing them to rise up and destroy whatever "strategic hamlets" remained. In Long An alone which had top priority in the enemy's plan, our compatriots rose up 80 times and destroyed 36 hamlets between October 1966 and March 1967. In Ben Tre, they destroyed 34 "strategic hamlets" in the month of April 1967 alone.

American civilian and military authorities were in serious disagreement over "pacification". Cabot Lodge and his assistant, Porter, who was responsible for the job, were dismissed. President Johnson had to make changes in the leading "pacification" organs and to hand them over to General Westmoreland. This proves that the enemy are in a quandary and meeting with serious difficulties, but also that they will resort to new perfidious "rural pacification" schemes. That is why all our compatriots and cadres at all levels of authority in the Front should heighten their vigilance and fight on still more powerfully and resolutely so as to foil the enemy's new machinations.

IV

In this second year of "limited war", our compatriots' political struggle and their persuasion work among puppet troops were firmly maintained and took on new features.

One of the outstanding characteristics of political struggle in the Winter-Spring period was that it centered mostly upon the task of opposing the enemy's "rural pacification plan". Our compatriots resolutely resisted round-ups, clung to their villages and fields, opposed massacres and destructions. They surrounded American and puppet armoured vehicles and prevented them from wrecking the crops. They snatched firebrands away from enemy soldiers' hands when they tried to set fire to their houses. They refused to leave their anti-air raid shelters when the soldiers tried to blow them up with explosive charges. They sat on their paddy stocks when the soldiers attempted to burn them down. Those fierce struggles set in full relief the great courage of our compatriots, especially the women.

Another characteristic of the struggles was that direct confrontations with American and satellite troops had become common occurrences. In the Winter-Spring period, wherever American troops were stationed, they were directly opposed by the local people. In Thanh Phu (Ben Tre) for instance, as soon as the G.I.'s landed, dozens of thousands of people in the whole of Ben Tre province staged seething demonstrations, shouting such slogans as: "No Americans in Ben Tre!", "No billet for Americans!". In Duc Hoa (Long An) the people

surrounded an American armoured battalion, immobilized it in a swamp for two days and one night, and eventually broke up the enemy raid. One village in Bong Son (Binh Dinh) was occupied by American troops in such large numbers that there was a soldier for every villager: yet, thanks to their resolute struggle, the villagers were able to maintain a normal life. Still another characteristic of the movement of political struggle was the co-ordination between urban and rural areas during the past Winter-Spring period. On March 15, 1967, 3,000 town and country people in Ben Tre staged a protest demonstration against the Americans and the Thieu-Ky clique. On May 1, workers and labouring people in the city of Can Tho, held a demonstration in support of their economic interests; the following day, thousands of people came from the surrounding countryside to voice support to their struggle. The workers and labouring people in Saigon also staged repeated demonstrations to protest against the bombings of the countryside by the Americans.

The urban population also actively struggled against the Americans and the Thieu-Ky clique to defend their economic interests and demand democratic rights, oppose the U.S. war of aggression and demand genuine peace, spearheading their struggle against the American aggressors and their most reactionary lackeys.

Following scattered struggles at the end of the rainy season, the movement grew up into a unified and impetuous fight by the middle of the dry season. Strikes by Saigon harbour workers to protest against the Americans' taking over the harbour and dismissing workers there were supported by nearly 40,000 workers of the

PRMK-BRJ contractor firms in Saigon, Cam Ranh, Da Nang, Nha Trang, Vung Tau and by Saigon public utilities workers, who staged strikes of their own to support them. Taxi, pedicab and motor-pedicab drivers in Saigon staged protest meetings against acts of hooliganism by American troops. The students forced the Americans and the Thieu-Ky clique to promise that the Vietnamese language would be used in teaching at the university. Students, intellectuals, businessmen, including importers and exporters, held debates and demanded economic independence. The women protested against the Americans' trampling on human dignity and the interests of women. Intellectuals opposed American aggression in the cultural field and stood up in defence of national culture. Students and teachers in Ben Tre refused to obey orders to present gifts to American troops and to participate in propaganda for the puppet regime's "open arms" policy*. Pedicab drivers in Can Tho decided at a meeting to boycott the Americans and launched a two-day campaign to punish American bullies, etc.

Towards the end of the dry season, on May 1, workers, labouring people, small traders and students, in defiance of repression and terror by the Americans and their lackeys, staged demonstrations in Saigon and other cities, fought back against American repressive agents, demanded improved living standards, and democratic rights, and an end to American bombings, massacres and destruction.

* To attract resistance members.

In workers' areas and the inner outskirts of cities, the people organized themselves more and more, kept watch for and fought against enemy pressgangs. Actions taken by the townspeople to break the enemy's grip, punish their wicked agents, and kill American aggressors became more and more frequent. In Saigon itself, members of armed self-defence youth organizations engaged in numerous operations and killed scores of enemy personnel, not only in relatively remote areas such as Cau Sap or Ro No, but even in areas close to enemy barracks, such as Tran Quoc Toan road.

The townspeople's struggle during the dry season showed three new features. The first was the setting up of a broad front against U.S. aggression, with many slogans and forms of struggle. The second was the steady growth in depth of this movement. Revolutionary consciousness grew ever more thorough and acute, and the fighters' ranks were enlarged and consolidated. The third feature was the ever-firmer position of the working class within the movement.

Those features constitute favourable factors which will help the movement develop further in strength and scope in the days to come.

On the basis of our army's and people's armed and political struggle, persuasion work among enemy troops achieved good results. The puppet troops' morale had already sunk very low; forced by the Americans to engage in "pacification", badly mauled by our troops and people, they received education and help from our compatriots. That was why their ranks collapsed by big chunks: a wave of desertion, disbandment, rebellion and mutiny surged through them.

An increasing number of puppet troops deserted in Central Nam Bo, where previously about 1,000 puppet troops deserted each month on an average; this number greatly increased during the last Winter-Spring: over 1,500 in November 1966 and 2,700 in February 1967. They left their units by the dozen, by the hundred, sometimes in whole platoons and companies, even in whole battalions. Following the pitiful fiasco of the American Operation *Junction City*, 250 puppet troops at Suoi Da (Tay Ninh) deserted: many companies had but some 30 men left, one had only six. Three puppet rangers' companies at Xa Rai (Kien Phong) and the puppet battalion stationed at Hieu Liem, Tan Uyen district (Bien Hoa province) deserted. Desertion was even more serious among the new recruits. On October 28, 1966, alone, 802 new recruits of the puppet 9th Division disbanded. During the Tet* in particular, puppet troops left their units en masse and went to the liberated areas to spend the holiday with their families. In Long An alone, 4,000 of them, including four whole battalions, eight companies and three platoons, threw away their weapons and left for the liberated areas for the Tet celebrations. Over 1,000 never returned, causing the disintegration of two rangers' companies, and one company and one platoon of the militia.

Rebellions and mutinies were rampant in the puppet army during the Winter-Spring period, more so than ever before. Right at the beginning of this period, in Central Nam Bo, 25 anti-war rebellions broke out, involving two battalions, nine companies, two platoons, and over

* Lunar New Year Festival.

1,200 soldiers, who refused to have anything to do with raids and relief operations. One militia company at Duy Xuyen (Quang Da) hurled insults at the district chief and refused to follow his orders. Soldiers at Xa Rai (Kien Phong) rebelled against orders to join a relief operation and arrested their captain, whom they bound hand and foot. The following day, three rangers' companies killed their American and puppet officers and deserted wholesale. In Long An, puppet soldiers gave support to demonstrators and even joined their struggle (Ben Luc). The whole rangers' battalion No 34 stationed at Duc Hoa refused to board helicopters for a raid on Duc Hue. Later, they refused to participate in another raid, at Ben Luc, Thu Thua. In late January, early February 1967, in Thu Dau Mot three battalions, thirteen companies and two platoons staged twenty rebellions, refusing to be confined to their barracks and going home to celebrate the Tet. On three occasions, they opened fire on their commanders, wounding nine. Mutinies and insurrections broke out more and more frequently. At Tay Vinh Hoa (Sa Dec) soldiers mutinied and, in co-ordination with Liberation troops, annihilated one company and badly mauled two others. The American troops' morale was not any better. Rebellions, some of which involving exchanges of shots, broke out at the American bases in Dau Tieng, Lai Khe, Vung Tau Dong Du, etc.

V

Not only did the American aggressors meet with failure in all fields in South Viet Nam, they also suffered bitter setbacks in their war of destruction against the North.

They have been launching ever more furious attacks and making new steps in their war escalation: raids on Hanoi, the capital city, and on Haiphong port; naval bombardments of coastal areas, shelling by long-range artillery of the southern edge of the demilitarized zone and the Vinh Linh area. But due punishment has been meted out to them. So far nearly 2,000* aircraft have been shot down over the North, over 20 war vessels of the Seventh Fleet have been hit by shore batteries. The Viet Nam People's Army's artillery have hit back at the Americans south of the demilitarized zone and put out of action more than a thousand of them.

Facts prove that the more the Americans escalate the war, the more painful shall be their fall. Our compatriots in the North are all the more resolved to resist their aggression to save the country, they are all the more determined to give full support to the South Viet Nam revolution. The big successes we recorded in the past Winter-Spring period must be credited to the people of both zones of our country, united in their resolve to oppose American aggression.

During the past period, the wave of protest against the American imperialists' war of aggression, in support of our people, has strongly developed in almost all continents, taking on the most various forms.

The socialist countries have unwaveringly given us active and efficient support. At present, more and more people in the socialist countries are doing extra hours of work to get money for Viet Nam and donating blood.

* 2,100 up to June 6, 1967;

The people and government of Cambodia, headed by Chief of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk, staunchly support our people's resistance against American aggression for national salvation.

The fraternal Lao people and the Neo Lao Haksat Front always stand by our side and oppose the American imperialists.

Answering the appeal by the Tricontinental Committee for Solidarity with Viet Nam, hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Africa and Latin America have staged demonstrations before American embassies in many countries, denounced the American war of aggression in Viet Nam and resolutely supported our people's just struggle. The conference of the heads of State of five African countries held in Cairo last April issued a declaration calling on the Americans to withdraw their troops from Viet Nam and recognize the National Front for Liberation as the only genuine representative of the people of South Viet Nam.

The peoples of Japan and many West-European countries also extend ever more active support to our people. Outstanding is the warm support of the American people for our people and their struggle against the war of aggression in Viet Nam.

From individual self-immolation by fire, draft-card burning, demonstrations by 2,000 priests and thousands of women, petition signed by 5,000 scientists for a withdrawal of American troops from Viet Nam, the American people's protest movement reached an apex with the "Spring mobilization" which lasted from April 8 to 15. Half a million Americans coming from all corners of the

United States gathered in New York to resolutely voice their deep anger at the Johnson gang's war of aggression against Viet Nam. This was the first time American Indians, Negroes and Whites stood shoulder to shoulder with each other holding aloft President Ho Chi Minh's portraits and N.F.L. flags, shouting to the face of the Johnson gang: "End the war of aggression in Viet Nam", "Viet Nam for the Vietnamese". This struggle quickly gained support from almost every country in the world and threw Johnson and his clique into panic.

Another event which set world opinion astir was the meeting in Stockholm of the first session of the Bertrand Russell International War Crimes Tribunal, which condemned the American imperialists' aggression in Viet Nam and laid bare before the world the heinous crimes perpetrated by the American aggressors against the Vietnamese people.

Our people are greatly encouraged by and feel proud of this support and solemnly promise to their friends all over the five continents that they will fulfil their duty towards freedom-loving and U.S. imperialism-opposing people in the world: to bring their resistance for national salvation to a victorious end, defeat the ringleader of aggressive and warlike imperialism, win independence, democracy and peace for Viet Nam, and contribute to the world people's struggle for genuine peace, freedom and social progress. Our people are fully resolved and fully able to fulfil this duty and after the Winter 1966-Spring 1967 campaign, we are now confident that victory is in our hands, although many difficulties and hardships are still ahead.

Our armed forces and people won great victories in Winter 1966-Spring 1967; the American aggressors' second "dry season counter-offensive" came to grief; their "two pincers" plan was foiled in its initial stage. But the American aggressors are obstinate and do not reconcile themselves to their defeats. They have not given up their dark aggressive designs against our country, they are scraping up more troops for the South Viet Nam theatre, putting pressure on their satellites for more mercenaries, and clinging to their "rural pacification" schemes in order to attack us through a "two pincers" offensive. On the other hand, they will stage more "democratic" farces, try to beautify their flunkeys so as to deceive public opinion and continue their war of aggression. Setting at defiance the world people's strong protests, they have intensified their bombing raids over the North while stepping up world-wide propaganda for their "unconditional negotiations" swindle. These machinations are proof of the blind alley the Americans are finding themselves in, but at the same time give idea of their mulishness.

As for us, we have won great successes. We have made progress in all fields, but there remain many problems which await better solutions, and new difficulties which we must overcome thanks to new determination on the part of our people and armed forces. In face of this situation, the task to be fulfilled by our people and armed forces is, on the basis of past successes, to unite closely, act on the offensive in all fields, give an all-round impulse to all our work, attack the enemy fiercely and contin-

uously through a three-pronged assault* in all three areas** with a view to driving the enemy's "two pincers" offensive plan to further failure, keep the initiative firmly in our hands and break up all enemy raids while smashing their "rural pacification" plan and "election" farces. Our people and armed forces will win still greater successes. They will knock down still more American and satellite forces, drive the puppet army to disintegration, strike hard at the enemy's rear and communications, break up all enemy raids, expand and consolidate our liberated areas and resistance bases, step up struggle in the disputed areas and the cities, and, while fighting the enemy, build up our strength in all fields.

In Winter 1966-Spring 1967, our armed forces and people won glorious victories whereas the American aggressors suffered their heaviest setbacks ever. Determined to fight on, in spite of all hardships and sacrifices, the armed forces and people of South Viet Nam in enthusiasm will follow up their Winter-Spring victories with still greater and more glorious successes.

* Political struggle, military struggle and persuasion work among adverse troops (*Publ.*).

** Forest-hill, urban and rural areas (*Publ.*).

A WINTER-SPRING OF VICTORIES

L.A.F. commentator

While the dry season was drawing to a close and the first showers began to pour down, heralding the rainy season much dreaded by the Yankees, there appeared many "disheartening symptoms" for the enemy: The marshalling of their forces had been upset. The 196th Brigade, a brigade of the First Air Mobile Cavalry Division and a brigade of the 25th Division badly mauled in East Nam Bo and Central Trung Bo without being able to replenish themselves, had had to hurry to North Quang Ngai and Quang Nam to replace the U.S. marines for the defence of their bases, so that the latter might help parry the staggering blows of the L.A.F. in the hilly region of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. forces in South Viet Nam, returned to the U.S.A. in a sorrowful mood to ask for reinforcements and placate public opinion there. The American and Western press and news agencies complained of the failure of the "pacification program". Then Johnson convened the National Security Council to discuss the Vietnamese problem. The list was long but all that sufficed to speak volumes of the predicament faced by the U.S. aggressors after the dry season.

The enemy's new strategic plan and "counter-offensive" preparations

This situation did not at all derive from the lack of calculations on the part of the Americans. In fact, their plan for the 1966-67 dry season as well as for the whole of 1967 had been carefully elaborated. In the second year of the "limited war", after the heavy failure of the "strategic counter-offensive" in the 1965-66 dry season and the 1966 rainy season, in October 1966 the most responsible American figures, from Defence Secretary McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff E. Wheeler to top-ranking politicians, specialists and generals, came en masse to South Viet Nam to make on-the-spot investigations and devise new military schemes. In November 1966, President Johnson himself and the heads of satellite countries participating in the South Viet Nam war as well as Thieu and Ky met in Manila and worked out the so-called "two pincers" plan, i.e., military offensive and "rural pacification". They paid greater attention to "rural pacification" which they called the "other front", thus closely combining it with military action. Though springing from a quagmire and a defensive position and bearing in itself the seeds of a more bitter failure, this plan reflected pretty clearly and comprehensively the stubbornness and perfidy of the American aggressors.

The closing months of 1966 and the beginning of 1967 were of paramount importance for them because in this dry season they could make full use of their weapons and techniques — especially aircraft, heavy guns,

armoured vehicles —, launch big and small operations, repeatedly counter attack us and realize the major part of their schemes for the whole year.

Thus, in the 1966-67 dry season the Yankees were bound to alter their strategic plan. We see in retrospect that they developed their plan as follows :

In the last months of 1966 — period of preparations — they introduced into South Viet Nam nearly 60,000 G.I.'s of such support units as armoured cars, artillery, engineering. The most striking feature was that they completed the landing of the whole of the U.S. 4th and 9th Divisions. From 330,000 at the beginning of the dry season, the number of G.I.'s rose to almost 390,000 by the end of 1966. War means also increased substantially, compared with 1965, particularly in the last quarter of 1966. While in December 1965 the Yankees had 2,300 aircraft, some 600 armoured vehicles, over 600 ordnance pieces and 50 war vessels, in December 1966 they had 3,500 aircraft (0.5 time more), 2,300 armoured cars (about 3 times more), 1,600 heavy guns (1.5 times more) and 230 warships (nearly 4 times more). With regard to the puppet troops, the number of their cannons rose from 630 to 670, and that of armoured personnel carriers from 800 to nearly 1,000.

The Yankees re-organized their strategic forces, sent the puppet troops to the "inner perimeter" to carry out "rural pacification". The G.I.'s mounted some operations, on the one hand to cope with our forces, and on the other to experiment their "two pincers" plan, such as *Irvin*, *Dai Bang 800* in Central Trung Bo, and Operation *Attleboro* which they were forced to launch in Tay Ninh province, etc.

Preparations for the "rural pacification program" by the Saigon army and administration dragged on and on and were completed as late as February 1967, for they had encountered great difficulties, had to confront our armed forces and people everywhere, and were in deep contradiction with the Americans who despised them and assigned the puppet troops to ancillary task. Towards the close of December 1966, the puppet generals met at Dalat to study "pacification" tactics. Apart from the use of 90 per cent of puppet troops in this job, they gathered about 40,000 thugs named "pacification cadres" and set up hundreds of such groups. Though puppet troops and officials formed the main force in the "pacification" work, they were masterminded by the Americans. In November 1966, Komer, a high-ranking specialist and Johnson's dependable adviser, was sent to South Viet Nam to direct the whole "pacification" business. He tried to secure control over the low levels of the puppet army and administration by appointing Colonel Wilson, special adviser of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, to a post much like the chief of Long An province.

At the beginning of 1967, Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went again to South Viet Nam to press on American and puppet military chiefs for stronger "pacification" work. Since then the enemy switched over to the "two pincers" plan period. A striking feature in this action was that they mounted protracted large-scale operations on many battlefields.

According to incomplete figures, from October 1966 to March 1967, and especially in the first months of this year, hundreds of operations from battalion-size upward — including three of army-corps size and over

60 of division-size were launched with unheard of savagery and cruelty. In the Bau Gon battle, Tay Ninh province, alone (Operation *Attleboro*) up to 15,000 cannon shells were fired. Almost all major operations were conducted by the Yankees, the puppet troops being reduced to a subordinate role. While in many operations in the 1965-66 dry season puppet troops took charge of entire army columns and accounted for 50 to 75 per cent of the effectives involved, in the 1966-67 dry season their participation in the raids mounted by the Americans lowered to from 10 to 30 per cent of the forces fielded.

In those operations, the Americans did their best to herd people into the areas under their sway, and unleashed 40,000 "pacification cadres" to seduce, terrorize and coerce the population in other places.

In North Viet Nam, in 1967 they made new, serious escalation steps by using heavy artillery from the Seventh Fleet and South Viet Nam to bombard the D.R.V.N., mining waterways and striking at many important industrial centres and populous areas in Thai Nguyen, Haiphong, Hanoi and its periphery. Of course, they still hullabalooed over what they call their "desire for peace".

Fierce trial of strength between the enemy and us on the battlefields

With such careful preparations and such a formidable battle-array, the Yankees thought at first that they would be able to work wonders and hastily counted their chickens before they were hatched.

But their optimism soon gave way to disappointment.

True, the South Vietnamese people and their armed forces were highly elated and confident that after their historic victory of strategic significance, which had foiled the enemy's strategic counter-offensive in the first dry season, and their successful attacks in the following rainy season, they could embark on the Winter 1966-Spring 1967 campaign with a great impetus and a new strength. The appeal on October 27, 1966 by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation urged our armed forces and people to fight and win ever-bigger victories. In the seven months of the dry season, we continually attacked and counter-attacked the U.S. and puppet troops and caused them heavy losses on all theatres. Most bitter for them was the fact that in the key areas where their great effectives were fielded and a big quantity of weapons was used and on which the enemy pinned high hope, they were the hardest hit and suffered the most serious setbacks.

Driven to an over-all defensive position as the dry season drew to a close the Yankees sank still deeper into the sea of people's war and lost initiative in each engagement and in the campaign as a whole. As early as the first days of the Winter 1966-Spring 1967 period, the gun report heralding our victories was already heard: in a single night the L.A.F. and people in Ben Tre overran 7 posts; those in Rach Gia wiped out an enemy battalion, 3 companies and decimated 2 battalions at Go Quao; those in Quang Tri annihilated a puppet paratroop battalion. Many enemy bases were attacked such as Long Binh (near Sai gon), the airfields of Soc Trang, An Hoa, Phan Rang, the U.S. and puppet C.P.'s at

Bien Hoa, Kien Binh (Rach Gia), Blao (Lam Dong), Thien Giao (Binh Thuan), Dien Ban (Quang Nam) and north of Highway No 9 (Quang Tri), etc. At the end of October and the beginning of November 1966, threatened by the L.A.F. in Tay Ninh, the Americans hastily launched Operation *Attleboro* which, according to their plan, would have initially the size of a reinforced brigade with the 196th Brigade commanded by General De Saussure, as the backbone. But this light brigade was badly mauled and needed to be patched up. Immediately they committed to action units of the 1st and 25th U.S. Infantry Divisions, thus raising the troops involved to the size of an army corps. De Saussure was dismissed and the command of the operation passed over to General Depuy, commander of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division. To quench their thirst, the Americans drank poison and were routed by the L.A.F., who inflicted upon them 3,000 casualties.

Meanwhile, on the Western High Plateaux, they found themselves in a quandary. The L.A.F. at Kontum and Gia Lai hammered unremittingly at the units of the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions and of the First Air Mobile Cavalry Division along the Sa Thay River, wiping out a dozen companies and even an entire U.S. battalion in a single engagement. Perplexed in face of this predicament, many American brigades, which had previously withdrawn to the plain, had to return to the Western High Plateaux where they had to narrow down their occupation areas. In the meantime, in the plains of Quang Nam, Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh, our armed forces and people fought heroically against enemy raids,

knocking out and wearing away 2 battalions and many companies of the U.S., Pak Jung Hi and puppet troops.

In January 1967, the armed forces and people of Thu Dau Mot, and Gia Dinh, mainly guerillas and regional troops, foiled another army-corps-size operation — *Cedar Falls* — inflicting 3,200 casualties on the Yankees. At the same time, the first U.S. units landing in the Mekong River delta were bogged down: many tanks and armoured cars supporting 4,000 G.I.'s in their raids on Ben Tre coastal region churned in the mud with many warships sunk in the Mekong River, and hundreds of G.I.'s killed. In three months, owing to the guerillas' fire and booby-traps, the Yankees in Rach Kien (Long An) lost 1,500 men, while in Binh Due (My Tho) their losses averaged 12 per day.

From February to the close of the dry season, the aggressors were violently attacked on many fronts. In Tay Ninh, after the two curtain raising Operations *Gadsden* and *Tucson*, they launched Operation *Junction City* — the biggest raid ever known so far — with a most ambitious aim, but it ended in a complete failure. Not only did the enemy achieve no notable results in any of his objectives but he suffered heaviest losses. From the beginning of February to early April, 13,500 G.I.'s were wiped out, nearly 170 aircraft downed and over 800 armoured cars destroyed.

In Quang Ngai, a key area for their strikes, the Americans also had 6 battalions annihilated or thinned out within a few days.

Another salient feature of this period was that the Quang Tri and Thua Thien armed forces and people,

masters of their land, delivered successive, stunning blows at the U.S. and puppet troops and won brilliant victories. The enemy was beaten everywhere in Gio Linh, Dong Ha, Huong Hoa, Cam Lo, Phong Dien, Hue, etc. To punish the U.S. aggressors for their shelling of the Northern zone with heavy artillery based at Gio Linh, the armed forces and people of Quang Tri and Thua Thien many times pounded their gun emplacements, killing hundreds of American infantrymen. From Vinh Linh*, the artillery of the Viet Nam People's Army killed hundreds of G.I.'s, rejoicing all our people and struck fear into the enemy's ranks. In our attacks on the U.S. marine bases at Quang Tri and Thua Thien, 600 enemies lost their lives in a single night. People's war has been surging up more and more powerfully in this heroic land: in a night of early April, a deep thrust into Quang Tri town to mete out punishment to the ring-leaders of the provincial puppet troops and authorities, resulted in the annihilation of hundreds of enemies and in the controlling of the town for many hours running; at the same time the H.Q.'s of the puppet regiment at La Vang (Quang Tri) and Tu Ha (Thua Thien) were destroyed and a battalion and some ten companies wiped out. Towards the end of April and beginning of May, as U.S. marines proceeded to the Viet Nam-Laos border in an attempt to relieve their Khe Sanh base from our pressure, their strong positions on Hills No 881, 861, etc., turned into graveyards for thousands of them. These attacks by our troops in Quang Tri and

* North of the demilitarized zone (Publ.).

Thua Thien were stinging blows which struck terror into the enemy and upset the deployment of his forces in the South Viet Nam theatre.

In co-ordination with major attacks throughout the Winter 1966-Spring 1967 period, our armed forces achieved resounding victories on all fronts, thus landing the enemy in great difficulties. According to still incomplete figures the following 17 provinces were credited with the annihilation of battalion-size units: Tay Ninh, Quang Tri, Quang Nam, Long An, Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, Ben Tre, Tra Vinh, Thu Dau Mot, Rach Gia, Kontum, Bien Hoa, Thua Thien, Gia Dinh, Bac Lieu, Baria and Binh Thuan.

Parallel to the big victories in which thousands of U.S. aggressors were annihilated in the "outer perimeter", our armed forces and people, especially the guerillas and regional troops, struck with might and main at the enemy's "rural pacification plan". We wiped out the puppet regular units going to concentrate the population, attack revolutionary bases and fight guerilla movements; at the same time we suppressed "pacification cadres" who terrorized, misled and coerced the inhabitants. According to incomplete data, from December 1966 to February 1967, about 5,000 of such thugs were suppressed. Most of the rest were frightened and crestfallen.

Persuasion work among puppet troops made notable headway under new favourable circumstances. In face of our resounding victories, puppet officers and men had less admiration for the Yankees and began to realize that sooner or later, the latter would fail in their enter-

prise. The fact that the Americans have committed direct aggression against our country, despise, and lord it over puppet soldiers and officials, kill and rape women who are their dear ones, tear to shreds their professions about their respect for the Vietnamese nation and people, about Viet Nam-American friendship and equality between the Americans and Vietnamese, and so forth. Love for the country has awakened among a number of puppet troops and many among them have begun to take part to a certain extent in the war of resistance against U.S. aggression. The refusal by whole units to go out for terrorist raids has become frequent occurrences. Many puppet army units left the G.I.'s in the lurch when the latter were attacked by the L.A.F.. In some areas such as Quang Ngai, puppet officers and men shot at Pak Jung Hi troops to punish them for violating their wives and daughters.

Our great success, the enemy's bitter failure

Thus ended the "favourable" dry season, on which the Yankees had pinned much hope. The enemy's optimistic calculations at the beginning and in the middle of the dry season prove utterly erroneous and are now the laughing stock for the world's people.

It was the intention of the Americans to knock down or wear out an important part of the L.A.F. and to destroy our resistance bases. But their senseless hope evaporated together with the dry season. They boasted that their military and political situation had become stable and that the "Viet Cong" had lost the opportunity to win (A.P., Nov. 3), that their new strategy had compelled the "Viet Cong" to run headlong and

scatter into small guerilla groups (*U.P.I.*, Dec. 15) and that General Westmoreland would crush the "Viet Cong" regulars from six to eight months in 1967, etc. But it was the major part of the enemy's forces that were wiped out and great quantities of their war materials, destroyed. Between October 1966 and April 1967, the South Viet Nam armed forces and people annihilated 175,000 adverse troops (including 70,000 G.I.'s, 15,000 satellite troops and 90,000 puppet soldiers), 49 battalions and similar units were annihilated wholesale (Infantry : 8 U.S., one Pak Jung Hi and 18 puppet ; Armour : 15 U.S. and one puppet squadron ; 5 U.S. artillery battalions and one puppet engineers' battalion) ; 230 companies (Infantry : 71 U.S., 9 Pak Jung Hi and 145 puppet ; Artillery : 5) and 352 platoons.

With regard to war materials, in Winter 1966-Spring 1967 we destroyed 1,800 aircraft, 1,785 tanks and armoured cars, 2,200 other military vehicles, 100 warships and motor boats, 340 heavy guns, 31 locomotives and nearly 60 carriages and 2 trains.

We also overran 200 posts and shattered 6 military subsectors and destroyed nearly 270 bridges and culverts.

As compared with the previous, in this dry season the number of enemy troops wiped out increased by 60,000, that of ships and boats destroyed was nearly 4 times bigger, and that of tanks and armoured cars over 5.5 times.

To record such a splendid achievement, the L.A.F. had displayed a great determination and an iron will, and had rapidly grown up. Our regular forces are really invincible. The L.A.F. artillery had made big strides

and its heavy shellings were a source of fear for the U.S., satellite and puppet troops and forced the enemy to revise his defence system. Together with the guerillas, the regional troops were resolute to fight off raiders, punish "pacification cadres", make deep thrusts, hold on then fan out to operate in adverse weak sectors. The guerillas fought well ; they clung to their localities, the people and the enemy to wear him out and inflict losses on his regular units and wiped out "pacification cadres". The guerillas in all bases proved to be outstanding fighters and made valuable contribution in the foiling of the adversary's operations and in the defence of our revolution's "sanctuary". Wherever the Yankees set foot, they would meet with a death-belt set by the guerillas and its wonderful effects. The belts at Rach Kien (Long An) and Binh Duc (My Tho) though recently built up, kept the G.I.'s in terror. All our three kinds of armed forces were very skilful in their fight against aircraft, heavy guns and especially armoured cars, thus foiling the enemy's tactics and impairing his morale. Not until recently did Westmoreland, when speaking of the L.A.F., had to bitterly admit that "his (Viet Cong) leadership is good and his men are tough and tenacious."... "I foresee, in the months to come some of the bitterest fighting of the war."

What about the outcome of the "rural pacification program" of the aggressors and their quislings? Clearly, though they had at times caused great difficulties to our compatriots and upset their living conditions in a number of localities, generally speaking, the enemy's activities in this field were heavy failure. Our liberated areas remained firmly under our control and even expanded in

such regions as Quang Tri and Thua Thien. The U.S. plan to dispatch an American division to occupy the Mekong River delta is still on paper. The enemy himself cannot hush up this fact. A *Washington Post* correspondent (March 20) said that a look at the balance-sheet showed that many points were not up to requirement, and that first and foremost: The call for help to repel night attacks did not receive appropriate answers. At dawn, he added, a number of "pacification" teams were beaten off, and that was a most serious setback.

The *New York Herald Tribune* complained that a big bloody crisis was taking place in the South Viet Nam countryside: The black-clad "pacification cadres" were repeatedly suppressed towards midnight. The paper produced the following figures which were certainly far below the truth: In the first quarter of 1967, 198 attacks were mounted by the guerillas on "revolutionary development" teams ("pacification cadres"); within the first twenty days of March, 200 of these cadres were killed. The paper went on to say that 50 battalions of the Saigon army stuck to their offices and barracks in bases very far from the hamlets and were unwilling to go on night patrol. The paper concluded that security was but a ghost in the whole tragedy of the Viet Nam war.

Those were the results of the "rural pacification program" undertaken by the Yankees and their henchmen.

The U.S. aggressors wanted to safeguard their combined bases and regions of strategic significance. But the L.A.F. made deep thrusts to attack them in their dens. In Saigon itself, the enemy's most important strategic centre, the Liberation forces went so far as to fire artil-

lery shells on the parade stand on "national day", and many a time to punish American and puppet thugs in the streets. The big ammunition depot at Long Binh, near Saigon, was stormed four times. The airfields at Tan Son Nhat, Bien Hoa, An Khe and Pleiku were bitterly attacked. So also were the airfields and military bases at Da Nang and Chu Lai, which sustained heavy damages. The military base in Hue and many other airfields, ammunition dumps, military sectors and subsectors could not escape the L.A.F. blows. For the Americans and their lackeys there is no sanctuary.

With regard to communications, the enemy did his best to link a number of arteries but had for this purpose to pin down great effectives. Such road sections as from Quang Nam to Thua Thien and Quang Tri were cut in many places and the L.A.F. once ambushed and completely destroyed a 200-vehicle convoy. Despite a very dense defence network the Long Tau River, an important waterway linking Saigon to the sea, was attacked no less than ten times by our troops who sent to the bottom or damaged over 20 warships, including one of 10,000 tons burthen.

The enemy wanted to sever our supply-lines, but we continue to live and fight as ever and have become even better-off in many respects.

He wanted to prevent aid to come from the North with a view to isolating the resistance war in the South, but never have our 31 million compatriots fought in so close co-ordination against the aggressors as in the recent past. In the North, our heroic and resourceful people have downed a large number of U.S. planes and set afire many warships. They have courageously accepted all

sacrifices and losses for the liberation of the South, wholeheartedly helping the revolution in the South in accordance with the motto: "All for the front, all for victory over the U.S. aggressors!"

It was heart-breaking for us to hear of bombings and devastation in the North. When the invaders struck at Hanoi and Haiphong, they were duly punished in Saigon, Hue and Da Nang. When their long-range artillery bombarded the North, immediately the armed forces and people in both the North and the South returned the blow on the Southern soil. Such was the united will of our entire heroic people. We thereby warned the aggressors and the quislings that should they obstinately and recklessly make other serious escalation steps, all the Vietnamese people, united in a monolithic bloc, would duly punish them in the very places where they would start from to perpetrate criminal actions. And the more they strive to divide our people in both zones, the more firmly we shall unite.

How then were the developments in the 1966-67 dry season?

At the beginning, the U.S. aggressors and the henchmen mapped out perfidious large-scale plans and made laborious preparations. But as early as October 1966, they were exposed to repeated attacks from the armed forces and people of South Viet Nam at Long An, Ben Tre, Rach Gia, Tay Ninh, Saigon, the Western High Plateaux, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, thus making it impossible for them to carry on their preparation smoothly. Compelled to parry our blows, they could not strike at our bases in advantageous conditions, and the

execution of their "pacification" plan — one of the two "pincers" — was postponed until February 1967.

When the "pincers" worked in full, our armed forces and people mounted fierce counter-attacks and foiled most of the big and small operations, wiping out the puppet troops engaged in "pacification", inflicting great losses on them and landing them in a quandary.

Now that the dry season is drawing to a close, the Americans and their lackeys find themselves in a gloomy situation, U.S. troops have been sent out without rhyme or reason. Westmoreland has had to come back to the U.S.A. to ask for more troops. The "pacification" plan remains to be a tragedy.

Paramount significance of our victory

What do we learn from our victory and the enemy's defeat in the 1966-67 dry season, or rather what do we see in the first step of the enemy's "two pincers" strategic plan?

We learn that:

1. The Americans wanted to take advantage of the dry season to carry out a perfidious large-scale strategic plan in order to retrieve their plight. They made careful preparations for it even in the U.S.A. and in its satellite countries in South-East Asia. But obviously, their failure was as big as their ambitions.

2. In a short period in 1965-66, they introduced nearly 200,000 G.I.'s in an attempt to change the situation but they met with failure. This year, with over 400,000 officers and men and a huge amount of war materials, they have been again incapable of turning the tide of

the war and sank still deeper in the South Viet Nam quagmire. Clearly, with such an increased strength, the Yankees could not wriggle out of their predicament and of the sea of people's war.

3. The more the Yankees extend the war, the heavier the punishment they are meted out in both South and North Viet Nam. Viet Nam is one, the Vietnamese people are one. All our 31 million compatriots are resolute to defend their sacred independence and sovereignty. The population of South Viet Nam, whose sole genuine representative is the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, stick to their determination to fulfil their task of liberating the South and defending the North, pending the peaceful reunification of their fatherland.

4. The more troops the Americans bring into South Viet Nam, the more insignificant becomes the role of the puppet army and administration which are held in contempt by the South Vietnamese people. For all their efforts they can by no means save them.

5. That is why we have ample reasons to believe that the aggressors would lose still more ignominiously than they did with 200,000 then 400,000, should they raise their effective to 600,000 or 700,000. However important, their build-up is only a patch work and they are bound to face a desperate situation and an inevitable failure. As we have the determination and strength to fight against 440,000 G.I.'s, we shall do the same against whatever force and whatever machiavellian schemes of the U.S. imperialists.

Obviously, our victory in the Winter 1966-Spring 1967 campaign is of paramount significance.

In the last dry season, the U.S. aggressors raised their "limited war" in South Viet Nam to a higher level than in Korea with regard to the number and quality of the troops and weapons involved and the fierceness of the war. They frenziedly attacked us in all the military, political and diplomatic fields. But they failed bitterly on all planes. Their "two pincers" strategic plan has been frustrated in its initial phase. Compared with the beginning of the dry season, their situation has grown from bad to worse. Their political crisis, strategic defensive position, tactical impasse and sinking morale have become more serious. A host of questions harass the American warmongers: How many more troops and weapons are needed? Lightning or protracted war? Can the war be fought at a quicker tempo? Is it possible to fight a protracted war? How to draw a tactic effective enough to secure victory? How to improve the morale of the U.S. and puppet troops? As the dry season, the most favourable period for military activities in execution of the "two pincers" plan, has ended in failure, what to do next? There is no denying the fact that the Yankees are at their wit's end for an effective way to defeat our heroic people, just as there is no means to make the sun rise in the west and set in the east.

Seven months have elapsed in which our country has experienced the hardest trial and the greatest difficulties so far. But our people and their armed forces from North to South have not flinched. They surmounted all obstacles, fought courageously and won major victories which pave the way for more glorious ones. These inspire

our armed forces and people and continue to make their influence felt among the people in the United States and the world.

Recent facts on the battlefields have proved that our policy of uninterrupted offensive is perfectly correct. Indeed, only by attacking the enemy unremittingly can we defeat him. But obdurate as they are, the U.S. imperialists do not want to stop their war of aggression. Last March, for the second time in the Winter-Spring period, President Johnson summoned to Guam the heads of the satellite States taking part in the Viet Nam war and the Thieu - Ky clique to envisage the stepping up of the war. Washington goes on to pour troops, weapons and money into South Viet Nam. American strategists and military experts are devising perfidious schemes, the war is expected to grow fiercer.

The dry season has come to an end, but for the South Viet Nam armed forces and people the time for brilliant feats of arms continues. The national liberation still rests on our shoulders and the opportunities to win victories lie ahead. In the light of the great lessons we have learnt — to attack, continually to attack — we shall systematically and completely thwart the “two pincers” plan, wipe out more American, puppet and satellite troops, deliver swinging blows at the U.S. scheme of aggression and gain bigger victories in 1967, a year of paramount significance for our people's sacred resistance war.

1. SOME PICTURES ON PEOPLE'S WAR IN SOUTH VIET NAM



Visit to the combatants by Dr Nguyen Huu Tho,
President of the Central Committee of
the National Front for Liberation



L. A. F. artillery in action

An M. 113 armoured car captured by the guerillas of Cu Chi village, Gia Dinh province




The population resist their being
herded into concentration camps



Tay Ninh people celebrate a military
success together with the L. A. F.

II. BALANCE-SHEET OF THE U.S. COUNTER-OFFENSIVE



Aircraft destroyed on the ground by the L.A.F.
at the U.S. Bien Hoa air base, May 2, 1967



U.S. position at Con Tien, Quang Tri
province, shelled by L.A.F. mortars

The G.I.'s after an engagement with the L.A.F.



APPENDIXES

**BALANCE-SHEET OF THE WINTER
1966-SPRING 1967 CAMPAIGN**

I. MAJOR L.A.F. VICTORIES

Tay Ninh victory : the most glorious so far

The L.A.F. smashed U.S. biggest ever Operation *Junction City* conducted by 45,000 G.I's in South Viet Nam.

From February 2 to April 13, 1967, they wiped out some 14,000 enemy troops (mostly Americans), destroyed over 1,000 military vehicles (including 801 tanks and armoured cars), shot down or destroyed 167 aircraft and demolished 90 heavy artillery pieces.

This was the battle in which the U.S. suffered the heaviest casualties (more than one fourth of the number of enemy troops involved), had the largest number of tanks and armoured cars destroyed or damaged (90 per cent of the enemy armoured vehicles put into action) and the biggest number of artillery pieces destroyed (nearly half of the total fielded).

West Plei J'rang victory : a brilliant manifestation of the art of entrapping the enemy

From October 18 to December 6, 1966, the L.A.F. lured the enemy troops to the Po Co and Sa Thay River areas where these were continually wiped out at the place and moment chosen. 2,500 enemy troops (including 2,100 Americans) were killed or wounded. Two battalions and eight companies of U.S. infantry, four companies and three platoons of U.S. artillery and five puppet commando companies were annihilated and another U.S. battalion heavily decimated, 27 aircraft downed or destroyed, 28 military vehicles and 26 artillery pieces demolished.

Xuan Son victory: quick annihilation

On December 27, 1966, the U.S. operational base at Xuan Son (Binh Dinh province) was razed to the ground within 13 minutes by the L.A.F. Two battalions and one platoon of U.S. engineers were wiped out, 11 artillery pieces and two mortars destroyed, and five aircraft downed or destroyed.

Loc Giang victory: an ambush in broad daylight

On December 17, 1966, the L.A.F. attacked both the raiders and their heliborne reinforcements all day long at Loc Giang (Binh Dinh). One battalion and two U.S. companies were completely wiped out, and another U.S. company heavily whittled down.

Dong Rnm victory: a telling blow at U.S. troops in Operation Junction City

In the surprise attack on Dong Rnm area (Tay Ninh province) on March 21, 1967, the L.A.F. completely wiped out one U.S. infantry battalion and three motorized squadrons of the expeditionary force, comprising 72 tanks and armoured cars, heavily decimated another U.S. infantry battalion, destroyed 18 artillery pieces, 10 aircraft and put out of action 1,200 enemy troops.

Ben Suc - Cu Chi victory: a glorious exploit of guerillas and regional forces

From the 2nd to the 29th of January 1967, guerillas and regional troops in Ben Suc (Thu Dau Mot) and Cu Chi (Gia Dinh) foiled Operation *Cedar Falls* conducted by 30,000 U.S. troops, wiped out 3,200 GI's, destroyed or heavily damaged 204 military vehicles and brought down 28 aircraft.

Tan Son Nhat victory: record number of aircraft destroyed

On the nights of December 4 and 5, 1966, the L.A.F. twice attacked Tan Son Nhat air base (Saigon), destroyed or damaged about 260 aircraft, wiped out over 600 GI's and blew up 200 tons of ammunition.

Da Nang victory: an attack on air base with heaviest U.S. casualties

Early on February 27, 1967, the L.A.F. attacked Da Nang air base, destroyed or damaged 94 aircraft and 200 military vehicles and killed or wounded more than 1,000 GI's.

Huong An - Ba Ren victory: a swift attack on communication lines resulting in largest number of enemy military vehicles destroyed or damaged

On March 24, 1967, within 20 minutes of fighting the L.A.F. completely wiped out an enemy convoy comprising over 200 vehicles between Huong An and Ba Ren on the road from Chu Lai air base to Da Nang (Quang Nam province).

Victory on Hill 241: largest number of U.S. troops wiped out by artillery

Early in the morning of March 7, 1967, the L.A.F. laid a heavy artillery barrage on the U.S. artillery base on Hill 241 (Quang Tri province), wiping out 1,450 GI's, destroying 21 105mm and 175mm guns.

La Vang - Tu Ha victory: night attack on many big U.S. military bases, causing heavy losses for the enemy

At dawn on April 6, 1967, the L.A.F. attacked the adverse position at La Vang, the Quang Tri provincial capital and Tu Ha (Tbua Thien province), wiping out over 1,800 troops, destroying 230 military vehicles and setting ablaze eight petrol and ammunition storages.

Quang Thanh victory: for the first time, one Pak Jang Hi battalion wiped out neatly

On February 15, 1967, the L.A.F. attacked the Pak Jnng Hi troops' position at Quang Thanh in Son Kim village, Binh Son district, Quang Ngai province, completely wiping out one Pak Jung Hi battalion comprising 500 men.

Cai Duoc and Tra Khuc River victories: two heavy blows at puppet troops in Cai Duoc and on Tra Khuc River banks

On October 18, 1966, the L.A.F. overran the Cai Duoc post (Rach Gia province) and intercepted the enemy reinforcements, wiping out nearly one puppet regular regiment, including over 1,000 men, and shooting down or damaging 29 aircraft.

From the 17th to the 19th of February 1967, the L.A.F. heavily decimated one puppet multi-battalion force on the Tra Khuc River banks (Quang Ngai province), wiped out or badly mauled five battalions. Nearly 1,200 enemy troops were killed or wounded.

Ham Luong victory: attack on river wiping out record number of vessels and enemy troops

On March 23, 1967, in a five-hour fighting, the L.A.F. demolished 10 warships and over 1,000 enemy troops on the Ham Luong River (Ben Tre province).

Long Tau victory: many warships sunk

From October 1966 to March 1967, the L.A.F. launched more than 30 attacks on Long Tau River near Saigon, sinking 20 gunboats and damaging many others, and wiping out more than 1,000 enemy troops.

Long Binh victory: heaviest losses at a U.S. logistical base

From October 1966 to February 1967, the L.A.F. attacked this base four times, destroying 1,200,000 bombs, shells and rockets, 3,575 barrels of explosive powder and wiping out 500 U.S. and puppet troops.

Attack on Saigon

On November 1, 1966, the L.A.F. slammed heavy artillery fire on the U.S. aggressors and their stooges right in Saigon city when a "national day parade" was being held. More than 250 U.S., puppet and satellite troops were killed or wounded.

**II. ENEMY UNITS WIPED OUT
(49 battalions and squadrons)**

No	Date	Unit	Place
19 puppet infantry and engineers' battalions			
1	October 6, 1966	2nd Paratroop Battalion	Dong Ha (Quang Tri)
2	October 18, 1966	2nd Battalion, 31st Regiment, 21st Division	Go Queo (Rach Gia)
3	November 6, 1966	1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, 2nd Division	Tam Ky (Quang Nam)
4	November 18, 1966	2nd Battalion, 46th Regiment, 25th Division	Highway 18 in Due Hoa district (Cholon)
5	December 10, 1966	5th Battalion, 49th Regiment, 25th Division	Duc Hoa (Cholon)
6	December 10, 1966	3rd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, 1st Division	An Lo (Thua Thien)
7	December 13, 1966	3rd Battalion, 6th Regiment, 2nd Division	Tam Ky (Quang Nam)
8	January 15, 1967	2nd Battalion, 46th Regiment, 25th Division	Can Giuoc (Cholon)
9	January 16, 1967	32nd Ranger Battalion	Chau Hung (Ben Tre)
10	January 19, 1967	1st Battalion, 14th Regiment, 9th Division	Me Tuc in Cang Long district (Tra Vinh)
11	February 17, 1967	37th Ranger Battalion	An My (Quang Ngai)

No	Date	Unit	Place
12	February 18, 1967	41st Ranger Battalion	Tan Thanh (Ben Tre)
13	February 19, 1967	7th Paratroop Battalion	Son Tinh (Quang Ngai)
14	March 1, 1967	42nd Ranger Battalion	Bac Lieu provincial capital
15	March 8, 1967	4th Battalion, 49th Regiment, 25th Division	Duc Hoa (Cholon)
16	March 21, 1967	4th Battalion, 52nd Regiment, 10th Division	Gia Rai - Suoi Cat area (Bien Hoa)
17	March 24, 1967	One puppet engineering battalion	South of Ba Ren (Quang Nam)
18	March 26, 1967	3rd Battalion, 13th Regiment, 9th Division	Dien Hoa (Tra Vinh)
19	April 5, 1967	One infantry battalion	Huong Hoa (Quang Tri)

13 U.S. infantry and artillery battalions

20	November 5, 1966	One battalion of the 196th Infantry Brigade	Bau Gon (Tay Ninh)
21	November 12, 1966	One battalion of the 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division	Sa Thay River (Kon tum)
22	December 17, 1966	One battalion of the 1st Air Mobile Cavalry Division	Loc Giang (Binh Dinh)
23	December 26, 1966	One battalion of the 1st Air Mobile Cavalry Division	Xuan Son (Binh Dinh)
24	January 26, 1967	One battalion of the 1st Marine Division	Thu Bon (Quang Nam)
25	March 1, 1967	One battalion of the 3rd Marine Division	Highway 9 (Quang Tri)
26	March 21, 1967	One battalion of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division	Dong Rum (Tay Ninh)

No	Date	Unit	Place
27	March 31, 1967	1st Battalion of the 1st Infantry Division	East of Bo Tuc area (Tay Ninh)
28	December 26, 1966	One artillery battalion of the 1st Air Mobile Cavalry Division	Xuan Son (Binh Dinh)
29	March 1, 1967	One artillery battalion	Highway 9 (Quang Tri)
30	March 1, 1967	One artillery battalion of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division	Dong Pan (Tay Ninh)
31	March 20, 1967	One artillery battalion	Doc Mieu (Quang Tri)
32	March 21, 1967	One artillery battalion of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division	Dong Rum (Tay Ninh)

One Pak Jung Hi battalion

33	February 15, 1967	One battalion of the Pak Jung Hi "Blue Dragon" Marine Brigade	Son Tinh (Quang Ngai)
----	-------------------	---	-----------------------

15 U.S. squadrons

34	November 21, 1966	One squadron of the 11th Armoured Regiment	Xuan Loc (Bien Hoa)
35	February 26, 1967	One motorized squadron	Cay Trac-Tan Thanh area, east of Cu Chi district (Gia Dinh)
36	February 28, 1967	One motorized squadron	Ong Hung Brook area (Tay Ninh)

No	Date	Unit	Place
37, 38, 39	March 1, 1967	Three motorized squadrons of the 3rd Marine Division	Highway 9 (Quang Tri)
40	March 10, 1967	One motorized squadron	Dong Pan (Tay Ninh)
41	March 10, 1967	One motorized squadron	Bau Co (Tay Ninh)
42, 43	March 19, 1967	Two motorized squadrons of the 9th Infantry Division	Bau Bang (Thu Dau Mot)
44	March 20, 1967	One motorized squadron	Doc Mieu (Quang Tri)
45, 46, 47	March 21, 1967	Three motorized squadrons of the 4th Infantry Division	Dong Rum (Tay Ninh)
48	March 26, 1967	One motorized squadron	Bau Tri Giet (Tay Ninh)
One puppet motorized squadron			
49	January 17, 1967	One armoured squadron	Highway 8 (Binh Thuan)

III. ATTACKS ON ENEMY AIRFIELDS AND BASES

No	Dates	Enemy airfields and bases attacked	Number of planes damaged or destroyed	Number of enemy troops wiped out		Other losses of the enemy
				Total	American	
	1966					
1	Oct. 13	Soc Trang (11th time)	16	141	40	
2	18	Bien Hoa (4th time)	2	40	40	
3	31	Soc Trang (12th time)	7	73	30	
4	Nov. 7	Dau Tieng (Thu Dau Mot)	1	16	16	
5, 6	10 and 11	Dau Tieng (2nd and 3rd times)	27	461	461	3 105-mm guns destroyed
7	16	Suoi Ram (Bien Hoa)		150	150	140 armoured cars destroyed
8	21	Tac Nich (North Thu Dau Mot)	1	100	100	2 M-41 tanks damaged
9	25	Dau Tieng (4th time)	10	300	300	2 artillery pieces destroyed

No	Dates	Enemy airfields and bases attacked	Number of planes damaged or destroyed	Number of enemy troops wiped out		Other losses of the enemy
				Total	American	
10	Dec. 3	Tan Thanh (Ben Tre)	1	34		2 105-mm guns destroyed
11, 12	Dec. 3 and night of 4	Tan Son Nhat (6th and 7th times)	260	600	400	One 200-ton bomb depot set ablaze, 13 military vehicles destroyed
13	9	Dau Tieng (5th time)	7	50	50	
14	11	Duc Hoa (Cholon)	6			
15	15	Ca Mau	10	110		3 trucks destroyed
16	23	Tra Noc, Can Tho (3rd time)	16			One radar station razed to the ground
17	26	Phu Loi - Thu Dau Mot (4th time)	20	165	165	
18	1967 Jan. 6	Pleiku, Gia Lai (3rd time)	92	280	280	5 million litres of petrol, 1,000 tons of ammunition and 14 vehicles set ablaze
19	21	Vinh Long (4th time)	3	100	100	

No	Dates	Enemy airfields and bases attacked	Number of planes damaged or destroyed	Number of enemy troops wiped out		Other losses of the enemy
				Total	American	
20	Feb. 6	Bien Hoa (5th time)				1,000,000 litres of petrol and 8,000 napalm bombs set ablaze
21	7	De Duc (Binh Dinh)	50	300	200	2 petrol storages set afire, 6 ordnance pieces destroyed
22	17	Tan Thanh, Ben Tre (2nd time)	4	45		2 depots and 2 radio transmitters set afire, 2 heavy guns, 2 vehicles destroyed
23	24	Tra Noc (4th time)	17	180		
24	27	Da Nang (2nd time)	94	1,000	1,000	200 vehicles set ablaze, one electronic centre damaged
25		Than Cuu Nghia, My Tho (5th time)		100		
26	Mar. 2	Ta Con (Quang Tri)	5	70	70	
27	2	Duc Hoa (2nd time)	4	11		One command-post destroyed

No	Dates	Enemy airfields and bases attacked	Number of planes damaged or destroyed	Number of enemy troops wiped out		Other losses of the enemy
				Total	American	
28	3	Quang Ngai (3rd time)		150		.
29	5	Chu Lai (5th time)	40	300	300	One radar station razed to the ground
30	8	Vinh Long (5th time)	4	19	19	
31	14	Phu Loi (5th time)	15	210	210	One petrol depot set ablaze, 6 tanks destroyed
32	14	Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa (3rd time)	26	100	100	6 military vehicles destroyed
33	15	Da Nang (3rd time)	16	586	586	One 2 million-litre dump of petrol set afire, 31 vehicles destroyed
34	15	Dong Du, Gia Dinh (2nd time)	10	300	300	36 vehicles and 3 guns destroyed
35	23	Go Hoi (Quang Ngai)	6	400	400	2 storages of petrol and ammunition set ablaze, 6 ordnance pieces and 10 military vehicles destroyed
36	26	Tra Noc (5th time)	25	177		

No	Dates	Enemy airfields and bases attacked	Number of planes damaged or destroyed	Number of enemy troops wiped out		Other losses of the enemy
				Total	American	
37	Apr. 1	Soc Trang (13th time)	12			
38	2	Suoi Ram (2nd time)	34	1,000	1,000	30 artillery pieces and 200 tanks destroyed
39	8	An Khe (4th time)	28	115	115	One military vehicle destroyed
40	11	Chu Lai (6th time)	38	675	675	
41	17	Duc Hoa (3rd time)	5	150	150	3 artillery pieces and 2 military vehicles demolished
42	24	Dau Tieng (6th time)	3	30	30	
43	28	Phu Bai (Thua Thien)	50	130	130	
44	30	Lai Khe (3rd time)	3	20	20	

IV. BALANCE-SHEET OF THE LAST TWO DRY SEASONS

A. ENEMY FORCES

	1965—1966 dry season	1966—1967 dry season	Increase
EFFECTIVES			
— Total	over 700,000	over 1,000,000	nearly one half more
— U.S. troops	200,000	410,000*	more than twice
— Puppet troops	over 500,000	over 500,000	
— Satellite troops	28,000	54,000	nearly twice
WAR MEANS			
— Aircraft	2,300	4,300	nearly twice
— Heavy artillery pieces	1,200	2,300	nearly twice
— Tanks, armoured cars	1,400	3,300	nearly two and a half times
— Warships	50	230	more than four and a half times

B. ENEMY LOSSES

	1965—1966 dry season	1966—1967 dry season	Increase
EFFECTIVES			
— Total	114,000	175,000	one half more
— U.S. and satellite troops	43,000	85,000	nearly twice
— Puppet troops	71,000	90,000	one fourth more

* It is to be noted that the total of 200,000 and 410,000 U.S. troops were recorded respectively late January 1966 and January 1967 (in the middle of each dry season). The total number of U.S. troops by the end of the first dry season was 250,000 and that of the second dry season 440,000.

	1965-1966 dry season	1966-1967 dry season	Increase
UNITS WIPED OUT			
— Battalions	31	49	nearly three fifths more
— (U.S. battalions)	21	28	one third more
— Companies (U.S. companies)	148 22	230 76	over one half more nearly three and a half times
— Platoons	252	352	two fifths more
— Aircraft downed or destroyed	1,440	1,800	one fourth more
— Military vehicles destroyed or damaged	1,310	3,985	more than three times
— Tanks and armoured vehicles wiped out	330	1,785	more than five and a half times
— Cannons destroyed	80	340	more than four times
— Warships and gunboats destroyed	27	100	nearly four times
— Military posts destroyed	114	206	nearly twice
— Bridges blown up	102	270	more than two and a half times
— Locomotives and wagons destroyed	67	91	nearly one half more

V. WESTERN PRESS OPINION REGARDING
U.S. SETBACKS IN SOUTH VIET NAM

A. "PACIFICATION PROGRAM" — A FLOP

The so-called American-controlled areas are no longer under American control for "good intentions are ruined by the very nature of the regime, by political wrangling, embezzlement, corruption, suspicion, the lack of security and other factors; because of all this, the pacification program has not yet been achieved."

A.P., November 5, 1966

"There is a sense of despair among Americans about what we used to call 'the winning of hearts and minds'."

It is freely admitted that 1966 has not been a year of success for the rural development scheme. The faults and failings have been many. The most glaring has been the failure to ensure that the hamlets in which the teams have been working have been secure against Vietcong attack and infiltration."

Guardian, December 21, 1966

"The war to win the hearts and minds of the South Vietnam people is the caricature of erroneous and insufficient efforts, of illusions over figures and of artificial optimism; these sad facts have emerged from the recent past..."

A.P., January 8, 1967

"The Saigon government remains a besieged regime; in rural areas, the communists operate freely and American officials have admitted that no less than ten million Vietnamese pay taxes to the Vietcong."

A.P., January 8, 1967

"Out of the 12,000 hamlets where the communists have many supporters only a handful can be considered to be pacified. And even here there is no stable government apparatus."

A.P., January 8, 1967

"After years of elaborate pacification plans launched with great fanfare on grand scales, the number of truly pacified hamlets and villages has shrunk constantly and dramatically."

A.P., March 27, 1967

"Almost everybody concedes that American hopes for lasting success in Vietnam depend on the outcome of the highly ballyhooed 'revolutionary development' program jointly sponsored by the governments of President Johnson and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky. If it is so, the future is dark indeed."

At the rate it has proceeded during last year it will take the rest of the century to complete, assuming it ever is, which is doubtful."

Washington Evening Star, April 3, 1967

"Anyone who has spent any time in South Vietnam in recent months is aware that not even the United States or Saigon officials have much confidence in the pacification program. Most of the time it is simply a paper pacification."

Washington Evening Star, April 3, 1967

"The White House craving for glowing reports on the progress of pacification is the butt of many jokes in Saigon; and with the arrival on the scene of Johnson's own special assistant, Robert Komer, the progress on paper ought to accelerate."

Washington Evening Star, April 3, 1967

"At the beginning of April 1967, the United States and South Vietnamese were able to claim control over fewer villages and hamlets than in 1962."

U.S. News and World Report, May 15, 1967

"Many towns and cities have been left virtually unprotected and pacification work has suffered badly. Only one third of the hamlets in the First Corps are considered secure enough to hold elections for local councils."

Newsweek, early June, 1967

B. "SEARCH AND DESTROY" Pincer -- A FAILURE

"Troops of the U.S. 25th Division already have felt the frustrations of the delta.

The beautiful delta might well be where the ugliest chapter of the Vietnam war is written for the United States."

A.P., November 30, 1966

McNamara admitted in Guam: "The Vietcong were by no means beaten."

U.S.I.S., March 1967

"The adversary still controls 80 per cent of the land, as much as he did a year ago. U.S. forces, at 450,000 are largely blocked by communist forces. General Westmoreland is asking for about 250,000 men.

The alternative: no better than a stalemate and war without an end that can be foreseen. Communist build-up is equalling the U.S. build-up.

At the moment, not much of anything seems to be going L.B.J.'s way. Graduated response as a war strategy has failed with no alternative."

U.S. News and World Report, March 23, 1967

"In the upper battle area, just below the demilitarized zone, the initiative has passed to the hands of the enemy... So heavy is the enemy pressure on the American advanced

positions that the marines have called for reinforcements. There is no sign of enemy weakening in any other part of South Vietnam. On the contrary, nearly half a million American troops continue to meet resistance and active enemies over the past two years. There is no reason today to think that the enemy in Vietnam is at or near the end of his resources. He seems to be rather growing in strength, resourcefulness and confidence."

Christian Science Monitor, April 17, 1967

"In this sense it was perfectly normal for the U.S. military to expect that, once the administration decided that it really meant to pick up the table of war against the communists in Vietnam, it would be U.S. strategic principles that would dominate the conflict.

Instead, it has been the relatively unequipped Asian adversary, often carrying all his supplies on his back who have lonely called the tunc."

Max S. Johnson, ex-commander

U.S. Ground Forces Military Institute, retired,
now military commentator of *U.S. News and World Report*,
May 8, 1967

"The war undeniably mushroomed since the first days of the year. In the Northern Corps areas alone, more than 20,000 American dead and wounded have been counted in the past four months. This is more than 10 per cent of the total number of the Americans assigned to combat roles."

A.P., May 31, 1967

"The L.A.F. were able to mount continual attacks in the northern provinces in South Vietnam and forced the allied command to reinforce the leathernecks."

U.P.I., May 31, 1967

— "A fact is certain, the American troops are unable, for the moment, to launch protracted division-size operations. Their recent setbacks in the demilitarized zone are very significant.

— Another fact is worth mentioning—the tactical possibility for the N.F.L. to command the American forces. Indeed; the U.S. Command cannot dispose of its troops as it wishes.

— In 1966, after the failure of the 1965-66 dry season the U.S. Command resigned itself to a strategic defensive, awaiting reinforcements.

Washington had made great efforts at that moment. In some months 200,000 were put at the disposal of Westmoreland.

But in 1967, it appears, Westmoreland cannot hope for such important reinforcements. It is not easy for the Pentagon to mobilize another 100,000 men:

...Wherever the battle goes on fiercely, the G.I.'s find it harder and harder to bear the constant pressure from their opponents. And, as a reporter of *Newsweek* notices it, should they happen to lay hold of a hill or a peak, that's not to hoist there the Star-spangled Banner and jeer at their adversary but to give it up the soonest possible and flee without pride."

Tribune des Nations, June 2, 1967

U.S. Navy Secretary, Paul Nitze, had to admit that "no military strategy in Vietnam will promise success."

U.P.I., June 3, 1967

"Two weeks ago, American forces suffered 2,929 combat casualties, the highest weekly toll so far; 313 of these were battle deaths, making a total of 1,177 killed in the last four weeks. Those figures not only show the rising human cost of the war, that also made it plain that after nearly two years of American combat operations and more than two years of the American bombing assault on North Vietnam, the opposing forces are not only strong and effective but have been able to take a major combat initiative.

This is their offensive in the First Corps region, forcing the redeployment of American troops, the weakening of

other sectors, new pressures for additional troops and such risking exercises as the marines' expedition into the so-called demilitarized zone."

New York Herald Tribune, June 6, 1967

C. THE U.S. WAR IN VIET NAM IN A DEADLOCK

"Substantial elements of U.S. troops have had to be shifted from the Cambodian border, from the Central Highland and from the coastal regions to deal with enlarged combat operations in and near the demilitarized zone in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. There are not enough men to do all the jobs that need doing."

U.S. News and World Report, June 12, 1967

"About the Vietnam war Mr. Johnson talks like a fool and there is not a ray of hope indicating that he will succeed."

New York Herald Tribune, January 18, 1967

"It is time to recognise, we think, that Vietnam has become a sickness without a cure."

Wall Street Journal, May 2, 1967

"This war is not being won; and by any reasonable estimate is not going to be won in the foreseeable future. It may be unwinnable."

The Sunday Times, June 4, 1967

PRINTED IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

