

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

86A

OPENING/CLOSING/SUSPENDING
MISSION NUMBER : 2-3-67-7 SEP 67
SUBJECT: WSAF F105
1 HH-3E
1 HH-43B (2 SAVES)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7 SEP 67 20 16

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN

DE RUMBAD 3BA 2501910
ZNY CCCCC
Z 071906Z SEP 67

briefed 18 Sep 7-
2 ACR Combat
units -

FM 3ARRGP OL 2 UDORN RTAFB THAI
TO RUMSBJ/3 ARRG TSN AB RVN
RUEFHQA/HQ USAF WASH DC
RUCIEUA/HQ MAC SCOTT AFB ILL
RUOLMFA/ARSCP ORLANDO AFB FLA ✓
RUMKLM/PARRC HICKAM AFB HAWAII
RUMSBJ/TAF TSN AB RVN
RUMTFJA/USAF MPC RANDOLPH AFB TEX
RUMSMA/MACV SAIGON RVN
RUMKLM/PACAF HICKAM AFB HI
RUCLBMA/48ARRS EGLIN AFB FLA
RUEDNBA/TAC LANGLEY AFB VA
RUMBDFA/TUOC UDORN RTAFB THAI
RUMKPB/OL 1 3 ARRG DAWANG AB RVN
RUMKAH/388 TFW KORAT RTAFB THAI
BT

FLASH

FLASH

FLASH

FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAR/3ARRGP (OL-2) 50109 SEP 67. HQ USAF FOR
AFCP/AFXOPM, MAC FOR MACOA AND MCP, PACAF FOR DOCC-R, USAFMPC FOR
AFPMSC, 7AF FOR DOTO, DO, DP, DI, BDPMP, CP, 3 ARRGp FOR JSARC, TAC FOR

PAGE 2 RUMBAD 33A C O N F I D E N T I A L
DOSS-LR

1. RESCUE OPENING CLOSING REPORT
2. 2-3-67-7 SEP 67
4. A. F-105F 2 P08
B. TACTICAL
C. NOT RELEASABLE
D. F-105F LOCUST TAIL NBR 63008260
E. USA
F. 388 TFW, KORAT RTAFB THAILAND
G. LT COL MCINERNEY, J.E. JR
H. TWO
I. STANDARD
5. UDORN RTAFB TACC/07/1325Z
6. NOT REQUIRED
7. 1335Z
8. DIRECTED LAUNCH OF ONE HH-43B FROM
HR-3E FROM NAKON PHANOM 1345Z
9. 1530N 10320E
10. A. 3000 SSTD 8000 BRKN 10 VIS W/L
11. CL-2, 3 ARRGSP, CAPT CLYDE A FECHS

STAFF	ACT	INFO
AGCCO		
AGOC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
ARPOC		
ARBOC		
ARMDC		
ADAS		
AFEL		
AFON		
AFOR		
AFSG		

PAGE 5 RUMBAD 33A C O N F I D E N T I A L

12. DET 3, 621 TCS, UDON RTAFB THAILAND

13. PEDRO 33/1540Z/1530N 10320E: JG 15/1540Z/1530N/10320E ✓

14. DET 4, 38ARRS/HH-43B/1550Z: DET 2, 37 ARR S/HH-3E/1550Z

15. A. 2/2/2/2/0/0

16. ONE ACM TRANSPORTED TO UBON RTAFB THAILAND, AND ONE RETURNED TO KORAT RTAFB THAILAND

17. 3/5:20/HH-3E/DET 2, 37 ARRS; 2/3:00/HH-43B/DET 4, 38 ARRS

18. S/E

18. S/E
19. A. JOLLY GREEN 15 - (RCC) HAYNES, MAJ, (CP) WAGNER, MAJ, (HM)
JAYNES, W.J., AIC, (PJ) PIGHINI, J.L., A/2C, ALL ASSIGNED DET 2, 37ARRS
PEDRO 15 - (RCC) LUNT, C.G., (CP) VINING, T.J., 1/LT: (HM) CARRINGTON,

J.B., A/IC: ALL ASSIGNED DET 5, 38 ARKS
B. MCENERNEY, J.E., JR., LT COL 388TFW KORAT RTAFB THAILAND
SHANNON, FRED, CAPT., 388 TFW KORAT RTAFB THAILAND

20. H. NOTIFICATION THAT AN F-105F, CALL SIGN LOCUST, WAS IN TROUBLE CAME FROM A RADAR SITE NEAR KORAT. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING, A KC-135, BLUE ANCHOR 14, REPORTED RECEIVING AN EMERGENCY BEEPER AND LATER TALKING TO THE COPILOT. ONE HH-43 HELICOPTER WAS LAUNCHED FROM KORAT AND TWO HH-3E HELICOPTERS WERE LAUNCHED FROM NAKON PHANOM. ALSO A US ARMY HELICOPTER WAS LAUNCHED BY DOWNTOWN TO THE SCENE. THE

PAGE 4 RUMBAD 33A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 4 HUMBAD 33A F-087-115 EN-11-1
FLARE SHIP USED WAS A C-130, LAMPLIGHTER 01. THE H-43 LANDED AND
PICKED UP THE PILOT, AND THE JG 15 LANDED AND PICKED UP THE COPILOT.
THE PILOT WAS RETURNED TO KORAT, AND THE COPILOT WAS TAKEN TO UBON
BOTH WERE REPORTED IN GOOD CONDITION, GP-4.

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

BT

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1973

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
XOD DIR 520019

INTERVALS
2 YEARS.

1-HH43
1-HH3E

N-N-N

512..

1. THE FIRST PART OF THE BOOK IS A HISTORY OF THE
LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, FROM HIS BIRTH TO HIS DEATH.

[Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page]

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SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

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OFF	ACT
AGENCY	
REC'D	

TEXAS
CLASSIFIED BY
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
FOUR MONTHS AFTER DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION
DECLASSIFIED ON 3/1/83
DECLASSIFIED ON 3/1/83

AGENCY	ACT	INFO
ARFDCO		
ARHDC	✓	
ARFDC		
ARHDC		
ARMDC		
ARHDS		
ARXDC		
ARFCII		✓
ARIIG		
ARASG		

CONFIDENTIAL

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L/SAR/3ARRGP (OL-2) 50111 SEPT 67. HQ USAF FOR
AFCP/AFKOPFH MAC FOR MACCOA AND MCP, PACAF FOR DOCC-R, USAFMPC FOR
AFMPC, 7AF FOR DOTO, DO, DP, DI, BDPMP, CP, 35ARRGP FOR JSARC, ZRCB FOR

PAGE 2 RUMBAD 14A C O N F I D E N T I A L
DOSS-LR. REFERENCE NY CONFIDENTIAL 50109 MISSION NUMBER 2-3-67
SEPT-67, ADD TO ITEM 20 (HD TWO ARRS NON COMBAT SAVES. GP-4
BT

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
 508 DFR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Det 4 38 ARRS

SUBJECT: ARRS Mission Narrative (2-3-67-7 Sept 67)

TO: 3 ARRGp (RGOP)

86A
MCJERNEY/SHANNON

1. In compliance with 3 ARRGp Sup 1 to ARRS 55-2, 19 December 1966, the following narrative report is submitted.
2. At 20:45 on 7 September the 388 TFW Command Post notified Det 4, 38 ARRS of a downed F-105F from Korat. The initial location of the crash site was 50 NM, 065 degrees from Korat. The alert aircraft was fueled and the flight surgeon was notified. The Command Post called back with a new location of the downed plane. The new location was given as 89 NM, 065 degrees from Korat. This put the crash site beyond the normal operating fuel range of the HH-43B, so the range extension tank was loaded aboard the helicopter and filled with fuel.
3. Pedro 33 departed Korat at 21:20 with a crew of four: Capt. Clarence G. Lunt, RCC; 1Lt Thomas J. Vining, RGOP; A1C Joseph B. Carrington, FE; and Capt. Angel Rivera, Flight Surgeon. The weather enroute was forecast as 3,000 overcast, 5 miles visibility, winds at 5 knots from the South and scattered thundershowers.
4. Since Pedro 33 was not equipped with a transponder or TACAN, it was necessary to climb to 7,000 feet to enable GCA to get a "skin paint" and vector Pedro 33 to the site. About 40 NM out Korat GCA's radar became inoperative so Pedro 33 continued on its original course of 065 degrees until it arrived within 10 NM of the crash site where a descent to 1,000 feet was made. At this time there was a C-130 "Lamplighter" at the crash site with two Jolly Greens and one Army Huey converging on the area.
5. Pedro 33 was the first helicopter to arrive at the scene. The weather in the search area was 400 broken, 800 overcast, visibility $\frac{1}{2}$ mile, in very heavy rain. Pedro 33 was receiving strong but conflicting beeper signals and attempted to home on one of them, but it was virtually impossible to communicate with the pilot. It was also difficult to home on a signal because of excessive interference from GUARD transmissions from other aircraft in the area. After about five minutes in the search area the pilot was spotted by looking out the side windows because forward vision was completely obscured by the driving rains. The Lamplighter's flares definitely made it easier to both spot the pilot's chute and look for a safe place to land. After coming to a hover over the pilot it was noted that he was hanging upside down in a tree with his right leg tangled in the parachute harness. It was obvious that a landing would be necessary to enable the rescue crew to cut the pilot out of his tangled harness. The area around the downed pilot was covered with 60-80 foot trees with the only clearing being a small water filled rice paddy. Pedro 33 elected to land in the rice paddy and did so despite the surrounding trees and deep water in the paddy. While the RCC kept the rotors turning to keep the helicopter from sinking into the mud the co-pilot, flight engineer, and flight surgeon went to aid the downed pilot.

The co-pilot cut him down from the tree and helped the flight surgeon and flight engineer load him on a stretcher. A considerable length of time was spent carrying the pilot to the waiting aircraft because of the necessity of wading through the deep mud and water. After the pilot was loaded aboard the aircraft and the stretcher secured, the co-pilot and flight engineer returned to collect the pilot's gun and other survival gear.

6. With the downed pilot and his gear aboard, Pedro 33 made a maximum performance takeoff over the trees and headed back to Korat. After 55 minutes of flight, the fuel low warning light came on and Pedro 33 landed on a small muddy road and refueled from the range extension tank carried inside the chopper. Within 13 minutes after landing Pedro 33 was again refueled, airborne and inbound to Korat. At this point Pedro 33 was 30 NM NE of Korat and in contact with Korat Approach Control. Approach Control vectored the chopper the last 30 miles, finishing up with a GCA approach. Thirty minutes after the refueling stop, the chopper was back at Korat and the pilot was on his way to the hospital for an examination.

7. Pedro 33 located the downed pilot 1 hour and 25 minutes after departing Korat. The second sortie was of 55 minutes duration and ended when the helicopter landed to refuel. The last sortie was of 30 minutes duration. In all the mission took 3 hours and 15 minutes including enroute time, search, pickup and refueling.

8. Lt. Col. J. E. McInerney was the pilot picked up by Pedro 33. Captain Fred Shannon was the EWO in the back seat of the F-105F. He was picked up by a Jolly Green Helicopter and later returned to Korat by Army Huey. He received a sprained ankle and bruises. Despite having hung by his right ankle for 2 hours and 30 minutes, Col. McInerney suffered only bruises and a temporarily paralyzed right leg.

Clarence G. Lunt

CLARENCE G. LUNT, Captain, USAF
RCC

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B
10

49

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CLARENCE G. LUNT, Captain, USAF
RCC

2-3-67-7 Sep 67

MISSION NARRATIVE - JOLLY GREEN 15, 7 SEP 67

(86A) ~~86A~~

9
Cub/30

The following report covers the SAR mission on 7 Sep 67. Captain Fred Shannon, FR3100995, of the 13th TRS, Korat RTAFB, was recovered.

Jolly Greens 36 and 15 were launched at 2110 for a position of 15°29'N 103°22'E (280°/88 miles from Channel 51). In route to the site, radio contact could not be established with Compress. Blue Anchor 14 and Lamp 01 relayed radio information for both Jolly Greens. Clouds were encountered and the last forty miles were flown under instrument conditions. Near the given location, Jolly Green 15 received a beeper and turned to track in. The Lamp aircraft was sighted and at one time we saw ground from the light of his flares; an immediate descent was made to below the clouds. Jolly Green 36 was the low bird, but during his descent in heavy rain, numerous electrical problems were encountered.

Weather in the area varied from 50 feet to 300 feet with 1/16 of a mile to 1 mile visibility. Flares from Lamp aircraft was the only thing that allowed the Jollys to obtain ground contact and start a search. Because of these problems, Jolly Green 15 assumed Low bird and Jolly Green 36 attempted to remain clear of the heavy rain since each time he entered it the transformer rectifiers and generators would go off the line.

Jolly Green 15 arrived in the area at 2235L, located the back seat man at 2250L and departed for Channel 51 at 2300L. No battle damage was incurred but other problems arose.

Six problems were encountered by Jolly Green 15 during the recovery:

1. An Army helicopter, 084 was reported in the area but no radio contact could be established to determine his position. Also, Pedro 33 was flying below the ceiling in the search area. Visibility was too poor at times to clear ourselves.

2. Three aircraft talking to the survivor, coupled with the beeper from the front seater that could not be shut off by the pilot, made radio procedures difficult. After Pedro 33 picked up the front seat pilot, he did not stop the parachute beeper.

3. Ground parties of Thai Nationals complicated the search. Three approaches were made to flashing lights that turned out to be groups of Thais. They would point the light directly at us and follow us flashing the light.

4. The back seat man that we recovered was afraid to give us a night flare until we were directly over him because he could hear people and was not sure of their intentions.

5. One problem was encountered with the flare operation. The chutes are difficult to see after the flare burns out. On one occasion a chute was spotted directly in front of us, at the last moment which would allow evasive action.

6. The weather conditions for night operations were the biggest problem of all. A landing was made 20 yards from the downed pilot because heavy rain prevented sufficient visibility to maintain a hover.

The recovered crew member had a painful right hip, which proved later to be only badly bruised. We arrived at Channel 51 at 2355 and off-loaded the injured man to an awaiting ambulance. Jolly Green 36 was escorted to Channel 51 by Jolly Green 15. No further problems arose after Jolly 36 departed the area of heavy rain. Both aircraft departed Channel 51 at 0140 and arrived Channel 89 at 0255.

The mission could not have been accomplished under the existing circumstances without the Lamp aircraft. They were necessary for us to get visual contact with the ground, to search at low level, and the downed pilot used their location in reference to him as steering information for us. The chute beeper from the other pilot made our UHF direction finding equipment useless. The crew of Lamp 01 did an outstanding job of dropping flare through an undercast with only a beeper for reference.

Gerald C Haynes

GERALD C. HAYNES, Maj, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

LOW BIRD 15

ECC, Maj Haynes
RCCP, Maj Wagner
FE, A1C Jaynes
RS, A2C Pighini

HIGH BIRD 36

ECC, Capt Dowdy
RCCP, 1/Lt Gonos
FE, SSgt Androwsky
RS, MSgt Williams