

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

86A

OPENING/CLOSING/SUSPENDING
MISSION NUMBER : 2-3-67-7 SEP 67
SUBJECT: USAF F105
1 HH-3E
1 HH-43B (2 saves)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 3 RUMBAD 33A C O N F I D E N T I A L
12. DET 3, 621 TCS, Ubon RTAFB THAILAND
13. PEDRO 33/1540Z/1530N 10320E: JG 15/1540Z/1530N/10320E
14. DET 4, 38ARRS/HH-43B/1550Z: DET 2, 37 ARRS/HH-3E/1550Z
15. A. 2/2/2/2/0/0
16. ONE ACM TRANSPORTED TO Ubon RTAFB THAILAND, AND ONE RETURNED
TO KORAT RTAFB THAILAND
17. 3/5:20/HH-3E/DET 2, 37 ARRS; 2/3:00/HH-43B/DET 4, 38 ARRS
18. S/E
19. A. JOLLY GREEN 15 - (RCC) HAYNES, MAJ, (CP) WAGNER, MAJ, (HM)
JAYNES, W.J., AIC, (PJO) PIGHINI, J.L., A/2C, ALL ASSIGNED DET 2, 37ARRS
PEDRO 15 - (RCC) LUNT, C.G., (CP) Vining, T.J., 1/LT: (HM) CARRINGTON,
J.B., A/IC: ALL ASSIGNED DET 5, 38 ARRS
B. MCNERNEY, J.E., JR., LT COL 388TFW KORAT RTAFB THAILAND
SHANNON, ERIC, CAPT, 388 TFW KORAT RTAFB THAILAND
20. H. NOTIFICATION THAT AN F-105F, CALL SIGN LOCUST, WAS IN
TROUBLE CAME FROM A RADAR SITE NEAR KORAT. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING,
A KC-135, BLUE ANCHOR 14, REPORTED RECEIVING AN EMERGENCY BEEPER AND
LATER TALKING TO THE COPILOT. ONE HH-43 HELICOPTER WAS LAUNCHED
FROM KORAT AND TWO HH-3E HELICOPTERS WERE LAUNCHED FROM NAKON PHANOM.
ALSO A US ARMY HELICOPTER WAS LAUNCHED BY DOCKED TO THE SCENE. THE

PAGE 4 RUMBAD 33A C O N F I D E N T I A L
FLARE SHIP USED WAS A C-130. LAMPLIGHTER 01. THE H-43 LANDED AND
PICKED UP THE PILOT, AND THE JG 15 LANDED AND PICKED UP THE COPILOT.
THE PILOT WAS RETURNED TO KORAT, AND THE COPILOT WAS TAKEN TO Ubon.
BOTH WERE REPORTED IN GOOD CONDITION. GP-4.

Classified by _____
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 21 DEC 1973

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
300 DIR 52000192

1-H-43
1-H-3E

NNNN

HSA

REF ID:

1123

1250 PD 50 58

HSA

CONFIDENTIAL

WNTW01TCZYUW RUMBER0542 2520846-CCCC--RUCLMFA-
DE RUMBAD 14A 2520345
ZNY CCCCC
D 09053 BZ SEP 67

DO RUMBDFR
DE RUMBAD 144 2520345

ZNY CCCCC
0 090338Z SEP 61

FE 3ARRGP OL 2 UDORN RTAFB THAI
TO RUMSBJV/3ARRGP TSN AB RVN
RUEFHQA/HQ USAF WASH DC
RUCLIEB/HQ MAC SCOTT AFB ILL
RUCLMFA/ARSGP ORLANDO AFB FLA
RUNKM/PARRC HICKAM AFB HAWAII
RUMSBJV/7AF TSN AB RVN
RUWFJAV USAF MPC RANDOLPH AFB T
RUMSAV/MACV SAIGON RVN
RUHLM/PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII
RUCLBMA/3SARRS ESL IN AFB FLA
RUEDNBA/TAC LANGLEY AFB VA
RUMNAF/3SARRS TUY HOA RVN
RUMBDFA/TUDC UDORN RTAFB THAI
RUMHPDV/OL 1 3ARRGP SON TRA

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L / S A R / 3 A R R G P (OL-2) 50111 SEPT 67. HQ USAF FOR
ECP / AFKOPFH MAC FOR MAOCOA AND MCP, PACAF FOR DOCC-R, USAFNPIC FOR
AFMSC, 7AF FOR DOTO, DO, DP, DI, BDPMP + CP, 35TRGP FOR JSARC, ERCS FOR

PAGE 2 RUMBAD 14A C O N F I D E N T I A L
DOSS-LR. REFERENCE MY CONFIDENTIAL 50109 MISSION NUMBER 2-3-67
SEPT 67. ADD TO ITEM 20 (H) TWO ARR'S NON COMBAT SAVES. GP-4

83

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 52 YEARS.
200 DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Det 4 38 ARRS

SUBJECT: ARRS Mission Narrative (2-3-67-7 Sept 67)

TO: 3 ARRGp (RCCP)

86A
MCINNENY/SHANNON

1. In compliance with 3 ARRGp Sup 1 to ARRS 55-2, 19 December 1966, the following narrative report is submitted.

2. At 20:45 on 7 September the 388 TFW Command Post notified Det 4, 38 ARRS of a downed F-105F from Korat. The initial location of the crash site was 50 NM, 065 degrees from Korat. The alert aircraft was fueled and the flight surgeon was notified. The Command Post called back with a new location of the downed plane. The new location was given as 89 NM, 065 degrees from Korat. This put the crash site beyond the normal operating fuel range of the HH-43B, so the range extension tank was loaded aboard the helicopter and filled with fuel.

3. Pedro 33 departed Korat at 21:20 with a crew of four: Capt. Clarence G. Lunt, RCC; 1Lt Thomas J. Vining, RCCP; A1C Joseph B. Carrington, FE; and Capt. Angel Rivera, Flight Surgeon. The weather enroute was forecast as 3,000 overcast, 5 miles visibility, winds at 5 knots from the South and scattered thunderstorms.

4. Since Pedro 33 was not equipped with a transponder or TACAN, it was necessary to climb to 7,000 feet to enable GCA to get a "skin paint" and vector Pedro 33 to the site. About 40 NM out Korat GCA's radar became inoperative so Pedro 33 continued on its original course of 065 degrees until it arrived within 10 NM of the crash site where a descent to 1,000 feet was made. At this time there was a C-130 "Lamplighter" at the crash site with two Jolly Greens and one Army Huey converging on the area.

5. Pedro 33 was the first helicopter to arrive at the scene. The weather in the search area was 400 broken, 800 overcast, visibility $\frac{1}{2}$ mile, in very heavy rain. Pedro 33 was receiving strong but conflicting beeper signals and attempted to home on one of them, but it was virtually impossible to communicate with the pilot. It was also difficult to home on a signal because of excessive interference from GUARD transmissions from other aircraft in the area. After about five minutes in the search area the pilot was spotted by looking out the side windows because forward vision was completely obscured by the driving rains. The Lamplighter's flares definitely made it easier to both spot the pilot's chute and look for a safe place to land. After coming to a hover over the pilot it was noted that he was hanging upside down in a tree with his right leg tangled in the parachute harness. It was obvious that a landing would be necessary to enable the rescue crew to cut the pilot out of his tangled harness. The area around the downed pilot was covered with 60-80 foot trees with the only clearing being a small water filled rice paddy. Pedro 33 elected to land in the rice paddy and did so despite the surrounding trees and deep water in the paddy. While the RCC kept the rotors turning to keep the helicopter from sinking into the mud the co-pilot, flight engineer, and flight surgeon went to aid the downed pilot.

The co-pilot cut him down from the tree and helped the flight surgeon and flight engineer load him on a stretcher. A considerable length of time was spent carrying the pilot to the waiting aircraft because of the necessity of wading through the deep mud and water. After the pilot was loaded aboard the aircraft and the stretcher secured, the co-pilot and flight engineer returned to collect the pilot's gun and other survival gear.

6. With the downed pilot and his gear aboard, Pedro 33 made a maximum performance takeoff over the trees and headed back to Korat. After 55 minutes of flight, the fuel low warning light came on and Pedro 33 landed on a small muddy road and refueled from the range extension tank carried inside the chopper. Within 13 minutes after landing Pedro 33 was again refueled, airborne and inbound to Korat. At this point Pedro 33 was 30 NM NE of Korat and in contact with Korat Approach Control. Approach Control vectored the chopper the last 30 miles, finishing up with a GCA approach. Thirty minutes after the refueling stop, the chopper was back at Korat and the pilot was on his way to the hospital for an examination.

7. Pedro 33 located the downed pilot 1 hour and 25 minutes after departing Korat. The second sortie was of 55 minutes duration and ended when the helicopter landed to refuel. The last sortie was of 30 minutes duration. In all the mission took 3 hours and 15 minutes including enroute time, search, pickup and refueling.

8. Lt. Col. J. E. McInernay was the pilot picked up by Pedro 33. Captain Fred Shannon was the EWO in the back seat of the F-105F. He was picked up by a Jolly Green Helicopter and later returned to Korat by Army Huey. He received a sprained ankle and bruises. Despite having hung by his right ankle for 2 hours and 30 minutes, Col. McInernay suffered only bruises and a temporarily paralyzed right leg.

Clarence G. Lunt

CLARENCE G. LUNT, Captain, USAF
RCC

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TO: 3 ARRGp (RGOP)

E6A
B
10
49

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Clarence G. Lunt
CLARENCE G. LUNT, Captain, USAF
RCC

2-3-67 - 7 Sep 67

MISSION NARRATIVE - JOLLY GREEN 15, 7 SEP 67

86A

9
Cub 30

The following report covers the SAR mission on 7 Sep 67. Captain Fred Shannon, FR3100995, of the 13th TRS, Korat RTAFB, was recovered.

Jolly Greens 36 and 15 were launched at 2110 for a position of $15^{\circ}29'N$ $103^{\circ}22'E$ (280°/88 miles from Channel 51). In route to the site, radio contact could not be established with Compress. Blue Anchor 14 and Lamp 01 relayed radio information for both Jolly Greens. Clouds were encountered and the last forty miles were flown under instrument conditions. Near the given location, Jolly Green 15 received a beeper and turned to track in. The Lamp aircraft was sighted and at one time we saw ground from the light of his flares; an immediate descent was made to below the clouds. Jolly Green 36 was the low bird, but during his descent in heavy rain, numerous electrical problems were encountered.

Weather in the area varied from 50 feet to 300 feet with 1/16 of a mile to 1 mile visibility. Flares from Lamp aircraft was the only thing that allowed the Jollys to obtain ground contact and start a search. Because of these problems, Jolly Green 15 assumed Low bird and Jolly Green 36 attempted to remain clear of the heavy rain since each time he entered it the transformer rectifiers and generators would go off the line.

Jolly Green 15 arrived in the area at 2235L, located the back seat man at 2250L and departed for Channel 51 at 2300L. No battle damage was incurred but other problems arose.

Six problems were encountered by Jolly Green 15 during the recovery:

1. An Army helicopter, 084 was reported in the area but no radio contact could be established to determine his position. Also, Pedro 33 was flying below the ceiling in the search area. Visibility was too poor at times to clear ourselves.
2. Three aircraft talking to the survivor, coupled with the beeper from the front seater that could not be shut off by the pilot, made radio procedures difficult. After Pedro 33 picked up the front seat pilot, he did not stop the parachute beeper.
3. Ground parties of Thai Nationals complicated the search. Three approaches were made to flashing lights that turned out to be groups of Thais. They would point the light directly at us and follow us flashing the light.
4. The back seat man that we recovered was afraid to give us a night flare until we were directly over him because he could hear people and was not sure of their intentions.

5. One problem was encountered with the flare operation. The chutes are difficult to see after the flare burns out. On one occasion a chute was spotted directly in front of us, at the last moment which would allow evasive action.

6. The weather conditions for night operations were the biggest problem of all. A landing was made 20 yards from the downed pilot because heavy rain prevented sufficient visibility to maintain a hover.

The recovered crew member had a painful right hip, which proved later to be only badly bruised. We arrived at Channel 51 at 2355 and off-loaded the injured man to an awaiting ambulance. Jolly Green 36 was escorted to Channel 51 by Jolly Green 15. No further problems arose after Jolly 36 departed the area of heavy rain. Both aircraft departed Channel 51 at 0140 and arrived Channel 89 at 0255.

The mission could not have been accomplished under the existing circumstances without the Lamp aircraft. They were necessary for us to get visual contact with the ground, to search at low level, and the downed pilot used their location in reference to him as steering information for us. The chute beeper from the other pilot made our UHF direction finding equipment useless. The crew of Lamp 01 did an outstanding job of dropping flare through an undercast with only a beeper for reference.

Gerald C Haynes

GERALD C. HAYNES, Maj, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

LOW BIRD 15

RCC, Maj Haynes
RCCP, Maj Wagner
FE, A1C Jaynes
RS, A2C Pighini

HIGH BIRD 36

RCC, Capt Dowdy
RCCP, 1/Lt Gonos
FE, SSgt Androwsky
RS, MSgt Williams