

FM 31-16

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

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HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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CHANGE

No. 2

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 27 May 1970

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

FM 31-16, 24 March 1967, is changed as follows:

Page 3, paragraph 1. The purpose of the manual is changed to read: "This manual provides guidance in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations."

Page 3, paragraph 2c. In line 3, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 3, paragraph 3. In lines 11 through 20 (last two sentences) are changed to read as follows: "For example, in jungles and mountains, emphasis may be placed on the use of footmobility; in swamps and inundated areas, on the use of watercraft; and in level terrain or desert, on the use of vehicle mobility. Airmobility of counter guerrilla units provides a distinct advantage over footmobile guerrilla forces, especially in difficult terrain, and should be exploited for troop lift, resupply, reconnaissance, surveillance, and fire support."

Page 3. Paragraph 4 is superseded as follows:

4. Changes and Comments

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to Commanding Officer, United States Army Combat Developments Command Infantry Agency, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905. Originators of proposed changes which would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels, to Commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and followup.

*This change supersedes Change 1, 25 July 1969.

Page 5, paragraph 6. Subparagraphs *i* and *j* are added as follows:

i. Throughout this manual, the terms regular armed, paramilitary, and irregular are used to identify the probable force structure used by guerrillas. These terms have been superseded by main, regional, and local force, respectively. For details on the guerrilla's organization see FM 31-23.

j. Throughout this manual, the terms reserve and reaction force are synonymous; however, in counter guerrilla operations, commanders enjoying a positive mobility differential normally do not retain an uncommitted reserve, but use least engaged units as reaction forces (reserves).

Page 5, paragraph 7. In line 7, "repetition" is changed to read "repetitive."

Page 7, paragraph 10. Lines 8 through 11, are changed to read "Since the essence of the counter guerrilla campaign is the control of the populace, emphasis must be placed on winning the support of the people by providing security and by conducting civil affairs activities. The situation in"

Page 8, paragraph 10b(3). In lines 4 and 5, "to press an advantage" is deleted.

Page 8, paragraph 11b. In line 1, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "insurgent wars"; and in line 6, "operations" is changed to read "tactics."

Page 8, paragraph 11c. In lines 2 and 3, "Howeve" is changed to read "However."

Page 8, paragraph 11c. Lines 5 and 6 are changed to read "the people, civil affairs activities directed towards controlling the people, gaining their support, and increasing their self-sufficiency become primary missions of the counter guerrilla forces of the host country and the United States."

Page 9, paragraph 12. In line 5, the word "stability" is changed to read "internal defense."

Page 9, paragraph 13b. In lines 2 and 3 "internal defense operations" is changed to read "insurgency situations."

Page 9, paragraph 13c. In line 3, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 9, paragraph 13e. In line 2, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 10, paragraph 17. In lines 5 and 6, "defense is achieved by" is changed to read "defense is achieved is by"; and in line 13, "Counter guerrilla operations" is changed to read "A counter guerrilla operation."

Page 11, paragraph 19b. In line 1, "military" is changed to read "stability"; and in line 3, "development" is changed to read "development."

Page 11. Paragraph 19b(1) is superseded as follows:

(1) *Tactical operations* directed against guerrilla forces. Tactical operations are conducted in support of either strike or consolidation campaigns. Strike campaigns are primarily offensive operations, characterized by brevity, which are conducted in an assigned area of operations, to find, fix, destroy, and capture the guerrilla. Consolidation campaigns are primarily defensive operations, characterized by long duration, which are conducted in an assigned area of responsibility, to provide a secure area in which positive effort can be devoted to internal defense and development.

Page 11. Paragraph 19b(4) is superseded as follows:

(4) *Civil affairs operations.* Any project or activity of U.S. forces involving contact with civilians outside the military establishment or designed to influence or control civilian activities and civil organizations can be classified as a civil affairs operation, unless the activity is being conducted solely or primarily for intelligence purposes. Intelligence operations must, however, be coordinated and conducted so as not to degrade the overall goals of the internal defense and internal development programs, to include especially civil affairs aspects. In counter guerrilla operations, control of the civilian populace and denial of material resources to the guerrilla along with gaining the support, loyalty, and

respect of the people are major concerns of the force commander. These civil affairs functions are achieved by the force commander primarily through populace and resources control and military civic action. Military civic action has proven effective in gaining civilian support for military operations and isolating the guerrillas physically and psychologically from the civilian support without which the guerrillas cannot exist. The military civic action program can encompass everything from a soldier imparting his particular skill or knowledge to a civilian (in order to help the civilian solve a problem or better his condition) to the entire unit providing security for crop harvest and aid in projects that contribute to social and economic improvement of the local civil government or population.

Page 12. Paragraph designation "19b(4)(a)" is changed to read "19b(5)."

Page 12. Paragraph 19b(4)(b) is rescinded.

Page 12. Paragraph 19b(6) is added as follows:

(6) *Advisory assistance.* Advisory assistance programs include assistance of host country military, paramilitary, and police forces by furnishing advice on organization, training, doctrine, operations, and materiel. In addition, it may include providing and controlling U.S. combat support and combat service support for host country military forces.

Page 15, paragraph 27. In lines 9 and 10 "terrain to insure" is changed to read "terrain and susceptibility of local vegetation and foliage to available herbicides to insure."

Page 18, paragraph 33. In lines 6 and 7, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 18, paragraph 33a(3). Line 9, the following is added "In this regard, early consideration must be given to an effective herbicide program."

Page 20. Paragraph 34 is superseded as follows:

34. General

This chapter provides general guidance on typical insurgent or resistance organizations and focuses on their military forces as opposed to their cadres and political organizations.

Page 22. Paragraph 39 is superseded as follows:

39. Organization

Guerrilla forces may vary from groups of squad and platoon size to units of division size or larger with extensive support organizations including elements for combat, intelligence, counterintelligence, political, and logistic support. Guerrilla forces may be organized in three principal types of forces: main, regional, and local. The distinction between these forces is based on differences in organization, training, weapons, equipment, and mission.

a. Guerrilla main force units normally are employed militarily when there is maximum chance for success. They usually operate for given periods of time in various regions, moving from region to region according to operational requirements and the effectiveness of counter guerrilla operations. These main force units possess the best available equipment, weapons (including mortars and artillery), and uniforms, and are used primarily against the counter guerrilla regular armed forces. Guerrilla main force units usually are well organized (into regimental-size units or larger), well trained, and well led. They operate in close conjunction with the paramilitary and irregular guerrilla forces. Fillers for the guerrilla regular forces usually are selected from the best of the guerrilla regional force troops. Sponsoring powers may provide elements of their armed forces as advisors or to reinforce guerrilla regular forces.

b. Guerrilla regional force units are less well organized, trained, and equipped than the regular forces. They may be organized into platoons, companies, battalions, and at times, regiments (or equivalent organizations). Guerrilla regional forces launch limited attacks, harass installations and troops, and ambush counter guerrilla force reinforcements. Normally they are assigned to a specific area of operation (e.g., state (province) or country (district)) and do not normally move from that area for conduct of operations elsewhere. Fillers for regional forces usually are obtained from guerrilla irregular forces.

c. Guerrilla local forces are auxiliaries responsible for collecting intelligence information, building bases, fortifying villages, acting as scouts or porters for the guerrilla main and regional forces, and providing security for insurgent officials at the local level. Members of local forces receive

limited military training but receive extensive political indoctrination. They normally retain their civilian occupations and function as combatants on a part-time basis in delaying and harassing the counter guerrilla force. These limited military activities may include sniping and employment of antipersonnel boobytraps and devices. The local forces normally do not operate in the military chain of command.

d. Sponsoring power resources, to include combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations and military organizers and advisors, and civilian political, economic, and psychological organizers and advisors may be provided to guerrilla forces to assist in organizational and operational missions and activities.

Page 23, paragraph 40a (2). In line 2, the following is added: "(except as noted below)."

Page 23, paragraph 40a. Subparagraph (9) is added as follows:

(9) To gain a psychological victory or as a diversionary action, the guerrilla will attack a built-up area, even at the risk of annihilation.

Page 25, paragraph 40f. In line 10, after the word "battle" the following sentence is added "Occasionally, guerrilla units may occupy and defend a population center to gain some advantage, usually political."

Page 26, paragraph 40f (3). In line 7, "regular forces" is changed to read "main force units," and to the end of the paragraph the following sentence is added "Main force units will frequently defend until dark before attempting to exfiltrate the contact area."

Page 26, paragraph 40f. Subparagraph (4) is added as follows:

(4) Guerrillas may defend, even at the risk of annihilation, in a built-up or fortified area if they are confident of winning a local or worldwide psychological victory, or causing the diversion of a large counter guerrilla force.

Page 28, paragraph 48. In line 12 the following sentence is added "In any event, the base area complexes will become meaningful targets for attack by U.S. and host country forces."

Page 29, paragraph 49. In line 4, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "stability operations."

Page 29, paragraph 50. In lines 4 and 5, "in internal defense and development" is changed to read "during stability operations."

Page 29, paragraph 51b. In line 10, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 29, paragraph 51d. In lines 4 and 5, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "stability operations"; and in lines 15 and 16, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 31, paragraph 52. In line 3, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "stability operations."

Page 31, paragraph 52a. In line 7, "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 31, paragraph 52b. In line 3 "internal defense" is changed to read "stability."

Page 31, paragraph 52e. Subparagraphs (6) and (7) are superseded as follows:

(6) Integration of Civil Affairs in all aspects of planning to include:

(a) Detailed planning and coordination of activities with civilian officials.

(b) Incorporating and monitoring civilian assistance in the operational plan by preparing and executing integrated civil affairs plans that embrace military civic action, populace and resources control, and psychological operations.

(7) Organizing and training, through advisory assistance, paramilitary and police forces for local defense, and insuring continuous support for these forces.

Page 32, Paragraph 52f is superseded as follows:

f. Subordinate commanders are allowed maximum flexibility in the execution of their assigned missions but should be assigned specific responsibilities and given sufficient guidance to insure a coordinated effort. The nature of guerrilla is such that, on occasion, plans for counter guerrilla operations must be changed instantly to take advantage of opportunities to employ brigade resources against elusive guerrilla forces.

Page 32, paragraph 53. In line 2, "indicate" is changed to read "dictate"; and in line 16, "may" is changed to read "will."

Page 32, paragraph 53a. In lines 3 and 4, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "internal defense and internal development."

Page 32, paragraph 53d. In line 3, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "internal defense and internal development."

Page 34, paragraph 55. In line 2, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "stability operations."

Page 34, paragraph 55e. In line 1, "Military civic action" is changed to read "Civil affairs operations."

Page 35, paragraph 56a. In lines 21 and 22, "internal defense and development" is changed to read "stability operations."

Page 36, paragraph 58a. Line 1, is changed to read "a. Guerrilla forces and base areas are the targets, not the"; and in lines 6 and 7, "guerrilla rather than" is changed to read "guerrilla and his bases rather than".

Page 36. Paragraph 58e is superseded as follows:

e. Large-scale reconnaissance-in-force operations should be conducted when sufficient counter guerrilla forces are available, if other forms of intelligence operations have failed to provide targets for attack. Reconnaissance-in-force operations can be conducted in all types of tactical operations (para 114).

Page 36. Paragraph 59a is superseded as follows:

a. Once a guerrilla force has been located, appropriate combat power, with emphasis on artillery, tactical air, Army aviation fires, and naval gunfire, is applied in order to destroy it. Normally, such operations require that the brigade force be larger than the guerrilla force; but if the brigade force is numerically inferior the difference in combat power can often be overcome with additional firepower. The encirclement may offer the greatest possibility of fixing the guerrilla force and achieving decisive results, provided the following conditions exist:

(1) Reliable intelligence on location of guerrilla elements.

(2) Troops are emplaced rapidly to maximize surprise.

(3) Effective counterintelligence measures and communications security practices insure the security of plans and movements.

(4) Sufficient troops are utilized to achieve an effective encirclement.

(5) Ample time is taken to search adequately the encircled area.

(6) Plans are made to offset the advantages which darkness affords the encircled guerrillas.

Page 37, paragraph 59b(9). In line 1, "and biological" is deleted.

Page 38, paragraph 64. In line 17, the following is added "in this regard, consideration should be given to the employment of riot control munitions details of which are in FM 3-10 and TC 3-16."

Page 38, paragraph 64a(2). In line 7, "their logistical" is changed to read "their total logistical."

Page 38. Paragraph 64a(3)(e) is superseded as follows:

(e) Maintenance of highly mobile all-weather, around-the-clock reaction forces to reinforce or relieve engaged units.

Page 38, paragraph 64a(4). In line 2, "strike" is changed to read "tactical".

Page 38, paragraph 64a(5). In lines 3 and 4 "consolidation operations designed to" is changed to read "consolidation campaigns assigned to."

Page 38. Paragraph 64a(6)(d) is superseded as follows:

(d) Providing reaction forces.

Page 38. Paragraph 64a(7) is added as follows:

(7) In areas where guerrilla forces have established base areas, the U.S. brigade commander should consider requesting aerial defoliation of these areas in order to improve vertical and horizontal visibility in these areas and to deny the guerrilla the natural cover and concealment afforded by the dense growth in jungle areas. If this dense growth can be defoliated, the guerrilla will suffer from the elimination of his natural concealment and he may then be pursued by friendly forces and destroyed by aerial and/or ground weapons.

Page 39. Paragraph 65a(5) is added as follows:

(5) Types of vegetation and susceptibility to available herbicides.

Page 40. Paragraph 65c(10)(b) is superseded as follows:

(b) Availability of arms, ammunition,

demolition, medicines, CBR protective equipment and other supplies.

Page 40, paragraph 65e. Line 1 is changed to read:
e. *Civil Affairs Operations.*

Page 40. Paragraph 68a is superseded as follows:

a. Tactical operations which may support:

(1) Strike campaigns.

(2) Consolidation campaigns.

Page 41. Paragraph 68e is superseded as follows:
e. *Civil Affairs Operations.*

Page 41, paragraph 69b. In line 14, a new sentence is added as follows: "Consideration should be given to the integration of indigenous personnel in maneuver units to provide specialized knowledge of the area, the enemy, and the population."

Page 41, paragraph 70a. In lines 10 and 11, "control attached host" is changed to read "control, or coordinate, when authorized by national agreement, combined operations with host."

Page 41. Paragraph 70a(1) title is changed to read *Support operations.*

Page 42. In figure 6, in list of augmentations is added "Chemical," "Indigenous Personnel (Interpreters, Guides, Defectors, etc)," and "Combat Tracker Teams."

Page 43. In figure 7, in list of augmentations is added "Chemical," "Indigenous Personnel (Interpreters, Guides, Defectors, etc)," and "Combat Tracker Teams."

Page 44, paragraph 76b. In line 12, "augmentation to" is changed to read "increased authorization in."

Page 44, paragraph 76c. In line 9, the following sentence is added: "For details on communication security, see FM 32-5."

Page 45, paragraph 76. A new paragraph is added as follows:

j. The capability of the guerrilla to employ electronic countermeasures against friendly communications-electronics equipment must not be discounted. Operators should be trained to expect and to operate in an electronic-countermeasures environment. Proper training in electronic counter-countermeasures, coupled with good signal security practices, will product the most effective

defense against enemy attempts to degrade friendly use of communications-electronics systems through jamming, imitative deception, and other forms of electronic countermeasures.

78. Special Forces

a. U.S. Army Special Forces are trained in both unconventional warfare and stability operations and may be employed under the direction or operational control of a unified command, another U.S. Army unit, a military mission, a MAAG or a MAC. The Special Forces group, augmented as required with civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, medical, military police, signal, engineer, and Army Security Agency elements is responsive to the advisory assistance needs of the host country's armed, paramilitary and irregular forces, as well as to governmental agencies and officials. Close coordination and exchange of information between Special Forces elements and other U.S. forces is essential.

b. Special Forces units, augmented as required, possess the following specific capabilities:

- (1) See FM 31-21 and FM 31-21A.
- (2) Provide planning, training and operational advice and assistance, including the management or supervision of fiscal and logistical support, as appropriate to:
 - (*a*) Host country Special Forces type units operating in areas dominated or controlled by insurgents.
 - (*b*) Host country armed paramilitary, or irregular forces engaged in remote area operations.
 - (*c*) Selected forces assigned to specialized missions such as raids or long-range patrol operations.
 - (*d*) Host country province and district level leaders and to paramilitary or irregular forces under their direction.
- (3) To provide temporary support in the absence of other U.S. units, to small MAAGs, military groups, or missions in the following:
 - (*a*) Advisory assistance to host country armed and paramilitary forces.
 - (*b*) Training or training assistance to host country ranger, airborne or Special Forces type units.
 - (4) Provides teams for operations or training assistance in civil affairs activities of host

country armed forces which are engaged in internal development programs designed to prevent insurgency.

(5) To establish an operational evasion and escape system in hostile areas,

c. Special Forces tables of organization and equipment are designed to satisfy the requirements of unconventional warfare. Prolonged employment in stability operations may require equipment and personnel in addition to that normally authorized.

Page 45. Paragraph 79 title is changed to read **MILITARY DOGHANDLER TEAMS.**

Page 45. Paragraph 79, line 1, is changed to read "Scout, sentry, and tracker dogs have value in" and subparagraphs *c*, *d*, and *e*, are added as follows:

c. Combat tracker teams (CTT) composed of tracker dogs and visual trackers are provided by increased authorization to TOE of combat brigade elements. These teams are employed in interpreting signs left by the enemy and in tracking him. The primary function of the CTT is to investigate areas of suspected enemy activity, follow retreating enemy groups, and reestablish contact with the enemy. This requires the use of highly developed skills by both the tracker dog and the visual tracker. (See FM 20-20 for tracking techniques.)

(1) The tracker dog has an advantage over the visual tracker in that the dog usually can track faster and can track at night. The tracker dog can also follow a track that does not leave a visible sign.

(2) A visual tracker is an expert at observing and interpreting the signs that men have left when they pass over terrain and through vegetation. He is able to provide detailed information about persons being tracked. For example, a well experienced visual tracker is able to tell the sex of the people making the track and the type of weapons that they are carrying, information on the size of the group, direction and speed of movement, morale and condition of the enemy being tracked, and recency of track.

(3) When these two capabilities are combined into a working team the result is a valuable reconnaissance capability for maneuvering infantry elements.

d. The organization of U.S. Army combat

tracker team elements follows the lines of the combat force it supports. All men in the team are cross-trained in visual tracking to provide the team with extra capabilities. For a CTT to be effective in the operational environment, all members must be highly trained in tracking, fieldcraft, and weaponry. Another factor that contributes to their effectiveness is mobility. All team members are lightly equipped; readily transportable by air, road, or on foot; and able to remain in the field for 48 hours without resupply. When the teams can be resupplied regularly, they can remain in the field for an indefinite period of time, except the tracker dogs, which should be relieved every 48 hours. The same principles of integrated operations as employed with scout dog teams are applicable.

e. Generally speaking, the CTT has three limitations which influence its effectiveness. First, the team is unable to track through heavy jungle at night, although with sufficient moonlight some tracking tasks can be performed through ground cover that consists of grass or low shrubs. Second, visual trackers and dogs often find it difficult to follow a track that has been subjected to heavy tropical rainfall. Third, it is difficult to follow a track that is more than 24 hours old. Subject to these limitations, combat tracker teams can perform a number of missions, including:

(1) Follow a retreating enemy and reestablish contact.

(2) Follow local enemy to villages or homes.

(3) Follow and recover U.S. personnel captured by the enemy.

(4) Follow and recover U.S. Army patrols or individuals who are lost or separated from their units.

(5) Backtrack captured personnel to determine where they have been and where they hid any supplies or equipment they may have had.

Page 46, paragraph 80. In line 4, the following sentence is added: "(See also FM 32-10.)"

Page 47. Paragraph 88.1 is added as follows:

88.1. Chemical

Missions, concepts, organization, and operations of a chemical nature are discussed in chapter 9 and in the 3-series manuals.

Page 49. Paragraph 94a is superseded as follows:

a. This chapter provides guidance on the mis-

sions, concepts and organization of the brigade in conducting counter guerrilla tactical operations. Its scope includes the operational environment, the forces required, and the types of counter guerrilla tactical operations, and the combat support required for each type.

Page 49. In paragraph 94b, "FM 31-50" is added as a reference.

Page 49, paragraph 96a. Line 18 is changed to read: * * * and elusiveness, but he may attack, seize, and defend all or portions of built-up areas for no other reason than the psychological impact on the civilians and the military forces. Various forms * * *

Page 49, paragraph 96b. In lines 8 and 9, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 49. Paragraph 96.1 is added as follows:

96.1. Security

a. The commander is responsible for providing continuous, allround security for his unit and other forces as well as installations in the area for which he has been assigned responsibility. He must accomplish appropriate actions to guard against subversion, espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and tactical surprise. Security measures insure freedom of maneuver in response to an enemy threat.

b. The commander provides for his security by coordinating all available security elements to:

(1) Provide timely and accurate warning of enemy movement into and within the area for which he has been assigned responsibility.

(2) Provide time and space for maneuver of his forces in reaction to enemy threats.

(3) Orient on installations, lines of communication, and units in his area of responsibility that are known or suspected enemy targets.

(4) Provide or coordinate protection of all fire bases, logistical installations, and lines of communication.

(5) Insure that reaction forces are provided and fires are coordinated for use in the event of enemy attack or other action.

(6) Provide for a counter reconnaissance screen and coordinate counterintelligence activities to insure detection and denial of enemy espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and provide deception for his own operations.

(7) Destroy or neutralize enemy threats by appropriate action to include coordinated attack and application of all available firepower.

Page 50, paragraph 98. In lines 5 and 6, "larger reserves will be maintained" is changed to read "a larger reaction force must be available."

Page 50, paragraph 98a. In line 7 after the word "force" the following sentence is added "However, to prevent entire units from becoming immobilized by the fires of guerrilla forces, every effort should be made to gain contact, using minimum forces, followed by maximum employment of maneuver forces and supporting fires to block possible routes of withdrawal or reinforcement and to destroy the enemy force."

Page 50. Paragraph 98b is superseded as follows:

b. Since terrain, organized fires, and maneuver are used by guerrilla forces to seize and hold the initiative and not terrain for itself, maneuvers such as envelopments, penetrations, and turning movements may not produce the same effects on guerrilla forces as they would on field army-type tactical forces. Caches, and other sources of supplies may be so dispersed that guerrilla units are not dependent on a few critical logistical bases which they must protect. Under these conditions, a turning movement, for example, launched by counterguerrilla forces to cause the guerrilla force to react to protect a base, may produce movements in entirely different directions than those anticipated.

Page 51, paragraph 99. In line 9, add "FM 31-50" as a reference.

Page 51. Paragraph 99 is redesignated "99a"; and subparagraph b is added as follows:

b. Heavily fortified guerrilla defenses in dense jungle are often so well concealed that their presence is not known until physically encountered at close range. In this situation, use will not have been made of preparatory fires to soften enemy defensive positions. The use of massive supporting fires at this time usually is necessary to defeat the guerrilla and destroy his position without suffering undue friendly casualties. Once such defenses are encountered, the commander may have to adjust his forward disposition while maintaining contact, in order to permit extensive employment of supporting fires. Simultaneously,

additional maneuver forces are committed and supporting fires are used to block the enemy's possible routes of withdrawal. When the preparatory fires have been completed, forces are maneuvered to defeat him in detail.

Page 51, paragraph 100. The following sentence is added after line 16. "This employment of armor is often decisive in engagements with dug-in enemy forces."

Page 51, paragraph 100a. In line 7, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 51, paragraph 101. In line 4, "Attack and pursuit are" is changed to read "Attack, pursuit, and reaction are."

Page 51, paragraph 101a. In line 6, "mounted" is changed to "mechanized."

Page 51, paragraph 101b. In line 1, "carriers where possible" is changed to read "carriers and mechanized flamethrowers where possible", and in line 3, "mobility advantage" is changed to read "mobility and firepower advantage".

Page 52, paragraph 104. In line 1, "carriers as part of" is changed to read "carriers, and mechanized flamethrowers as part of."

Page 52, paragraph 105. Line 21, the following sentence is added: Because of its organization and lack of heavy organic weapons, airmobile infantry relies heavily on supporting firepower to overcome a dug-in enemy.

Page 53, paragraph 105c. Line 9, the following sentence is added: Airmobile forces are ideally suited to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations.

Page 53, paragraph 105e. In line 15, the following is added: "* * * airmobile operations and FM 31-50 for airmobile operations in fortified and built-up areas."

Page 54, paragraph 107. In lines 5 and 6, the text in parentheses is deleted; and in lines 11 and 12, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs operations."

Page 54, paragraph 109. In line 3, "located" is deleted; and in line 12, "usually entails" is changed to read "may entail."

Page 55, paragraph 110. In line 2, "either" is changed to read "ideally"; and in lines 3 and 4, "preferably" is deleted.

Page 55, paragraph 111b. In line 6, "reserve" is changed to read "reserve (reaction forces)."

Page 57. Paragraph 111g is superseded as follows:

g. Separation of tactical units from parent headquarters is normal in counter guerrilla operations, but they must operate as part of a well-coordinated plan and be prepared to concentrate rapidly. Objectives normally are not oriented on terrain, but rather on destroying guerrilla forces and bases. Once guerrilla forces have been located, priority of all available combat power is given to operations to destroy or incapacitate the guerrilla. Destruction missions normally require a counter guerrilla force larger than the located guerrilla force. Reserves (reaction forces)—normally the main destruction units—immediately apply sufficient combat power to engage and destroy guerrilla forces before the guerrilla forces disperse. The use of airmobile and airborne forces is emphasized for the conduct of strike operations. The use of chemical munitions to disorganize and incapacitate a guerrilla force will enable the counter guerrilla force to attain its objective with minimum firepower and casualties. After a successful attack on guerrilla forces, the area is thoroughly searched for guerrilla personnel, supplies, equipment, and documents.

Page 58. Figure 10 is changed as follows: The night patrol route (dotted black line) indicated as leaving the patrol base from the six o'clock position and returning to the base at the five o'clock position is changed to indicate the reverse, that the patrol leaves from the five o'clock position and returns at the six o'clock position.

Page 58, paragraph 112. Line 6 is changed to read as follows: "capture the guerrillas. When maneuver elements encounter a strongly fortified position in the jungle and are unable to reduce the position by employment of organic weapons and maneuver, the commander may have to reposition his forward elements while still maintaining contact to permit maximum utilization of tactical air and artillery fires. The guerrillas' ability."

Page 59. Paragraph 114 is superseded as follows:

114. Reconnaissance Operations

a. This paragraph provides general guidance on the conduct of reconnaissance operations during counter guerrilla operations.

b. Reconnaissance is the directed effort to collect information of the enemy and the area of operations by ground and air activities. The purpose of reconnaissance is to obtain combat information of the enemy and the area of operations for the production of combat intelligence. The combat intelligence produced is used in the planning and conduct of combat operations.

c. Reconnaissance and security complement each other and cannot be readily separated. Effective ground and air reconnaissance provides a certain amount of security, and a security force provides information of the enemy and the area of operations.

114.1. Fundamentals of Reconnaissance Operations

Reconnaissance operations vary with the situation and conditions vary with the situation and conditions in the area and with the assigned missions, size, type, and composition of the reconnaissance units. Ground combat reconnaissance operations are performed in conformance with the following five fundamentals.

a. Orient on the Location or Movement of the Intelligence Targets. Units performing reconnaissance must maneuver according to the location or movement of the intelligence target rather than the location or movement of friendly forces. The target may be enemy troops, a terrain feature, or a locality. To perform the operation, commanders of units conducting reconnaissance must be allowed maximum freedom of action.

b. Report All Information Accurately. Reconnaissance is conducted to obtain information to be used in the production of combat intelligence. To be of value to the commander, this information must be timely and accurate. All members of units conducting reconnaissance missions must report all positive and negative information rapidly and accurately to the next higher headquarters. When considered in conjunction with information from other sources, information that is unimportant to

one level of command may be extremely valuable to the next higher commander. The use of a brief reconnaissance spot report form facilitates the rapid transmission of essential information. A unit performing reconnaissance has not fully accomplished its mission until it has reported all information gathered to the next higher headquarters.

c. Avoid Decisive Engagement. Except in a reconnaissance in force where the mission is to engage the enemy, units performing reconnaissance obtain information by stealth whenever possible, but fight when necessary to gain the desired information. The reconnaissance mission must not be jeopardized by combat with the enemy when combat is not essential to obtain the information desired.

d. Maintain Contact With the Enemy. In the performance of a reconnaissance mission to obtain information of an enemy force, contact with the enemy is gained as soon as possible. Once contact has been made, it is maintained and is not voluntarily broken without authority from higher headquarters. Contact can be maintained by ground and/or air observation.

e. Develop the Situation. When contact with the enemy is made, or an obstacle is encountered, the situation must be developed quickly and a decision made regarding subsequent operations. In the case of enemy contact, the following actions, known as actions on contact, are taken:

(1) *Deploy and report.* Units move immediately to positions from which they can fire, observe, or be employed against the enemy. The commander immediately reports the enemy contact to higher headquarters in as much detail as possible.

(2) *Reconnoiter.* The enemy's location, strength, composition, and disposition are determined, with a special effort to determine the flanks of his position. Patrols, whether mounted or dismounted, are supported by fire and by other elements of the unit.

(3) *Choose a course of action.* After reconnoitering the enemy position to gain as much information as he can, the commander must choose a course of action appropriate to the immediate situation as well as to the accomplishment of the assigned mission. A decision to attack, bypass, or contain the enemy must be made as quickly as the

reconnaissance will permit. In counter guerrilla operations, enemy units are rarely bypassed.

(4) *Report.* After developing the situation, the commander gives a report to his higher headquarters. This report includes the additional enemy information gained by the reconnaissance and the decision as to what course of action the commander plans to follow.

114.2. Types of Reconnaissance Missions

There are three types of reconnaissance missions: route, zone, and area. The type to be employed is determined after considering the information desired, where the information is to be sought, the known enemy situation, terrain, size of the reconnaissance force, and the time available for obtaining the information.

a. Route Reconnaissance.

(1) Route reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain information of the route, obstacles, and enemy along a specific route, and the terrain adjacent to the route which, if occupied by the enemy, would affect movement along the route.

(2) Route reconnaissance may be assigned to obtain information of a specific route or of an enemy force moving generally along a specific route. When intelligence indicates that the enemy is moving on one or more routes, or when terrain features canalize his advance, these routes may be reconnoitered to obtain enemy information. Routes of advance of friendly forces may be reconnoitered when specific information of a route or series of routes is required.

(3) The technique employed and the requirements of a route reconnaissance are less time-consuming and normally can be performed more rapidly than zone or area reconnaissance.

b. Zone Reconnaissance.

(1) Zone reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain detailed information of all routes, terrain, and enemy forces in a zone defined by boundaries.

(2) When the enemy's location is in doubt, or when it is desired to locate suitable routes or determine cross-country trafficability in a zone, a zone reconnaissance may be directed. The width of the zone assigned to subordinate units is determined by the pattern of the road net, terrain features, type of information desired, anticipated enemy

action, troops available, weather, visibility, and time available to accomplish the mission.

c. Area Reconnaissance.

(1) Area reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain detailed information of all routes, terrain, and enemy forces within a clearly defined area.

(2) The area may be reconnoitered for possible enemy or to determine its suitability as an assembly area or for other uses by friendly forces. The area to be reconnoitered must be clearly delineated. The unit assigned the mission moves directly to the area and conducts the reconnaissance employing the same techniques as in a zone reconnaissance.

114.3. Reconnaissance in Force

a. General. Reconnaissance in force is a limited-objective operation to discover and test the enemy's positions, locations, and strength, and to gather information. In counter guerrilla operations, its objective is collection of information of the enemy and the destruction of his units and facilities. The commander must be prepared to exploit meeting engagements and meaningful intelligence to achieve tactical success by conducting a coordinated attack to destroy discovered enemy units and facilities, or take additional security measures if required. The committed force may conduct the operation as a unit, or only selected subordinate units may be committed on a limited scale.

b. Basic Considerations.

(1) Reconnaissance-in-force operations normally develop enemy information more rapidly and in more detail than do other reconnaissance methods; therefore, when firm intelligence is lacking, the principal effort of the committed unit may be a widespread and continuous reconnaissance-in-force operation coupled with mandatory security missions. In arriving at a decision to reconnoiter in force, the commander considers:

- (a) His overall mission.
- (b) His knowledge of the enemy situation.
- (c) The urgency and importance of other information.
- (d) The efficiency and speed of other intelligence collection agencies.

(e) The possibility that the reconnaissance may lead to a general engagement under favorable conditions.

(f) The continuing requirements for local and area security.

(g) The availability of adequate reserves (reaction forces) and the resources to deliver them quickly to the area to be exploited.

(h) The availability of adequate, all-weather fire support means.

(2) The ground maneuver elements conducting the reconnaissance in force should have mobility at least equal to that of the enemy. Reserves (reaction forces) must have a mobility differential or capability that permits them to quickly exploit enemy weaknesses and influence the action.

(3) The size of the subordinate reconnaissance units depends on the mission, the size of the area being investigated, combat power available, the ability to quickly commit reserves (reaction forces), and the enemy's strength.

c. Area Reconnaissance in Force. An area reconnaissance in force is an offensive action designed to develop enemy information rapidly within a specific area, and it is only conducted when available intelligence is not adequate to support operations with more specific objectives. These operations are not executed without benefit of intelligence about the enemy forces suspected of being within the area of operations. However, these operations are conducted only in the most likely areas in which guerrilla elements or installations should be found based on the best intelligence available. All available intelligence and the judicious estimate of the commander on the probable locations and activities of the enemy are utilized in planning area reconnaissance-in-force operations.

(1) *Concept.*

(a) In an area reconnaissance in force, commanders—especially small-unit commanders—may have restrictions placed on them to avoid decisive engagement. The ground maneuver element gains contact through aggressive patrolling by small reconnaissance elements, thereby exposing minimum forces to surprise attack or ambush.

(b) The commander exploits contacts gained by the reconnaissance in force by destroying the enemy unit engaged and his facilities when

possible. Those facilities not destroyed by artillery or other fire support means are destroyed during the local exploitation using demolition teams when appropriate. Commanders must be prepared to extract the friendly unit if decisive engagement is unfavorable at that time.

(c) The destruction of large enemy forces, usually employed in prepared fortifications, is accomplished by a coordinated attack of the enemy's position with appropriate forces supported by all available combat power including artillery, tactical air, naval gunfire, Army aviation fires, and armor. During the conduct of the attack, possible escape routes are put under surveillance or blocked by maneuver elements, artillery fire, naval gunfire, or the use of chemical munitions. The actual attack force which in many cases is smaller than the defending enemy unit, should not execute the ground attack until the enemy unit and his defensive position have been neutralized to the degree possible by the massed firepower. When entering the enemy's position, the infantry close with the remaining enemy and destroy or capture them, conduct a thorough search for materiel, and destroy the positions prior to extraction or continuation of the operation when possible. When available, other units conduct pursuit operations and attempt to regain contact if it is lost.

(2) *Conduct.*

(a) In selecting the area to be reconnoitered in force, the commander directing the operation must consider the size of the assigned area of operations (AO), the terrain and vegetation within the AO, size and location of any known or suspected enemy units within the area, the size of the force available to him to conduct the area reconnaissance in force, and the support available to accomplish the mission, to include fire support and the Army aviation elements available for transportation. There is no specified frontage for a given size force conducting a reconnaissance-in-force mission. After considering all of the above elements, the commander decides how the area will be subdivided to accomplish the mission.

(b) Any number of techniques may be used to reconnoiter an area in force; however, they generally will be variations of one basic concept. To thoroughly reconnoiter an area, it must be saturated with ground elements aggressively patrolling their assigned reconnaissance areas to locate

and engage the enemy. In order to accomplish the necessary complete saturation of an area, the area must be subdivided by the controlling headquarters into subordinate unit reconnaissance areas. To the maximum extent possible, the insertion of the individual reconnaissance elements should be as nearly simultaneous as possible in order to achieve maximum surprise and mutual support. However, this saturation of an area of operations may not always be possible to the degree that is desirable. This may be due to the lack of sufficient ground units and support to adequately saturate the designated area of operations. In this situation, a variation of the technique of complete saturation of an area may be used. The number of variations, as to the initial positioning of ground units and the plan for their movement within the area, is usually limited only by the adaptability of the units. Once inserted, the units act independently in their assigned areas of responsibility until an enemy unit is located or its security is threatened. The overall objective is to locate and engage the enemy forces. Once contact has been made, maximum fires are placed on the enemy positions. The controlling headquarters directs adjacent units to occupy blocking or ambush positions along likely avenues of escape, while others are directed to converge on the target. Where superior forces are encountered, the requirement is to fix the enemy until sufficient combat power can be massed to defeat the guerrillas. Guerrillas characteristically operate in difficult terrain which limits the capability to rapidly move ground units to the decisive point. When this occurs, all available fire support should be used to achieve the necessary massing of combat power.

114.4. Reconnaissance by Fire

a. Reconnaissances by fire is accomplished by firing on likely or suspected enemy positions in an attempt to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement or firing. During reconnaissance by fire, positions being reconnoitered must be continuously observed so that any enemy movement or return fire will be definitely located.

b. Reconnaissance by fire is used when time is critical. It is made at the risk of losing surprise, but it tends to lessen the probability of moving into a well-concealed enemy position without being aware of its presence.

c. If the enemy returns the fire, the unit proceeds to develop the situation. If the fire is not

returned, the unit continues on its mission. However, caution should be exercised because reconnaissance by fire may fail to draw the fire of seasoned enemy troops.

114.5. Reconnaissance by Aircraft

a. Army aircraft extend, supplement, or in some instances replace ground reconnaissance means. Commanders not having organic aircraft should request them to support their reconnaissance efforts.

b. Army aircraft normally are employed in conjunction with, and in close support of, ground reconnaissance forces. Aircraft are used to extend the reconnaissance effort by air observation, air photography, and electronic surveillance.

c. Army aircraft may be used to conduct radiological surveys and to locate routes through or around contaminated areas.

114.6. Coordination and Control During Reconnaissance Operations

a. Reconnaissance must be coordinated at all levels of command. This will insure maximum results from the intelligence effort, prevent duplication of effort, and provide for economical use of reconnaissance forces. Coordination is accomplished primarily by assigning a specific mission to each unit conducting the reconnaissance.

b. The commander conducting the reconnaissance uses radio as the primary means of control. Phase lines, checkpoints, contact points, boundaries, routes, objectives, and time limitations are used by the commander in controlling his unit. Liaison personnel, staff officers, messengers, and aircraft are used to assist in the rapid transmission of reconnaissance instructions and reports.

114.7. Reconnaissance Instructions

Reconnaissance instructions must be complete and must include exactly what combat information is to be obtained, the time by which the information must be reported, where the information is to be sought, and when the mission is to be executed. Essential details may include:

a. Pertinent information of the enemy and friendly troops.

b. Plans of the higher commander.

c. Specific information desired.

d. Zone, area, or route to be reconnoitered.

e. When, where, and how information is to be reported to the higher commander.

f. Time of departure.

g. Appropriate control measures.

h. Action to be taken when mission is completed.

Page 59. Paragraph 115 is superseded as follows:

115. Movement to Contact

Movement to contact in counter guerrilla tactical operations is basically the same as in limited and general war operations. Night movement, clandestine movement, and counterambush precautions are emphasized. Lead elements of advancing units may move by bounds. Where terrain permits, the lead element moves from one favorable position to the next, covered by a strong base of fire in position to engage any resistance encountered. Leading elements of the advancing strike forces gain and maintain contact with the guerrillas. Close-in supporting fires are used in conjunction with the direct fires of elements in contact to destroy the enemy. If the guerrillas withdraw, every effort will be made to retain contact. In many situations, action by committed forces and subordinate elements may develop into a series of meeting engagements. Care must be taken to avoid ambushes in movement to contact. The infantry maintains contact by aggressive frontal and flank patrolling by small security elements, thereby exposing a minimum of troops to ambush. Supporting fires are placed close-in along, and parallel to, the route of advance. When brigades move by ground to the strike area, and on subsequent unit maneuvers, tactical movements must be employed. Habitual use is made of the movement to contact and reconnaissance in force. To prevent ambush of counter guerrilla forces, to gain or reestablish contact, or to develop guerrilla force dispositions, strike operations are best accomplished by airdrop or airmobile assault. Movement by air may enhance surprise and avoids the inherent dangers in ground movement to contact.

Page 61. Paragraph 118 is superseded as follows:

118. Operations in Built-Up Areas

Built-up areas usually are unfavorable for guerrilla force operations. Guerrillas normally will not choose to fight in these areas; however, under-

ground elements in cities and towns may incite organized rioting, seize portions of urban areas, erect barricades, and resist attempts of counter-guerrilla forces to enter the area. They may be reinforced by main force guerrilla units. Non-combatants in the area usually are held as hostages and used as shields by guerrilla forces to deter the application of maximum combat power by counter-guerrilla forces. When an urban area has been seized by insurgent or guerrilla forces, an evaluation has to be made as to whether it is more advantageous, from both a tactical and stability operations perspective, to recapture it with unrestricted force or to recapture it using other techniques. The decision as to the amount of force and the specific techniques to be used to recapture the area is based on analysis of the psychological impact on the enemy, noncombatant civilians, and friendly troops; the safety of civilians and friendly troops; the destruction of buildings; and the military requirements for other impending tactical operations. Riot control munitions can temporarily neutralize such targets so that counter-guerrilla forces can close with and capture the enemy with minimum injury to the noncombatants. Operations to counter these activities will be assisted by civilian police actions. For details of combat in fortified and built-up areas, see FM 31-50.

Page 63, paragraph 119. In line 7, "Reserves" is changed to read "Reserves (reaction forces)."

Page 63, paragraph 119a. In line 1, "Reserves" is changed to read "Reserves (reaction forces)."

Page 63. Paragraph 119b is superseded as follows:

b. Dispersal of reserves (reaction forces) provides flexibility, and locations that facilitate rapid movement to point of probable employment are occupied. In tactical operations, emphasis is placed on transporting those forces by air. Regardless of how they move, they must be positioned within supporting distances of committed forces.

Page 63. In paragraph 120, lines 5 and 6, the text in parentheses is deleted.

Page 67, paragraph 129h(2)(f). In line 1, "Mobile reserves" is changed to read "Mobile reserves (reaction forces)."

Page 68, paragraph 129i. To line 16 the following is added: "The reserves (reaction forces) must be available around the clock to relieve beleaguered posts. Herbicides may be used to defoliate and/or kill the vegetation along lines of communication for security purposes."

Page 68, paragraph 130. In lines 4 and 7, "reserve" is changed to read "reserve (reaction force)."

Page 68, paragraph 130a. In line 4, "reserves" is changed to read "reserves (reaction forces)."

Page 68, paragraph 130b. In lines 2 and 7, "reserve" is changed to read "reserve (reaction force)."

Page 69, paragraph 130c. In lines 3, 7, 9, and 12, "reserve" is changed to read "reserve (reaction force)."

Page 69. Existing section IV is renumbered section V, and new section IV is added as follows:

Section IV. URBAN OPERATIONS

130.1. General

a. This section provides general guidance on the missions, concepts, organization, and operations in conducting counter-guerrilla operations in urban areas.

b. Urban operations restore host country governmental control of the populace and resources of the urban area and return the area to the control of host country local police and paramilitary forces when internal security can be maintained and economic, political, social, and civil activities of the population can be pursued and improved. Units committed to urban operations will apply their resources using the following methods:

(1) In the offensive phase, tactical operations are conducted in a manner that minimizes loss of life and destruction of structures and facilities. Some of the methods used are: The rapid containment of the guerrilla; the conduct of psychological operations to separate the guerrilla from the friendly populace and destroy the insurgent's will to fight; show of force; use of chemicals; and the judicious use of fire to limit destruction and loss of life.

(2) In the defensive phase, tactical operations, to include extensive coordinated patrolling by military and police units outside the perimeter of the urban area, are necessary. During this phase,

U.S. units will perform advisory assistance in training host country forces for defensive missions, populace and resources control operations, and intelligence and psychological operations. When guerrilla activity within the area has been neutralized, and host country civilian and governmental agencies have resumed control of the urban area, U.S. units will be free to conduct counter-guerrilla operations in other areas.

130.2. Mission

a. The mission of U.S. infantry-type brigades in counter-guerrilla operations in urban areas will include neutralization of the guerrilla threat, or his domination of the area, and return of populace and resources to host country government control. The specific mission will be dictated by the nature of the objective sought; ultimately, it will be based on instructions from higher echelons.

b. Once the counter-guerrilla operation is initiated in an urban area, the accomplishment of the mission for that operation remains the U.S. commander's primary consideration; therefore, any restrictions on the use of his full combat power must be defined clearly and understood by all concerned before the start of the operation.

130.3. Phases of Operations

a. The phases of counter-guerrilla operations in an urban area will be based on the doctrine outlined in sections II and III, modified as necessary to reflect consideration of the specific combat environment and the nature of the enemy. The rules of engagement in an urban area will reflect the same concern and consideration for noncombatants and host country populace and resources in rural areas. In general, the rules applied in an urban area may include:

- (1) Selective response.
- (2) Do not fire unless fired upon.
- (3) Use only that amount of firepower necessary to minimize casualties among the counter-guerrilla forces.

b. Doctrine on which to base techniques for combat in an urban area is contained in FM 31-50 (as changed), with emphasis on the considerations applicable to operations in fortified and built-up areas (i.e., urban) regardless of the nature of the enemy. In a stability operations environment, the enemy which must be neutralized in an otherwise

friendly urban area may be a hostile guerrilla force which treats the local populace and resources as a mass hostage. For doctrine on which to base combat techniques in such a situation, see FM 31-23 as well as FM 31-50. In all phases of a counter-guerrilla operation in an urban area, continuous and close coordination are required between U.S. and host country forces, along with rehearsals and/or operational readiness tests, to determine the amount and method of application of combat power which is to be used in neutralizing the guerrilla force. (A detailed discussion of the hostile guerrilla force is contained in chapter 5.)

c. Counter-guerrilla operations in an urban area are followed by redeployment of the counter-guerrilla force upon return of the area to host country civil control.

Page 69, paragraph 132. Line 9 is changed to read: "in counter-guerrilla tactical operations. Field artillery must be capable at all times of extremely rapid and precise massing of all available fires onto a fleeting or well-fortified enemy at close ranges to friendly troops. The"

Page 70, paragraph 132d(1). In lines 16 and 17, "and biological" is deleted.

Page 71, paragraph 132d(5). In line 8, "105-mm howitzer" is changed to read "105-mm and 155-mm howitzer."

Page 73, paragraph 134b(1). In line 1, "reserve" is changed to read "reserve (reaction force)."

Page 74, paragraph 137a. Subparagraphs (2) and (8) are superseded as follows:

- (2) Armed/attack helicopter operations.
- (8) Dissemination of chemical munitions.

Page 75, paragraph 137c(1). In lines 1 and 6, "airmobile company (light)" is changed to read "assault helicopter company"; and in line 3, "of combat" is changed to read "of troops, combat."

Page 75, paragraph 137c. Subparagraphs (1.1) and (1.2) are added as follows:

(1.1) The medium helicopter company, when in support of counter-guerrilla forces, provides tactical air movement of troops, combat supplies, and equipment within the brigade operational area. Capabilities of the medium helicopter company include:

- (a) Same as (1)(a) above.

(b) Augments other troop lift capability. (Normally not used for initial assault, but provides a capability for rapid troop buildup in an air-head.)

(c) Same as (1) (d) above.

(d) Provides airlift for light artillery units.

(e) Provides airlift for emergency aircraft evacuation.

(f) Provides aerial movement of supplies and equipment within the operational area.

(1.2) The heavy helicopter company, when in support of counter guerrilla forces provides tactical air movement of combat supplies and equipment within the brigade operational area. Capabilities of the heavy helicopter company include the following:

(a) Same as (1) (a) above.

(b) Provides aerial movement of supplies and equipment within the operational area.

(c) Provides airlift for mobile surgical unit.

(d) Provides airlift for light and medium artillery units.

(e) Provides airlift for heavy equipment to include engineer equipment.

(f) Provides airlift for emergency aircraft evacuation.

Page 75, paragraph 137c(3). In lines 1 and 7 "Armed" is changed to read "Armed/attack."

Page 75, paragraph 138b. In line 3 "guerrilla forces" is changed to read "guerrilla forces, especially in prepared positions."

Page 76, paragraph 141. In lines 12 and 13, "populate and resources control operations," is deleted and "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs."

Page 78, paragraph 147a(1). In line 8, the following is added: "* * * capabilities, and visibility/surveillance diagrams (see FM 6-40) should be collected from all FO and surveillance teams to establish which areas are under observation or surveillance."

Page 78, paragraph 147a(6). In line 4, "communication" is changed to read "electronic."

Page 78. Paragraph 147a(9) is superseded as follows:

(9) Interrogator teams trained in the language of the host country, and document and materiel exploitation specialists.

Page 79, paragraph 147b(8). In line 22, the following is added as the next to last sentence: "* * * guerrilla communication. Imitative deception against guerrilla communication systems should be considered where such a course of action could achieve decisive results. Well-planned and well-executed deception activities may cause a guerrilla force to divulge information of intelligence value."

Page 88. "Section V. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION" is rescinded.

Page 93. Paragraph 175e is superseded as follows:

e. Reaction forces are vital considerations in planning and coordinating movements. The guerrilla must be convinced that ambushes will inevitably produce a fast, relentless, hard-hitting response by counter guerrilla supporting forces, to include airstrikes and ground pursuit. The reaction force is designated to cover the possibility of ambush. Prior to a movement, reaction force commanders and aviators must be briefed on the general area of operations, with emphasis on landing areas and known and suspected guerrilla locations, and on communications, as well as usual preoperations information. Reaction forces are designated in successive areas if the route is of sufficient length to make reaction time of a single reaction force prohibitively long.

Page 100. In Section III title, "WATERBORNE" is changed to read "RIVERINE."

Page 100, paragraph 186. In line 8 the following is added "See FM 31-75 for detailed discussion of riverine operations and see FM 31-11 and FM 31-12 for discussion of amphibious operations."

Page 100, paragraph 187. In line 11, "military civic action" is changed to read "civil affairs."

Page 100. Paragraph 188 is superseded as follows:

188. Concept

The brigade may participate in riverine operations along with host country regular armed forces (particularly naval forces), paramilitary forces, and U.S. naval forces.

Page 101, paragraph 190a, lines 3 through 5, delete portion of first sentence beginning with "but should be . . . war operations."

Page 101. In paragraph 190b, line 2, "naval craft" is changed to read "watercraft."

Page 101. Section IV title is changed to read "CHEMICAL OPERATIONS."

Page 101. Paragraph 191 is superseded as follows:

191. General

This section provides general guidance on the purposes concepts, organizations, and operations of brigade units employing riot-control munitions in counter guerrilla operations. These munitions are particularly useful where there is difficulty in pinpointing actual guerrilla locations, and where the area coverage provided by riot-control munitions would be greater than that of other available weapon systems. Nonlethal chemical munitions can be effective in areas in which the guerrilla force is intermingled with the local population and the employment of firepower such as artillery and air-delivered ordnance must be avoided. For additional information on CBR munitions, see FM 3-10, 3-12, 3-50, 21-40, and 101-40.

Page 101, paragraph 192b. In line 1, "and biological" is deleted.

Page 101, paragraph 192b (1). In line 2, "deny" is changed to read "restrict use of."

Page 102, paragraph 192b (5). In line 1, "biological or" is deleted.

Page 102, paragraph 193. In line 4, "The munition is" is changed to read "Some munitions are"

Page 102, paragraph 193a. The first sentence is changed to read:

a. Riot-control agents are used to support operations in which the counter guerrilla forces desire to restrict the use of an area for a short period of time using nonlethal means.

Page 102. Paragraph 193b is rescinded.

Page 102, paragraph 194. The introductory text in lines 1 through 8 is superseded as follows:

Since there may not be sufficient chemical personnel available to meet requirements in counter guerrilla situations, brigade personnel must be able to handle smoke, flame, and nonlethal agents such as riot-control munitions.

Page 102. Paragraph 194a is superseded as follows:

a. Ground Units. Any size ground tactical organization can employ riot-control agents. A platoon, for example, may designate one squad as the riot-control agent squad to provide target coverage. Larger units (company and battalion) may employ the munitions against more extensive targets, particularly in conjunction with air delivery of the agent. The agent may be employed in any desired quantities to gain the desired effects on target.

Page 108. Paragraph 201a is superseded as follows:

a. The need for a counter guerrilla force to conduct search operations or to employ search procedures will be a continuous requirement in stability operations. Most search operations will support strike operations or consolidation operations, or they may be conducted as the main effort in populace and resources control operations. A search may be oriented to people, to materiel, to buildings, or to terrain. It usually will involve both civil police and military personnel.

Page 113, paragraph 204c (3) (c). In lines 1 and 3, "reserves" is changed to read "reserve (reaction force)."

Page 115, paragraph 209a. In lines 2 and 3, "in internal defense operations" is changed to read "during stability operations."

Page 118, paragraph 212. In line 8, "infantry, airborne" is changed to read "infantry, airmobile infantry, airborne"

Page 120, paragraph 217. In line 9, "affairs" is changed to read "affairs."

Page 123, paragraph 225k. In line 7 "intelligence channels. In" is changed to read "intelligence channels and the remainder through logistical channels. In"

Page 123. Paragraph 225l is superseded as follows:

l. Destruction of Supplies and Equipment. Destruction of supplies and equipment (less medical) may be accomplished to deny their use to the guerrilla. Under the provisions of Geneva Conventions, medical supplies will not be intentionally destroyed (FM 27-10). For information on which to base destruction plans, see FM 5-25.

Page 141. In numerical sequence, the following references are added:

FM 19-4, Military Police Support, Theater of Operations

FM 30-17, Counterintelligence Operations. (Original entry for FM 30-17 is deleted.)

(C) FM 30-17A, Counterintelligence Special Operations (U)

FM 31-23, Stability Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine

(C) FM 32-5, Signal Security (U) (change in title)

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution:

To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 requirements for Counterguerrilla Operations.

(S) FM 32-10, USASA in Support of Tactical Operations (U)

(C) FM 32-20, Electronic Warfare (Ground-Based) (U)

Page 148, paragraph 17b(3). In line 19, the following text is added: “* * * when appropriate. The use of CW and horizontally polarized antennas as aids to operating in an electronic warfare environment should be stressed. The recognition of electronic countermeasures and electronic counter-countermeasures techniques should be subjects for integration with communication training.”

W. C. WESTMORELAND,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

FIELD MANUAL

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COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

	Paragraphs	Page
PART ONE. INTRODUCTION		
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION		
Section I. General	1-4	3
II. Terminology	5-7	4
CHAPTER 2. CONTRASTS AND COMPARISONS OF OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS	8-11	7
PART TWO. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT		
CHAPTER 3. INTRODUCTION		
Section I. General	12, 13	9
II. Relationships of operations and activities	14-19	9
III. Internal defense and development forces	20-23	12
CHAPTER 4. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT		
Section I. General considerations of the area of operations	24-30	15
II. Effects of the characteristics of the area	31-33	17
CHAPTER 5. THE HOSTILE GUERRILLA FORCE		
Section I. Disposition	34-37	20
II. Composition	38, 39	21
III. Activities	40, 41	22
IV. Strengths	42-44	27
V. Peculiarities and Weaknesses	45-48	27
CHAPTER 6. CONCEPTS AND PLANNING		
Section I. Concepts	49-51	29
II. Planning	52-67	31
III. Brigade organization for operations	68-89	40
IV. Phasing deployment to the host country	90-93	47
CHAPTER 7. TACTICAL OPERATIONS		
Section I. Introduction	94-160	49
II. Strike operations	107-119	54
III. Consolidation operations	120-130	63
IV. Combat support	131-138	69
CHAPTER 8. RELATED OPERATIONS		
Section I. Introduction	139-143	76
II. Intelligence operations	144-148	76
III. Psychological operations	149-153	82
IV. Civil affairs operations	154-160	83
V. Military civic action	161-165	88
VI. Advisory assistance operations	166-170	90
CHAPTER 9. SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES		
Section I. Movement security	171-181	92

* This manual supersedes FM 31-16, 19 February 1963.

	Paragraphs	Page
Section II. Border control operations	182-185	98
III. Waterborne operations	186-190	100
IV. Chemical, biological, and radiological operations	191-195	101
V. Tactical base operations	196-200	104
VI. Search operations and procedures	201-206	108
VII. Airbase/airfield defense	207-211	114
 PART THREE. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT		
CHAPTER 10. INTRODUCTION	212-216	118
11. LOGISTICS AND SERVICES		
Section I. Introduction	217-221	120
II. Supply	222-225	121
III. Maintenance	226-230	123
IV. Transportation	231-234	124
V. Medical service	235-239	126
VI. Other logistical services	240-243	128
CHAPTER 12. PERSONNEL	244-251	130
13. CIVIL AFFAIRS	252-256	133
 PART FOUR. REAR AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS		
CHAPTER 14. INTRODUCTION	257-261	136
15. BRIGADE OPERATIONS	262-266	137
 APPENDIX A. REFERENCES		139
B. MILITARY TRAINING		142
 INDEX		150

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

Section I. INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose

This manual provides guidance to commanders and staffs of brigades and subordinate units, and combat, combat support, and combat service support units in the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations.

2. Scope

a. Part One introduces the subject of counter-guerrilla operations and discusses the contrasts between the operational environments of these operations in limited and general war and in stability operations.

b. Part Two discusses brigade counter-guerrilla tactical and related operations applicable to stability operations.

c. Part Three discusses combat service support aspects common to counter-guerrilla operations in both internal defense operations and in rear area security operations, differentiating where appropriate between the two operational situations.

d. Part Four discusses counter-guerrilla operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited and general war.

e. All parts are applicable to both nuclear and nonnuclear war situations.

3. Application

The doctrine prescribed in this manual ap-

plies to existing brigade organizations which may be tailored or modified to meet the requirements of counter-guerrilla operations. The principles generally have universal application; however, since the guerrilla normally conducts his operations on the most difficult terrain in an area of operations, counter-guerrilla force commanders must modify the tactics and techniques discussed in this manual to fit the particular terrain in which they must operate. For example, in jungle and mountains, emphasis must be placed on the use of footmobility; in swamps and inundated areas, on the use of watercraft; and in level terrain or desert, on the use of vehicle mobility. This manual emphasizes the use of attached or supporting aviation for troop lift, resupply, reconnaissance, and fire support in the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations.

4. Changes and Comments

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve it. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text to which change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to Commanding Officer, United States Army Combat Developments Command Infantry Agency, Fort Benning, Ga., 31905.

Section II. TERMINOLOGY

5. General

The terms used in this manual are based upon those defined in AR 320-5 and related publications. To the extent that these publications do not provide terminology applicable to this manual, terms found in branch and general field manuals are used. Terms which pertain to specific parts of this manual are discussed in the appropriate paragraph. The terms, applicable to counter guerrilla operations and environments, are discussed below.

a. Area coordination center—a composite area headquarters at various political/military levels in which internal defense operations are planned, coordinated, and directed. Its members include the local chiefs of military, paramilitary, and other governmental agencies and their U.S. counterparts.

b. Area oriented—a term applied to personnel or units whose organization, mission, training, and equipping are based upon operational deployment to a specific geographical area.

c. Asset (intelligence)—includes any resource—person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, or supply—at the disposition of an intelligence organization for use in an operational or support role.

d. Consolidation psychological operations—psychological operations conducted toward populations in friendly areas of operations or in territory occupied by friendly military forces with the objective of facilitating operations and promoting maximum cooperation among the civil population.

e. Exfiltration—the removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means.

f. Penetration operation (intelligence)—the use of agents or technical monitoring devices in a target organization or installation for the purpose of gaining access to the secrets or of influencing and controlling its activities.

g. Populace and resources control—actions undertaken by a government to control the populace and its material resources or to deny

access to those resources which would further hostile aims and objectives against that government.

h. Stability operations—The term is used in the generic sense. It can be described as the full range of Internal Defense and Development operations and assistance which the U.S. Army can employ to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which government under law can function effectively and without which progress in modernization cannot be achieved.

6. Type Forces and Operations

The following terms in addition to those in AR 320-5, describing forces and operations, are used throughout this manual and are applicable to counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development and to counter guerrilla operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited and general war:

a. Regular Armed Forces. Permanent armed forces maintained in the highest state of organization, training, and equipment readiness to perform assigned missions in peace or war.

b. Irregular Forces. Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (Irregular forces may include organized youth groups, auxiliary political organizations and part-time, armed civilian militia.)

c. Guerrilla Operations. Tactical operations which utilize tactics characterized by surprise; brief, violent action; and elusiveness, and which may be supported entirely from resources within the operational area or in varying degrees by external sources.

d. Guerrilla Force. A combatant force employing guerrilla operations tactics. (The term is not used to indicate a type force based on organization, mission, and equipment, but only on the type tactics employed. Any type force—regular armed force, paramilitary or irregular force may be a guerrilla force when it conducts guerrilla operations.)

e. Counter guerrilla Operations. Operations and activities conducted by military forces and

nonmilitary agencies to defeat hostile forces employing guerrilla operations tactics.

f. Operation. A military action, or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.

g. Tactical Operation. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objective of any battle or campaign.

h. Campaign. A series of related military operations to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space.

7. National Structures and Subdivisions

The following terms, describing national structures and subdivisions, are used throughout this manual and are applicable to counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development and to counter guerrilla operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited and general war. To avoid repetition mention of the variances of political subdivisions between

and among nations, the structures discussed below will be used throughout this manual. The principal term used herein is given first, followed by equivalent or related terms in parentheses. The structures and their relationship are illustrated in figure 1.

a. Nation (Country, Republic, Union, Kingdom). Depending on the form of its government or the title of its leading or ruling figure or group, a *nation* may be otherwise designated as a country, republic, union, or kingdom. U.S. policy will determine the appropriate designation to be used in liaison between the U.S. and a given counterpart, with due regard for the preference of the counterpart. *Country*, although not used in the official title for a nation, applies generically to all nations.

b. Region (Zone, Territory). Most nations are divided naturally into two or more *regions* (zone, territory). Often, these regions have no formal governmental structure. They may be based on geographical land forms such as highlands, deltas, or valleys; they may be based




Figure 1. National structures and subdivisions.

on the general compass location of the area within the parent nation, such as Northwest, South, or Central; or they may be based on common religious, economic, or social ideas of the inhabitants.

c. State (Province). Most nations use formal *state* (province) type organizations as the first major subnational political subdivision. These may be purely administrative organizations, or they may be administrative and policy-making entities. State (province) organizations are usually subordinate to the regional (zone, territory) governmental structure when the regional structure exists.

d. County (District, Parish). A *county* (district, parish) is an administrative subdivision of a state (province). Counties (districts, parishes) may have certain policy-making options granted to them by the state (province); otherwise, they are administrative in nature.

e. Township (City, Village). A township

(city, village) is a subdivision of a county (district, parish), and it is administrative in nature except when specifically granted political options by the state (province). The options can rarely be granted by the parent county (district, parish). In some cases, townships serve merely as a basis for electoral districting. In figure 1, it should be noted that *village*, as used in some nations, implies an area somewhat larger than a town.

f. Town (Hamlet). This locality constitutes a population center within a township (village). It generally has formal governmental structure and may exercise considerable local options granted to it by the state (province). Within towns, further divisions may consist of *precinct, block, neighborhood, or ward*. These usually do not have formal governmental organizations and they may only serve as a basis for electoral districting or for dividing public services.

CHAPTER 2

CONTRASTS AND COMPARISONS OF OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

8. General

This chapter summarizes the operational differences between counter guerrilla operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited and general war and counter guerrilla operations in stability operations.

9. Limited and General War

These operational environments imply a state of open, *de facto* belligerency between nations, and a direct confrontation of their armed forces.

a. The Guerrilla Situation. In field army-type operations in limited and general war, hostile guerrillas may operate deep in the communications zone, or throughout the rear of engaged forces in the combat zone. The guerrilla forces may be composed of regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, irregular forces, or any combination of these forces. The following characteristics are typical of the guerrilla in limited and general war:

- (1) When the conventional force which he is supporting is defeated, the guerrilla normally loses his incentive to fight.
- (2) The personnel and equipment resources provided to the guerrilla in rear areas by a sponsoring power may be limited by the requirements of the sponsoring power to conduct warfare with its conventional forces.

b. The Counter guerrilla Situation. Essentially, counter guerrilla operations as part of the rear area security mission will be conducted to prevent interference with friendly operations in support of forces engaged in combat operations along the FEBA (forward edge of the battle area).

- (1) The counter guerrilla force commander may have almost complete authority over all aspects of the area of operations, particularly when operating in an occupied country.
- (2) Local political activities are normally not a major consideration affecting the activities of counter guerrilla forces.

10. Internal Defense and Development

This operational environment encompasses internal conflicts short of overt armed conflict between the regular armed forces of two or more sovereign nations. There is no recognized state of belligerency. The insurgent apparatus and the guerrilla normally operate to some degree throughout the affected nation. Since the essence of the counter guerrilla campaign is to win back the support of the people for the established government, the importance of civil affairs is paramount. The situation in the area of operations could vary widely. Under the best conditions the host government would be in firm control, and a relatively secure area as a base for U.S. counter guerrilla operations would be available. Alternatively, the guerrilla influence could predominate to such a degree that control by the host government would have been disrupted and the effect of the host government armed forces destroyed and the securing of an initial base area for U.S. forces made difficult. All counter guerrilla doctrine must be flexible to take into account varying situations.

a. The Guerrilla Situation.

- (1) The hostile guerrilla wages an ideological battle for the support of the population of a country. The guerrilla's objective in the conflict is not necessarily dependent on total defeat of the country's armed forces.

- (2) The external sponsoring power, if any, of the guerrilla may be able to provide personnel, equipment, and supplies with impunity.
- (3) The enemy of the guerrilla is the government, which may not be popularly supported by the majority of the people.

b. The Counterguerrilla Situation.

- (1) The U.S. counterguerrilla force commander does not have complete authority over all activities in his area of operations.
- (2) The host country may be limited in the resources it can expend to defeat the guerrilla force or its sponsoring power.
- (3) The major portion of available military resources within the host country may be fully committed; therefore, when major reserves are needed to press an advantage, they must be withdrawn from other operational areas and thus create situations in those areas which can be exploited by hostile guerrilla forces.
- (4) Divergent policies of political parties or economic, religious, or other organizations, while not supporting the hostile guerrilla force morally or actively, may undermine stringent government efforts to defeat the guerrilla force by seeking concessions or advantages during the period of internal conflict.

11. Comparisons of Operational Environments

a. Limited and general war military forces move amid their own systems of subsistence, law, and security largely apart from, or minimally involved with, their surroundings. In effect, they establish their own environments. Weather and terrain generally have equal in-

fluence on operations by both opposing forces. The military objectives of the two forces will usually be oriented to terrain and its occupation and defense, or to the denial of its use by the opposing force.

b. In internal defense and development, the two opposing forces are a national government and an insurgent movement within the country to overthrow that government. The military arm of the insurgent movement is the guerrilla force that employs guerrilla operations in its internal attack of the government. This guerrilla force and the counterguerrilla force organized to combat it will both move amid the populace of the country with the objective of winning their support and denying such support to the opposing side. The influence of weather and terrain on the operations of the two opposing forces will vary. Inclement weather and rugged terrain may favor the guerrilla force; fair weather and level, open terrain generally favors the counterguerrilla force.

c. In limited and general wars, civil affairs is used primarily in a supporting role. However, in internal defense operations, because of the importance of isolating the guerrillas from the people, civil affairs becomes one of the primary missions of the counterguerrilla force. This is because all internal defense operations plans must be based on an integrated civil-military approach designed to progressively reassert host government control and gain the trust, confidence, and active cooperation of the people. For this reason paragraphs 154 through 160 stress civil affairs because of its importance in internal defense operations. This must not be construed as meaning that specialist civil affairs units or personnel are requisite to the conduct of civil affairs operations. On the contrary, civil affairs operations, like intelligence operations is a command responsibility. If a commander is not provided with specialist civil affairs support, he must discharge his responsibilities with the resources available.

PART TWO

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER 3

INTRODUCTION

Section I. GENERAL

12. Purpose

The purpose of this part is to provide guidance to commanders and staffs of brigades and subordinate units, and combat, combat support, and combat service support units in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations in stability operations.

13. Scope

This part details the general doctrine promulgated in FM 61-100, FM 100-5, and FM 100-20.

a. This chapter introduces the subject of counter guerrilla operations in internal defense operations and presents general data and concepts applicable to the other chapters of this part.

b. Chapter 4 discusses the counter guerrilla operational environment in internal defense operations.

c. Chapter 5 discusses type guerrilla forces which may require brigade-size forces to combat them in internal defense operations.

d. Chapter 6 discusses military counter guerrilla concepts and planning factors.

e. Chapter 7 discusses counter guerrilla tactical operations in internal defense operations.

f. Chapter 8 summarizes the missions, concepts, organization, and operations of related counter guerrilla operations which are integrated with tactical operations.

g. Chapter 9 summarizes special operations which are of particular importance in supporting all counter guerrilla operations.

Section II. RELATIONSHIPS OF OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

14. General

This section presents a perspective from which to view the integration of U.S. brigade counter guerrilla operations with the overall internal defense and internal development of a host country.

15. Host Country/U.S. Relations

A nation becomes a *host country* when representatives or organizations of another nation are present because of governmental invitation or international agreement. The formal liaison

between a host country and the United States will normally be conducted by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission (usually an ambassador). The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body is normally the U.S. Country Team. The country team is composed of the senior members of each represented U.S. department or agency and is headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission.

16. Internal Security

a. During the course of normal national life, a host country's objectives and policies include

those which deal with preserving its *internal security*, the state of law and order within a nation, as determined by the government's capability to cope with violence, subversion, and lawlessness, and the prevailing public confidence in that capability.

b. In insuring or restoring its internal security, a host country conducts among other measures *counterintelligence*, that aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of hostile intelligence activities and to protecting information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or materiel against sabotage.

- (1) In the context of counterintelligence activities, *espionage*, the clandestine or covert use of agent personnel and/or equipment in order to obtain information, is met by *counterespionage*, a category of counterintelligence, the objective of which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage.
- (2) *Subversion*, which is action, principally clandestine or covert, designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength is met by *countersubversion*, that part of counterintelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical subversion activities, through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.
- (3) *Sabotage*, any deliberate act undertaken by an individual, group, or organization which employs disruptive or destructive methods against critical materials, facilities, and installations for the purpose of denying or limiting their use, is met by *countersabotage*, which is action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through the process of identifying, penetrating, and manipulating, neutralizing, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations

conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

c. The internal security of a country may be threatened by an *internal attack*, the full range of measures taken by organized insurgents to bring about the internal destruction and overthrow of a constituted government. An internal attack is countered by a combination of *internal defense* and *internal development*.

17. Internal Defense

Internal defense is the full range of measures taken by a constituted government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. One of the means by which internal defense is achieved by the conduct of *internal defense operations* which include any operation conducted by a host country or its allies—security establishment, military, paramilitary, or security organization—directly against armed insurgents, their underground organization, support system, external sanctuary, or outside supporting power. Counterguerrilla operations as discussed in this manual in a stability operational environment is classified as an internal defense operation. The host country capability to perform internal defense is assisted by the U.S. and other allies through *internal defense assistance operations*, which include any operation undertaken by the military, paramilitary, police, or other security agencies of an outside power to strengthen the host government politically, economically, psychosocially, or militarily.

18. Internal Development

Internal development is the strengthening of the roots, functions, and capabilities of government and the viability of the national life of a country toward the end of internal independence and freedom from conditions fostering insurgency. Internal development is achieved by the conduct of *internal development operations*, which include any direct operation undertaken by a host government or its allies to strengthen the local government politically, economically, socially, or militarily, or make more viable its national life. The host country capability to perform internal development is assisted by the U.S. and other allies through *internal development assistance operations*, which include any organized action taken by

government or nongovernment agencies of an outside power to support host government internal development efforts.

19. Related Activities in Internal Defense and Development

a. The host country activities associated with internal defense and development plans oriented primarily toward countering an internal attack may be categorized in the following actions:

- (1) *Political action*, which includes activity in political channels or the use of political power to attain specific objectives. It involves such activity as appointing officials, initiating and operating political organizations, providing political education, and enacting laws or decrees.
- (2) *Economic action*, to include the planned use of measures designed to generate economic stability within the host country and serve to improve the standard of living of the individual.
- (3) *Psychological action*, which includes political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in hostile, neutral, or friendly groups, the emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national objectives.
- (4) *Civic action*, which includes the participation by an agency, organization, or group in economic and sociological projects which are useful to the local population at all levels, but for which the sponsor does not have primary governmental responsibility. Projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others which contribute to the general welfare, and serve to improve the standing of the sponsor with the population.
- (5) *Military action*. Host country military and paramilitary action is only a part of the overall internal defense and development effort, and this ac-

tion must be in consonance with the overall effort of the host country and will normally be conducted as described in this manual for the U.S. brigade.

b. The U.S. brigade will conduct military operations in support of both the internal defense and the internal development efforts of a host country. In the conduct of counter guerrilla operations in support of internal defense and development, the brigade will concentrate its efforts toward the following:

- (1) *Tactical operations* directly against guerrilla forces. Tactical operations may be either *strike operations* or *consolidation operations*. Strike operations are primarily offensive operations, characterized by brevity, which are conducted in an assigned area of operation, to find, fix, destroy, or capture the guerrilla. Consolidation operations are primarily defensive operations, characterized by long duration, which are conducted in an assigned area of responsibility, to provide a secure area in which positive effort can be devoted to internal development.
- (2) *Intelligence operations* which will extend host country civil intelligence programs, and provide information useful in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development. Military intelligence systems will be coordinated with host country activities.
- (3) *Psychological operations*. In order to extend the civilian psychological operations campaign to the lowest levels, and to support their own activities, brigade forces will conduct psychological operations, integrated with the national psychological operations campaign.
- (4) *Civil affairs operations*. Any project or activity of the brigade forces involving contact with civilians outside the military establishment or designed to influence or control civilian activities and civil organizations can be classified as a civil affairs operation.

In counterguerrilla operations, control of the civilian population, denial of material resources along with gaining the support loyalty and respect of the people are major concerns of the force commander. These civil affairs functions are achieved by the force commander primarily through populace and resources control and military civic action. Hereafter, they will be discussed separately as the most evident manifestation of civil affairs operations in the brigade, but the two programs must always be considered with respect to the total relationship between the military force, the host government, and the people.

- (a) *Populace and resources control operations.* In order to isolate guerrilla forces from both in country and sponsoring power logistical and manpower support, the brigade may be called upon to augment over-

taxed civil police and other host country forces in actions to control the populace and its resources or to deny access to those resources which would further hostile aims and objectives against the host country government.

- (b) *Military civic action.* Military civic action has proved effective in gaining civilian support for military operations and isolating the guerrillas physically and psychologically from the civilian support without which they cannot exist. The military civic action program can encompass everything from a soldier imparting his particular skill or knowledge to civilian in order to help the civilian solve a problem or better his condition to the entire brigade providing security for crop harvest and aid in developing living needs.

Section III. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT FORCES

20. General

Internal defense and development forces comprise organizations, both civilian and military, of the host country, U.S., and allied nations which are employed to free and protect the host country society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

21. Host Country Internal Defense and Development Forces

Host country internal defense and development forces may consist of varied types or organizations: regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, irregular forces, and civilian agencies.

a. Regular Armed Forces. Regular armed forces, composed of standard and specially trained units, may make up the largest contingent of readily available indigenous troops which can be moved at will throughout a country. These units are normally employed in the counterguerrilla role.

- (1) Divisions, brigades, or regiments can be organized into a number of vari-

able sized task forces. These forces engage in reconnaissance and combat patrols, or operate in larger formations organized to strike rapidly against guerrilla forces. Regular armed forces are situated to permit rapid reaction to guerrilla attacks, or to conduct planned operations in coordination with other counterguerrilla forces. Regular armed forces also are frequently available for, and should always be considered in planning and executing, military civic action projects. The extent to which their work in military civic action is made known to the people by effective PSYOP will contribute to the degree of cooperation and amount of intelligence information received from the population for counterguerrilla tactical operations.

- (2) Special units of the regular armed forces of a host country may include ranger, airmobile, and airborne units.
- (a) Ranger-type units normally operate

within the military chain of command, either as companies or battalions, or in ranger task forces. Their form of combat is offensive in nature and characterized by aggressive reconnaissance patrols and combat operations aimed at the destruction of guerrilla forces by raids and ambushes, long-range patrolling, and the disruption of guerrilla lines of communication. They can provide the forces for intelligence and operational screening missions.

- (b) Airmobile troops with their assault-type helicopters are located to meet established reaction time criteria for reaching planned objective areas in the shortest possible time.
- (c) Airborne units provide troops to assault by parachute objective areas which are too distant for airmobile or other forces to respond within the required reaction time.

b. Paramilitary Forces. The organization of the paramilitary force may be similar to regular armed forces. They are frequently constituted from indigenous volunteers whose knowledge of the terrain and people is equal to that of the guerrilla. Paramilitary units are composed of armed personnel and have the primary mission of relieving the regular armed forces of security missions and local defense duties within a given political subdivision, such as a state (province). Armament for paramilitary forces will consist primarily of individual weapons, light machineguns, and light mortars. Communication equipment may be limited. Paramilitary units may be organized as squads, platoons, companies, or battalions and may be trained to perform limited tactical missions. Often, they are charged with enforcing the law and maintaining public order and security in rural areas. In their security roles, paramilitary units conduct raids, and ambushes, either alone or with irregular forces or regular armed forces. Paramilitary units may be called upon to reinforce security posts under attack or to pursue withdrawing guerrillas. Other typical tasks for which paramilitary units may be responsible are defense of towns and guarding

headquarters, bridges, key installations, and local airstrips.

c. Police Forces. Police forces, consisting of local, regional, and national security elements, normally constitute the primary populace and resources control forces of a host country. They are oriented on the population and in addition to ferreting out the insurgent underground elements they may be the only effective indigenous counterguerrilla force in a given locale. Police forces are normally charged with the responsibility of securing key governmental installations, public facilities, and preserving a state of law and order.

d. Irregular Forces. Irregular forces, or armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces or paramilitary forces, consisting of civilian political organizations, trade unions, youth groups, and others, may be mobilized, trained, and armed to supplement the regularly constituted military, paramilitary, and police forces described above. They may also be organized primarily to indoctrinate their members to support the government.

e. Civilian Agencies. Governmental and private civilian agencies, organizations, and religious welfare groups normally address problems associated with internal development. These groups may well perform immediate impact programs in areas provided troop protection for limited periods of time (strike operations) in addition to performing long-range impact programs in areas under firm and continuous governmental control (consolidation operations).

22. U.S. and Allied Internal Defense and Development Forces

U.S. and allied internal defense and development forces may consist of military advisory groups; combat, combat support, and combat service support units; governmental civilian agencies; nongovernmental assistance organizations; and religious and welfare groups. Some or all of these agencies may be performing tasks with indigenous elements in the brigade operational area. The brigade commander or senior military combat commander must coordinate all allied and U.S. activities

with similar host country organizations and activities to the extent necessary for successful brigade operations.

a. U.S. and allied civilian organizations provide funds, facilities, and personnel to assist the host country population in economic, social, political, and civic internal development, and in providing emergency relief measures.

b. U.S. and allied armed forces missions are described in subsequent chapters; however, of particular interest to brigades committed in internal defense are MAAG personnel and specialized units which may have been deployed earlier than the brigade and who know the population, operational area, and military and civilian leaders, and who have cooperated with host country regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, and irregular forces in the area. These personnel and units can provide the brigade with intelligence information and identify the necessary points of contact for coordination and planning.

c. U.S. Air Force and similar allied units can assist in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations by—

- (1) Maintaining air superiority.
- (2) Preventing air delivery of supplies and equipment by a sponsoring power.
- (3) Conducting aerial resupply and other logistical functions.
- (4) Conducting close air support, interdiction, and tactical air reconnaissance.
- (5) Delivering airborne and air landed forces.
- (6) Disseminating chemical agents, flame, smoke, riot-control agents, and defoliant agents on selected targets.

d. U.S. and allied naval forces can assist in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations by—

- (1) Disrupting guerrilla coastal supply channels.
- (2) Providing sea transportation, support of amphibious operations and assault craft for river and other waterborne operations.

(3) Conducting shore bombardment, close air support, interdiction, and tactical air reconnaissance.

(4) Preventing seaward escape of guerrilla forces.

(5) Providing seaborne supply and other logistical functions.

e. U.S. Marine forces and similar allied forces can assist in the conduct of counter guerrilla operations by conducting operations in the air and on the ground similar to those performed by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Marine forces are specially trained to conduct amphibious operations.

23. Brigade Considerations of Host Country Internal Defense Forces

Although host country military forces may not be organized along U.S. lines, the doctrine developed and tested by U.S. agencies may prove useful in many countries of the world. Chiefs of MAAG and Missions and brigade commanders should encourage the military leaders of the host country to adopt organizations similar to those which have been proven effective in dealing with guerrillas. It may often be necessary to compromise between those forces organized conventionally to deal with an external threat and the forces necessary to combat guerrillas. However, with appropriate modifications and additional training, most host country forces can perform both roles. Host country military establishments will probably not be modern. They may not have the capability to administer themselves adequately so as to operate efficiently, lacking such things as—

a. A central personnel record system to include pay records.

b. Regulations, training literature, and other guidance material.

c. Standard uniforms and insignia.

d. Adequate reporting procedures.

e. Capability of conducting combined-arms operations.

CHAPTER 4

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Section I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

24. General

This chapter outlines environmental factors which must be considered in planning and conducting brigade counter guerrilla operations. It includes a general description of typical operational areas, to include economic, political, and social aspects of the areas, the military aspects of the area, and effects of the characteristics of the area on brigade operations. Department of the Army area and country studies provide details on specific areas or countries, while FM 100-20 provides additional general guidance on the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces, and which bear on the decisions of the counter guerrilla force commander.

25. Planning for Counter guerrilla Operations

Information concerning a host country which affects planning for counter guerrilla operations includes a detailed examination of the country with regard to its geography, sociology, economy, politics, and other specific fields constituting areas which may have an effect on counter guerrilla operations. The following is a general discussion of some principal factors which should be considered. It is not exhaustive in scope; rather, it is intended to illustrate the importance of considering these factors in planning for brigade counter guerrilla operations.

26. Military Considerations of the Area of Operations

Counter guerrilla operations may be required in areas which vary from mountains to plains and deltas; from deserts to jungles and rain forests; and from relatively open areas to obstacle-studded terrain. Each area has its own

peculiarities, and brigades committed in a particular area must be organized appropriately. Administrative and logistical support will be complicated by variances of terrain. Each area presents significantly different problems of supply, transportation, maintenance, medical support, and other logistical services. Similarly, personnel services, as well as the brigade personnel, must be fitted and acclimated as the operational area dictates.

27. Geography, Topography, Terrain, Climate, and Vegetation

Mild or tropical climate favors the guerrilla forces, who must depend largely on the land for subsistence, since this type of climate insures year-round vegetation and foliage for subsistence, cover, and concealment. Rigorous cold climates hamper guerrilla operations, since increased logistical support is required for operations under these conditions. The brigade must have an intimate knowledge of the terrain to insure effective counter guerrilla operations.

28. Political Considerations

a. Brigade commanders and staffs must consider the political forces which influence the operation of the society in a host country.

b. Important considerations in politics are the leaders and their motivations, ambitions, and influence. An understanding of the formal structure of the host country government and its operations is important, to include its relationship with the population, the relationships among the internal departments such as police and revenue, and the relationships each of these departments has with the population, to include those between the government services provided and the taxes levied by the government.

Equally important is a complete understanding of the informal and actual civilian power structure of the area wherever and whenever this differs from that of the formal government. In many areas, actual social controls are in the hands of religious, tribal, economic, or other nongovernmental power structures which may wield more effective influence over the local populace than does the host country government.

29. Economic Considerations

Among the economic considerations relevant to an area of operations are the types of economy (agricultural or industrial), living conditions, transportation, communications, food supply, and standard of living of the various segments of the population. The causes of unrest which lead to emergence of guerrillas almost always include, and may consist chiefly of, frustration resulting from living in backward economic environments with corresponding undeveloped national infrastructures. The following common problems are faced by host countries countering guerrillas and simultaneously trying to remove the cause of the emergence of the guerrillas.

a. Raw Material. While some developing nations are richly endowed with raw material resources, other countries have only one or two basic resources and are vulnerable to the destruction of their markets by development of synthetic substitutes, fluctuating world markets, or by rising transportation costs.

b. Agriculture. Most developing nations must rely on agricultural export for foreign exchange. Dependent on one or two crops, they are vulnerable to various weather and world market fluctuations. Antiquated agricultural technology, an expanding population, and the need to export in exchange for medicine and other necessities create problems for even potentially rich agricultural nations.

c. Industry. Few newly independent nations have modern industrial complexes. Shortages of capital, management capability, skilled labor, raw materials, power, transportation, and marketing techniques all inhibit modernization, consequently, many nations must import manufactured goods.

d. Utilities. Modernization depends on basic

utilities such as power, communications, and transportation. In developing nations, the capital required to establish utilities is usually not available. A nation countering guerrillas has committed its resources largely to the military effort; thus it has little left to underwrite improvement of the environment. Generally, guerrillas who claim to struggle for improvement of the economic, social, and political environment are themselves responsible for its stagnation.

30. Sociological Considerations

Population size and distribution, basic racial stock and physical characteristics, ethnic minority groups, social structure, religion, and culture—all must be considered relevant to an area of operations.

a. Concentrated, urban populations are more easily controlled and protected by host country forces than are scattered populations in rural areas.

b. The racial stock and physical characteristics of the population of an area are important considerations in counter guerrilla operations. A tendency exists among the populations of developing countries to fear and distrust persons who are not of their own race.

c. Ethnic groups, constituting minority factions, become a consideration in counter guerrilla operations; because of discrimination or persecution, they may be either a source of discontent or of major assistance.

d. Social groups may exercise great influence and control over their members.

e. In countries where religion exerts a strong influence, gaining the favor of, and some influence with, the clergy could be valuable.

f. Languages may be diverse within any one country. Various ethnic and tribal groups will have significantly different dialects which are incompatible and these may be unintelligible to those speaking the official language of the government and of the metropolitan areas.

g. Customs and traditions may vary greatly, but respecting and accommodating them will assist in understanding those which affect brigade counter guerrilla operations.

Section II. EFFECTS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA

31. General

This section outlines some typical effects of area characteristics on guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations. The discussion is based upon guerrilla and counter-guerrilla force disposition, capabilities, weaknesses, composition, and peculiarities outlined in chapters 5 and 6, and in this chapter.

32. Effect on Guerrilla Force Courses of Action

a. Geography, Topography, Terrain, Climate, and Vegetation. Rugged topography provides ample cover, concealment, and obstacles, and few good road nets. The deemphasis on critical terrain by guerrilla forces, coupled with the inability of the constituted government to control the people living in remote areas, permits guerrilla forces relatively free access to all but those areas under direct control of the host country government. A geographical position adjacent to a sponsoring power or powers further facilitates the development and operations of guerrilla forces. The following are significant examples of area characteristics which must be given constant attention by the counter-guerrilla force:

- (1) Areas suitable for guerrilla bases. Such areas have the following characteristics:
 - (a) Difficulty of accessibility, as in mountains, jungles, or marshes.
 - (b) Concealment from aerial reconnaissance.
 - (c) Terrain which favors defense and covered withdrawals.
 - (d) Location usually a one-day journey from small civilian settlements which may provide food and act as outposts.
- (2) Numerous concealed trails approaching possible guerrilla areas of operation.
- (3) Principal roads and trails traversing and passing along the circumference of friendly-controlled areas.
- (4) Principal routes connecting separate guerrilla-controlled areas.

- (5) Roads and trails in the vicinity of host country installations and lines of communication.

- (6) Fords, bridges, and ferries across rivers; seasons when the rivers are in flood.

- (7) Areas where drinking water is available and where foot approaches are difficult or impossible.

- (8) Small settlements and farms in and near guerrilla-controlled areas.

- (9) Suitable areas for airdrops or boat or submarine rendezvous; roads and trails leading into guerrilla or sponsoring power controlled areas, or areas friendly to the guerrillas.

- (10) Suitable helicopter landing zones.

b. Political Considerations. The lack of well-developed political and administrative structures which do not reach, or are not responsive to, the population, or which prevent host country police or armed forces from being effective, reinforces the guerrilla force capability of coercion or persuasion to gain the support of remote local populations. Guerrilla operations in these areas may go uncountered or unpunished by the host country, and political bickering or host country administrative confusion is capitalized upon by guerrilla psychological operations emphasizing the separation of the host country government from the local population.

c. Economic Considerations. The low standard of living and lack of basic comforts, or unemployment among the population in the area, are psychological themes frequently used against the host country government. These conditions may be a disadvantage to guerrilla forces because logistical support derived from a population living under substandard conditions may engender counter-guerrilla attitudes. On the other hand, these people may be attracted to the guerrilla force by promises or relatively minor acts of economic assistance provided by the guerrilla force.

d. Sociological Considerations. Sociological conditions in the area may have the same general effects as do economic conditions described

above. The groups of a fragmented society may be played off against one another, be subverted from host country allegiance, and recruited to the guerrilla force more easily than a monolithic population, thus permitting guerrilla forces logistical, personnel, psychological, and intelligence support essential to successful guerrilla operations.

33. Effect on Brigade Courses of Action

Consideration of the military aspects of the area must encompass all of the operations in which brigades may become involved, to include not only tactical operations, but also intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance performed in support of brigade tactical operations. In all of the counter guerrilla operations described later in this manual, certain factors (*a-d* below) which are significantly different from normal limited and general war employment must be recognized in brigade counter guerrilla planning and operations.

a. Geography, Topography, Terrain, Climate, and Vegetation.

- (1) The guerrilla force usually knows intimately the area of operations. This may not be true of the host country forces or of the U.S. or allied forces which may assist the host country. Increased emphasis on complete intelligence, habitual employment of brigade forces in the same area, and the integration of the brigade activities into the activities of the population are required to gain and maintain familiarity with an area equal to that of the guerrilla.
- (2) Undeveloped surface transportation networks (roads, canals, and railroads) may prevent free use of sophisticated, organic brigade means of transportation. Operations under these circumstances stress footmobility and the possible use of nonorganic means of transportation, such as boats, pack animals, bicycles, and others.
- (3) Increased reliance on host country

sources of intelligence, and an increased overall intelligence collection effort to locate guerrilla bases and caches and approaches thereto, will be required because difficult terrain which the guerrilla favors can provide excellent cover and concealment for his installations.

b. Political Considerations. The possible lack of well-defined responsibilities within a host country may confuse command lines and hamper operations. This will require the brigade to coordinate with numerous governmental officials in order to locate sources of authority and decision.

c. Civil Affairs Considerations.

- (1) *Economical.* Brigade operations must be conducted to assist in improving the economic status of the population in the area, and to insure that operations disrupt as little as possible the normal economic activities of the local population. If logistical support is available from the population, and if gaining this support from the local population will assist rather than harm the economy, local procurement may be authorized. If this is not the case, the brigade must be more dependent on logistical support from outside the operational area. In any case, damage to economic installations incident to tactical operations must be minimized, and just compensation made for damage which does occur.
- (2) *Sociological.* Brigade operations must be conducted to disrupt, as little as possible, the customs, social activities, relationships between ethnic and tribal groups, and the physical well-being of the population. The brigade is committed to assist the host country and its people; therefore, the application of firepower must be selective and restrained to prevent injury or death to the civil population. Psychological operations and military civic action programs must be tailored to the specific attitudes and needs of the local population. Language differences be-

tween brigade personnel and the population, and between various ethnic or tribal groups within the population, must be minimized by use of interpreters or multilingual personnel from the host country or the U.S.

d. Combat Service Support Aspects. The operational aspects discussed above are generally applicable to combat service support aspects. Because of the requirement for integration of brigade activities with the population, the political structure, and economic activities, emphasis must be placed on the civil affairs aspects of operations. This may require civil affairs

staff sections at brigade and battalion level, and may entail civil affairs augmentation to company, or lower levels, and, concurrently, the capability of all personnel to function effectively without civil affairs assistance must be recognized, ingrained in all troops, and accommodated, by training, in planning and operations. Logistical activities must include planning to support not only the brigades, but also civilian supplies or commodities, goods, or services to be made available to the civilian population, government, or economy in areas administered by brigades or in areas in which brigades are committed.

CHAPTER 5

THE HOSTILE GUERRILLA FORCE

Section I. DISPOSITION

34. General

This chapter provides general guidance on typical insurgent or resistance organizations, and focuses on their tactical forces, the guerrilla, as opposed to their underground cadres and auxiliary organizations.

35. Areas

In general, the size of areas of operation, the types of guerrilla activity conducted in each, and the distribution of the elements of the guerrilla force within areas depend primarily on the degree of control exercised by the counter guerrilla force. The degree of control of an area will fluctuate with the effectiveness of the overall internal defense and development effort; the size and capabilities of the guerrilla force; and the attitudes of the population. Guerrilla operations are conducted in areas generally as follows:

a. Guerrilla Controlled Areas. Normally, guerrilla headquarters, camps, and bases are located in these areas, and determined resistance may be offered to counter guerrilla forces attempting to penetrate them. The guerrilla and his support organizations normally concentrate their propaganda and recruiting programs in these areas.

b. Contested Areas. These are the principal areas of offensive operations by the guerrilla force. Guerrillas may not offer determined resistance to the entry of counter guerrilla forces into this area, preferring instead to conduct harassing operations against them.

c. Friendly Controlled Areas. Guerrilla offensive operations in these areas are normally limited to raids, small ambushes, sniping, and mining operations. Guerrillas may occasionally attempt to penetrate these areas by coordinated

attacks launched by battalion or larger sized formations. Other hostile activities include covert operations such as subversion, espionage, psychological operations, terrorism, and sabotage.

36. Guerrilla Areas of Operations

Guerrillas can be expected to divide their area of operations, including areas controlled by the host country, into smaller areas of responsibility which are assigned to subordinate guerrilla units. Within these areas, guerrilla units carry out tactical missions and psychological operations, and attempt to control the populace and collect taxes, food, and supplies. Guerrilla areas of operation may be structured on established host country political boundaries, and may include a complete insurgent shadow government in each area with designated political chiefs and economic, political, social, and civic organizations designated to replace host country functionaries as the situation permits. Irregular, paramilitary, and regular armed guerrilla forces generally are assigned local, regional, and national missions, respectively, as the situation dictates, and function as extensions of the insurgent shadow government.

37. Distribution and Location

The distribution and location of forces within guerrilla operational areas is highly flexible, shifts in forces being made as opportunities to strike the counter guerrilla force and the host country government are presented. Guerrilla forces normally employ frequent moves as a counterintelligence technique to prevent their location and destruction by counter guerrilla strikes against them. Guerrillas often disperse and intermingle with the populace when any sizable counter guerrilla action threatens the guerrilla force operations.

Section II. COMPOSITION

38. General

Composition of a guerrilla force varies according to purpose; terrain; character and density of the local population; availability of food,

medical supplies, arms, and equipment; quality of leadership; amount and nature of external support and direction; and countermeasures used against it by counter guerrilla forces (fig. 2).




Figure 2. Type guerrilla force organization.

39. Organization

Guerrilla forces may vary from groups of squad and platoon size to units of division size or larger with extensive support organizations including elements for combat, intelligence, counterintelligence, political, and logistic support. Guerrilla forces may be organized in three main types of forces: regular, paramilitary, and irregular armed forces. The distinction between these forces is based on differences in organization, training, weapons, equipment, and mission.

a. Guerrilla regular armed forces (sometimes called main force) are only employed militarily when there is maximum chance for success. They usually operate for given periods of time in various regions, moving from region to region according to operational requirements and the effectiveness of counter guerrilla operations. The regular forces possess the best available equipment, weapons (including mortars and artillery), and uniforms, and are used primarily against the counter guerrilla regular armed forces. Guerrilla regular forces usually are well organized (into regimental-size units or larger), well trained, and well led. They operate in close conjunction with the paramilitary and irregular guerrilla forces. Fillers for the guerrilla regular forces usually are selected from the best of the guerrilla paramilitary troops. Sponsoring powers may provide elements of their armed forces as advisors or to reinforce guerrilla regular forces.

b. Guerrilla paramilitary forces are less well organized, trained, and equipped than the regu-

lar forces. The guerrilla paramilitary force may be organized into platoons, companies, battalions, and at times, regiments (or equivalent organizations). Guerrilla paramilitary forces launch limited attacks, harass installations and troops, and ambush counter guerrilla force reinforcements. A guerrilla paramilitary force is normally assigned to a specific area of operation (e.g., state (province) or county (district)) and does not normally move from that area for conduct of operations elsewhere. Fillers for paramilitary forces usually are obtained from guerrilla irregular forces.

c. Guerrilla irregular forces are auxiliaries responsible for collecting intelligence information, building bases, fortifying villages, acting as scouts or porters for the guerrilla regular forces or paramilitary forces, and providing security for insurgent officials at the local level. Members of guerrilla irregular forces receive limited military training but receive extensive political indoctrination. They normally retain their civilian occupations and function as combatants on a part-time basis in delaying and harassing the counter guerrilla force. These limited military activities may include sniping and employment of improvised antipersonnel boobytraps and devices.

d. Sponsoring power resources, to include combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations and military organizers and advisors, and civilian political, economic, and psychological organizers and advisors may be provided to guerrilla forces to assist in organizational and operational missions and activities.

Section III. ACTIVITIES

40. Tactical Operations

When guerrilla forces first become operational, they engage in limited or small-scale activities and operations; if guerrilla forces are permitted to reach a level of sophisticated organization, training, and equipment, they can conduct large-scale operations which will require regular armed forces to combat them.

a. Guerrilla Operations. Guerrilla operations constitute a sustained campaign utilizing tactics characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and

brief, violent action. Basically, guerrilla forces employ raid and ambush tactics in the offense. There usually is little attempt, in contrast to normal combat operations, to seize with the intent of holding physical objectives. In any given action, small hostile guerrilla units, usually lacking the weapons for indirect fire support and staying power, are involved. Attacks are executed and the units disperse, leaving the scene of action in order to avoid engaging more powerful counter guerrilla force reserves com-


mitted against them. Guerrilla operational principles include—

- (1) Attack vulnerable objectives with superior strength.
- (2) Avoid direct, decisive engagement with superior counter guerrilla forces.
- (3) Concentrate rapidly for action, then disperse to avoid counteraction.
- (4) Intermingle with the populace.
- (5) Maintain the initiative.
- (6) Conduct all operations to surprise counter guerrilla forces. Guerrilla forces attempt to achieve surprise through accurate intelligence, detailed planning including rehearsals, clandestine approach to objectives, footmobility in rugged terrain, speed and determination in execution of operations, and camouflage and deception measures.
- (7) Conduct defensive operations characterized by delaying tactics, harassment, sniping, and deceptive maneuver. On occasion, forces conducting guerrilla operations will establish defensive positions around towns or bases or on favorable terrain in areas under guerrilla control, withdrawing before the position becomes untenable.
- (8) Attack by mortar and artillery fire fixed installations such as logistical installations, airbases/airfields, compounds, outposts, and other base complexes.

b. Ambushes. The ambush is a common form of guerrilla attack (fig. 3). It is based on thorough intelligence and detailed planning, and is executed with surprise and determination. Ambushes are directed against troop and supply movements and drop zones and landing areas. Defiles and ravines in mountainous or wooded areas are good sites for ambushes; however, ambushes are sometimes conducted in open areas. Commanding ground, concealment, and camouflage are fully utilized. Attacks usually are made at close range to gain maximum shock effect. Automatic fire may be used to cover the entire target in depth. Shotguns, grenades, and mortars may be used. Road-

blocks, demolitions, mines, or recoilless weapons often are used to halt fast-moving columns or trains at the desired place of ambush.

- (1) Silence and immobility are scrupulously observed by the guerrilla ambush forces in the area of the ambush. Small elements of the advance security of a counter guerrilla force usually are permitted to pass through the ambush position to be attacked by a guerrilla element separate from the main ambush force. Fire is opened and the attack is launched by prearranged signal, usually given by the guerrilla element charged with halting the head of the main column. If the ambush is successful, usually the ambush force quickly salvages usable supplies and equipment, destroys the remainder, and withdraws. The guerrilla will be particularly certain to salvage armament and ammunition left at the site of the ambush since, in the early stages of guerrilla force organization, this is an important source of his resupply of these critical items.
- (2) The guerrilla force uses extensive security measures to cover its movement to the ambush position, preparation of the ambush position, and the withdrawal. Secondary ambushes, some distance from the site of the principal ambush, frequently are used to destroy or delay counter guerrilla force reinforcements. Often, an initial or preliminary ambush is used to lure counter guerrilla reaction force into a primary or major ambush.
- (3) When the guerrilla force is not strong enough to destroy ambushed forces, action is terminated by a prearranged signal as counteraction begins to form. A planned withdrawal covered by security detachments is executed. Often, the guerrilla will withdraw by detachments in several directions to complicate pursuit. Elements of the guerrilla irregular force, or civilians, are used to maintain visual contact and to harass and delay by sniping action or to report on pursuing units.



- ① ELEMENT TO HALT LEADING VEHICLE OR PARTY
- ② ASSAULT ELEMENTS
- ③ ELEMENT TO ISOLATE ADVANCE GUARD
- ④ ELEMENT TO CUT OFF RETREAT
- ⑤ ELEMENT TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT
- ⑥ ELEMENT TO COVER WITHDRAWAL

Figure 3. Type guerrilla ambush.

c. *Raids.* Guerrilla forces conduct raids to destroy fixed installations or capture arms, equipment, and supplies, to kill or capture personnel, and/or to harass or demoralize counter-guerrilla forces. The raid, like the ambush, is based on thorough intelligence and detailed planning, including rehearsal, and it is executed with speed, surprise, and violence. Infiltration is normally employed by the guerrilla raiding force and is covered with extensive security measures and by clandestine movements generally made at night. The guerrilla force making a raid usually is organized into three principal elements, each being assigned a specific mission. One element eliminates the guards. Since surprise is indispensable to the success of this type of operation, ruses may be used in eliminating sentries before they can sound an alarm. The use of firearms in this task usually is forbidden. Following the elimination of the guards, a second element kills or captures personnel, and destroys or carries away equipment and supplies. A third element of the raiding force covers the operation and the withdrawal. Sometimes, individuals of the raiding force will infiltrate the target area prior to the raid and assist by causing confusion and operating according to prearranged plans. Such supporters of the raiding force may be indigenous to the target area.

d. *Operations Against Lines of Communication.* Guerrilla forces may continually attack host country lines of communication to deny their use to the counter-guerrilla forces and harass, delay, or prevent movement along the routes. Guerrilla elements normally are assigned sectors of the line of communication to be blocked. Within each sector, the bridges and roadbeds may be destroyed to the degree necessary to prohibit or regulate traffic. Often, trees are felled and slides are caused to further block the route. Mines and demolitions are used extensively. Guerrilla units usually are deployed along the line of communication. They engage small elements of the counter-guerrilla force to prevent the route from being repaired or cleared. They ambush counter-guerrilla supply and troop movements. If superior counter-guerrilla force is massed against any sector, the guerrillas withdraw and seek to block another sector of the line of communication which is less strongly protected. By constantly shifting

their forces to weak points, lines of communication may be so thoroughly disrupted that the host country is forced to abandon the route or to employ sizable forces to protect it.

e. *Attacks in Force.* Guerrilla regular forces which have attained a high level of organization and are adequately armed, equipped, and supported, are capable of attacks in force against isolated garrisons, combat units, and installations. Operations of this nature closely parallel conventional offensive operations. Normally, the guerrilla force tries to isolate the objective from adjacent areas. The roads, railroads, and wire communications leading to the objective area are systematically disrupted. Paramilitary and irregular guerrilla forces may be used to establish defenses of drop zones and landing zones and use sabotage and ambushes to intercept, delay, or destroy counter-guerrilla troops and supply movements into the objective area, while the guerrilla regular force executes the main attack.

f. *Defensive Combat.* Defensive combat in the limited and general war sense seldom is used by a guerrilla force, partly because the guerrilla lacks adequate weapons and equipment, such as artillery and antitank weapons, which normally are required for a successful defense. In addition, control of any given terrain is rarely so critical to the guerrilla's operations that he is willing to defend it at the risk of meeting counter-guerrilla forces in set battle. When the guerrilla does defend an area, he modifies the principles of defensive combat to meet his needs and offset his deficiencies.

- (1) Occasionally, guerrillas may resort to defensive action to contain an opposing force in a position favorable for attacking its rear or flanks. These attacks may include raids, ambushes, and attacks on the lines of communication, flanks, reserve units, supporting arms, and installations. Snipers may fire on key personnel, radio carriers, drivers, messengers, and other targets. Routes of approach may be mined. Diversionary action in adjacent areas may be intensified to distract attacking counter-guerrilla forces or to lure them into dividing their efforts.

- (2) Guerrilla forces may defend to prevent counter guerrilla force penetration of guerrilla-controlled areas, and to gain time for guerrilla regular forces to react. Defensive combat by a guerrilla force is characterized by flexibility, mobility, and aggressiveness.
- (3) When surrounded or cut off, guerrillas may immediately attempt to break out by force at a single point, or they may disband and exfiltrate individually. If both tactics fail, individuals attempt to hide or intermingle with the population. Guerrilla regular forces will have a lesser capability to hide among the population; therefore, they are more likely to maintain unit integrity and attempt to break out as units. Often, tunnel complexes are used by guerrillas to escape detection and to withdraw from certain areas.

41. Populace Control

An insurgent movement attempts to exercise physical, psychological, and political control of the civilian populace. Control of the populace generally is established through a network of well-indoctrinated local leaders, rather than tactical guerrilla forces. These leaders will act covertly or overtly within the different political subdivisions of a country, depending on the degree of guerrilla control. Attempts are made to make every man, woman, and child feel that he is a part of the struggle. A portion of each supporter's time is devoted to some task in support of the guerrilla force. Measures used by the guerrilla to control the population include organization of the civilian population, propaganda, and threats and terrorism against uncooperative individuals and communities.

a. Intelligence. The danger to the guerrilla force of counter guerrilla spies, informers, and collaborators is stressed, and everyone supporting the guerrilla is charged with the responsibility of detecting and reporting all suspects. Besides these counterintelligence missions, civilians may be organized to perform intelligence missions for the guerrilla, to create civil disturbances, to incite subversion, to sabotage equipment or installations, to compose security details, and to perform supply work.

b. Psychological and Terrorist Operations. Guerrillas use propaganda to gain and maintain civilian support. They appeal to the people's national pride or the lack of a people-government relationship, and they attempt to foment or exploit dissatisfaction with the host country government. To control civilian activities and to discourage cooperation with the government, guerrillas may enforce restrictive orders and policies. Individuals who fail to comply with these orders and policies are punished or killed. Normally, guerrillas make a few ruthless examples to influence the population of a large area to comply with the desires of the guerrilla.

- (1) Guerrillas may resort to taking prominent individuals from a community and holding them as hostages. The people are told that no harm will come to the hostages as long as the community cooperates with the guerrilla force.

- (2) Communities which cooperate with the government or refuse to support the guerrilla may be punished. This may include the destruction or looting of local food supplies and stocks or blocking the movement of food supplies from rural areas. Public gatherings, communication centers, or administrative offices may be bombed. Arson is often used to destroy communities, thus warning surrounding communities to support the guerrilla. Officials or soldiers of the government force may be killed and the guerrillas may deposit corpses in pro-government communities, intending that the discovery of the bodies will expose the entire community to investigations and punishment by the host country government, a result which will be vigorously exploited by the guerrillas to gain sympathizers and to strengthen their cause.

c. Civil Disturbances. To hamper government operations and production, and to weaken popular support of the established government by demonstrating the weakness of the government, underground and auxiliary organizations may be expected to organize and instigate labor

strikes, slowdowns, protest meetings, and riots. Under cover of this confusion, industrial property, machinery, products, and raw materials may be sabotaged. Power, communication, and transportation facilities may be damaged, and government officials, industrial leaders, and military leaders may be abducted or assassinated.

d. Sabotage. Sabotage is used by guerrillas to lessen the government's internal security capabilities. When conducted under a well-organized plan and on a large scale, it becomes one of the guerrilla's most effective tactics. Sabotage may be conducted by the overt guerrilla force, but it is usually a mission of the guerrilla's covert organization. Its scope and

application, in relation to both objectives and areas, are almost unlimited. Objectives of sabotage activities may include industry, government, administrative offices, power sources, materials, transportation, public services, agricultural production, and communication agencies. Sabotage lends itself to guerrilla operations because it does not necessarily require a time schedule, and it can be accomplished with means readily available requiring neither elaborate equipment nor logistical support from outside sources. Destruction or removal of cables, machinery, and rails are common forms of sabotage. Arson is committed against goods, installations, and raw materials. Explosives are used to destroy buildings, bridges, and roadbeds.

Section IV. STRENGTHS

42. General

This section discusses advantages that guerrilla forces may have over counter guerrilla forces. These strengths must be avoided or compensated for in counter guerrilla operations.

43. Host Country Weaknesses

The economic, social, psychological, and political weaknesses of the host country can be major contributing factors to guerrilla strengths. These factors may include—

a. Discontent of the population with host country government policies, and their environmental conditions as a result of host country activities, or lack of them, to accommodate the needs of the people.

b. Defeatist feeling which affects host country forces and the belief among most of the people that the internal attack will succeed. These attitudes can develop after a base of population support for the guerrilla is established and the attitudes may become self-propagating.

44. Guerrilla Strength

Some factors of guerrilla operational strength include—

a. A lack of responsibility, except in guerrilla base areas or other areas under their control, to maintain normal governmental obligations toward the population to include economic development, security, and associated activities.

b. Guerrilla leaders generally are highly motivated and trained.

c. Disciplinary measures to include the immediate, effective application of punitive measures without recourse to time-consuming judicial processes.

d. Devotion to a cause which many guerrillas may accept as a religion.

e. Capability to escalate or de-escalate methods of operations, almost at will, from subversion through open warfare.

Section V. PECULIARITIES AND WEAKNESSES

45. General

This section discusses considerations of tactical and psychological aspects of guerrilla operations to permit understanding of basic guer-

rilla attitudes, situations, and motivating factors. The guerrilla must not be underestimated nor must he be thought of as being invulnerable. He has many basic weaknesses which, if ex-

ploited by counter guerrilla forces, are certain to defeat him.

46. Personnel Weaknesses

Basically, the guerrilla endures a life of physical danger, privation, and isolation, cut off from friends and family and subject to extreme restrictive measures. Some factors of personnel weaknesses include—

a. Mental and physical stress, caused by fighting in a hostile environment and being subjected to periods of violence and physical combat.

b. Terror or the threat of violence to himself or his family and friends, which may be imposed by his own organization to insure his cooperation.

c. A feeling of numerical inferiority to the forces arrayed against him, particularly in the early stage of guerrilla force development.

d. The possibility of being treated as a common criminal by the government which he opposes.

47. Operational Weaknesses

Some factors of guerrilla operational weaknesses include—

a. Security which is a continuing, major consideration requiring extensive resources to maintain.

b. Technologically superior forces committed against him, using sophisticated means of mobility, fire power, and communication.

c. Training bases and areas which are difficult to acquire and operate effectively against counter guerrilla forces.

d. The guerrilla force effort and the insurgent or resistance movement will topple if its popular base can be won away and realigned with the government.

48. Logistic Support Weaknesses

Logistic support is a continuing weakness of the guerrilla. As the guerrilla force develops and expands, its logistical requirements will increase to a point where the internal popular support base can no longer provide subsistence items to the guerrilla force without creating hardships or lowering living standards of the populace. If the guerrilla force is supported by an external source, the guerrilla is faced with the continuing problem of securing supply lines, transport means, and storage facilities.

CHAPTER 6

CONCEPTS AND PLANNING

Section I. CONCEPTS

49. General

This chapter provides guidance for brigade contingency planning activities during predeployment phases and for counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development. Possible missions, broad concepts, type organizations, and planning procedures are outlined. The general provisions of FM 101-5 and the other staff officers' field manuals apply to counter guerrilla planning.

50. Brigade Planning, Organization, and Operation

This section provides a general basis upon which brigade planning, organization, and operations may be conducted. It correlates all counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development, the details of which will be discussed in following chapters, and it identifies the overall plans, policies, and programs which brigade operations are designed to extend.

51. Military Plans and Operational Areas

The primary reason for the use of armed forces, either host country or U.S., in counter guerrilla operations is to assist the host country in insuring its internal security by counter ing subversion, lawlessness, and/or insurgent activities. The national level host country military campaign plan outlines the use of regular armed forces and paramilitary forces in furthering the overall internal defense plans, and relates these forces to other national level host country economic, social, political, psychological, and civic internal development plans and forces.


a. The brigade operates as a force governed

by the national military campaign plan, as promulgated by intervening higher headquarters, at the regional, state, or local levels.

b. The military campaign plans directly affecting the brigade provide guidance, in the form of missions, concepts, and operational instructions, of its activities in the operational area, describing the manner and extent to which the brigade will concentrate on tactical operations (both strike operations and consolidation operations), intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations.

c. Brigade plans must coordinate and extend these operations, activities, and programs to its subordinate units, in comprehensive plans and orders, insuring that subordinate unit commanders are presented with sufficient operational guidance, coordinated with the overall requirements of the brigade operational area.

d. Operational areas may be a part of friendly controlled areas, guerrilla-controlled areas, or contested areas. Counter guerrilla tactical and related operations in internal defense and development are applied, to varying degrees, depending on type operations conducted, the operational area (fig. 4), and the intensity of guerrilla activity in the area in which the brigade operates. Operations in friendly controlled areas may dictate that the brigade support civilian governmental economic, social, political, and civic activities by tactical consolidation operations, and may require that intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations also be conducted. Operations in contested areas or guerrilla-controlled areas may



LEGEND:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY | STATE (PROVINCE) CAPITOL |
| STATE (PROVINCE) BOUNDARY | COUNTY (DISTRICT) CAPITOL |
| COUNTY (DISTRICT) BOUNDARY | TOWN (HAMLET) |
| TOWNSHIP (VILLAGE) BOUNDARY | GUERRILLA CONTROLLED AREA |
| RAO - REMOTE AREA OPERATION | FRIENDLY CONTROLLED AREA |

Figure 4. Operational concepts (schematic).

require the brigade to accentuate tactical strike operations (para 107-119), and relegate other related counter guerrilla operations in internal

defense and development to supporting status during the period of the strike.

Section II. PLANNING

52. General

This section outlines brigade planning activities prior to and during counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development. It discusses differences from limited and general war planning to include predeployment and in-country tailoring, estimates, and the general decision-making process. For further guidance on planning, see FM 101-5 and the various branch field manuals.

a. The principles of command and staff action in battalions and brigades discussed in FM 7-20 and FM 7-30 are applicable in counter guerrilla operations; however, the techniques of their application conform to the conditions created by the local situation. Counter guerrilla operations in internal defense operations emphasize political, economic, sociological, and psychological considerations to a much greater degree at lower levels than is normal in limited and general war operations.

b. The maintenance of high morale in brigades engaged in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense operations presents problems different from those encountered in normal limited and general war operations. Operating against an elusive force that seldom offers a clear target, and where tangible results are seldom observed, requires continuous troop indoctrination in the importance of, and challenges inherent in, counter guerrilla operations.

c. Independent missions for prolonged periods of time, where much of the brigade support depends on the ingenuity, skill, knowledge, courage, and tenacity of the commander, will be usual at all echelons.

d. Other factors of counter guerrilla operations which require increased emphasis on command are—

- (1) Difficulty of maintaining combat-area thinking of psychology during extensive, continuous operations, while making little contact with guerrilla

forces. To counter the guerrilla tactic of ceasing operations in an area in order to create a false sense of security and then capitalizing on this by surprise attacks, commanders continually emphasize security even though guerrilla activity within their areas has apparently diminished.

- (2) Operations in a hostile environment, coupled with language difficulties and unfamiliar customs and religions.
- (3) Less desirable food, shelter, and sanitary conditions imposed on counter guerrilla forces when operating independently and for extended periods.
- (4) The aspect of guerrilla operations which includes terrorism and murder of civilians.

e. Command and staff action in counter guerrilla operations emphasizes—

- (1) Detailed planning of small-scale, decentralized tactical operations.
- (2) Command and control over extended distances.
- (3) Extensive contingency planning for employment of reserves, and fire support means.
- (4) Deception operations.
- (5) Detailed coordination and direction of the intelligence collection effort by—
 - (a) Coordination with host country and U.S. civil intelligence agencies, and host country regular armed and paramilitary force intelligence agencies.
 - (b) Use of the local population in the development of overt and covert intelligence collection systems.
 - (c) Systematic and thorough interrogation of prisoners and suspects.
- (6) Detailed planning and coordination of activities with civilian officials.
- (7) Incorporating and monitoring civil-

ian assistance in the operational plan by—

- (a) Preparing and executing integrated civil affairs plans that embrace military civic action, populace and resources control, and psychological operations.
- (b) Organizing and training, through advisory assistance, paramilitary and police forces for local defense, and insuring continuous support for these forces.
- (8) Integrating combat service support functions, especially aerial resupply, into all planning.

f. Subordinate commanders are allowed maximum flexibility in the execution of their assigned missions but should be assigned specific responsibilities and given sufficient guidance to insure a coordinated effort. The nature of guerrilla is such that, on occasion, counter-guerrilla operations is such that, on occasion, counter-guerrilla operations plans must be changed instantly to take advantage of opportunities to employ brigade resources against elusive guerrilla forces.

53. Area Coordination Center

The command and staff actions discussed above indicate a requirement for a single headquarters or coordination center in which all of these actions can be accomplished expeditiously. This may be accomplished by the organization of an area coordination center (ACC) (fig. 5). The ACC is a composite facility at various political/military levels in which internal defense operations and internal development operations are planned, coordinated and directed. Its members include the local chiefs of military, paramilitary, and other governmental agencies and their U.S. counterparts. U.S. and host country policy and agreements will determine command relationships between U.S. and host country forces in the ACC. The brigade may retain its own tactical operations center (TOC), and the ACC is not intended to take the place of the normal host country political organization in the operational area.

a. *Mission.* The ACC has two primary missions; first, to provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction of all of the internal

defense and development effort in a given tactical area of responsibility; second, to insure an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. In addition, it insures communication with the people and their participation in programs designed to improve their security and well-being.

b. *Concept.* In order to provide a means for coordinating the counter-guerrilla effort at all levels, particularly at the state (province) and county (district) or township (village) levels, ACC are established. ACC are composed of representatives from all forces and agencies participating in the total internal defense and development effort. The chiefs (or chairmen) of ACC may be military or political officials selected on the basis of leadership ability, reliability, intelligence, and freedom from conflicting partisan interests. Staffs are constituted of selected representatives of participating forces and agencies.


c. *Organization.* Membership of ACC may include the following, subject to modification to meet local situations:

- (1) The senior military commander in the area.
- (2) Senior police representatives.
- (3) Representatives of local and national intelligence organizations (police, military, and civilian).
- (4) Representatives of public information and psychological operations agencies.
- (5) Representatives of paramilitary organizations (local security and self-defense units).
- (6) Representatives, military and civilian, of key communication activities.
- (7) Other local and national government representatives to include, for example, project directors of the local economic, social, political, and civic internal development agencies.

d. *Operations.* ACC should operate continuously to make decisions and coordinate actions of the total internal defense and development effort.

54. Civil-Military Advisory Committee

The civil-military advisory committee



- NOTES: (1) ACC DOES NOT REPLACE STATE (PROVINCE) GOVERNMENTS.
 (2) ACTUAL COMPOSITION OF ACC WILL BE DETERMINED BY LOCAL RESOURCES, BUT AS A MINIMUM, ACC SHOULD CONTAIN ELEMENTS FOR CONTROL OF TACTICAL GROUND FORCES, FIRE SUPPORT, AIR SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE, AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT.

Figure 5. Type state (province) area coordination center.

(CMAC) participates in the ACC function primarily by providing advice and assisting in planning and executing programs. It evaluates

the effects of various projected actions affecting the civil population, and so informs the ACC. It also reports civilian attitudes toward

operations, activities, and programs currently in progress.

a. Like the ACC, the organization of the CMAC will vary depending on local requirements and must be flexible enough to meet changing situations. It will ordinarily be headed by the appointed or elected civilian leader of the community or area, such as the state governor (province chief), mayor or other political appointee, and may include the following:

- (1) Local police chief.
- (2) Superintendent of schools or school principal(s).
- (3) Senior members of dominant religious faiths.
- (4) Judges and/or other judiciary representatives.
- (5) Labor union president(s).
- (6) Editors of influential publications.
- (7) Representatives of major business or commercial interests.
- (8) Other influential persons.

b. The CMAC will meet as necessary, on call of the chairman of the committee. It should be noted that possibly some persons, such as the police chief, may be members of both the ACC and the CMAC.

55. Missions

Variations of counter guerrilla missions in internal defense and development which might be assigned to the brigade include relief of host country regular armed forces performing static security and populace and resources control missions to permit these host country forces to engage guerrilla forces in combat operations. The brigade may also be assigned border control missions and combat support and combat service support rather than combat missions. These variations in missions usually will require the accomplishment of the following:

a. Tactical operations against guerrilla forces.

b. Intelligence operations, to include integrating unit capabilities with, and extending, the overall host country and U.S. intelligence program and system.

c. Psychological operations, to include integrating unit capabilities with, and extending, the overall host country and U.S. information program and system.

d. Populace and resources control operations in support of host country police and other civil security organizations.

e. Military civic action supporting host country economic, psychological, and sociological activities.

f. Advisory assistance operations in organizing, equipping, and training regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, and irregular forces as required.

56. Operational Information

Information sources upon which to base brigade intelligence collection, and upon which to base operational planning required prior to commitment to a host country will be from data bases at higher headquarters. After deployment of the brigade in-country, host country and U.S. civil and military information sources must be used. Host country military forces and police and U.S. military forces, the U.S. country team, unified command, and MAAG already deployed are examples of principal sources of in-country information. Maximum efforts, to include locating brigade intelligence personnel in-country prior to deploying the brigade, must be made to establish as early as possible adequate information for brigade planning.

a. *World Situation.* Brigade commanders faced with planning and executing counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development must consider several categories of information concerning the possible operational environments, and of guerrilla warfare and its peculiarities which may affect the attitudes, motivations, and actions of their organizations, staffs, and subordinate commanders. All personnel must understand the motivations and philosophy of the social-political-economic movement from which the guerrilla originates so as to better prepare themselves psychologically for the military implications of that origin. For example, the scheduled campaigns, quick victories (or defeats), measurable successes or failures in terms of ground, men, or materiel

gained or lost, secure rear areas, and the cleared battlefields of limited or general war situations must not be expected; but, rather, protraction and attrition in internal defense and development counter guerrilla operations must be expected and accommodated.

b. The Host Country. Information—geographical and cultural—concerning the area is essential if successful counter guerrilla operations are to be waged by the brigade. The desires, drives, aspirations, language, and customs of the people among whom the U.S. unit is to operate must be understood if support by the population is to be mobilized (ch 4). The forces employed, the policies followed, and the political-social-military structure within which operations are to be conducted will condition the methods employed.

- (1) The guerrilla force must be thoroughly understood. To assess guerrilla capabilities properly, the commander must understand not only how the area of operations will affect his operations, but also how the hostile guerrilla uses the area to his advantage (ch 5).
- (2) The geographic, economic, social, and political characteristics of the host country are essential areas of information in normal limited and general war (field army-type) operations. They become even more meaningful to brigades conducting counter guerrilla operations because the principal strength of the guerrilla lies in his intimate knowledge of the terrain and of the people among whom he operates.

57. Operational Considerations

Since the guerrilla will probably react to applied pressure by moving to another area, by intermingling with the local population, or by remaining inactive until the vigor of current countermeasures has lessened, commanders must be particularly cautious not to consider the guerrilla force eliminated merely because opposition has ceased. Continuous pressure must be maintained throughout a campaign against guerrilla forces.

a. Need for Constant Pressure Upon the

Guerrilla. If contact with the guerrilla force is lost, aggressive efforts must be made to re-establish contact by using timely and accurate intelligence and harassing actions through such means as covert agents, aerial surveillance, ground patrols, and airmobile combat patrols. Periods of inactivity will permit the guerrilla to rest, reorganize, and resume offensive operations. Around-the-clock operations by the counter guerrilla force must be emphasized.

b. Importance of Offensive Operations. Purely defensive measures allow the guerrilla to develop and become stronger. The maintenance of the offensive at all levels is vital to the success of the counter guerrilla campaign.

c. Requirement for Secrecy and Surprise. The need for secrecy must be emphasized in all plans and operations. The guerrilla's intelligence system may make it difficult to deny him information concerning impending counter guerrilla operations. This makes it all the more important that every echelon of command within brigades, to include squads and platoons, employ the most ingenious and imaginative methods of operation. Security will be enhanced and surprise more likely achieved when plans provide for—

- (1) Constant indoctrination of the individual soldier with the importance of security.
- (2) Effective and secure communication.
- (3) Avoidance of established operational patterns by varying methods of operations and using unorthodox tactics and techniques.

d. Requirement for Mobility. Superior mobility is essential in counter guerrilla tactical operations. To achieve surprise and to successfully counter the mobility of the guerrilla, brigade plans should consider the need to use all means of mobility available, to include aircraft, tracked and wheeled vehicles, boats, and pack animals.

e. Importance of Intelligence. To be successful, brigades engaged in counter guerrilla operations must have accurate and timely intelligence about the terrain, the guerrilla, and the population. Since the guerrilla may live among and be protected by the population,

intelligence may be difficult to secure. Counter-guerrilla planning must provide for the collection and rapid dissemination of all available intelligence so that counter-guerrilla forces can take immediate action to destroy the fast-moving guerrilla.

f. Importance of Popular Support. Military operations must take into account protection of the civilian population. This is a problem in counter-guerrilla operations because the guerrilla usually hides himself in the civilian population and fights from that base of support. Bringing artillery or airpower to bear on a town from which sniper fire was received may neutralize the guerrilla action, but it will almost certainly alienate the civilian population as a result of casualties among noncombatants.

58. Methods of Operation

a. Guerrilla forces are the targets, not the terrain. Terrain, as a tactical objective, means little to the guerrilla unless he is allowed to develop conventional warfare capabilities. Commanders must orient their efforts continually on the destruction or neutralization of the guerrilla rather than the terrain. The guerrilla usually can yield the terrain with little tactical loss.

b. Front or rear lines do not exist in an area threatened by the guerrillas. Counter-guerrilla units throughout the threatened area must maintain the same overt and aggressive attitude as frontline combat troops in conventional operations. Priorities of effort must be designated by brigade planners to provide guidelines for the allocation of counter-guerrilla forces within the brigade operational area.

c. Areas of responsibility assigned to military commanders usually encompass political subdivisions of the affected area, and are not defined by straight, linear boundaries. Such assignments are made to insure maximum coordination and assistance from civil agencies. This will also serve to coordinate counter-guerrilla operations more closely with other operations and activities in internal defense and development.

d. The brigade assigned offensive strike missions should not dissipate its offensive capability by the widespread assignment of small de-

tachments to defensive tasks such as garrison, rail, or road sentries. When the situation demands that small detachments be employed in defensive tasks, such tasks should be performed by paramilitary forces or brigades assigned missions of consolidation operations.

e. Expenditure of manpower in large-scale reconnaissance operations should be avoided except when sufficient counter-guerrilla force and intelligence is available to achieve decisive results.

f. Large military forces are not garrisoned in areas of guerrilla activity to deter guerrilla operations by the mere physical presence of counter-guerrilla troops. Movement of the brigade out of the garrisons and into the realm of the guerrilla insures maximum effect of operations in the area. Effort should be made to keep brigades in continuous operations under all conditions of weather.

59. Offense

Offense applied in strike operations has as its purpose the destruction, or the neutralization by harassment, of guerrilla forces. These operations are characterized by gaining and maintaining contact with the guerrilla.

a. Once a guerrilla force has been located, combat power is applied in order to destroy it with the least possible delay. Normally, such operations require that the brigade force be larger than the guerrilla force. The encirclement offers the greatest possibility for fixing the guerrilla force and achieving decisive results, provided the following conditions exist:

- (1) Positive intelligence on location of guerrilla elements.
- (2) Troops are emplaced rapidly to maximize surprise.
- (3) An effective counterintelligence system insures security of plans and movement.
- (4) Sufficient troops are utilized to achieve an effective encirclement.
- (5) Ample time is taken to search adequately the encircled area.
- (6) Plans are made to offset the advantages which darkness affords the encircled guerrillas.

b. Harassment will prevent the guerrilla from resting and reorganizing, inflict casualties, prevent massing of personnel and supplies for large-scale attacks, aid in gaining intelligence of the area of operations, and cause the guerrilla to expend his resources. Harassment may be conducted as an economy-of-force measure in order to deny the guerrilla absolute freedom of operation in an area of low priority. During the conduct of harassment, the majority of the counter guerrilla force will operate from patrol bases and maintain continuous pressure on the guerrilla force by vigorous patrolling efforts. Harassment is conducted primarily by the use of—

- (1) Reconnaissance patrols to locate guerrilla units and bases.
- (2) Extensive ground combat patrolling and raids.
- (3) Airmobile combat patrolling and raids.
- (4) Ambushes.
- (5) Artillery and naval gunfire.
- (6) Air Force bombing and strafing.
- (7) Mining probable guerrilla routes of communication as appropriate and as prescribed by U.S./host country policies.
- (8) Continuous aerial surveillance.
- (9) Employment of chemical and biological agents as appropriate and as prescribed by U.S./host country policies.

60. Defense

Defense applied in consolidation operations provides the physical and moral base from which offensive strike operations against guerrillas are launched. Population defense and denying the guerrilla manpower and materiel support and defense against guerrilla attacks are instrumental in gaining the support of the population and in incapacitating the guerrilla force.

61. Retrograde

Since guerrilla forces (except in the later stages of development) will seldom be able physically to push counter guerrilla forces from an area, it may be desirable—for economy of force or other reasons—to retire. Therefore,

retrograde movements must be planned and executed. As guerrilla organizations develop, delaying actions, withdrawals while in contact, and other tactics associated with retrograde must be planned and executed.

62. Commander's Guidance

The commander's guidance for counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development must be far more detailed and comprehensive than in limited and general war, and must accommodate all operational aspects inherent to brigade counter guerrilla operations. Prior to the receipt of the specific mission, the commander's guidance and subsequent planning must be based on all probable missions to include supporting consolidation operations or conducting strike operations, as well as on the specific characteristics of the guerrilla, terrain, and population in the specific operational area. After receipt of the mission, his guidance will become more specific and will include the extent to which the brigade will become involved in tactical operations (strike or consolidation), intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations.

63. Decisions

Decisions made in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development will be in accordance with techniques outlined in FM 101-5.

64. Concepts

Planning and actions must be flexible. Guide figures for operational areas assigned to units must not be expected; rather, each situation must be estimated by itself. Not only fire and maneuver, but military civic action, political action, and cultural peculiarities must be considered in counter guerrilla operational planning. Combat power will be applied selectively and its effects modified to preclude harming the population. In many instances, a U.S. commander will be faced with choosing between a course of action which will assure entrance into a given area by utilizing maximum combat power and a course of action which will require him to apply his combat power with less vio-

lence, and most selectively so as not to harm the population.

a. *Tactical Operations.* Tactical operations are based upon sound intelligence.

- (1) Planning and conducting tactical operations against well-developed guerrilla forces must be anticipated. As the guerrilla force gains experience and materiel support and/or receives reinforcement from a sponsoring power, his forces may become more sizable and highly organized, and consequently more easily identified. Combat units must be capable of both counter-guerrilla operations and conventional operations because the guerrilla will retain the initiative in selecting the type of warfare employed.
- (2) Appropriate tactics must be employed, depending on guerrilla capabilities. Having developed multiple base areas, guerrilla forces may maneuver in any direction in reaction to an offensive maneuver against them and still not sacrifice their logistical support capabilities.
- (3) Counter-guerrilla operations require the movement of small units throughout zones wherein normal civilian activities must be maintained, and must be conducted against forces which may materialize from, fight behind, and dissolve into the population. These conditions require special measures or emphasis from the counter-guerrilla unit. Some of these measures are—
 - (a) Use of stay-behind patrols.
 - (b) Unit communications to control dispersed elements.
 - (c) Communication systems to permit instant location of units over vast areas.
 - (d) Extensive coordination measures to prevent engaging friendly forces either ground-to-ground or air-to-ground.
 - (e) Maintenance of highly mobile, all-weather, around-the-clock reserves (quick reaction forces) to reinforce or relieve engaged units.

- (4) The U.S. brigade commander must be prepared to operate his forces in strike operations against guerrilla forces operating in contested or guerrilla-controlled areas. These operations are essentially offensive in nature, brief in duration, and involve primarily military tactical operations.
- (5) The U.S. brigade commander must be prepared to employ his forces in conjunction with consolidation operations designed to neutralize permanently the guerrilla influence in areas designated for friendly control. The use of U.S. forces in this operational mode involves both offensive and defensive tactical operations; advisory assistance in training paramilitary forces for area defense; and support of civilian economic, political, social, civic, intelligence, psychological operations, and populace and resources control programs in the area. The overall operation is basically civilian and may involve subordination of military operations to those of civilian programs. Operations such as these are of long duration, thorough in execution, and require the continuous presence of counter-guerrilla forces.
- (6) In addition to the strike operation and the consolidation operation normally conducted by the brigade, the brigade may be concerned with those operations normally conducted by special forces organizations. These operations are undertaken largely in contested areas or in areas under guerrilla control. The brigade may support special forces operations by—
 - (a) Providing fire support.
 - (b) Providing supplies and equipment on an emergency basis.
 - (c) Coordinating combat actions.
 - (d) Providing reserve (reaction) forces.

b. *Civilian Populations.* Since civilian support is required for the restoration of national internal security, there is a requirement to conduct counter-guerrilla tactical operations without destroying civilian life and property. It may be necessary to subordinate combat re-

quirements to the general welfare of the populace.

- (1) Full combat power and the violence of counter guerrilla operations may be diminished in order not to endanger the civilian population. Application of combat power will have to be far more selective than in conventional combat operations, and limited to the minimum required to accomplish the mission.
- (2) Local socio-political aspects may complicate the planning and conduct of operations.

c. Special Operational Considerations. Commanders must be aware of the various military and civilian support operations being conducted in their areas of responsibility, and anticipate the various missions they might be assigned.

- (1) They must appreciate that all components of internal defense and development are integrated; that is, a unit assigned a counter guerrilla tactical mission must devote resources not only to the primary tactical mission, but also to others not traditionally military.
- (2) Brigades may be employed defensively to free host country forces for offensive operations; in such cases, brigades become virtually integral to the civilian socio-political structure. In any case, elements of many or all of these components of internal defense and development will be present regardless of the primary mission assigned. The significant point is that resources devoted to other aspects of internal defense and development will not be available to support the counter guerrilla tactical effort.
- (3) All brigade personnel must be taught not to underestimate the guerrilla, but to be aware of his weaknesses. Unless this indoctrination is accomplished effectively, commanders, staffs, and troops will be surprised psychologically and tactically.

65. Staff and Commander Estimates

Planning for counter guerrilla operations requires a detailed estimate of the situation. Close attention is given to both the civil and military situation. Estimates are based on the analysis of the area of operation, the mission, commanders' guidance, and other information outlined previously. These considerations are governed by the techniques outlined in FM 101-5, modified to the operational environment. This paragraph outlines some of the salient modifications required for counter guerrilla operations. The following specific factors are among those emphasized in the estimates:

a. Weather and Terrain.

- (1) Effects of weather, seasons of the year (to include planting and harvesting periods), phases of the moon (which affect night visibility), and tides on both guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations.
- (2) Suitability of terrain and road net for both guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations.
- (3) Suitability of terrain for guerrilla bases.
- (4) Control of border and coastal areas, if applicable.

b. Population.

- (1) Loyalty of various segments of the population to include their morale, will to resist, and willingness to undergo hardship.
- (2) Size and proportion of population likely to engage in, or assist, guerrilla activities.
- (3) Size and proportion of population likely to support host country, U.S. and allied forces.
- (4) Relative susceptibility of various elements of the population to propaganda.
- (5) Basic or potential causes of unrest.

c. Guerrilla.

- (1) National and regional origins.
- (2) Organization, to include effectiveness and unity of command.

- (3) Strength, morale, and status of training.
 - (4) Leaders and their personalities.
 - (5) Relations with the civil population.
 - (6) Status of equipment and supplies.
 - (7) Effectiveness of communications.
 - (8) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence, to include the extent of probable infiltration of host country civil and military establishments by guerrilla informers, supporters, or sympathizers.
 - (9) Tactics being employed.
 - (10) Resources available.
 - (a) The capability of the area to furnish food and water.
 - (b) Availability of arms, ammunition, demolitions, fuels, medicines, and other supplies.
 - (c) External support from sponsoring powers.
 - 1. Amount and type of support—personnel, materiel, and moral.
 - 2. Lines of communication.
- d. Host Country, U.S., and Allied.*
- (1) Forces available for counter guerrilla operations.
 - (a) Host country and U.S. forces.
 - (b) Paramilitary units.
 - (c) Civil police and irregular units.
 - (d) Friendly guerrilla forces.
 - (e) Host country and U.S. civil officials and agencies.
 - (f) Other forces available within area if needed.
 - (2) Size and composition.
 - (3) Ability to operate on the terrain.
 - (4) Vulnerabilities.
- (5) Resources.
 - (a) Effectiveness of measures for employment of local manpower and materiel resources within the area to meet critical deficiencies such as personnel for security of communities, installations, and lines of communication.
 - (b) Effectiveness of measures to deny the guerrilla access to resources required by him.
- e. Other.*
- (1) Policies and directives regarding legal status and treatment of the civilian population and guerrilla forces.
 - (2) Organization, effectiveness, reliability, and key personalities of the local host country government and its agencies.

66. Preparation of Plans

Consolidation operations may require detailed planning for commitment of the brigades to a long-term host country and U.S. combined operational plan. On the other hand, strike operations may require relatively simple planning, accentuating the usual tactical operations over short periods of time.

67. Approval of Plans

Plans must be closely coordinated with those U.S. and host country military and civilian agencies which the plans may affect. Commanders and staffs must anticipate delay in gaining approval for brigade plans because of the unusual coordination required. Adequate time must be allowed for this coordination of brigade plans at higher, subordinate, and adjacent levels.

Section III. BRIGADE ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATIONS

68. General

Brigades will be organized for counter guerrilla operations according to the threat, environment, and the type operation supported, in order to conduct—

a. Tactical operations which include—

- (1) *Strike operations by means of fire and*

maneuver in order to destroy or capture the guerrilla; to repel an attack by fire, close combat, and counterattack; to conduct extensive combat and reconnaissance patrolling, to include long-range patrolling; to conduct air-mobile operations when provided with sufficient air transport; to conduct

airborne operations with minimum marshaling and planning procedures (airborne units only); and to participate in limited amphibious operations.

- (2) *Consolidation operations* in which all internal defense operations and internal development operations can be conducted to maintain or restore internal security. Consolidation operations include the capability to conduct strike operations.

b. Intelligence operations.

c. Psychological operations.

d. Populace and resources control operations.

e. Military civic action.

f. Advisory assistance operations.

69. Organization for Operations

a. Normally, the specific terrain and civil and military situations in the area of operations will require some reorganizing of the brigade, battalion, and company prior to each operation. Emphasis in organizing for tactical operations is placed on firepower, mobility, and command-control communication.

b. Task organization should strive for tactical self-sufficiency by attaching or placing in direct support sufficient intelligence, signal, transportation, and other combat support and combat service support to make units capable of semi-independent or independent operations. Moreover, consideration must be given to providing capabilities for dealing with the civilian population in the area by giving the force sufficient translators, interpreters, civil affairs personnel, psychological operations personnel, and other supporting resources from higher level organizations (or from the TOE -500 and -600 series).

70. The Brigade (Divisional and Separate)

a. In counter guerrilla operations, divisional brigades may be employed as subordinate elements of the division, particularly during large-scale operations, or with appropriate reinforcing combat, combat support, and combat service support units, as independent or semi-independent forces. The brigade has the

capability to command and control up to five attached maneuver battalions (fig. 6). It also has the capability to command and control attached host country regular armed forces and paramilitary forces.

- (1) *Support.* Combat, combat support, and combat service support units are attached to, or placed in support of, the brigade as required by the specific mission assigned. In counter guerrilla operations, the emphasis is normally on the attachment of combat and combat support units. The missions assigned to the brigade may vary from control over a segment of the population in areas partially or completely under friendly control, to the execution of purely combat tasks in a contested area or in areas under control of the guerrilla.

- (2) *Tactical consolidation operations.* When assigned consolidation operations missions in support of internal defense and development, the brigade organization will require the attachment and support of civilian and military personnel and units to assist in the conduct of intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action programs, and advisory assistance. In such situations, the brigade normally will receive attachments of engineer, military police, military intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, signal, and other units. Host country regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, irregular forces, and police and other nonmilitary agencies may be attached for consolidation operations missions.

- (3) *Tactical strike operations.* When the brigade is organized for the conduct of strike operations, the emphasis is on the attachment of primary combat and combat support units which enhance the combat power of the brigade.

b. The *separate brigade* has the organic capability to command and control up to five maneuver battalions in independent offensive and




Figure 6. Type brigade task force for counter guerrilla operations.

defensive combat operations. The separate brigade differs from a divisional brigade in that the combat, combat support, and combat service support elements of the separate brigade are designated by TOE on a permanent basis.

71. Maneuver Battalions

Battalions are the basic maneuver elements of the brigade. The personnel, equipment, and training of battalions provide versatile forces which can combat guerrilla forces effectively with a minimum or reorganization to meet the exigencies of the mission, terrain, and situation. The command structure of the battalion is designed to accept augmentation (fig. 7).

a. In counter guerrilla tactical operations, infantry battalions normally are employed as subordinate elements of a brigade. In exceptional cases, they may be employed directly under the control of a higher headquarters, or

may conduct independent operations. Because of the decentralized nature of counter guerrilla operations, the battalion normally will receive the attachment of combat, combat support, and combat service support units, or have these units placed in direct support to assist in the accomplishment of the mission.

b. Battalion task organizations depend on the particular requirements of each situation. Under unusual circumstances, task forces may have continuous operational control of tactical aircraft to provide an airmobile capability; however, tactical transport aircraft will normally be retained under the operational control of higher headquarters to be allocated specific task assignments as required.

72. Companies

Companies are the basic maneuver elements of the battalion. They may be detached from




Figure 7. Type battalion task force for counter guerrilla operations.

the parent unit for employment as part of combined arms, joint, or combined task forces.

73. Reconnaissance Platoons and Armored Cavalry Troops

If the area of operations will not permit extensive use of vehicles, the reconnaissance platoon or cavalry troop may be employed dismounted, thereby having the advantage of retaining the unit as a valuable intelligence collection agency. If the area of operations will permit use of vehicles, the platoon or troop may be employed as an economy-of-force unit to conduct operations in areas facilitating wheeled or tracked mobility, thereby releasing other units for dismounted operations against the guerrilla force in less trafficable areas. With their organic mobility, reconnaissance platoons or cavalry troops can disperse over relatively large areas—periodically visiting the civilian communities in the area, patrolling lines of

communication—and still mass rapidly to counter a guerrilla element elsewhere in the area. For further discussion on the organization and employment of the armored cavalry troop, see FM 17-1 and FM 17-36.

74. Antitank Platoons

If the particular situation requires conducting operations against a guerrilla force in remote, undeveloped areas where the armor threat is minimal or nonexistent, consideration should be given to organizing this element to accomplish other more pressing missions such as antipersonnel or point target (fortifications) missions, or as a security force for the unit combat base.

75. Heavy Mortar Platoons

For security, the firing elements of the heavy mortar platoon normally will occupy positions

within the combat base. If sections are required to occupy firing positions outside combat bases, rifle elements are used to secure the positions.

76. Communications

a. Radio is the primary means of communication in counter guerrilla operations. The planning and implementation of radio communications nets for the brigade and its maneuver battalions may become highly complex in counter guerrilla operations as compared to operations in limited and general war. As communication advisor to the commander, the brigade signal officer must be prepared to advise, in the early planning stages, on the capability of available communication means to support each course of action being considered. Platoon and company-level communications take on added significance in counter guerrilla operations, since employment of such units in patrol bases and on area missions may often overtax their organic signal communication capability.

b. Requirements of maneuver battalions will be principally for manpack-type radios to replace vehicle-mounted radio sets and the shorter range manpack sets organic to squad communications. Aerial relay stations may be required to extend the ranges of FM radio equipment. Since the brigade communication platoon has no reserve from which to provide augmentation, special communication needs of brigade elements must be provided either by redistribution of equipment organic to the combat elements of the brigade, or by obtaining augmentation to the TOE. For long-range radio communication between battalion combat bases, and for patrol bases at extended distances from their next higher unit, communication support teams may be required.

c. Extensive use of radio for communication expands the communication security problem. The tendency to consider the guerrilla force as too unsophisticated to be able to acquire communications intelligence must be avoided. Conventional communication security measures should be employed at all levels with emphasis on the changing of operational codes at the lower tactical echelons.

d. The vulnerability of wire communication

to guerrilla action will normally dictate that wire be used only for internal communication within secure bases and installations. The physical wire system employed in the conventional role to connect brigade with battalion and battalions with companies will often not be feasible because of the vulnerability of such a system to guerrilla action and the difficulty of installing and maintaining wire in a counter guerrilla environment. Such lines as are installed and allowed to remain will be subject to monitoring by the guerrilla. When distances permit, consideration should be given to requesting radio-relay and carrier teams from the division signal battalion to provide a usable telephone and teletype system below brigade level.

e. Emphasis at all levels should be placed on the use of visual communication. Prearranged visual signals are especially effective for surface-to-surface communication between small units in proximity to each other, and for surface-to-air communication. Both infrared and visible light should be employed.

f. Motor messenger service is one of the most secure, economical, and reliable means of communication in limited and general war. In the counter guerrilla environment, however, its use is extremely limited. Motor messengers are vulnerable to snipers, mines, and roadblocks, and cannot be employed as a reliable means of communication without expending sizable combat strength on escort missions. Air messengers should be employed to carry the communication loads normally carried by motor messenger in limited and general war. Message drop and pickup methods should be employed when landing of aircraft is not feasible. For economy, aircraft on resupply, medical evacuation, or transport missions should also be utilized concurrently as air messenger vehicles.

g. Temporary or immediate requirements for communication with regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, or civil governmental agencies of the host country may be satisfied by exchange of communication equipment and liaison personnel. Continuing liaison communications requirement, or requirements beyond resolution on the local level, should be submitted to the appropriate ACC.

h. The expanded use of Army aircraft for

many types of missions in counter guerrilla operations increases the need for emphasis on a responsive and reliable air-ground communication system. Provision must be made to insure that any ground unit operating independently has the capability of communicating with its air support. In addition to radio communication, backup visual signal means with comprehensive codes should be provided.

i. Communication sites are prime targets for the guerrilla force. Communication personnel must take all feasible measures to secure and defend their installation within the capabilities of their own resources. However, commanders should be made aware of the limited capability for defense inherent in most signal teams or units and be prepared to commit combat forces to their security in the degree warranted by the importance of retaining command-control communication.

77. Ground Surveillance Sections

a. Since most tactical operations against guerrilla forces involve the use of small-unit patrols, particular consideration should be given to the use of radar teams at combat base and patrol bases to assist patrols by locating guerrilla activity, vectoring patrols toward guerrilla activity or on a desired route, and receiving coded signals from counter guerrilla patrols.

b. During the conduct of an encirclement, radar may be used effectively for surveillance forward of the line of encirclement to give early warning of an attempted breakout by encircled forces.

c. Since the nature of radar limits its use in densely vegetated areas, the defensive use around the combat base and other strongpoints should be emphasized. If properly sited, radar can give early warning of impending attacks by reporting guerrilla movement into probable attack or assault positions and along avenues of approach.

d. The ability of radar to vector aircraft during periods of low visibility increases the capability of resupplying isolated units during these periods.

78. Special Forces

U.S. special forces usually are employed un-

der the direction of the unified command when conducting unconventional warfare operations, but special forces may be assigned to, or function under the operational control of, other U.S. Army forces employed in counter guerrilla operations.

a. Special forces units are trained in both unconventional warfare and counter guerrilla operations. As far as counter guerrilla operations are concerned, special forces units have the capability to provide planning, training, advice, and operational assistance to selected host country forces.

b. U.S. Army special forces have the following capabilities:

- (1) To train, advise, and provide operational assistance to host country special forces-type units in unconventional warfare.
- (2) To advise host country special forces, provincial authorities, and tribal leaders in remote areas in organizing, training, and operating tribal elements; or to assist ethnic minority groups in providing security to local communities, conducting border operations, and performing military civic action.
- (3) To function as advisors to host country regular armed forces and paramilitary forces at division level and below, and to provide advisory assistance for special missions such as raids and long-range patrols.
- (4) To establish an operational evasion and escape system in hostile areas.

79. Military Dogs

Both scout and sentry dogs have value in counter guerrilla operations and should be used; however, the presence of a dog in a unit creates varied reactions among its personnel. Some may become apprehensive; others may feel an exaggerated sense of security. To avoid extreme reactions, the handler must brief the unit on the dog's mission, capabilities, and limitations (FM 20-20).

a. Scout dogs are organic to Infantry Scout Dog Platoon TOE 7-167, and are employed

with their handlers in support of brigade operations. The scout dog platoon leader should know in advance the numbers and types of patrols he is required to support. This allows him to use the most effective dog-handler teams, and gives the handlers time to prepare themselves and their dogs for the mission. The handler (and the dogs, as appropriate) should be completely integrated into the patrol during planning, rehearsal, execution, and debriefing phases. During planning, the handler makes recommendations to the patrol leader on the most effective employment of the dog.

b. Sentry dog units are composed of teams from TOE 19-500. The sentry dog is used principally on guard duty as a watchdog. He can be used to the best advantage in such critical areas as airfields, munition storage areas, ration dumps, motor pools, and warehouses. The sentry dog's primary function while on post is to detect an intruder and to alert the handler. The dog's secondary function is to pursue, attack, and hold any intruder who attempts to evade apprehension. The local commander is responsible for determining policies regarding the releasing of sentry dogs to attack intruders. Innocent people should be warned that they are approaching a restricted area guarded by sentry dogs.

80. Army Security Agency Units

The Army Security Agency (ASA) will be utilized to provide those types of intelligence security and electronic warfare support set forth in AR 10-122. Application of ASA support to elements will be organized to fit the specific missions. ASA unit mobility will be compatible with that of the supported unit. To accomplish its task, ASA support is echeloned into three compatible and integrated types as follows:

a. Manpack subsystem to furnish direct support to lower echelon combat troops in contact with the enemy.

b. Forward area subsystem to provide direct support to forward elements while utilizing vehicle mobility.

c. Rear area subsystem to incorporate ASA activities in support of all rear elements.

81. Military Police

Military police units in the performance of

their normal functions are an effective part of any counter guerrilla force. Early employment of military police units in an operational role provides a distinct advantage in accomplishing the police-type operations of the populace and resources control program. Military police operate in conjunction with the host country civil and military police. Planning is required to insure that an adequate number of military police units are available if populace and resources control operations are included as a mission. Military police units may require augmentation from TOE 19-500 to be prepared to fully engage in internal defense and development. Military police are particularly suited for employment in the following tasks:

a. *Populace and Resources Control Operations.* Operations in internal defense and development may involve extensive police activities to control the host country populace and material resources, including relocation, screening, identification, registration, enforcement of curfews, operation of patrols and checkpoints, and investigation of crime.

b. *Intelligence Operations.* Since criminal and guerrilla activities often overlap in their spheres of action, police activities will develop, over a period of time, informants and informant nets which will produce intelligence information for the brigade force.

c. *Searches.* Searches are conducted by military police in support of security operations conducted by combat and other units. Of particular importance in the military police support of the search are manning or supervising of search parties, securing persons or property captured, and evacuating prisoners. For details on search procedures, see paragraphs 201 through 206.

d. *Securing Ground Lines of Communication.* Military police assist in securing lines of communication by road and aerial patrolling; establishing traffic control points; escorting convoys, individual vehicles, and dignitaries; and by conducting continuing reconnaissance of their area of responsibility. In this capacity, they apprehend individual guerrillas and their supporters and are prepared to combat small guerrilla bands, or act as reporting and fixing forces until the arrival of combat units.

e. *Physical Security.* Military police provide

physical security to individuals and installations, to include populations of designated communities. See FM 19-30.

f. Handling of Prisoners. Military police process, secure, and evacuate captured persons and detainees in accordance with FM 19-40 and Department of the Army directives. See paragraph 249 for further information on handling captives and detainees.

82. Engineer

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of engineer units are discussed under combat support and combat service support operations later in this manual, and in engineer branch manuals.

83. Military Intelligence

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of military intelligence units are designed to support intelligence operations outlined throughout this manual and in the intelligence series field manuals.

84. Civil Affairs

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of civil affairs units and personnel are covered throughout this manual and in the civil affairs series field manuals.

85. Psychological Operations

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of psychological operations units are discussed later in this manual and in FM 33-1.

Section IV. PHASING DEPLOYMENT TO THE HOST COUNTRY

90. General

When the decision has been made to commit U.S. brigades to counter guerrilla operations in internal defense operations, planning will commence immediately for their employment. The operation must be considered against a background of a serious and deteriorating situation, because direct U.S. military action, as distinct from internal defense assistance and internal development assistance, will not otherwise be required. The deployment of brigades normally includes some but not necessarily all of the following steps (the operations may overlap and be a part of a coordinated plan):

86. Artillery

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of artillery organizations are discussed in combat support later in this manual, and in the artillery series field manuals.

87. Army Aviation

Missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of Army aviation organizations are discussed under combat support and combat service support sections of this manual, and in aviation and airmobile operations series field manuals.

88. Medical Service

The brigade will require significant augmentation of medical service organizations not only to support its tactical operations but to administer to the civilian population with which it comes in contact in base areas or during strike or consolidation operations. These organizations are particularly effective in military civic action. The missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of these units are discussed throughout this manual, particularly under combat service support, and in medical service field manuals.

89. TOE 500/600-Series Organizations

Resources from these TOE will be required by the brigade to conduct counter guerrilla operations, and are discussed throughout this manual and in branch field manuals.

a. Preparatory operations.

b. Points of entry, to include tactical bases.

c. Consolidation operations to establish controlled areas.

d. Strike operations.

91. Preparatory Operations

During the preparation for movement to the host country, commanders should consider the following:

a. The mission.

b. Contingency plans.

c. Intensification of training for counter-guerrilla operations.

d. Status-of-forces agreements.

e. Liaison with U.S. advisors, MAAG, Missions, and unified commands or joint task forces, and host country organizations, as applicable.

f. Language barriers.

g. Geographical studies.

h. Area intelligence.

i. Organization of forces, to include prepositioning of heavy equipment needed in case of escalation.

j. Organization and dispatch of an advance party.

k. Reconnaissance and selection of points of entry.

l. Selection of operational areas.

m. Selection of tactical base sites.

n. Communication support.

92. Points of Entry

The purpose of establishing a point of entry is to position brigades in areas from which they can initiate and sustain subsequent operations.

a. Movement. Brigades normally will be moved to the area of operations by air and/or sea, although in some instances overland movement may be possible. In some situations, entry may be necessary by amphibious, airdrop, or airlanded combat operations.

b. Opposition. Although it is assumed that the host country government will be in control of the point of entry, brigades must be prepared to meet opposition at the outset.

c. Deployment. Brigades will initially be concentrated in the general area of the point of entry, which will most probably remain as a logistical base for the forces. The situation may

dictate that U.S. forces be deployed to battalion or brigade areas and be prepared for guerrilla force reaction which may escalate to limited or general war, either nuclear or nonnuclear.

d. Relationship with Host Country Forces. During the initial period when brigades are being established at points of entry, the command-control and liaison relationships between brigades and host country military forces and civilian agencies should be established. As soon as practicable after brigades arrive at the points of entry, liaison within area coordination centers (para 53) should be established. The initial concern of the brigade within these centers should be the coordinated defense of the points of entry, to include coordination of patrolling and other security measures. Also, at these centers U.S. brigade commanders, in coordination with host country officials, may begin screening and recruiting local nationals for duty as scouts, guides, interpreters, porters, and laborers.

e. Local Security. Whatever the assumed reliability of local government elements, U.S. brigades will be responsible for their own local security. This may include the control of civilians in base areas, and control measures instituted by U.S. brigades on civilian populations coordinated with control measures of the local government.

f. Operations. During the establishment of the points of entry, it may be appropriate for brigades to initiate limited tactical operations as well as intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance, to assist host country forces charged with the responsibility of preserving law and order.

93. Strike Operations and Consolidation Operations

These operations are discussed in chapter 7.

CHAPTER 7

TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

94. General

a. This chapter provides guidance on the missions, concepts, and organization of the brigade in conducting counter guerrilla tactical operations. Its scope includes the operational environment, the forces required, and the two primary types of counter guerrilla tactical operations: *strike operations* and *consolidation operations*, and the combat support required for each type.

b. References which provide further guidance on the various underlying concepts of counter guerrilla tactical operations include FM 31-22, FM 61-100, FM 100-5, and FM 100-20.

95. Mission

The brigade will conduct tactical operations, in a coordinated campaign with host country, allied, and other U.S. military and civilian agencies, to harass or destroy the guerrilla force by strike operations, or to neutralize the guerrilla force and secure an area by consolidation operations.

96. Concept

a. When guerrilla activities first begin to emerge, hostile activities range from threats of violence to situations in which antigovernment incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. These initial activities are usually countered by civil police and other government agencies capable of performing populace and resources control. Since there is no major outbreak of violence, and since there are no operational guerrilla forces which are uncontrollable by existing law enforcement elements, the host country regular armed forces and paramilitary forces are usually only mar-

ginally involved in tactical operations to counter the developing guerrilla force. If the guerrilla gains sufficient local and/or external support, he will initiate operations characterized by surprise; brief, violent action; and elusiveness. Various forms of guerrilla activity and operations may be conducted simultaneously, or in any combinations, in various geographical areas (ch. 4 and 5). Regardless of the method of employment of brigades—either to independent strike operations or in consolidated operations—they must be prepared tactically to counter concurrently all forms of guerrilla activity.

b. Guerrilla forces must be harassed and destroyed by strike operations, and concurrently they must be denied support from local civilians and/or external sponsoring powers. Civilian support may be denied to guerrillas by actions and operations in consolidation operations through intelligence/counterintelligence, populace and resources control, and military civic action. Support from an external sponsoring power may be denied to guerrilla principally by border control.

97. Countering Small Guerrilla Forces

Operations conducted by regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, irregular forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a government to counter small guerrilla forces include operations by squad and platoon forces widely dispersed to find, fix, and destroy small guerrilla forces. The following concepts are employed.

a. *Continuous, extensive patrolling* by small, highly mobile units moving by foot, track or wheel vehicle, air, or water. They will operate day and night in visiting populated areas, establishing surprise checkpoints on routes of communication, and preserving order outside

the boundaries of populated areas. In counter-guerrilla operations, the fundamentals of patrolling are generally the same as in conventional operations; however, patrolling will be more extensive and will frequently be the principal combat activity of small units. Commanders should recognize and emphasize the following employment considerations.

- (1) The common lack of detailed information concerning the guerrilla force and terrain.
- (2) The requirement to assign patrol areas rather than precise routes.
- (3) The increased time required for patrols to cover assigned areas (or routes).
- (4) The difficulty and undesirability of controlling patrols by means of a detailed time schedule.
- (5) The requirement for assigning patrols missions which provide flexibility to act on information gained during the patrol.
- (6) The increased difficulty in reinforcing and supporting patrols.

b. Area ambushes in which companies and battalions establish dispersed, but mutually supporting, small ambush sites over an area organized in depth and width, being careful to maintain an adequate reserve to prevent defeat in detail of individual ambush sites. The area ambush, when based upon accurate intelligence, is an effective technique for achieving maximum results against guerrilla forces moving about within an area. The area ambush consists of the primary ambush element which triggers the ambush, supported by smaller ambush groups which cover all likely routes of guerrilla withdrawal. Once the ambush is triggered, the smaller ambush groups open fire as the guerrilla force attempts to withdraw from the area.

c. Numerous small raids against towns and outlying areas suspected of harboring guerrilla personnel and/or materiel.

d. Minimizing reserves to permit employment of maximum resources in operations directly against the guerrilla.

e. Minimizing static defenses of outposts and other installations, depending on fire support,

close air support, and/or small mobile reserves to relieve posts under attack by guerrillas.

f. Maximum use of civilian police to patrol areas and to conduct populace and resources control operations.

g. Maximum area coverage by fire support weapons, with less emphasis on the requirement to mass fires on large forces.

h. Immediate destruction of guerrilla forces by units establishing the contact.

98. Countering Large Guerrilla Forces

The concepts outlined in paragraph 97 must be modified to meet a threat from large guerrilla forces. While the same activities and objectives in countering small guerrilla forces will be sought, larger reserves will be maintained, the size of operating units will be increased, the need to mass artillery fires will be greater, and larger security and defense detachments will be required.

a. The overall effect of the introduction of a large regular force capability by the guerrilla will be concentration of counter-guerrilla forces. Brigade units may be centralized and required to conduct strike operations of brigade-size, or brigades may participate in strike operations as part of a larger force. The threat of the guerrillas' increased tactical capability must be watched closely and provisions made to concentrate larger counter-guerrilla forces on short notice to counter this increased capability of the guerrilla force.

b. Since terrain, organized fires, and maneuver are used by guerrilla forces to seize and hold the initiative and not terrain for itself, maneuvers such as envelopments, penetrations, and turning movements may not produce the same effects on guerrilla forces as they would on field army-type tactical forces. Caches, guerrilla safe areas, and populations sympathetic to, or dominated by, the guerrilla may be so dispersed that guerrilla units are not dependent on a few critical logistical bases which they must protect. Under these conditions, a turning movement, for example, launched by counter-guerrilla forces to cause the guerrilla force to react to protect a base, may produce movements in entirely different directions than those anticipated.

99. Countering Strong Guerrilla Defense

A strong, position-type defense conducted by the guerrilla entails his use of limited and general warfare tactics and techniques. In these situations, the guerrilla will employ consolidated frontlines and highly coordinated positions, and will have rear areas normal to limited and general war. Countering such defenses will require conventional offensive operations, which are discussed in FM 7-20, FM 7-30, and FM 61-100.

100. Armor Employment

Limited road nets, heavily wooded or inundated areas, and generally rugged terrain are usually characteristic of the operational environment of a guerrilla force. Since tank movement may be considerably limited in these areas, large-scale employment of tanks by counter guerrilla forces may be restricted. When tanks are used in counter guerrilla operations, careful selection of routes and axes of advance is necessary. Armor units of the counter guerrilla force will normally operate with infantry-heavy teams or task forces. However, in areas that permit mounted operations, tank-heavy teams and task forces should be employed to take advantage of the tank's firepower, mobility, armor protection, and shock effect.

a. When employed, armor units, will be committed primarily in counter guerrilla tactical operations, but tank units may also be used to reinforce police and other civilian agencies in intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations. The tank, with its appearance of massiveness, is an excellent show-of-force weapon.

b. The tank unit commander must exercise firm control of fires and tank movement in counter guerrilla operations, and he must use minimum combat power required to accomplish his missions, as contrasted to employment of massed armor in limited and general war operations. A limitation may be placed on the use of the tank's firepower because of the presence of a population whose support may quickly be alienated if innocent people are killed or injured by indiscriminate application of fire. Even in areas permitting cross-country mo-

bility, uncontrolled movement of tanks may adversely influence a population if fields or crops are damaged.

c. For further details on armor employment, see FM 17-1, FM 17-15, FM 17-30, FM 17-36 and FM 17-95.

101. Mechanized Infantry Employment

In counter guerrilla operations, terrain permitting, mechanized infantry units may operate independently or as part of a combined-arms team or task force. Attack and pursuit are primary roles for mechanized infantry when employed mounted in carriers. When dismounted or separated from the carrier, mechanized infantry will conduct offensive operations discussed in this manual in the same general manner as infantry units. See FM 7-11, FM 7-15 and FM 7-20.

a. Mechanized infantry forces are suited to counter guerrilla operations, terrain permitting, because of their flexibility and ability to operate equally well either mounted or dismounted. The increase in firepower and ground mobility associated with mounted infantry forces can produce decisive results if properly employed, especially against larger guerrilla forces.

b. Use of armored personnel carriers, where possible, will result in achieving a significant ground mobility advantage over guerrilla forces. If guerrilla forces have limited anti-armor capabilities, the armored personnel carrier can be used as a fighting vehicle against guerrilla forces in the open. Premature dismounting from carriers may cause unnecessary casualties and the loss of the carrier's speed, armor protection, and psychological effect. Riflemen usually dismount when—

- (1) Securing an objective after an assault, when prisoners must be secured, and when the area must be searched for hidden guerrillas and materiel. This task is accomplished by carriers and dismounted riflemen working as a team.
- (2) Terrain obstacles preclude armored vehicles closing with guerrilla forces. In this situation, a dismounted attack is immediately launched. If possible, carrier-mounted weapons are used to

fix the guerrilla by fire while dismounted elements maneuver to close with him.

- (3) The unit is unavoidably halted in an area which has not been secured. Observation and listening posts, patrols, and local security are provided by dismounted riflemen.
- (4) Missions such as search of an area are assigned.

102. Armored Cavalry Employment

Terrain permitting, armored cavalry units are well suited for offensive operations against guerrilla forces. Their extensive means of communications, mobility, combined-arms organization, and capability to perform reconnaissance and security missions permit their operation over relatively large areas. Armored cavalry units may be used as separate maneuver units or to support the offensive operations of larger units.

103. Air Cavalry Employment

Air cavalry units are used in offensive actions against guerrilla forces as separate maneuver units to support ground operations of armor and infantry units and to support airmobile operations. Since air cavalry units are not normally affected by the terrain obstacles usually encountered by ground maneuver units in counter guerrilla operations, the tactics, techniques, and procedures for offensive operations contained in FM 17-36 are readily adaptable to counter guerrilla operations.

104. Tank and Mechanized Infantry Team/Task Force Employment

Tanks and carriers as part of a combined-arms team can be of value in counter guerrilla tactical operations, and every effort should be made to take advantage of the team's mobility and firepower. Limitations placed on the employment of armored vehicles by the terrain may be reduced significantly by reconnaissance, especially aerial reconnaissance, to determine favorable routes.

a. When tanks or carriers are used against guerrilla forces, they must be supported closely by infantry to guard against ambush. In the

early stages of their development, guerrilla forces usually lack sophisticated antitank weapons in great quantity; however, they may be skilled at improvising means to destroy or cripple tanks and carriers.

b. Terrain permitting, tanks or carriers may be used effectively in counter guerrilla tactical operations to—

- (1) Execute offensive strike operations, including harassment, against well-organized guerrilla forces.
- (2) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
- (3) Perform reconnaissance-in-force missions.
- (4) Provide convoy escort.
- (5) Provide mobile reserves for destruction missions or movement to blocking positions.
- (6) Conduct demonstrations and feints.
- (7) Assist in defense of base complexes and airfields.

105. Airmobile Forces Employment

Airmobile forces offer effective means to fix and destroy guerrilla forces. Airmobile combat patrols may be employed to locate guerrillas by reconnoitering suspect localities, and assaulting guerrillas to capture or destroy them. Small numbers of troops and aircraft can patrol extensive areas, and centrally located reserves can reinforce units in contact. Airmobile teams, to include troop-carrying and armed aircraft, are formed. Armed helicopters engage guerrilla forces and maintain contact until other forces are deployed. Airmobile forces exploit their mobility by attacking guerrillas located in difficult terrain. During offensive operations, airmobile forces may be employed to block avenues of escape. The ability of aircraft to deliver assault forces quickly and immediately on guerrilla forces enhances tactical surprise. Aggressive ground attacks in conjunction with airmobile assaults exploit surprise and thereby aid in the destruction of the guerrilla force.

a. Detailed plans for airmobile operations against guerrilla forces are prepared to cover as many contingencies as practicable. As soon

as possible after units move into areas of operation, aviation unit commanders determine the location of potential landing areas, drop zones, and assembly areas throughout the area of operations. Whenever possible, detailed reconnaissance is made of these areas to determine suitability for use and the number and type of aircraft which can be accommodated. A catalog of these areas, together with all other available information, is of significant assistance in planning airmobile assaults to include employment of reserves in strike operations or consolidation operations.

b. The operational control of transport aircraft is retained at the lowest level of command commensurate with requirements for continuous employment to support the tactical operation. Whenever possible, sufficient aircraft will be provided to the brigade for the performance of routine support missions and for the simultaneous lift of the brigade force reserve. Under unusual circumstances, aircraft may be placed under operational control of battalions or companies for prolonged periods of time; however, it is more normal for aircraft to be placed in support of these units for the conduct of specific tasks or for specified short periods of time. Priority for the employment of transport aircraft is given to the reserve when committed. Aviation elements may be in an alert status within combat bases or at locations convenient to supported forces. When practicable, reserves and aircraft are held in the same general location.

c. Available information of the guerrilla force location, strength, disposition, and composition should be considered before airmobile elements are committed. Information collection is continued throughout the operation with emphasis on guerrilla antiaircraft fire capabilities. All means and sources are exploited to collect accurate and timely information to support continuing estimates of the situation.

d. In counter guerrilla operations conducted where a field army is not available to provide weather information, alternative measures must be adopted to obtain the information such as having deployed units down to battalion level regularly submit weather data of their area.

e. After the initial mission is completed, the

airmobile force may engage in a variety of other operations to include linkup with other forces to encircle the guerrilla forces, pursuit operations to exploit initial success, establishment of new combat bases, or withdrawal of troops from the area. Combat forces and logistical support are air-delivered as required. During operations, plans should stipulate that supporting aircraft continue to deliver troops, supplies, and equipment directly to the using ground units, thus reducing the requirements for stocking supplies or maintaining vulnerable land lines of communications. See FM 57-35 for detailed discussion of airmobile operations.

106. Airborne Force Employment

With their capability for vertical entry into areas of operation either by airdrop or air-landing, airborne forces are well suited for strike operations. Airborne infantry units may be assigned primary missions of combatting guerrilla forces. Airborne infantry battalions or rifle companies may be attached to infantry units conducting counter guerrilla tactical operations. The essential difference between airborne forces and other combat forces employed against guerrillas is the mode of entry into the area. For discussion of U.S. Army forces in joint airborne operations, see FM 57-10. An airborne infantry unit assigned the primary mission of combatting guerrilla forces will conduct the operations discussed in this manual in the same general manner as infantry units.

a. When airborne units compose all or part of reserve forces, the following considerations apply:

- (1) Ground alert of sufficient troop transport aircraft to airlift these forces is maintained.
- (2) Each airborne rifle company is reinforced with fire support and logistical support necessary to accomplish its mission.
- (3) Planning for the utilization of Army and Air Force aircraft must be considered. The use of Army aircraft necessitates utilization of Army pathfinders to mark the drop zone and operate the necessary communications and guidance equipment to insure dropping on the selected drop zone.

When Air Force aircraft are used, the combat control teams perform this function. These personnel should be maintained on 24-hour alert by the appropriate level of command.

- (4) Each airborne unit should maintain in a ready status all combat and parachute delivery equipment and rations to sustain itself in combat operations for required periods.
- (5) The use of an airborne forward observer (FO) during the early stages of an airborne operation must be considered. In addition to his ability to adjust indirect fire for the attacking force, his use as an airborne communication relay is indispensable.

b. The immediate employment of airborne forces in counter guerrilla tactical operations normally dictates that the troops drop on ex-

tremely small drop zones. Often, drop zones will be selected and marked by the pathfinder observer flying in an observation aircraft after the unit is airborne. The following measures are taken to insure drop patterns which will produce effectively deployed tactical units on small drop zones:

- (1) Aircraft are loaded tactically so platoons and squads land as units.
- (2) Aircraft formations are employed which will provide a narrow drop pattern and facilitate rapid assembly of troops after the drop.
- (3) Complete delivery of the personnel load of each aircraft is made in one pass over the drop zone.

c. Unit SOP must provide for immediate employment without deliberate and detailed planning for a specific reserve mission.

Section II. STRIKE OPERATIONS

107. General

This section provides general guidance on the missions, concepts, organization, and operations—to include tactics and techniques—involved in conducting strike operations. Strike operations (sometimes called search and clear, or search and destroy operations) inflict damage on, seize, disrupt, or destroy an objective—either terrain or hostile guerrilla forces. Other operations (consolidation operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations) are minimized during the period of a strike operation. Because strike operations are of relatively short duration (generally, from one day to several weeks), other activities are pursued only to the extent that they assist the brigade force while it is in the area of the strike operations. While the guidance outlined here is focused on the infantry brigade and its supporting organizations, the provisions of this section may be extended to apply to any combined-arms organization conducting counter guerrilla operations in any environment.

108. Mission

Brigade strike operations are conducted to—

- a. Harass the guerrilla by all means available to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistical resources.
- b. Destroy the guerrilla force and his base complexes.
- c. Demonstrate support for the populace in the area.

109. Concept

Strike operations may be conducted in support of consolidation operations, but generally they are conducted against located guerrilla forces and bases. Additionally, they serve to keep the guerrilla forces on the move and off balance. Areas of strike operations are usually outside of those undergoing consolidation operations or those under friendly control, and generally comprise either areas under guerrilla control or contested areas. The objective of a strike operation is to harass or destroy guerrilla forces and usually entails no intent to remain permanently in the area of operations. Ground

or water means of entry may be used, but air-mobile or parachute delivery means are most adaptable to this type of operation, and these modes of entry should be stressed. Usually, a combination of means is required. Strike operations include offensive tactics such as raids, reconnaissance in force, and coordinated attacks, or combinations of these operations.

110. Organization

Brigades assigned strike operations missions either are relieved from *area responsibility* well in advance of the strike mission, or preferably, will be constituted as specialized forces held at the national or regional levels, having no permanently assigned area responsibilities. Brigade strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forces capable of operating for given periods of time in areas of operations normally remote from logistical bases, and capable of being sustained logistically by air. For organizations of brigade and battalion task forces, and their supporting elements, see paragraphs 70 and 71.

111. Areas of Operations

The brigade normally is assigned a specific area of operation, similar to an airhead, in which to conduct strike operations (fig. 8). Commanders will coordinate through area coordination centers (para 53) which will be responsive to the employment of all U.S. and host country resources available throughout their area of operations.


a. The brigade commander normally will assign operational areas to the subordinate battalions which, in turn, assign areas to companies. Company commanders may assign specific areas to platoons; however, platoons are normally assigned missions to further the accomplishment of the company mission throughout the company area. Brigades and battalions normally will each establish at least one combat base. Companies normally will operate from patrol bases, but at times may operate from separate company combat bases. The size of the area assigned to a unit depends on the mission, the terrain, the nature of the guerrilla force, and the counter guerrilla forces available. When the areas assigned to units are too large to be reconnoitered concurrently by sub-

ordinate units, commanders establish a priority for reconnaissance of the areas.

b. Battalion areas of operations are dependent upon the mission, the nature of the terrain, the guerrilla forces, and friendly troops available. Battalion commanders assign areas of operations to the rifle companies, retaining sufficient battalion reserve to react rapidly as opportunities occur. A typical battalion area containing three company areas is shown in figure 9. Each of the rifle company areas of operation will be patrolled continuously and aggressively. The location of the company patrol base and routes assigned must be varied to insure complete coverage of the area.

c. The size of the company area assigned will vary, depending on the nature of the terrain and the estimated strength of the guerrilla force. A typical rifle company area is shown in figure 10. The rifle company moves to, secures, and occupies the company patrol base, carrying sufficient supplies to permit independent operations based on resupply capabilities. If the unit is to operate in the same area for a relatively extended period of time, consideration should be given to establishing several small ration and ammunition caches. The company headquarters normally accompanies one of the platoons. The company area is patrolled to provide complete coverage day and night with emphasis on the night patrols where terrain and other conditions permit. Generally, a rifle platoon-size patrol has sufficient firepower to fight most guerrilla elements it is likely to encounter; however, if larger units are encountered, the company commander may concentrate his other platoons against these forces, and/or request that the battalion reserve (reaction force) be committed. Emphasis is placed both on engaging the guerrilla with organic means of fire and maneuver, and employing artillery, aerial fire, and close air support.

d. Orders issued to the company commanders include the area to be patrolled, time allocated to patrol the area, and resupply instructions. The conduct of operations is based on decentralized planning and execution. Company commanders keep fully informed of the activities of their platoons in order to coordinate their activities and to insure maximum success of the overall company mission. Platoons on patrol



NOTES: (1) APPLICABLE TO BOTH STRIKE OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS.

(2) DIRECT SUPPORT ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRES MUST BE PLANNED THROUGHOUT THE BRIGADE AREA OF OPERATIONS.


Figure 8. Brigade area of operations.

carry assault rations and leave unnecessary equipment at company or battalion bases.

e. Battalion combat bases normally are re-supply points for rifle companies. Rifle company mortars may be located in battalion combat bases, with mortar FO accompanying the companies. If the terrain and situation permit, battalion combat bases may be moved as the companies move their patrol bases. If communities are located in the area, and if security conditions permit, battalion bases are located

near (but do not include) the community to conduct concurrent psychological and intelligence operations and military civic action missions, and to insure security of the base and afford secrecy of base operations. Suitable landing zones for aerial evacuation and resupply are established at battalion combat bases and at company patrol bases as required.

f. Raids and ambushes to harass and destroy guerrilla forces will be used to the maximum within battalion areas of operations. Night op-



NOTES: (1) APPLICABLE TO BOTH STRIKE OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS.

(2) DIRECT SUPPORT ARTILLERY AND ORGANIC MORTAR FIRES MUST BE PLANNED THROUGHOUT THE BATTALION AREA OF OPERATIONS.

Figure 9. Battalion area of operations.

erations are conducted against guerrillas moving about the area of operations on tactical and administrative missions. Daylight operations are directed primarily against guerrilla encampments or installations.

g. Separation of tactical units from parent headquarters is normal in counter guerrilla operations, but they must operate as part of a well-coordinated plan and be prepared to concentrate rapidly. Objectives normally are not oriented on terrain, but rather on destroying guerrilla forces. Once guerrilla forces have been located, priority of all available combat power is given to operations to destroy or incapacitate

the guerrilla. Destruction missions normally require a counter guerrilla force larger than the located guerrilla force. Reserves (reaction forces)—normally the main destruction units—immediately apply sufficient combat power to engage and destroy guerrilla forces before the guerrilla forces disperse. The use of airmobile and airborne forces is emphasized for the conduct of strike operations. The use of chemical agents to incapacitate a guerrilla force will enable the counter guerrilla force to attain its objective with minimum firepower. After a successful attack on guerrilla forces, the area is



- NOTE:** (1) APPLICABLE TO BOTH STRIKE OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS.
 (2) AMBUSH SITES ARE OCCUPIED ON A 24-HOUR BASIS.
 (3) NORMALLY, THE MAJORITY OF THE UNIT'S STRENGTH IS DEVOTED TO NIGHT PATROLS.

Figure 10. Type patrolling in rifle company area of operations (schematic).

thoroughly searched for guerrilla personnel, supplies, equipment, and documents.

112. Operations

Intensive reconnaissance and reliable intelligence is required to develop the situation to include the size and location of guerrilla forces. Once guerrilla forces have been located and fixed in place, strike forces maneuver to kill or capture the guerrillas. The guerrillas' ability to hide weapons and assume noncombatant roles in attempting to avoid capture will require strike forces to conduct thorough search of the

area and to capture and collect all suspected, as well as known, guerrillas. In planning strike operations, commanders and staffs must allot sufficient time to perform thorough search operations. Suspects must be handled with firmness but with fairness and respect to avoid turning innocent suspects into guerrilla sympathizers. When small units conducting reconnaissance missions discover relatively large guerrilla forces, mobile reserves (reaction forces) may be required to destroy the guerrilla forces. Deliberate attacks undertaken after thorough reconnaissance, methodical evalua-

tion of relative combat power, acquisition and development of targets, and analysis of all other factors affecting the situation are rare in counter guerrilla operations. The elusive nature of guerrilla forces normally precludes this time-consuming preparation. If intelligence is sufficiently reliable to locate guerrilla forces precisely, or if guerrilla installations or troops are fixed, the raid is feasible. If, as is usually the case, an area is only suspected of harboring guerrilla forces or installations, a reconnaissance in force followed by a coordinated attack or raid will be required.

113. Raid

A raid is an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, harass the hostile guerrilla force, or destroy his installation. It ends in a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. A successful raid is based on accurate, up-to-date, and detailed information of the area, unit, or installation to be raided. Inclement weather or periods of limited visibility, or terrain considered impassable are used to assist in attaining surprise.

a. The raiding force may vary in size from a squad to a reinforced battalion. The force is normally organized into an assault element and a security element. Larger raiding forces may have support elements. Small raiding forces may be organized into assault and security elements only, with supporting weapons included in the assault element.

b. The use of airborne and airmobile reserves in a raid, where the terrain permits, enhances surprise; and airdropping troops at night into objective areas offers a variety of tactics to be used in areas the guerrilla may consider relatively secure. If night airborne or airmobile raids are conducted, the area must be one in which the counter guerrilla force can easily orient itself on the ground, and measures must be taken to insure accurate delivery. Airmobile combat patrols supported by armed helicopters offer infinite possibilities for conducting raids on guerrilla installations, taking advantage of the firepower and mobility of the helicopter. This type of raid force can move in, strike the objective, and withdraw without extensive preparation or support from other sources.

c. For additional information on the composition and organization of raid forces, see FM 7-20 and FM 21-75.

114. Reconnaissance in Force

A reconnaissance in force is a limited-objective operation by a considerable force to discover and test the hostile guerrilla force dispositions and strengths or to develop other intelligence. It must be followed immediately by a coordinated attack or raid on located forces or installations. Reconnaissance in force in counter guerrilla operations is characterized by thorough search of the area. When guerrilla units are operating in smaller-than-platoon size, counter guerrilla force platoons may conduct reconnaissance in force, using the combat power provided by artillery and other fire support. If large, guerrilla forces are located, small units should maintain contact and attempt to fix the guerrilla forces until reserves can be employed to assist in the capture or destruction of the guerrilla. Brigade forces engaged in reconnaissance in force have the capability to attack in company and battalion strength, when required, by maneuvering units to the location of the guerrilla force. The advantages brigade forces possess in firepower, communications, and ground and airmobility are exploited.

115. Movement to Contact

Movement to contact in counter guerrilla tactical operations is basically the same as in limited and general war operations. Night movement, clandestine movement, and counterambush precautions are emphasized. Lead elements of advancing units move by bounds. Where terrain permits, the lead element moves from one favorable position to the next, covered by a strong base of fire in position to engage any resistance encountered. Leading elements of the advancing strike forces gain and maintain contact with the guerrillas. If the guerrillas withdraw, every effort will be made to retain contact. In many situations, action by committed forces and subordinate elements may develop into a series of meeting engagements. Care must be taken to avoid ambushes in movement to contact. When brigades move by ground to the strike area, and on subsequent unit maneuvers, tactical movements must be employed.

Habitual use is made of the movement to contact and reconnaissance in force. To prevent ambush of counterguerrilla forces, to gain or reestablish contact, or to develop guerrilla force dispositions, strike operations are best accomplished by airdrop or airmobile assault. Movement by air insures surprise and avoids the inherent dangers in ground movement to contact.

116. Pursuit

The pursuit (fig. 11) is an offensive operation against a retreating hostile force. It may consist entirely of direct-pressure forces (as in a frontal attack) or a combination of direct-pressure and encircling forces (as in envelopment). It is the final phase of the exploitation and occurs when the guerrilla attempts to disengage. It has as its primary purpose the destruction of the guerrilla force, which is in the process of disengaging, rather than preventing the guerrilla force from reorganizing an effective defense. Although terrain objectives may be assigned, the primary objective is the guerrilla force itself. When direct-pressure forces combined with encircling forces are employed, the direct-pressure force maintains constant pressure on the guerrilla as he withdraws. The encircling force should have a mobility advantage over the guerrilla. Both the direct-pressure force and the encircling force employ all available fire support (artillery, air, and naval gunfire) to assist in the accomplishment of the destruction mission.

117. Encirclement

Encirclement (fig. 12) offers the best possibility for fixing guerrilla forces in position and achieving decisive results. The brigade, battalion, and (to a limited degree) the company may conduct encirclements. The company, and smaller units, normally possess insufficient personnel strength and command and control capability to conduct encirclements except against small, concentrated guerrilla forces. All units of the brigade may participate in encirclements conducted by a larger force.

a. Planning, preparation, and execution are aimed at complete encirclement of the guerrilla force. Maximum security and surprise can be

gained by completing the encirclement during the hours of darkness.

b. Encircling movements are executed rapidly. Maximum use of airmobile and airborne troops will contribute speed and surprise to the early phases of the operation. Positions are occupied simultaneously in order to block escape. If simultaneous occupation is not possible, escape routes most likely to be used are covered first. Initial occupation is the most critical period of the operation. If large guerrilla formations realized during this period that they are being encircled, they can be expected to react immediately to probe for gaps or attack weak points to force a gap.

c. Units occupying the encircling positions provide strong combat patrols well to their front so early warning of attempted breakouts may be received and escape routes blocked. Mobile reserves are positioned for immediate movement to counter any threat of a breakout, and to reinforce difficult areas such as deep ravines or areas containing cave or tunnel complexes.

d. Indirect fire support can serve to cloak an impending encirclement by gaining and maintaining the guerrilla's attention through interdiction and harassing fires while encircling units move into position. Fires, including fires of field artillery, should be planned in detail to support the encirclement after it is discovered.

e. Following the initial encirclement, the capture or destruction of the guerrilla force is conducted methodically and thoroughly by use of fire and maneuver in a simultaneous, controlled contraction of the encirclement. As the line of encirclement is progressively contracted, and depending on terrain, units may be removed from the line and added to the reserve. Against small guerrilla forces, the entire encircled area may be cleared by progressive contraction; however, against larger guerrilla forces, it is probable that, at some point, some action other than further contraction will be required.

- (1) One technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerrilla force to divide it, permitting the destruction of guerrillas in each subarea.
- (2) Another technique, employed after





Figure 11. Pursuit.


some degree of contraction, is to employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the perimeter while part of the line of encirclement forces the guerrillas against the blocking force by offensive action. Either element may accomplish the actual destruction, but it will usually be accomplished by the attacking element. This technique is most effective when the blocking force is located on, or immediately in the rear of, a natural terrain obstacle.

118. Operations in Built-Up Areas

Built-up areas are usually unfavorable for guerrilla force operations. Guerrillas will not normally choose to fight in these areas; however, underground elements in cities and towns may incite organized rioting, seize portions of urban areas, erect barricades, and resist attempts of counter guerrilla forces to enter the area. Noncombatants in the area are usually held as hostages and used as shields by guerrilla forces to deter the application of maximum com-



A. INITIAL ENCIRCLEMENT BY A THREE-BATTALION BRIGADE TASK FORCE.



B. PLATOON POSITIONS FOR INITIAL ENCIRCLEMENT.

LEGEND: ● — SECURITY DETACHMENTS
 — AERIAL SURVEILLANCE

NOTE: (1) SECURITY DETACHMENTS MOVE IN AS COUNTERGUERRILLA FORCES MOVE FORWARD.
 (2) APPLICABLE TO BOTH STRIKE OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS.

Figure 12. Occupation of the initial encirclement.

bat power by counter guerrilla forces. Operations to counter these activities will be assisted by civilian police actions. For details of combat in fortified and built-up areas, see FM 31-50.

119. Reserves

Reserves (reaction forces) are retained by the brigade and its subordinate units either within the strike area or at some distance from the strike area, or both, to enter combat offensively at a decisive time and place to complete the accomplishment of the destruction mission. Reserves also provide commanders with means to deal with unforeseen contingencies. Mobility, particularly airmobility, vastly enhances the employment of reserves.

a. Reserves may be used to exploit success by—

- (1) Reinforcing the attack.
- (2) Maintaining or increasing the momentum of the attack.
- (3) Defeating or blocking counterattacks.
- (4) Providing security.
- (5) Creating diversions.

b. Dispersal of reserve elements into multiple assembly areas or march columns provides flexibility, and locations that facilitate rapid movement to points of probable employment are occupied. In strike operations, emphasis is placed on transporting reserves by air. Regardless of how they move, reserves must be positioned within supporting distances of committed forces.

Section III. CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

120. General

This section provides general guidance on the missions, concepts, organization, and operations used by the brigade in conducting consolidation operations. Consolidation operations (sometimes called clear and hold operations) are, in essence, the application of all aspects of national internal defense and internal development programs to specific regions, states (provinces), counties (districts), or other political subdivisions to maintain or restore internal security of that area.

121. Mission

The brigade will conduct consolidation operations to neutralize the guerrilla domination of a given area and to provide a secure area in which continuing civilian and military internal development operations may be conducted.

122. Methods of Operation

Consolidation operations maintain or restore host country governmental control of the populace and resources of the area and provide an area within which the economic, political, social, and civic activities of the population may be pursued and improved. Brigades committed to consolidation operations support

the overall internal defense and development effort by the application of their resources in the following methods:

a. In the offensive phase, tactical offensive operations of the strike variety are stressed, the other internal defense and development operations being subordinated to the tactical mission during this phase.

b. In the defensive phase, tactical defensive operations, to include extensive patrolling and defense of the area, will be the primary missions of the brigade. During this phase, U.S. brigades will perform advisory assistance in training host country paramilitary and irregular forces for defensive missions, populace and resources control operations, and intelligence and psychological operations, and the brigades will initiate military civic action programs. When guerrilla activity within an area being consolidated has been neutralized, and when normal host country civilian and governmental agencies have resumed control of the consolidated area, the brigade will be free to expand its counter guerrilla operations to other areas.

123. Concept

Consolidation operations involve the implementation in the field by area governmental heads (usually at state level) of integrated

regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, and economic, social, psychological, and civic agency activities designed to neutralize and prevent resurgence of the insurgent or resistance movement in the specific area concerned. The Ministry of Defense (or equivalent), operating the national military establishment, usually supports the host country Ministry of Interior (or equivalent) and other host country civilian agencies in countering a resistance or insurgent movement wherever it exists in the country; however, the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces are clearly in supporting roles. When civilian facilities, organizations, and communication and transportation systems are ineffective, the armed forces may provide these until civilian remedial programs have taken effect, at which time the armed forces will be phased out of these activities. The employment of the U.S. brigade in consolidation operations approaches limited and general war rear area security activities in that a consolidation operation has as its objective the creation of secure areas behind an effective defensive zone. Some of the features in consolidation operations are—

a. Combined, joint, and interdepartmental civil and military operations at the lowest levels.

b. Subordination of military activities to civilian programs.

c. Dispersion of small elements of the brigade over extremely wide areas.

d. Mission diversity between the military/civilian operations.

124. Organization

a. At each political subdivision, interdepartmental civil-military task forces plan and execute consolidation operations within their area of responsibility. The brigade will be organized into small independent task forces, each supporting consolidation operations for the various subareas of a political subdivision. The areas of responsibility will be designated by the appropriate governmental head, advised and assisted by the brigade commander and staff. Care must be exercised to insure that proper phasing of areas to be controlled pre-

cludes overcommitting forces to areas which they cannot control, and to missions which they cannot accomplish.

b. Brigade and subordinate commanders will establish a force element in the area coordination center of each applicable level, i.e., brigade at state (province) ACC, and battalion at county (district) ACC. For details of ACC concepts, organization, and operation, see paragraph 53.

125. Operations

Initial control will be established by clearing the bulk of guerrilla forces from the areas which will subsequently be expanded and linked. Brigade commanders should encourage civil authorities to extend controlled areas only to the limits of combined military/civil capabilities. Once an area has been cleared of the bulk of guerrillas, sufficient defense capabilities must be established and maintained to hold the area. Although guerrilla infiltration into a friendly controlled area is possible, the civil administration, supported by regular armed forces and/or paramilitary forces, must be capable of controlling infiltration by populace and resources control measures. Friendly controlled areas must not be allowed to revert to guerrilla domination. During consolidation operations, populace and resources control operations such as screening of civilians will be accomplished to prevent guerrillas from infiltrating and posing as loyal citizens. Every effort will be made to reestablish government authority throughout the friendly controlled area, and to return as many civil activities as practicable to the administration of civil agencies, so as to release military forces for further combat duties.

126. Phases of Consolidation Operations

Consolidation operations are of long duration involving the application of all available resources in the area to accomplish the mission of consolidation. The conduct of consolidation operations includes a planning phase followed by the operational phases of offense and defense.

127. Planning Phase

Plans for consolidation operations must be

detailed and must provide for long-range commitment of both personnel and materiel resources (military and civilian). In formulating plans for consolidation operations, assessment of the area proposed for consolidation must be made to determine military and civilian resources requirements. Plans must be coordinated fully with all agencies which will be involved in the consolidation. Required resources to implement consolidation operations plans must be available for commitment to the area prior to initiation of the offensive phase of the consolidation operation.

128. Offensive Phase

The offensive phase of a consolidation operation involves moving the civil-military task force into the operational area; destroying, or clearing guerrilla forces from the area; replacing insurgent political, economic, social, civic, and psychological functionaries in the local government; and locating, identifying, and destroying underground elements and sympathizers. Strike operations are conducted to establish additional counter guerrilla bases and to attack and destroy guerrilla bases and formations within the area.

a. Offensive patrolling, area surveillance, ambushes, and other small-unit actions will be used extensively to disrupt guerrilla operations and gain information during the operations which culminate in establishment of friendly controlled areas.

b. Patrolling operations, extended in range and scope, cover the entire area to be controlled. Efforts are oriented toward seeking out the guerrilla and blocking approaches into the area. Some patrols will be long-range and of long duration and will require air support for delivery, resupply, and pickup. Followup offensive operations of the strike variety will be conducted after the necessary intelligence effort is producing timely and accurate information. Strike operations, using ground, air, or waterborne forces, normally will include the following:

- (1) Accurately locating the guerrilla forces and the routes into and out of his area.
- (2) Blocking the escape routes (using

area or point ambushes) and positioning the reserve to be employed in pursuit operations.

- (3) Containing guerrilla forces in position by using a small fixing force.
- (4) Committing a strike force to destroy the guerrilla force and his installations by fire and maneuver.
- (5) Committing the reserve as required.

c. Success in the establishment of friendly controlled areas will allow use of a portion of the counter guerrilla forces from these areas for offensive operations elsewhere; however, care must be taken not to allow the friendly controlled area to revert to guerrilla domination by depleting the troop strength prematurely.

d. Brigade operations in the offensive phase will normally be coordinated with political chiefs. These operations require detailed planning, a high degree of firepower, security, and speed in execution. They may be mounted directly from friendly controlled areas or from other secure sites. A flexible communication system must be carefully planned so as to insure a high degree of control and coordination.

129. Defensive Phase

The defensive phase of a consolidation operation involves holding an area against guerrilla attack to permit the civilian security forces and other governmental agencies to conduct their internal defense and development programs. It involves training local irregular and paramilitary forces to assume the defensive and security missions from the regular armed forces. Defensive operations are conducted by brigade forces to provide defense against guerrilla attack, to deny guerrillas access to support, and to provide a secure base from which to expand the consolidation operation. Offensive action is required for elimination of guerrilla forces; however, defense of areas, population centers, tactical bases, logistical installations, airbases/airfields, and lines of communication must be provided for.

a. Defensive actions in consolidation operations are conducted to accomplish one or more of the following included tasks:

- (1) Deter guerrilla offensive action.
- (2) Reduce guerrilla capacity for offensive action.
- (3) Deny guerrilla entry into an area.
- (4) Deny guerrilla internal and external support.
- (5) Destroy or trap guerrilla forces.
- (6) Develop favorable conditions for other counter guerrilla operations.
- (7) Economize forces in one area in order to apply decisive force elsewhere.

b. A variation of the area defense and the mobile defense described in FM 7-20, FM 7-30, and FM 61-100, is the normal form of defense in consolidation operations. Emphasis is placed on fire planning and use of obstacles. Considerations for assigning areas of responsibility to the counter guerrilla force are discussed in paragraph 111.

c. In the defensive phase of consolidation operations, security echelons will conduct extensive patrolling throughout the area of responsibility. The bulk of the defending force may be assigned to this security echelon.

d. The composition of defense and reserve echelons of the brigade will vary with the size of the area and nature of the terrain to be defended. Relatively large areas require extended distances between elements of the defense echelon. The defense echelon may be fragmented into numerous elements required to defend dispersed installations located throughout the area of responsibility. In this situation, the reserve echelon may be assigned missions as a reaction force for several installations assigned to the defense echelon.

e. Fire support for the variations of the area defense and the mobile defense described above may require fragmentation of fire support units to a much lower level than normal in conventional operations. To support these widely separated defense echelons and security echelons, decentralization of fire support may be required. Prior registration of indirect fires on likely guerrilla assembly areas and avenues of approach will assist in the execution of the defense. When direct fire supporting weapons (including artillery in the direct fire role) are located within the defensive position, their fires

can be effective when using time- and super-quick fuze against covered positions along avenues of approach. This is particularly important if the guerrilla force closes within the minimum range limitation of indirect fire weapons, and support from other positions is not available. Provisions should be made for supporting both U.S. force local tactical operations and host country local defense.

f. Maximum effort should be made by counter guerrilla forces, through advisory assistance, to organize, train, and utilize available host country personnel to assist in securing and defending the area. U.S. civil affairs units may be available to assist the brigade commander in maintaining civilian populace and resources control through the use of organized host country agencies.

g. Personnel security is a command responsibility and function. All military personnel will be thoroughly briefed on known or suspected guerrilla forces. Security measures, including extensive patrolling, are employed to minimize the effectiveness of guerrilla attacks. Troops in friendly controlled areas often acquire a false sense of security, and commanders at all echelons must maintain high security discipline. All personnel are trained in defensive tactics and techniques to be used against guerrilla attacks. Trained dogs may be used with guards and patrols. Rigid security measures are enforced on local laborers to include screening, identification, and supervision as a defense against sabotage within installations. All security measures are maintained on a continuing basis.

h. All military and critical civilian installations and population centers are defended against guerrilla sabotage and attack. These area and strongpoint defenses include the use of combat bases and static defense posts.

- (1) Installation and population center defense is based on the principle of mutual support. The larger installations and communities and the surrounding smaller ones mutually assist in their defense until other support or reinforcements arrive. Fire support from artillery and mortars within range of several installations and

communities contributes to mutual defense.

- (2) The defense of communities, after being cleared by military forces, is primarily the task of local paramilitary, police, or irregular forces. The defense of communities is conducted along the same lines as defense of installations with special emphasis on populace and resources control measures. Special considerations arise in planning the defense of communities.
 - (a) Boundaries, coordinating points, and the configuration of the operational area are dependent upon the location of the community rather than upon the most favorable terrain.
 - (b) Surveillance and security measures must be provided for day and night operations.
 - (c) Since guerrilla attacks of communities usually are initiated from close-in assembly areas, fire planning emphasizes coordinated short-range fires to repel the attack.
 - (d) Extensive intelligence coverage inside and around installations.
 - (e) Extensive patrolling outside the defensive perimeters.
 - (f) Mobile reserves ready to counter guerrilla surprise attack.
 - (g) Communications must be provided for coordination purposes.
- (3) Special attention in defense of installation and population centers is given to the security of food supplies, arms, ammunition, and other equipment of value to the guerrilla. Use is made of camouflage and deception measures such as dummy positions, natural and manmade obstacles, alarms, illumination, flame field expedients, electronic surveillance devices, and restricted areas. Fields of fire are cleared and field fortifications are constructed. The local defense system is supplemented by vigorous patrolling using varying schedules and routes and operating at a distance from the installation

which will minimize effects from guerrilla employment of light mortars. The routine means of defending installations are altered frequently to prevent guerrilla forces from obtaining detailed information about the composition and habits of the defenders.

- (4) Defensive measures are organized for the defense of both the installation or community and the security force. Reliable communications must be established between static defense posts, the parent unit base, and the nearest artillery support unit. The parent unit must be prepared to counterattack with its reserve to assist the installation or community.
- (5) Installations and communities are organized for all-around defense, and they may receive artillery support from units located in the area. Adequate guards and patrols are used to prevent surprise. Concealed approaches are mined and/or covered by automatic weapons. Flame field expedients are used to cover approaches and to serve as a warning to the defenders. Areas from which short-range fire can be placed on the position are cleared and mined. Personnel are provided auxiliary exits and covered routes from their shelters to combat positions. Buildings, if used for shelter, should be selected with care and the walls should be reinforced for protection against small-arms fires. If the installation or community consists of more than one position, consideration is given to the use of connecting trenches. Sufficient sustaining supplies are stored in dispersed and protected caches. Adequate security must be provided for the communication equipment. Combat efficiency is maintained by training and periodic alert drills.
- (6) Host country personnel other than defense forces are not allowed to enter the defensive positions, except as absolutely required, and those living in the immediate vicinity are screened

and evacuated, if necessary. Friendly civilians and domestic animals may be helpful in warning of the approach of guerrilla units.

- (7) The defense of the installation or community should be varied to counter information the guerrilla may have received concerning the disposition and routine operations of the security force. This may be accomplished by varying—

- (a) Patrol and sentinel routes.
- (b) Fixed posts and listening post locations.
- (c) Schedule of changing guard.
- (d) Password.
- (e) Position of automatic weapons.

- (8) As a means of countering the guerrilla tactic of night attack, proper illuminating means—to include illuminating grenades, air and ground flares, artillery and mortar illuminating shells, searchlights, and all types of improvised means of illumination—must be employed in night defense of installations and communities. For details on battlefield illumination, see FM 20-60.

i. Military units may be required to secure lines of communication in the area. This may be accomplished by surveillance, patrolling, and establishment of a system of static security posts. Static security posts protect critical points along lines of communication such as terminals, tunnels, bridges, and road or railway junctions. The size of the security post depends on the mission, the type and size of the hostile force which may attack it, and the attitude of the local civil populace. Static security posts in remote areas will necessarily be larger than those nearer supporting forces. All consideration possible is given to troop comfort during the organization and preparation of the security post.

j. When terrain permits, armor and air cavalry units should be considered for use in defensive operations. Missions may include tactical base defense, community and installation defense, border control, and reserve operations as required by the tactical situation. FM 17-1,

FM 17-15, FM 17-30, FM 17-36 and FM 17-95 contain basic doctrine, techniques, and procedures for employment of armor units in the defense. Armor and air cavalry units may be committed to offensive actions against guerrilla forces during the defense phase of consolidation operations. Emphasis is placed on planning, rapid movement, surprise, and shock effect.

130. Reserves

Reserves (reaction forces) are required and can be used more extensively as the guerrilla is located throughout the operational area. The reserve may be used to destroy the guerrilla force after it has been fixed in place by another force, or to restrict its maneuver and to deny its escape. The reserve should be prepared to move by all means available within the area of responsibility.

a. Commanders at all levels continually establish priority assumptions as to what action the guerrilla force may take. Plans for decisive employment of reserves against each assumed guerrilla action are made and kept current. These plans must be simple, coordinated in detail, and rehearsed where possible. To be effective, these plans must be based on the best continuing operational intelligence of the area and the guerrilla force. A current list of possible guerrilla objectives must be maintained, such as airbases, ports, important road and railroad junctions, defiles, bridges, homes of important persons, key military and police installations, key communities, public utilities, public gathering places, and commercial establishments. Since the guerrilla is most active during the hours of darkness, it must be assumed that most reserve plans will be executed at night.

b. In areas where only small guerrilla forces are operating, the reserve may be small with maximum effort devoted to aggressive patrolling within the defensive area. If the guerrilla force has the capability to mount large-scale operations, emphasis must be placed on larger mobile, self-sustaining reserves capable of rapid employment in order to destroy guerrilla concentrations as they occur.

c. Since the guerrilla force will often use

attacks on small outposts or installations as ruses to draw the reserve into a well-prepared, deliberate ambush, care must be taken in selecting means of transportation and routes of approach. Priority of use of aircraft must be given to the movement of the reserves. Depend-

ing on the situation, aircraft may be located habitually with reserves. In any case, there should be minimum delay between a request for assistance from an engaged force and the employment of the reserve.

Section IV. COMBAT SUPPORT

131. General

This section provides general guidance on combat support requirements for counter guerrilla tactical operations inherent in strike operations and consolidation operations. Fire support in support of host country local defense operations is also included. Missions, concepts, organization, and operations of engineers, military police, and other supporting elements in intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations military civic action, and advisory assistance operations are treated in chapter 8.

132. Artillery

In counter guerrilla tactical operations, as in conventional operations, field artillery must be able to provide effective fire support whenever and wherever needed, including fire support to assault elements in strike operations and to defensive operations conducted in consolidation operations. The tactics and techniques of conventional operations require some modification in counter guerrilla tactical operations. The pattern of guerrilla tactics and the elusiveness of guerrilla forces requires quick response by counter guerrilla forces, and field artillery provides one of the most rapid means of placing accurate, lethal fire on guerrilla forces.

a. Missions. The missions of field artillery in counter guerrilla tactical operations are to provide continuous and timely fire support to the counter guerrilla force (U.S. and/or host country) by destroying or neutralizing, in priority, those targets jeopardizing the accomplishment of the mission. Artillery units may be assigned one of the following standard tactical support missions (FM 6-20-1): direct support, reinforcing, general support, or general support-reinforcing. Field artillery fires can be effectively employed to accomplish or assist in the following:

- (1) Tactical operations to defend security posts, checkpoints, roadblocks, and patrols against attack. This may be accomplished by use of detailed fire plans and establishment of a comprehensive fire request net, and by widespread use of trained ground and airborne military and civilian forward observers. Harassment of guerrillas may be accomplished by artillery fires during periods of reduced counter guerrilla patrol activity. Guerrillas may be driven out of areas of limited or difficult accessibility into ambushes or other destruction forces. Escape routes of a guerrilla force which is being attacked or encircled by strike forces may be blocked by artillery fire. Maximum casualties may be inflicted with massed fires during strike operations. These fires are particularly effective when the area of dispersion available to the guerrilla force is reduced to an absolute minimum by the encirclement. Field artillery may also provide fire support to drop zones and landing areas; and by employing white phosphorus ammunition, it may be used to set fire to otherwise inaccessible guerrilla food crops.
- (2) Intelligence operations may be supported by deceiving the guerrilla force as to the plan of counter guerrilla action. To do this, fires are placed in areas other than those in which an operation is planned to distract guerrilla forces from the main effort and enhance the element of surprise.
- (3) Populace and resources control operations may be supported by providing illumination and supporting police raids on urban or outlying areas. This

is valuable during guerrilla night attacks on important installations such as airbases, powerplants, communication centers, supply points, and bridges, or communities sympathetic to the host country. Immediate fire may be provided to assist a convoy or column subjected to guerrilla attack. Concentrations must be plotted along the march route to insure immediate fire to protect the convoy or column.

- (4) Psychological operations may be supported by exploiting show-of-force operations.

b. Concept. The ability to deliver timely and effective artillery fire in response to guerrilla activity may discourage subsequent guerrilla activity within known artillery range. Ingenuity and departure from conventional war concepts often make artillery support possible under the most adverse circumstances in counter guerrilla operations. Quick reaction times and the capability of shifting artillery fires over wide areas requires a responsive and effective means of communication within civilian and military nets. To provide effective fire support, artillery is employed to obtain maximum area coverage with available weapons while retaining the capability to mass fires. In addition to supporting tactical operations, artillery may be positioned to provide area fire support for depots, logistic complexes, population centers, and other critical installations. The concept of greater area coverage makes it possible for some artillery to be within range of an attacking force at all times, and generally outweighs the need for massing the fires of a battalion or battery against small targets. Fires frequently may be requested by personnel from civilian forces and population centers, logistic complexes, and other support units, rather than by the supported tactical force.

c. Organization. Depending on the situation, artillery battalions in support of, or attached to, the brigade may be further deployed by battery or platoon in support of subordinate maneuver units engaged in widely dispersed counter guerrilla tactical operations. Artillery employed in smaller than battery-size units (platoon, section) will require additional secu-

rity forces from the supported force commander.

d. Operations. The decentralized nature of counter guerrilla tactical operations increases the requirement for extensive coordination of fire support below brigade level. For detailed discussion of fire support planning and coordination principles and procedures, see FM 6-20-1, FM 6-20-2, and FM 6-140. In planning counter guerrilla operations, the capabilities of field artillery to deliver accurate, surprise fire in all conditions of weather, terrain, and visibility, and to shift and mass fire rapidly within a large area should be considered. Also, consideration must be given to the limited freedom and restrained application of fire which may be required because of friendly communities, activities, and movements within the area of operations.

- (1) *Fire support coordination.* The artillery commander or his representative is normally the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) for the counter guerrilla force commander. The responsibilities of the FSCOORD are outlined in FM 6-20-1. FM 101-5 gives information on that portion of fire support coordination which involves requests for Army aviation, naval gunfire, and tactical air support. Nuclear fires, if they are used, must be closely coordinated, not only with tactical operations in the area, but also with the activities of the civilian population. Appropriate chemical and biological weapons may be used effectively. In contrast to conventional war, the nature of the counter guerrilla mission, the abnormally large size of the assigned area, and the nature of the guerrilla activity normally will dictate—
 - (a) A greater decentralization of organic, attached, and supporting fire support.
 - (b) A reduced capability for brigade control and coordination of all fires within the brigade area.
 - (c) Greater security requirements for firing positions, to include planning of direct fires for defense.

- (d) A requirement to fire in all directions.
 - (e) Provision for support to local defense forces and static security posts.
 - (f) Discriminate use of fire support to avoid noncombatant casualties in the area of operation which would alienate the population and intensify possible hostile attitudes toward U.S. units.
- (2) *Fire support planning.* Lack of time may preclude the preparation of a formal coordinated and integrated fire support plan for each operation; therefore, SOP should provide for all logical contingencies. The habitual establishment of extensive fire control measures such as fire coordination lines and no-fire lines may not be required in a decentralized operation involving supported maneuver units and artillery units providing the fire support. Close liaison and continuous contact between the supported commander and the forward observers of artillery units provide the required coordination; however, in operations involving extensive employment of maneuver and support forces, such as in the final phase of an encirclement when artillery fires are used to destroy the guerrilla force, coordination measures *must* be used to insure that converging friendly units are not fired upon.
- (3) *Observation.* The requirement to provide fire support for a number of isolated static defensive positions as well as mobile military and/or paramilitary forces throughout a 360° zone of action may exceed the artillery organic observation capabilities. Consideration should be given to training selected members of the supported forces, including paramilitary elements, in techniques and procedures for artillery observation and fire adjustment, thus providing augmentation of observer resources and improving the ability of artillery units to support all operations.
- (4) *Positioning.* Field artillery batteries may be positioned and laid by platoon or by single piece, each covering a different sector of fire. Field artillery batteries employed in this manner have a 6400-mil firing capability and can quickly accomplish a fire mission in any sector of fire.
- (5) *Mobility.* In operations conducted in large inundated areas or areas traversed by navigable streams and rivers, boats or rafts are an excellent means for transport of weapons and ammunition. In large watercraft, artillery may be positioned to fire from the craft. The 105-mm howitzer can be lifted by helicopter. This technique affords the planner the opportunity to use field artillery in almost any operation where terrain and the guerrilla situation are a deterrent to normal ground mobility. Helicopters can be used for position reconnaissance and also for ammunition supply and resupply. Aerial artillery can provide *direct* fires from the air in support of counter guerrilla tactical forces, using rocket launchers with high explosive, high explosive antitank, and white phosphorus munitions.
- (6) *Fire direction.* When fire control is centralized, the artillery battalion establishes a fire direction center (FDC) for the computation of firing data for the batteries. During highly decentralized operations, the direct support artillery cannon battery has adequate fire direction personnel to enable the battery to operate independently for limited periods. When required, a platoon or section of the cannon battery can also employ FDC techniques to deliver indirect fire for limited periods when employed to support separate operations.
- (7) *Communications.* Counter guerrilla operations place a burden on communi-

cations and fire control. Since radio is the most flexible, mobile, and, at times, the only possible means of communication, it may be necessary to make extensive use of aircraft as radio relay stations, air observation posts, and airborne FDC which can adjust fire and perform tactical fire direction. Communications must be maintained with the local host country forces and ACC.

- (8) *Ammunition.* Artillery projectiles and fuzes provide capabilities and characteristics which are flexible enough to meet most counter guerrilla tactical requirements.

133. Engineer

Counter guerrilla tactical operations may require vastly increased engineer support over conventional war operations because of poorly developed road nets; light construction of bridges, culverts, and other key installations; and the possible lack of host country engineer capabilities. For a discussion of the capabilities and organization of divisional and nondivisional engineer units, and engineer teams and detachments, see FM 5-1, FM 5-135, FM 5-136, and FM 5-142.

a. Missions. Missions which engineer units perform in support of the brigade counter guerrilla tactical operations are listed in (1) through (9) below:

- (1) Hasty repair of routes and bridges.
- (2) Installation of expedient or combat float or fixed bridges.
- (3) Breaching of obstacles by removal or destruction.
- (4) Engineer reconnaissance.
- (5) Assistance in detaching and removing mines and boobytraps.
- (6) Production of potable water.
- (7) Assistance in construction of command posts, landing zones and strips, medical facilities, shelter, storage facilities, and field fortifications.
- (8) Planning and assistance in the construction of defensive works around stationary facilities and outposts.

- (9) Provision of specialized personnel and equipment for destruction of fortifications and tunnel complexes.

b. Concept. Engineer combat support of brigade counter guerrilla tactical operations is performed in much the same manner as engineer combat support of operations in conventional war. The differences in increased security requirements, capabilities to fight as infantry, restrained application of firepower, low-level combined operations, and other factors of the counter guerrilla operational environment which apply to all brigade elements are the primary differences affecting engineer employment.

c. Organization. In counter guerrilla tactical operations, the brigade is initially supported by the divisional engineer company with which it is customarily associated. If the area is isolated, the engineer company may be attached; however, direct support is desirable, since it allows the division engineer flexibility in meeting engineer support requirements throughout the operational area. In most cases, additional companies or elements of the divisional engineer battalion will be required. Non-divisional engineer units or engineer teams and detachments from TOE 5-500 may be attached or placed in direct support when additional support is required beyond the capability of divisional engineers.

d. Operations. Security forces for engineers engaged in priority missions must be provided. While engineers habitually provide their own job-site security, the full capabilities of the unit cannot be realized when a large portion of the engineer troops are engaged in conducting the additional security operations required to prevent tactical surprise by guerrilla forces.

134. Ground Transportation

Depending on the mission, trafficability of the terrain, the size of the area of operations, and the civil and military situations, the brigade and subordinate units engaged in counter guerrilla operations may require habitual support of wheeled vehicles from division, corps, or field army transportation units in addition to vehicles organic to the brigade.

a. Additional vehicles may be required for—

- (1) Motorizing reserves.
- (2) Motorized patrolling.
- (3) Resupply and evacuation.
- (4) Transport of civilians during relocation operations.
- (5) Supporting military civic action projects.

b. Armored personnel, carriers, when available to the brigade, may be used in a variety of ways in operations against a guerrilla force. Carriers may be particularly effective in security or transportation of personnel or supplies if the terrain is trafficable. Armored personnel carriers may be utilized for—

- (1) Mechanizing all or part of the reserve.
- (2) Employment with convoy security detachments.
- (3) Employment on remote static security posts.
- (4) Transporting key civilian government officials.
- (5) Patrolling of lines of communication.
- (6) River-crossing operations or on-river patrols.
- (7) Flamethrower vehicles by adding flame guns and fuel tanks.
- (8) As show-of-force or psychological weapons.
- (9) For patient evacuation.

135. Signal Support

a. Rapid, reliable communication is essential in counter guerrilla operations. Since specific guerrilla locations are normally unknown, counter guerrilla units are often dispersed to search out the guerrilla. Communication becomes vital in order to mass sufficient counter guerrilla forces to react rapidly when contact is made with guerrilla forces.

b. When tactical maneuver units are employed in a nonconventional pattern, the signal officer must be prepared to reallocate his signal resources accordingly. Ingenuity and flexibility are paramount considerations in tailoring signal support to meet the counter guerrilla force commander's organization for combat and plan of maneuver. Maintaining conven-

tional tactical integrity of signal elements may not be possible when supporting counter guerrilla operations.

c. In a counter guerrilla operational environment, the standard command axis, or area-type communication systems, may require extensive modification. Communication between combat bases, to include those established within brigade areas, is of prime importance to the signal officer. Because installation of a brigade wire net will normally not be feasible, it may be necessary for elements of the division signal battalion to provide signal support to augment the brigade's normal communication capability. Close and continuous liaison and coordination between the brigade signal officer and the division signal officer are necessary to insure adequate and timely signal support.

d. The employment of multichannel radio-relay should be considered for interconnecting combat bases, and should be extended below brigade level when practical. It is normally not feasible to establish isolated relay stations in the counter guerrilla operational environment. Close and continuous liaison and Therefore, the locations of and distance between combat and/or patrol bases will have a serious impact on the capability to provide a reliable multichannel communication system. This must be taken into consideration by the signal officer when presenting his recommendations to the counter guerrilla force commander concerning base locations.

e. The conventional radio net structure and allocation of telephone circuits should be carefully evaluated for suitability in counter guerrilla operations. These operations may require the establishment of additional nets to handle the added requirements for broader coordination and intelligence gathering. When planning radio nets or allocating telephone circuits, the actual need should be evaluated for each operation.

f. Air-ground communication takes on added complexity in counter guerrilla operations. In these operations, it is normal for a company, platoon, or squad to require communication with Army aircraft for resupply, medical evacuation, artillery fire support, close air support, and transportation missions. Coordina-

tion of frequencies, call signs, authentication and/or recognition signals, and the dissemination of this information to all that have a need to know require special emphasis.

g. The composition of the signal element committed in support of the brigade counter guerrilla force should be modified to meet the specific requirements of the mission and the situation. The signal support element can be either in direct support or attached. A direct support role is normally more desirable as it affords wider latitude to the signal officer and greater flexibility to meet changing support requirements throughout the brigade area. In all cases, the supported unit must provide security forces for the signal elements attached or in direct support.

h. Requirements for augmentation by non-divisional signal elements for the purpose of constructing, rehabilitating, and/or maintaining civilian communication facilities are coordinated by the brigade signal officer.

i. When a brigade is involved in counter guerrilla operations, brigade communication must be tied in with host country military and paramilitary forces, area coordination centers, U.S. advisory elements, and civilian communication systems.

136. Air Defense

In general, current air defense doctrines, techniques, and procedures covered in FM 44-1 and FM 44-2 are adaptable to counter guerrilla operations. Air defense is a combination of all active and passive means available. The timely, intelligent choice and application of that combination of active and passive measures best matching the existing or anticipated situation is paramount in order to meet air defense objectives.

137. Army Aviation

Army aviation units perform combat support missions in response to requirements of land forces engaged in counter guerrilla operations to a far greater degree than for land forces engaged in conventional operations. These missions may be performed in support of U.S. brigades, host country forces, allied or combined forces. This paragraph discusses typical

combat support missions which may be performed by aviation units, the missions and capabilities of selected TOE aviation units, and the employment and capabilities of armed helicopters. FM 1-5, FM 1-15, FM 1-100, FM 1-105, and FM 1-110 discuss Army aviation organizations and employment.

a. Mission. Army aviation supplements the ability of land forces to perform the land battle functions of intelligence; mobility; force/ firepower; command, control, and communications; and service support. Typical combat support tasks performed by aviation units include—

- (1) Command and control of land force maneuver elements through the use of the aerial command post.
- (2) Armed helicopter operations.
- (3) Aerial surveillance and target acquisition, to include visual, photographic, infrared, and sensors.
- (4) Adjustment of artillery fire (aerial observation).
- (5) Battlefield illumination.
- (6) Airmobile operations, to include airlift for reserves (reaction forces).
- (7) Augmentation of USAF search and rescue capability, to include crash rescue.
- (8) Dissemination of riot-control agents and smoke.
- (9) Wire laying.
- (10) Radio relay.
- (11) Message drop and pickup.
- (12) Airdrop of personnel.
- (13) Convoy security.
- (14) Mapping and survey.
- (15) Emergency medical evacuation.
- (16) Liaison.
- (17) Command and staff transportation.
- (18) Chemical and radiological monitoring.
- (19) Route reconnaissance.
- (20) Area reconnaissance.
- (21) Column control.
- (22) Screening.
- (23) Delivery of critical personnel supplies and material to isolated areas.

b. Concept. The tactics employed by aviation

units are those of the supported unit, modified to take advantage of the mobility provided by aviation units. Employment of aviation units is directed according to the command and control relationship established for U.S. brigades and host country forces, with the U.S. brigade commander or the U.S. Army senior advisor exercising operational control of U.S. Army aviation resources.

c. Organization.

- (1) The *airmobile company (light)*, when in support of the brigade, provides tactical air movement of combat supplies and equipment within the brigade operational area. Capabilities of the airmobile company (light) include the following:
 - (a) Provides continuous (day and night) operations during good visibility and limited operations under low visibility in support of the counter guerrilla force in the brigade operational area.
 - (b) Provides, in a single lift, airlift for the assault elements of one rifle company.
 - (c) Provides aerial movement of troops, supplies, and equipment within the operational area.
 - (d) Augments evacuation capability of medical air ambulance elements.
- (2) The *aerial surveillance company* extends surveillance and target acquisition capabilities of brigades through the use of organic aircraft, sensor equipment, and aerial observers. The aerial surveillance company has the capability to—
 - (a) Conduct sustained surveillance of that portion of the brigade area of influence for which the brigade has primary aerial surveillance responsibility. This task will be performed both day and night, and during instrument weather conditions.
 - (b) Conduct aerial reconnaissance of routes, zones, and areas.
 - (c) Acquire target acquisition information by aerial means.
 - (d) Collect information for post-strike analysis of nuclear weapons effects.

- (e) Collect information for chemical and radiological survey.
- (f) Provide an airfield terminal control facility.

(3) *Armed helicopters* provide ground commanders with a highly mobile and immediately responsive aerial fire support system which is often the most effective means of countering the hit-and-run tactics employed by guerrilla forces. Capabilities of armed helicopters which are particularly applicable to counter guerrilla operations include—

- (a) Aerial escort for airmobile operations, to include aerial fire support in the objective area.
- (b) Aerial escort for surface convoys, to include ground, water, and rail movements.
- (c) Armed reconnaissance and surveillance, to include target marking and limited destructive fires.
- (d) Aerial fires in support of committed forces.

138. Tactical Air Support (TAS)

a. Tactical air support includes close air support, tactical air reconnaissance and tactical airlift. Requirements and procedures for requesting close air and tactical air reconnaissance support are contained in FM 100-25/AFM 2-52, *Tactical Air Support of Land Forces* (to be published). Procedures for requesting or, when appropriate, directing tactical airlift support are contained in FM 100-27/AFM 2-50, *U.S. Army/U.S. Air Force Doctrine for Tactical Airlift Operations*.

b. The flexibility and striking-power of tactical air makes it an important means of neutralizing and destroying guerrilla forces. The unpredictable nature of hit-and-run targets in counter guerrilla operations and the reaction times involved dictate maximum use of all fire support means to include tactical air. Air Force tactical airlift forces increase the battlefield mobility of the Army in land combat operations by providing a capability to airland or airdrop combat elements and providing these forces with sustained logistical support.

CHAPTER 8

RELATED OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

139. General

This chapter provides further guidance on the missions, concepts, organization, and operations relating to counter guerrilla tactical operations in internal defense and development. These related operations include intelligence operations, psychological operations, civil affairs operations, and advisory assistance operations. General policies and doctrine concerning these activities is contained in FM 100-20, while specific doctrine will be found in manuals referenced in each section.

140. Mission

Collectively, the objective of these related operations, together with tactical operations, is to assist the host country by the application of U.S. brigade resources in countering guerrilla activity in internal defense and development. Specific objectives of each operation are discussed in their respective sections.

141. Concept

The activities discussed in this chapter, as well as the tactical operations discussed in chapter 7, are mutually supporting and must be planned and executed according to an integrated, coordinated campaign plan. During one period of time, counter guerrilla tactical operations may be accentuated; at other times, intelligence, military civic action, advisory assistance, and/or psychological operations may claim significant brigade resources. Intelligence operations provide the basis for tactical operations, psychological operations, populace and

resources control operations, military civic action, and even advisory assistance operations, while psychological operations are inherent in all of the other activities, and so on. In summary, the brigade cannot be committed solely to counter guerrilla tactical operations without participating to some degree in all of these related operations. In any case, the operations discussed in this chapter are long-term and continuous, and they are directed at defeating the guerrilla and his underground and auxiliary organizations.

142. Organization

Organization of the brigade to conduct these various activities will vary constantly according to the brigade mission. The offensive phases of consolidation operations will require an organization to facilitate offensive tactical operations, while in defensive phases the conduct of military civic action and advisory assistance operations will require redistribution of brigade resources to accomplish these missions. Advisory assistance operations by medical, military police, and engineer units may be a heavy initial requirement in order to train host country personnel to assist themselves and the brigade in the overall campaign. Organizations must be flexible and yet permit continuity in all programs underway in the operational area.

143. Operations

For details on operational concepts and planning, see chapter 6.

Section II. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

144. General

a. Intelligence is generally considered to be

the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information concerning one or

more aspects of foreign countries or areas, which is immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies, and operations.

b. An essential in counter guerrilla operations is a thorough understanding of all aspects of the area and the society, augmented by a complete understanding of the prevailing internal and external forces supporting the guerrilla force and its underground. Effective intelligence operations must exploit all host country or allied intelligence assets developed prior to the emergence of guerrilla activity. The basic inventory of intelligence on a specific area and situation is derived from area and country studies supplemented with operational intelligence collected more recently on the scene. This body of data forms the basis of the commander's estimate of the guerrilla situation and the subsequent intelligence collection plans of his intelligence officer.

c. Special aspects of intelligence which apply specifically to counter guerrilla operations are discussed in this chapter. The general doctrine, methods, and procedures for collection planning, collecting, processing, and disseminating and using intelligence are covered in FM 30-5.

145. Mission

Intelligence efforts support specific counter guerrilla plans and operations as well as provide specific and general knowledge of the area of operations and the guerrilla forces upon which to base follow-on plans and operations.

146. Concept

To be successful, counter guerrilla operations must be based on timely and reliable intelligence. The production of this intelligence will involve the following special considerations:

a. Success in counter guerrilla operations almost invariably goes to the force which receives timely, accurate information from the local population.

b. Political, economic, psychological, and sociological factors are of more importance at a lower level in the production of intelligence in counter guerrilla operations than in the production of intelligence in normal limited and general war operations.

c. Collection and dissemination must be closely controlled to insure that all agencies or forces—military and civilian—contribute to the collection effort and have access to as much of the resulting intelligence as their missions require.

d. Countermeasures must be taken against hostile underground and auxiliary elements which collect intelligence for guerrilla forces.

e. Deception and secrecy must be emphasized to prevent the compromise of operations and plans.

f. Counter guerrilla operations will require modification or adaptation of basic combat intelligence collection procedures.

g. Electronic surveillance devices may be of less value in counter guerrilla operations than against forces in limited and general war primarily because of civilian activity within the area of counter guerrilla operations. Surveillance may best be accomplished by counter guerrilla forces or civilian-agent surveillance teams using concealed static surveillance sites combined with extensive ground reconnaissance patrolling and aerial observation.

h. Communications must be provided to transmit timely intelligence information. Speed of dissemination to permit immediate action is stressed.

147. Organization

Normally, it will be necessary to augment brigade and battalion intelligence sections with intelligence personnel, and area specialists largely from the -500 and -600-series TOE, to conduct effective, 24-hour-a-day intelligence operations at these levels. Intelligence operations must be coordinated through the appropriate ACC.

a. Collection agencies organic to the brigade, its attachments from higher headquarters and from TOE 33-500 and 33-600, and other support sources may include—

- (1) Maneuver battalions and other combat units. Each maneuver battalion has an organic reconnaissance and ground surveillance capability specifically designed for information collection and target acquisition. In addition, subor-

- dinate units of a battalion have information collection capabilities.
- (2) Aviation sections of brigade headquarters and headquarters companies.
 - (3) Combat support units. The target acquisition capabilities of supporting artillery units can provide valuable target acquisition assistance and augment surveillance and reconnaissance efforts within the operational area. Artillery target acquisition resources include ground and aerial observers, counter-mortar, and medium-range surveillance radars. All combat support units having habitual contact with the civilian population, such as engineer units engaged in civil construction, are good information collection agencies.
 - (4) Combat service support units. In limited and general war, these units normally have limited capabilities for information collection; however, in internal defense and development, when these units may be engaged extensively in providing logistical support to the civilian population, they are valuable collection agencies. All medical personnel, supply specialists, truck drivers, and other administrative personnel whose duties require close contact with the civilian population are trained to collect and report information. Of particular interest are civil affairs and military police units. Civil affairs personnel and military police in their day-to-day operations deal with the civil population, their equipment, and their documentary matters, all of which have intelligence value. Civil affairs and military police personnel often can provide indication of the attitudes of the civilian population in specific areas.
 - (5) Provisional long-range patrols. See FM 31-18.
 - (6) U.S. Army Security Agency. This agency can provide communication and noncommunication intelligence, certain communication countermeasures, and means of assisting in communication security and electronic security.
 - (7) Counterintelligence specialist elements.
 - (8) U.S. civil affairs teams.
 - (9) Interrogator teams trained in the language of the host country.
 - (10) Order-of-battle specialists.
 - (11) Imagery interpreters.
 - (12) Intelligence research and analysis personnel.
 - (13) U.S. Criminal Investigation Detachments.
 - (14) Psychological operations teams.
 - (15) Host country civilian and military collection agencies. These are normally available within the brigade areas of operations, and they may include host country regular armed forces units; national, municipal, or special police units; irregular units; civilian administrators; friendly guerrilla units; and paramilitary forces.
 - (16) Other U.S. civilian and military agencies.
- b. Sources of information available to counter guerrilla forces in stability operations are—
- (1) Intelligence agents.
 - (2) Agencies of the civil government.
 - (3) Hostile activity.
 - (4) Captured personnel, documents, and materiel.
 - (5) Studies and reports.
 - (6) Photographs and maps.
 - (7) Civilians who can be induced to report on the activities of guerrillas in the area.
 - (8) Guerrilla communication. Information collection agencies make special efforts to intercept guerrilla communication. Communication provides the essential link between guerrilla forces and outside armed forces sponsoring or allied with them. Control and coordination within guerrilla commands and with supporting underground and auxiliary groups depend on communication. Radio normally is the primary means used by the guerrilla to transmit timely intelligence. Special attention

is given to intercepting and breaking guerrilla codes. Guerrilla radio frequencies may be jammed to deny the use of radio channels, but before directing that a local station be destroyed or jammed, consideration must be given to the loss of information which could otherwise be obtained from guerrilla communication. Radio direction finders are used to locate guerrilla force transmitter stations.

- (9) **Police intelligence network.** The daily contact of police with the population makes the police an important source of information to newly arriving counter guerrilla forces. Police records can pinpoint the criminal element or political dissidents that provide a fertile recruiting ground for guerrillas.

148. Operations

a. Intelligence Production. Intelligence production in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense operations is in accordance with the standard intelligence cycle of collection planning, collecting, processing, and dissemination and use.

- (1) *Collection planning.* A collection plan provides the intelligence officer with a logical, orderly system for directing the collection effort. Ideally, it insures that all information necessary is collected in time to be of use and that all possible sources of information are exploited by appropriate collection agencies.
- (2) *Collecting.* The need to exploit all sources of information will require resourceful, flexible, and aggressive direction and coordination of the intelligence collection effort. It is essential that commanders and intelligence officers be fully aware of the capabilities and limitations of all available intelligence resources in order to make the best use of them. Among the collection techniques employed will be the use of standard procedures as well as the use of expedients and improvisations necessitated or permitted by

local conditions and resources, and the employment of specialized intelligence personnel and equipment which may be placed in support of the brigade.

- (3) *Processing.* The effort to produce intelligence necessary to support counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development will require continual and close coordination with higher, subordinate, adjacent, supporting, and cooperating civil and military intelligence agencies and elements.
- (4) *Disseminating and using.* The timely dissemination of available intelligence and its immediate use is of vital importance in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development. Primary, alternate, and special intelligence channels of communication may be established when facilities and resources permit.

b. Civilian Population. Exploitation of civilian sources of information in counter guerrilla operations in stability operations normally requires a sophisticated intelligence organization which is resident within the population. However, as the counter guerrilla campaign progresses, the civilian populace can be expected to volunteer increasing amounts of intelligence information within the brigade operational area.

- (1) *Type information.* Civilian sources or informants normally may be expected to provide the following type information:
 - (a) Details of the local terrain.
 - (b) Ideological motivation and sympathies of local residents.
 - (c) Logistical support available, or potentially available, to guerrillas operating in the area.
 - (d) Potential guerrilla targets or objectives.
 - (e) Identification of covert or part-time members of the guerrilla force.
 - (f) Sabotage, espionage, and terrorism techniques and activities of the guerrilla and underground support organizations.

- (g) Weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the guerrilla force.
 - (h) Psychological operations by the guerrilla force and the impact on the local population.
- (2) *Information source file.* To expedite the evaluation of information provided by the civilian populace it may become necessary for brigade intelligence personnel to establish records which will quickly identify local sources of information and the degree of reliability of such sources. When established, this information source file should include such information as—
- (a) Name and physical description of source.
 - (b) Area in which source can obtain information.
 - (c) Factors contributing to source's motivation to cooperate with counter-guerrilla forces.
 - (d) Information collection capabilities of source, to include indication of training received.
 - (e) Method by which source is contacted.
 - (f) Record of payments or other remuneration if made to source.
 - (g) Record of productivity and reliability of source.
- (3) *Overt exploitation of civilian sources.* In overt exploitation, a source is contacted openly by the intelligence officer or one of his recognizable agencies, and information is solicited directly. This method has the advantage of providing for the immediate collection of information, but it frequently entails significant disadvantages, to include—
- (a) The information requirements of the brigade or battalion are made apparent to the source, thus entailing a security risk.
 - (b) The source may not cooperate fully because of lack of motivation or because of fear of reprisal.
- (4) *Covert exploitation of civilian sources.* Covert intelligence techniques are necessary in counter-guerrilla operations in internal defense and develop-

ment to complement overt collection efforts in determining location, strength, and capability of guerrilla forces, underground cells, and civilian supporters. Normally, at brigade or battalion level it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish an *original* covert collection or informant net or system during the time the brigade or battalion is in a particular area of operations. Therefore, the S2 should support and utilize reliable informant or covert collection operations being conducted by other U.S., allied, or host country agencies within the brigade or battalion area of interest. Intelligence collected through covert exploitation of civilian sources of information will be made available to counter-guerrilla commanders through an ACC, joint operations—intelligence center, or a similar facility established to coordinate internal defense and development operations.

c. Counterintelligence. Counterintelligence increases the security of all forces and increases the probability of attaining surprise in operations against guerrilla forces. Adequate security measures must be developed and continuously enforced to prevent penetration of the intelligence operation by hostile elements and to detect hostile elements already within the operation. Since guerrilla forces usually are numerically inferior to those of the host country, allied, and U.S. forces opposing them, the guerrilla must depend heavily on intelligence for successful operations. U.S. brigades, in coordination with host country authorities, habitually will place emphasis on the following counterintelligence measures.

- (1) *Denial measures.* Denial measures particularly applicable to counter-guerrilla operations may include—
 - (a) Removal of compromised informant sources from the area of operations.
 - (b) Restrictions on the movement and communication facilities of the civilian population within the area of operations.
 - (c) Thorough briefing of all U.S. allied, and attached host country personnel

on the intelligence practices and techniques used by the guerrilla and his underground support organization and on the security of information.

- (d) Emphasis on the secure disposal of trash and waste matter.
 - (e) Employment of silent weapons by patrols.
 - (f) Normal activity while preparing for operations to preclude indication to the guerrilla force of a change in routine.
 - (g) Maintenance of strict security concerning current or projected logistic movements and the nature of supplies.
 - (h) Conduct of major troop movements under the concealment of darkness or during inclement weather and by the most rapid means of movement available.
- (2) *Detection measures.* Appropriate detection measures in counter guerrilla operations may include—
- (a) Background investigations and screening of all civilians employed by, or operating with, U.S. and host country forces, and those in civil positions. Particular attention must be given to the control of guides or trackers who are familiar with the location, disposition, and objectives of the friendly forces.
 - (b) Surveillance of all known or suspected members of the guerrilla force, its underground and auxiliary organizations.
 - (c) Extensive employment of trip flares, boobytraps, and ambushes in areas of suspected guerrilla reconnaissance activity.
 - (d) Employment of dogs in conjunction with other security measures.
 - (e) The clearance of vegetation and the plowing of selected areas to provide

indications of passage across the area.

- (f) Maximum emphasis on visual and electronic observation. Augmentation of organic visual aids and electronic detection devices is frequently required.
 - (g) Monitoring civil communication media.
 - (h) Employment of civil policewomen for search and interrogation of women and children.
 - (i) Surprise relocation and counterintelligence screening of the entire population of settlements suspected of intelligence activities in support of guerrilla force.
 - (j) Wide distribution of photographs of known guerrillas or key underground personnel to assist in their apprehension.
 - (k) Offering rewards for information leading to the capture of informants or other agents supporting the guerrilla force.
 - (l) Periodic photography of all residents of villages within the guerrilla area of influence and comparison of these photographs to determine additions to, or deletions from, the population during the interim period.
 - (m) Issue of closely controlled identification cards to all residents of the area of operations. In counter guerrilla operations, counterintelligence activities normally are complicated by the presence of large numbers of civilians of unknown reliance; it is difficult to distinguish among the friendly, neutral, and hostile elements. All possible security measures which will facilitate identification of these elements must be employed continually.
- (3) *Deception measures.* In counter guerrilla operations, units habitually plan and execute small-scale cover and deception.

Section III. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

149. General

This section provides guidance to the brigade in the conduct of psychological operations in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development. These operations include the planned use of propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives. Comprehensive guidance relative to psychological operations principles and techniques are contained in FM 33-1 and FM 33-5.

150. Purpose

The essential purpose of brigade psychological operations is to enhance the probability of successfully accomplishing the brigade's various internal defense and development missions. This purpose is achieved by employing psychological operations principles and techniques to lessen or exploit—as appropriate—the potential or actual psychological implications and effects of the brigade's tactical or nontactical operations upon either or both the population-at-large and the guerrilla.

151. Concept

The overall psychological operation's program for a given host country is established at the national level by a U.S.-host country agency. This program provides the guidelines within which each appropriate succeeding lower military and civilian echelon conducts itself with respect to the psychological battle for the support of the population which is inevitably waged between the host country government on the one hand and the subversive elements and guerrillas on the other. The brigade must insure that its operations are in consonance with the overall psychological operations program for the host country. The brigade will employ psychological operations not only to support its tactical strike and consolidation operations but also in the support of intelligence operations, civil affairs operations, and advisory assistance operations. Care must be exercised to insure that the allegiance of the people is directed toward the host country

rather than toward U.S. brigade forces and that announced programs and projects are attainable. This coordination can best be accomplished in the local ACC.

152. Organization

The psychological operations staff officer(s) and psychological operations units perform assigned missions in the same manner as other specialized units or staff members that are attached to, or placed in support of, the brigade or battalion. In situations where such support is not available, a member or section of the unit staff is assigned responsibility for incorporating psychological operations considerations into plans, action and operations. Psychological operations resources are provided either from higher headquarters units or from TOE 33-500 resources. Psychological operations units can provide, in addition to advice, support in the form of loudspeaker teams, leaflets, and various other audio-visual media.

153. Operations

Properly integrated and employed in the planning and conduct of operations and activities, psychological operations can facilitate the accomplishment of the brigade's mission in the realm of psychological effects in much the same fashion that artillery fire does in the realm of more tangible physical effects. Therefore, brigade forces should consider the employment of psychological operations in all operations and activities.

a. The establishment of logistic bases and forward tactical bases will necessitate gaining the support of the populace in the vicinity. Themes should stress the purpose of U.S. support and the military civic action program, the need for laborers, the effects of pilferage on the counter guerrilla effort, and the necessity that people not discuss U.S. and host country military activities.

b. In tactical operations, psychological themes should be tailored to the type of operation being conducted and addressed to both the local people and to the guerrilla force. In consolidation operations, which are intended to secure an area

permanently, the main theme should stress the security of the population and the internal development program. In strike operations, which are not intended to provide continuous security for the inhabitants, the theme employed should state the purpose of the operation and may invite the populace to move to friendly controlled areas for their own welfare and safety. In combat actions, every effort must be made to provide for the safety of the civilian population and, if possible, to separate them from the guerrilla forces so that the maximum available firepower can be employed against the guerrilla. The decision to employ psychological operations media to accomplish this task must be carefully weighed against compromising surprise and security. Themes employed against guerrilla forces should stress the failures of their economic or political systems as they apply to the individual, rather than using ideological rebuttals; the power of the host

country and U.S. forces; and the hardships endured by the guerrilla.

c. Brigade intelligence operations can be facilitated by employing psychological operations media to inform the people that they should report to the proper authorities information pertaining to strangers, suspicious persons, unusual activities by neighbors, and guerrilla activities. Posters and leaflets should provide definitive instructions as to persons and places that are available to receive this information. The message should indicate what rewards, if any, are available.

d. Captured or defected leaders of the guerrilla force should be exploited. Written and broadcast messages prepared by these individuals and reviewed by trained psychological operations personnel of the brigade may be used in communities suspected of supporting guerrilla forces, and in tactical operations against guerrilla forces.

Section IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

154. General

This section provides general guidance in the missions, concepts, organization, and conduct of brigade civil affairs operations as part of counter guerrilla operations. Only those aspects that are particularly pertinent to internal defense operations have been expanded in this section. For further details of civil affairs operations see the FM 41-series.

155. Responsibilities

a. Civil affairs operations are those activities of a command, which obtain for a military commander essential civilian cooperation and support or reduce civilian interference in a given locality, area, or country in the attainment of his objective. They affect the relationship between his military forces and the civil authorities and people of the country or area in which such forces are located and may involve the performance of military forces of some or all of the functions normally performed by civil government.

b. The civil affairs responsibilities of the counter guerrilla force commander can be broken down into seven major activities.

- (1) Provision of civilian support for and prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.
- (2) Provision of or support for the functions of government for a civilian populace.
- (3) Community relations of the military force.
- (4) Military Civic Action as part of the Internal Development Program.
- (5) Military Involvement in the Populace and Resources Control program as part of Internal Defense Operations.
- (6) Military support of Civil Defense.
- (7) Consolidation Psychological Operations.

c. Command priority will be given to those major CA activities which are most closely related to the accomplishment of the command mission. The CA staff element will plan and supervise all CA activities of the command to provide for maximum command effort in support of this mission. In internal defense operations, priority of CA activity will normally be given to military civic action and to military participation in the populace and resources control program, but as important as these two

functions are the commander cannot presume that they will meet his total civil affairs responsibility.

156. Objectives

In counterguerrilla operations, the objective of civil affairs operations will always be to provide civilian support for, and to prevent civilian interference with, the Brigade tactical operations against guerrilla forces. Success in achieving this objective largely depends on—

a. Adequate plans at all levels stating official guidance, policy, decisions, and detailed directions on matters which are likely to arise.

b. Proper organization for the conduct of civil affairs operations at all levels.

157. Concept

a. During the initial stages of guerrilla development, U.S. military forces already deployed to a host country, may not yet be involved in counterguerrilla tactical operations and, although they may be heavily involved in training, it is during this period that they are able to make significant contributions to national development programs through military civic action. Through these efforts, the cooperation and active support of the population will be engendered, and vital intelligence, personnel and resources support, and psychological support will be rendered the host country and denied to the guerrillas. This program supports populace and resources control operations and, in turn, is supported by PSYOP and intelligence operations; therefore, these operations should be closely coordinated.

b. Both the guerrilla force and the host country government conduct operations based on the population. Each side seeks to deprive the other of manpower, resources, and intelligence support. Initially, the national government usually has at its disposal almost all of these assets, although it may not actually control them. The guerrillas seek to gain control of these assets through a combination of persuasion, terror, and tactical operations. In many cases, the government of a developing country learns too late that it actually does not control the more remote regions of the country. The time, administration, and know-how required

to develop a populace and resources control program may not be available in the more isolated areas, and for this reason, guerrilla influence may expand rapidly in these areas. The brigade normally will assist host country civil police agencies and U.S. civilian agencies in populace and resources control missions. Populace and resources control operations support, and are supported in turn by, tactical operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations. Populace and resources control involves every phase of governmental activity needed to insure mobilization of people and resources for the government and to deny them to the insurgent movement or antigovernment guerrilla force. Among the aspects of populace and resources control those of primary interest to the brigade involve the provision of security to host country and U.S. resources, institutions, industries, and personnel. While civil police have primary responsibility for the provision of such security, they may require military augmentation for the accomplishment of this mission. Where the civil police are unavailable or unreliable, military and paramilitary forces may have to undertake primary responsibility until adequate and reliable civil police can be recruited and trained.

158. Organization

In counterguerrilla operations, civil affairs staff representation is required at all levels from battalion task force upward. If a commander is not provided with specialist Civil Affairs elements, he must discharge his responsibilities with the resources available. Specialist Civil Affairs elements including functional teams from the TOE 41-500-series are discussed in chapter 13.

159. Military Civic Action

This manual focuses on military counter-guerrilla tactical operations, and brigades assigned these missions are required to participate to varying degrees in military civic action. In the consolidation phase of tactical operations, priority of the brigade effort may be given to military civic action, while in strike operations, or in the offensive phase of counterguerrilla tactical operations, relatively few brigade re-

sources will be devoted to this activity. U.S. brigades will probably have technical capabilities which exceed anything available in a developing area. This is true particularly in the more remote areas where military forces are likely to be employed in counter guerrilla tactical operations. Units at fixed or semifixed installations are particularly vulnerable to guerrilla attack, subversion, and sabotage. In many cases, however, they are, by the same token, well equipped to participate in military civic action. The opportunity to develop the loyalty of the surrounding population is capitalized upon. All military civic action must be coordinated through the appropriate Area Coordination Center (ACC). Civil affairs staff sections plan and provide staff supervision for the military civic action program. This involves integrating the efforts of such elements as medical specialists, engineers, transportation, and others. Specialist Civil Affairs elements if assigned, also may perform certain military civic action tasks if the tasks fall in functional areas dealing with host country governmental procedures and economies. In any case, civil affairs staff sections assist commanders to coordinate brigade military civic action programs with the internal development effort of the host country. Working with brigade troops, the civil population gains knowledge and experience in performing future similar tasks unassisted, and, through personal contact, mutual respect is fostered. Where possible, units should be utilized to support the military civic action program by providing teams to advise and assist the people during the progress of work. Combat units are capable of supporting the majority of military civic action missions; however, when technical assistance and construction beyond their capabilities is required, augmentation from higher headquarters or from TOE -500-series should be assigned.

a. Military civic action must not be a haphazard and chance operations. Basic planning steps are—

- (1) Consider the political, economic, and sociological background of the area and people.
- (2) Consider the capability of the brigade, including time, know-how, and equipment available to do the job.

- (3) Determine the most critical projects required, taking into account national internal development plans, the desires of the local people, and the local situation.

- (4) Select courses of action.

b. Critical considerations in executing military civic action programs are—

- (1) The projects should be desired by the local population so that they can be persuaded to maintain them. In many cases, what appears to be military civic action is merely a case of local citizens meeting their tax assessments through labor instead of cash payment.
- (2) At the other extreme, desired results might not be achieved by having brigade forces perform all of the work. A gift from the government is apt to mean something quite different to a traditionally voteless villager than it would to an American.
- (3) The national internal development plan usually prescribes certain types of projects which can be undertaken as military civic action, and local desires usually encompass a certain number of projects. Projects actually undertaken should be those which are found on both lists.
- (4) Care must be taken that the project does not favor one segment of the population.
- (5) Care must be taken to avoid having brigade units assist villagers of questionable loyalty to achieve higher standards of living than other loyal citizens enjoy.
- (6) The basic reasoning behind projects must be understandable to the citizens. A project to develop a clean water supply will soon fail if the villagers do not understand the need for clean water. Villagers who do not understand the disease-carrying characteristics of rats will soon lose interest in a rodent-control program.
- (7) Provision must be made for maintenance of the project after the project

team departs. A technical capability should exist in the village, and the local host country government should be prepared to supply spare parts, as necessary. Responsibilities should be fixed.

- (8) Elements of the U.S. Country Team, international nonprofit organizations, or multinational organizations may be engaged in internal development activities. Where cooperation with these elements is possible and productive, it should be exploited.

160. Populace and Resources Control

The brigade populace and resources control program has the basic objective of isolating the guerrilla force from the population and resources of the brigade operational area. It is designed to complement and support other counter guerrilla operations and environmental improvement being conducted by the military forces, and to contribute to the overall stability of the country or the operational area. To the maximum extent possible, control of the populace and resources should be performed by host country agencies. This is a matter of practicality, but there are also legal and psychological implications. Brigade participation in the populace and resources control program could range from very minor support in the countryside at large to complete control in U.S. bases. In any case, the program must be coordinated in the appropriate ACC.

a. The control measures established are a joint military/civilian effort. Administrative measures imposed to control the populace and resources, and to minimize the ability of the populace to collaborate with guerrilla forces, may include the following tasks:

- (1) Checkpoint and patrol operations.
- (2) Search operations.
- (3) Surveillance.
- (4) Apprehension of guerrilla sympathizers.
- (5) Prevention of illegal political meetings and rallies.
- (6) Registration and documentation of all civilians.

- (7) Inspection of individual identification documents, permits, and passes.
- (8) Restrictions on public and private transportation and communication means.
- (9) Curfew.
- (10) Censorship.
- (11) Control of production, storage, and distribution of foodstuffs, and protection of food-producing areas.
- (12) Control of the possession of arms, ammunition, demolitions, drugs, medicine, and money.
- (13) Evacuation of areas, as required.

b. Execution of the brigade populace and resource control program will be based on, and closely integrated with, the host country populace and resources control operations. It may not be possible for the host country government to spare a sufficient number of qualified personnel to accompany brigade operations; nevertheless, the populace and resources control aspects of all operations will remain important.

c. Brigade units must be trained to recognize and react to the many populace and resources control problems which they will encounter in their normal screening and checkpoint operations. Combat troops searching an area must know what critical items are subject to licensing or are considered contraband in the hands of civilians (para 201-206). Examples of this are—

- (1) Civilians found possessing such combinations as potassium chlorate and arsenic sulfide, which make lethal explosives when combined, should be immediately suspect.
- (2) Objects which appear to be harmless, such as blacksmith equipment, or a concentration of sewing machines in a possible uniform factory, should alert brigade elements to the possibility of a well-camouflaged guerrilla base area.
- (3) It is possible that apparently suspicious circumstances may be quite innocent. To destroy or confiscate a stock of medicine found in a hut, without investigation for example, could have

crucial psychological consequences. It could be insulin required by a diabetic, possibly a close relative of a host country soldier who is also combatting guerrillas. A concentration of sewing machines might be a tailor shop licensed by the host country government and subject to regular inspection by the local police.

- (4) The host country government probably will have an extensive list of chemicals, medicines, fertilizers, machines, and equipment which are subject to regulation.

d. Other populace and resources control measures may include identification card systems, photographs of all household members, permits to travel outside the area, curfews, block-reporting systems, "staged" incidents to test informant nets, and work, school, and civil organization attendance records.

e. The extent of control imposed upon the civilian populace depends on the degree of cooperation by the population within the assigned area. Often, it will be necessary to insure rigid control of a populace collaborating with guerrilla forces. Brigade troops screening an area or manning checkpoints must be able to deal with a broad spectrum of critical items and unknown individuals. U.S. elements performing these missions must be able to make rapid decisions which are in accord with the comprehensive national program for populace and resources control.

f. Checkpoint operations are employed normally as surprise checks, to control the movements of civilians, to confiscate illegal goods, to apprehend guerrillas, and to check the adequacy of other controls such as the use of identification passes and travel permits. Elements of the brigade must be trained and rehearsed so as to be capable of quickly establishing checkpoints.

- (1) Checkpoints normally are located where there is sufficient space for assembling people under guard and for parking vehicles for search and investigation. Troops must be positioned in the vicinity of the checkpoint, to apprehend those vehicles and individuals attempting to avoid the checkpoint,

and to provide fire support. Local security must be posted to protect the checkpoint.

- (2) The processing of individuals and vehicles at the checkpoint is as rapid and efficient as possible. The attitude of the personnel conducting the operations should be impersonal. Search must be thorough.

g. Search operations, in populace and resources control, are conducted to clear a built-up area, search watercraft, apprehend guerrillas, and seize illegal arms, communication means, medicines, and other items of a critical nature. A search operation is conducted as a preventive measure against the accumulation of critical items by the population and the harboring of guerrillas, and in accomplishing administrative control measures previously established. (For details on search operations, see para 201-206.)

h. Block control is the constant surveillance and reporting of activities within a block or other small, populated area by a resident who has been appointed and is supervised by an appropriate authority in the counter guerrilla force. Block control is one of the most effective and economical means of populace and resources control; however, the system takes considerable time to establish and, by its nature, operates more effectively under civil authority than under military control. Brigade forces must actively support and exploit existing block control systems in their assigned area.

- (1) Block control is instituted by dividing each block (or area) in zones, each of which includes all the buildings on one side of a street within a block. A zone leader is appointed from among the residents for each zone, and a separate block leader is appointed for each block. Zone leaders report to block leaders all movements, to include arrivals and departures. The block leader reports periodically to the military commander or civil authority on all movements within his block. Unusual activities are reported immediately.

- (2) If the loyalty of the zone and block

leaders is questionable, informants may be located throughout the area as an effective check on their operations.

i. Under certain conditions, the rural population may be concentrated, by relocation, in protected villages. The potential loss in goodwill should be balanced carefully against the probable increase in security before deciding to relocate villagers.

j. Materiel and equipment must be controlled

at the point of origin, in storage, in transit, at the distribution point, and in the end use. Control may be accomplished through licensing, outright prohibition, or the substitution of relatively harmless materials. An example of substitution would be to prohibit the import of 82-mm pipe (convertible into mortars) but to permit uncontrolled import and manufacture of 77-mm construction pipe which would have no particular value to guerrilla forces.

Section V. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

161. General

This section provides general guidance on the missions, concepts, organizations, and operations of brigades conducting military civic action in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development environments. While this manual focuses on military counter guerrilla tactical operations, brigades assigned these missions are required to participate to varying degrees in military civic action or that civic action performed or supported by military or paramilitary forces using their military skills, equipment, and resources in cooperation with civil authorities, agencies, or groups. Civic action is the participation by an agency, organization, or group in economic and sociological projects which are useful to the local population at all levels, but for which the sponsor does not have primary governmental responsibility. Projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others which contribute to the general welfare and serve to improve the standing of the sponsor with the population. In the defensive phase of consolidation operations, priority of the brigade effort may be given to military civic action, while in the offensive phase of consolidation operations, or in strike operations, relatively few brigade resources will be devoted to this activity. For more details of U.S. policy and doctrine governing military civic action, see the FM-41-series, and FM 100-5 and FM 100-20. For branch involvement in military civic action, see the branch series field manuals.

162. Purpose

The brigade, either voluntarily or by direction, contributes to the economic and social development of the population in order to improve its environment, to improve the standing of host country, U.S. and allied armed forces with the population in the operational area, and to develop the spirit and practice of cooperation between civilian and military members of the community.

163. Concept

National economic and civic development programs provide the overall matrix of national programs which prescribe economic modernization and social progress activities. The military involvement in these activities is called military civic action. It is a critical element in the counter guerrilla program, and in the initial stages of guerrilla development, national internal development receives great emphasis. It is during this period that the military forces are least employed in counter guerrilla tactical operations and, although they may be heavily involved in training, they are able to make significant contributions to national development programs. Through these efforts, the cooperation and active support of the population will be engendered, and vital intelligence, personnel and resources support, and psychological support will be rendered the host country and denied to the guerrillas. Military civic action supports, and in turn is supported by, tactical operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations, population and resources control operations, and advisory assistance operations.

Military civic action should be coordinated in the local ACC.

164. Organization

The standard U.S. brigade organization will probably have technical capabilities which exceed those available in a developing area, especially in those remote areas where the brigade is likely to be employed in counter guerrilla tactical operations.

a. Civil Affairs Personnel. When available, civil affairs personnel may plan and provide staff supervision for the military civic action program. This involves integrating the efforts of such elements as medical specialists, engineers, transportation, and others. Civil affairs elements also may perform certain military civic action tasks especially when the tasks fall in functional areas dealing with host country governmental procedures and economies. In any case, civil affairs personnel assist commanders in coordinating brigade military civic action programs with the internal development effort of the host country.

b. Engineers. The support of that portion of the military civic action program which requires assistance and planning in the construction of facilities for use and benefit of the civil population is best accomplished by engineer units, which are well suited by their organization, equipment, and skills to undertake such tasks. Construction units normally remain under control of a higher headquarters, but may be attached lower than division level. For a discussion of engineer construction units, see FM 5-162.

165. Operations

Working with brigade troops, the civil population gains knowledge and experience in performing future similar tasks unassisted, and, through personal contact, mutual respect is fostered. Where possible, units should be utilized to support the military civic action program by providing teams to advise and assist the people during the progress of work. Combat units are capable of supporting the majority of military civic action missions; however, when technical assistance and construction beyond their capabilities is required, augmenta-

tion from higher headquarters or from TOE -500-series may be assigned.

a. Military civic action must not be a haphazard or chance operation. Basic planning steps are—

- (1) Consider the political, economic, and sociological background of the area and people.
- (2) Consider the capability of the brigade, including time, know-how, and equipment available to do the job.
- (3) Determine the most critical projects required, taking into account national internal development plans, the desires of the local people, and the local situation.
- (4) Select courses of action.

b. Critical considerations in executing military civic action programs are—

- (1) The projects should be desired by the local population so that they will voluntarily maintain them.
- (2) Projects should be accomplished predominantly by the local population; little is achieved by having brigade forces perform all of the work.
- (3) The national internal development plan usually prescribes a list of projects which can be undertaken as military civic action, and local desires usually encompass another list of projects. Projects actually undertaken as military civic action should be those which are found on both lists.
- (4) Care must be taken that the project does not favor one segment of the population.
- (5) Care must be taken to avoid having brigade units help citizens of questionable loyalty achieve higher standards of living than other loyal citizens enjoy.
- (6) The basic reasoning behind projects must be understandable to the citizens. A project to develop a clean water supply will soon fail if the population does not understand the need for clean water. A population that does not

understand the disease-carrying characteristics of rats will soon lose interest in a rodent-control program.

- (7) Provision must be made for maintenance of the project after the project team departs. A technical capability should exist in the area, and the local host country government should be prepared to supply logistical support,

as necessary. Responsibilities should be fixed.

- (8) Elements of the U.S. Country Team, international nonprofit organizations, or multinational organizations may be engaged in internal development activities. Where cooperation with these elements is possible and productive, it should be pursued.

Section VI. ADVISORY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

166. General

This section provides general guidance on brigade advisory assistance operations in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development. Advisory assistance is considered to be that advice and assistance provided by allied personnel to host country regular, paramilitary, and irregular forces and to civilian agencies to permit them to become more effective in the performance of their missions. These activities support and, in turn, are supported by tactical operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, and military civic action. For general policy and doctrine governing advisory assistance activities, see FM 100-5 and FM 100-20. For branch involvement in advisory assistance operations, see branch field manuals, and FM 31-73.

167. Purpose

The brigade may be required to organize, train, equip, and advise host country civil and military personnel and units to perform counter guerrilla missions. Some included tasks may be—

- a. Organizing, equipping, training, and advising paramilitary and irregular forces locally recruited to assume local defense missions from the brigade.
- b. Equipping, training, and advising host country regular armed forces on new equipment provided by Military Assistance Program (MAP).
- c. Organizing, equipping, training, and advising host country police organizations.
- d. Advising host country regular armed

forces, paramilitary forces, and local governments in all aspects of internal defense and development.

168. Concept

Brigade advisory assistance to host country personnel and organizations, as differentiated from military civic action, usually is performed to extend MAP activities. Such activities as organizing, equipping, training, and advising host country forces may best be accomplished while in base areas or during the defensive phase of consolidation operations of counter guerrilla tactical operations. If U.S. military assistance organizations are operational, advisors usually will be provided for this purpose; however, in cases where U.S. advisors and/or mobile training teams are not immediately available, brigades may be required to assume this function. Advisory assistance must be coordinated closely with both the internal defense and the internal development programs through the local ACC.

169. Organization

All brigade organizations must be prepared to provide individuals or teams capable of performing advisory assistance within their areas of specialization. Organization for advisory assistance operations may require the tailoring of specific teams to accomplish specific missions.

- a. Military police, augmented by brigade elements, may be required to train host country police organizations in the area, while combined-arms teams may be required to train local host country artillery and armor units in artillery and armor tactics and techniques.

b. Training centers may be required if the training load is sufficient to warrant them.

c. Teams from brigade units may be organized for on-duty training of host country specialists. These specialists are trained in use of specialized equipment which is organic to brigades but which will be supplied to host country forces in the near future.

d. Mobile training teams formed by the brigade may be dispatched to local host country

forces to conduct training at host country unit bases or training centers.

170. Operations

Advisory assistance operations inherently involve the requirement to use advisory techniques. Consequently, tact, discretion, language qualification, expertness in the subject, and other qualifications normally associated with U.S. advisors and advisory operations must be stressed. For additional information on U.S. advisory techniques, see FM 31-73.

CHAPTER 9

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

Section I. MOVEMENT SECURITY

171. General

This chapter provides general guidance on counter guerrilla operations which are not categorized specifically as major tactical or related operations, but which support all such operations. The commitment of brigades and other U.S. forces in stability operations requires that the special operations discussed in this chapter be stressed. These special operations and activities include movement security, border control operations, waterborne operations, CBR operations, tactical base operations, search operations and procedures, and airbase and airfield defense.

172. Mission

a. This section provides general guidance on movement security for brigade elements moving by foot track or wheel vehicle, air, or water. Movement security in counter guerrilla operations, except in consolidated areas, involves tactical operations. For techniques of security and counterambush procedures, see FM 21-50 and FM 21-75, and branch field manuals.

b. Movement security forces and techniques are applied to insure the safe, uninterrupted movement of materiel and personnel.

173. Concept

In counter guerrilla operations, all movements of troops and supplies must be planned and conducted as tactical operations with emphasis on extensive security measures. These security measures may include—

a. Secrecy, including planning and disseminating orders, strict noise and light discipline, and varying routes and schedules of movement.

b. Security forces organized and equipped to insure effective front, flank, and rear security during movement and halts. Prepositioning security elements along the route of movement aids in performing route reconnaissance and movement security.

c. Air cover. Coordination with supporting air units includes a thorough understanding of air support used to assist the movement, both in taking preventive measures and in close combat operations. The need for secrecy may preclude initial air cover, but it will not preclude use of close air support when required.

d. Fire support. Fire support elements must take measures to insure close and continuous fire support for the movement, and may include reconnaissance by fire by artillery and other fire support means.

e. Maneuver for counterambush actions, to include contingency plans for immediate action against an ambush and use of formations which allow part of the column to be in position to maneuver against an ambush force.

f. Communications with supporting units and higher headquarters, to include airborne radio relay, if necessary.

g. Varying the location of leaders, communications, and automatic weapons within the movement formation.

h. Interrogating local civilians along the movement route for intelligence information, to include possible guerrilla ambush sites.

i. Movement by bounds with overwatching fire.

j. Use of scout dogs and other ambush detection means.

174. Organization

Organization of the movement will depend upon the means of movement, i.e., whether by ground, air, or water, and will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

175. Operations

Planning for movements should be coordinated in the appropriate ACC and with military units along routes of movement, and should consider the following:

a. Communications, to include radio, sound, and visual methods, are vital to the success of movements. Radio communication must be planned between convoy serials and march units, artillery forward observers, and air controllers, and units and population centers in the areas along the route of movement. Visual and sound signals, which include colored smoke, identification panels, and whistle signals, should be prearranged. While limited in scope, these means of communication are effective when prearranged meanings and responses are well understood and rehearsed.

b. Artillery and mortar support may be provided by units within range of the route of movement, or by artillery and mortars which may be moved within range of the proposed route for the movement. Movements requiring artillery and mortar support should have observers with them, or in observation aircraft; however, the use of strip maps marked with planned concentrations will enable personnel other than forward observers, who have the communications capability, to request fires. Coordination with FDC capable of providing fire along the route of movement must be such that it allows the FO, once the movement is begun, to enter the FDC net, make routine location reports, and request and adjust fires. Call signs, frequencies, authentications, areas of possible employment, schedules of movement, and concentration numbers must be coordinated in advance.

c. Close air and aerial fire support planning provides for armed helicopters and fixed-wing strike aircraft. Since the presence of aircraft has a proven deterrent effect on ambushes, column cover is habitually requested. Planning includes the type, number, and method of em-

ployment of aircraft. Methods of employment include column cover, air alert, and ground alert. Since column cover by fighter aircraft is expensive in terms of crew fatigue and equipment maintenance, light observation type aircraft are used and generally are sufficient for short movements over frequently-used routes in more secure areas. When air support is planned, information concerning radio frequencies, call signs, and identification procedures must be disseminated. In addition, the supporting air unit must know the maneuver intentions of the ground element in case of ambush.

d. Route clearing operations may be required to clear roads and other routes before certain critical movements. The use of route clearing operations will depend upon the availability of troops, the importance of the movement, and the guerrilla threat within the area to be traversed. Forces employed in route clearing operations are normally designated from units having responsibility for the area through which the movement will pass. These route clearing forces will normally include both mounted and dismounted elements. In addition to a thorough reconnaissance of the main route of movement, consideration must be given to securing critical terrain in proximity to the route.

e. Reserves (reaction forces) are vital considerations in planning and coordinating movements. The guerrilla must be convinced that ambushes will inevitably produce a fast, relentless, hard-hitting response by counter-guerrilla supporting forces, to include airstrikes and ground pursuit. The reserve is designated to cover the possibility of ambush. Prior to a movement, reserve force commanders and aviators must be briefed on the general area of operations, with emphasis on landing areas and known and suspected guerrilla locations, and on communications, as well as usual preoperations information. Reserve forces are designated in successive areas if the route is of sufficient length to make reaction time of a single reserve prohibitively long.

176. Motor Movement

Because of the pervasiveness of the threat, special escort attachments may not be available to secure all motor movements; therefore, all

convoys must be prepared to secure themselves. When a maneuver unit is designated to provide escort for a vehicle convoy, elements of the unit should provide escort through their respective areas of responsibility. Reconnaissance of the route immediately prior to the passage of the convoy is desirable. When a single unit is to provide escort through several units' areas of responsibility, close coordination must be achieved with those units to insure adequate fire support and availability of reinforcement from local units during passage of the convoy.

a. Concept. Since there seldom will be time for the issuance of orders after an ambush is discovered, the actions of the security detachment are planned and when possible rehearsed by drills prior to the commencement of the movement.

(1) Before movement, convoy command responsibility is clearly fixed. The commander is briefed on the latest information about the area through which he is to pass. He formulates his plans and issues his orders to include formation, intervals between echelons and vehicles, rate of travel, and detailed plans for action if the guerrilla force attacks the convoy. All elements are briefed to take immediate action according to prearranged plans. Canvas covers on trucks are removed and tailgates are left down. When practical, personnel are entrucked in such a way that they can observe and fire assigned sectors while mounted and so that they can dismount rapidly into predrilled formations. Arms and ammunition are readied for immediate action, and senior noncommissioned officers are charged with the responsibility of keeping personnel alert.

(2) Convoys may be escorted by reconnaissance or armed Army aircraft and may have tactical air support on call. The use of reconnaissance Army aircraft for surveillance of routes immediately forward of a convoy will often provide early warning of impending danger to the front.

(3) Armored wheeled vehicles are often

used by units assigned missions of route security and convoy escort. These vehicles possess limited cross-country mobility but are well suited for operations on roads.


b. Security of a Convoy with a Strong Security Detachment (fig. 13). Special combined-arms teams may be organized and trained to accompany and protect convoys. The force is organized with adequate combat power and counter guerrilla raids and ambushes. The size and composition of the detachment will vary with the topography, the capability of the guerrilla force, and the size and composition of the convoy.

(1) In any case, the security detachment should have the following subordinate elements:


- (a) A headquarters elements to provide command, control, and communication.
- (b) Medical facilities.
- (c) An armored element to provide increased firepower and shock effect.
- (d) A mechanized or motorized infantry element.
- (e) A combat engineer element to supplement combat forces, to make minor repairs to bridges and roads, and to detect and remove mines and obstacles.
- (f) Large convoys should include field artillery as an element of the security detachment. Ideally, half of the artillery would be placed well forward in the column, and half near the rear of the column. The artillery command and control element would move in the vicinity of the security detachment headquarters. This arrangement allows the most flexibility for providing artillery fire support to elements of the column in the event of ambush.

(2) The combined-arms security element is usually interspersed throughout the convoy so that the various elements can be employed either as a holding element or attaching element as the situation dictates.

(3) The formation of a security detach-



LEGEND:

-  AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OR ARMED ESCORT
-  SECURITY ELEMENTS
-  MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE CONVOY

NOTE: ELEMENTS SHOULD BE INTERSPERSED TO ALLOW MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO THE CONVOY COMMANDER TO REACT TO ATTACK FROM ANY DIRECTION.

Figure 13. Convoy with a strong security detachment.

ment and its integration into a convoy is varied because guerrillas may be expected to observe convoy habits and prepare their ambushes to cope with expected formations. The holding element is distributed to provide close-in defense throughout the convoy. Tanks lead the convoy to gain maximum advantage from their mobility and firepower. If no tanks are available, a heavy vehicle with sandbags placed beneath personnel should lead the convoy.

- (4) A strong attack element is placed at the rear of the convoy formation where it has maximum flexibility in moving forward to attack any force attempting to ambush the head or center of the convoy.
- (5) The guerrilla force may allow the advance guard to pass the site of the main ambush, and then block the road and attack the main body and the advance guard separately.
- (6) At the first indication of an ambush, vehicles attempt to move out of the killing zone. If required to halt, vehicles stop in place. No effort is made to clear the road by driving to its side or shoulders, which may be mined.
- (7) Specified individuals (SOP) return fire from inside vehicles immediately to cover detrucking of the remaining personnel. These individuals detruck last under cover of fire by those who detrucked first. Upon dismounting, personnel open fire on suspected targets and immediately assault the ambushing force. Tanks open fire and maneuver toward the ambushing force or to the most favorable ground in the immediate vicinity.
- (8) While the designated holding element conducts its action to protect the convoy, the commander rapidly surveys the situation and issues orders to the designated attack elements to begin predrilled offensive maneuvers against the guerrilla force. The fire of the holding element is coordinated with that of the attacking element.

- (9) After destruction or neutralization of the guerrilla force, security details are posted to cover convoy reorganization. The convoy commander, employing the most expeditious means of communication available, gives a brief account of the engagement either to his commander or the appropriate ACC. Captured guerrillas are interrogated as to the location of the rendezvous at which the guerrilla force is to reassemble, and this information is reported to higher headquarters.

- (10) After an ambush, patrols may be sent to interrogate and, if necessary, apprehend civilians living near or along the routes of approach to the ambush positions.

c. Security of a Convoy with a Weak Security Detachment. If the security detachment accompanying a convoy is not strong enough for decisive action against a guerrilla attack or ambush, the following principles apply:

- (1) Some of the troops are placed well forward in the convoy, and the remainder are placed to follow the convoy at a short distance as a rear guard.
- (2) Radio contact is maintained between the two groups.
- (3) Sharp curves, steep grades, or other areas where slow speeds are necessary are reconnoitered by foot troops before passage.
- (4) At the first indication of ambush, and while the convoy is in motion, leading vehicles, if the road appears clear, increase speed to the safe maximum in an effort to smash through the ambush area.
- (5) Troops from vehicles halted in the ambush area dismount and immediately return fire. Troops from vehicles breaking through the ambush dismount and attack the flanks of the ambush position. The rear guard of the convoy, upon learning that the main body has been ambushed, also dismounts and attacks the flanks of the ambush position. Both attacking groups exercise care that they do not fire on each other.

- (6) If the guerrilla force allows the main convoy to pass through and then ambushes the rear guard, troops from the main body return and relieve the rear guard by an attack against the flanks of the ambush position.

177. Armor and Cavalry Movement

General security doctrine and techniques for ground movement of armored units are contained in FM 17-1; FM 17-36 contains the doctrine and techniques for movement of air cavalry units. During movements, unit vehicles and equipment are arranged to facilitate their employment upon contact with, or interference from, guerrilla forces. Air cavalry is used to provide column cover and to give early warning of hostile activity. All measures are employed to keep guerrilla forces from learning of the movement or its destination once it has begun. Terrain and weather permitting, a ground covering force (advance, flank, and/or rear guards) may be used to provide security. When terrain precludes the use of these security elements, air cavalry will perform these activities as part of the cover mission. The proximity of other friendly forces not directly involved in the movement also provides security.

178. Rail Movement

a. Mission. The primary mission of train personnel and combat or security troops is to get the train through to its destination.

b. Concept. As long as this mission is being accomplished and the train continues to move, control of the train remains with the train crew; however, if a firefight develops and the train is unable to disengage by movement forward or backward, the escort commander will take command and undertake defense of the train with all available personnel. If there is no escort, the senior military member aboard will take command. Radio communications are used to call for assistance. Security detachments guarding the right of way have their own communication system which may be tied into the railway communications system when required.

c. Organization. Railway installations and rail traffic are secured by establishing defined areas of responsibility from theater command,

or corresponding echelon, down through the brigade and subordinate commands. Standing operating procedures are normally published by theater or the corresponding echelon of command. When trains are passing through areas of likely ambush, such as ravines, defiles, or areas overgrown with heavy underbrush, automatic weapons may fire continuously to the flanks until the danger area is passed. Flame weapons may be used to clear heavy underbrush, in addition to preventing a possible ambush. Such fire is opened only on the command of the train commander.

d. Operations.

- (1) Armored trains may be used for patrolling track where guerrilla activity may be expected. Armored trains operate tactically under orders of the appropriate military commander. Since the operation of an armored train is quite different from that of other trains, the transportation railway service will assign specially selected train crews which will operate in coordination with the movement of other trains and with proper regard for the tactical situation.
- (2) Railway gondolas may be quickly prepared for defense by piling sandbags on the floor and at the sides, and mounting machineguns, mortars, and rocket launchers. These cars must not be placed next to cars containing gasoline, ammunition, or other flammables.
- (3) Locomotives should be preceded by two or more cars loaded with sandbags, rocks, or scrap material for protection against mines and obstructions.
- (4) On a single-track rail division subject to guerrilla attack, the positive-block method of operations is employed. In this method of operation, a following train is not permitted to enter a block until the preceding train has cleared it. This permits the train in the block, if attacked, to back up if necessary, and reinforcements may be provided to the ambushed element by train from either direction.

179. Water Movement

In an area of operations containing inland waterways, small boats may provide a high degree of mobility for the brigade.

a. Mission and Concept. Boats may be used to perform a variety of tactical as well as logistical tasks. Waterways movement of troops and supplies is planned and conducted in much the same manner as are mounted movements on land; however, special characteristics of water transportation means must be considered.

b. Organization. When a large waterborne force moves, it adopts a march formation similar to a ground convoy. Advance and rear guards are organized, moving in boats. Flank security may be provided by patrols moving in adjacent streams or by foot on the banks, but, contrary to ground convoy procedures, the movement is not necessarily in file or column formation. The selection of formation is dependent upon the purpose of the movement, the strength of the counterguerrilla force, and the width of the stream, and it is based on the same considerations as those which apply to combat formations on land, to include control, security, flexibility, speed of reaction, observation, and fields of fire.

c. Operations. Waterways themselves are

devoid of cover and concealment. Boats can be seen and fired on easily in daylight. This disadvantage can be reduced by night movement and by traveling close to the streambanks where shadow and overhead branches aid concealment. Power-driven boats are noisy and attract attention. Boats must go to or near the shore to unload, thus limiting the reaction time of the transported troops in case of ambush. Convenient landing sites are often not available. The transported troops should be assigned firing positions on board their vessel for defense against ambush. A maximum number of the crew-served weapons of the transported units should be positioned on the vessels to engage guerrillas on one or both banks of the river.

180. Foot Movement

Dismounted movements by small units are planned and conducted using the principles for patrolling (FM 21-75); for larger units, the principles for movement to contact will apply (FM 7-11 and FM 7-20).

181. Air Movement

Air movements are an integral part of counterguerrilla operations, and the principles governing security of such movements are contained in FM 7-11, FM 7-20, and FM 57-35.

Section II. BORDER CONTROL OPERATIONS

182. General

While operations to control borders are normally a civilian security agency mission, the brigade may be required to participate in these operations by reinforcing or assuming responsibility for border surveillance and control. Brigades conducting or supporting consolidation operations may become involved in border control activities. In some cases, the scope and combat requirements incident to controlling a border may make border operations more a tactical than a civilian security force problem, and may require the conduct of successive strike operations by the brigade in its area of operations.

183. Mission

Border control operations require effective

measures to secure extensive land border or seacoast areas and to preclude communication and supply operations (to include aerial resupply) between an external sponsoring power and guerrilla forces.

184. Concept

a. Border control operations are initiated early in a counterguerrilla campaign. Border control operations are coordinated with other counterguerrilla operations to deny guerrillas the benefit of sanctuaries across international borders. The methods of contact and delivery of guerrilla personnel, supplies, and equipment—whether by air, water, or land—must be determined at the earliest possible time. Detailed surveillance of border areas is conducted continuously to determine—

- (1) Location of entry and exist routes.
- (2) Frequency of crossings.
- (3) Volume of traffic.
- (4) Type of transportation.
- (5) Terrain conditions.
- (6) Probable locations of sanctuaries.

b. Brigades may be given the primary mission of blocking routes across a border or shoreline, or they may be required to conduct border control activities concurrently with the conduct of tactical operations.

185. Operations

While certain definite portions of an international land border or shoreline may be placed under effective surveillance and control by use of static security posts, reserve forces, ground and aerial observers, electronic listening posts, and patrols, the continuous surveillance and control of an extensive land border or shoreline is extremely difficult. Since it may not be possible to place brigade forces at all the crossing or landing sites, a priority system for the sites requiring military forces must be established.

a. In the following paragraphs, two operational concepts for the control of extensive land borders are discussed. They are the *restricted zone* and the *friendly population buffer*.

- (1) *Restricted zone*. Under this concept, an area of predetermined width contiguous to the border is declared a restricted zone. Appropriate proclamations are issued to the population, so that all personnel understand that any individual or group encountered in the zone will be considered as an element of the guerrilla force, if not readily identifiable as a member of a host country regular armed force, paramilitary force, or similar organization.
- (a) So far as practicable, the restricted zone is cleared of vegetation and other obstacles to observation over the area. Defoliants and earth-moving equipment may be used for this purpose. Since the clearance of the zone along the entire border is normally not feasible, a priority of areas for clearance is usually necessary.

- (b) The restricted zone is controlled by the use of ground and aerial observers, electronic sensor devices, listening posts, patrols, mines, and obstacles. It is preferable that these activities be conducted by host country civil police and paramilitary forces to economize on the available regular armed forces combat power which can be better utilized in tactical operations.

- (2) *Friendly population buffer*. The civilian population in the area of operations is redistributed as necessary to insure that all civilian personnel residing in the vicinity of the border are sympathetic to host country and U.S. forces. This may entail the screening of all personnel settled along the border, relocation of those persons of doubtful sympathy, and supplementary resettlement of the border area with friendly elements of the civilian population.

- (a) This concept provides a good potential informant net along the border, it provides friendly local civilians for employment in self-defense units to control the border area, and it denies potential civilian contacts and houses of refuge for use by the guerrillas in border-crossing activities.
- (b) The extensive relocation of portions of the civilian population is beyond the capability of brigade units, and it should be accomplished under the supervision of civilian agencies.
- (c) Relocation operations must be preceded by detailed economic, social, psychological, and political preparation so the socio-economic stability of the area is not endangered by the shifts in population. The conduct of these operations without such preparation can result in the following undesirable effects in the area: political instability; extensive unemployment; inequities in land distribution; inadequate public utilities; inadequate housing; and inter-

mingling of populations with conflicting religious beliefs and social mores.

b. In addition to use of restricted zones and friendly population buffers, as discussed above for land borders, the surveillance and control of extensive coastal areas and shorelines normally require the use of—

- (1) Coordinated ground patrols of the shoreline.
- (2) Coordinated offshore sea patrols of the shoreline and river delta areas.

- (3) Reinforcing aerial, visual, and photographic surveillance of the offshore waters and the shoreline.
- (4) Observation posts along the shoreline in the vicinity of river mouths, ground lines of communication, and accessible portions of the shoreline.
- (5) An effective system of licensing and identifying all friendly military and civilian watercraft using the offshore waters.
- (6) Effective centralized control and coordination of all these activities.

Section III. WATERBORNE OPERATIONS

186. General

Counter guerrilla operations may be conducted in large inundated areas (lakes, coastal waters, flooded delta areas, and inland waterways) which are inhabited by large population segments and which have limited or no rail and road nets. The ability of the brigade to operate in these areas is a requirement in conducting successful counter guerrilla operations.

187. Mission

Brigade missions remain unchanged from those described previously and include counter guerrilla tactical operations, populace and resources control operations (such as insuring safe transport of critical agricultural products and raw materials on rivers and canals in the brigade area, maintaining surveillance over waterways and coastal and river villages, and denying and interdicting guerrilla movement), intelligence operations, psychological operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations.

188. Concept

The brigade may participate in waterborne operations along with host country regular armed forces (particularly naval forces), paramilitary forces, and U.S. naval forces. These operations are designated as waterborne operations since they include both shore-to-shore and amphibious operations (FM 31-12).

a. Naval forces may be organized into small

independent units comprising river assault groups which may be employed in a blocking role to intercept guerrilla forces withdrawing in boats. Reserve (reaction) forces may be deployed rapidly by airmobile or water transport for the destruction of these guerrilla forces.

b. U.S. allied, and host country naval forces may support the brigade by providing services such as combat force transport, logistical support, fire support, patrolling, and escort and minesweeping actions.

c. Brigade subordinate units may use swimmer-support boats (fiberglass boats with outboard motors), airboats, and indigenous craft for limited tactical operations, populace and resources control operations, and intelligence, military civic action, and psychological operations in and along small rivers, canals, and inundated areas.

189. Organization

River assault groups may be composed of landing vessels such as LST (landing ship, tank), LCM (landing craft, mechanized), LCVP (landing craft, vehicle, personnel), and similar craft. A waterborne force may range from a platoon or company-size force supported by a few naval craft up to a joint/combined brigade task organization comprising—

- a. Organic brigade units.
- b. Artillery (waterborne).

c. Army aviation units (troop transport and armed reconnaissance).

d. Tactical air control parties (control of U.S., allied, and host country tactical air support).

e. Armored personnel carriers.

f. U.S., allied, and host country naval support (river assault groups, troop transport, and fire support).

g. Host country regular armed forces and paramilitary forces.

h. Other combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

190. Operations

Many combinations of blocking, attacking, and screening tactical actions can be devised by the brigade utilizing the mobility of naval forces (river assault groups) and airmobile units. Teamwork between ground forces moving along banks and supporting naval craft firepower and floating artillery will result in successful operations against guerrilla forces in inundated areas.

a. The amount of, and time for, planning increases with the size of the force to be involved, but should be less formal than for standard amphibious operations in limited and general

war operations. Planning should be as detailed as time permits, but quick reaction will be necessary to capitalize on current intelligence. Planning should include—

- (1) Reduction to SOP all planning facets of embarking and debarking of troops and equipment.
- (2) Integrated and combined planning for U.S., allied, and host country military forces and civilian agencies.
- (3) Command and control means to facilitate unity of command and coordination of fire and other support.
- (4) Reduction of rehearsals to a minimum, based on habitual employment; reduction of activities to SOP; reduction of equipment and logistical requirement.
- (5) Detailed intelligence information from the population and civilian police.
- (6) Information on currents and tides at H-hour, beach conditions, and conditions of banks or shores for exit routes.

b. Brigade crew-served weapons and artillery being transported on naval craft must be in position at all times to engage guerrilla ambush forces.

Section IV. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

191. General

This section provides general guidance on the purpose, concepts, organizations, and operations of brigade units employing CBR munitions in counter guerrilla operations. CBR munitions are particularly useful where there is difficulty in pinpointing actual guerrilla locations, and where the area coverage provided by CBR munitions would be greater than that of other available weapon systems. Nonlethal CBR munitions can be effective in areas in which the guerrilla force is intermingled with the local population and the employment of firepower such as artillery and air-delivered ordnance must be avoided. The primary emphasis of this section is on the employment of smoke and nonlethal agents such as riot-control munitions.

For additional information on the employment of CBR munitions, see FM 3-10, FM 3-50, FM 21-40, and FM 101-40.

192. Purpose

a. Smoke may be used to deny guerrilla forces direct visual observation of counter guerrilla troop and equipment assembly areas, weapons positions, combat service support installations, river-crossing sites, objectives, and landings of airmobile forces (FM 3-50).

b. Chemical and biological agents may be employed—

- (1) By use of persistent-effect agents to deny selected areas to guerrillas.
- (2) By use of nonpersistent-effect agents

to destroy or neutralize the guerrilla force but leave the area trafficable for counter guerrilla military units and civilian personnel.

- (3) By use of riot-control agents to temporarily incapacitate a guerrilla force intermingled with friendly civilians with no permanent effects to the civilians.
- (4) By use of chemical antiplant agents to defoliate vegetation restricting observation and fields of fire.
- (5) By use of biological or chemical antiplant agents to destroy food-producing crops.

c. Portable flamethrowers and flame field expedients are extremely effective in counter guerrilla operations. Mechanized flamethrowers may be used if the terrain permits their employment. These weapons are effective in countering ambushes, defending fixed installations, and as ambush weapons.

d. Riot-control agents are used to provide rapid area coverage with an effective (intolerable) concentration of agent to reduce an unmasked guerrilla's capability for combat and subject him to capture or destruction.

193. Concept

Riot-control agents may be used in various offensive and defensive operations in which guerrillas lack adequate eye and respiratory protection. The munition is designed to produce effects independent of meteorological influences and is a supplementary and complementary form of firepower and, for optimum results, must be supported by fire and maneuver.

a. The agent is used to support operations in which the counter guerrilla forces desire to deny an area for a short period of time using nonlethal means. When counter guerrilla forces, armed with the agent, are required to halt and adopt a temporary defensive posture, the munitions are emplaced to augment defense of the position, or to assist in withdrawal when attacked by an overwhelmingly superior guerrilla force. The agent will increase the commander's capability and flexibility in applying effective

combat power in a variety of situations where death and permanent injury are to be minimized, such as in consolidation operations where the agent may be used to subdue guerrilla forces intermingled with the civilian population.

b. In offensive action against an alert and fleeting guerrilla force, it will, in many instances, be impossible for the counter guerrilla unit to place the agent on the target without detection and vulnerability to small-arms fire. Thus, the agent is employed best in those defensive situations in which the guerrilla moves within the range of emplaced weapons.

c. The employment of the agent is limited only by availability of the agent, means of delivery (either ground or air), and the imagination of the commander and his staff. When air-ground communications are inadequate, air-dropped riot-control agents can be employed with less information available than is required to employ other munitions; however, maximum effectiveness will be realized under optimum air-ground coordinated action.

194. Organization

The chemical smoke generator battalion and company are the only TOE chemical combat support units, and since there rarely will be enough chemical units and personnel available to meet requirements in counter guerrilla situations, brigade personnel must be able to handle smoke, flame, and nonlethal agents such as riot-control munitions.

a. *Ground Units.* Any size ground tactical organization can employ riot-control agents; however, a platoon is considered to be the minimum-size force which can employ the agent effectively in counter guerrilla tactical operations. A platoon, for example, designates one squad as the riot-control agent squad to provide target coverage. Larger units (company and battalion) may employ the munitions against more extensive targets, particularly in conjunction with air delivery of the agent. The agent may be employed in any desired quantities to gain the desired effects on target.

b. *Aviation Units.* The agent may be delivered by rotary-wing or fixed-wing aircraft. The number of aircraft used depends on the size

of the target and the amount of agent concentration desired on the target.

c. Police. Host country (civilian or military) or U.S. military police may employ riot-control agents to control mobs, or to re-establish control over rioting prisoners.

d. Intelligence. Intelligence units may employ riot-control agents to assist in taking prisoners for interrogation or for obtaining documents, such as records, maps, and operations plans, where immediate incapacitation of guerrilla personnel will impede destruction of these documents.

195. Operations

Initially, in operations conducted against small bands of elusive guerrilla forces, there is limited opportunity for employment of chemical smoke generator units. If guerrilla activities escalate to large-scale operations by companies, battalions, or larger units, judicious employment of smoke generator units is advantageous.

a. Tactical Operations.

(1) *Offense.* Air and ground delivery of riot-control agents may be planned in consonance with preparatory fires on objectives. The agent may be delivered as the attacking troops cross the line of departure, and delivery of the agent in the target area should cease no earlier than 5 minutes prior to friendly forces arrival. Guerrilla forces in the objective area should be sufficiently incapacitated to offer little resistance.

(a) When riot-control agents are used to force guerrillas from caves and tunnels, a positive pressure in the form of an air pump adequate to penetrate a subterranean complex should be utilized.

(b) In helicopter-assault operations, airdelivery of riot-control agents directly on known or suspected hostile positions around the landing area can immediately precede the armed escort helicopters. If intelligence does not indicate known guerrilla positions, the munition may be held on call awaiting return fire by the

guerrilla forces, and forward air controllers (FAC) can direct the delivery of the munition on positively-sighted guerrilla positions. Aircraft crews and assault troops must be prepared to wear protective masks during landing.

(c) Riot-control agents may also be employed in airborne and amphibious operations.

(d) In counterguerrilla force ambush operations, the riot-control agent can be used to produce confusion and incapacitation, permitting counterguerrilla ambush forces to move to the killing zone to take prisoners. In night ambushes, riot-control agents can be used effectively in conjunction with trip flares.

(e) When attacking hard targets such as fortified positions, gun positions, and bunkers, the agent may be used to make the positions untenable and to flush the occupants into the open where they may be captured or destroyed.

(f) Other offensive operations in which the agent may be employed are—river-crossings; reconnaissance by fire; canalizing and blocking; harassing; attack on guerrilla forces in populated areas; raids; and anti-aircraft fire suppression.

(2) *Defense.* Air and ground-delivered riot-control agents may be used in hasty and deliberate position defenses in which the agent may be emplaced some distance from the position in likely areas of guerrilla approach, rigged with trip wires to serve as a warning of, and deterrent to, guerrilla attack.

(a) The agent can be integrated into perimeter defenses of various types of fixed installations (communication centers, airbase/airfield complexes, outposts, villages, and support facilities). When there is considerable friendly activity around these installations, strict command and control measures must be pro-

vided to prevent unintentional discharge of the agent by friendly personnel.

- (b) The agent may be of use in counter-ambush situations if it is delivered rapidly on the guerrilla ambush force.
- (3) *Retrograde.* The agent may be used as a means of breaking contact when a counterguerrilla unit's position becomes untenable. Also, isolated units may employ the agent, in conjunction with other fires, as a means of route clearance and/or flank security in particularly vulnerable areas on the route of withdrawal.

Section V. TACTICAL BASE OPERATIONS

196. General

This section provides guidance on the missions, concepts, organization, and operations of tactical bases, to include both combat bases and patrol bases. Additional guidance on tactical bases can be found in FM 21-50 and FM 21-75.

197. Purpose

Tactical bases are established as internally secure and defended localities from which operations are projected or supported. Bases contain installations which provide logistic or other support.

198. Concept

Brigades establish bases (fig. 14) in areas vital to the host country government, which may include areas of significant guerrilla activity. In some instances, a point-of-entry logistic command base may be used as a brigade base for short periods. Brigades operate from bases to mount strike operations against guerrilla forces and their lines of communication and installations; to control populace and resources; and to establish friendly controlled areas by consolidation operations.

199. Combat Base

a. Combat bases are semipermanent installations containing essential command, control, communications, combat support, and combat

b. *Populace and Resources Control Operations.* The agent may be used in situations where active enforcement of populace control measures is necessary.

c. *Psychological Operations.* The agent is an effective psychological weapon, especially when used against personnel in countries where superstition and a fear of the unknown are prevalent in cultural backgrounds. The explanation of why the agent is being used (e.g., to protect the population from severe harm that would be present if conventional firepower were used) should be PSYOP followup to exploit the favorable characteristics of the agent when used in populated areas.

service support elements of the brigade or battalion establishing the combat bases, and those attachments necessary for accomplishing the assigned missions. Combat bases should provide environments in which training, planning, coordination, and administration can be conducted in relative security, and when possible, they should include facilities for recreation, baths, and hot meals to meet the needs of troops for morale-boosting rest and rehabilitation.

b. Headquarters of each brigade and each battalion establish combat bases. Brigades assigned strike operations missions (to be conducted within an area or possibly throughout the nation as part of a regional or national mobile force) may establish combat bases in or near major cities and towns. These bases will be more permanent than those established to support consolidation operations within a smaller political subdivision or tactical area. In this case, brigade units usually will be in the forward extremities of their area of the consolidation operations, moving as new areas are designated for control and consolidation.

c. The organization and location of a combat base will be determined by the following considerations:

- (1) Missions assigned (strike operations or consolidation operations).
- (2) Combined host country-U.S. plans for establishing controlled areas.




Figure 14. Type battalion/brigade combat base (schematic).

- (3) Guerrilla threat in the area.
- (4) Capabilities of local host country and U.S. regular armed forces and host country paramilitary, police, and irregular forces.
- (5) Distance from adjacent combat bases (or points of entry) and their capability for mutual support and reinforcement.
- (6) Population density and population attitudes.
- (7) Terrain and its defensibility.
- (8) Airfield, airstrip, drop zones, and landing site availability.

d. Establishing a combat base involves first deploying reconnaissance forces to the planned location for the base. These forces reconnoiter and prepare landing zones and the base area for follow-on forces, and secure these areas as necessary. The advance party also establishes liaison with local host country and U.S. military and civilian elements in the ACC if one is operational. This force may require attachment or direct support of airmobile means.

- (1) The main body which is to occupy the combat base will move into the reconnoitered area and initially establish its own defensive positions or defense posts. Desirably, such positions will be outside of towns and villages and will exclude host country civilians except those cleared and required to support brigade forces.
- (2) Using all information gained, and taking advantage of any ground work accomplished in the preparatory phase, brigades initiate patrolling operations, primarily in the immediate vicinity of the base. The area immediately surrounding the base will be secured before attempting to extend control over more distant areas; however, this does not preclude the use of long-range surveillance methods, including aircraft.
- (3) Concurrently, brigades assist local government authorities in preparing defenses for civilians. In addition, the brigade may train, through advisory assistance operations, civilians re-

cruited by local authorities to defend their own areas.

- (4) Mobile reserves (reaction forces) are formed to assist threatened towns and defense posts, and to strike guerrilla forces located by patrols or other sources of surveillance and intelligence.
- (5) Intelligence operations, begun in the preparatory phase, will be developed and closely coordinated with U.S. and host country military and civilian intelligence systems. Local intelligence-gathering agencies will be used and encouraged to continue in their normal roles.

e. Combat base defense includes local military measures—both normal and emergency—required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of guerrilla attacks on, or sabotage of, the base, so as to insure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to the brigade. A brigade or battalion combat base is defended on the same principle as in conventional area defense. Base defense varies with the size of the unit occupying the base, the defensive characteristics of the terrain, guerrilla capabilities, and the probability of guerrilla force attack. The base is kept as small as is practicable to facilitate its defense, and it is organized so that the position can be defended with a minimum number of troops in order to commit as many troops as possible to primary missions. Obstacles and field fortifications are prepared to enhance the defensive positions. Outposts and listening posts are established well forward of the defensive perimeter and occupied at all times. Likely avenues of guerrilla approach are mined. Roads and trails are used by counter guerrilla forces only as necessary.

f. Intelligence operations will be conducted by the brigade as described in paragraphs 144 through 148.

g. Psychological operations should be initiated immediately toward the local population to explain local regulations and the advantages that the presence of the combat base provides to them, to promote cooperation between the base forces and the population, and to win the population to the host country government. If

the base is to be relatively permanent, long-term PSYOP programs, initiated and supported by the host country, may emanate from the base.

h. The brigade will support populace and resources control operations conducted by host country paramilitary, police, and irregular forces to maintain a state of law and order. The brigade will conduct such operations within the limits of the base.


i. Military civic action should be initiated immediately in order to improve the economic, social, and civic conditions of the local population, and to gain its support.

j. Advisory assistance operations are facilitated

by providing a relatively secure training establishment in which host country and U.S. personnel may receive military or specialist training from brigade combat base forces.

200. Patrol Base

Patrol bases (fig. 15) are temporary bases established by companies, and other subordinate units of the brigade, engaged in operations away from brigade or battalion combat bases. From these patrol bases, extensive patrolling, reconnaissance, raid, and strike operations are conducted. Patrol bases are not protected by elaborate defenses, and must remain mobile. The size of a unit operating from a patrol base depends on the mission, the counter guerrilla



NOTE: ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRES ARE PLANNED ON LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH.

Figure 15. Type company patrol base.

forces available, and the strength of the guerrilla force in the area. Patrol bases must be moved frequently, and the same patrol base is not normally occupied in excess of 24 hours. The same patrol base site is not normally re-occupied, and alternate patrol base sites are always selected. The organization and location of a patrol base would be determined by the following considerations:

- a. Guerrilla capabilities.
- b. Missions assigned.
- c. Terrain, cover, and concealment.
- d. Proximity of roads and trails, and water.
- e. Multiple routes for withdrawal.
- f. Adequate communications.
- g. Security.

Section VI. SEARCH OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES

201. General

a. The need for a counter guerrilla force to conduct search operations or to employ search procedures will be a continuous requirement in tactical operations, and the requirement can occur during other operations internal defense operations and internal development operations. Most often, search operations will support strike operations or consolidation operations, or they may be conducted as the main effort in populace and resources control operations. A search may be oriented to people, to materiel, to buildings, or to terrain. It will usually involve both civil police and military personnel.

b. Since misuse of search authority can adversely affect the ultimate outcome of operations against guerrillas, seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other items during searches must be accomplished lawfully and properly recorded to be of future legal value. Proper use of authority in searches will gain respect and support of the people. Abusive, excessive, or inconsiderate search methods may temporarily suppress the guerrilla force or expose elements of it, but at the same time such methods may ultimately increase the civilian population's sympathy for and/or support of the guerrilla.

c. Authority for search operations must be carefully reviewed. Military personnel must be aware that they will perform searches in areas within military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful) for purposes of apprehending suspects or securing evidence that tends to prove an offense has been committed. Usually, there will be special laws regulating the search powers of the military forces. These laws must be given wide dissemination.

d. Search teams must have detailed instruction on controlled items. Lists of prohibited or controlled-distribution material such as chemicals, medicines, machine tools, and other items should be obtained and distributed. The military or civil police who administer the populace and resources control program should be contacted before the conduct of search operations, or periodically if search operations are a continuing activity.

e. Search operations involving U.S. forces may be ineffective when language difficulties prevent full communication with the indigenous population. U.S. units given a search mission should be provided with interpreters as required.

f. The pace at which a search operation is conducted must be slow enough to allow for an effective search but not so slow as to allow the guerrilla force time to react to the threat of the search.

g. If active resistance develops to the search operation, offensive operations are conducted to eliminate the resistance.

h. Consideration must be given to returning to a searched area after the completion of an initial search to surprise and eliminate guerrillas or their underground and auxiliary organizations who may have remained undetected or who may have returned to the previously searched area.

202. Search of an Individual

a. *General.* The fact that anyone in an area to be searched can be a guerrilla or a guerrilla sympathizer is stressed in all search operations. However, searchers must be tactful to

avoid making an enemy out of a suspect who may, in fact, support the host country government. It is during the initial handling of a person about to be searched that the greatest caution is required. During search of an individual, one member of a search team must always cover another member who makes the actual search.

b. The Frisk Search. The frisk is a quick search of an individual for weapons, evidence, or contraband. It is conducted preferably in the presence of an assistant and a witness. In conducting the frisk, the searcher stands behind the suspect. The searcher's assistant takes a position from which he can guard the suspect with his weapon. The suspect is required to raise his arms. The searcher then slides his hands over the individual's entire body, crushing the clothing to locate any concealed objects.

c. The Wall Search. Based on the principle of rendering the suspect harmless by placing him in a strained, awkward position, the wall search affords the searcher a degree of safety. It is particularly useful when two searchers must search several suspects. Any upright surface, such as a wall, vehicle, or a tree, may be utilized.

(1) *Position of suspect.* The suspect is required to face the wall (or other object) and lean against it, supporting himself with his upraised hands placed far apart and fingers spread. His feet are placed well apart, turned out, and as parallel to and as far away from the wall as possible. His head is kept down.

(2) *Position of searcher's assistant.* The searcher's assistant stands on the opposite side of the suspect from the searcher and to the rear. He covers the suspect with his weapon. When the searcher moves from his original position to the opposite side of the suspect, the assistant also changes position. The searcher walks around his assistant during this change to avoid coming between his assistant and the suspect.

(3) *Position of searcher.* The searcher approaches the suspect from the right side. The searcher's weapon must not

be in such a position that the suspect can grab it. When searching from the right side, the searcher places his right foot in front of the suspect's right foot and makes and maintains ankle-to-ankle contact. From this position, if the suspect offers resistance, the suspect's right foot can be pushed back from under him. When searching from the left side of the suspect, the searcher places his left foot in front of the suspect's left foot and again maintains ankle-to-ankle contact.

(4) *Searching technique.* In taking his initial position, the searcher should be alert to prevent the suspect from suddenly attempting to disarm or injure him. The searcher first searches the suspect's headgear. The searcher then checks the suspect's hands, arms, right side of the body, and right leg, in sequence. The searcher repeats the procedure in searching the suspect's left side. He crushes the suspect's clothing between his fingers; he does not merely pat it. He pays close attention to armpits, back, waist, legs, and tops of boots or shoes. Any item found that is not considered a weapon or evidence is replaced in the suspect's pocket. If the suspect resists or attempts escape and has to be thrown prior to completing the search, the search is started over from the beginning.

d. Search of Multiple Suspects. When two or more suspects are to be searched, they must assume a position against the same wall or object but far enough apart so that they cannot reach one another. The searcher's assistant takes his position a few paces to the rear of the line with his weapon ready. The search is begun with the suspect on the right of the line. On completing the search of one suspect, he is moved to the left of the line and resumes the position against the wall. Thus, in approaching and searching the next suspect, the searcher is not between his assistant and a suspect.

e. Strip Search. This type search is usually considered necessary when the individual is

suspected of being a guerrilla leader or important messenger. The search is conducted preferably in an inclosed space, such as a room or tent. The searching technique can be varied. One method is to use two unarmed searchers while an assistant, who is armed, stands guard. The suspect's clothing and shoes are removed and searched carefully. A search is then made of his person, including his mouth, nose, ears, hair, armpits, crotch, and other areas of possible concealment.

f. Search of Females. The guerrilla force will make maximum use of females for all types of tasks where search may be a threat. Counter-guerrilla forces must make maximum use of female searchers. If female searchers cannot be provided, a doctor or aidman should be considered for use in searching female suspects.

203. Search of Vehicles

a. General. It will be necessary to maintain a continuous check on road movement to apprehend suspects and to prevent smuggling of controlled items. This requires the use of checkpoints (fig. 16). Since checkpoints cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it is important that the civil population understand that checkpoints are entirely a preventive and not a punitive measure.

(1) *Types.* Checkpoints may be described as either deliberate or hasty.

(a) *Deliberate.* This type of checkpoint is positioned in a town or in the open country, often on a main road. It will act as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement.

(b) *Hasty.* This type of checkpoint is highly mobile and is quickly positioned in a town or in the open country. The actual location of the hasty checkpoint is often related to some item of intelligence. The hasty checkpoint is designed to achieve a quick success.

(2) *Location.* Concealment of a checkpoint is desirable, but often impossible. The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back or reverse a vehicle without being observed. Culverts, bridges, or deep cuts may be suitable

locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advantage that drivers do not see the checkpoint in sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages may outweigh the advantages of such positions. A scarcity of good roads will increase the effect of a well-placed checkpoint.

(3) *Troop dispositions.* A checkpoint must have adequate troops to prevent ambush and surprise by a guerrilla force. An element of the checkpoint force should be positioned and concealed at an appropriate distance (one hundred to several hundred meters) from the checkpoint to prevent the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn back upon sighting the checkpoint. The vehicle, driver, and passengers are searched. If the checkpoint is manned for any length of time, part of the force is allowed to rest. The rest area is located near the search area so that the troops can be assembled quickly as a reserve force.

(4) *Special equipment required.* For the checkpoint to achieve maximum results, special equipment is required. Portable signs in the native language and in English should be available. Signs should denote the speed limit of approach, vehicle search area, vehicle parking area, male and female search area, and dismount point. Adequate lighting is needed for the search area if the checkpoint is to function efficiently at night. Communication is required between the various troop units supporting the checkpoint operation. Barbed-wire obstacles across the road and around the search area should be provided. Troops must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to halt a vehicle attempting to flee or crash through the checkpoint.

b. Method. The checkpoint is best established by placing two parallel obstacles (each with a gap) across the road. The distance between these two parallel obstacles depends on the amount of traffic that will have to be held in the search area. The inclosure formed can




Figure 16. Checkpoint.

then be used as the search area. If possible, there should be a place in the search area where large vehicles can be searched without delaying the flow of other traffic which can be dealt with more quickly. Areas are required for searching female suspects and detaining persons for further interrogation. If possible, the personnel manning a checkpoint should include a member of the civil police, an interpreter, and a trained female searcher. When searching a vehicle, all occupants are made to get out and stand clear of the vehicle. The driver should be made to observe the search of his vehicle. The searcher is always covered by an assistant. When search-

ing, politeness and consideration are shown at all times. The occupants of the vehicle can be searched simultaneously if sufficient searchers are available.

204. Search of a Built-Up Area

a. General. Search techniques in built-up areas must be perfected by counter guerrilla forces operating in populated areas. These techniques are required for searching either a few isolated huts or buildings or for searching well-developed urban sections. Thorough preparation and rehearsal are the key to successful

built-up area search operations. Special emphasis should be given to the following:

- (1) The area to be searched is divided into zones, and a search party is assigned to each. A search party should consist of a search element (to conduct the search), a security element (to encircle the area and prevent entrance/exit, and to secure open areas), and a reserve element (to assist, as required).
- (2) When enemy material, including propaganda signs and leaflets, is found, it must be considered boobytrapped until inspection proves it is safe.
- (3) Underground and underwater are areas that require detailed search. Any freshly excavated ground can be a hiding place. Mine detectors will assist in locating metal objects underground and underwater.
- (4) Speed of deployment is essential to search operations where the guerrilla force is still in the area to be searched. The entire area to be searched must be physically encircled simultaneously. If this is not possible, *observed* fire must cover that portion not physically covered.

b. Search Teams. Special teams may be formed for the conduct of search. In searching small areas (a few buildings), small units can conduct search without special teams for each function. If formed, however, the teams should include a capability for—

- (1) Reconnaissance.
- (2) Physical or visual search.
- (3) Fire support.
- (4) Control.
- (5) Prisoner detention.
- (6) Mine detection.
- (7) Scout dogs.
- (8) Chemicals and demolitions.

c. Principles. The basic principle of a search of a built-up area is to conduct it with a measure of controlled inconvenience to the population. The populace should be inconvenienced to the point where they will discourage guerrillas

and guerrilla sympathizers from remaining in the locale, but not to the extent of influencing the populace to collaborate with the guerrilla force as a result of the search. The large-scale search of a built-up area is normally a combined civil police and military operation. It is planned in detail and rehearsed when possible. Early physical reconnaissance of the area is avoided. The information needed about the ground is obtained from aerial photographs. In the case of larger towns or cities, the local police may have detailed maps showing relative size and location of buildings. For success, the search plan is simple and is executed swiftly. Methods and techniques can be varied.

- (1) *Organization of troops.* As built-up areas vary, a search force must be task-organized for each search. A task organization consisting of military troops, civil police, and other elements, is designed to accomplish the following:

- (a) Surround the area to prevent escape.
- (b) Establish checkpoints and road-blocks to prevent entrance to or exit from the area to be searched.
- (c) Prevent an attack or interference by personnel from outside the area.
- (d) Search houses and individuals as necessary to identify suspects.
- (e) Escort apprehended persons and evacuate confiscated material to designated locations.

- (2) *Command and control.* Normally, a search involving a battalion or larger force is best controlled by the military commander with the civil police in support. For a smaller search, it is often best for the civil police to be in control with the military in support. Regardless of the controlling agency, the actual search is performed by local police, when they are available in adequate numbers, are well trained, and show unquestioned loyalty.

- (3) *Method.*

- (a) *Approach.* At times, the situation may allow mounted movement directly into the area to be searched.

On other occasions, the situation may dictate dismounted movement into the area. In any case, emphasis should be placed on rapid and coordinated entrance to the area to be searched.

- (b) *Surrounding the area.* During darkness, troops should approach by as many different routes and as silently as possible. During daylight, the area can be covered by a chain of observation posts with gaps covered by patrols. Normally, it is impossible to completely surround an area for any length of time because of the large number of troops required. If necessary, troops dig in, take advantage of natural cover, and use barbed wire to help maintain their line.
- (c) *Reserves.* If there is a chance that hostile elements from the outside could interfere, reserves are employed to prevent them from joining the inhabitants of an area under search. An air observer can assist by detecting and giving early warning of any large-scale movement outside the isolated area.
- (d) *Search parties.* The officer in command of the operation makes known that the area is to be searched, that a house curfew is in force, and that all inhabitants are to remain indoors or gather at a central point for searching.

d. House Search.

- (1) Each search party assigned to search an occupied building should consist of at least one local policeman, a protective escort, and a female searcher, if appropriate. The first action required of the search party is to assemble everyone in one room. The civil police may give the necessary orders and do the actual searching. The object of this search is to screen for suspected persons. Apprehended persons are evacuated as soon as possible. Troops normally perform this task; there-

fore, escort parties and transportation must be planned in advance.

- (2) When it is decided to search inhabitants in one central area, the head of the house accompanies the search party when the house itself is searched. If this is not done, the head of the house is in a position to deny knowledge of anything incriminating that is found or to make accusation of theft and looting against troops. In small searches, it may be possible to obtain a signed certificate from the head of the household that nothing has been illegally removed, but in a large search this may be impractical. In order to avoid accusations of theft, it may be necessary to search in the presence of witnesses.
- (3) Buildings are best searched from bottom to top. Mine detectors are used to search for arms and ammunition. Every effort is made to avoid unnecessary damage. After a house or building is searched, it is marked with a coded designation. This designation can serve to identify occupants who must be accounted for in subsequent searches, and the designation will insure that no building will be overlooked in the current search.
- (4) In the case of a vacant house or in cases of resistance, it may be necessary to force entry. After searching a house containing property but whose occupants are away, it should be secured and a sentry placed outside to prevent looting. Before troops depart, arrangements are made in the community to protect empty houses until the occupants return.

205. Search of Tunnels

a. Guerrilla forces may construct elaborate tunnel systems for hiding personnel, equipment, and supplies. From the surface, these underground installations are extremely difficult to detect. Entrances and exits are usually well concealed in gardens, animal pens, or brush, or under apparently innocent piles of

straw or refuse. Entrances may be below the waterline in banks of streams and rivers or in large wells.

b. Tunnel systems are usually built in zigzag patterns with multilevels and ventilation holes at varying intervals. This type of construction provides the guerrilla protection against grenades and flame weapons used at entrances.

c. All entrances to tunnel systems must be regarded by a counter guerrilla search party as boobytrapped. Guerrillas may also have means of ejecting grenades from ventilation holes to cause casualties among the counter guerrilla force search party above ground.

d. Searching and clearing tunnels is a slow and deliberate procedure which can be costly in terms of casualties. To keep casualties among searchers to a minimum, all means available, such as chemical agents, flame weapons, and demolitions, must be employed to flush out or destroy the occupants of the tunnel. Direct investigation and exploration of a tunnel system by members of a search party may require special selection and training of personnel to conduct such a search.

206. Search Operations by Airmobile Patrols

a. The employment of search units mounted

in armed helicopters utilizes both the mobility and firepower of these craft to the maximum and will have a decidedly depreciating effect on the morale of the guerrilla force.

b. Airmobile combat patrols, in the conduct of an aerial search, reconnoiter from the air an assigned area or route in search of guerrilla forces. When a guerrilla force is located, it may be engaged from the air or members of the airmobile combat patrol may land and engage the guerrilla force on the ground, utilizing to the maximum the aerial fire support of the helicopters. This technique has little value in thickly-vegetated areas and should be limited to those operations in which sufficient intelligence exists to justify its use and then normally in conjunction with ground operations. In ground operations, helicopters land in an assigned area suspected of containing guerrilla elements. The personnel unload, search the area, and then repeat the same process in other areas. Members of airmobile combat patrol should be trained in tracking procedures and may follow guerrillas to their base. If the patrol encounters a superior guerrilla force, the reserve (reaction force) is committed. After completion of its ground mission, the airmobile combat patrol is picked up by the helicopters and the aerial search is continued.

Section VII. AIRBASE/AIRFIELD DEFENSE

207. General

This section provides general guidance on the mission, concepts, organization, and operational considerations pertaining to the security and defense of an airbase/airfield in counter guerrilla operations in stability operations. The primary objective of airbase/airfield security and defense is to preserve the operating integrity of the base. In general, airbase/airfield defense consists of local military measures required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile guerrilla attack on the base and is similar in scope and concept to rear area security in limited and general war and consolidation operations conducted in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense (as discussed in para 120-130). Generally, overall

responsibility for security and defense of an airbase/airfield is that of the *designated* commander in whose tactical area of responsibility the airbase/airfield is located.

208. Mission

The mission of the counter guerrilla force in security and defense of an airbase/airfield is to prevent, disorganize, or repulse all forms of hostile guerrilla attack; to contain hostile guerrilla forces that may establish a penetration in the defensive area; or to eject or destroy the penetrating guerrilla force by counterattack in order to provide a secure area in which normal activities of the base can continue without interruption.

209. Concept

a. The security and defense of an airbase/airfield in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense operations is characterized by detailed planning and a degree of centralized control contingent on host country and U.S. national and local agreements specifying the responsibilities, employment, and command of U.S. host country, and allied forces employed in airbase/airfield security and defense.

b. The capabilities of the host government and its military and law enforcement agencies must be considered in determining the source of security personnel for the defense of an airbase/airfield. Close cooperation on the control and planning between U.S. forces and host country forces must be firmly established during the planning phase for the defense of an airbase/airfield.

c. The security and defense of an airbase/airfield may be complicated by its proximity to large population centers with civilians living on or near the base and the possible reluctance of the host government to relocate these civilians because of the political implications. Further complicating the security and defense are the variety and number of U.S., host country, and allied tenant organizations with divergent missions.

d. In the establishment of security and defense for an airbase/airfield in counter guerrilla operations, the following general concepts on responsibilities must be considered.

- (1) The *tactical area commander* of the tactical area in which the base is located is responsible for the defense of the base. The *base commander* is responsible for the perimeter and interior defense of the base. Forces assigned to the base and transient forces are normally placed under operational control of the base commander for perimeter and interior defense.
- (2) In order to secure and defend the airbase/airfield, responsibilities are established and assigned to three defense echelons, as follows:

(a) *Interior defense force*. This force

is composed of those forces available within the base. This echelon is responsible for the interior guard of unit installations, facilities, and equipment located on the base, entrances and exits, and individual buildings. The interior defense force is the responsibility of the base commander.

(b) *Base perimeter defense force*. This force may consist of U.S., host country, or allied regular armed forces, or host country paramilitary and (when appropriately organized) police forces. The source of troops is contingent on U.S./host country agreements, the size and availability of tenant units, or the decision of the tactical area commander to allocate combat troops for the defense of the airbase/airfield. The base commander is responsible for base perimeter defense.

(c) *Tactical area defense force*. The airbase/airfield commander will seldom have the resources to provide tactical area defense required to secure the base out to the maximum range of light mortars; therefore, these defense forces will normally be provided on a continuing basis by the tactical area commander as a normal function of his mission in the tactical area of responsibility. Forces provided for tactical area defense should be highly mobile and should have extensive communications capabilities to provide command, control, and coordination. The operations of this force are the responsibility of the tactical area commander, and they are coordinated through the local ACC.

(3) The commander of the forces of each tenant organization at a base is responsible to the base commander for—

(a) Participating in preparation of base defense plans.

- (b) Training the tenant forces for base defense.
- (c) Providing appropriate facilities and essential personnel for a base defense command operations center, and appropriate personnel for the base defense commander's staff (if a joint staff is established) to be regular working members of the staff.
- (d) Providing for interior security of his own (tenant) command.

210. Organization

In the organization of airbase/airfield security and defense in counter guerrilla operations during stability operations, all available forces—combat, combat support, and combat service support—from all of the services of the U.S., host country, and allied forces must be utilized to secure and defend the base. Police, paramilitary, and other host country civil agencies must also be utilized to their full capabilities consistent with national and local agreements between U.S., host country, and allied forces. The coordination required for formation of this combined/joint force organization can best be accomplished in the local area coordination center.

211. Operational Considerations

a. The planning, organization, and conduct of the defense and security of an airbase/airfield by U.S. brigades in counter guerrilla operations during internal defense operations are based on fundamental defensive principles and considerations (FM 61-100) modified to meet the existing guerrilla threat, local tactical situation, and the terrain. The forms of defense used to secure an airbase/airfield will differ with the defense echelon involved and will vary from the *area defense* in defending the perimeter of the base (with well dug-in positions) to variations of the *mobile defense* employed by the tactical area defense force (in defending avenues of approach leading into the airbase/airfield).

b. The overall airbase/airfield defense plan involves the careful integration and coordination of all defensive measures.

- (1) Fire plans are prepared to directly support tactical area defense elements, to control unoccupied areas or to cover barriers, to directly support the base perimeter defense force, and to support offensive action such as counterattacks or strike operations. Planned fires are integrated into the overall defensive scheme, and fires of all units are closely coordinated.
- (2) Natural terrain features in the tactical area are supplemented by the use of planned barriers to include minefields and other artificial obstacles and, when authorized, chemical agents. Such barriers are designed to restrict the movement of the guerrilla force without restricting the planned maneuver of counter guerrilla forces. The airbase/airfield barrier plan is integrated with the requirements of the tactical area commander, and the plan is designed to support the overall scheme of defense of the commander's tactical area of responsibility. The barrier plan is carefully coordinated to insure that it will accommodate planned maneuver, particularly the movement of reserves (reaction forces).
- (3) In the disposition, maneuver, and fire planning of combat elements employed in airbase/airfield defense, maximum consideration is given to mutual support.

c. Infiltration by the guerrilla force is a constant consideration in the defense of an airbase/airfield. Guerrilla infiltration may be attempted as a means of harassing and disrupting base operations, or the guerrilla force may attempt massive infiltration as a form of surprise attack. Forces defending the airbase/airfield must maintain ground and aerial surveillance of likely infiltration routes into the area and likely assembly areas in proximity to the airbase/airfield.

d. Commanders committed to counter guerrilla operations in stability operations where little, if any, hostile air threat exists, must be

alert to the possible escalation of, and actual entry into, the conflict by a power capable of air attack. Since an airbase/airfield may be a critical initial target for such attack, com-

manders must consider provisions for air defense of such bases. For further information on air defense, see paragraph 136, and FM 44-1.

PART THREE

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

CHAPTER 10

INTRODUCTION

212. General

Combat service support encompasses the assistance provided operating forces primarily in the fields of administrative services, chaplain service, civil affairs, finance, replacements, legal service, maintenance, medical service, military police, supply, transportation, and other logistical services. The combat service support of infantry, airborne infantry, and mechanized infantry brigades and subordinate units is discussed in the FM 7-series, and FM 9-30, FM 10-50, and FM 54-2. As far as practical, the procedures discussed in these field manuals will be followed in counter guerrilla operations; however, the extended distances between units, the diversity of the missions, the lack of security of supply installations and lines of communication, and the possible requirement to support the population administratively and logistically as prescribed by higher headquarters normally will require modification of these combat service support procedures.

213. Mission

The combat service support missions in counter guerrilla operations are similar in both limited and general war rear area security and in stability operations; however, requirements to support host country civil and military forces in internal defense and development may alter missions considerably and require the assignment of additional combat service support missions.

214. Concept

When employed as part of a division, the brigade is normally a tactical echelon which enters service support channels only to the extent necessary to insure the successful accomplishment of its mission. Maneuver battalions assigned or attached to the brigade are logistically self-sufficient when normal logistic support is available through the division support command. Personnel and administrative functions and services are accomplished for the maneuver battalions by the appropriate staff section of the division administration company.

215. Organization

Because of the decentralized nature of counter guerrilla operations and the extensive areas of operations normally assigned to military units, the division brigade may be tailored, similarly to a separate brigade, to be administratively self-sufficient. In this case, it will require the attachment of a provisionally organized support battalion to provide logistic support.

a. The provisionally organized support battalion may include the following units:

- (1) Headquarters and headquarters detachment provisionally organized.
- (2) Medical company.
- (3) Forward support maintenance company.
- (4) Administrative company or detachment, provisionally organized.

- (5) Supply and transport company, provisionally organized.
- (6) Aerial supply platoon.
- (7) Air equipment support detachment, for airborne units.

b. Maneuver battalions subordinate to an administratively self-sufficient brigade task force are not administratively dependent on the division as prescribed in FM 7-20; instead, they receive combat service support from parent brigades.

216. Operations

Combat service support operations discussed in the following chapters are concerned primarily with areas in which increased emphasis must be placed on certain facets of the functions of Army aviation, civil affairs, medical service, military police, maintenance, supply, and transportation support, and where modification of the normal procedures employed by combat service support units may be required for the conduct of counter guerrilla operations.

CHAPTER 11

LOGISTICS AND SERVICES

Section I. INTRODUCTION

217. General

Brigade logistic activities and functions for counter guerrilla operations are essentially the same as for normal operations in limited and general war; however, these functions are complicated by requirements to support not only brigade tactical operations but also to assist host country civilian agencies and military forces by intelligence operations, psychological operations, civil affairs operations, and advisory assistance operations. The requirement for these operations to support host country civilian agencies will occur predominantly in internal defense and development; however, this requirement may exist in counter guerrilla operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited or general war.

218. Mission

The missions of logistic elements, and the objectives of logistic activities comprising the supply, maintenance, transportation, medical service, and other logistic services, are discussed in the following sections.

219. Concept

While currently prescribed logistic systems are adequate to support all facets of military counter guerrilla operations, the techniques of support employed must be geared to the operational requirements and may vary considerably from those normally employed for limited or general war.

220. Organization

The brigade logistical operations are concentrated in the brigade trains, which in counter guerrilla operations are normally located in the brigade base.

a. Composition of brigade trains will vary with the tactical situation and the disposition of the combat, combat support, and combat service support units, and the host country military and civilian forces attached to, or supporting, the brigade. Extended distances between units, diversity of missions, and the possible requirement to support the host country military and civilian elements as prescribed by higher headquarters will influence the composition of brigade trains for counter guerrilla operations. Normally, in counter guerrilla operations, the brigade trains will include—

- (1) Elements of the brigade headquarters company.
- (2) Brigade staff section personnel not normally located at the command post.
- (3) Maintenance and supply section of the aviation unit.
- (4) Division support command elements, or logistic elements of this command attached to the brigade if the brigade is organized for administrative self-sufficiency.
- (5) Service elements of combat and combat support, and combat service support units attached to, or in support of, the brigade, as required.
- (6) Civilian support resources.
- (7) Host country regular armed forces or paramilitary forces support resources.
- (8) Brigade airstrip, landing zone, or drop zone.

b. The battalion normally will organize and employ only one trains organization instead of

utilizing both the field and combat trains prescribed in FM 7-20. For security, these trains normally will be located in the vicinity of the battalion headquarters or reserve in the battalion combat base. In counter guerrilla operations, seldom will logistical elements of the infantry or airborne infantry battalion be located in the brigade trains as in normal limited or general war operations. The battalion trains normally include—

- (1) Class I, III, and V distributing points.
- (2) Kitchen area.
- (3) Maintenance area.
- (4) Bath and clothing exchange units.
- (5) Medical elements.
- (6) Salvage collecting point.
- (7) Collecting points for excess equipment and captured materiel.
- (8) Battalion airstrip, landing zone, or drop zone.
- (9) Trains elements of attached units.
- (10) A water point.

(11) Aerial resupply point.

(12) Vehicle dispersal area (motor park).

c. Company trains usually are located in the combat base of the battalion except when the company is responsible for operating its own combat base.

221. Operations

Flexibility and responsiveness of logistic support of counter guerrilla operations are facilitated by—

a. Planning by which all units are equipped with the minimum essential supplies and equipment required for successful mission accomplishment.

b. Maximum use of airlift for logistic support.

c. Providing security for the movement of supplies, equipment, and personnel.

d. Programing of allotted personnel resources to logistic and security tasks.

Section II. SUPPLY

222. General

Supply missions in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development may be vastly expanded over those in limited and general war because of the possible added requirement to support host country military forces and civilian agencies, and also because of insecure surface lines of transportation and widely dispersed deployment of supported U.S. and host country forces and agencies. Limited and general war supply procedures generally are adaptable to counter guerrilla operations but must be modified to the particular area and type of operations conducted. This section discusses the problems and the differences involved in such modification.

223. Mission

In counter guerrilla operations, the supply system must provide effective supply to brigades conducting tactical operations, intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance. In addition, supply units and personnel must

be prepared to engage directly in all of these operations as required.

224. Concept

Tactical units engaged in counter guerrilla operations are provided only those supplies and equipment items that are essential to the accomplishment of the assigned mission and any known or probable contingencies. Other supplies are maintained in the brigade and battalion trains and static logistic bases so as not to hamper the mobility of the combat elements.

225. Operations

The planning of resupply activities in counter guerrilla operations must be detailed, and must be accomplished well in advance of the actual resupply requirements. Resupply procedures are standardized at all levels of command, and the experience factors on which to base this standardization must be computed early in the counter guerrilla campaign.

a. *Aerial Resupply.* Emphasis is placed on

the maximum utilization of resupply by air within the availability and capability of aircraft and the established priority for their employment. Rendezvous points for resupply are established for units engaged in operations away from their unit base. These points vary according to a schedule which will not disclose a pattern of counter guerrilla force operations.

b. Experience Factors. Once experience factors, to include ammunition requirements and possible civilian population requirements, have been determined, a standard basic load to cover the desired time period can be established for each unit, irrespective of its size. These basic loads for battalions, companies, platoons, and squads can be used for the pre-packing, rigging, and prepositioning of supplies in brigade and battalion combat bases ready for immediate air delivery either scheduled or on call. To facilitate the removal of supplies from the resupply rendezvous point, individual resupply packages should not exceed a one-man load.

c. Unit Distribution. Unit distribution of all supplies to the lowest level possible is emphasized. For example, the issue of supplies to a company should be not only to the company base, but also directly to elements of the company conducting operations from forward patrol bases.

d. Catalog Supply System. The procedure for requesting items of supplies and equipment can be simplified by the preparation and use of a catalog supply system. This system utilizes a brevity code in which a single item or several associated items are identified and requested by an abbreviated code word. The system permits the user maximum flexibility in choice of supply consistent with the use of the abbreviated coded request and communications transmission security (FM 31-21).

e. Civilian Supply. The counter guerrilla force must be prepared to provide essential items of supply to elements of the civilian populace, especially civilian victims of military operations, remote population centers, and groups relocated or concentrated for security reasons. The availability of these supply items provides for emergency situations, assists in

the implementation of military civic action, and may prevent serious drains on a bare subsistence civilian economy. Maximum use is made of captured guerrilla supplies for civilian support. Stocks of the following supplies may be maintained for issue to the civilian population:

- (1) Food staples tailored to the population's dietary requirements.
- (2) Clothing which may include cloth in bolts, salvaged military clothing *which has been re-dyed*, and/or new items of locally procured clothing.
- (3) Shelter such as salvaged tents and construction materials.
- (4) Medical supplies.
- (5) Fuel of the type characteristic of the heating systems of the area.

f. Control. Strict control must be exercised over the assembly, storage, and distribution of supplies destined for civilian consumption to preclude their use in establishing a black market or to prevent their capture by guerrillas. Civil affairs units organized and trained for this purpose will often be available to assist in the exercise of control.

g. Local Procurement. Minimum dependence is placed on the local economy for the provision of supplies and equipment unless local procurement is encouraged to bolster the economic development of the area. Often, authority may be granted to use supplies such as food for payment for services rendered by the civilian population. Such payments must be made in the name of the counter guerrilla force and not as an individual gesture.

h. Supply Economy. All friendly troops must understand the difficulties in providing logistical support in counter guerrilla operations and the importance of conserving, maintaining, and securing supplies and equipment. Troops must realize that supplies lost or abandoned may be recovered by the guerrilla force.

i. Water Supply. In counter guerrilla operations, units may not always be able to obtain water from established engineer water points and must therefore revert to the use of possibly contaminated indigenous sources. In such

cases, the water obtained must be treated by the individual or unit. Several expedients are available to purify water before it is used for cooking and drinking. These expedients include use of calcium hypochlorite, individual water purification tablets, and boiling. For details on water purification, see FM 21-10.

j. Messes. Unit messes are normally provisionally organized for counter guerrilla operations. Elements of the brigade force conducting operations at small static defense posts or operating from forward patrol bases normally must depend predominantly on the use of combat-type rations, or on local procurement when authorized. Issuing Class I items to these units usually will be modified to provide foodstuffs suitable for preparation by improvised techniques. Except in secure areas and bases, the use of TOE field ranges and other cooking equipment may be impractical since they substantially reduce mobility.

k. Captured Materiel. Captured materiel is reported to the next higher headquarters, where it may be a source of intelligence information. Captured materiel which may have

originated from a sponsoring power and new and unusual weapons and equipment are evacuated through intelligence channels. In accordance with U.S./host country agreements, captured materiel may be destroyed, or it may be tagged and evacuated in the same manner as salvage. Captured weapons are used by the counter guerrilla force only in emergencies. In counter guerrilla operations, the characteristic sounds of weapons are often valuable aids in distinguishing between guerrilla and counter guerrilla forces. Public display of captured materiel and weapons can be useful in psychological operations.

l. Destruction of Supplies and Equipment. Destruction of supplies and equipment (less medical) may be accomplished to deny their use to the guerrilla. In counter guerrilla operations, the authority to destroy supplies and equipment is normally delegated down to and including squad leaders. Under the provisions of Geneva Conventions, medical supplies will not be intentionally destroyed (FM 27-10). For information on which to base destruction plans, see FM 5-25.

Section III. MAINTENANCE

226. General

Maintenance in counter guerrilla operations may be more critical than in limited and general war operations because the maintenance elements normally will not accompany tactical troops which may be operating in a dispersed deployment or on a short-term basis.

227. Mission

The mission of maintenance personnel and organizations is essentially the same in counter guerrilla operations as in conventional operations. In stability operations, counter guerrilla operations maintenance requirements may be increased by—

a. Wide dispersion of units and difficulty of maintenance contact teams to reach dispersed units.

b. Insecure surface routes of communication.

c. Added missions to train host country maintenance personnel through advisory assistance.

d. Brigade support of host country regular armed forces and paramilitary forces maintenance activities.

e. Maintenance of equipment which may be in standby storage to be used in event of escalation to limited war operations.

f. High use rate and rigorous operational conditions.

g. Lack of command supervision of maintenance in remote areas.

228. Concept

In relatively secure areas, an area service concept of maintenance may be feasible; however, if a requirement exists for providing maintenance support to units conducting strike operations or operating in widely dispersed,

remote areas through which ground communication is insecure, maintenance support may be provided by attachment of tailored maintenance organizations from higher headquarters or from the TOE 500-600-series.

229. Organization

a. When the brigade is operating as part of a division, a forward support company of the division maintenance battalion with appropriate augmentation operates as part of the division support command element in the brigade trains area. This unit is backed by the main support company. When the brigade is organized for independent and semi-independent operations, a forward support company with appropriate augmentation is normally attached to the brigade.

b. This augmentation may include crypto maintenance personnel from the division signal battalion if the brigade is widely separated from the division or other crypto support. The infantry or airborne infantry battalion conducting counter guerrilla operations normally will require considerable augmentation of its maintenance platoon. The extent of this augmentation will depend on the particular requirements of the situation. In any case, it normally includes a composite direct support maintenance team from the forward maintenance support company supporting the brigade. This team habitually functions in the battalion trains area in the battalion combat base.

230. Operations

a. *General.* Maintenance support units in counter guerrilla operations may be concentrated in secure bases at much lower levels than in limited and general war, and air delivery of spare parts and contact teams may be routine. Greater inventories of spare parts

stocks and maintenance float items at lower echelons than in limited and general war may be required; and for units engaged in operations, increased use of one-for-one exchange of equipment may be required. Maintenance service and serviceable exchange items must be brought to units, and unserviceable, repairable items must be evacuated by other than combat personnel. No item of unserviceable equipment of possible value to guerrilla forces may be left unsecured awaiting evacuation. Troops may be relieved of nonessential equipment which requires excessive maintenance efforts. This equipment is placed in local standby storage.

b. *Maintenance Float Items.* Normal replacement of end items is a supply function and is accomplished through end item supply channels. The direct support maintenance unit, however, will carry a maintenance float of end items for exchange purposes. This float will consist primarily of small arms, fire control instruments, and portable radio sets, but will also include a limited quantity of small vehicles and other items. Items from the float are issued to replace like unserviceable items when the need for the item is such that delay in providing a serviceable replacement will hamper mission accomplishment of the unit needing the item. The exchange of small arms and radios with units conducting operations away from the unit combat base will be normal. Unserviceable items, after repair at the direct support level, are returned to direct support maintenance float stockage. The direct support maintenance team provided to augment capabilities at the battalion combat base will be provided a maintenance float stockage of small arms, fire control instruments, and radios; other float items required by forward units are provided from the brigade combat base. Maintenance float aircraft are provided by the backup direct support maintenance unit or a general support maintenance unit.

Section IV. TRANSPORTATION

231. General

Unusual transportation problems must be considered in providing transportation support to combat units in counter guerrilla oper-

ations. These problems arise primarily because of the large size of the operational areas, the difficult and underdeveloped nature of the area, and the lack of secure ground lines of

communication. Transportation planning for counter guerrilla operations must provide reliable transportation systems responsive to the requirements of tactical operations and, as applicable, intelligence operations, psychological operations, civil affairs operations (especially populace and resources and military civic action programs), and advisory assistance operations. Depending on the situation, the provision of adequate transportation may require using such measures as host country civilian ground and water transportation means, to include trucks, bicycles, motorcycles, and watercraft, and recruiting host country porters and pack animals for operations. Aircraft provide an effective means of transportation because of speed, relative security from ground attack, and lack of sensitivity to terrain conditions. Emphasis is placed on airdrop, low-level extraction (LOLEX), and airlanded operations.

232. Motor Transportation

a. Missions. Motor transport missions include transporting supplies and equipment to combat units; transporting troops to attack or defensive positions; and providing transport for headquarters, for heavy equipment, and for supplies.

b. Concept. Movement of troops or equipment in direct support of counter guerrilla operations may be made by organic transport, by vehicles of assigned or attached truck units, or by vehicles of transportation truck units committed on a mission basis. Headquarters may use organic or attached motor transport as a pooled service to be allocated where and when needed to meet operational requirements.

c. Organization. Often, the terrain and the civil and military situations will require that brigades engaged in counter guerrilla operations release to the next higher headquarters certain of their ground vehicles not required for command, control, and transportation support. Conversely, if the terrain is trafficable, brigades assigned the primary missions of conducting counter guerrilla operations in a large area will usually require augmentation of organic ground transportation means. This is

due primarily to the extended distances that may exist between the static defense posts, combat bases, and patrol bases used in conducting counter guerrilla operations. Augmentation may come from U.S. and host country military and civilian sources.

d. Operations. Principles of operations of motor transport will follow, as closely as possible, those established in FM 55-35. Local policies and directives will establish procedures by which transportation, other than organic, is requested, provided, and utilized.

- (1) Motor transport units have a limited capability for providing security of cargo and personnel being transported. Heavy security requirements, if imposed upon truck units, will result in a corresponding decrease in the capabilities of these units to perform their assigned missions; therefore, security should be provided by troops being transported or by supporting security forces.
- (2) In areas of limited road nets, the available roads must be utilized to their maximum capacities. Extensive engineer support will be required to maintain and construct roads and bridges. For off-road operations, supporting motor transport units should be equipped with vehicles having mobility comparable to the vehicles of the supported unit.

233. Army Aviation

a. Mission. Combat service support missions performed by U.S. Army aviation units participating in counter guerrilla operations include the air movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment. These missions may be performed in support of U.S. Army ground forces, host country forces, or allied forces. Combat service support tasks performed by aviation units may include—

- (1) Liaison, air courier, wire laying, radio relay, and message drop and pickup.
- (2) Logistic supply and resupply.
- (3) Air movement or evacuation of patients, prisoners, and materiel.

- (4) Administrative troop movement.
- (5) Military civic action.
- (6) Mapping and survey.
- (7) Command and staff transportation.
- (8) Chemical and radiological monitoring.
- (9) Route and area reconnaissance.

b. Concept. In areas lacking railroads, navigable waterways, and suitable roads, air transport is the most effective means of transport and may be the only practicable means when priority conditions exist.

c. Organization. The ability of aviation units to perform airlift missions depends primarily upon the weight and dimensions of the materiel to be airlifted and the capability of aircraft assigned to the units. Appropriate TOE should be consulted to determine the airlift capability of each type unit. Establishment of loading areas as far forward as practicable will increase the airlift capability of aviation units by reducing the amount of fuel required aboard each aircraft. Aircraft refueling facilities are established at or near the loading areas so that aircraft can be refueled and loaded at the same location. Aircraft maintenance personnel and equipment may be provided at the location to make minor repairs.

d. Operations. Aviation units performing airlift missions will employ airlanded, or airdrop techniques. Aircraft returning from forward areas can be used to evacuate patients, prisoners, or equipment.

- (1) *Airlanded* personnel and materiel are moved by air and disembarked or unloaded after the aircraft has landed. This operation requires that a landing area, suitable to the type aircraft concerned, be available at the destination.
- (2) *Airdrop* is accomplished by parachuting personnel or materiel from aircraft in flight. Trained troops can disembark from helicopters by rap-

elling. Materiel can also be airdropped by use of free-fall techniques.

e. Security. Security of both the loading areas and landing zones must be maintained. Since an aviation unit lacks the capability to maintain this security while conducting operations, ground elements must be provided for this security.

234. Pack Animals

Factors such as weather, terrain, trafficability, geographic location, or security may preclude the use of normal transportation means. In these circumstances, consideration must be given to the use of pack animals. Pack animals can traverse difficult terrain, keep up with dismounted columns, and free personnel from heavy equipment burdens.

a. Pack-animal units may be organic to host country forces or procured locally for specific operations conducted by U.S. or host country forces. Animals to be used must be sound, well trained, and adequately equipped with necessary harness and rigging. Their handlers must have a knowledge of their care, management, and feeding, and their capabilities and limitations. Pack animals must be loaded properly or they may become a liability rather than an asset.

b. Pack animals may be employed in support of a variety of operations to include—

- (1) Long-range reconnaissance or combat patrols.
- (2) Battalion or company tactical operations.
- (3) Border patrols, by either tactical forces or by civil border-control agencies.
- (4) Resupply to remote areas when aircraft are not available or desirable, or during bad weather when aircraft cannot fly.
- (5) Transporting medical, engineer, or other materiel for use in military civic action.

Section V. MEDICAL SERVICE

235. General

The provision of medical support in counter-guerrilla operations must be as flexible and

imaginative as the supported operations. During counter-guerrilla operations, the extended distances between installations and the semi-

independence of operations complicate medical support and will normally require augmentation of organic medical units and modification of the supporting medical service organization and procedures of higher headquarters. In addition, units may operate in naturally hostile environments with attendant medical problems of polluted water, insects, disease, and severe heat or cold.

236. Mission

The missions of medical service in limited and general war operations and in counter-guerrilla operations are basically the same, except that the demonstrated effectiveness of medical services in military civic action, either voluntary or directed, imposes on medical service resources vastly increased requirements.

237. Concept

Patients must be evacuated from operational areas as rapidly as possible. Initial medical attention is concerned primarily with diagnosis, emergency treatment, and rapid evacuation; however, in some instances, a limited local holding and surgical capability may be required. Patient evacuation is, as far as possible, by Army aircraft (normally, helicopters); however, combat action and other factors may prevent the use of aircraft, and alternate means of patient evacuation must be employed. Standard area medical evacuation handling procedures are required. These procedures will include standard recognition signs, method of patient handling, and procedures for requesting evacuation aircraft. Guerrilla action may preclude the landing of aircraft and the evacuation of patients in some operations; therefore, measures may be required to build up the local surgical and holding capacity quickly. When appropriate, medical resources may be directed to support U.S. and host country internal development as a primary mission. Military civic action conducted voluntarily as resources permit should be exploited to the maximum when such action is in consonance with the primary mission.

238. Organization

Medical staffing and medical command and control elements will be in consonance with the

organization of the U.S. combat forces and will operate under the staff supervision of the S1. Medical service units are described fully in FM 8-10. When appropriate, these units can make vital contributions to military civic action programs. When in support of military civic action or host country military forces, all medical service units use host country personnel to the maximum extent possible, through advisory assistance, providing on-the-job training, instruction, and assignment to positions of responsibility commensurate with the training and capabilities of the host country personnel. Augmentation from TOE 8-500 should be exploited to the maximum.

239. Operations

a. Operational procedures which brigades may follow in facilitating medical service in counter-guerrilla operations include—

- (1) Establishment of small aid stations with a treating and holding capability at static defense bases, combat bases, and other echelons lower than normal.
- (2) Provision of sufficient Army aircraft to move medical elements rapidly to reinforce existing treatment and holding installations where the patient load has risen unexpectedly.
- (3) Maximum use of scheduled and on-call air evacuation.
- (4) Provision of small medical elements to support extended patrols, and raid and ambush forces.
- (5) Assignment of specially trained enlisted medical personnel capable of operating small treatment facilities with minimum supervision.
- (6) Use of host country litter-bearer teams.
- (7) Strict enforcement of the highest standards of sanitation and first aid and buddy-aid training.
- (8) Utilization of host country medical resources and capabilities when available and acceptable.
- (9) Cross-training of all combat personnel in the practical application of emergency treatment.

(10) Training and utilization of paramedics to support units during airdrop operations and to make vertical entry into isolated areas to provide emergency medical support to combat units.

(11) Provision of security for medical facilities and personnel.

b. Prescribed emergency treatment and evacuation procedures should be outlined in unit SOP.

c. Medical support in internal defense and development, through military civic action should be provided to civilian patients when operational conditions permit. Military medical support should be terminated as soon as possible to avoid alienating civilian doctors who might be deprived of their means of livelihood.

d. In counter guerrilla operations, individual and small-unit preventive medicine measures will be practiced in lieu of large-scale environmental control. Such measures as routine immunizations and suppressive drugs will continue to be necessary together with positive measures for the control of prevalent diseases. The most significant types of diseases or illnesses which may occur in areas of counter guerrilla operations include skin disease; diseases which are insectborne, waterborne, and

foodborne; diseases due to climatic conditions; and psychiatric disorders.

e. Water in an area of counter guerrilla operations should be considered contaminated and must be treated before using. Bathing in streams and ponds may be dangerous because of the prevalence of waterborne diseases. Therefore, and understanding of the endemic diseases and parasitic infections that must be countered is necessary. To preclude a sharp increase in the incidence of skin diseases, and to maintain the highest possible standard of personal cleanliness, each water source must be evaluated prior to acceptance or rejection.

f. Acclimation is the result of physiological adaptation to extremes in climatic conditions and altitude. Physiological acclimation for the adjustment of the body's heat-regulating mechanism can be 80 percent established in 1 week; 90 percent in 2 weeks; and 100 percent in 3 to 6 weeks. Incomplete acclimation means loss of effectiveness and, in some cases, may lead to early exhaustion or death. Environmental stress of high altitudes can result in acute altitude sickness. The commander must be aware of those acclimation problems peculiar to the operational area to which he is committed, and he must insure that necessary measures are taken to acclimate personnel.

Section VI. OTHER LOGISTICAL SERVICES

240. General

In addition to the activities discussed in preceding sections, construction and the utilization of available labor are also important logistic services in counter guerrilla operations.

241. Construction

Requirements for construction of both U.S. and host country facilities are of increased importance in counter guerrilla operations in stability operations as compared with counter guerrilla operations in limited and general war. The area of brigade operations may be relatively fixed by the boundaries of the host country or political subdivisions. In limited and general war, forces may not remain in specific areas for long periods of time, while in stability operations, the habitual employment of forces for

extended periods in specific local operational areas is stressed. The internal development requirements may dictate that U.S. military resources be used to build and maintain roads, airfields, communication centers, training centers, powerlines, schools, dispensaries, markets, churches, and other facilities which will have lasting value to the host country. The situation may require that brigades, properly augmented, engage in major construction efforts to provide permanent tactical and logistical bases to support brigade operations, and schools, markets, dispensaries, and similar facilities to support the civil population as part of the brigade military civic action program. Construction of training centers and other facilities to support the overall advisory assistance effort, and construction of defended population centers to sup-

port populace and resources control operations may also be required. Maximum use should be made of host country skills and materials for construction and for projects allied to military civic action.

242. Labor

In order to economize scarce brigade labor resources, to assist the civilian economy, and to train a labor pool to contribute to national or local internal development, maximum use should be made of indigenous labor resources consistent with security requirements and limitations imposed by the overall labor policy of higher headquarters. Use of these labor resources must be based on sound intelligence and planning. The premature use of these resources may invite treachery. The brigade commander

must first establish an efficient counterintelligence organization and use it to screen those persons available for use as laborers. Hostile organizations may infiltrate agents into locally organized labor forces to obtain information and to exploit these labor forces in conjunction with tactical operations at the opportune time. When there is doubt about the loyalty of the indigenous labor resources, consideration should be given to their possible use in nonsensitive duties.

243. Miscellaneous

Miscellaneous logistic services include procurement of real estate, quartering, firefighting, utilities, camouflage, and decontamination. For details on these services, see FM 54-4.

CHAPTER 12

PERSONNEL

244. General

a. Personnel operations in limited war, general war, and stability operations are similar. Personnel services to support limited or general war rear area counter guerrilla operations are governed by the standard procedures outlined in the various combat service support manuals and in branch-level manuals. This chapter discusses personnel operations which require emphasis in counter guerrilla operations as related to stability operations.

b. Personnel operations must accommodate the various missions which may be assigned to the brigade committed to counter guerrilla operations. If the brigade is conducting independent strike operations in remote areas, then personnel actions may have to wait the return of the troops to base areas. Reports and information will be difficult to gather and transmit because access to units will be largely confined to air lines of communication or radio communication. If the brigade is supporting a consolidation operation, then direct ground contact between units may be possible even though brigade units may be deployed widely over large areas.

c. In counter guerrilla operations, increased command emphasis must be given to the following areas:

- (1) Orientation of replacements.
- (2) Development and maintenance of morale.
- (3) Maintenance of military discipline, law, and order.
- (4) Relations with civilians.
- (5) Handling of prisoners and civilian internees.

245. Personnel Services

a. Personnel services and procedures to im-

plement them are similar in counter guerrilla operations in both limited and general war and stability operations.

b. Counter guerrilla operations require careful planning to use austere personnel services resources. Plans should be based on bringing individuals and brigade units into contact with special services activities, and exchange and motion picture services, rather than bringing the services to troops while on operations. Frequent rest, leave, or in-country rotation to metropolitan areas should be programed. Educational and similar services will be difficult, if not impossible, to execute by individuals assigned to brigades on operations away from the unit base.

246. Replacements

Replacements for counter guerrilla forces must receive orientation on the nature of the terrain and climate, unusual health hazards, characteristics of the population, the counter guerrilla force relations with the population, and (especially in internal defense and development) the ideological and political fallacies of the insurgent or resistance movement which the guerrilla supports.

247. Morale

a. Troops employed in counter guerrilla operations are subjected to continuing morale and psychological pressures which result largely from—

- (1) The natural reluctance of the soldier to repress women, children, and old men who may be supporting guerrilla activities.
- (2) Fear of guerrilla atrocities and an impulse to take vindictive retaliation because of such atrocities.
- (3) The characteristics of the operations

including intangible results, poor living conditions, and long periods of activity.

- (4) Lack of knowledge of guerrilla tactics.
- (5) The elusiveness of the guerrilla and the difficulty in identifying him.
- (6) The presence of civilians in the operational areas and the need to provide for their security and well-being.

b. Orientation, education, and recreation programs must be conducted on a continuing basis to offset these morale and psychological pressures.

248. Military Discipline, Law, and Order

The maintenance of discipline, law, and order is extremely important when operating among the civil population. The conduct of brigade personnel must impress the civil population with their ability, courtesy, and moral fiber and with the neatness, security, and efficiency of their bases and installations.

249. Prisoners and Civilian Internees

a. In counter guerrilla operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited or general war, the handling of prisoners of war and civilian internees will be in accordance with the principles and procedures contained in FM 19-40. However, the handling of captured personnel in internal defense and development will create special problems for U.S. counter guerrilla force commanders which differ from problems in handling prisoners in limited and general war. Of special significance is the fact that guerrillas captured by U.S. brigades may be extended treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and as directed by Department of the Army. In all cases, captured personnel are accorded humane treatment by U.S. forces. Procedures and facilities should be established to collect and process captured personnel. Their evacuation to the next higher echelon, or as otherwise directed, should be accomplished as expeditiously as possible.

b. In insurgent wars, guerrillas generally are not accorded prisoner-of-war status because such status may support their recognition by other nations. If this happens, then the guerrilla force may be recognized as representing

a *de facto* government, thus changing the situation to one of civil war. Generally, the guerrilla in insurgent wars is considered as a violator of municipal law, or as a common criminal; and while U.S. forces must accord any prisoners or internees humane treatment by U.S. regulations, care must be exercised to prevent enhancing the status of the guerrilla force to that of a recognized belligerent power. Captured nationals of external sponsoring powers require special handling, to include segregating them from other prisoners and immediately evacuating them to a higher headquarters for intelligence purposes.

250. Graves Registration

Graves registration functions normally are performed at brigade by a supporting collection and evacuation section which establishes a collecting point in the brigade base area to receive the dead from subordinate units and to identify and evacuate remains. Brigade units on strike operations may not be capable of evacuating the dead to the brigade collecting point, and alternate provisions for evacuation must be made. Battalions engaged in counter guerrilla tactical operations normally will receive assistance from attached collection and evacuation elements in the evacuation of the dead.

251. Finance, Legal, and Chaplain Services

a. *Finance.* Complete information on finance service is provided in FM 14-1.

b. *Legal.* A commander who exercises general court-martial authority is required by law to have a staff judge advocate to advise him. Divisional brigades, normally commanded by a colonel who does not have general court-martial authority, will require assistance on legal matters from the parent division. Separate brigades, normally commanded by a brigadier general with general court-martial authority, will have the required staff judge advocate. The mission of the judge advocate is to furnish legal service and advice to the commander, to other staff members, and to the commanders and members of units assigned or attached. The specific functions of the judge advocate include administration and supervision of military justice and claims; provision of legal assistance; stating legal opinions concerning personnel actions, procurement, and civil-mili-

tary jurisdiction; supervision of war crimes matters; and formulation and administration of certain international agreements.

c. Chaplain. The chaplain section of the brigade provides religious services and pastoral

care for all units or elements assigned or attached to the brigade. The brigade chaplains will coordinate their activities and provide assistance and supervision necessary to insure adequate religious coverage of all organic or attached units, which may be widely dispersed.

CHAPTER 13

CIVIL AFFAIRS

252. General

This chapter provides general guidance on the employment of specialist civil affairs resources to support the brigade in counter guerrilla operations in internal defense operations as well as in counter guerrilla operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited and general war. Where appropriate, differentiation is made between these two operational environments.

253. Mission of Specialist Civil Affairs Elements

Civil affairs missions can range from liaison and coordination with local civil agencies in stability operations to military government operations in rear areas of forces engaged in limited and general war. In stability operations, proper use of civil affairs elements can expedite the furnishing of assistance by military forces to local governments, and the reciprocal provisioning and support of military forces by the local government. Civil affairs may involve the temporary performance by U.S. military forces of certain governmental functions in the name of the host country. Specialist civil affairs elements support internal defense and development by organizing and motivating the civil population to assist host country and U.S. civil and military forces in counter guerrilla operations by eliminating or reducing political, economic, or social problems such as ineffective administration, unemployment, and poor public sanitation. Examples of tasks which can best be performed by specialist civil affairs elements to muster and synchronize civil support and assistance are as follows:

a. Increase the efficiency of the local administrations so that orders, intelligence, requests, and information pass expeditiously among the

commander, the civil administrator, and the population.

b. Expedite payment of just claims to insure that civilian support and cooperation will not be refused as a consequence of previous bad faith.

c. Develop the efficiency of the civil police and its image with the populace to enhance its effectiveness in civil security and intelligence.

d. Improve local health through simple inoculation and public health measures to improve the host country government image, increase civilian productivity, and eradicate disease.

e. Initiate or modernize public welfare activities.

f. Modernize financial operations, including controls over budget, taxation, expenditures, and public funds, and update appropriate fiscal accounting procedures, all with the objective of increasing revenues.

g. Establish a school system to provide technical and liberal education for adults as well as adolescents, both to raise productivity and to improve the image of the host country government.

h. Determine labor availability for work such as stevedoring, facility and equipment construction or repair, and base upkeep, and coordinate with local labor procurement agencies.

i. Locate and negotiate for civil assets required by the military, such as storage facilities and troop housing, foodstuffs and water, transportation means, and others.

j. Organize or modernize public utilities, such as water distribution, sewage, power, communications, and transportation.

k. Prepare and disseminate information through military and civilian information media.

254. Concepts

Civil affairs policy formulation should be centralized, to the degree practicable, with operations and activities coordinated over broad geographical areas; however, in internal defense and development, civil affairs staffs, units, and teams will frequently be found at echelons lower than in limited and general war situations. These elements must be allowed operational latitude sufficient to accommodate local political, economic, and sociological variations.

255. Organization

In counter guerrilla operations, whether in internal defense and development or in limited or general war rear areas, civil affairs staff representation is required at all levels from battalion task force upward. Wherever possible the civil affairs staff section should consist of or include specialist civil affairs personnel. Appropriate civil affairs functions include the normal combat support and combat service support activities; but, in addition, they are particularly applicable to the military civic action and populace and resources control programs which specialist civil affairs elements may assist in coordinating. Civil affairs companies may serve under the direct supervision of a field army, corps, or similar commands, and in turn may command up to fifteen civil affairs platoons.

a. In counter guerrilla operations, units as small as battalion task forces may be assigned missions to implement plans for which the civil affairs officer has staff responsibility. Under these situations, a civil affairs platoon may support a brigade, as contrasted to limited and general war situations in which a civil affairs platoon normally supports a division.

b. Functional teams from the TOE 41-500-series cover the civil affairs functional areas and include the language team. For training, functional teams are sometimes grouped into four categories: governmental control, eco-

nomie, public facilities, and special functions. They are assigned or attached to civil affairs units according to situational requirements.

c. Language teams may be required in large numbers. However, a better solution than an extensive number of language teams is to have civil affairs officers qualified in the local language. Those who are not school-trained should make efforts to train themselves in local dialects.

256. Operations

In counter guerrilla operations planning, the civil affairs staff section presents the political, economic, and sociological considerations.

a. Civil affairs companies and platoons may serve either in a command or area support role. Area support, usually to civil or military officials having area responsibilities, though not always possible, is preferred because—

- (1) Intimate knowledge of the local situation and working relationships with local inhabitants are critical. Much time may be required to bridge the barriers which separate host country from U.S. personnel and to establish mutual trust.
- (2) The advantages of being supported by the civil affairs unit which best knows the situation, area, and personalities will probably outweigh other considerations.

b. In stability operations direct civil affairs liaison between U.S. brigades and the host country government should extend, as a minimum, through all levels at which brigades are operating under unified control. Basic coordination should be accomplished in the area coordination centers (ACC) (para 53). If a military assistance program was underway before the arrival of the brigade, the framework for a liaison system may already exist in the form of advisors to political subdivision chiefs. These advisors may be civil affairs officers, or they may have civil affairs officers on their staffs.

- (1) U.S. brigade civil affairs liaison officers to the host country government

may assist host country political subdivisions chiefs by—

- (a) Explaining U.S. brigade capabilities to support internal defense and internal development programs.
 - (b) Keeping host country political leaders informed on political, economic, and sociological information acquired by U.S. forces during the conduct of operations.
 - (c) Serving as local agents for U.S. civil agencies concerned with internal development and information programs.
 - (d) Continuing advisory assistance activities, if appropriate.
- (2) U.S. civil affairs liaison officers to the host country government may assist U.S. brigade forces in the area by—
- (a) Keeping U.S. brigade commanders informed of host country government policies, plans, and programs.
 - (b) Advising U.S. brigade commanders as to capabilities and plans of local administrations.
 - (c) Recommending economic and sociological courses of action for U.S. brigades.

(d) Relaying political, economic, and sociological information acquired by host country administrators which might be of use to U.S. brigade commanders.

(e) Accompanying U.S. forces on tactical operations to provide continuing advice which might otherwise be unavailable.

- (3) Host country civil affairs elements or government teams may operate with U.S. brigade forces. These teams will render assistance of the same nature listed in (2) above. In addition, host country government teams will be needed to assist U.S. forces conducting consolidation operations. These teams would perform the mission of establishing or reestablishing government facilities, influences, and controls. The rapid establishment of government in newly controlled areas not only has a psychological impact on the populace, but it also frees combat forces for further tactical operations by organizing the populace to perform their own local defense.

PART FOUR

REAR AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 14

INTRODUCTION

257. General

a. Rear area security operations are those operations, except for active air defense, conducted to neutralize or destroy threats to units and activities in rear areas.

b. Rear areas are those areas to the rear of frontline units in which combat support and combat service support functions are performed.

c. Rear area security operations are conducted as part of the mission of all elements operating in rear areas. The rear area security operations conducted by nontactical units are usually limited to internal security, local security and perimeter defense of installations. Military police units normally perform area security missions for an assigned area of responsibility and are charged with convoy security.

258. Responsibility for Rear Area Security

Responsibility for rear area security rests with the commander exercising territorial control (COMMZ, army, and corps commanders). Although no formal organization for rear area security exists at this time, it is envisaged that commanders having territorial responsibility will designate a subordinate headquarters as the agency having responsibility for rear area security. This headquarters will conduct planning, establish a communication network, and operate an operations/intelligence center. U.S. Army doctrine does not provide for the perma-

nent allocation of combat troops to rear area security missions. Combat units will be committed to rear area security missions only when the situation is beyond the capability of the area commander, using his own resources. Combat units committed to rear area security missions will remain committed for the minimum time required to reduce or eliminate the threat.

259. Threat

The threat to rear areas may consist of guerrillas, by-passed enemy units, enemy airborne/airmobile forces, or civil disturbances.

260. Purpose

This part provides information and guidance to commanders and staffs of the brigade and its subordinate elements when committed to rear area security counter guerrilla operations.

261. Scope

This part is limited to operations against guerrillas (including regular forces conducting guerrilla-type operations) in limited and general war environments. Foregoing parts of this manual address brigade counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development environments. When a situation develops in the rear area which requires the employment of a force against an enemy threatening the command as a whole, the action is no longer a rear area security operation, and operations to counter the threat are conducted as part of the main battle.

CHAPTER 15

BRIGADE OPERATIONS

262. General

Brigade counter guerrilla operations in rear area security missions are characterized by rapid movement to the area of operations, rapid deployment and development of the situation, and sustained offensive combat to eliminate the guerrilla threat. The brigade, when committed to counter guerrilla rear area security missions, will be allocated resources commensurate with the mission. Army aircraft are utilized to the maximum extent. Brigade counter guerrilla operations are conducted to insure the uninterrupted operations of administrative and logistical functions performed in the area of operations.

263. Command and Control

The brigade will normally be under the operational control of the area commander in whose area it is committed. Nontactical units in the immediate area of operations may be placed under the operational control of the brigade. Tactical missions assigned to nontactical units must cause a minimum of interference with their primary mission and must be consistent with their limited capabilities for conducting tactical operations.

264. Basic Considerations

a. Guerrilla forces normally require several essential elements for effective operations. Among the more critical of these elements are—favorable terrain from which to operate; a source of supply; an intelligence system; and, to a differing degree, support of the local populace.

b. Brigade operations against guerrillas posing a threat to rear area security are aimed at the reduction or elimination of all of these essential elements (with priority to those

which intelligence indicates are most vulnerable).

265. Combat Operations

a. The brigade will normally be introduced into the area of operations when the threat has reached proportions that are beyond the capabilities of the forces of the area commander. The brigade commander must exploit the intelligence gained by the nontactical units in the area of operation and must develop a plan for the rapid deployment of brigade forces. He will be influenced in his deployment of brigade forces by the necessity to provide for defense of key installations and to secure priority routes of communication. Brigade operations, despite the constraints imposed by the above considerations, will be offensive in nature. Maximum use will be made of the capabilities of nontactical units to provide for their own internal and local security. The defensive posture of nontactical units/installations must be screened and protected by aggressive small-unit patrols and by extensive aerial reconnaissance. The brigade commander normally subdivides his area of responsibility into battalion operational areas, retaining a highly mobile reserve (preferably airmobile, airborne or mechanized) as a quick reaction force.

b. Tactical operations of the brigade against guerrilla forces in limited and general war environments are conducted generally following the concepts established in Part Two of this manual.

266. Contrast Between Environments

The rear area security operations of the brigade in limited and general war environments differ from those conducted in internal defense and development environments primarily in the minimal military civic action and

vironments are normally performed by other military units subordinate to the commander exercising territorial responsibility.

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

(C) AR 10-122	United States Army Security Agency (U)
(C) AR 105-87	Electronic Warfare (U)
AR 320-5	Dictionary of United States Army Terms
AR 320-50	Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes
(C) AR 515-1	Army Cold War Activities (U)
AR 633-50	Apprehension and Confinement—Prisoners of War; Administration, Employment, and Compensation
AR 633-51	Apprehension and Confinement—Civilian Internees Administration, Employment, and Compensation
AR 735-35	Supply Procedures for TOE and TDA Units or Activities
AR 750-5	Organization, Policies, and Responsibilities for Maintenance Operation
AR 750-8	Command Maintenance Management Inspections
FM 1-5	Aviation Company
FM 1-15	Aviation Battalion
FM 1-100	Army Aviation Utilization
FM 1-105	Army Aviation Techniques and Procedures
FM 1-110	Armed Helicopter Employment
FM 3-10	Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents
FM 3-50	Chemical Smoke Generator Units and Smoke Operations
FM 5-1	Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations
FM 5-15	Field Fortifications
FM 5-25	Explosives and Demolitions
FM 5-31	Boobytraps
FM 5-135	Engineer Battalion, Armored, Infantry and Infantry (Mechanized) Divisions
FM 5-136	Engineer Battalion, Airborne Division
FM 5-142	Nondivisional Engineer Combat Units
FM 5-162	Engineer Construction and Construction-Support Units
FM 6-20-1	Field Artillery Tactics
FM 6-20-2	Field Artillery Techniques
FM 6-140	Field Artillery Cannon Battalions and Batteries
FM 7-11	Rifle Company, Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized
FM 7-15	Rifle Platoon and Squads Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized
FM 7-20	Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Battalions
FM 7-30	Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized Division Brigades
FM 8-15	Division Medical Service, Infantry, Airborne, Mechanized and Armored Divisions
FM 8-35	Transportation of the Sick and Wounded
FM 8-55	Army Medical Service Planning Guide
FM 9-1	Ordnance Service in the Field
FM 9-3	Ordnance Direct Support Service
FM 9-6	Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations

FM 9-30	Maintenance Battalion: Division Support Command
FM 10-8	Air Delivery of Supplies and Equipment in the Field Army
FM 10-50	Supply and Transport Battalion, Division Support Command
FM 11-50	Signal Battalion Armored Infantry and Mechanized Infantry Divisions
FM 11-57	Signal Battalion, Airborne Division
FM 12-11	Administration Company, Airborne, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized Divisions
FM 17-1	Armor Operations
FM 17-15	Tank Units, Platoon, Company, and Battalion
FM 17-30	The Armored Division Brigade
FM 17-36	Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units
FM 17-95	The Armored Cavalry Regiment
FM 19-1	Military Police Support, Army Divisions and Separate Brigades
FM 19-2	Military Police Support in the Field Army
FM 19-3	Military Police Support in the Communications Zone
FM 19-5	The Military Policeman
FM 19-15	Civil Disturbances and Disasters
FM 19-20	Military Police Investigations
FM 19-25	Military Police Traffic Control
FM 19-30	Physical Security
FM 19-40	Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees
FM 20-20	Military Dog Training and Employment
FM 20-32	Land Mine Warfare
FM 20-33	Combat Flame Operations
FM 20-60	Battlefield Illumination
FM 21-5	Military Training Management
FM 21-6	Techniques of Military Instruction
FM 21-10	Military Sanitation
FM 21-11	First Aid for Soldiers
FM 21-18	Foot Marches
FM 21-20	Physical Training
FM 21-26	Map Reading
FM 21-30	Military Symbols
FM 21-40	Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Defense
FM 21-41	Soldier's Handbook for Defense Against Chemical and Biological Operations and Nuclear Warfare
FM 21-48	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR), and Nuclear Defense Training Exercises
FM 21-50	Ranger Training and Ranger Operations
FM 21-60	Visual Signals
FM 21-75	Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling
FM 21-76	Survival
FM 21-77	Evasion and Escape
FM 22-100	Military Leadership
FM 23-12	Technique of Fire of the Rifle Squad and Tactical Application
FM 23-65	Browning Machinegun Caliber .50 HB, M2
FM 24-18	Field Radio Techniques
FM 24-20	Field Wire and Field Cable Techniques
FM 27-10	The Law of Land Warfare
FM 29-22	Maintenance Operations in the Field Army
FM 29-45	General Support Supply and Service in the Field Army
FM 30-5	Combat Intelligence

FM 30-10	Terrain Intelligence
(C) FM 30-17	Counterintelligence Operations, Intelligence Corps, U.S. Army (U)
(S) FM 30-18	Intelligence Collection, Operations, Intelligence Corps, USA (U)
FM 30-28	Armed Forces Censorship
FM 31-10	Barriers and Denial Operations
FM 31-12	Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Force)
FM 31-18	Infantry Long-Range Patrol Company
FM 31-20	Special Forces Operational Techniques
FM 31-21	Special Forces Operations
(S) FM 31-21A	Special Forces Operations (U)
FM 31-22	U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces
(S) FM 31-22A	U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces (U)
FM 31-25	Desert Operations
FM 31-30	Jungle Training and Operations
(C) FM 31-40	Tactical Cover and Deception (U)
FM 31-50	Combat in Fortified and Built-up Areas
FM 31-60	River-Crossing Operations
FM 31-70	Basic Cold Weather Manual
FM 31-71	Northern Operations
FM 31-72	Mountain Operations
FM 31-73	Advisor Handbook for Counterinsurgency
(CM) FM 32-5	Communications Security (U)
FM 33-1	Psychological Operations-U.S. Army Doctrine
FM 41-5	Joint Manual for Civil Affairs
FM 41-10	Civil Affairs Operations
FM 44-1	U.S. Army Air Defense Employment
FM 54-2	The Division Support Command
FM 54-4	The Support Brigade
FM 55-6	Transportation Services in Theaters of Operations
FM 55-35	Motor Transport Operations and Motor Transport Units
FM 57-10	Army Forces in Joint Airborne Operations
FM 57-35	Airmobile Operations
FM 57-38	Pathfinder Operations
FM 61-100	The Division
(S) FM 100-1	Doctrinal Guidance (U)
FM 100-5	Field Service Regulations, Operations
FM 100-10	Field Service Regulations, Administration
FM 100-15	Field Service Regulations, Larger Units
(C) FM 100-20	Field Service Regulations—Counterinsurgency (U)
FM 100-25/	Tactical Air Support of Land Forces (to be published)
AFM 2-52	
FM 101-5	Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure
FM 101-10-1	Staff Officers' Field Manual—Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data —Unclassified Data
FM 101-40	Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment and Defense
DA Pam 27-1	Treaties Governing Land Warfare
JCS Pub 1	Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage
JCS Pub 2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

APPENDIX B

MILITARY TRAINING

Section I. INTRODUCTION

1. General

This appendix provides guidance to support the training operations of U.S. brigades which have been committed, or have contingency plans for commitment to counter guerrilla operations.

a. Army field manuals, subject schedules, training texts, training programs, and other training literature should be consulted to guide

the planning and execution of training outlined in this appendix.

b. Administrative and tactical training responsibilities of commanders are cited in AR 220-50, AR 220-60, AR 220-70, and AR 385-63. Commanders will use these regulations as guides in the supervision, administration, and training of individuals and units under their command.

Section II. MISSION

2. General

The mission of counter guerrilla operations training is to insure success in counter guerrilla operations through the combining of required individual skills, unit capabilities, and sound planning for the efficient, timely, coordinated commitment of brigade forces into counter guerrilla operations whether in rear areas of forces engaged in limited and general war or in support of internal defense and development of a host country.

3. Individual Training

Individual training objectives in counter guerrilla training generally are the same as for limited and general war operations; however, the degree of proficiency required is greater because of increased reliance on individual and

small-unit actions. The individual must be trained to react instantly to his leader's orders and often to react in the absence of orders. Ranger-type training is emphasized.

4. Unit Training

Unit training objectives are to develop unit capabilities through teaching individuals of units how to work within and between units, and to provide an understanding of the specific characteristics and requirements of counter guerrilla operations revolving around the major activities of tactical operations (to include strike and consolidation operations), intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory assistance operations.

Section III. CONCEPT

5. General

All individuals and brigades gain and maintain proficiency to enable them to be committed to counter guerrilla operations with minimum

premission training. In training, offensive tactics are not emphasized to the detriment of the defense. Both are important to the unit committed to counter guerrilla operations.

6. Designated Counter guerrilla Forces for Stability Operations

Units designated for counter guerrilla operations in stability operations should begin intensified training at their home stations immediately upon notification of their scheduled deployment. After deployment to the host country, and prior to commitment to operations, units should be given a period of in-country training at host country training centers or in designated training bases or locations. This should be accomplished to enable units and individuals to acclimate themselves psychologically and physically to the host country environment, and to permit commanders and staffs to accomplish the required coordination and planning within their own command structure and with civil and military host country, U.S., and allied organizations with which they will be cooperating. After

commitment, in-country operations readiness training between operations should be continued and stressed, using weaknesses identified in operations as the basis for training. Individuals and units redeployed to CONUS should maintain proficiency for possible recommitment to counter guerrilla operations in internal defense and development operational environment.

7. Designated Counter guerrilla Forces in Limited and General War

When brigades are designated for counter guerrilla operations as part of the rear area security mission in limited and general war operations, preparation time for employment, if any, will normally be very short. This situation dictates that continuous counter guerrilla training be emphasized by all units in their normal training programs.

Section IV. ORGANIZATION

8. General

As soon as possible after being designated for counter guerrilla operations in a given area, commanders and staffs should determine training requirements by staff visits to the area and by using available data bases in CONUS or other areas. Depending on the time available, officers and key noncommissioned officers may be sent to language schools and other service schools to equip them for the counter guerrilla mission. Designated support elements should be assimilated by the brigade as soon as possible and should be trained with the brigade.

9. Training Program

A counter guerrilla training program provides guidance for the conduct of counter guerrilla operations training for all units.

a. Units which are likely to be attached to, or placed in support of, infantry units in counter guerrilla operations should undergo counter guerrilla operations training with those units when possible.

b. Both nuclear and nonnuclear training should be covered by the program.

10. Planning

The duration of the training program will depend on many factors, including previous related training. In general, the training should be conducted from a tactical bivouac and should involve continuous operations. Consideration should be given to the training of appropriate size units in the conduct of guerrilla warfare tactics so that they can act as Aggressor guerrilla forces during the training cycle.

Section V. OPERATIONS

11. General

Individuals and units must be proficient not only in tactical operations, but also in other skills which are inherently required in coun-

ter guerrilla operations, and which involve aspects of intelligence operations, psychological operations, populace and resources control operations, military civic action, and advisory

assistance operations. Varied missions and limited resources will require that individuals and units, through cross-training, be capable of effective action in any or all of these operational situations and activities. Counter guerrilla operations inherently require more effort by both individuals and units than do limited and general war situations in which tactical operations are the primary, all-encompassing mission.

12. Training for Commanders, Staffs, and Small-Unit Leaders

a. Commanders and staffs, prior to commitment in counter guerrilla operations, receive training in activities peculiar to counter guerrilla operations, to include—

- (1) Tactical operations involved in combatting an adversary who usually has little interest in seizing and holding terrain.
- (2) Familiarization with tailoring or modification of organization and equipment necessary for success in counter guerrilla operations.
- (3) Command, control, communication, and logistical problems, to include medical treatment and evacuation, associated with conducting highly decentralized operations over large areas.
- (4) Understanding and support of clandestine intelligence and communication nets and cooperation with other intelligence agencies, both U.S. and host country.
- (5) Conduct of military civic action.
- (6) Employment of supporting civil affairs and psychological operations units, and the conduct of psychological and civil affairs operations.
- (7) Employment of unit resources in local advisory assistance.
- (8) Employment of the unit to assist in populace and resources control operations.
- (9) Area orientation, to include national characteristics such as customs and

religious, economic, and political aspects of the host country or area of employment.

- (10) Orientation on the terrain, climate, and unusual health hazards.
- (11) Ability to integrate staff augmentation elements, such as intelligence, imagery interpreters, civil affairs, and psychological operations staff personnel, into unit staffs through battalion level.
- (12) More frequent use of feints, deception, and preparation of dummy positions at lower unit levels.
- (13) Use of interpreters.

b. Small-unit leader development is stressed. During the conduct of decentralized counter guerrilla operations, the small-unit leader must be able to plan and execute operations with little or no assistance from higher headquarters. He must be able to perform effectively the duties of his senior in the event the senior becomes a casualty. Training should provide for the periodic assumption of higher command by small-unit leaders. Small-unit leaders are trained in procedures for requesting and adjusting mortar and artillery fires, and requesting aerial fire support. Training should include maintenance of direction in difficult terrain, security SOP, and health and well-being of his men.

13. Night Operations Training

Effective operations during the hours of darkness are important in all forms of warfare, but are essential in counter guerrilla operations. The basic ingredient of successful night operations, offensive or defensive, is the confidence of the individual soldier in his ability and that of his unit to operate in the night environment. This confidence stems from detailed planning and painstaking training.

a. Training programs which devote from one-quarter to one-third of the total training time to night operations provide troops and units with the necessary knowledge, confidence, and skill that they need for night combat. The key to successful night training is to schedule training which includes transition of operations

from day to night, and vice versa. This is scheduled as an uninterrupted tactical exercise. Further, the scope of night training should not be limited, but should include all aspects of operations. Offensive and defensive actions involving night movement should be stressed.

b. Areas of emphasis in night training are—

- (1) Techniques of fire during periods of darkness.
- (2) Individual weapons firing under all conditions of natural and artificial illumination.
- (3) Night relief procedures at small-unit levels.
- (4) Night reconnaissance patrols and security at halts.
- (5) Individual proficiency in land navigation at night.
- (6) Individual and unit light and noise discipline.
- (7) Use of detection devices in offensive and defensive night operations.
- (8) Night live-firing exercises for squads and platoons.
- (9) Artillery employment in support of night operations.
- (10) Night airmobile operations.
- (11) Night airborne operations.
- (12) Night aerial delivery.
- (13) Use of aerial sensors and aerial fire support at night.

14. Individual Training

Counter guerrilla training of the individual emphasizes physical and mental conditioning and acclimation of all personnel to the areas of operation, the characteristics of the proposed country or area of employment, and techniques used for analyzing the assigned sector as the basis for military counter guerrilla operational plans. This includes tactics and techniques of counter guerrilla tactical operations and orientation on the nature of the motivations, operations, and objectives of resistance or insurgent movements, to include counter-PSYOP training and orientation on the need to engage in counter guerrilla operations.

a. Cross-training of personnel is required in

the employment of all types of weapons and communications and other equipment and skills found in the unit, because counter guerrilla operations require the habitual employment of small, widely separated, self-sufficient units. The loss of a portion of a unit should never cause crew-served weapons, communication equipment, or essential skills to be unused because of a lack of trained personnel. Personnel are cross-trained in the use of non-organic equipment such as lighter, more mobile equipment, e.g., shotguns and handheld automatic weapons, boats, the light mortar in lieu of the heavy mortar, and civilian-type equipment to include weapons and vehicles.

b. Physical conditioning permits the counter guerrilla force not only to match the foot-mobility and endurance of the guerrilla, but to exceed it. This requires an intensive training effort to condition personnel. Training exercises are planned and conducted to enhance the physical endurance of unit personnel. This conditions the troops to accept mentally the concept of continuous offensive operations to the limits of physical stamina. Emphasis is placed on foot marches to include speed marches, physical training drills; combatives to include hand-to-hand combat and bayonet drill; survival, escape, and evasion training (both land and water), and confidence tests.

15. Unit Training

The preparation of standard combat units for employment in counter guerrilla operations involves training in the following primary areas—tactical operations; intelligence operations; psychological operations; populace and resources control operations; military civic action; and advisory assistance operations. Intensive training in counter guerrilla operations is necessary to prepare U.S. units to recognize, understand, and combat such general guerrilla tactical force strengths as their discipline, motivation, experience, supply economy, ruthlessness, hardiness, and knowledge of the local terrain, language, customs, and other characteristics of the population.

a. Tailoring or modification of units engaged in counter guerrilla operations training takes place prior to each exercise for optimum

results during the training. Unnecessary vehicles and other equipment are withdrawn from the units to minimize vehicular movement during training. Continuous study is made of the weapons, ammunition, and equipment required for operations. Emphasis is placed on determining the essential load the individual and unit may carry and still maintain required footmobility. Unit SOP are developed stipulating the specific amounts and types of rations, clothing, equipment, and ammunition to be carried by each individual. An increase in the individual or unit load seriously reduces the ability to move and fight. For details on fighting and existence loads, see FM 7-11.

b. Army aviation is used extensively by counter guerrilla forces and they must be trained to fully utilize Army aircraft as a normal means of combat support. All units, from battalions to rifle squads, are trained to conduct coordinated airmobile operations as proficiently as ground operations. SOP are developed for the loading and tactical deployment from all available types of Army aircraft. Units should be supportable with any mix of available aircraft with minimum lost time in reorganizing the force to accommodate the type of aircraft furnished for the operation. Particular attention must be given in training to—

- (1) Characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of Army aircraft.
- (2) Techniques of loading and unloading, to include rappelling.
- (3) Techniques of stowing and transporting equipment.
- (4) Terminal guidance techniques.
- (5) Employment of terminal guidance equipment and navigational aids.
- (6) Aerial resupply techniques, to include the procedures for packaging equipment.

c. Unit esprit is developed by the habitual training of small units in widely separated areas and on detached task assignments which require the maximum endurance of the individual and the unit.

d. Immediate action drills are essential to the majority of the counter guerrilla operations conducted by small units, since their actions will be in rapid reaction to guerrilla activities. Brigade forces must be prepared to react immediately against detected guerrilla forces. In these cases, speed is more essential than a total reconnaissance of the area, development of detailed estimates of the situation, or issuance of detailed orders. This requires that small units be conditioned to react with predrilled movements immediately after contact has been made. Battle drills, discussed in FM 7-15, are excellent guides to training in these movements. Patterns in reaction drills should be avoided as the enemy will observe and capitalize on repetitive patterns. Small-unit alerts at various times throughout the training program will condition further the personnel to react swiftly to unanticipated situations.

e. Proficiency in the following areas should be stressed:

- (1) Organization of units into a number of small operational task forces (squad to battalion) capable of semi-independent action with austere support.
- (2) Achievement of a mobility differential over guerrilla forces requiring a high degree of training in foot movement over difficult terrain under adverse conditions, and extensive use of Army aviation for combat support, combat service support, and reconnaissance. If Army aviation is not available during the training, its use should be simulated.
- (3) Exploitation of local intelligence sources.
- (4) Commitment against guerrilla forces to isolate them from their sources of supply.
- (5) Use of small-unit mobile patrol bases for extensive ground patrolling.
- (6) Continuous harassment of guerrilla tactical forces.
- (7) Measures to quell civilian disturbances and to eliminate covert elements by populace and resources control measures.

- (8) Raids, ambushes, and destruction of guerrilla forces through strike operations.
- (9) The locating, identifying, and fixing of hostile elements.
- (10) Use of psychological operations.
- (11) The assignment of areas, sectors, and subsectors to units, and the clearing from these areas of guerrilla forces by consolidation operations.

16. Field Training Exercises

Battalions and brigades conduct extensive training exercises to gain proficiency in counter guerrilla operations. Unlike limited and general war operations which may be broken down to increments such as the attack, the defense, or retrograde operations, counter guerrilla operations normally are long-term with a complicated interplay of tactical operations, populace and resources control operations, and concurrent psychological, intelligence, and advisory assistance operations, and military civic action. This requires that only specific, well-defined, developed situations normal to overall counter guerrilla operations be played, and individual tactical exercises be varied to cover all possible aspects.

a. Guerrilla tactical force representation must be played realistically during the exercises. The guerrilla plan of action must be detailed, accurate, comprehensive, and purposeful; the use of an Aggressor force operating at random throughout the area, making contact with the player unit at will, serves no useful purpose and contaminates the intelligence effort of the player unit. See FM 30-101, 30-102, and 30-103 for additional guidance on Aggressor guerrillas.

b. Civilian populations which can be expected in an area of operations must be represented adequately in training for counter guerrilla operations. This is necessary in all tactical exercises emphasizing civil affairs operations, psychological and intelligence operations, advisory assistance, and military civic action. Realism may be acquired by dividing, prior to the exercise, the civilian representation into the following groups:

- (1) Sympathizers with the counter guerrilla force (known only to the player unit).
- (2) Sympathizers with the guerrilla force (known only to the Aggressor guerrilla unit).
- (3) Personnel with no polarized sympathies.

c. Inspection and maintenance are stressed during training exercises. Emphasis is placed on maintaining weapons and equipment in operational condition at all times.

17. Subjects for Integrated Training

Much of the training presented in the normal training program for combat against a limited or general war enemy is also applicable in training for combat against guerrilla forces which have little or no interest in the seizure and retention of terrain. Varying the situation between these two types of operational environments provides breadth to training, and it also permits the extensive integration of counter guerrilla operations into formal training.

a. Examples of subjects suitable for the integration of counter guerrilla training, and possible areas to be integrated into individual training, follow:

- (1) *Tactical training.* Organization, missions, and tactics of counter guerrilla patrols. Stress ability to move silently, avoid detection, and track guerrilla forces.
- (2) *Guard duty.* Develop security consciousness against infiltration and guerrilla actions. Emphasize the need for alertness against surprise attack.
- (3) *Intelligence training.* Stress the need for continuous and accurate reporting of information of the terrain and guerrilla to insure detection of guerrilla units and information and activities. Stress the need for rapid transmission of information on guerrilla activity.
- (4) *Field sanitation and personal hygiene.* Stress the need for proper health

measures, self-aid, buddy-aid, and aerial medical evacuation methods and additional items to be included in the individual aid kit such as calamine lotion, sodium bicarbonate, and insect repellents. Discuss the composition and coding systems for pre-packing medical supplies for airdrop (FM 31-21).

b. Examples of subjects suitable for the integration of counter guerrilla training, and possible areas to be integrated, into unit training follow:

- (1) *Patrolling and squad tactical training.* Include training in countermeasures against infiltrators; measures to detect, evade, or counter guerrilla ambushes; and tailoring or modification of patrols to fit missions. Stress need for effective small-unit leadership and aggressiveness after guerrilla forces have been encountered.
- (2) *Crew-served weapons training.* Stress security of crew-served weapons to prevent destruction or loss to guerrilla or underground elements. Cross-train on alternate weapons which may be used.
- (3) *Communications.* Cover communication in counter guerrilla operations to include communication security and the use of all means of communication. Stress that signal communication is a primary guerrilla target. Include training in operation of AM radio sets. Instruct on operation of each new item of radio equipment to be used. A segment of training should include CW code instruction for familiarization of maintenance of proficiency for those radio operators designated to operate radios with a CW capability. The usefulness of field expedient antennas must be stressed and sufficient emphasis placed upon their construction to insure their use when appropriate.
- (4) *Field fortification training.* Stress improvised obstacles to include

sharpened stakes, pits, and use of nails in making foot traps. Cover preparation of weapons positions. Demonstrate the use of obstacles in counter guerrilla tactical operations.

- (5) *Landmine warfare.* Cover improvised types of mines, boobytraps, and other explosive devices and techniques used by guerrilla and counter guerrilla forces.
- (6) *Concealment and camouflage.* Emphasize use of concealment and camouflage to deceive guerrillas as to the location of forces, patrol bases, and combat bases. Discuss guerrilla techniques of concealment and camouflage.
- (7) *Squad, section, and platoon tactical exercises and ranger training.* Incorporate the conduct of raids and ambushes on guerrilla forces. Stress tactics and techniques employed by small units in offensive and defensive operations against guerrilla force infiltrators. Emphasize security, intelligence, communications, and the use of aggressive action when contacting guerrilla elements.
- (8) *Combined-arms training.* Instruct on the capabilities, optimum roles, and techniques of employment of armor, artillery, and infantry. Emphasize close coordination between all tactical and civil elements. This training should stress the capability of armor, particularly armored cavalry units, to cover large trafficable areas and to perform reconnaissance and security missions.
- (9) *First aid.* Integrate medical training such as care of wounds and snakebites, and mouth-to-mouth artificial respiration.
- (10) *Joint and combined training.* Stress the concepts, techniques, and procedures required to coordinate the activities of units with military and civilian U.S., host country, and allied units and agencies.

(11) Delivery of intense, accurate, small-arms fire at short ranges.

c. Counterguerrilla training is integrated into training and field exercises and maneuvers of all units.

INDEX

	Paragraphs	Pages
Acclimation -----	26, 234f	15, 128
Administrative support -----	210	118
Advisory assistance operations -----	19b, 55f, 64a, 78b, 122b, 129f, 139, 142, 166-170, 199j	11, 34, 38, 45, 63, 66, 76, 90, 107
Aerial (see also Air):		
Artillery -----	132d	70
Command post -----	137a	74
Fire -----	111c, 137c, 175c	55, 75, 93
Movement -----	137c	75
Observers -----	137c, 146g, 147a, 185	75, 77, 99
Patrolling -----	81d, 105	46, 52
Reconnaissance -----	104, 137c	52, 75
Relay station -----	76b, 132d	44, 70
Resupply -----	22c, 52e, 220b, 225a	14, 31, 120, 121
Search -----	206	114
Supply platoon -----	215a	118
Surveillance -----	59b, 137	36, 74
Agriculture -----	29b, 100b	16, 51
Air (see also Aerial):		
Alert -----	175c	93
Cavalry employment -----	103, 129j, 177	52, 68, 97
Controller -----	175a	97
Cover -----	173c	92
Defense -----	136, 211d	74, 116
Delivery -----	22c, 105e, 225b	14, 52, 121
Drop -----	32a, 92a, 106, 113b, 115, 137a	17, 48, 53, 59, 74
Fire support -----	116, 175c	60, 93
Force, U.S. -----	6a, 22c, 59b, 106a	4, 14, 37, 53
Landed -----	22c, 92a, 106	14, 48, 53
Lift -----	106a, 137a,c, 221b	53, 74, 75, 121
Movement -----	137c	75
Observation post -----	132d	70
Observer -----	204c	111
Strikes -----	175e	98
Support (see also Close air support and Tactical air support) -----	76h, 128b, 132d, 173c, 175c	44, 65, 70, 92, 93
Threat -----	136, 211c	74, 116
Airbase (see also Airfield) -----	129, 130a, 132a, 195a, 207-211	65, 68, 69, 103, 114
Airboat -----	188c	100
Airborne:		
Communication relay -----	106a	53
Fire direction center -----	132d	70
Forces -----	22c, 106, 111g, 117b	14, 53, 57, 60
Forward observer -----	106a, 132a	53, 69
Infantry -----	106	53
Operations -----	106, 195a	53, 103

	Paragraphs	Pages
Airborne—Continued:		
Radio relay -----	173f	92
Rifle company -----	106a	53
Units -----	21a, 106a, 215a	12, 53, 118
Aircraft (see also Army aircraft) -----	57d, 71b, 105, 106, 130c, 135f, 137c, 175c, 192b, 199d, 225a, 233	35, 42, 52, 53, 68, 73, 75, 93, 101, 106, 121, 125
Airfield (see also Airbase) -----	79b, 129, 137c, 195a, 207-211	46, 65, 75, 103, 114
Airmobile:		
Assault -----	115	59
Capability -----	71b, 199d	42, 106
Combat patrol -----	57b, 59a, 105, 113b, 206b	35, 36, 52, 59, 114
Company (light) -----	137c	75
Forces -----	105, 111g, 117b, 190	52, 57, 60, 101
Operations -----	103, 105, 109, 137a,c	52, 54, 74, 75
Teams -----	105	52
Transport -----	188a	100
Units -----	21a	12
Alert forces (see also Reserve forces) -----	21b	13
Allied forces -----	22, 65d	13
ALOC. (See Air line of communication.)		
Ambassador -----	15	9
Ambush (see also specific type) -----	40b, 59b, 128a,b, 130c, 132a, 148c, 173d, 175c,e, 176, 178c, 195a	23, 37, 65, 68, 69, 80, 92, 93, 97, 103
Ammunition -----	129h, 225b	66, 121
Amphibious operations -----	22d,e, 92a, 188, 190a, 195a	14, 48, 100, 101, 103
Animals (see also Dogs and Pack animals) -----	129h	66
Antiaircraft fires -----	105c, 195a	53, 103
Antiguerrilla. (See Counterguerrilla.)		
Antiplant agents -----	22c, 192b	14, 101
Antitank platoon -----	74	43
Area:		
Ambush (see also Ambush) -----	97b, 128b	50, 65
Characteristics -----	32a	17
Coordination center -----	53, 92d, 111, 124b, 132d, 135f, 147, 156b, 175, 176b, 199d	32, 48, 55, 64, 70, 74, 77, 84, 93, 94, 106
Defense -----	64a, 129b, 199e, 211a	38, 66, 106, 116
Responsibility -----	110	55
Specialists -----	147	77
Studies -----	24, 144b	15, 77
Areas of operations -----	111	55
Armed forces -----	6b, 51	4, 29
Armored:		
Carriers. (See Carriers.)		
Cavalry -----	102, 177	52, 97
Cavalry troop -----	73	43
Trains -----	178d	97
Wheeled vehicles -----	176a	93
Armor employment -----	100, 104, 129j, 169a, 177	51, 52, 68, 90, 97
Army:		
Aircraft -----	76h, 106a, 135f, 176a	44, 53, 73, 94
Aviation -----	87, 132d, 137, 189c, 194b, 216, 233	47, 70, 74, 100, 102, 119, 125
Security Agency -----	80, 147a	46, 77
Transport aircraft -----	105b	53
U.S. -----	6a	4
Arson -----	41b	26

	Paragraphs	
Artillery -----	40a, 59b, 86, 98, 111c, 116, 129e,h, 132, 135f, 137a, 147a, 169a, 173d, 175b, 176b, 189b, 190, 191	22, 37, 47, 50, 55, 60, 66, 69, 73, 74, 77, 90, 92, 93, 94, 100, 101
ASA. (See Army Security Agency.)		
Assault craft -----	22d	14
Assault element -----	113a	59
Attacking element -----	176b	94
Auxiliary organizations -----	6e	4
Aviation (see also Army aviation) -----	3	3
Axes of advance -----	100	51
Base. (See specific type.)		
Basic load -----	225b	121
Bath -----	199a, 220b	104, 120
Battalion. (See specific type.)		
Battalion trains -----	220b	120
Bicycles -----	33a	18
Biological agents -----	59b, 132d, 191, 192	37, 70, 101
Black market -----	225f	121
Block control -----	160h	87
Blocking -----	105, 117e, 184b, 188a, 190, 195a	52, 60, 98, 100, 101, 103
Boats (see also Watercraft) -----	22d, 32a, 33a, 57d, 132d, 179, 186-190	14, 17, 18, 35, 70, 98, 100
Boobytraps -----	133a, 148c, 204a, 205c	72, 80, 111, 114
Border control -----	55, 65a, 96b, 129j, 182-185	34, 39, 49, 68, 98
Border operations -----	78b, 182-185	45, 98
Brigade:		
Concepts -----	49-51	29
Courses of action -----	33	18
Deployment -----	90-93	47
Methods of operation -----	58	36
Missions -----	55	34
Operational areas -----	51d	29
Organization -----	3, 68-89, 110, 142, 169	3, 40, 55, 76, 90
Planning -----	52-67	31
Separate -----	70b	41
Trains -----	220	120
Building, search -----	204d	111
Built-up areas, operations -----	118, 204	61, 111
Caches (see also Guerrilla caches) -----	111c, 129h	55, 66
Call signs -----	135f, 175b,c	73, 98
Camouflage -----	129h	66
Campaign -----	51, 51a, 141, 142	29, 76
Carriers -----	101, 134b, 189e	51, 73, 101
Catalogue supply system -----	225	121
Cavalry. (See Air cavalry and Armored cavalry.)		
CBR. (See Chemical, biological, and radiological, and specific entries.)		
Censorship -----	160a	86
Chaplain service -----	212, 251	118, 131
Checkpoints -----	97a, 160a,b, 203, 204c	49, 86, 110, 112
Chemical:		
Agents (see also specific type) -----	22e, 59b, 111g, 132d, 191-195, 204, 105d	14, 37, 57, 70, 101, 111, 53
Biological, and radiological -----	137c, 191-195	75, 101
Smoke generator -----	194	102
City -----	7e	6
Civic action (see also Military civic action) -----	19a	11

Civil:		
Affairs -----	33c, 52e, 69b, 70a, 84, 147a, 157, 164a, 212, 216, 252-256	18, 31, 41, 47, 77, 84, 89, 118, 119, 133
Disturbances -----	41c	26
Military Advisory Committee -----	54	32
Civilian:		
Internees -----	249	131
Population -----	64b, 65b, 148b, 185, 225e	38, 39, 79, 99, 122
Supply -----	225e	122
Clear and hold operation (<i>see also</i> Consolidation operations) -----	120	63
Climate (<i>see also</i> Weather) -----	27, 32a, 33a	15, 17, 18
Close air support -----	22c,d, 97e, 111c, 135f, 138, 173c, 175c	14, 50, 55, 73, 75, 92, 93
CMAC. (<i>See</i> Civil-Military Advisory Committee.)		
Codes -----	76c,h, 77a, 147b, 225d	44, 45, 78, 121
Column cover -----	175c, 177	93, 97
Combat:		
Base -----	129h, 199, 220b	66, 104, 120
Control team -----	106a	53
Patrol -----	21a, 59b, 117c	12, 37, 60
Power (<i>see also</i> Firepower) -----	59a, 64, 70a, 100b, 193a	36, 37, 41, 51, 102
Service support -----	1, 2c, 33, 52e, 55, 69b, 70, 147a, 212-256	3, 18, 31, 34, 41, 77, 118
Support -----	1, 55, 69b, 70, 94a, 131-138, 147a	3, 34, 41, 49, 69, 77
Zone -----	9a	7
Combined-arms team -----	104, 169a, 176b	52, 90, 94
Combined operations -----	133b	72
Command and staff action -----	52a,e	31
Command-control communication -----	69a, 76i	41, 45
Commander guidance -----	52f, 62	32, 37
Communication -----	29, 64a, 76, 123d, 129h, 132d, 135, 146h, 147a, 148c, 173f, 175, 203a	16, 38, 44, 65, 66, 70, 73, 77, 80, 92, 93, 110
Equipment -----	21b, 135	13, 73
Nets -----	76, 132b, 135	44, 70, 73
Platoon -----	76b	44
Relay -----	106a	53
Security -----	76c	44
Site -----	76i	45
Zone -----	9a	7
Communities, defense -----	129h	66
Company (<i>see also specific type</i>) -----	72	42
Company trains -----	220c	120
Compensation for damage -----	33c	18
Concealment -----	27, 32a, 33a	15, 17, 18
Concentrations -----	132a, 175b	69, 93
Concepts and planning:		
Consolidation operations -----	123	63
Internal defense and development -----	49-93	29
Strike operations -----	109	54
Consolidation operations -----	19b, 60, 64a, 68a, 70a, 94a, 95, 120-130, 131, 142, 168, 182, 198	11, 37, 38, 40, 41, 49, 63, 69, 76, 90, 98, 104
Construction -----	241	128
Contested areas -----	35b, 51d	20, 29
Contingency planning -----	49, 52e, 173e	29, 31, 92
Contraband -----	157a, 201b, 202b	84, 108
Controlled areas. (<i>See specific type.</i>) -----		
Convoy -----	81d, 132a, 137a,c, 175a, 176	46, 69, 74, 75, 93

	Paragraphs	Pages
Counterambush -----	115, 173e, 176a, 195a	59, 92, 93, 103
Counterespionage -----	16b	10
Counterguerrilla:		
Bases -----	128	65
Concepts and planning -----	49-93	29
Definition -----	6	4
Environments -----	8-11, 25-33	7, 15
Forces -----	20-23, 65d	12, 40
Operations. (<i>See specific type.</i>) -----		
Related operations -----	139-170	76
Situation -----	9b, 10b	7, 8
Special operations -----	169-211	90
Tactical operations (<i>see also</i> Tactical operations) -----	94-138	49
Counterinsurgency. (<i>See</i> Internal defense and developments.) -----		
Counterintelligence -----	16b, 41a, 59a, 147a, 148c	10, 26, 36, 77, 80
Countermortar -----	147a	77
Countersabotage -----	16b	10
Countersubversion -----	16b	10
Country -----	7a	5
Studies -----	24, 144b	15, 77
Team. (<i>See</i> U.S. Country Team.) -----		
County -----	7d	6
Cover -----	27, 32a, 33a	15, 17, 18
Covering force -----	177	97
Covert operations. (<i>See specific type.</i>) -----		
Crash rescue -----	137a	74
Crypto -----	229b	124
Curfew -----	157b, 160a, 204c	84, 86, 111
Customs -----	30g, 33d, 52d, 56b	16, 19, 31, 35
Deception -----	52e, 129h, 148c	31, 66, 80
Defense -----	11a, 40f, 70, 122b, 195a, 207-211	8, 25, 41, 63, 103, 114
Defense echelon -----	129d	66
Defensive operations -----	19b, 60, 64a, 122b, 195a	11, 37, 38, 63, 114
Definitions. (<i>See</i> Terminology.) -----		
Defoliants (<i>see also</i> Antiplant agents) -----	185a, 192b	99, 101
Delaying action -----	61	37
Demolitions -----	40d, 204b, 205d	25, 111, 113
Demonstrations -----	148c	80
Deployment. (<i>See specific type.</i>) -----		
Desert -----	3	3
Destruction operations -----	59a	36
Disease -----	239d	127
District -----	7d	6
Divisional brigade. (<i>See</i> Brigade.) -----		
Dog-handler team -----	79	45
Dogs -----	79, 129g, 148c, 173j	45, 66, 80, 92
Drop zones -----	105a, 106, 132a	52, 53, 69
Echelons of defense (<i>see also specific type</i>) -----	129c,d	66
Economic action -----	19a	11
Economic considerations -----	29, 32c, 33c	16, 17, 18
Economy of force -----	59b, 61, 73	37, 43
Education. (<i>See</i> Training.) -----		
Effects, area characteristics -----	31, 32	17
Electoral districting -----	7	5
Electronic:		
Surveillance -----	129h, 146g, 148c, 185	66, 77, 80, 99
Warfare support -----	80, 147a	46, 77
Encirclement -----	59a, 77b, 105e, 116, 117, 132d	36, 45, 53, 60, 70

Pages		Paragraphs	Pages
92, 98, 103	Engineer -----	70a, 82, 183, 142, 147a, 164, 176b	41, 47, 72, 76, 77, 89, 94
10		98a, 116	50, 60
65	Envelopment. (<i>see also specific type</i>) -----		
29	Environment. (<i>See specific type.</i>) -----	24-33	15
4	Environmental factors -----	78b	45
7, 15	Escape and evasion -----	16b, 148b	10, 79
12, 40	Espionage -----	65	39
76	Estimates -----	30, 33d, 78b	16, 19, 45
7, 8	Ethnic groups -----	134	72
90	Evacuation (<i>see also Aerial and Medical</i>) -----	78b	45
49	Evasion and escape -----	116, 148b	60, 79
	Exploitation -----		
	External support. (<i>See Sponsoring power.</i>) -----		
	FDC. (<i>See Fire direction center.</i>) -----		
3, 36, 77, 80	FEBA. (<i>See Forward edge of the battle area.</i>) -----		
77	Feints -----	148c	80
10	Females, search -----	202f, 203b	108, 110
10	Field army-type operations -----	98b	50
5	Finance service -----	212, 251	118, 131
15, 77	Fire: -----		
6	And maneuver -----	117e, 128b, 193	60, 65, 102
15, 17, 18	Coordination line -----	132d	70
97	Direction center -----	132d, 175b	70, 93
74	Support -----	3, 52e, 97e, g, 116, 129e, h, 131, 132, 135f, 137c, 173d, 176, 204b	3, 31, 50, 60, 66, 69, 73, 75, 92, 93, 112
124	Support coordinator -----	132d	70
84, 86, 111	Firepower (<i>see also Combat power and Restrained firepower</i>) -----	69a, 100, 101a, 104, 153b, 191, 193, 203a	41, 51, 52, 82, 101, 102, 110
1, 19, 31, 35	Fixing -----	59a, 81d, 97, 101b, 105, 117, 128b	36, 46, 49, 51, 52, 60, 65
31, 66, 80	Flame -----	22c, 129h, 134b, 176c, 192c, 194, 205b, d	14, 66, 73, 96, 102, 114
3, 103, 114	Flares -----	129h, 148c, 195a	66, 80, 103
66	Food (<i>see also Agriculture</i>) -----	29, 32a, 41b, 129h, 132a, 192a, 199a, 225	16, 17, 26, 66, 69, 101, 104, 121
88, 63, 114	Footmobility -----	3, 33a, 180	3, 18, 98
99, 101	Foot movement -----	180	98
37	Forces, type -----	6	4
5, 111, 118	Fortifications -----	129h, 183a, 195a, 199e	66, 72, 103, 104
80	Forward: -----		
3	Air controller -----	195a	103
36	Area subsystem -----	80b	46
127	Edge of the battle area -----	9b	7
6	Observer -----	106a, 111e, 132a, d, 175a, b	53, 56, 69, 70, 93
45	Friendly controlled areas -----	32a, 35c, 51d, 64a, 125, 128, 129g, 198	17, 20, 29, 38, 64, 65, 66, 104
66, 80, 92	Friendly population buffer -----	185a	99
52, 53, 69	Frisk search -----	202b	109
66	Frontlines -----	58b, 99	36, 51
11	FSCoord. (<i>See Fire support coordinator.</i>) -----		
18, 17, 18	General war. (<i>See Limited and general war.</i>) -----		
37, 43	Geography -----	27, 32a, 33a, 56b	15, 17, 18, 35
17	Governmental structures. (<i>See National structures.</i>) -----		
5	Graves registration -----	250	131
	Ground: -----		
77, 80, 99	Alert -----	106a, 175c	53, 93
46, 77	Observers -----	185	99
53, 60, 70	Patrol -----	59b, 81d, 146g	37, 46, 77
	Surveillance section -----	77, 147a	45, 77

	Paragraphs	Pages
Guerrilla:		
Activities	40, 41	22, 27
Attack in force	40e	25
Auxiliary organizations	21c, 39c, 148c, 201h	13, 22, 80, 108
Bases	32a, 33a, 35a, 128	17, 18, 20, 65
Caches	33a, 98b	18, 50
Characteristics	9a	7
Communications	147b	77
Composition	38, 39	21, 22
Controlled areas	32a, 35a, 51d	17, 20, 29
Counterintelligence	41a	26
Courses of action	32	17
Defense	40f, 99	25, 51
Definition	6h	5
Disposition	35-37	20
Force	6g, 32, 34-48, 58, 97, 98	5, 17, 20, 36, 49, 50
Intelligence	41a, 146d, 148c	26, 77, 80
Logistic support	48, 148b	28, 79
Materiel	225k	121
Morale	206a	114
Operations	6f, 11b, 40a	5, 8, 22
Organization	39	22
Psychological operations	41b, 148b	26, 79
Resources	65c	39
Sanctuary	17, 98b, 184a, 185a	10, 50, 98, 99
Situation	9a, 10a	7
Strengths	42-44	27
Training	47d	28
Underground organizations	17, 21c, 118, 128, 148b,c, 201h	10, 13, 61, 65, 79, 80, 108
Weaknesses	45-48, 148b, 153b	27, 79, 82
Guides	148c	80
Hamlet	7f	6
Harassing operations	59b, 117d, 132a, 195a	37, 60, 69, 103
Heavy mortar platoon	75	43
Helicopter	21a, 32a, 105, 113b, 132d, 137, 175c, 194b, 195a, 206a	12, 17, 52, 59, 70, 74, 98, 102, 103, 114
Holding element	176b	93
Hostages	41b, 118	26, 61
Host country	15, 56b	9, 35
Controlled areas. (See Friendly controlled areas.)		
Forces	21, 23, 56, 65d, 92d, 122	12, 14, 34, 40, 48, 63
Weaknesses	43	27
House, search	204d	111
Howitzer, 105-mm	132d	70
Illumination	129h, 132a, 137a	66, 69, 74
Independent operations	52c,d, 69b, 70	31, 41
Individual, search	202	108
Industry	29c	16
Infantry-heavy teams	100	51
Infiltration	40c, 125, 211c	25, 64, 116
Informants	81b, 148b,c, 185a	46, 79, 80, 99
Information sources	147b, 148b	78, 79
Infrared	76e, 137a	44, 74
Infrastructures	29	16
Installation defense	129h	66
Insurgent:		
Activities	16c, 17, 20, 51	10, 12, 29
Organization	17, 34	10, 20
Sanctuary	17	10

Insurgent—Continued	Paragraphs	Pages
Shadow government -----	36	20
Intelligence -----	16b, 33a, 57e, 59a, 64a, 128b, 144-148, 190a, 194d, 201b	10, 18, 35, 36, 38, 65, 76, 101, 102, 108
Collection -----	33a, 52e, 56, 73, 144b, 146c, 147a, 148a	18, 31, 34, 43, 77, 79
Cycle -----	148a	79
Dissemination -----	146c, 148a	77, 79
Information -----	22b, 81b, 146h, 147b, 225k	14, 46, 77, 78, 123
Officer -----	144b, 148a	77, 79
Operations -----	19b, 55b, 64a, 81b, 111e, 132a, 139, 144-148, 153c, 161, 199d	11, 34, 38, 46, 56, 69, 76, 83, 88, 104
Processing -----	148a	79
Production -----	148a	79
Security -----	57c, 81	35, 46
Interceptors -----	136	74
Interdiction -----	22c,d, 117d, 187	14, 60, 100
Internal:		
Attack -----	11b, 16c, 43b	8, 10, 27
Conflict -----	10	7
Defense -----	16c, 17, 19b, 22b, 120, 168	10, 11, 14, 63, 90
And development -----	2, 6, 10, 11b, 12, 211	3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 116
Assistance operations -----	17	10
Operations -----	17, 53	10, 32
Development -----	16c, 18, 19b, 22a, 51, 120, 161, 164a, 165, 168	10, 11, 14, 29, 63, 88, 89, 90
Assistance operations -----	18	10
Operations -----	18, 53, 121	10, 32, 63
Security -----	16, 41d, 51, 64b, 120	9, 27, 29, 38, 63
Security forces -----	6e	4
Interpreters -----	33d, 69b, 92d, 201e, 203b	19, 41, 48, 108, 110
Interrogators -----	147a	77
Inundated areas -----	3, 132d, 186, 190	3, 70, 100, 101
Irregular forces, counter guerrilla -----	6e, 21d, 129h	4, 13, 66
Irregular forces, guerrilla -----	6e, 39c	4, 22
Jungle operations -----	3	3
Kingdom -----	7a	5
Kitchen area -----	220b	120
Labor -----	242	129
Laborers -----	129g	66
Land forms -----	7b, 26	5, 15
Landing:		
Areas -----	105a, 132a, 175e	52, 69, 93
Vessels -----	189	100
Zones (see also Landing areas) -----	32a, 133a, 199d	17, 72, 106
Landmines -----	40d, 59b, 129h, 133a, 176b, 185a, 199e, 204b	25, 37, 66, 72, 94, 99, 106, 112
Language -----	30f, 33d, 52d, 56b, 147a, 170, 201e, 203a	16, 19, 31, 35, 77, 91, 108, 110
Law -----	11	8
Legal service -----	212, 251	118, 131
Lift. (See specific type.)		
Limited:		
And general war -----	2a,d, 9, 11, 99, 100b	3, 7, 8, 51
Objective attack -----	114	53
War. (See Limited and general war.)		

	Paragraphs	Pages
Lines of communication -----	129, 134b, 198, 212	65, 73, 104, 118
Air -----	135f	73
Ground -----	40d, 81d, 105e, 185b	25, 46, 53, 99
Linkup -----	105e	53
Listening posts -----	199e	104
Local procurement -----	33c, 225g	18, 121
Local security -----	92e	48
Logistical (<i>see also</i> Logistics):		
Activities -----	33d	19
Installations, defense -----	129	65
Services -----	212, 240-243	118, 128
Support -----	27, 197	15, 104
Systems -----	219	120
Logistics -----	217-243	120
MAAG. (<i>See</i> Military Assistance Advisory Group.)		
Machinegun -----	21b, 178d	13, 97
Maintenance -----	212, 215a, 216, 220b, 226-230	118, 119, 120, 123
Maintenance float items -----	230b	124
Maneuver battalions -----	70, 71, 147a, 214, 215b	41, 42, 77, 118
Manpack subsystem -----	80a	46
MAP. (<i>See</i> Military Assistance Program.)		
Marines, U. S. -----	22e	14
Marshes. (<i>See</i> Inundated areas.)		
Mechanized infantry employment -----	101, 104, 176b	51, 52, 94
Medical:		
Evacuation -----	135f, 137c	73, 75
Service -----	212, 216, 235-239	118, 119, 126
Specialists -----	164a	89
Supplies -----	225d	121
Support -----	88, 142, 215a, 220b	47, 76, 118, 120
Message drop and pickup -----	76f, 137a	44, 74
Messenger -----	76f	44
Messes -----	225j	121
Military:		
Action -----	19a	11
Aspects of areas -----	33	18
Assistance Advisory Group -----	22b, 56	14, 34
Assistance Program -----	167b, 168	90
Civic action (<i>see also</i> Civic action) -----	19b, 21a, 33d, 55e, 78b, 111e, 134, 139, 159-165, 199i, 225e	11, 12, 19, 34, 45, 56, 72, 76, 84, 107, 122
Considerations of areas -----	25, 26	15
Definition -----	6a	4
Discipline -----	248	131
Dogs -----	79	45
Forces. (<i>See specific type.</i>)		
Intelligence systems -----	19b, 70a, 83	11, 41, 47
Objectives -----	11	8
Police -----	70a, 81, 142, 147a, 169a, 194c, 201d, 212, 216	41, 46, 76, 77, 90, 103, 108, 118, 119
Militia -----	6e	4
Mines. (<i>See</i> Landmines.)		
Mobile defense -----	129b, 211a	66, 116
Mobility -----	3, 57d, 69a, 73, 97a, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 119, 132d	3, 35, 41, 43, 49, 51, 52, 63, 70
Morale -----	52b, 199a, 247	31, 104, 130
Mortar forward observer -----	111e	56
Mortars -----	21b,c, 40a, 75, 111e, 129h, 175b, 178d	13, 22, 43, 56, 66, 93, 97

	Paragraphs	Pages
Motor movement	176, 232	93, 125
Mountain operations	3	3
Movements (<i>see also specific types</i>)	77c, 92a, 115, 137c, 148c, 171-181	45, 48, 59, 75, 80, 92
Movement security	171-181	92
Movement to contact	115	59
Nation	7	5
National structures and subdivisions (<i>see also Political subdivisions</i>)	7	5
Naval gunfire	59b, 116, 132d, 190	37, 60, 70, 101
Navy, host country	188	100
Navy, U.S.	6a, 22d, 188, 189	4, 14, 100
Neighborhood	7f	6
Night operations	59a, 89f, 111f, 113b, 129h, 130a, 132a, 148c, 195a, 204c	36, 56, 59, 66, 68, 69, 80, 103, 112
No-fire lines	132d	70
Nonnuclear	2e, 92c,	3, 48
Nuclear	2e, 92c, 132d, 137c	3, 48, 70, 75
Objectives, military	11, 40a	8, 22
Observation aircraft	175b	93
Observation posts	204c	111
Obstacles	32a, 103, 129b, h, 133a, 176b, 203	17, 52, 66, 72, 94, 110
Occupied country	9b	7
Offensive operations	19b, 57b, 59, 64a, 70, 99, 105, 122a, 195a, 201g	11, 35, 36, 37, 41, 51, 52, 63, 103, 108
Operation, definition	6f	5
Operation, type	6	5
Operational:		
Areas, brigade	51d	29
Considerations	57	35
Environments	2a, 8-11, 24-33	3, 7, 15
Information	56	34
Relationships	14-19	9
Order of battle	147a	77
Outpost defense	97e	50
Pack animals	33a, 57d, 234	18, 35, 126
Parachute operations (<i>see also Airborne</i>)	21a, 106, 109	12, 53, 54
Paramilitary:		
Action	19a, 21b	11, 13
Forces, counter guerrilla	6d, 21b, 64a, 70a, 97b, 129h, 185a, 189g	4, 13, 38, 41, 50, 66, 99, 101
Forces, guerrilla	6d, 39b	4, 22
Parish	7d	6
Pathfinders	106	53
Patrol:		
Base	59b, 200	37, 107
Long-range	128b, 147a	65, 77
Operations	21b, 79, 81d, 97a, 105, 122b, 128a, b, 129, 134a, 146g, 148c, 155a, 185, 199d, 200	13, 45, 46, 49, 52, 63, 65, 73, 77, 80, 83, 99, 106, 107
Penetration	98b	50
Personnel	244-251	130
Personnel carriers. (<i>See Carriers.</i>)		
Physical security	81e	46
Planning. (<i>See specific type.</i>)		
Point ambush (<i>see also Ambush and Area ambush</i>)	128b	65
Point of entry	92	48

	Paragraphs	Pages
Police:		
Civilian -----	21c, 56, 81, 92f, 96a, 97f, 118, 132a, 147b, 185a, 194c, 201d, 203b, 204c	13, 34, 46, 48, 49, 50, 61, 69, 78, 99, 103, 108, 110, 112
Forces. (<i>See specific type.</i>)		
Military. (<i>See Military police.</i>)		
Policewomen -----	148c	80
Political:		
Action -----	19a	11
Activities -----	9b	7
Considerations -----	28, 32b, 33b	15, 17, 18
Subdivisions -----	7, 58c, 120, 124a	5, 36, 63, 64
Populace and resources control forces -----	21c	13
Populace and resources control operations -----	19b, 55d, 64a, 81, 96, 122, 125, 129f, 132a, 139, 154- 158, 161, 163, 195b, 199h	11, 34, 38, 46, 49, 63, 64, 66, 69, 76, 83, 88, 104, 107
Populace control (<i>see also</i> Populace and resources control) -----	41, 158	26, 84
Population. (<i>See Civilian population.</i>)		
Position defense -----	195a	103
Precinct -----	7f	6
Predeployment planning -----	49, 90	29, 47
Prepacking -----	225b	121
Preparatory operations -----	91	47
Prisoner -----	52e, 81c, b, 153d, 194c, d, 204b, 249	31, 46, 83, 103, 112, 131
Prisoner of war -----	249	131
Propaganda -----	35a, 41b, 65b, 204a	20, 26, 39, 111
Province -----	7c	6
Psychological action -----	19a	11
Psychological operations -----	19b, 21a, 33d, 41b, 55c, 64a, 69b, 85, 111e, 132a, 139, 149-153, 163, 195c, 199g	11, 12, 19, 26, 34, 38, 41, 47, 56, 69, 76, 82, 88, 103, 104
Pursuit -----	105e, 116, 128b, 175e	53, 60, 65, 93
Radar -----	77, 147a	45, 77
Radio:		
Carriers -----	76d	44
Communication -----	76, 132d, 147b, 148c, 175a, c, 176c, 178b	44, 70, 78, 80, 93, 96, 97
Relay -----	76d, 132d, 135d, 137a	44, 70, 73, 74
Raids -----	40c, 59b, 97c, 113, 195a, 200	25, 37, 50, 59, 103, 107
Rail movement -----	178	97
Ranger units -----	21a	12
Rations (<i>see also</i> Food) -----	111d, 225j	55, 121
Raw material -----	29a	16
Reaction forces -----	64a, 119, 129d, 130, 137a, 175e, 188a, 199d	38, 63, 66, 68, 74, 93, 100, 106
Rear area security operations -----	2c, d, 9b, 255-257	3, 7, 134
Rear area subsystem -----	80c	46
Rear guard -----	176c	96
Reconnaissance (<i>see also specific type</i>) -----	3, 105a, 111a, 132d, 133a, 137c, 146g, 147a, 175d, 176, 199d, 200, 204b	3, 52, 55, 70, 72, 75, 77, 93, 106, 107, 112
By fire -----	173d, 195a	92, 103
In force -----	112, 114	58, 59
Patrol -----	21a, 59b	12, 37
Platoon -----	73	43
Recreation -----	199a	104
Region -----	7	5

	Paragraphs	Pages
Regular armed forces, counter guerrilla -----	6c, 21a, 70a, 185a, 189g	4, 12, 41, 99, 100
Regular armed forces, guerrilla -----	6c, 39a	4, 22
Religion -----	30, 52d, 185a	16, 31, 99
Relocation -----	134, 148c, 158e, 185a, 225e	72, 80, 84, 99, 121
Replacement personnel -----	212, 246	118, 130
Republic -----	7a	5
Reserve echelon -----	129d	66
Reserves -----	10b, 52e, 64a, 97d,e, 98, 106, 113b, 119, 128b, 129, 130, 134, 137a, 175e, 185, 188a, 199d, 204c	8, 31, 38, 50, 53, 59, 63, 65, 68, 72, 74, 93, 99, 100, 106, 112
Resistance organization -----	34	20
Restrained firepower (<i>see also</i> Combat power) -----	33d, 57f, 64, 100b, 111g, 118, 132d, 133b, 191, 193a, 195c	19, 36, 37, 51, 57, 61, 69, 72, 101, 102, 103
Restricted zone -----	185a	99
Resupply (<i>see also specific type</i>) -----	3, 134, 225	3, 72, 121
Retrograde operation -----	61, 195a	37, 103
Rewards -----	148c, 153c	80, 83
Rigging -----	225b	121
Riot-control agents -----	22c, 137a, 191-195	14, 74, 101
Riots -----	194c	102
River:		
Assault craft (<i>see also</i> Boats and Watercraft) -----	22d	14
Assault group -----	188a, 189, 190	100, 101
Operations (<i>see also</i> Amphibious operations) -----	22d, 134b, 187, 195a	14, 73, 100, 103
Roadblock (<i>see also</i> Checkpoints) -----	204c	111
Road clearing. (<i>See</i> Route clearing.)		
Road nets -----	32a, 133, 186	17, 72
Rocket launcher -----	132d, 178d	70, 87
Route:		
Clearing -----	176d, 195a	93, 103
Of advance -----	100	51
Of communication -----	97a	49
Reconnaissance -----	173b	92
Ruses (<i>see also</i> Deception and Feints) -----	40c, 130c	25, 68
Sabotage -----	16b, 41d, 129, 148b	10, 27, 65, 79
Salvage -----	220b	120
Sanctuary. (<i>See</i> Guerrilla sanctuary.)		
Scout dogs -----	79, 204b	45, 111
Screening missions -----	21a, 185a, 190	12, 99, 101
Sea:		
Patrol -----	185b	99
Transport -----	22d	14
Seaborne supply -----	22d	14
Search -----	59a, 81c, 155b, 157a, 201-206	36, 46, 83, 84, 108
And clear -----	107	54
And destroy -----	107	54
Parties -----	204c	112
Teams -----	201d, 204b	108, 112
Searchlights -----	129h	66
Security -----	11, 59a, 79, 81c,e, 92e, 98, 129g, 133b,d, 147a, 148c, 171-181, 221c	8, 36, 45, 46, 48, 50, 66, 72, 77, 79, 92, 121
Echelon -----	129c	66
Element -----	113a	59
Selective firepower. (<i>See</i> Restrained firepower.)		
Self-defense units -----	21b	13

	Paragraphs	Pages
Sensors	187a,c, 185a	74, 75, 99
Sentry dogs (<i>see also</i> Military dogs)	79	45
Separate brigade	70b	41
Shadow government	36	20
Shore bombardment	22d	14
Shoreline	183-190	98
Show of force	100a, 132a, 134b	51, 69, 73
Signal officer	76a	44
Signal support	70a, 135	41, 73
Smoke	22c, 137a, 175a, 191, 192, 195	14, 74, 93, 101, 103
Smoke generator	194, 195	102, 103
Sociological considerations	28b, 30, 32d, 33d	15, 16, 17, 19
Sound communication	175a	93
Special forces	78, 94b	45, 49
Special operations	171-211	92
Sponsoring power	6f, 9a, 10, 17, 19b, 22c, 32a, 39a,d, 64a, 144b, 147b, 183, 225k	5, 7, 11, 14, 17, 22, 38, 77, 78, 98, 123
State	7c	6
Static defense posts	129h, 225j	66, 123
Static security posts	129i, 132d, 134b, 185	68, 70, 73, 99
Stay-behind patrol	64a	38
Strafing	59b	37
Strike operations	19b, 64a, 68a, 70a, 94a, 95, 98a, 107-119, 128, 131, 182, 198, 200	11, 38, 40, 41, 49, 50, 54, 65, 69, 98, 104, 107
Strip search	202e	109
Submarine rendezvous	32a	17
Subsistence	11, 27, 48, 225e	8, 15, 28, 121
Subsystem. (<i>See specific type.</i>)		
Subversion	16b	10
Supply	212, 215a, 216, 222-225	118, 119, 121
Supply economy	225h	121
Support battalion	215	118
Supporting power. (<i>See</i> Sponsoring power.)		
Surprise	57c, 59a	35, 36
Surveillance	146g, 148c, 155c, 176a, 182, 184a, 185b, 199d	77, 80, 83, 94, 98, 100, 106
Swamps	3	3
Swimmer-support boats	188c	100
Tactical air:		
Control party	189d	100
Reconnaissance	22c,d, 138	14, 75
Support	132d, 138, 176a	70, 75, 94
Tactical:		
Bases (<i>see also specific type</i>)	129, 153a, 196-200	65, 82, 104
Operation, definition	6f	5
Operations	19b, 40, 55a, 59, 64a,b, 68a, 94-138, 195a	11, 22, 34, 36, 38, 40, 49, 103
Operations center	53	32
Tailoring	3, 69, 215	3, 41, 118
Tank. (<i>See</i> Armor.)		
Tank-heavy teams	100	51
Target acquisition	137a,c, 147a	74, 75, 77
Task force	21, 70, 100, 104, 124a, 128	12, 41, 51, 52, 64, 65
Task organization	69b, 71b, 204c	41, 42, 112
Telephone	76d, 135e	44, 73
Teletype	76d	44
Terminal control facility	137c	75
Terminology	5-7, 14-23	4, 9
Terrain (<i>see also</i> Weather and Terrain)	3, 11, 26, 27, 32a, 33a, 40f, 58a, 100, 104, 129	3, 8, 15, 17, 18, 25, 36, 51, 52, 65

	Paragraphs	Pages
Territory -----	7b	5
Topography -----	27, 32a, 33a	15, 17, 18
Town -----	7f	6
Township -----	7e	6
Tracked vehicles -----	57d, 73	35, 43
Traditions -----	30g	16
Traffic control points -----	81d	46
Training -----	47c, 52e, 64a, 167, 168, 169, 199, app B	28, 31, 38, 90, 104, 142
Translator. (<i>See</i> Interpreter.)		
Transportation -----	29, 33a, 130c, 134, 135f, 164a, 212, 215a, 216, 231-234	16, 18, 68, 72, 73, 89, 118, 119, 124
Transportation networks -----	33a	18
Trenches -----	129h	66
Tribal groups (<i>see also</i> Ethnic groups) -----	30f, 33d, 78b	16, 19, 46
Troop lift -----	3	3
Tunnels -----	40f, 117c, 133d, 195a, 205	25, 60, 72, 103, 113
Turning movement -----	98b	50
Unconventional warfare operations -----	78	45
Union -----	7a	5
Unit distribution -----	225c	121
U.S.:		
Advisors -----	166-170	90
Country Team -----	15, 56, 165b	9, 34, 89
Forces -----	22, 65d	13, 40
Utilities -----	29d	16
Vectoring -----	77	45
Vegetation -----	27, 32a, 33a, 77c, 148c	15, 17, 18, 45, 80
Vehicle mobility -----	3, 57d, 73	3, 35, 43
Vehicle, search -----	158c, 203	84, 110
Village -----	7e	6
Visual signals -----	76e, h, 175a	44, 93
Wall search -----	202c	109
Ward (urban) -----	7f	6
Watchdog. (<i>See</i> Sentry dog.)		
Water movement -----	179, 186-200	98, 100
Water, potable -----	32a, 133a, 165b, 220b, 225i, 239e	17, 72, 89, 121, 122, 128
Waterborne operations -----	22d, 128b, 179, 186-190	14, 65, 98, 100
Watercraft (<i>see also</i> Boats) -----	3, 22d, 132d, 179, 185b, 188	3, 14, 70, 98, 99, 100
Weapons. (<i>See specific type.</i>)		
Weather (<i>see also</i> Weather and terrain) -----	11b, 105d	8, 53
Weather and terrain -----	11, 65a	8, 39
Wheeled vehicles -----	57d, 73, 134, 176a	35, 43, 72, 94
White phosphorus -----	132a, d	69, 70
Wire communication -----	76d	44
Withdrawal operations (<i>see also</i> Retrograde operations) -----	61, 105e, 113	37, 53, 59
Youth groups -----	6e	4
Zone (<i>see also specific type</i>) -----	7b	5
Zone leader -----	158d	84

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