

USAADS

RB TD1.80305

REFERENCE BOOK
THE MIDDLE EAST



TACTICS DEPARTMENT

US ARMY AIR DEFENSE SCHOOL
FORT BLISS, TEXAS

JULY 1975

US ARMY AIR DEFENSE SCHOOL

Fort Bliss, Texas

1. This reference book has been prepared for use by the students, faculty, and staff of the US Army Air Defense School.
2. The copyright material in this publication has been reproduced by special arrangement with the copyright owner in each case. Such material is fully protected by copyright laws of the United States. The views and ideas expressed in these readings are those of the respective authors and do not necessarily represent the position of the Department of the Army or the US Army Air Defense School.

PREFACE

1. This reference book provides general reference material for Air Defense Artillery Officer Advanced students of the US Army Air Defense School. The material has been selected and edited to support a specific plan of instruction outlined in Student Handout TDL.80305.

2. The book is organized as follows:

a. Chapter 1 is designed to provide the student background information regarding the events which lead up to the present Middle East situation.

b. Chapter 2 discusses the Middle East oil situation and its relationship to the industrialized nations.

c. Chapter 3 attempts to analyze Soviet interest in the Middle East.

d. Chapter 4 includes articles which analyze the interim agreement between Israel and Egypt as well as some proposals for a final Middle East solution.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Page
1

PREFACE

CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Section I.	Introduction	1-1
Section II.	The Middle East Today. One Reading: US Department of State, "Regional Profile."	1-2
Section III.	Palestine Before Israel. Three Readings: Safran, Nadav, "The Jewish Connection with Palestine."	1-7
	Safran, Nadav, "The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate."	1-14
	Cattan, Henry, "Historical Background."	1-21
Section IV.	The Birth of Israel. Two Readings: Safran, Nadav, "The United States and the Birth of Israel."	1-43
	Cattan, Henry, "The Emergence of Israel and the Palestine War (1948)."	1-53
Section V.	The Palestinians: Three Readings: Cattan, Henry, "The Exodus of the Palestine Refugees."	1-59
	Syrkin, Marie, "The Arab Refugees: A Zionist View."	1-71
	Congressional Quarterly, "Suspicion, Violence and Terror in a Torn Land"	1-79
Section VI.	Arab-Israeli Wars. One Reading: Congressional Quarterly, "Israel and the Arabs: A Quarter Century of Conflict."	1-86

CHAPTER 2. THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF OIL

Section I.	Introduction	2-1
Section II.	Oil Facts. Two Readings: Department of Defense, "Oil and Energy."	2-2
	Congressional Quarterly, "Petroleum Politics: Volatile Arab Weapon."	2-5
Section III.	Problems and Approaches. Three Readings: Issawi, Charles, "Oil and Middle East Politics."	2-20
	Conant, Melvin A., "Oil: Cooperation or Conflict."	2-29
	Runyon, Richard P., and Rocks, Lawrence, "Energy Crisis."	2-35
Section IV.	US Perspective. One Reading: Department of State, "Outlook on the Middle East."	2-43

CHAPTER 3. SOVIET INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Section I.	Introduction	3-1
Section II.	Great Power Involvement. One Reading: Department of State, "Great Power Involvement."	3-2
Section III.	The Soviet Interest. Two Readings: Ra'anan, Uri, "The USSR and the Middle East: Some Reflections on the Soviet Decision-Making Process."	3-8
	Joshua, Wynfred, "The Middle East in Soviet Strategy."	3-33

CHAPTER 4. TOWARD A SOLUTION

Section I.	Introduction	4-1
Section II.	The Sinai Accords. Two Readings: US Department of State News Release, "Agreement Between Egypt and Israel"	4-2
	US Department of State, "Press Conference."	4-7
Section III.	Analysis of the Interim Agreement, Two Readings: Congressional Quarterly, "Sinai Accord: Postponement of Basic Issues."	4-15
	J. W. Fulbright, Speech Before the Middle East Institute, October 1975, "Beyond the Interim Agreement."	4-21
Section IV.	Proposals for the Future. Two Readings, Brzezinski, et al, "Beyond Step-by-Step: Action Proposals."	4-36
	Ullman, Richard H., "Alliance with Israel?"	4-44

APPENDIX A

Maps:

The Middle East	A-1
Israeli Expansion	A-2

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Section I: Introduction

Most of us know the Middle East as a festering sore of conflict, a land which has seen four wars in our lifetime and is perpetually on the verge of another. We tend to view the Middle East conflict in view of the situation as it exists today. We see a tiny Israel surrounded by a sea of hostile Arabs. We do not understand Arab terrorism and wonder why the Arabs will not let the Israelis live in peace. We rarely pause to try to analyze the causes of the Arab/Israeli hostility which manifests itself in violent outbursts which threaten to engulf the great powers in armed conflict.

In this chapter we will take a rather detailed look into the roots of the Arab/Israeli conflict and, perhaps more importantly, analyze the totally different perspectives of identical historical events. We will also learn a little bit about the societies, economics and politics of the Middle East nations.

Section II provides political and sociological data on the Middle East today.

Section III is important because it presents Israeli and Arab perspectives of the legitimacy of the Jewish claim to Palestine, the significance and legality of the Balfour Declaration, British rule under the Mandate and partition. The articles written by Nadav Safran reflect the Israeli perception while those written by Henry Cattani present the Arab view.

Section IV describes the indecision and chaos surrounding the birth of Israel.

Section V presents Arab and Israeli views of the perennial problem in the Middle East: The Palestinians.

Section VI discusses the four Arab-Israeli wars from 1948 through 1975.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

REGIONAL PROFILE

The Middle East is accurately called the cradle of civilization. Here, many of the earliest crafts and skills, trading methods, and sciences were developed. The world's three great monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—were nurtured along the "fertile crescent" running up the east coast of the Mediterranean Sea and bending down through the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Here, too, great empires rose and fell—ancient Egyptian and Sumerian, Assyrian and Babylonian, Macedonian and Roman, Byzantine and Persian, Abbasid and Ottoman.

There is no universally accepted definition of the territory of the Middle East. For the purposes of this paper the Middle East includes Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Turkey, Iran, and the "Arab world."

I—PREDOMINANTLY ARAB COUNTRIES

The entire Arab world is included here because the Arab-Israeli dispute affects the affairs of the entire Arab region. The Arab world includes the six predominantly Arab countries of northern Africa and those 12 on the eastern Mediterranean and the Arabian Peninsula bounded on the north by the southern borders of Turkey and the western borders of Iran.

Land: The 18 states of the Arab world (see map inside front cover) spread over approximately 4.6 million square miles (compared with 3.6 million in the 50 United States), of which only about 6 percent can be used for farming or pasture. Each square mile of arable land supports about 400 people (compared with the U.S., 130; U.S.S.R., 260; India, 700; China, 1,800; Japan, 3,700).

People: The great majority of Arabs are Sunni Muslims (except in Lebanon which is 93 percent Arab, half Christian and half Muslim—the Lebanese Muslims are divided about equally between Sunnis and Shi'ites; and Iraq, where half of the Arabs are Shi'a Muslims). The total population of the 18 Arab states is 106 million.

Wealth: There is considerable contrast in the wealth of both the Arab states and people. The gross national product (GNP) of all Arab states combined, including the relatively wealthy oil countries, amounts to only \$21 billion, with an average per capita GNP of less than \$200. Per capita GNP ranges from primitive barter economy in some parts of the region to \$3,200 in Kuwait—one of the highest in the world.

Literacy: Educational levels are generally low; average literacy rate for all Arabs is 26 percent, but in 12 states it is less than 15 percent. Highest literacy rates are found in Lebanon (86 percent), Kuwait (49 percent), Syria (40 percent), United Arab Republic (40 percent), Libya (35 percent), and Tunisia (30 percent).

Government: Nine Arab states with approximately 85 million people live under some form of republican government; four states with 18 million people are governed by constitutional monarchs; one state with 3.5 million people is a kingdom with an absolute monarchy; three states with a total of 400,000 people are sheikhdoms; one state with 600,000 people is a sultanate ruled by an absolute monarch. In seven of the 18 states the Communist Party is considered inactive or insignificant; in 11 the Communist Party is illegal. (Interestingly

Reproduced from U.S. Department of State Publication 8409, Issues in United States Foreign Policy, No. 1 - "The Middle East," released October 1968.

This article was written after the June 1967 war but prior to the Yom Kippur war of 1973. For an update on events since the June 1967 war see "Israel and the Arabs: A Quarter Century of Conflict," p 1-86.

enough, the latter group includes countries, such as Syria, the United Arab Republic, Algeria, and Iraq, which have received substantial arms and other aid from the Communist bloc. The refusal of socialist and democratic socialist governments to allow the Communists into a coalition government, or even to claim legitimacy as a *bona fide* political party, is not unusual in other parts of the less developed world, but it takes on special importance in the Arab world where there are deep-seated conflicts between communism and Arab nationalism.) In the Sudan, by contrast, the Communist Party is legal and active.

II—NON-ARAB MUSLIM COUNTRIES

The Turkish and Iranian peoples, together with some minorities such as the Kurds and Armenians, occupy the "northern tier"—the Anatolian and Iranian mountain ranges abutting the Soviet Union. Turkey also controls the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, through which must funnel the traffic between the Black Sea ports and the Mediterranean Sea.

Land: The two Middle Eastern states comprising non-Arab Islam—Iran and Turkey—total 1 million square miles.

People: Their combined population of 57 million is more than half that of the entire Arab world. Ninety-three percent of Iranians are Shi'a Muslims; 98 percent of Turks are Sunni Muslims (also the sect of most Arabs).

Literacy: Turkey, 55 percent; Iran, 20 percent.

Wealth: With Turkey's GNP in 1966 at \$9.1 billion and Iran's at \$6.4 billion, the GNP of the two countries is about three-fourths that of the entire Arab world. Per capita GNP for Iran was \$250 in 1966; for Turkey, \$295.

Government: Iran has a constitutional monarchy; Turkey is a republic. As in many Arab countries, the Communist Party is illegal in Turkey and Iran.

III—NON-MUSLIM COUNTRIES

There are three non-Muslim countries in the region: Greece, Cyprus, and Israel.

Greece, once part of the Ottoman Empire, has been drawn repeatedly into conflict with Turkey since winning her independence in 1830. Both states are members of NATO. In most respects Greece is European, but it is included here because the Aegean Sea approaches to the Turkish Straits are bounded on the West by Greece, and because of the deep Greek involvement in the Cyprus issue.

Cyprus, the second non-Muslim state in the Middle East, is a festering troublespot because of disputes between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority—disputes which have threatened to draw the Governments of Greece and Turkey into open war.

The third non-Islamic state in the Middle East is Israel.

In terms of general development, these three are the most advanced in the region. Only the small oil-rich states of Kuwait and Abu Dhabi have a larger per capita GNP. Literacy for all three is higher than 80 percent. Comprising a land area of only 63,000 square miles, with 12 million people, the three non-Muslim countries nevertheless have an aggregate GNP approaching \$11 billion. Per capita GNP was \$750 in Cyprus and Greece in 1966, and \$1,450 in Israel.

IV—ETHNIC GROUPINGS

There are four dominant groups in the Middle East: Arab, Iranian, Greek, and Turkic. The ties of the first three groups to their present lands go far into antiquity. However, the Turks moved into the Middle East out of Central Asia between the 11th and 15th centuries, when the Seljuk and Ottoman Turks drove back the Persians and then the Byzantine Greeks to establish their empire west across the Anatolian Peninsula to the Black Sea Straits. The Ottoman Empire then expanded to encompass most of the Arab and Byzantine lands, as well as the Balkans. But by World War I, the Ottoman Empire was confined to its Asiatic provinces.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, and the resultant fragmentation of the Empire, the modern

MIDDLE EAST														
	LAND			PEOPLE				ECONOMY			GOVERNMENT		U.S. ASSISTANCE	
	Total sq. ml. (000)	Culti- vated (per- cent)	Pasture (per- cent)	Popula- tion, 1966 (000)	Lit- eracy (per- cent)	Religion % Muslim	Ethnic	1966 GNP (billions)	Per capita GNP	Main source of revenue	Type	Status of Communist Party	Economic aid 1946-66 (millions)	1967** (mil- lions)
I. ISLAMIC—ARAB														
Algeria.....	920	3	16	12,200	15	98	Ar.-Berber	\$1.9	\$156	Oil	1-party repub.	Illegal	\$179.4	\$21.6
Bahrain.....	230	•	•	185	15	100	Arab	.03	162	Oil	Sheikhdom	Illegal	0	0
Iraq.....	172	18	26	8,300	22	90	77% Arab	2.0	240	Oil	Nom'l repub.	Illegal	56.1	3.3
Jordan.....	37	12	•	2,000	10	93	97% Arab†	.5	250	Agr.-min.	Constitutional Monarchy	Illegal	517.2	44.3
Kuwait.....	6	•	•	500	49	98	85% Arab; 15% Kurd	1.6	3,200	Oil	Sheikhdom	•	0	50.0
Lebanon.....	4	27	•	2,600	86	50	93% Arab	1.25	481	Agr.-tour.	Republic	Illegal	79.2	1.6
Libya.....	681	6	•	1,700	35	97	97% Arab	1.1	645	Oil	Constitutional Monarchy	Illegal	207.5	1.0
Morocco.....	187	19	19	13,700	15	87	97% Ar.-Berber	2.5	182	Agr.-min.	Constitutional Monarchy	Illegal	546.8	44.3
Muscat and Oman...	82	•	•	600	low	100	Arab	Unknown	Unknown	Agr.	Sultanate	•	0	0
Qatar.....	4	•	•	60	low	100	Arab	.05	833	Oil	Sheikhdom	•	0	0
Saudi Arabia.....	618	1	•	4,400	10	100	Arab	1.6	364	Oil	Absolute Monarchy	•	47.4	0
Sudan.....	967	3	15	13,900	10	73	39% Arab; 48% Negroes	1.5	108	Cotton	Republic	Active	107.8	20.4
Syria.....	72	38	41	5,500	40	87	90% Arab; 9% Kurd	1.1	200	Agr.	Nom'l repub.	Illegal	73.2	6.9
Trucial States.....	32	•	•	117	low	100	Arab	Unknown	Unknown	Oil	Sheikhdom	•	0	0
Tunisia.....	63	28	28	4,500	30	98	Arab	0.9	200	Agr.-min.	Republic	Small	468.1	54.9
United Arab Republic	386	3	•	30,400	40	90	90% Hamitic	5.0	164	Agr.	Nom'l repub.	Illegal	1,133.3	11.9
Yemen.....	75	20	•	4,100	15	100	90% Arab	.5	120	Agr.	Revolutionary republic	Illegal	41.8	2.1
Yemen, Southern.	110	32	•	1,275	10	100	Arab	.28	204	Agr.-trade	Nominal republic	•	0	0
TOTALS AVERAGE	4,626	18		106,037	26			21.79	\$205				\$3,457.8	262.3
II. ISLAMIC—NON-ARAB														
Iran.....	636	11	Agr.	25,400	20	100	72% Iran.; 22% Turk.	6.4	252	Oil	Constitutional monarchy	Illegal	856.8	108.8
Turkey.....	296	22	49	31,900	55	98	90% Turk.; 7% Kurd	9.4	296	Agr.	Republic	Illegal	2,277.7	151.9
						% non-Muslim								
III. NON-ISLAMIC														
Cyprus.....	3.6	47	10	600	80	Christian, 82	78% Greek; 18% Turk.	.44	730	Agr.-min.	Constitutional republic	Active	19.3	1.1
Greece.....	52	30	39	8,600	82	Greek Ortho- dox, 97	96% Greek; 2% Turk.	6.6	767	Varied	Constitutional monarchy	Illegal	1,895.1	1.7
Israel.....	8	19	34	2,600	88	Jewish, 90	90% Jews; 9% Arab	3.8	1,454	Varied	Republic	Legal, small	1,076.9	12.2

*Insignificant.

**Figures on 1967 U.S. economic aid are not in all cases additive to net figures for prior years, since deobligations in 1967 of prior year commitments have been omitted.

†60% of Jordan's Arabs are Palestinians.

Turkish nation was formed under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk at the same time as nationalism asserted itself in the other states of the old Empire.

In the rush to nationhood after World War I, several nationalities remained in a minority status when new borders were drawn and new states were formed. Among these were such peoples as the Kurds, Armenians, and the Assyrians. The Kurds, for example, form a national group spreading over the juncture of northern Iran (Azerbaijan Province), northern Iraq, eastern Turkey, northern Syria, and the Soviets' southeastern Caucasus. The Armenians claimed a homeland divided between the Caucasus and eastern Turkey.

Armenian and Kurdish national aspirations have provided opportunities for the Soviet Union to put pressure on the Governments of Iran and Turkey. Immediately after World War II, Kurdish Communists were used by the Soviets in an attempt to annex Azerbaijan Province. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. demanded return of the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan which adjoin Soviet Armenia.

The problem of Jewish nationalism is different from the above in that it originated in Europe and was brought to Palestine under the auspices of Great Britain. The State of Israel was created by the United Nations with the support of the great powers, over the violent objections of the Arabs. Hence, to many Arabs, Israel has become a symbol of big power—principally United States and United Kingdom—"imperialism," to the elimination of which many Arab nationalists are dedicated. Arab nationalists, who also aim to unify the Arab world, typically regard elimination of Israel as an independent state as indispensable to such unity. Thus, Jewish nationalism and Arab nationalism are diametrically opposed to each other and their aims probably will remain irreconcilable as long as uncompromising nationalism is a force in the area.

Within the broad ethnic groups there are additional cultural differences which complicate efforts to achieve stability in the region. For example, there are western and oriental Jews in Israel with different outlooks on national policy and different experiences in their relations with the Arabs. Many Arabs insist that under the Ottoman Millet system there was a long tradition of peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Jews in the Middle East. They say the sudden infusion of European Jews into Palestine during the pogroms of the late 19th century in Eastern Europe, and in the 1930's during the rise of Hitlerism, is responsible for much of the friction between the two peoples.

Similarly, among the Arabs there are differences in social policy between the more conservative leaders of the sheikhdoms and kingdoms and the liberal and radical leaders of the new republics.

Sunni-Shi'ite Split

In addition to the religious differences between Jews and Muslims and Christians and Muslims, there are numerous sectarian differences within Islam itself. Chief of these is the split between Sunni and Shi'ite Islam, which roughly resembles that between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity.

Sunni-Shi'ite tension has played a considerable role in unrest in Iraq and the Yemen. The Shi'ites tend to be suspicious of Arab nationalism as Sunni-dominated, and they are inclined to look to Iran for support against it.

In Syria the extreme Shi'ite 'Alawis and the heterodox Druzes have long been suspicious of Sunni attempts to dominate them, and this situation has contributed to political instability in that country.

Irredentism

There are numerous irredentist claims, in addition to that of Palestine, and border disputes that tend to disrupt the peace of the Middle East:

- Iran claims the Bahrain archipelago in the Persian Gulf, and the Arabs strongly oppose this claim.

- The Yemen Arab Republic has expressed designs on part of Saudi Arabia's territory. The Yemen has always maintained that what is now the People's Republic of South Yemen belongs to the Yemen, while South Yemen aspires to extend its control over Yemen proper.

- Iraq's threats to annex Kuwait caused a crisis in 1961, and this problem still worries Kuwait.

- Iran fears that the Arab nationalists want to separate its oil-rich province of Khuzestan from Iran on the ground that its population is largely Arab.

- Syria still claims the present Turkish province of Hatay, which the French ceded to Turkey in 1939 when they controlled Syria.

- Saudi Arabia since 1955 has been in a bitter dispute with Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman over the Buraymi group of oases.

- Since 1955 the Imam of Inner Oman has been in rebellion against the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and has received aid from Arab sources unfriendly to the Sultan.

Arab Nationalism

Arab nationalism in itself is a major force for instability in the Middle East. Apart from Arab nationalism's implications for the Arab-Israeli issue, it also involves relations among the Arab states themselves. Briefly, Arab nationalism—like Zionism with respect to the Jews—holds that the Arab people constitute a nation unto itself; Arab nationalists believe that if the Arabs are to resume their assumed historic position of power and influence in the world, they must become unified.

While the idea of unity is widely popular in the Arab world, its precise form never has been agreed upon. Those movements and leaders that have pushed hardest for unity have also advocated revolutionary social and economic as well as political change, and they have been suspected by the conservatives and the minorities of trying to dominate the Arab world for their own benefit. Thus, while the unity movement led to the creation in 1958 of a union between Egypt, Syria, and the Yemen, it broke up in a storm of violent recriminations 3 years later. The issue of Arab nationalism has also caused serious rifts among the conservative and the revolutionary Arab states and bitter rivalries among the several competing Arab nationalist movements.

The Jewish Connection with Palestine

I. THE ANCIENT HEBREW CIVILIZATION

The origins of the Jewish connection with Palestine go back to the remote realms in which history is merged with legend, myths, and religious traditions. The Bible tells the story of God's command to Abraham to go forth from his native land of Ur, in present-day Iraq, to what came to be known as Palestine, which country He promised to grant to his descendants forever though not before they had passed a period of four hundred years as persecuted strangers in an alien land. In accordance with the divine forecast, Abraham's grandson Jacob, or Israel, was compelled by famine to go to Egypt with his entire family in the circumstances described in the moving story of Joseph and his brothers and settle there in the land of Goshen. From seventy souls in all, the children of Israel multiplied so rapidly in the course of time that they aroused the anxiety of Egypt's rulers who took drastic measures to check their growth and keep them under control. At the proper time, God appointed Moses as His prophet and mouthpiece and entrusted him with the task of leading the Children of Israel out of Egypt and back to the land He had promised to Abraham. After many trials, during which God continually supported Moses with signs and miracles, and after forty years of wandering in the desert during which the multitude of the Children of Israel was forged into a "nation" vowed to the exclusive worship of God and endowed with His Own laws, Moses finally brought his people to the gates of the Promised Land. God called His servant when his mission was fulfilled and Joshua led the Israelites into their homeland.

In regard to most points of this story, history is able to tell us little that is certain. We know generally that during the second millennium B.C. there were periodical incursions of Semitic tribes from the Syrian desert into the lands lying on the seacoast of the Mediterranean; that one tribe or group of tribes who claimed descent from Abraham of Ur and were known as Hebrews, or Israelites, had migrated into the territory of Palestine; and that by 1100 B.C. the Israelites were in firm occupation of most of the hill country and were already distinguished by their religion from the Phoenicians and Philistines of the coast and from the nomads who dwelt on the eastern side of the Jordan.

For the next twelve hundred years the Children of Israel were settled in Palestine. They were never the sole occupants of the land, nor were they always its "sovereign" masters. But they were definitely rooted in it, and it was there that they developed the great spiritual heritage which they contributed to mankind.

Reprinted by permission of the publishers from THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL by Nadav Safran, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 1963 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

During the twelfth and eleventh centuries B.C., the Israelites lived under a system of separate tribes which were often in conflict with each other and with their neighbors. This phase of their life is fairly amply described in the Book of Judges. But under the pressure of foreign enemies, particularly the Philistines, the tribes were driven to establish a monarchy which, following its halting beginnings under Saul, became consolidated and reached the height of its power under King David (1010-970 B.C.) and King Solomon (970-930 B.C.). David decisively defeated the Philistines and other enemies, and Solomon extended the influence of the realm he had inherited from his father over nearly the entire area lying between the two rival powers of Assyria and Egypt. The glory of Solomon's reign was crowned by the construction of the Temple in Jerusalem, which gradually became the focal point of the religious and national life of the Israelites.

On King Solomon's death, ten tribes inhabiting the northern half of the country seceded and formed their own kingdom which became known as Israel. The Philistines reasserted their independence in their coastal city-states as did other subject nations. What remained of Solomon's realm became known as the kingdom of Judah and continued to have its center in Jerusalem and its Temple. The two small kingdoms, as well as the city-states of the coast, managed to preserve their independence for nearly two hundred years, despite their size and relative weakness, until 721-715 B.C. when the Assyrian giant conquered the kingdom of Israel, destroyed its capital, and deported the able and wealthy among the population to distant lands. Judah escaped a similar fate by submitting to Assyrian suzerainty. But several generations later, in 585 B.C., Nebuchadnezzar of the new Babylonian empire, which had dispossessed Assyria, conquered and drove out the Judeans as well. Jerusalem was sacked, and many were deported to Babylon. Thus ended the episode known in Jewish tradition as the period of the First Temple. Politically, the record of that period was rather unimpressive after the reigns of David and Solomon. Spiritually and culturally, however, it witnessed in its latter half the high soaring of the human spirit, the deepening of the moral conscience, and the flowering of the great rhythmic prose evident in the legacy of the prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah.

The captivity of Judah in Babylon did not last long. In 539 B.C., Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian empire, occupied Babylon and in the next year gave permission to the Judean exiles to return to their country. Nearly 40,000 of them, a small part of the total Jewry of Babylon, availed themselves of the opportunity and returned to their homeland to reconstitute their national life as a small vassal state and to rebuild the Temple. Little was known until quite recently about the life of the "men of Judah," or Jews, for the next three or four hundred years apart from the fact that they were under Persian suzerainty and afterwards came under the Ptolemaic Greeks. But recent research, much of it done in Jerusalem, indicates that it was in this period that the cultural identity of the Jews was fixed and secured. It was then that the Torah (the Pentateuch) took its final form and became the focus of Jewish life, and it was then that the books of Job, Ruth, the Song of Songs, Ecclesiastes, Proverbs, and some of the finest Psalms were written.

A new phase began with the conquest of Palestine by the Seleucid rulers of Syria. Hellenism had made deep inroads among the Jews, but when the Seleucids tried to hasten the historical process by banning adherence to rules of the Torah, a revolt broke out which succeeded in recovering the independence of Judea. The revolt had been led by the Hasmonean priestly family who set up a dynasty of priest-kings. Under some of its more able members, Judea expanded in all directions so that by 150 B.C. it had reached something like the limits of the kingdom of David and Solomon. Less than one hundred years later, however, Judea succumbed once more to the might of another great empire when, in 63 B.C., Pompey captured Jerusalem. For the next two thousand years Palestine was never to become an independent realm again, until Israel was established in A.D. 1948.

During the next century after their conquest the Romans ruled Judea indirectly and did not, on the whole, disturb the community life of the Jews. At times they allowed native rulers like Herod to assume the title and many of the prerogatives of a king. But the heavy burden of taxation, internal feuds, and above all the growth of a fierce national spirit which fed on a fanatic attachment to religion, led to continual strife and tension culminating in a general revolt in A.D. 64. It took Rome seven years of bitter fighting before she was able to subdue the Jews. The Temple, which was the seat of the last resistance, was burned to the ground by Titus and his soldiers. But the Jews were not yet completely crushed. They revolted again in 115 and in 132. This last revolt, which was led by Shimon Bar Kochba, was so successful that Rome determined to make its repetition impossible. In 135 Jerusalem was destroyed and its site was plowed up. Countless Jews were slaughtered and countless others were carried off to slavery. For two more centuries the pacified Jews of Palestine were able to maintain a communal life under the leadership of a patriarchate sanctioned by Rome, during which the great work of elaborating the Torah into the legal-moral compendia known as the Mishna was completed. But subsequent centuries saw the dwindling of Jewish life in Palestine until only a few thousand impoverished Jews remained in their ancient homeland. Long before this point had been reached, Jewish history had ceased to be the history of Palestine and began to be what it still is in large measure today: the history of Jewish communities dispersed over much of the world.

2. THE DIASPORA AND THE IDEA OF RETURN

The long, fascinating, and often tragic history of the Jewish communities outside of Palestine is beyond the scope of this work. However, a few paragraphs giving its bare outline might provide a useful background for many topics touched upon in this book, and are particularly important for setting the Jewish connection with Palestine in its historical context.

The history of the Jewish Diaspora, or dispersion, began long before the disastrous end of the Bar Kochba uprising in A.D. 135. Many, if not most, of the Jews who had been exiled to Babylon in 585 B.C. did not return in 538 B.C. or thereafter; and their descendants, swollen by waves of immigration, grew in the course of time into a very large community which kept in close touch with Pales-

tine and developed a creative cultural-religious life centered on the Torah. When Palestine declined as the center of Jewish culture, around the third century of our era, that function passed to the Babylonian Jewish community and remained with it through the Arab conquest in the seventh century and the golden age of Arab-Islamic civilization in the next three centuries. In the course of this long span, the academies established by Babylonian Jewry collected and produced the immense corpus of commentaries and elaboration upon the Mishna known as the Talmud, worked out the principles of Jewish jurisprudence, assembled the homilies and legends known as the Midrash, and elaborated the first Siddur, or prayerbook. This body of material has served ever since as the core of traditional Jewish learning everywhere and has provided Jews in the Diaspora with a common heritage of doctrine, law, and lore which contributed enormously to preserving the unity of the Jewish people until the dawn of modern times. Even today, nearly one hundred Yeshivot—religious colleges—in Israel, and many others all over the world devote themselves mainly to the preservation and enrichment of the heritage bequeathed by Babylonian Jewry.

A Jewish community was established in Alexandria, Egypt, almost since the foundation of the city by Alexander the Great. In the course of time, the community grew to such an extent that it dared, in A.D. 115, to revolt against Roman power and was able to secure the relaxation of an old Roman law against mutilation of the body, which had been used in the years before the uprising to ban circumcision. But jealous as it was for its faith, that community nevertheless participated fully in the Hellenistic culture and shared in the glory of Alexandria when it was the center of Hellenistic civilization. The Septuagint—the Greek translation of the Old Testament—and the work of the great Jewish philosopher Philo testify to the effort made by that community to reach an accommodation with Greek culture and thought which, incidentally, influenced in turn the philosophy of the Church Fathers. In later Roman times, the Jewish community in Alexandria declined in importance and numbers, just as did Palestine's Jewry with which it had kept in close contact, but the Jews of Alexandria flourished again under the generally tolerant Arab-Muslim rule. Once more the Jews of Egypt adopted the language, way of living, and culture of the surrounding society while retaining their separateness in matters pertaining to their faith. Many of them attained positions of power and honor in the government, in finance, in science and in learning.

From the Near East, from Egypt, and from North Africa Jews migrated to Spain in the wake of the Arab conquest and reinforced Jewish groups who had migrated to that country in earlier times. There they became full-fledged partners with the Arabs in the brilliant civilization that developed under a succession of magnificent princes. All walks of life, rural and urban, were open to the Jews and many of them attained the highest positions in the economic, social, cultural, and political life of the various Spanish states. And while the Spanish Jews, like the Egyptian, assimilated by adopting Arabic names, the Arabic language, and Arab ways, they managed at the same time to produce a bright revival of Hebrew culture including religious and secular poetry. The record of the period between the tenth and twelfth centuries, studded with names like

Hasdai ibn Shaprut, Samuel the Naguid, Solomon ibn Gabirol, ibn Janah, Bahya ibn Pakuda, Isaac al-Fasi, Moses ibn Ezra, Judah Halevi, Abraham ibn Ezra, and Moses ibn Maimun, or Maimonides, constitutes a glorious chapter in Jewish history. Unfortunately this period came to a premature end with the Almohade persecution of the Jews of Spain and North Africa, exceptional in its fierceness in the record of Muslim treatment of Jews, which compelled Maimonides, among many of his co-religionists, to seek refuge on the more hospitable shores of Egypt.

In the Western world, the Jews fared nowhere nearly so well as in the lands that came under the dominion of Islam. In Europe, the Jews were compelled to live an isolated community life, assimilating little of the culture and ways of the peoples among whom they lived until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. From Rome and other cities of Italy, where large Jewish communities existed by the first century, Jews had penetrated into the European provinces of the Roman empire and, after its collapse, into Germany and England. When Christianity became dominant in these areas, the Jews were submitted to various restrictions and prohibitions which marked them off as distinct and inferior people because of their denial of the central belief of Christianity. In the course of time, the gulf established by ecclesiastical discriminatory decrees was widened by the effect of social factors. The Jew could not find a place on the land or in the artisan guilds. Consequently, he became a middle man, merchant, or peddler; and since usury was forbidden to Christians, he also became the moneylender. Concentrated in the towns where they were confined to special quarters known as ghettos, foreigners and foreign-looking, keeping to themselves, occupied in unpopular albeit useful professions, clinging stubbornly to their faith, and viewed as bearing collectively and for all time the guilt of the crucifixion, the Jews became intensely disliked by the populace. This dislike came to a head in the period of the Crusades, when it became as much an act of piety to kill the Jews in Europe as to kill the Saracens in the Holy Land. A wave of persecution, increasingly brutal, spread all over Western Europe. In England, France, and Germany, Jews were despoiled, tortured, some massacred and the rest finally expelled. For a time, there was less brutality in the parts of Spain reconquered by Christians. But in the second half of the fifteenth century the Inquisition took up its task of hunting and burning heretics, and in 1492 all Jews who refused to be converted were expelled.

The refugees from western Europe went to the eastern frontiers of the expanding continent to Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary. This migration continued through the ages until half the Jews in the world were congregated in that area. At first, the Polish kings protected them; but the respite was short-lived. In the middle of the seventeenth century came the Tartar invasion and later on Russian rule. A sort of territorial ghetto, "the pale of settlement," was set up from the Baltic, north of Warsaw, to the Black Sea, near Odessa, to keep the Jews from penetrating Holy Russia; throughout this area, the ghetto system was enforced.

The refugees from Spain went mostly to the Mediterranean provinces of the Ottoman empire, to North Africa, Egypt, the Balkans, Asia Minor, and even to Constantinople itself. A few of them

trickled into Italy and southern France and were followed in subsequent generations by Marranos Jews—Jews who had remained in Spain by bowing to the Inquisition in outward form but not in conviction—who also infiltrated Holland, Germany, and England and paved the way for the return to all these countries of undisguised, professing Jews. The Spanish refugees who went to the Muslim lands merged with the Jewish communities already existing there and enjoyed relative freedom from the worst forms of persecution. But just as these Jews had shared in the glory of the Muslim countries in the previous centuries, so in the centuries that followed they shared in the decay and stagnation that engulfed them at the very time when the western Christian peoples were forging ahead toward a new world.

By the time of the American and French Revolutions, Jews had lived in dispersion for one and a half to two and a half millennia without losing their identity and their essential unity. Certain minor differences in ritualistic details and much larger sociological and even racial differences had crept in among various communities or groups of communities over the centuries, giving rise to three major divisions: 1) the Ashkenazim—literally, Germans, but actually those who had lived under Christianity before the expulsion of the Jews from Spain; 2) the Sefaradim—literally, Spaniards, but actually the Spanish outcasts and all the communities of the Mediterranean basin with which they intermingled; and 3) various communities which existed uninterruptedly in the East from before the destruction of the Second Temple, notably the Yemenites and the Iraqis. But the differences among these divisions were outweighed by the enormous body of religious law, ritual, customs, lore, and knowledge which they shared in common, and above all by the common conception of the history and destiny of the Jews centering upon the ideas of *Galuth* and *Geullah* which they all held.

Galuth, meaning exile, defined the condition of the Jews in their own eyes, and *Geullah*, delivery from the exile and return to the ancestral homeland, defined their expected destiny. Among various Jewish communities at various times these two concepts were overlaid with metaphysical meaning, but never until the nineteenth century was the idea of actual return to Palestine missing in any interpretation. Assertions of the conviction of Jews that their current status was that of an exiled people and expressions of their faith in delivery and return are to be found in countless rituals, from the daily prayers through the ceremonials attending birth, marriage, and death. But the belief in these concepts found its strength in the roots it has in the traditional Jewish view of the world. This view, which saturates much of the Old Testament, conceives of the universe as governed by a divine design operating continuously, the chief motif of which is God's relation with His Chosen People. Empires rise and fall, nature pursues or modifies its prescribed course, and the earth proffers or withholds its bounty in order to serve an identifiable purpose in the cosmic moral drama that had its historical beginning in God's covenant with Abraham. It followed that such events as the destruction of the Temple and the scattering of the Jews, the most momentous since the Exodus, could not be accidental or definitive, but served a certain purpose and had to have a sequel.

him from the peoples among whom he lived.

1-13

The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate

The triumph of Zionism as expressed in the establishment of Israel was not only the outcome of the convergence of the wills and forces of the Jewish people just described. The support of powerful individuals, groups, and governments for various aspects of the Zionist case was also crucial on several occasions, even as it is essential today for the survival and development of Israel. One of the most important of these occasions was the issuing of the Balfour Declaration by the British Government on November 2, 1917. It was this Declaration which laid the foundations for the development of the Jewish community in Palestine from 56,000 divided and squabbling people scattered in two dozen settlements and a few mixed towns at the end of World War I into the disciplined and prospering embryonic nation of 700,000 which was able to withstand the combined assault of all the surrounding Arab states in 1948.

1. THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

The Declaration consisted of a single, long sentence in the form of a letter addressed by Foreign Secretary Balfour to Lord Rothschild as representative of the Zionists. It read: "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

The reasons which had prompted the British government to issue the Balfour Declaration are of interest not only because they reflect the grounds for the appeal of Zionism to a great Gentile power like Britain but also because they foreshadow the grounds for the subsequent trouble in British-Zionist relations. A recent definitive study by Leonard Stein (see bibliography) indicates that, in the immediate sense, the British Cabinet approved the issuing of the Declaration in the hope that the Jews of Russia, which was then in the throes of revolution, might be able to exert a steadying influence on their country and keep it in the war; in order to counter the apathy toward the war of a considerable section of American Jewry; in the expectation of reaping some propaganda benefits in all the countries where Jews lived; and, finally, with a view to forestalling an expected German declaration in favor of the Jews.

Reprinted by permission of the publishers from THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL by Nadav Safran, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 1963 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

Beneath these immediate political considerations, however, there was a large variety of longer-range sentiments and motives in favor of the object of the Declaration which were reflected at one time or another in the course of the long process of interviews, discussions, and negotiations that preceded its issuance. Among these, there was an intuitive sympathy with Zionist aspirations on the part of many British statesmen which expressed itself as soon as Turkey entered the war and its partition became a major war object of the Allies; there was the impression made on the British government by men like Chaim Weizmann and Sir Herbert Samuel that Zionism was a powerful force among Jewry and that Jewish good will was an intangible asset worth acquiring; there was the response of some imaginative British minds to the suggestion that a large-scale Jewish settlement in Palestine might have a stabilizing influence in an area where important British interests were at stake and might contribute to the regeneration of the Middle East as a whole; there was the hope that a chance given to Zionism might serve as an antidote to the subversive movements in which Jews, in rebellion against their lot, were finding an outlet for their frustrated energies; there were the romantic dreams of men like Mark Sykes to help a great but corrupted people regenerate itself through the renewal of its life in the cradle of its civilization; there was the desire to use the sponsorship of Zionist aspirations as a means to help nullify French claims to parts of Palestine and bring the whole country under British auspices; and, finally, there was the more comprehensive view expressed by Balfour a few weeks after the Declaration that "the Jews ought to have their rightful place in the world: a great nation without a home is not right." In short, the Declaration was issued out of broad humanitarian considerations, for immediate tactical political advantages, and for long-range strategic interests—an irresistible combination to any imaginative Anglo-Saxon statesman.

The Declaration was approved by the chief Allied Powers, including the United States, and its principles were incorporated in the terms of the Mandate approved by the League of Nations by which Britain was to govern Palestine. The instrument of the Mandate recognized "the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and . . . the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country." The Mandatory Power was directed to encourage immigration and close settlement of Jews on the land; and, as a sign of the Jewish cultural renaissance, Hebrew as well as Arabic and English was to be an official language. The instrument prescribed the establishment of a Jewish Agency representing the Jewish people to advise and cooperate with the British Administration in economic, social, and other matters which might affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and assist and take part in the development of the country.

2. THE APPLICATION OF THE MANDATE: INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

The story of the application of the Mandate as far as the Jews are concerned appears as the history of increasing frustration, despair, turmoil, and strife in the external political sphere, and of steady growth, prosperity, and achievement in the internal economic,

social, cultural, and political fields. In retrospect, it seems, oddly enough, that the frustrations as well as the achievements operated in favor of the creation of the state of Israel. For had the external political situation been less intolerable to the Jews by the end of the second World War, they might not have risen against the prevailing order for a few more years, at least, and this might very well have made all the difference in terms of obtaining international support for partition and the establishment of a Jewish state. In any case, the over-all development of the Mandate was such that by the time its initial spirit and purpose had been completely whittled away, the Jewish settlement had grown in every respect to the point when it could take its fate in its own hands and forge ahead to create and sustain the state of Israel.

In terms of internal development, the history of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) during the Mandatory period is marked by three phases. The first, which lasted from the confirmation of the Mandate in 1922 until the end of 1932, was characterized by a rather slow evolution. The basic institutions of Jewish Palestine were established or consolidated during that period—the institutions of communal self-government, the Jewish Agency, the labor movement, the main forms of settlement, the political parties, the Hebrew education system, the university, a national press, and so on; but the flow of immigration was disappointingly, almost fatally, slow. In his appearance before the Peace Conference in 1919, Chaim Weizmann had estimated the expected level of immigration to the envisaged National Home at between 70,000 and 80,000 a year. Louis D. Brandeis had had notions of transferring a million Eastern European Jews to Palestine in a few years. In contrast, the number of immigrants in the period under consideration averaged slightly more than 10,000 a year, and in 1927-1928 the number of Jews who emigrated from Palestine actually exceeded that of Jews who immigrated to it. It is true that the closing of the exit gates before Russia's Jews was partly responsible for the disparity between the expectations of the Zionist chiefs and reality; but there can be no doubt that these men had grossly overestimated the eagerness of the Jews to avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them to build a homeland without the constant prodding of persecution. Thus, despite the important qualitative development of the Yishuv during that decade, its slow quantitative growth carried with it the danger that the Jewish National Home in Palestine might shrivel of its own accord to something not unlike the interesting but ultimately unimportant Jewish agricultural settlement in Argentina sponsored by Baron de Hirsh. That this did not happen was largely due to Hitler's coming to power in Germany.

The persecution of the Jews by the Nazis induced or compelled tens of thousands to leave Germany, then Austria, then Czechoslovakia and all of Central Europe, with nowhere else to go but Palestine. Such were the skills and qualifications of these people, or such was the capital they were able to take out, that very large numbers of them passed the tests of the Mandatory government devised to restrict immigration in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity of the country. And as those who entered invested their money in various enterprises and built houses and facilities, they created further absorptive capacity for more Jews from everywhere.

Thus it came about that in the course of the six years from 1934 to 1939 more than twice as many immigrants came to the country as had come to it in the previous twelve years. By the outbreak of World War II, the Yishuv had not only grown to a substantial community of more than half a million, but its over-all potentialities had expanded tremendously by the injection of new capital and vast numbers of excellently trained professionals, technicians, entrepreneurs, and highly educated people generally.

The third phase in the growth of the Yishuv dates from 1940 until the foundation of the state. Because of the war and political restrictions, the number of immigrants who came in during this period was relatively small, averaging about 15,000 a year; nevertheless this phase was of great importance for the formation of the Yishuv in all other respects. It was a period in which the economic and technical capacities of the Yishuv were fully realized as the dwindling of imports to the entire Middle East and the Allied war effort stimulated the growth of new Jewish industry, the reorganization of agriculture, and the expansion of the entire economy through vast new expenditures. It was a period in which the Yishuv was able to acquire valuable military experience through the 30,000 men it contributed to the British forces, and to accumulate a substantial arsenal of clandestine weapons from the enormous stocks that circulated in the area. Above all, it was a period when the Yishuv, screened against its own will from any vast inflow of new immigrants, totally engaged in the war and fired by the shame, pain, agony, and hatred caused by the savage destruction of millions of fellow Jews, was able to merge all the previous waves of immigration into a national community as cohesive and fanatically determined as any the world has seen. It was the insufficient appreciation of this moral-psychological factor, the outcome of the strains of the war and its aftermath, that completely confounded the estimates of the Yishuv's real strength made in Cairo and Damascus as well as in London and Washington.

3. THE APPLICATION OF THE MANDATE: EXTERNAL POLITICAL ASPECTS

In the political sphere, the story of the Mandate is the history of the continual narrowing of its original intent and purport as these came increasingly into conflict with the interests of the Mandatory Power in the Middle East as a whole. Already at the beginning of the Mandate, the immediate tactical political calculations that stood behind the issuing of the Balfour Declaration had become irrelevant. The broad humanitarian impulse which had moved statesmen in London to adopt a decision of principle in favor of the Jews was naturally less effective when it became a question of influencing the decisions and actions of officials in London and Jerusalem concerned with the routine application of the Mandate in the face of mounting practical difficulties. Finally, the long-range strategic considerations began to turn more and more decisively against the Zionist case as Arab opposition to the Jewish National Home deepened and broadened and as the world headed toward an international crisis in which the good will of the Arab mass of the Middle East seemed to weigh more and more heavily in the eyes of the British government.

Even before the Mandate had been confirmed, the Palestinian Arabs manifested their resistance to the policy it embodied in serious riots in 1920 and 1921. The following year, the British government issued an interpretation of the Mandate designed to assuage Arab fears and to check any extravagant expectations on the part of the Jews. The interpretation, known as the Churchill White Paper, explained that the development of the Jewish National Home did not mean the imposition of Jewish nationality upon all the inhabitants of Palestine, but the full development of the existing Jewish community to become a center in which the Jewish people could take pride. Having given the purport of the Mandate this cultural twist, the White Paper then went on to insist that the Jewish community in Palestine was there "as of right, not on sufferance."

For seven years comparative peace reigned in Palestine. Then, in 1929, Arab religious and national feeling, excited by a conflict involving the Wailing Wall (a remnant of the Second Temple), which stands in an area sacred to both Arabs and Jews, burst out in a series of murderous attacks on the Jewish population. A number of British commissions visited Palestine to inquire into the causes of the trouble and recommend remedies. Their reports suggested the imposition of qualifications and restrictions on Jewish immigration and, in general, stressed those provisions of the Mandate safeguarding the rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants to as great an extent as those designed to secure the establishment of a Jewish national home, if not more.

Once again there was a seven-year period of peace followed by another outburst of Arab violence and another spate of commissions of inquiry which submitted recommendations designed to appease the Arabs. This time, however, the issues were more significant, the commissions were of a higher caliber, the recommendations were more basic, and the stakes were consequently much higher.

The grounds for the Arab outburst had been the sudden increase in the rate of Jewish immigration following Hitler's rise to power. Although this immigration gave a fillip to the economic life of the country from which everybody benefited, the Arabs became fearful of the prospect, now real for the first time, that the Jews might soon become a majority in the country. As a sop to their apprehensions, the Palestine government suggested in 1936 the formation of a Legislative Council in which Arabs would outnumber Jews and official members. But the scheme was severely criticized in the British Parliament and withdrawn; whereupon the Arabs initiated acts of violence which soon assumed the character of an open, all-out revolt against British authority.

A Royal Commission, sent to inquire and make recommendations, did not content itself with suggesting new restrictions, but reached the drastic conclusion that the Mandate itself was altogether "unworkable." Instead of the Mandate, the Commission suggested the partitioning of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state and a British zone. The Arabs rejected the scheme outright, the Jews accepted the principle of partition, and the British government sent another commission to work out the details of its application. The Arab revolt was resumed and was supported this time by popular agitation in the neighboring Arab countries and by propaganda, money, and some arms from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The commission appointed to work out the details of partition submitted

a report which concluded that partition was impracticable. To break the deadlock, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, summoned a conference of Arabs and Jews in London. In recognition of the character which the Palestine question had begun to assume by that time and as an indication of the context in which the British government now viewed it, not only the Jewish Agency and the Palestine Arabs were invited to attend, but also the representatives of all the neighboring Arab countries.

The conference assembled in London at the beginning of 1939 in the shadow of a new climax in the international crisis. Hitler had just violated the Munich agreement by annexing the rest of Czechoslovakia and even Neville Chamberlain realized by then that war could no longer be avoided. In this context, the foremost concern of the British government was to win Arab good will or at least to check the spread of pro-Axis sympathies in order to secure Arabian oil and protect the Middle East link of its imperial communications. Consequently, when the conference, as had been expected, got nowhere, the British government issued a unilateral statement of policy—the White Paper henceforward—which proposed to give up the Mandate in favor of an independent, predominantly Arab Palestine that would be established in ten years if a constitution protecting Jewish rights could be secured. In the interim period, Jewish immigration was to be fixed at a maximum of 75,000 in the entire first five-year period, after which it would depend on Arab consent. The Jews would be allowed to acquire land from the Arabs only in a very small portion of the country. In short, the Jewish National Home was to be frozen at the level it had attained by then, and Palestine was to remain predominantly Arab.

Throughout the years of the Mandate, the majority in the Zionist movement, under the moderate leadership of Chaim Weizmann, had perforce reconciled itself to the successive British restrictions of its aims as long as the residual policy still allowed the growth of the National Home at a reasonable rate. The general feeling was that the political future of Palestine would ultimately be determined more by the established realities of relative strength and number than by any legal or political formula. The promulgation of the White Paper policy, by foreclosing further growth of the Jewish proportional strength, disrupted this approach and threw the whole movement into agitation. Dissident rightist groups resorted to systematic terror against the British as soon as the Nazi threat to the area receded. The majority of the movement formally adopted a program which, for the first time since the Balfour Declaration, spoke no longer of a Jewish National Home but redefined its aim as the establishment of a Jewish state. A substantial minority on the left opposed the new program as impractical or premature and urged the establishment of a bi-national Jewish-Arab state with freedom of immigration. With all the ringing proclamations and programs, however, it is almost certain that all sections of opinion would have been content with the abolition of the White Paper and the restoration of the *status quo ante* with large-scale immigration.

For a moment right after the war, the chances of achieving just that seemed propitious. The Yishuv had made an important contribution to the war effort, the world was under the shock of the fantastic extent of the Nazi horrors perpetrated against the Jews, and the Labor Party had come to power in Britain soon after its Conference had adopted far-reaching pro-Zionist resolutions. But it soon became apparent that, under the aegis of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, Britain's Palestine policy was more than ever wedded to the aim of winning Arab support for a new Middle East order based on an Anglo-Arab alliance. Pressure from President Truman on the British government to admit to Palestine immediately 100,000 survivors of the Nazi extermination camps brought about the appointment of an Anglo-American commission to inquire into the whole much-inquired-into Palestine question. The commission reported favorably on the admission of 100,000 people but also made some political recommendations which included the need to dismantle and disarm all illegal forces. President Truman and the Zionists hailed the conclusion concerning immigration and pressed for immediate application, while the British government made it contingent upon the disarming of illegal armies and upon American financial and military support in the enforcement of the entire scheme. There was another committee, another plan, another conference, and a long series of embittered exchanges between British, Jews, Arabs, and Americans, but it was obvious that the whole issue was getting nowhere. In the meantime, tension in Palestine built up rapidly to a climax. The dissident groups extended their acts of terror. The Haganah—the underground army under the authority of the Yishuv leadership—engaged in sabotage and brought in numerous unauthorized immigrant ships; and the British responded with hangings, martial law, curfew, arrest of Yishuv leaders, and deportation of illegal immigrants to camps in Cyprus and even back to Germany. When the last device—an Arab-Jewish-British conference—collapsed, the harassed British government finally decided on April 2, 1947, to place the whole Palestine issue squarely in the hands of a special Assembly of the United Nations.

Historical Background

It is essential for a proper understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Palestine Question, as it used to be called, to review its historical background.

I PALESTINE BEFORE 1922

The name of Palestine is derived from the Philistines who lived in the southern coastal part of the country in the 12th century B.C.

What is the origin of the people of Palestine?

As far as one can look back in history, the country is found to be inhabited. The early inhabitants were semi-nomadic tribes, but about the 20th century B.C. the Canaanites began to settle in the plains and on the coast. They built villages and towns and developed their own culture. In the Bible the country is called 'the land of Canaan' (*Numbers 34: 1, 35: 10*) or 'the country of the Canaanites' (*Exodus 3: 17*).

It is necessary at the outset to correct a current misconception. The Israelites were not the earliest inhabitants of Palestine. They were invaders. When the Israelite tribes, after their exodus from Egypt, invaded the land of Canaan in the 12th century B.C., they found a settled population and an established culture. The population of the country then included the settled Canaanites, the Gibeonites and the Philistines. The Philistines were never completely subdued by the invaders and retained control of their coastal plain along the Mediterranean. The rest of the country was occupied and settled by the Israelites, who established the Kingdom of Israel. This Kingdom lasted for two centuries and then was split into the Kingdom of Israel in the north and the Kingdom of Judah in the south.

Between 733 B.C. and 721 B.C. the Assyrians overran the territories of the northern Kingdom and in 721 B.C. Israel became politically extinct.

'Never again did it gain full independence, for in the time of the Hasmoneans and their successors, the house of Herod, it had only a limited local authority.'¹

After the Assyrians and Babylonians, the country was occupied in turn by the Persians (whose king allowed in 538 B.C. the return of the Jewish exiles), the Greeks and the Romans. Following the Jewish rebellion against the Romans, Titus destroyed Jerusalem in A.D. 70 and Hadrian quelled the last revolt in A.D. 132. 'In Judea proper the Jews seem to have been virtually exterminated, but they survived in Galilee.'²

¹ *Palestine and Transjordan*, Geographical Handbook Series, p. 87.

² *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1966, Vol. 17, p. 166.

Reprinted by permission of the publishers from PALESTINE, THE ARABS AND ISRAEL by Henry Cattán, London: Longman Group Ltd., Copyright © 1969. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

From the 4th until the 7th century of our era, Palestine came under Christian influence. Emperor Constantine I built the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. His mother Helena built two other churches, the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem and the Church of the Ascension at Jerusalem. Palestine began to attract Christian pilgrims and also became a centre of eremitic life; men flocked from all quarters to become hermits and the country was soon dotted with a number of monasteries.

In A.D. 637 occurred the Moslem Arab conquest of Palestine. Many of the indigenous inhabitants were converted to Islam and, as a result, 'the predominantly Christian population became predominantly Muslim'.³ However, a Christian minority remained in Palestine after the Arab conquest.

There was a Christian resurgence during the Crusades, particularly as a result of the establishment of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem in A.D. 1100. Upon Saladin's victory over the Crusaders in A.D. 1187 and his recovery of Palestine, the indigenous Christians continued to live in Palestine side by side with the Moslems.

In A.D. 1518, the Turks conquered Palestine and remained in occupation until 1917. This conquest, however, did not involve any colonization nor did it cause any change in the composition of the population. The Turkish conquest did not in any way alter or affect the basically Arab character of the country. Its inhabitants, language, customs and culture remained Arab.

The long and bloodstained story of wars and invasions which have afflicted the Holy Land is reflected by the picture of the successive powers which have held Jerusalem from 1050 B.C. until 1950. These, as given by the Reverend Charles T. Bridgeman, were:

		Years
Israelites	Davidic Kingdom to Fall of Jerusalem 1050-586 B.C.	464
Babylonians	Fall of Jerusalem to fall of Babylon 586-538 B.C.	50
Persians	Cyrus to Macedonian conquest of Persia 538-332 B.C.	206
Greeks	Alexander's conquest of Jerusalem to emancipation of city by Maccabees 332-166 B.C.	166
Jews	Maccabean Kingdom 166-63 B.C.	93
Pagan Romans	Roman conquest of Jerusalem to fall of paganism 63 B.C.-A.D. 323	386
Christian Romans	From Constantine to Persian conquest A.D. 323-614	291
Persians	Period of Persian rule A.D. 614-628	14
Romans	Reconquest by Byzantines A.D. 628-637	11
Arabs	Conquest by Moslem Arabs A.D. 637-1072	435
Turks	Rule by Moslem Turks A.D. 1072-1092	20
Arabs	Reconquest by Arabs A.D. 1092-1099	7
Christians	Crusading Kingdom A.D. 1099-1187	88
Arabs	Reconquest by Arabs A.D. 1187-1229	42
Christians	City ceded by treaty to Frederick II A.D. 1229-1239	10

³ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

Arabs	Revived Arab rule A.D. 1239-1514	278
Moslem Turks	Jerusalem under Ottoman Turks A.D. 1517-1917	400
Christians	British conquest and mandate A.D. 1917-1947	30
Arabs and Israelis	Jerusalem seized by Israelis and Arabs A.D. 1947-1950	34

But notwithstanding the bewildering succession of wars, invasions and conquests in Palestine, the original indigenous elements of the population—to the exclusion of the Israelites who were themselves invaders and were subsequently killed or deported—had until almost the middle of the 20th century remained basically unchanged. There exists a common misconception—deliberately created—that the Palestine Arabs were invaders of Palestine during the Moslem Arab invasion of Palestine in the 7th century. This is not historically correct. The Palestine Arabs are the original inhabitants of Palestine. The Moslem Arab conquest of Palestine in A.D. 637 was not the starting-point of their occupation of the country. The Arabs are a pre-Islamic people. They lived in Palestine and other parts of the Middle East before the advent of Islam. In fact, the number of the invaders at the time of the Moslem Arab conquest of Palestine in the 7th century was small and they were assimilated by the indigenous inhabitants. Professor Maxime Rodinson points out that the Arab population of Palestine was native in all the senses of that word and were Arabized as a result of the Arab conquest in the 7th century.⁵ The Palestinians of today are the descendants of the Philistines, the Canaanites and the other early tribes.⁶ They are the earliest and original inhabitants of the country. They have lived continuously and without interruption in their country since the dawn of history. Their settlement in Palestine can be traced back to at least forty centuries. There were infusions of other racial elements into the Palestinian stock, mainly from the Greeks, the Romans, the Moslem Arabs and the Crusaders. But this Palestinian stock, which comprises both Moslems and Christians, continued to constitute the main element of the population until the majority of the original inhabitants were displaced by the Israelis in 1948 in circumstances to be hereinafter described.

Apart from the Moslems and Christians, there existed other small communities which lived in the midst of the people of Palestine. These included Jews, Armenians, Assyrians and Kurds.

The Jews did not integrate into the ethnic stock formed by the original people of Palestine. They represented a small community. From the 1st century of our era until the 20th century, the Jews had almost ceased to exist in Palestine. 'Even as the main element in the population the Jews largely disappeared after the wars of A.D. 70 and A.D. 135. Benjamin of

⁵ See Reverend Charles T. Bridgeman's letter to the President of the Trusteeship Council, January 13 1950, General Assembly Official Records, 5th Session, Supplement No. 9, U.N. Document A/1286, p. 15.

⁶ Maxime Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs*, (Penguin Books, 1968), p. 216.

⁷ 'The Palestinian Arab of today, then, is a descendant of the Philistines, the Canaanites and other early tribes, and of the Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders, Mongols and Turks'; Moshe Menuhin, *The Decadence of Judaism in our Times*, (Exposition Press, New York, 1965), p. 18.

Tudela, a Jewish pilgrim who visited the Holy Land about A.D. 1170-1171 found but 1,440 Jews in all Palestine; and Nahman Gerondi, in A.D. 1267, found only two Jewish families in Jerusalem.⁷ Up to the 19th century the Jewish population of Palestine had increased very little. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Jews in Palestine numbered 8,000; in 1845, they were 11,000 and in 1880 their number did not exceed 20,000.⁸ In 1918 the Jews numbered 56,000.⁹ At the time of the Balfour Declaration (1917) the Jews represented less than 10 per cent of the total population of Palestine. After the end of the First World War and following the Balfour Declaration, there was a wave of Zionist Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Palestine census in 1922 gave their number as 83,794 out of a total population of 757,182.¹⁰

During the Turkish period, i.e., from 1518 until 1917, Palestine was an administrative division of the Turkish Empire. In accordance with the administrative organization which took place in 1887-1888, Palestine was divided into the *mutassarifiyehs* (administrative units) of Acre, Nablus and Jerusalem. However, Jerusalem and its surrounding area enjoyed an autonomous status and instead of being dependent upon the governor of the province were linked directly to Constantinople, the capital of the Empire.

The various citizens of the Turkish Empire, Turks, Moslem Arabs, Christian Arabs, Kurds, Greeks, Armenians and Jews, all enjoyed equal civil rights, regardless of race, creed or religion. The principle of equality of rights which existed, in fact, was reaffirmed by the Turkish Constitution of December 23 1876. This Constitution provided for a cabinet, an elected parliament and proportional representation of all nationalities.¹¹ Parliament was elected and met in March 1877 but Sultan Abdul Hamid adjourned it and ignored the Constitution. On July 24 1908, as a result of the Young Turk Revolution, Sultan Abdul Hamid restored the Constitution and ordered the holding of elections. On December 17 1908 parliament met. The deputies consisted of 142 Turks, 60 Arabs, 25 Albanians, 23 Greeks, 12 Armenians, 5 Jews, 4 Bulgars, 3 Serbs and 1 Vlach.¹² New parliamentary elections were held in 1912. It should be remarked that the inhabitants of Palestine participated in all parliamentary elections and elected their deputies. Article 48 of the Turkish Constitution recognized the right of every person of Ottoman nationality to elect and be elected for national representation.

Not only did Arab citizens, among them the Palestinians, enjoy equal rights with the Turks with regard to national representation, they also participated in the general administration of the country. Many rose to high executive, legislative and administrative positions and several occupied important ministerial and palace posts. As one writer has observed:

⁷ Reverend Charles T. Bridgeman's letter to the President of the Trusteeship Council January 13 1950, General Assembly Official Records, 5th Session, Supplement No. 9, U.N. Document A/1286, p. 13.

⁸ *Dictionnaire Diplomatique*, p. 294.

⁹ Government of Palestine, *Survey of Palestine*, Vol. I, p. 144.

¹⁰ Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine*, 1941, p. 12.

¹¹ S. N. Fisher, *The Middle East* (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1960), p. 322.

¹² S. N. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

The Turks were a racial minority in their great empire, and made no attempt at the general colonization of the conquered provinces. The empire was conceived on no narrow Turkish-national basis, but was a comprehensive empire like the Abbasid or the Roman. Whatever a man's race or birthplace, he was eligible for government service and could attain the highest office . . . while the bulk of senior officials were Turks, Syrian and Palestinian townsmen gained by their innate keenness of intellect an appreciable number of senior posts.¹³

• It is of extreme importance to emphasize the legal and political status which the Palestinian Arabs enjoyed during the Turkish regime, because subsequent events, particularly the imposition of the British mandate over Palestine, have somewhat obscured two basic facts. First, the Palestinians, whether Moslems, Christians or members of other communities, enjoyed with the Turks complete political independence and equality, exercised their full civil rights and shared with the Turks the rights of sovereignty over the various territories comprised within the Turkish Empire. The separation of sovereignty between Arabs and Turks occurred only upon the detaching of the Arab provinces from the Turkish Empire after the First World War. Secondly, the Palestinians had attained before the First World War a level of cultural development and political maturity which could well have exempted them from being assisted by a mandatory power. Referring to the establishment of mandates over Palestine, Syria and Lebanon after the First World War, Mr. Duncan Hall remarks:

These were cradles of western civilization and of great religions of Europe and Asia; and their peoples were capable of becoming independent states within a short period of time if they could in fact devise constitutions based on the consent of the main elements of the population.¹⁴

Notwithstanding their enjoyment of full political rights, the Arabs wished to establish a purely Arab state independent of the Turkish Empire. There were already several undercurrents at the end of the 19th century that aimed at the achievement of this objective. These undercurrents rose to the surface and gained strength during the First World War. The Allied Governments encouraged the struggle of the Arabs for their independence, or more correctly their secession from Turkey, since this fitted into their plans for a victorious termination of the conflict. In particular, the United Kingdom and its Allies made several pledges for the recognition and establishment of Arab independence.

These pledges and assurances included:

- i. The correspondence in 1915-1916 between King Hussein of the Hedjaz, then Sharif of Mecca, and Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, which embodied a pledge by the Government of Great Britain that (with the exception of portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo) it was prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca.

¹³ George E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East* (Methuen, London, 1948), pp. 59-60.

¹⁴ H. Duncan Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeships*, pp. 33-34, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1948.

ii. The Hogarth message addressed by the British Government to the Sharif of Mecca in January 1918 in order to allay Arab fears about the Balfour Declaration, the issue of which had then come to the knowledge of the Arabs and had alarmed them about the sincerity of British intentions concerning the future of Palestine.

iii. The Declaration to the Seven of June 16 1918, which assured the inhabitants of territories occupied by the Allied armies that the future government of these territories would be based upon the consent of the governed.

iv. The Anglo-French Declaration of November 7 1918, which stated that the goal envisaged by France and Great Britain in prosecuting the war was the complete and final liberation of the peoples who had so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations that should derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations. Thousands of copies of this declaration were dropped in leaflets from air-planes over Palestine.¹⁵

These pledges encouraged the Arab movement for secession from the Turkish Empire. The Arabs revolted against the Turks in many parts of the country and, in fact, made a substantial contribution to the Allied victory in the First World War. King Hussein of the Hedjaz joined the Allied armies, and Arabs from Syria, Lebanon and Palestine answered his call for revolt, joined the ranks of the Allies and fought with them against the Turks.

It has been established that the Arabs were betrayed¹⁶ not only because these promises were not kept but also because Great Britain, after its promise to the Arabs, made an incompatible promise to the Zionist Jews concerning the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. For many years before the Balfour Declaration was made, the Zionist Jews had entertained ambitions over Palestine. Jewish Zionism owed its origin to the desire of the Jews of Eastern Europe to escape the discrimination, and at times the persecution, from which they suffered in Eastern European countries. Theodor Herzl (1860-1904) became the strongest exponent of Zionism. In 1896 he wrote a pamphlet, *The Jewish State*, in which he advocated the establishment of British-sponsored Jewish colonization in Argentina or Palestine with a view to the eventual creation of a Jewish state.¹⁷ Herzl's concern was a solution to the problem of anti-semitism, not the fulfilment of the prophecies of traditional Judaism.¹⁸ In 1897, he convened the first Zionist Congress in Basle, at which the aim of Zionism to create a 'home' for the Jewish people in Palestine was proclaimed. Herzl tried to persuade the Turkish authorities to facilitate Jewish immigration to Palestine and grant them a certain degree of autonomy, but he was unsuccessful.

¹⁵ For the text of the pledges made to the Arabs, see George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, Khayats, Beirut.

¹⁶ See Anthony Nutting, *The Arabs* (New American Library, New York, 1965), pp. 289 et seq.

¹⁷ Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State*, 5th ed. (H. Pordes, London, 1967), p. 30; A. R. Taylor, *Prelude to Israel* (Philosophical Library, New York, 1959), p. 3.

¹⁸ F. F. Andrews, *The Holy Land under Mandate*, I, p. 303.

The Zionist objective of creating a Jewish state in Palestine was the root of the trouble and the source of the Palestine tragedy. It ignored the fact that Jewish presence in Palestine had almost ceased as from the 1st century A.D. It was also in obvious conflict with the rights of the people of Palestine who had inhabited the country since time immemorial. Historically speaking, the Jews were neither the earliest inhabitants nor the owners of the land in Palestine. The Jewish occupation of Palestine in biblical times was simply an episode in the long history of the country. The modern Zionist Jews, the great majority of whom can hardly claim to be descendants of the ancient Hebrews, seized upon this biblical episode in order to stake a political claim more than twenty centuries later upon the territory of Palestine. The fact that such a claim was incompatible with the facts of history, with justice and with the rights of the real owners of the country was ignored.

The Zionist Jews seized the occasion of the First World War to represent to the British Government the advantage of winning Jewish support by helping Zionist ambitions. These efforts succeeded. Accordingly, on November 2 1917 the British Foreign Minister Arthur James Balfour, in a written communication to Lord Rothschild, declared that the British Government viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of 'existing non-Jewish communities' in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

It is significant that the Balfour Declaration was made notwithstanding Jewish opposition in some quarters to the concept of a Jewish national home. Jewish criticism which was made at the time proved to be prophetic. Mr. C. G. Montefiore, who was one of the Jewish leaders consulted about the Declaration before it was made, has said:

When the Balfour declaration about Palestine was being discussed by the Cabinet, the terms were privately submitted to some half-a-dozen Jews, of whom four, if I remember rightly, were pronounced or semi-Zionists, and two, of whom I was one, were opposed to Zionism. We two ventured to suggest that the words 'the national home for the Jewish people' were likely to cause trouble. We were, it would seem, not so far wrong. . . . We objected to the words because we denied that the Jews were any longer a nation, and we did not want them even to become a nation again. We claimed and desired, as I and my friends still claim and desire, that they should be free and equal citizens of all the countries in which they lived. We feared that the proposed national home might create far more anti-semitism than it would cure. Our views and objections were, however, not listened to, except that for the definite article 'the', as the draft originally read, the indefinite article 'a' was substituted, so that the words now run: 'a national "home for the Jewish people"'.¹⁹

The Balfour Declaration was described as a document in which 'one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third. . . . It is true that the Arabs in Palestine lived under Turkish overlordship;

¹⁹ C. G. Montefiore, *The National Review*, December 1936, p. 731.

but they have been living there for centuries, and the country was no doubt "theirs" in the generally accepted sense of the word.²⁰

Mr. Michael Adams, an English journalist, has analysed the Balfour Declaration and the circumstances in which it was made, and emphasized its connection with the Arab-Israeli conflict of June 1967. Under the title, *The Twice-Promised Land*, he wrote in *The Guardian* on November 3 1967:

The only good result of the fighting that took place in June is that it has forced the world to reconsider the realities of the Palestine question. What is astonishing is that these realities have been so successfully disguised and misrepresented in so short a space of time. The 50th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration provides an opportunity to restate them as matters of historical fact.

Fifty years ago there was no Palestine 'problem'. There was only Palestine itself, at that time a province of the Ottoman Empire, but a part of the Arab homeland like any other, occupied without interruption by Arabs for more than 1,300 years, and sharing the expectations of the rest of the Arab world. These expectations centered around the promise of immediate independence made to the Arabs by the British Government in 1916, in return for which the Arabs had risen in revolt against their Turkish masters, to play a significant part in the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire.

But before this promise to restore Arab independence could be kept, the British Government had entered into another, much less precise, undertaking to the Jewish people, then scattered throughout the world. This later undertaking, which we know as the Balfour Declaration, conflicted with the earlier promise to the Arabs; indeed, it could only be fulfilled at the expense of the Arabs—and in this contradiction lies the essence of the Palestine problem.

At the time that the British Government made the Balfour Declaration, it possessed no sovereignty, dominion or other title in Palestine which empowered it to recognize any rights in favour of the Jews in Palestine. After remarking that the Balfour Declaration had no substance or validity in terms of international law, Mr. Adams observes:

There are two points to consider about the phrasing of the Balfour Declaration. The words 'a national home' had obviously been chosen with care. What was intended was some form of refuge, a sanctuary where Jews could escape from the restrictions and sometimes the persecutions to which they were subject in other parts of the world.

Plainly, the concept which the British Government had in mind was not a Jewish State in Palestine, or it would have said so. In any case, only a year earlier Britain had promised that Palestine would form part of an independent Arab State; and even if this promise were to be forgotten or disregarded, it would be patently impossible to create a Jewish State in Palestine without prejudicing 'the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities' in the country.

This phrase provides the other curiosity about the Balfour Declaration. It could only suggest, to someone who was unfamiliar with Palestine in 1917, that its population was predominantly Jewish, with some other, and possibly substantial, minorities. If this was deliberate, it was a piece of carefully calculated misrepresentation, for it expressed the precise opposite of the truth.

²⁰ Arthur Koestler, *Promise and Fulfilment*, p. 4.

On the day when Mr. Balfour signed his letter to Lord Rothschild, Jews constituted between 7 and 8 per cent of the population of Palestine. That deceptive phrase 'existing non-Jewish communities' meant, in effect, the Arabs, the people whose ancestors had been in uninterrupted occupation of Palestine for 1,300 years and who, in 1917, constituted more than 90 per cent of the population and owned 97.5 per cent of the land. These were the unfortunates whose 'civil and religious rights' the British Government pledged itself to protect by the terms of the Balfour Declaration.

It is their children and grandchildren who now live in refugee camps or under Israeli occupation in the disputed remnants of their homeland.

The Balfour Declaration was issued without the knowledge or the consent of the Arabs. When the Arabs learned of it, they were seized with consternation and protested to the British Government. The latter immediately despatched Commander Hogarth to Jeddah early in 1918 to assure King Hussein of Hedjaz that the British Government favoured the return of Jews to Palestine only in so far as would be compatible with the political and economic freedom of the existing population.

However, this and other assurances given to the Arabs by the British Government that the Balfour Declaration would not affect their civil and religious rights or their political freedom were neither kept nor intended to be kept. Here again one might leave the word to Mr. Michael Adams:

In a memorandum to the British Government dated August 11 1919 (Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 1st series, Vol. IV, HMSO) Mr. Balfour wrote:

'In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country. . . . The four great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.'

On that point, understandably, the Arabs disagree. I find it hard to see how any dispassionate observer can fail to sympathise with them. What Mr. Balfour was saying in that remarkably blunt and revealing memorandum to his colleagues was that there was no longer any intention to keep the promise to protect 'the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine'.

Should the Arabs accept without question the consequences of a decision made 50 years ago by a small group of middle-aged Englishmen, and based on some ill-defined preference for the 'age-long traditions' of international Jewry over the 'desires and prejudices' of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine? It is difficult to see what line of reasoning, what emotion, what sense of self-respect or of respect for the rights of humanity as a whole could induce them to do so.

As far as Britain and its reputation are concerned, the Balfour Declaration is the seemingly innocuous tip of an iceberg of deception. That is something which every Englishman ought to remember when he considers the present situation in the Middle East, to whose complexities the Balfour Declaration has so powerfully contributed.

As far as Israel is concerned, the Balfour Declaration is the original foundation stone of the Jewish State now constituted in Palestine. This, too, is something for all Zionists to bear in mind if they are concerned to understand and to come to terms with the attitudes of their Arab neighbours.²¹

²¹ Michael Adams, *The Twice-Promised Land*, *The Guardian*, November 3 1967, p. 12.

The question of the future of Palestine and the other Arab countries occupied by the Allied Forces during the First World War was the subject of discussions at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.²² Two main forces then came into play to shape the future of Palestine at the Peace Conference.

On the one hand, the ideas which President Wilson had propounded towards the end of the First World War—namely, the rejection of any territorial acquisition by conquest and the recognition of the right of self-determination of peoples²³—came to be generally accepted and were incorporated in 1919 in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.²⁴ The Covenant laid down that, to the peoples inhabiting territories which have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the State which formerly governed them, there should be applied 'the principle that their well-being and development form a sacred trust of civilisation'. Moreover, and specifically with regard to the communities detached from the Turkish Empire, namely, the people of Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, Article 22 laid down that '... their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.'

On the other hand, the Zionists exerted all their efforts to secure indorsement of the Balfour Declaration by the Peace Conference. Already Zionist efforts had won over France, Italy and the United States to an acceptance of the concept of a Jewish national home in Palestine.²⁵ Representatives of the Zionist Organization appeared before the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers at the Peace Conference in February 1919 and presented the Zionist programme for the future of Palestine. This programme, as explained and modified in subsequent proposals, included the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish national home to be developed into an autonomous commonwealth. The Zionist representatives even submitted proposals concerning the terms to be embodied in the proposed mandate which was to be granted over Palestine. The text of the Palestine mandate was the subject of negotiation between the British delegation at the Peace Conference in Paris and the Zionist Organization. 'The Zionists obtained nearly all they desired; but there is no record of any consultation with the Arabs whose vital interests were

²² Palestine was occupied by the British Army under General Allenby in 1917-1918 and an armistice was signed on October 30 1918.

²³ President Wilson's Fourteen Points, presented to the American Congress on January 8 1918 stated, *inter alia*, that non-Turkish nationalities in the Turkish territories occupied by the Allied Forces should be given "an absolute unmolested opportunity of development." In his address on January 11 1918 he stressed that "peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that every territorial settlement involved in the war must be made in the interests and for the benefit of the populations concerned." (*AJIL*, Vol. 17, 1923, p. 51).

²⁴ The text of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is set out in Appendix I.

²⁵ An account of Zionist activities to secure support for a Jewish national home in Palestine is given in the Report of the Zionist Organization to the 12th Zionist Congress at Carlsbad published in 1921.

3

at stake.²⁶ The Arabs, and, in particular, the people most directly concerned, the Palestinians, were neither represented at the Peace Conference nor consulted about the future of Palestine or the terms of the proposed mandate. On March 20 1919 President Wilson proposed to the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers at the Paris Peace Conference that an Inter-Allied Commission should visit Syria and Palestine to elucidate the state of opinion regarding the mode of settlement of their future. The Supreme Council adopted President Wilson's suggestion. However, fearing the result of such a consultation, the French refused to appoint their representative and the British representative withdrew. The two American members of the Commission, Henry C. King and Charles R. Crane, proceeded to the Middle East and conducted their investigation. Their report, though made in 1919, is still of intense topical interest. It permits an understanding of the Palestine issue and the present Arab-Israeli conflict.²⁷ Paragraph 5 of the King-Crane Commission's report stated *inter alia*:

If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to—favoring 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine'—it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist program must be greatly modified. For 'a national home for the Jewish people' is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the 'civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine'. The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.

In his address of July 4 1918 President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great 'ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting': 'The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.' If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine—nearly nine-tenths of the whole—are emphatically against the entire Zionist program. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's rights, though it kept within the forms of law.

²⁶ Lord Sydenham of Combe, *The Tragedy of Palestine, The Nineteenth Century and After*, London, May 1930, p. 603.

²⁷ For a full report on the investigation, see Harry N. Howard, *The King-Crane Commission* (Khayats, Beirut), 1963.

The King-Crane Commission emphasized the serious injustice involved in the implementation of the Balfour Declaration as well as the absence of any basis for the Zionist claim to Palestine. It stated that the Zionist programme could not be carried out except by force of arms, and observed:

That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a 'right' to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.²⁸

Unfortunately for the future of Palestine and the peace of the Middle East, the recommendations of the King-Crane Commission were discreetly buried and even concealed.²⁹ Although the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers did not espouse the proposal sponsored by the Zionists which envisaged the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine, the Balfour Declaration itself was incorporated in the mandate over Palestine. The incorporation of the Balfour Declaration in the Palestine mandate was a denial of justice to the people of Palestine. The mandate system was conceived by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations as a means to implement the principle of self-determination of peoples. As a result of Zionist influence this objective was defeated in the case of the Palestine mandate. As Professor Keith has observed, the adoption of the principle of a Jewish national home ran counter to the doctrine of the right of each people to self-determination.³⁰ On April 25 1920 the Supreme Council of the Principal and Allied Powers sitting at San Remo agreed to give the mandate over Palestine to the British Government, and on July 24 1922 the Council of the League of Nations entrusted the mandate to the British Government. The mandate, however, did not formally come into operation, because Turkey had not yet accepted the separation of the Arab provinces. By the Treaty of Sèvres of August 10 1920 Turkey agreed to accept the separation of the Arab provinces as well as the Balfour Declaration. The Treaty of Sèvres, however, was not ratified by the Turkish National Assembly, which rejected some of its provisions, including the Balfour Declaration. It was only three years later that the detachment of the Arab provinces from Turkey became legally effective in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne which Turkey signed on July 24 1923. It is significant, however, that the latter Treaty did not embody Turkish acceptance of the Balfour Declaration.

²⁸ Harry N. Howard, *op. cit.*, pp. 349 *et seq.*

²⁹ The King-Crane Commission's Report was suppressed and kept secret for three years. It was published only in 1947: see Harry N. Howard, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

³⁰ B. Keith, *Mandates, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law*, Vol. IV, 1922, p. 78.

2 PALESTINE DURING THE BRITISH MANDATE

The Palestine mandate embodied two main objectives.

On the one hand, as stated in its preamble, the mandate was given 'for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations'. Two of those provisions were of consequence. First, the provision that 'the well-being and development' of the people of the mandated territory 'form a sacred trust of civilization'. Secondly, the provision that the existence of the people of Palestine 'as an independent nation was provisionally recognized'.

On the other hand, the Palestine mandate also required that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2 1917 by the British Government in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, 'it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country'.

These various objectives were merged into Article 2 of the Palestine mandate which was worded as follows:

Art. 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Moreover, the mandate further provided that Jewish immigration should not affect the rights and position of other sections of the population. Article 6 stated:

Art. 6. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

Did the Mandatory achieve these objectives? Furthermore, did the Mandatory not prejudice the rights and position of the existing Palestine Arab population?

It is clear that the Mandatory utterly failed to achieve the mandate's first and basic objective of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant and of leading the country towards independence by the development of self-governing institutions. Largely because of Zionist opposition to the grant of any real powers to the existing population as long as the Jews were only an insignificant minority, almost no advance was made towards the development of self-governing institutions. From the beginning of the mandate in 1922 until its end on May 15 1948 all legislative and executive powers in Palestine were kept in the hands of the British Government and its representative, the British High Commissioner. While the Arabs were thus denied any right of self-government or even of participation in the administration of their own country, the Jews enjoyed a specially privileged status. Article 4 of the man-

date had provided that 'an appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home. . . .'

The Zionist Organization which later became the Jewish Agency was recognized as such agency, and thus the Jewish Agency, a foreign body composed of Zionists, became a government within a government. On two occasions during the mandate the British Government indicated an intention to establish self-government in Palestine, but in both cases such intention did not materialize and the plan was defeated because of Zionist opposition. The first attempt was made in 1922. The Palestine Order-in-Council, 1922, which embodied what may be described as the organic law of Palestine during the mandate, had envisaged in Article 17 the constitution of a Legislative Council. The Legislative Council would consist of the High Commissioner and twenty-two members, ten of whom were to be appointed official members and twelve to be elected non-official members.³¹ Elections took place in 1923 but were soon declared null and void and no further elections were held thereafter.³² Article 17 of the Palestine Order-in-Council, 1922, was then repealed and replaced by a provision giving the British High Commissioner full powers of legislation.³³ The half-hearted attempt made by the British Government to grant some semblance of autonomy to the people of Palestine by the establishment of a Legislative Council had failed because the Palestine Arabs claimed that it was undemocratic for the British Government not to recognize majority rule in self-governing institutions and because the Zionist Jews strongly opposed the concession of any form of self-government to the Palestine Arabs. Again in 1939 the British Government indicated its intention to establish self-government in Palestine. In The White Paper issued in 1939 the British Government declared its intention to limit Jewish immigration to 75,000 over the next five years and to grant to Palestine its independence after ten years.³⁴ This White Paper was violently opposed by the Zionist Jews, who had other plans for the future of Palestine. They organized a campaign of violence against the Government and, as a result, the realization of the promise of the independence of Palestine contained in The White Paper was eventually defeated.

The other purpose of the mandate, namely, to give effect to the Balfour Declaration by 'placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home', was successfully implemented. This was achieved in plain disregard of 'the rights and position' of the original inhabitants. The Mandatory Government opened the gates of Palestine to Jewish immigration despite the violent opposition and continuous protests of its Arab inhabitants. Jewish immigration in Palestine was inspired, artificially promoted and financed by Zionist organizations with a political objective: the domination of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state.

³¹ Drayton, *The Laws of Palestine* (Waterlow and Sons, London, 1934), Vol. III, p. 2574.

³² Drayton, *ibid.*, p. 2593. ³³ Drayton, *ibid.*, p. 2591. ³⁴ Cmd. 6018, May 17 1939.

At first, there was not a strong response to Zionist efforts to increase Jewish emigration to Palestine. The Zionists were helped, however, by the advent of the Nazi regime in Germany and by the Nazi oppressions of the Jews. The only limitation which the British Government at a later date placed upon Jewish immigration in Palestine was the so-called test of 'economic absorptive capacity'. This limitation, however, did not unduly restrict Jewish immigration nor protect the Arab majority against the legal and political erosion of its rights and position. Jewish 'legal' immigration was supplemented by a massive 'illegal' immigration which offset the effect of any official limitation upon the number of Jewish immigrants.³⁵ The result was the establishment by artificial means and against the will of the original inhabitants of a Jewish political and demographic nucleus which for twenty centuries had not existed in Palestine. Within a quarter of a century the Jewish population of Palestine increased more than tenfold. Here is the picture:

Year	Moslems	Christians	Jews	Others	Total
1918	574,000	70,000	56,000 ³⁶	—	700,000
1922 (census)	590,900	73,014	83,794	9,474	757,182 ³⁷
1931 (census)	759,712	91,398	174,610	10,101	1,035,821 ³⁸
1946	{ 1,076,780				1,972,560 ³⁹
	{ 127,000				
	{ (bedouin)				
	1,203,780	145,060	608,230	15,490	

Thus, by means of an immigration forced upon the country against the will and the wishes of the majority of the original inhabitants, the number of the Jews in Palestine was increased from one-twelfth to one-third of the total population. There can be no doubt that such a substantial alteration of the demographic structure in Palestine with all its political implications quite obviously caused a serious prejudice to 'the rights and position of the other sections of the population' contrary to the terms and objectives of the mandate.

The original inhabitants of Palestine, Moslems and Christians, opposed the flow of Jewish immigration into their country. Their opposition took the form of protests, demonstrations, civil disturbances and even an armed rebellion against the Mandatory Government.⁴⁰ After each serious disturbance the British Government appointed a commission of inquiry to determine its causes, as if these causes were not clear enough already. A military Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances of April 1920 found that the reasons for the trouble were Arab disappointment at the non-fulfilment of the promises of independence which were given to the Arabs during the war, Arab belief that the Bal-

³⁵ As to Jewish 'illegal' immigration into Palestine and its estimated number, see *A Survey of Palestine*, published by the Government of Palestine, Vol. I, p. 210.

³⁶ Government of Palestine, *Survey of Palestine*, Vol. I, p. 144.

³⁷ Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine*, 1941, p. 12.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³⁹ Appendix 1 to Report of Sub-Committee 1, Official Records of the 2nd Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, p. 270.

⁴⁰ Major riots and disturbances occurred in 1920, 1921, 1929, 1933 and almost continuously from 1936 until 1939 when they assumed the proportions of a rebellion.

four Declaration implied a denial of the right of self-determination, and fear that increase in Jewish immigration would lead to their economic and political subjection to the Jews.⁴¹ Another Commission of Inquiry, headed by the Chief Justice, reported that the fundamental cause of the disturbances of May 1921 was a feeling of discontent and hostility among the Arabs due to political and economic causes connected with Jewish immigration. The Commission rejected the Jewish suggestion that the riots had been artificially stimulated by the 'effendi' (the well-to-do) class and declared that the root of the trouble lay in the Arab fear of the consequence of Jewish immigration, which they regarded as an ultimate means of Arab political and economic subjection.⁴² The Commission of Inquiry, headed by Sir Walter Shaw, which inquired into the riots of August 1929 made findings similar to the Commission of 1921.⁴³ The Royal Commission, named the Peel Commission, which investigated the unrest in 1936 found that the underlying causes of the disturbances were the desire of the Arabs for national independence and their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish national home.⁴⁴ The Peel Commission recommended the termination of the mandate and partition of the country between Arabs and Jews, save for enclaves covering Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth.⁴⁵ On further investigation of the form and practicabilities of partition by another Commission, called the Woodhead Commission, the British Government came to the conclusion that the difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish states within Palestine were so great as to make partition impracticable.⁴⁶

Only in 1939 did the British Government appear to realize that continued Jewish immigration into Palestine caused serious prejudice to the rights and position of the Palestine Arabs which it was its duty under the mandate to safeguard. Consequently it issued the White Paper previously mentioned, in which it declared its intention to limit Jewish immigration to 75,000 persons over the next five years and to grant to Palestine its independence after ten years. After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration would be allowed except with Arab consent.⁴⁷ But the Zionist Jews fought this White Paper by a campaign of violence. The three Jewish secret para-military organizations, the Haganah, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, joined forces to commit a series of acts of violence against the British and the Palestine Government in order to intimidate the British Government and secure the withdrawal of its limitation upon Jewish immigration into Palestine.⁴⁸

⁴¹ Government of Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine*, Vol. I, p. 17.

⁴² Cmd. 1540; Government of Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine*, Vol. I, pp. 18-19.

⁴³ Cmd. 3530; Government of Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine*, Vol. I, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁴ Government of Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine*, Vol. I, p. 38.

⁴⁵ Cmd. 3479.

⁴⁶ Cmd. 3854.

⁴⁷ Cmd. 6018, May 17 1939.

⁴⁸ For details about these outrages, see Government of Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine* Vol. I, pp. 36-37; The British Statement on Acts of Violence, Cmd. 6873 (1946); also S. N. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 379; G. Kirk, *The Middle East 1945-1950* (Oxford University Press, London, 1954), pp. 209-213 and 218-223.

Concurrently with their campaign the Zionists exerted all efforts to influence American public opinion and to bring pressure upon the American Government in order to secure their support for large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine. On the one hand, they quoted certain Biblical promises to the descendants of Abraham as if the Jews, and particularly the Jews of Eastern Europe, who then constituted the largest proportion of Jewish immigrants to Palestine, were his only descendants. On the other hand, they pointed to the Nazi persecution of the Jews during the Second World War. This persecution evoked deep sympathy for the displaced Jews of Europe and gave rise to a massive 'guilt complex', particularly among Americans. This 'guilt complex' was prompted by the feeling that the American refusal to open the gates of the U.S.A. to Jewish immigration before 1939 had contributed to the vast dimensions of the tragedy and the Americans now felt an obligation to offer recompense for the horrors which the Jews of Europe suffered at the hands of the Nazis. But this recompense was to be offered at the expense of the people of Palestine, who were not responsible for the crimes committed against the Jews in Europe. This generosity at the expense of others is illustrated by the fact that, while President Truman requested in 1946 the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine, only 4,767 displaced persons and refugees from Europe were admitted into the United States between December 22 1945 and October 21 1946.⁴⁹ In addition to the Bible and Nazi persecution, the Zionists also exploited the 'Jewish vote' in the American elections. As a result, there developed a strong American pressure upon the British Government to secure a larger measure of Jewish immigration to Palestine. This matter became a bone of contention between the American and British Governments. Accordingly, an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was formed in 1946 to suggest a solution. The Committee found that hostility between Jews and Arabs made the establishment of an independent Palestine impossible at the moment, and, therefore, advised that the British Government retain the mandate until a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations could be arranged. Meanwhile the Committee recommended the admission to Palestine of 100,000 European Jews as requested by President Truman.⁵⁰

Unable to permit any further Jewish immigration into Palestine against the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants, plagued by Zionist demands for more and more immigrants, subjected to pressure by the United States and harassed by the Zionist campaign of violence, the Mandatory Government in 1947 referred the question of the future government of Palestine to the United Nations. The mandate was thus coming towards an inglorious and tragic end after it had failed to achieve the purposes underlying Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Its principal result was that it had allowed the introduction and implantation in Palestine of a foreign people who as a well-organized and militant minority were determined to wrest the country from its indigenous inhabitants.

⁴⁹ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

⁵⁰ Report of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, April 20 1946, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington.

3 THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 29 1947 FOR THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE

The question of the future government of Palestine was the subject of discussion at a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations held in April and May 1947. On May 15 1947 the General Assembly appointed the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) to consider the problem of Palestine and to submit such proposals as it might consider appropriate for its solution. UNSCOP submitted its report to the General Assembly in September 1947. Two plans for the solution of the Palestine problem, a majority plan and a minority plan, were offered in UNSCOP's report. The majority plan proposed the termination of the mandate, the partition of Palestine and the creation of an Arab State, a Jewish State, and a *corpus separatum* for the City of Jerusalem, which would come under a special international regime to be administered by the United Nations. The Arab and Jewish states would be linked by an economic union. The minority plan also suggested the termination of the mandate but proposed the establishment of a federal state consisting of an Arab State and a Jewish State with Jerusalem as the capital.

The Arabs opposed the proposal to partition Palestine on the ground that it was incompatible with law and justice and the principles of democracy. Partition was against the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. The Arabs also questioned the legal competence of the United Nations to recommend the partition of their ancestral homeland.⁵¹ On several occasions they suggested that the legal issues affecting the Palestine Question, including the competence of the United Nations to recommend or to enforce any plan of partition of Palestine contrary to the wishes of its inhabitants, be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. But the political forces which were then attempting to secure a favourable vote on partition at any cost and by any means were not anxious to have their efforts hampered by an adverse judicial ruling. They were able each time to vote down every proposal to refer a legal issue to the International Court.⁵² It has been remarked that the rejection of the proposals to refer the question of United Nations jurisdiction over the Palestine situation to the International Court of Justice 'tends to confirm the avoidance of international law' in this regard.⁵³

⁵¹ The absence of competence in the United Nations to decide the partition of Palestine and the ineffectiveness of the partition resolution to vest any territorial title in Israel will be discussed in Appendix XI.

⁵² For several denials in 1947 by the U.N. of requests for an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice on the Palestine Question, see U.N. Documents A/AC 14/21, October 14 1947; A/AC 14/24, October 16 1947; A/AC 14/25, October 16 1947 and A/AC 14/32, November 11 1947. See, in particular, the rejection by the Ad Hoc Committee on November 24 1947 by 21 votes to 20 of the recommendation of Sub-Committee 2 that an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice be sought on the legal issues involved in the partition of Palestine (Official Records of the 2nd session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, p. 203).

⁵³ Pitman B. Potter, *The Palestinian Problem before the United Nations*, *AJIL*, Vol. 42, 1948, p. 860.

Despite Arab opposition the General Assembly adopted on November 29 1947, by a vote of 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions, a resolution for the partition of Palestine basically on the lines suggested by the majority report with some territorial modifications.⁵⁴ The territories allocated to the proposed Arab and Jewish states respectively under the partition resolution are shown on the map annexed as Appendix II.

It is generally known that the U.N. vote in favour of partition was secured by Zionist pressures and power politics.⁵⁵ 'Several days before the vote was taken it appeared that the partition plan might not obtain the necessary two-thirds majority of those voting; but several postponements gave Zionists and sympathizers among United States officialdom opportunity to put pressure on China, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Liberia and the Philippines, all of which intended to vote against partition. Greece, alone, withstood the pressure.'⁵⁶ President Truman used his personal and official influence to secure a U.N. vote in favour of partition.⁵⁷ Mr. Pitman B. Potter has observed: 'The United States came close to exercising undue influence to get the partition plan adopted...'⁵⁸ Dr. Stephen B. L. Penrose, President of the American University of Beirut, has criticized the American pressure which was used to secure adoption of the partition resolution in the following terms:

The political maneuvering which led to the final acceptance of the United Nations General Assembly of the majority report of UNSCOP provides one of the blacker pages in the history of American international politics. There can be no question but that it was American pressure which brought about the acceptance of the recommendation for Partition of Palestine with Economic Union voted by the General Assembly on November 29 1947. It was this effective American pressure for partition which is largely responsible for the terrific drop which American prestige took in all parts of the Arab and Muslim world.⁵⁹

The U.N. resolution to partition Palestine was one of great injustice to the original inhabitants of the country both in respect of the principle of partition and in the manner of the division.

As regards the principle of partition, there can be no doubt that the very concept of the division of the country between its original inhabitants and a body of newcomers who had been allowed during the

⁵⁴ Resolution 181 (II). For a concise review of the Palestine Question before the United Nations, see L. Larry Leonard, *The United Nations and Palestine*, International Conciliation, October 1949, pp. 603-786, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York.

⁵⁵ See in this regard Kermit Roosevelt, *The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics*, 2 *Middle East Journal* (1948), p. 1.

⁵⁶ S. N. Fisher, *The Middle East* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959), p. 583.

⁵⁷ As to President Truman's exertions to secure that the votes of states amenable to U.S. influence be given in favour of partition, see *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 309, 323, 344, 348, 357, and Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, *We Need Not Fail*, p. 63. See also John H. Davis, *The Evasive Peace* (John Murray, London, 1968), p. 37.

⁵⁸ Pitman B. Potter, *The Palestine Problem before the United Nations*, *AJIL* (1948), Vol. 42, p. 861.

⁵⁹ Stephen B. L. Penrose, *The Palestine Problem: Retrospect and Prospect* (American Friends of the Middle East, New York), p. 10.

British mandate to enter and settle therein against the wishes of the people of Palestine because their alleged ancestors had lived in it a few thousand years before was fundamentally wrong, unjust and undemocratic.

Moreover, the principle of partition could not be justified on the basis either of Jewish population or of Jewish ownership of land.

In terms of population, the Jews constituted in 1947 less than one-third of the inhabitants of Palestine. Only one-tenth of them were part of the original inhabitants and belonged to the country. In fact, this original Jewish Palestinian community—consisting of Arabic-speaking and strictly Orthodox Jews—did not favour partition nor the establishment of a Jewish state.⁶⁰ The rest of the Jewish population was composed of foreign immigrants originating mostly from Poland, U.S.S.R. and Central Europe.⁶¹ Only one-third of these Jewish immigrants had acquired Palestinian citizenship.⁶² Excluding the Jews of Palestinian origin, the Jewish community then existing in Palestine was, therefore, mainly composed of foreigners—both in origin and in nationality. Nowhere, except in Palestine, have foreign immigrants been allowed to break up the territorial integrity of the country in which they came to live. The legal implications arising from the alien character of the majority of the Jews living in Palestine who proclaimed in 1948 the state of Israel will be considered in Appendix XI.

Even in the proposed Jewish state, the majority of the inhabitants were Arabs. The creation of a Jewish State in a territory whose population was predominantly Arab was criticized by Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question:

It will thus be seen that the proposed Jewish State will contain a total population of 1,008,800, consisting of 509,780 Arabs and 499,020 Jews. In other words, at the outset, the Arabs will have a majority in the proposed Jewish State.⁶³

The Sub-Committee further analysed in detail the respective Arab and Jewish population figures in the three sections of the proposed Jewish State as follows:

65. It is even more instructive to consider the relative proportion of Arabs and Jews in the three regions comprising the area of the proposed Jewish State. In its southern section—the Beersheba area—there are 1,020

⁶⁰ A few Jews of non-Palestinian origin also opposed the partition of Palestine. Among the most prominent Jewish opponents of the partition of Palestine was Dr. Judah Magnes, Rector of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who advocated a bi-national state: see Alfred Lilienthal, *What Price Israel?* (Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1953), pp. 51–52, 73, 80 and 172.

⁶¹ See Government of Palestine, *Statistical Abstract*, 1944–1945, p. 42.

⁶² The number of Jewish immigrants that entered Palestine from 1920 until 1945 was about half a million persons. Notwithstanding the facilitation by the Government of Palestine of the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jewish immigrants during the mandate only 132,616 of them had acquired citizenship by the year 1945: see immigration and naturalization figures in *Statistical Abstract* of the Government of Palestine, 1944–1945, pp. 36 and 46, and *A Survey of Palestine*, also published by the Government of Palestine, Vol. I, p. 208.

⁶³ Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, U.N. Document A/AC 14/32, November 11 1947, Official Records of the 2nd session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee, 1947, p. 291.

Jews as against an Arab population of 103,820. In other words, the Jewish population is less than 1 per cent of the total. It is surprising that the majority of an international committee such as the Special Committee should have recommended the transfer of a completely Arab territory and population to the control of the Jews, who form less than 1 per cent of the population, against the wishes and interests of the Arabs, who form 99 per cent of the population. Similarly, in the northern section of the proposed Jewish State—eastern Galilee—the Arab population is three times as great as the Jewish population (86,200 as against 28,750). Only in the central section of the proposed Jewish State—the plains of Sharon and Esdraelon—have the Jews a majority, the respective population figures being 469,250 Jews and 306,760 Arabs (these figures do not include Bedouins, as separate estimates are not available for this area). Even in this region, the majority is more apparent than real because almost half the Jewish population is located in the Jewish towns of Tel Aviv and Petah Tiqva.⁶⁴

The geographical distribution and percentages of the Arab and Jewish population in 1946 are shown on the U.N. chart annexed as Appendix III.

In terms of ownership of land—exclusive of urban property—the Palestine Government's Village Statistics, annexed hereto as Appendix IV, indicate that the Jews owned in 1945 only 1,491,699 dunoms⁶⁵ of land out of a total area of 26,323,023 dunoms in Palestine.⁶⁶ Jewish land ownership represented a proportion of 5.66 per cent of the total area of the country. The figure of land in Jewish possession on June 30 1947 was given by Sub-Committee No. 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question as being 1,802,386 dunoms.⁶⁷ This figure, however, represents land in Jewish possession rather than in Jewish ownership and includes 200,000 dunoms of public lands leased by the Government of Palestine to the Jews in the Haifa Bay area. Even if one takes as a basis land in Jewish possession instead of ownership, the percentage of total Jewish land holdings still remains at the low figure of 6.8 per cent only of the area of Palestine.

The Village Statistics establish also that land in Arab ownership amounted to 12,574,774 dunoms, representing 47.77 per cent of the total area of the country. This figure does not include large tracts of grazing land which belonged to Arab villages and which were classified under public lands. The balance, i.e., 46 per cent of the total area, represented public lands. The distribution of land ownership between Arabs and Jews by sub-districts in Palestine is shown in U.N. map No. 94 (b) of August 1950 annexed as Appendix V.

On the other hand, the manner of the division of the territory between the two communities was extremely unfair to the Palestine Arabs. The disproportion between the area of land owned by the Jews and the area of Palestine allocated to the Jewish state is astounding. In disregard of the

⁶⁴ Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Document A/AC 14/32, November 11 1947, pp. 291-292.

⁶⁵ One dunom equals one thousand square metres. Four dunoms equal one acre approximately.

⁶⁶ Appendix VI to the Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, U.N. Document A/AC 14/32, November 11 1947, p. 270.

⁶⁷ Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, 1947, A/AC 14/34.

fact that the Palestine Arabs constituted the majority of the population and despite the predominance of Arab ownership of the land, the partition resolution recommended that an area equivalent to 14,500 square kilometres, corresponding to 5,700 square miles, out of a total area of 26,323 square kilometres, equivalent to roughly 10,000 square miles, i.e., 57 per cent of the territory of Palestine, be allocated to the proposed Jewish State as against 11,000 square kilometres or 4,300 square miles, i.e., 43 per cent, to the proposed Arab State.⁶⁸ In effect, this meant that the Jews, who represented less than one-third of the population and owned about 6 per cent of the land, were allocated almost two-thirds of the country, i.e., a territory which was almost ten times the area owned by them. Furthermore, the part of Palestine allocated to the Palestine Arabs was mostly hilly, desert and unproductive country, while most of the fertile coastal belt from Acre in the North to Isdud in the South was allocated to the Jewish State.

⁶⁸ UNSCOP had even originally proposed that 3,600 square miles be assigned to the Arab state as compared with 6,400 square miles to the Jewish state.

The United States and the Birth of Israel

The Palestine problem was brought before a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on April 28, 1947, and seven months later the regular session of the world body adopted the well-known resolution to partition Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. Although all the practical arrangements made by the United Nations for the application of its resolution were nullified by British obstruction and Arab resistance, and although the Jews of Palestine had to fight a costly war for their state, the resolution was nevertheless crucial for the emergence of Israel. It was crucial because it liquidated the Mandate and defined the legal framework within which the Yishuv could conduct its struggle and establish its state while placing its enemies in the position of aggressors. It was crucial because it made it possible for the Yishuv to obtain material help from abroad and diplomatic support from the United States and the United Nations at critical moments in the war. It was crucial, above all, because it provided the Yishuv with a definite goal and a program around which it could rally all its forces. Only five years before the United Nations' resolution, the adoption by the Zionist movement of a program redefining its immediate aim as the setting up of a Jewish state instead of simply assuring the further development of the National Home had encountered great difficulties and in the end left a substantial minority in opposition. Only the year before the U.N. resolution, the energies of the movement had been concentrated on getting accepted the recommendations of the Anglo-American Commission which explicitly ruled out a Jewish state. It was only after the majority of the United Nations' own inquiry commission (UNSCOP) recommended partition and a Jewish and an Arab state that the stragglers, not to be less "Zionist" than the commission, and the extremists, not to miss the opportunity of getting what could be obtained, rallied to the center, and that the entire Yishuv, from Communists to Irgunists, could fight for a common program.

The United States was intimately involved in the adoption of the partition resolution as well as in the chain of events that had brought the Palestine question before the United Nations. In the very intense struggle that developed between supporters and opponents of partition, the United States not only stood on the side of partition, but in the crucial moments before the decision threw her full weight into the effort to mobilize the votes that were still needed. Without this effort, it is very doubtful whether the partition resolution would have obtained the statutory two-thirds majority of the General Assembly.

Reprinted by permission of the publishers from THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL by Nadav Safran, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 1963 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

In many quarters in the United States, including some departments of the government, the role played by America in the Palestine controversy under the aegis of President Truman has been severely criticized as unwise and unfair in terms of the Palestine issue itself and as practically damaging to the interests of the United States. Actually, as we shall see, the United States stand in favor of partition can be justified on any and all of these grounds at least as adequately as the implied alternatives of its critics. The real trouble was that that stand as well as all the positions advocated or adopted in connection with the Palestine question, had not been carefully thought through by anybody in any terms. Various groups exerted pressure on the President to favor or oppose specific measures, but nobody presented him with any suggestion for a comprehensive, consistent policy on Palestine. The result was vacillation and inconsistencies which did more harm to the issue and more damage to American prestige and interest than the substance of the final position taken.

1. AMERICA'S PALESTINE RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION

The absence of a definite, comprehensive American policy on Palestine when its fate was being decided stemmed partly from the fact that though the United States had had connections with Palestine and the Middle East going back at least one century, she had few interests there until just a few years before the problem came up in the United Nations. Until Wilson's brief sally into world politics during the first World War and after it, United States concern with the area had been almost purely a function of the academic, missionary, and philanthropic interests of some of her citizens in that part of the world. The activities of the American government in connection with these interests were uncontroversial and worked directly or indirectly for the benefit of Arabs and Jews equally. On the Arab side, the government afforded indispensable protection to the educational work of American missionaries which helped spark a cultural revival that marked the birth of Arab nationalism. On the Jewish side, American consuls provided protection to large numbers of Jerusalem Jews under the capitulations system, and American representatives in Constantinople wrestled with discriminatory laws against Jews because they affected the few hundred American Jews then residing in Palestine. In the course of the war, American naval vessels helped evacuate Palestinian Jews expelled by the Turks from Jaffa to Alexandria, and were commissioned to transport food, petrol, medicines, money, and other relief to the Jews of the Holy Land, cut off from their sources of aid in the rest of the world by the British blockade and abandoned to their fate by the Turks. These activities derived from the concern of the American government that American citizens should not be discriminated against or placed under unjust laws, or they were undertaken out of humanitarian considerations in response to appeals of American Jews on behalf of their distressed brethren.

For a brief period after the end of World War I, the nature of America's involvement in Palestine and the Middle East changed abruptly. Although she had not declared war against

Turkey, the United States became concerned with the political future of the area as part of the general peace settlement. The United States government still had no special interest of its own to advance; but its influence was vigorously contested by opposing forces which then began to crystallize and were destined henceforth to become a permanent factor in the Palestine question in its American context. As early as October 1917, President Wilson, under the influence of his Zionist friend and adviser Louis D. Brandeis, had conveyed to the British government his support for one of the last drafts of the Balfour Declaration, unknowingly helping its advocates in Britain to overcome the last obstacles on their way. But the President had given that support in an offhand way and did not act in the Peace Conference as though he had already committed himself on the Palestine question. To the dismay of Brandeis and his associates, the President and some of his aides from the State Department entertained suggestions about the future of Palestine and Syria which took no account whatever of the Balfour Declaration or were opposed to it. Such suggestions had been made among others by groups of missionaries who feared that their work would be undone by the Jews and unfolded instead the vision of a united Arab world under American tutelage. They were reinforced by the opposition of anti-Zionist Jews to the Declaration out of fear of the charge of dual allegiance, and by the opposition of some American business interests—notably Standard Oil—which had acquired concessions from the Turks in the Negev and feared the Zionists. In the end, President Wilson reaffirmed his support of the Balfour Declaration in strong and unequivocal terms; but his initial casual involvement, his subjection to opposing pressures, his vacillation and final commitment, were a remarkable preview of what was to happen on a grand scale with President Truman thirty years later.

With the failure of Wilson's internationalism and the return to isolationism, the United States government lost any interest it may have had in the political fate of the Middle East and Palestine, and its concern with the area reverted once more to being subsidiary to the private interests of American citizens there. By then, however, these interests were no longer confined to the sphere of religion, humanitarianism, and philanthropy but had come to include economic and political interests of increasing importance.

As early as 1920 American oil concerns had appealed to their government to secure for them equal opportunity in the Middle Eastern countries under the control of the French and the British. The American government responded to this appeal and obtained for a group of American companies a 23.75 per cent share in the Iraq Petroleum Company. Thereafter, the United States government strove to obtain from the powers controlling the Middle Eastern countries commitments to an open-door policy that would not discriminate against private American business. In this connection, the United States concluded the Anglo-American Treaty of 1924 which regulated relations between the two countries in connection with the Palestine Mandate and secured the protection of business and missionary interests of Americans in Palestine. Incidentally, the preamble to this treaty included a reference to the Balfour Declaration, inserted at the insistence of the British nego-

tiators, which was to be interpreted later by various parties as giving the United States the right to have a say in any changes in the Mandate.

As for the political interest of American citizens in the Middle East, this had already manifested itself in the pressure on President Wilson by American Zionists, headed by men like Brandeis, Frankfurter (later Justices of the Supreme Court), Judge Mack, and Stephen Wise, to support the Balfour Declaration and the granting of the Palestine Mandate to Britain. Having attained its object, the political activity of the American Zionists subsided for most of the inter-war period. But in the 1930's, as persecution of Jews in Hitler's Reich mounted and as the British put increasing restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine, the American Zionists bestirred themselves once more in an effort to induce their government to press the British to alter their policy. At that particular juncture, the Zionists did not obtain much satisfaction from the President or the State Department; but Congress was another matter. The legislature of the United States, partly because it was not directly responsible for America's foreign policy and could therefore afford to look at the matter in abstract humanitarian terms, and partly because its members were more sensitive to the electoral implications of their position, had by then an already established tradition of sympathy with Zionist aspirations and wishes. In 1922, for example, Congress had adopted a joint resolution in support of the Balfour Declaration; and the sponsor of the resolution in the Senate was none other than Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the spearhead of American isolationism in the post-war years. Now, in 1939, a majority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and twenty-eight senators publicly protested against the restriction of immigration to Palestine at that critical moment for the Jews. They called the defense of Jewish interests in Palestine "a moral obligation of the United States" and declared that the White Paper was a violation of the Anglo-American Treaty of 1924.

During the second World War the private interests of American citizens in the Middle East became much more intense and, in addition, the American government itself developed new interests of its own in the area. In 1933, American companies had obtained from the ruler of Saudi Arabia extensive oil concessions which reached the stage of large-scale production by 1940. Toward the end of the war, the excessive drain on America's own oil reserves caused the government itself to show interest in the Middle East Oil. In 1944, for instance, Secretary of the Interior Ickes sought to give the government a stake in Arabian oil by suggesting to the companies concerned that it should finance the building of a pipeline from the Arabian oil fields to the Mediterranean. The oil companies balked at the proposal, but official concern with insuring the flow of oil from the Middle East continued in government quarters, especially after the oil companies themselves undertook to build the pipeline and to expand their operations at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.

The outbreak of war and the initial disasters which were inflicted upon the Allies made it difficult for the Zionists to draw much attention to the problem of Palestine and the Jews. But as the tide of the war began to turn and victory loomed upon the horizon,

and as news of the Nazi projects for exterminating the Jews reached the United States, the American Zionists, supported by the entire Jewish population and by large sections of the non-Jewish public, exerted a persistent and desperate pressure on the government to persuade the British to open the gates of Palestine and to commit themselves to the support of a Jewish commonwealth. Congress responded with a series of resolutions and declarations in the period 1943-1945 in favor of unrestricted immigration and a Jewish state in Palestine. President Roosevelt gave a number of clear pledges during the election campaign of 1944 to help bring about the realization of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine which he counterbalanced with ambiguous pledges to King Ibn Saud that he would take no action which might prove hostile to the Arab people without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. The War Department expressed concern lest the declarations made by Congress and the President should endanger the war effort of the Allies, while the State Department held to the line that Palestine was Britain's responsibility, except insofar as the American government was interested in the general problem of the tragedy of European Jewry and was eager to help. This last qualification was quite important; it was to prove the opening wedge of the American government's involvement in the Palestine question right after the war, which began with President Truman's appeal to Prime Minister Attlee to admit 100,000 survivors of the Nazi camps to Palestine.

While the private interests of its citizens were drawing it into greater involvement in Middle Eastern matters, the American government itself was acquiring its own interest in the area. During the war, the United States became directly interested in the Middle East as a theater of operations, as a strategic base, and as a supply route to Russia. At the end of the war, it looked for a time as though the United States might pull out of the whole area and leave it under the responsibility of Britain. But the civil war in Greece and Soviet pressure on Turkey and Iran compelled the American government to become more and more engaged, first politically and on the side of Britain, and then both politically and militarily as the chief actor. The turning point came in the spring of 1947 when, after Britain notified the United States of her intention to divest herself of responsibility for Greece and Turkey, the United States proclaimed what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. The Doctrine committed the United States specifically to guarantee the security of Greece, Turkey, and Iran and declared the intention of the American government to contain Communist aggression everywhere. Thus, both by implication and as the hinterland of the American defense perimeter established along the three above-mentioned countries, the Middle East now came directly into the orbit of American global strategy.

2. THE UNITED STATES AND THE EMERGENCE OF ISRAEL

When the Palestine question came up for decision before the United Nations in the fall of 1947, the implications of the various involvements of the United States in the Middle East had not yet been fully worked out. There was a general sense that it was important to have the good will of the governments of the Arab land

mass right behind the American defense perimeter. There was a belief that an effort should be made to insure the undisturbed development and flow of Arabian oil. And there was a generally accepted notion that something ought to be done to relieve the survivors of the Nazi slaughter and thus assuage the agitation of Palestine's Jews, alleviate the pressure of their American brethren, and meet a demand endorsed by public opinion generally. But all these considerations had not been assessed together in the context of the realities and possibilities of the Palestine situation in an effort to formulate an appropriate policy. What happened, instead, was that different individuals and sections in the government and among the public seized upon one aspect or another of the question in disregard of other facts and endeavored to press it upon President Truman while impeaching the arguments and even the motives of others. The President was left to steer his own course by hunch or impulse amidst conflicting views and opposing pressures; and his instinct guided him now one way, now another.

In the fall of 1947, the President decided, apparently without much difficulty, to support partition, against the judgment of people in the State Department. He, like everyone else, had been impressed by the fact that a majority of a United Nations commission, composed of representatives of countries with no direct interest in Palestine which had just investigated the problem had recommended this solution. (These countries were Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.) The solution also seemed to accord well with the humanitarian impulse which had induced him in the course of the two previous years to press for the admission to Palestine of a large number of survivors of Nazi concentration camps. Moreover, the proposed partition plan had been accepted with barely hidden enthusiasm by the Jewish masses of America whose votes seemed particularly important in that election year when Truman was the underdog in the contest against Governor Dewey of New York.

But the partition plan did not work out according to the schedule prepared for it by the United Nations. The British refused to collaborate with the world organization in easing the transition to the new order and even seemed to be doing their best to make it difficult. At the same time, the Arabs of Palestine rose up in arms in December 1947 with the encouragement and support of the neighboring Arab states, and the country was plunged into a vicious civil war in which the Jews seemed to be getting the worst of it. The United Nations considered organizing an international constabulary to enforce partition, but a force of the size thought to be needed was impossible to raise without Russian participation, to which the United States was opposed. The President was under mounting pressure to send American troops to do the job, but he was disinclined to commit the country further and, moreover, his military advisers informed him that the United States did not have the necessary forces available in any case. In these circumstances, the President accepted the advice of the State Department and authorized the American representative in the United Nations to declare the partition plan impracticable and to submit instead a proposal for a United Nations Trusteeship over Palestine.

This reversal of policy brought frantic protests and appeals from American Zionists and Jews, congressmen and other politicians, and prominent and plain American citizens. It also encouraged the Arabs to believe that whatever the political decisions were, it was the military facts that counted. But while the United Nations became entangled in fruitless discussions about Trusteeship and how it could be enforced, the Jews of Palestine, having received a shipment of Russian arms and enjoying greater freedom of action as the British forces kept withdrawing from the country, launched an offensive which reversed the course of the civil war and brought most of the territory allocated to them by the partition plan under their effective control. On May 14, 1948, notwithstanding State Department advice to the contrary, they proclaimed their state, calling it Israel. A few hours later, as army columns from the neighboring Arab states poured into Palestine in an attempt to establish a new set of military facts, the American chief delegate to the United Nations had to interrupt a speech in favor of Trusteeship to announce that the American government, that is, the President, had just awarded *de facto* recognition to the new state of Israel. The Trusteeship proposal was, of course, buried.

President Truman's recognition of Israel, undertaken without even notifying the men who were in charge of executing America's foreign policy, was not the last act in the undignified spectacle of United States inconsistency. Once again, the Secretary of State himself was to support a modification of the partition resolution, known as the Bernadotte plan, in the forum of the United Nations only to see the President repudiate it publicly at home; and more than once the President was to go over the heads of his State Department, as he did in choosing and instructing the first ambassador to Israel. All this seesawing and confusion, besides causing great damage to the prestige of the United States and encouraging the belligerents to believe and act as though military facts were the only important considerations, has left as residue the notion that the United States' support of Israel and the partition plan had been forced upon a well-meaning but weak President by sinister pressure groups regardless of the damaging effect on America's interest. To what extent is such a notion justified?

3. APPRAISAL OF AMERICA'S POSITION IN 1947-1948

That the President of the United States was submitted to unusually strong and sharp pressures in connection with the Palestine problem which helped to confuse his judgment is beyond doubt. As the published records of the period indicate, however, these pressures came from the opponents as well as from the supporters of partition. As to the question whether or not America's support of the partition plan was unwise, unjust, and contrary to the national interest, an appraisal of the situation in 1947, taking into account the background of the Palestine problem and the three basic aims of the United States at that time—to maintain peace and gain Arab good will, to protect the oil interests, and to help the escapees of Hitler's massacres—would seem to indicate that partition was, if not the best, at least the only available solution worthy of support.

It should be recalled that by the fall of 1947, two basic facts in regard to the Palestine problem were clear to all. One was that the Mandate could not go on and had to be terminated. This was a

conclusion which had been reached by the British, the Arabs, and the Jews and was included among the unanimous recommendations of the United Nations' inquiry committee. The second fact was that Arabs and Jews were determined to fight: the former to prevent large-scale Jewish immigration, the latter to achieve just that. These two facts must be taken as premises in any attempt to assess the most desirable and practical policy for the United States at the time.

Before the United Nations and the world, three competing solutions to the Palestine problem were presented. Two of these were suggested by the United Nations inquiry committee which, given its composition, could not be said to have had any interest in the question other than providing a fair and viable solution under the circumstances. The majority of the committee recommended partition into two sovereign, independent Arab and Jewish states and an international zone linked by an economic union, and allotted to the proposed Jewish state nearly 55 per cent of the territory of Palestine in order to give it some living space for future immigration. The minority recommended a single federal government for all of Palestine with two constituent states, Arab and Jewish, endowed with a considerable degree of autonomy. Immigration, together with defense and foreign affairs, was to be entrusted to the federal government whose legislature was to be bicameral, with equal Arab and Jewish representation in one house and proportional representation in the other. All legislation was to require a majority of both houses. Deadlocks were to be resolved by an arbitral committee in which the decisive voice would belong to an outsider. The third solution was suggested by the Arabs themselves. It called for an independent, unitary, sovereign state in Palestine in which the Jews would enjoy guarantees of their status as a minority and would be awarded a large measure of municipal and cultural autonomy. Immigration, as all other matters, would depend on the decision of the legislature, which would, of course, be predominantly Arab.

Now, the Arab solution was the one which least endangered the oil interests, and support for it would have gained for the United States the good will of the Arabs at least in the immediate sense. But from the point of view of the United States it had at least three major disadvantages. First, it precluded in practice any substantial Jewish immigration for which the United States had been pressing Britain. After all, an important factor in exacerbating the Palestine crisis right after the war had been the plea made by President Truman to the British government to admit a large number of survivors of the Nazi massacres into that country in the belief that such tragic necessity could hardly be resisted. Even the Morrison-Grady plan of 1946, agreed upon by the State Department and the British but rejected by the President, had envisaged an immigration of 100,000 immediately and held out the promise of more thereafter. It is true that the embarrassment of appearing inconsistent did not prevent the United States government from changing its mind several times later on; but at least in these cases it could plead *force majeure* whereas, in this instance, supporting the Arab plan would have required it to accept and even urge something much less than what it had previously rejected as inadequate at a time when the United Nations commission was recommending more. Secondly, it was extremely doubtful that the Arab solution,

even with American support, would have gained the required two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly considering its extreme remoteness even from the minority report of the United Nations commission. Thirdly, the application of such a solution would have required measures to suppress the Jews of Palestine even more drastic than those which had been adopted by the British to no avail in the previous two years. It would have needed something like an international force or a great power sealing the country while the armed forces of the Arab states crushed the Jewish settlers. And this right after the Nazi massacre of Europe's Jews.

We have deliberately dwelt at some length on the Arab solution because it was the only one which seemed to offer the prospect of satisfying the "real," tangible, and immediate interests of the United States, and it is therefore important to stress how infeasible it was. The other two proposals, that of the majority and that of the minority of the United Nations commission, were labeled "absurd" by the Arabs and were vehemently rejected. Consequently, United States support for either seemed to entail a risk of alienating the needed Arab good will and endangering the oil interests. It is of course true that in the perspective of later events it became clear that the Arabs would have preferred the minority plan; but in this same perspective the Arabs have expressed their acceptance of partition too. As things stood in 1947, support for the minority plan would have entailed almost the same risks for United States interests without satisfying the Jewish aspirations and having the Jewish support which the majority plan enjoyed. Furthermore, supposing the minority plan were capable of mustering, with United States' active support, the needed vote—which is not at all certain—its realization and viability depended so much on continual Arab-Jewish cooperation that once the two partners of the envisaged state opposed it they in fact doomed it. The realization of the plan in the face of such opposition would have required the indefinite presence of a third power which almost surely was not to be found and which in any case would gain the hostility of both sides very quickly. The problem of Palestine would have remained to plague the United Nations and, in all likelihood, one of the federated states would have seceded sooner or later and reopened the entire issue.

In the light of the circumstances of 1947, there seems to be no doubt that the partition plan offered the best hope for a solution of the Palestine problem. It had the support of the Jews, which greatly simplified the problem of application. Violence and difficulties might have been expected from the Arab side, but if handled wisely and with determination, the extent of the violence might have been limited and, after a transition period, there would have been two independent states capable of taking care of themselves. From the point of view of the United States, there were undoubtedly some risks of losing her standing among the Arabs and endangering the oil interests of her citizens in which she too was interested; but these were in less danger from the quick surgical operation of partition than from the festering open wound of a federal state or some similar scheme. Finally, the partition plan did offer some prospect of closing the painful episode of Jewish martyrdom which weighed heavily on the conscience of the Western world. If subsequent circumstances disproved the calculations that

might have been made in 1947, it was in great degree because the calculations were *not* made and therefore the support given to partition was uncertain, hesitant, and incomplete. Who knows whether the Arab armies would have intervened had the United States as well as the Soviet Union provided arms to the Jewish militia in March and April of 1948 instead of knuckling under to Arab violence and repudiating the partition plan? The Jewish state might have been erected then within the boundaries provided for it by the United Nations, and a Palestinian Arab state might have emerged at its side. Further, the bulk of the refugee problem would not have existed, much bloodshed and misery would have been spared, the entire heritage of the tragedy of Palestine might have been less bitter, and a salutary precedent might have been set for Arabs and Jews, as well as for other nations, in those crucial formative years of the international body, that the United Nations' will cannot be flouted with impunity.

The emergence of Israel and the Palestine war (1948)

The United Nations partition resolution touched off a wave of protests, demonstrations and disturbances in Palestine. The chronology of events in Palestine during the last six months which preceded the end of the mandate reads like a sequence of horrors. This chronology is annexed as Appendix VI. The Arabs were determined to resist the partition of their country. The Jews were equally determined to create a Jewish state in Palestine. The Palestine Commission appointed by the General Assembly in its resolution of November 29 1947 to implement the partition plan had reported on the steadily deteriorating situation in Palestine. The Security Council considered the situation between February 24 and April 1 1948 without any concrete results. On March 19 1948 Mr. Warren R. Austin, the U.S. representative at the U.N., asked the Security Council to suspend action on the partition plan and to call a special session of the General Assembly at once to work on a new solution. He advocated a temporary trusteeship for Palestine under the Trusteeship Council until the establishment of a government approved by Arabs and Jews. On March 30, he presented to the Security Council a resolution asking that the General Assembly be convened 'to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine'. On April 16 1948 a second special session of the General Assembly was convened to consider further the question of Palestine. Discussions both at the Security Council and at the second special session of the General Assembly revealed that some governments questioned the wisdom of the partition plan. The United Kingdom, as the retiring Mandatory Power, declared that it was not prepared to participate in the enforcement of a settlement which was not acceptable to both Arabs and Jews and further asserted that lack of co-operation on its part sprang from the fact that the partition had not been impartially conceived. The Jews opposed any reversal of attitude concerning partition. The suggestion made by the United States Government for the establishment of a temporary U.N. trusteeship over Palestine was attacked by the Jews as 'a shocking reversal of the United States position'. Eventually the idea of a trusteeship was abandoned and the General Assembly ended its second special session on May 14 1948 with a resolution appointing a Mediator to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future of Palestine. The United Nations were thus unable to prevent the explosion of the Palestine conflict which had been brewing since the adoption of the partition resolution.

For this conflict, Jews and Arabs were differently and unevenly prepared.

Reprinted by permission of the publishers from PALESTINE, THE ARABS AND ISRAEL by Henry Cattán, London: Longman Group Ltd., Copyright © 1969. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

Politically, the Jews had more cohesion than the Arabs. Financially, they possessed much greater resources. Militarily, they were better prepared, trained and equipped for an armed conflict. For several years, they had enforced a compulsory military training of all Jews able to carry arms. Most Jewish immigrants were already militarily trained since they came from countries which applied military service. The Jews also could rely upon the experience of the Jewish Military Brigade which had been formed during the Second World War and upon the supernumerary police force which was set up, trained and armed by the Government of Palestine during the mandate for the protection of Jewish colonies.¹ In addition, the Jews had created during the mandate three illegal underground para-military organizations: the Haganah with a membership of 60,000 to 80,000, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang.² The Irgun Zvai Leumi had a membership of about 5,000 to 10,000, together with several thousand sympathisers.³ According to the British Government's Statement on Violence (1946), these three organizations worked in co-operation on certain operations.⁴ Towards the end of the mandate the Jews decreed the total mobilization of Jewish manpower and converted the Haganah from an underground force into a regular army.⁵ Between December 8 1947 and March 9 1948 the Haganah had registered and called to active service all Palestine Jews between the ages of 17 and 25.⁶ Moreover, no Jew was permitted by the Zionist authorities to leave the country 'without an exemption from military service issued by the Haganah and a receipt for taxes paid for military financing'.⁷ In addition to possessing a trained combatant force, the Jews possessed considerable stocks of light arms: some of those arms had been given to them by the Palestine Government for the defence of their settlements; the larger part, however, was smuggled during the mandate.⁸ Some arms, including tanks, were even bought by the Haganah from British forces upon their evacuation of Palestine.⁹

In sharp contrast, the Palestine Arabs possessed no military organization or training. Their military potential depended exclusively upon certain groups of volunteers from among them with little or no military training. These groups were not even centrally organized.¹⁰ The largest group of volunteers was called the Arab Liberation Army and had an

¹ As regards the number and training of Jewish settlement and additional police during the mandate, see Government of Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine*, Vol. II, pp. 590-591.

² For details about these three Jewish para-military organizations, see the *Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine*, 1946, pp. 40-41; S. N. Fisher, *The Middle East* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1960), p. 579; G. Kirk, *The Middle East 1945-1950* (Oxford University Press, London, 1954), pp. 4, 194, 195; Palestine Government, *A Survey of Palestine*, Vol. II, pp. 601-606.

³ *Zionist Review*, May 30 1947, p. 4.

⁴ *Cmd.* 6873, p. 3.

⁵ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

⁶ *Middle East Journal* (1948), pp. 215 and 329.

⁷ S. N. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 584.

⁸ The Palestine Government recognized that there was 'ample evidence of arms smuggling by the Jews' (*A Survey of Palestine*, Vol. II, p. 594).

⁹ S. N. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 586.

¹⁰ As to the contrast between the respective military position of Arabs and Jews in 1948, see S. N. Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 585-586.

estimated strength of 6,000 to 7,500 men.¹¹ Unlike the Jews, the bulk of the Palestine Arab population was not mobilized nor did it possess any military training. Accordingly, the Palestine Arab combatant force never matched in numbers, training or organization the Jewish combatant force.¹²

Other factors also operated against the Palestine Arabs and greatly diminished their chances in any armed conflict with the Jews. By reason of their opposition to the British mandate and to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine—such opposition having on several occasions led to violent disturbances, riots and even rebellion against the British Government—the latter had followed the policy of systematically disarming the Arab population. Thus, between 1935 and 1947, over 7,600 rifles were confiscated by the Palestine Government from the Arabs, while only 135 rifles were confiscated from the Jews.¹³ Moreover, special emergency legislation was enacted to deal with the possession or carrying of firearms, and courts were established in order to punish this severely, even with death. Thousands of Palestinian Arabs were tried and sentenced by military courts for such offences.

On May 14 1948 the hour struck. The British High Commissioner left Palestine and the British mandate formally ended.

On the same day the Jewish state of Israel was proclaimed and a Provisional Government was formed. The Haganah became officially the army of the new state. Thereupon, military hostilities commenced between Israel and its four neighbouring Arab states, namely, Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon. The Arab states put into the field 'four armies with no central command, no concerted aim, and no serious and sustained will to win', to face the Israelis, who had proceeded with a total mobilization of their manpower on modern lines.¹⁴ The Arab armies which then moved into Palestine represented what in fact were token forces, a total of about 20,000 men.¹⁵

Three days after the intervention of the Arab states in Palestine, the United States Government submitted to the Security Council a resolution under Article 39 of the Charter ordering the belligerents to cease fire within thirty-six hours. The British Government questioned the desirability of invoking Article 39 of the Charter and thought that there should be a thorough study of the juridical status of Palestine after the end of the mandate. The United States proposal was not adopted, but on May 22 1948 the Security Council called upon the Governments concerned to order a cease-fire within thirty-six hours. Then on May 29 1948 the Security Council called for a truce for a period of four weeks during which the Governments should refrain from introducing into

¹¹ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

¹² See also on Arab military unpreparedness, Musa Alami, *The Lesson of Palestine*, *Middle East Journal* (1949), p. 373.

¹³ Government of Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine*, Vol. II, pp. 594-595.

¹⁴ Albert Haurani, *Arab Refugees and the Future of Israel*, *The Listener*, July 28 1949; S. G. Thicknesse, *Arab Refugees*, p. 2 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1949).

¹⁵ For an account of military operations during the Palestine war and the respective military strength of Arabs and Jews, see Edgar O'Ballance, *The Arab-Israeli War, 1948* (Faber, London, 1956).

their countries men of military age or war material. The late Count Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator, arranged for the month's truce to begin on June 11 1948.

The truce lasted from June 11 1948 until July 7 1948. 'The Israelis disregarded their undertaking not to import war materials during the truce, and took ample advantage of that respite to rectify their almost total lack of combat aircraft, artillery and heavy armoured vehicles. . . .'¹⁶ On the expiry of the truce, hostilities were resumed. The Israelis not only occupied the areas allotted by the partition resolution to the Jewish State in the northern and central parts of the country but also seized the whole of Western Galilee as well as Lydda, Ramleh and a large part of central Palestine which the Arab Legion of Transjordan had evacuated. All of these areas had been allocated by the partition resolution to the Arab state. This time the fighting lasted only ten days, for on July 15 1948 the Security Council ordered the parties to desist from further military action. The second truce came into force on July 18 1948 and this time it was not subject to a time limit. The resolution stated that the truce should remain in force until a peaceful adjustment of the future of Palestine was reached, and charged Count Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator, to supervise its observance.¹⁷

Count Bernadotte was unable to pursue his efforts to secure a peaceful settlement between the parties for he was assassinated with United Nations observer Colonel André Sérot at Jerusalem on September 17 1948 by Jewish terrorists. However, one day prior to his assassination he had completed and signed his report which recommended that the United Nations should order the repatriation of the Palestine refugees and make certain territorial modifications in the partition plan.¹⁸

The Israelis were not to be contained within any territorial limits by the truce ordered by the Security Council on July 15 1948. They found pretexts to expand in breach of the truce and they undertook several offensives during which they seized more territory. On October 15 1948 the Israelis, in breach of the truce, launched a general offensive against the Egyptians on the southern front. 'The Israelis, now enjoying for the first time a superiority in the air, made substantial gains of territory, capturing Beersheba on the 21st, Bait Hanun (only five miles north-east of Gaza) on the 22nd, and Bait Jibrin (in the direction of Hebron) soon afterwards.'¹⁹

The parties accepted a cease-fire with effect from October 22 1948 but on October 31 the Israelis defied a warning by the U.N. Chief of Staff and launched an attack on the Lebanese front and occupied fifteen villages situated within Lebanese territory.²⁰ Also, in November, they moved forward in the Negeb in the direction of the Gulf of Aqaba.

On December 22 1948 the Israelis launched another offensive in the south, occupied the area of Auja and made substantial penetration into Sinai.²¹

¹⁶ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

¹⁷ Resolution No. 54 (1948), July 15 1948.

¹⁸ U.N. Document A/648, September 16 1948.

¹⁹ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

²⁰ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

²¹ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

This was not their last violation of the truce. On March 10 1949, in breach of their Armistice Agreement with Egypt dated February 24 1949, the Israelis again moved further south until they reached the Gulf of Aqaba and occupied the Palestine Police post of Umm Rashrash, which they afterwards named Eilat.²²

The Palestine war of 1948 was concluded by four Armistice Agreements signed by Israel with Egypt on February 24 1949, with Lebanon on March 23 1949, with Jordan on April 3 1949 and with Syria on July 20 1949. 'It was a short war', Commander Hutchison has observed, 'marked by outside intervention, Arab disunity and unlimited aid to Israel from the West, in addition to timely and substantial shipments of arms from behind the Iron Curtain, primarily from Czechoslovakia. This aid, sent in against the orders of the United Nations, was sufficient to turn the tide of battle and to grant Israel considerable land gains.'²³

An examination of the course of events in Palestine in 1948 reveals three significant facts which have been blurred by Zionist propaganda.

First, before the end of the mandate and, therefore, before any possible intervention by the Arab states, the Jews, taking advantage of their superior military preparation and organization, had occupied a number of Arab cities and seized a considerable part of the territory of Palestine. The chronology of events in Palestine during the six months preceding the end of the mandate shows that Jewish forces had seized and occupied most of the Arab cities of Palestine before May 15 1948. Tiberias was occupied on April 19 1948, Haifa on April 22, Jaffa on April 28, the Arab quarters in the New City of Jerusalem on April 30, Beisan on May 8, Safad on May 10 and Acre on May 14 1948.²⁴

Secondly, the Jews showed no respect, either before or after May 15 1948, for the territorial boundaries fixed by the partition resolution for the proposed Arab and Jewish states. They not only occupied the territory of the proposed Jewish state but also seized a substantial portion of the territory reserved for the proposed Arab state. The areas seized by Jewish forces before and after May 15 1948, in excess of the territorial limits of the Jewish state as fixed by the partition resolution, include Western Galilee, the New City of Jerusalem, the area west of Jerusalem to the Mediterranean, the Arab cities of Jaffa, Acre, Lydda and Ramleh and several hundred Arab villages. These areas are shown in Appendix VII. The total areas which the Israelis seized in 1948 and 1949 amounted to 20,850 square kilometres²⁵ out of 26,323 square kilometres representing the total area of Palestine. This meant that Israel increased the territory of the Jewish state as proposed by the United Nations from 14,500 square kilometres to 20,850 square kilometres and by the same act decreased the territory of the proposed Arab state from 11,800 square kilometres to about 5,400 square kilometres. The total area which thus fell under Israeli control amounted to almost 80 per cent of the territory of the country. This is in striking contrast with the 6 per cent total Jewish

²² G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

²³ E. H. Hutchison, *Violent Truce* (Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1950), p. 95.

²⁴ See Appendix VI and also G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-266.

²⁵ Israel Government, *Government Year-book*, English edition, 5712 (1951/1952), p. 315.

land ownership in the whole of Palestine.

The Arabs, on their part, were left with one-fifth of the original territory of their country. And what remained to them was the bone. It has been remarked that '3,000 out of the 8,000 square kilometres in Arab control after 1948 in Central Palestine are mountainous desert. The remaining 5,000 square kilometres, with the exception of some land around Nablus and Jericho, are among the most infertile in the whole of Palestine outside the Negeb'.²⁶

In contrast, the Palestine Arabs did not seize any of the territories reserved for the Jewish state under the partition resolution. Even when the Arab states did intervene militarily on May 15 1948, an express restriction was imposed on one of their armies in this regard. The Arab Legion of Transjordan was under orders from its British command not to move into territory awarded to the Jews by the United Nations partition plan.²⁷ Sir John Glubb, also known as Glubb Pasha, the commander of the Arab Legion, states that the Jordanians did not enter territory allotted by the United Nations to Israel but defended the area allotted to the Arabs.²⁸

Thirdly, the Israelis have pretended that they did not respect the territorial limits set by the resolution of November 29 1947 because of the Arab refusal to accept partition. In actual fact, they themselves largely contributed to the defeat of the partition resolution by occupying by force, and even before the end of the mandate, the major part of the territories allocated to the Palestine Arabs by the resolution.

The result of the Palestine conflict of 1948 was summed up by the American Chairman of the Israeli-Jordan Armistice Commission in the following terms:

The brief official Palestine war of 1948-1949 is now a part of history—it settled none of the basic issues of Arab-Israeli contention. The major powers of the West and the East, losing sight of the true value of a friendly Arab World in the swirling clouds of Zionist propaganda, overran the rights of the indigenous population of Palestine—the Arabs. Every step in the establishment of a Zionist state had been a challenge to justice.²⁹

Not only did the Palestine war of 1948 settle none of the basic issues of the Palestine Question, it created a new one: the tragedy of the Palestine refugees. During the strife which occurred before the end of the mandate and during the war that followed, more than half of the Palestine Arab population were displaced in circumstances to be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

²⁶ S. G. Thiesse, *op. cit.*, p. 22. It may be remarked that the area under Arab control in 1948 was less than 8,000 square kilometres.

²⁷ S. N. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 585. See also G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 270-271.

²⁸ Glubb Pasha, *The Middle East Crisis* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1967), p. 39.

²⁹ Commander E. H. Hutchison, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

The Exodus of the Palestine Refugees

I CAUSES OF THE EXODUS

Rarely in history—at least in modern history—has a majority of the population of a country been forcibly displaced and uprooted by a militant minority of foreign origin. Yet this is what happened in Palestine in 1948. Nearly a million Palestinians then left or were forced to leave their homes, towns and villages, were robbed of their lands, properties and possessions, and became refugees without any means of livelihood. The bulk of them went to Jordan and the Gaza Strip, the remainder to Syria and Lebanon. Why did so many leave? The exodus of the Palestine refugees in 1948 was due to three causes: Jewish terrorism, expulsion, and the breakdown of security and government machinery for the preservation of law and order during the last few months of the mandate. In his Progress Report the late Count Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator for Palestine, summarized these causes as follows:

The exodus of Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their communities, by rumours concerning real or alleged acts of terrorism, or expulsion.¹

2 Jewish terrorism

Before directing their outrages against the Arab civilian population in 1948, the Jewish terrorist organizations had for several years past turned their wrath against the British authorities in Palestine with the avowed purpose of forcing their hand on the immigration issue. The Jews had rebelled, as we have seen, against the British Government's policy declared in its White Paper of May 17 1939 of limiting Jewish immigration into Palestine to 75,000 over the next five years. Upon the expiration of this quota, Jewish organizations proceeded to instigate and organize the emigration of Jews from Europe to Palestine in violation of the law and also launched a terrorist campaign against the British in order to secure the repeal of the immigration restrictions. During this terrorist campaign, the Jews sabotaged public installations, dynamited government offices,² raided military stores, shot, killed, abducted and

¹ U.N. Document A/648, p. 14.

² The blowing up of the headquarters of the Palestine Government at Jerusalem by the Irgun Zvai Leumi on July 22 1946 during working hours will remain as the most notorious of these outrages. The terrorists deposited explosives in the basement of the King David Hotel where the government's offices were located and blew up the entire southern half of the east wing, causing the death of 91 persons and the wounding of 45 others: G. Kirk, *The Middle East 1945-1950* (Oxford University Press, London, 1954), pp. 221-222.

Reprinted by permission of the publishers from PALESTINE, THE ARABS AND ISRAEL by Henry Cattán, London: Longman Group Ltd., Copyright © 1969. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

flogged British soldiers and government officials.³

Jewish terrorism was then severely condemned by Viscount Samuel, who was himself a Zionist Jew and the first High Commissioner of Palestine, in the following terms:

The Jewish people have always taken pride in the good deeds performed and the distinctions won by their members; in the number of scientists, writers, musicians, philosophers and statesmen, who have come from the Jewish ranks. . . . Today these same people have given birth to a set of assassins, who, disguised in false uniforms, waylay soldiers and policemen, hurl bombs promiscuously, blow up trains. . . . I feel bound to say . . . that the Jewish population of Palestine and the Jewish Agency are blameworthy for not having . . . extirpated this curse which has brought shame upon all members of the Jewish community.⁴

Upon the outbreak of violence in Palestine following the U.N. partition vote, the Jews resorted to terrorism as a weapon of psychological warfare against the Palestine Arabs with the double object of subduing their opposition to the creation of a Jewish state and of causing their eventual flight from the country. At the end of 1947 and during the remaining months of the mandate, they turned against Arab civilians the terrorist machine which they had developed and perfected in their campaign of violence against the Government of Palestine. The chronology of events in Palestine during the six months preceding the end of the mandate, annexed as Appendix VI, sheds some light upon the horrible acts for which Jewish terrorism was responsible. Among Jewish exploits were the dynamiting of houses over the heads of their residents,⁵ the bombing of crowds in public places,⁶ the murder of people,⁷ and the destruction of villages. The destruction by Israel of Arab villages after their occupation was mentioned by the late Count Bernadotte in his report to the United Nations. He said:

There have been numerous reports from reliable sources of large-scale looting, pillaging and plundering, and of instances of destruction of villages without apparent military necessity. The liability of the Provisional Government of Israel to restore private property to its Arab owners and to indemnify those owners for property wantonly destroyed is clear. . . .⁸

In the same report, Count Bernadotte mentioned his investigation into the destruction of the villages of Ein Ghazal and Jaba and the representations that he made to the Israeli Government. He stated in his Report:

³ See British statement on Acts of Violence, *Cmd. 6873* (1946); S. N. Fisher, *The Middle East* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1960), pp. 579, 582; G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 197, 203, 210, 215, 218, 238, 245.

⁴ From Viscount Samuel's speech in the Palestine Debate in the House of Lords, April 23 1947, cited by J. L. Magnes, *Palestine—Divided or United*, Jerusalem, 1947, p. 89.

⁵ For examples, see the chronology in *Middle East Journal* (1948), pp. 217, 218, 220, 329 (Appendix VI). One of the horrible examples of this kind of terrorism was the dynamiting by the Haganah of the Semiramis Hotel in a residential quarter of Jerusalem on January 5 1948 causing the death under the debris of twenty residents of Jerusalem, including the Spanish Consul: see chronology in *Middle East Journal* (1948), p. 217.

⁶ For examples, see chronology in *Middle East Journal* (1948), pp. 216, 217 (Appendix VI).

⁷ Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator, *op. cit.*, p. 40; G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

⁸ U.N. Document A/648, September 16 1948.

After intensive investigation by observers, who succeeded in locating more than 8,000 of the villagers and in establishing that less than 130 were killed or missing, the Central Truce Supervision Board found that the villages were attacked by the Jews between 18 and 25 July by air and land, and the inhabitants had been forced to evacuate; after the evacuation the villages of Ein Ghazal and Jaba were destroyed by the Israeli forces. The attack could not be excused as a police action. . . . I informed the Provisional Government of Israel that the type of military action undertaken by their military forces was unjustified, and that the measures taken involving the systematic destruction of two villages, were excessive and constituted a violation of both the spirit and letter of the terms of the truce.⁹

Notwithstanding the Mediator's protest, the destruction of Arab villages by Israel proceeded on a large scale. The intention was to prevent their inhabitants who had fled or had been forced to evacuate from returning to their homes. Up till November 1953 one hundred and sixty-one Arab villages had been razed to the ground after their occupation by Israeli forces.¹⁰ Many of these villages were even destroyed after the United Nations resolution of December 11 1948 calling upon Israel to permit the return of the refugees to their homes.

Outstanding in savagery among the outrages committed by Jewish organizations in Palestine against the unarmed Arab civilian population was the deliberate and unprovoked massacre on April 9 1948 of almost all the villagers of Deir Yassin, a small peaceful village on the outskirts of Jerusalem. This outrage will remain as an indelible stain on Zionism. An authentic account of this horrible massacre was given by Mr. Jacques de Reynier, the Chief Delegate of the International Red Cross who, at the risk of his life, was able to reach the village and witness the aftermath of the tragedy.¹¹ 'Three hundred persons', he said, 'were massacred . . . without any military reason nor provocation of any kind, old men, women, children, newly-born were savagely assassinated with grenades and knives by Jewish troops of the Irgun, perfectly under the control and direction of their chiefs.'¹² Mr. Reynier described Jewish troops which he met on the scene, men and women, armed with pistols, sub-machine guns, grenades and 'large knives most of which were still bloodstained'.¹³ A young woman even showed him her knife, 'still dripping, as if it were a trophy'. Reynier forced his way into the homes of the village, found the mutilated bodies of the victims, and among them a girl ten years old and two old women, who, though wounded and left for dead, were still breathing. The Jewish Agency and the Haganah did all they could to prevent the delegate of the International Red Cross from investigating this horrible massacre.¹⁴ The Zionist au-

⁹ U.N. Document A/648, pp. 40-41.

¹⁰ A list giving the names of these villages was published with a letter of protest to the Israeli Government in *Al Rabitah*, No. 12, November 1953, a church magazine of the Greek Catholic Episcopate in Israel.

¹¹ Jacques de Reynier, *A Jerusalem un Drapeau flottait sur la Ligne de Feu* (Editions de la Baconnière, Neuchâtel, Switzerland, 1950).

¹² Translation from Reynier, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

¹³ Translation from Reynier, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

¹⁴ Reynier, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

thorities expressed 'horror and disgust' following the disclosure of the massacre by the International Red Cross but this did not prevent the Zionist Council from ratifying on the same day an agreement, concluded before the massacre, for co-operation between the Haganah and the Irgun Zvai Leumi, who were responsible for the massacre.¹⁵

The Jewish objective for the Deir Yassin massacre, of terrorising the Arab civilian population, was achieved with disastrous results. It can safely be said that the Deir Yassin massacre was the principal reason which caused the Palestine Arab exodus of 1948. Mr. Jacques de Reynier commented in the following terms:

This action had immense repercussions. The whole press, both Jewish and Arab, did strongly condemn this manner of acting, but insisted all the same upon the fact of its possible repetition and upon the need of being watchful. Thereupon terror seized the Arabs and gave rise to movements of panic which were wholly out of proportion with the real danger. The exodus began and became nearly general.¹⁶

The leader of the Irgun Zvai Leumi at the time of the massacre, Menahem Begin, who is at present a minister in the Israeli Cabinet, has even boasted that there would not have been a state of Israel without what he described as the 'military victory' at Deir Yassin.¹⁷

The exodus of the Palestine Arabs 'did not assume catastrophic proportions until after the massacre of Arabs by Jewish terrorists at the village of Deir Yassin on April 9. This village had shown no special animosity to its Jewish neighbours, yet it was attacked by Jewish terrorists in order to demonstrate their military strength. Although Jewish terrorist leaders now deny that it was they who planned and executed the attack, it was they themselves who held a press conference the same night and boasted of what they had done.'¹⁸

Dr. Stephen Penrose, President of the American University of Beirut, explained the connection between the Deir Yassin massacre and the exodus of the Palestinian Arabs in 1948:

On both sides dreadful deeds were committed but, in the main, the Zionists made better use of terrorist tactics which they learned only too well at the hands of Nazi taskmasters. There is no question but that frightful massacres such as that which took place at Deir Yassin in April 1948 were perpetrated for the major purpose of frightening the Arab population and causing them to take flight. The Zionist radio repeated incessantly for the benefit of Arab listeners 'Remember Deir Yassin'. It is small wonder that many Arab families began a hasty exodus from the battle area and from sectors which might soon become battlegrounds. Terror is contagious, and it built up the tremendous migration which has led to the results which may be witnessed in the refugee camps.¹⁹

¹⁵ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

¹⁶ Translation from Reynier, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

¹⁷ Begin, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, Henry Schuman, New York, 1951.

¹⁸ Edwin Samuel, *Middle East Journal* (1949), p. 14.

¹⁹ Stephen B. L. Penrose, *The Palestine Problem: Retrospect and Prospect* (American Friends of the Middle East, New York); p. 12.

Although both Arabs and Jews have resorted and still resort to violence, one should not make the mistake of equating Jewish with Arab violence. Their objectives were and still are fundamentally different. Jewish terrorism was employed in the past in Palestine in order to oust the British Government which had been assigned the responsibility for its temporary administration, to displace the indigenous population and to take over the country against the will of its people. Nowadays, Jewish terrorism aims at the intimidation of Israel's neighbours and the repression of Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories. In contrast, the Arabs resorted to violence before the end of the mandate in order to retain, and more recently to regain, a land which is historically and legally their own.

In Deir Yassin and other places, the Israelis repeated Joshua's exploit on his entering the Land of Canaan as related in the Bible: 'And they utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and woman, both young and old, and ox and sheep, and ass, with the edge of the sword' (*Book of Joshua, ch. 6*). Mr. Moshe Menuhin has observed:

Quoting the Bible and using terror to spread panic were ancient devices for 'redeeming' a 'Promised Land' and getting rid of the native population. Ben Gurion and Menachem Begin had only to look up the Book of Joshua before applying the old methods of terror in Palestine, at Deir Yassin on April 9 1948, at Qibya on October 14-15 1953, and in many other unforgettable massacres of the Palestinian Arabs. Only, Joshua tells his story with unvarnished primitiveness, in the name of a young Jehovah who had not as yet grown up, and in the context of his barbaric times; whereas today's Joshuas, who are public-relations diplomats of expediency, act in the same way as ancient Joshua, but cry 'Peace, peace; all we want is the status quo!' after the dirty job has been done.²⁰

b Expulsion

Another cause of the Palestine exodus was actual expulsion of people from their towns and villages. The expulsion of the inhabitants was carried out in Haifa,²¹ Lydda and Ramleh,²² Tiberias,²³ Safad,²⁴ Beer-sheba and several other towns and villages.²⁵ On various occasions Israeli forces used loud-speakers to threaten the civilian population and order it to leave.²⁶ Describing the occupation of Haifa, George Kirk states:

²⁰ Moshe Menuhin, *The Decadence of Judaism in our Time* (Exposition Press, New York, 1965), p. 6.

²¹ *Middle East Journal* (1949), p. 325.

²² In Lydda and Ramleh 60,000 persons many of whom were refugees from other places were expelled by the Israelis: G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 281. The people expelled were relieved of their money, jewellery and other articles of value in their possession and were sent on foot to Ramallah, a town north of Jerusalem.

²³ *Middle East Journal* (1948), p. 331.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 332.

²⁵ S. N. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 589.

²⁶ As to the use of loud-speakers by Israeli forces as a means of 'psychological blitz' to frighten and secure the evacuation of the civilian population of Haifa, see G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 262, and S. N. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 589. As to their use in Akre, see Sacher, *The Establishment of a State*, p. 245.

The Jewish combatants there and elsewhere made skilful use of psychological warfare to break their opponents' morale, and the effect upon the civilians was only what was to be expected. At a later stage, the Israeli armed forces did not confine their pressure on the Arab civilian population to playing upon their fears. They forcibly expelled them: for example, the population of 'Akka (including refugees from Haifa) in May; the population of Lydda and Ramleh (including refugees from Jaffa) in July; and the population of Beersheba and Western Galilee in October.²⁷

c *Breakdown of security and government machinery before the end of the mandate*

The last of the causes that contributed to the exodus of the Palestine Arabs in 1948 was the breakdown of security and government machinery during the last six months of the mandate. After the outbreak of violence and terrorism following the partition vote by the United Nations, the British Government was neither able to maintain law and order in Palestine nor willing to commit its forces for that purpose. The mandate was coming to an end on May 15 1948 and the British Government concerned itself mainly with the evacuation of its personnel and equipment.

On December 15 1947 the Palestine Government withdrew its forces from Jaffa and Tel Aviv and turned over the policing in these two cities to the Arab and Jewish police respectively.²⁸ The British Government intimated to the U.N. that during their gradual withdrawal British troops would maintain order in the area which they still occupied, but would not be available to maintain order on behalf of the Palestine Commission which was charged with the implementation of partition.²⁹ On January 20 1948 the British Government stated that 'the policy of allowing both the Jewish and Arab communities to make arrangements for their own security, in areas where either community was in the great majority, had been carried further, so that the British police could be concentrated in Jerusalem and other mixed localities'.³⁰ At the beginning of February 1948, British personnel in the principal cities were concentrated in enclosed and guarded zones.³¹ What happened outside the guarded zones ceased to be of concern to the Mandatory Government. In so far as law, order and security were concerned, the people were left to fend for themselves. During March 1948 the evacuation of British personnel began.³² Notwithstanding that hundreds were being killed or wounded, not a single prosecution or police enquiry was even attempted. An indication of the complete absence of any Government machinery at the time is afforded by the fact that on the occurrence of the massacre of Deir Yassin on April 9 1948 no Government authority lifted a finger either to prevent the massacre or to assist and save the wounded or even

²⁷ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

²⁸ *Middle East Journal* (1948), p. 215; G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

²⁹ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

³⁰ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

³¹ G. Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

³² *Middle East Journal* (1948) p. 329.

to bury the dead.³³

Although Article 2 of the mandate had imposed upon the British Government the responsibility for developing self-governing institutions in Palestine, no administrative machinery of any kind existed or was envisaged for the preservation of law and order after the abandonment by the Mandatory Power of its functions of government and administration. The question of the preservation of law and order upon the termination of the mandate was the subject of discussion at the U.N. in the spring of 1948 but nothing tangible resulted therefrom. On February 10 1948 the U.N. Palestine Commission in its first progress report stressed the need for an international police force. The Commission envisaged the possibility of a collapse of security on the termination of the mandate unless adequate means were made available to it for the exercise of its authority. On February 16, in a special report to the Security Council, the Commission stated that unless immediate steps were taken the British withdrawal from Palestine would initiate 'a period of uncontrolled widespread strife and bloodshed'. The Commission reported that for the period from November 30 1947 to February 1 1948 the total number of casualties was 1,462 Arabs and 1,106 Jews. It also stated that the British Government as the Mandatory Power planned to terminate the existence of the Palestine Police Force as from May 15 1948 and to leave its equipment, arms and stores to 'the successor authorities'. As it happened, there were no successor authorities and the Commission was correct in forecasting 'a security vacuum immediately following the termination of the mandate'.

The complete state of chaos into which the country was plunged impelled many Palestine Arabs to seek temporary refuge elsewhere either in Palestine itself or in neighbouring countries. This movement was further encouraged by the absence of any communal organization for the protection of the Arabs from Jewish armed attacks or of the provision of elementary public services. Planning and organization to meet the situation which was to arise upon the ending of the British mandate on May 15 1948 were far more developed among the Jews than the Arabs. For years the Jews had been organizing politically, militarily, financially and administratively for this very situation. They had long laid their plans to establish a Jewish State. Upon the ending of the mandate, the Jews could switch with comparative ease to an autonomous administration equipped with all necessary services, including a well-trained military organization. In contrast, the Arab community possessed no shadow government, no proper military organization, no institutions for the discharge of governmental functions or the maintenance of public services. Don Peretz has observed:

With the breakdown of all functions of government necessary to maintain law, order and well-being, water, electricity, posts, police, education, health, sanitation and the like—Arab morale collapsed. . . .³⁴

³³ This is apparent from the account given by Jacques de Reynier, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-77 and 213.

³⁴ Don Peretz, *Israel and the Palestine Arabs* (Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1958), p. 7. Regarding the breakdown of public services, see also Reynier, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-215.

Considerations relating to the preservation of law and order and the protection of the Palestine Arabs were a determining factor in the military intervention of the Arab States at the end of the mandate. The cable addressed on May 15 1948 by the Arab League to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (S/745) declared:

The Mandatory has already announced that on the termination of the mandate it will no longer be responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Palestine. . . . This leaves Palestine absolutely without any administrative authority entitled to maintain, and capable of maintaining, a machinery of administration of the country adequate for the purpose of ensuring due protection of life and property.

However, for reasons previously explained, the intervention of the Arab states was not effective in preserving law and order, or in preventing Jewish occupation of a large area of Palestine. Consequently the conditions of total insecurity, chaos and anarchy which had prevailed in Palestine since the U.N. vote on partition continued unabated upon the withdrawal of the mandatory and caused the exodus of the Palestinians to increase.

Those are the main causes of the exodus of the Palestine Arabs from Palestine. Israeli propaganda has sought to misrepresent the reasons for the exodus. When world opinion awakened to the refugee tragedy, Israel disavowed responsibility for what happened and laid the blame upon the Arab states, the British, and even the refugees themselves.³⁵ Long after the tragedy, the Israelis began spreading the story that Arab broadcasts had been made to the Palestinians to flee from their homes. This fabrication was exposed by Mr. Erskine B. Childers, a British journalist. As a guest of the Israeli Foreign Office, this journalist investigated the Israeli statement about the alleged Arab broadcasts ordering the evacuation, and could find no dates, names of stations or texts of messages. He even checked British and American monitoring units of all Middle Eastern broadcasts throughout 1948. 'There was not', he concluded, 'a single order or appeal, or suggestion about evacuation from any Arab radio station inside or outside Palestine, in 1948. There is repeated monitored record of Arab appeals, even flat orders, to the civilians of Palestine to stay put.'³⁶

The Israelis have also attempted to disclaim liability for the exodus of the Palestinians by alleging that the refugee problem was the result of the war between the Arab States and Israel. There is nothing farther from the truth. The Palestine refugee tragedy was principally the consequence of Jewish terrorism and of the Deir Yassin massacre. This massacre was perpetrated several weeks before any war had taken place between the Arab states and Israel. In fact, the exodus had already reached considerable proportions before the outbreak of the war. It was estimated that before the Arab-Israeli war started on May 15 1948 the number of Palestine refugees had reached about 300,000. As Mr. Anthony Nutting has remarked: 'it would be truer to say that the

³⁵ See Don Peretz, *op. cit.*, pp. 36 and 86.

³⁶ *The Spectator*, May 12 1961.

refugees were the cause of the first Arab-Israeli war and not the result'.³⁷

One might ask: why did the Zionist Jews resort to terrorist tactics to drive the Palestinians out of their homes and, where this failed, to their physical and forcible expulsion? The answer is to be found in the underlying Zionist racist objective of creating in Palestine a state which would be racially, religiously and exclusively Jewish. Professor Maxime Rodinson has observed that the Jewish character of the state is 'the prime aim and postulate of Zionist ideology'.³⁸ In other words, the Zionists wanted to convert Palestine into a state for the Jews and no one else but the Jews. The realization of this objective necessitated the displacement of the original inhabitants and their dispossession of their lands. The racial and religious exclusiveness of the Jewish state as envisaged in the Zionist programme had long been emphasized by Zionist leaders. The British Statement of Policy of 1922 referred to unauthorized statements which had been made to the effect that the purpose of the Balfour Declaration was to create a wholly Jewish Palestine and that Palestine was to become as Jewish as England is English.³⁹ Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the First President of Israel, made it plain that the aim of Zionism was that the Jews should 'take over the country'.⁴⁰ The Zionist objective of creating a Jewish State in Palestine by dispossessing its inhabitants was perceived by the King-Crane Commission as early as 1919. The Commission stated:

The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish representatives that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase. . . .⁴¹

For more than a quarter of a century during the mandate the Zionists exerted all efforts and used all kinds of inducements in order to purchase the lands of Palestine. But despite all their efforts their total land holdings in 1947 represented, as we have seen earlier, a very small percentage, about 6 per cent of the total area of Palestine.⁴² Their original intention disclosed to the King-Crane Commission, which aimed at the dispossession of the non-Jewish inhabitants by various forms of purchase, had failed. The Arab character of Palestine, of its lands and of its people stood in the way of Zionist aspirations to create an exclusively Jewish state. It was, therefore, necessary to have recourse to other means, particularly since in accordance with the partition plan proposed by the

³⁷ From a speech delivered under the auspices of the American Council of Judaism at New York on November 2 1967. Regarding the causes of the Palestine exodus, see also Walid Khalidi, *Why Did The Palestinians Leave?* (Arab League Office, London, 1963).

³⁸ Maxime Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs* (Penguin Books, London, 1968), p. 228.

³⁹ *Cand.* 1700, p. 18.

⁴⁰ Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1949), p. 224.

⁴¹ Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (D. Van Nostrand Company, New Jersey, 1956), Vol. II, p. 70; Harry N. Howard, *The King-Crane Commission* (Khayats, Beirut, 1963).

⁴² Out of this proportion only 2 per cent was bought from Palestinian Arabs, the balance representing lands which the Jews had acquired prior to the First World War or from absentee non-Palestinian landowners. As to Jewish land ownership in Palestine, see Section 1 (3), *ante*, and Appendices IV and V.

United Nations in 1947 the Jewish state would have a majority of Arab population in the proportion of 509,780 Moslems and Christians to 499,020 Jews.⁴³ It would obviously be a contradiction to describe as Jewish a state in which the Arabs exceeded the number of the Jews and, moreover, owned most of the land. But the Zionist Jews undertook to remove this contradiction. Accordingly, the Arab population of the territory of Palestine seized by Israel in 1948 was reduced by methods which we have seen to less than one-tenth of its original number. Count Bernadotte wrote in 1948:

As a result of the conflict in Palestine, almost the whole of the Arab population fled or was expelled from the area under Jewish occupation. This included the large Arab population of Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Ramleh and Lydda. Of a population of somewhat more than 400,000 Arabs prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the number presently estimated as remaining in Jewish-controlled territory is approximately 50,000.⁴⁴

Moreover, all lands which belonged to the Arab refugees were confiscated and most of the lands owned by Arabs who remained were expropriated.⁴⁵

The creation of a Jewish state in Palestine has been described as 'a process which either by accident or intent rid Israel of the majority of its large Arab population'.⁴⁶ There is no doubt that there was little accident in the process. Mr. I. F. Stone observed:

Jewish terrorism, not only by the Irgun, in such savage massacres as Deir Yassin, but in milder form by the Haganah itself 'encouraged' Arabs to leave the areas the Jews wished to take over for strategic or demographic reasons. They tried to make as much of Israel as free of Arabs as possible.⁴⁷

Dr. John H. Davis, who occupied for five years the office of Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, has remarked that 'the extent to which the refugees were savagely driven out by the Israelis as part of a deliberate master-plan has been insufficiently recognized'. Dr. Davis went on to explain how the Zionist concept of a Jewish state called for the ousting of the indigenous Arab population from its homeland, and the manner in which this objective was achieved by means ranging from 'expert psychological warfare to ruthless expulsion by force'.⁴⁸

The Zionist racist objective of building up an exclusively Jewish state by displacing the existing population and dispossessing it of its lands and homes was the underlying cause of the Palestine refugee problem and is at the root of the Palestine Question. Sir John Glubb has observed:

⁴³ See Appendix I to Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Official Records of the 2nd Session of the General Assembly, Document A/AC 14/32, p. 304, and Section 1 (3), *ante*.

⁴⁴ Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, General Assembly official records: 3rd Session, Supplement No. 11, A/648, p. 47.

⁴⁵ As to the confiscation and expropriation by Israel of Arab property, see Section 5 of Part II, *post*.

⁴⁶ *Middle East Journal* (1948), p. 447.

⁴⁷ I. F. Stone in *New York Review of Books*, August 3 1967.

⁴⁸ John H. Davis, *The Evasive Peace* (John Murray, London, 1968), pp. 57-60.

It is quite essential vividly to grasp the unique conditions of the struggle in Palestine. We have witnessed many wars in this century, in which one country seeks to impose its power on others. But in no war, I think, for many centuries past, has the objective been to remove a nation from its country and to introduce another and entirely different race to occupy its lands, houses and cities and live there. This peculiarity lends to the Palestine struggle a desperate quality which bears no resemblance to any other war in modern history.⁴⁹

2 THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES

During the first three months of 1948 the number of refugees was relatively small. The exodus reached catastrophic proportions as a result of the massacre of Deir Yassin on April 9 1948, and of the expulsion by the Israelis of the Arab inhabitants of Tiberias (April 19), Haifa (April 22), Jaffa (April 29), Safad (May 10), Ramleh and Lydda (July 12), Beer-sheba (October 21), and Western Galilee during October 1948.

Early figures of the number of refugees were in the nature of rough estimates made during a continuing flow. Count Bernadotte's estimate as on September 10 1948 was 330,000. The Acting Mediator's report made in October 1948 revised the figure to 472,000 but stated that the estimates made by Arab authorities reached a total of between 740,000 and 780,000.⁵⁰ When a more precise estimate could be made, it was found that the real number was much higher. In June 1949 the Secretary-General of the United Nations reported to the fourth session of the General Assembly that the number of refugees was 940,000.⁵¹ At the time that UNRWA was constituted (May 1 1950) to assist the Palestine refugees, their number was estimated at 960,000.⁵² This figure did not include an unspecified number who either were not registered with UNRWA or were not receiving assistance from this organization. It can be reckoned that the number of Palestine refugees in 1948 was about one million persons. This was the estimate made at the time by the Delegate of the League of Red Cross Societies to the Middle East.⁵³

As a result of natural increase, the number registered with UNRWA as on May 31 1967 had reached a figure of 1,344,576.⁵⁴ This figure, however, does not represent the total number because at no time was any census made of those who, though displaced in 1948, have never become dependent upon UNRWA and live of their own means or from their work. These were mostly professional people, merchants or artisans. Some of them live in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon while others work in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and other countries. In his Annual Report dated August 27 1962 the Commissioner-General of UNRWA

⁴⁹ Glubb Pasha, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁵⁰ U.N. Document A/689, pp. 1 and 5.

⁵¹ Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, July 1 1948-June 30 1949, p. 102.

⁵² Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA, 1953 (A/2470), p. 5.

⁵³ *Middle East Journal* (1949), p. 251.

⁵⁴ Annual Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for the period July 1 1966-June 30 1967, U.N. Document A/6713. The same Annual Report gave the distribution of the refugees as follows: Jordan (722,687), the Gaza Strip (316,776), Lebanon (160,723) and Syria (144,390).

estimated their number as twenty per cent of the total.⁵⁵ This estimate is quite conservative and the proportion could well be closer to twenty-five per cent. But even if the Commissioner-General's estimate were taken as a basis and added to those registered with UNRWA, the total number of Palestine refugees displaced by the events of 1948 must be considered to have been as on May 31 1967 in excess of 1,600,000.

3 AGGRAVATING FACTOR IN THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

The basic factor which has doubled the dimensions of the refugee problem was the occupation by Israeli forces of various territories of Palestine in excess of the boundaries fixed for the Jewish state by the United Nations partition resolution. These territories are shown in Appendix VII. In terms of population, the territories seized by Israel in excess of the partition resolution were peopled mostly, if not exclusively, by Arabs: Western Galilee (123,000 Arab inhabitants), the Jaffa enclave (114,000 Arab inhabitants),⁵⁶ the Ramleh sub-district and portions of the sub-districts of Nazareth, Jenin, Tulkarm, Gaza and Hebron. The Israeli seizure extended to the wholly Arab towns of Jaffa, Acre, Nazareth, Lydda, Ramleh, Shafa Amr, with an estimated Arab population of 195,000 people,⁵⁷ as well as to several hundred Arab villages.⁵⁸ Israel's seizure of the territories, towns and villages reserved for the proposed Arab state resulted in the expulsion or flight of more than 600,000 persons. In other words, almost two-thirds of the refugees who were displaced in 1948 came from the areas seized by Israel in excess of the territorial boundaries fixed by the partition resolution. The significance of this fact will appear later during the discussion of an effective solution for the refugee problem.

⁵⁵ U.N. Document A/5214, p. 2.

⁵⁶ The above figures of inhabitants are derived from the report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, U.N. Document A/AC 14/32, pp. 305-306.

⁵⁷ The population figures of these towns can be found in two publications of the Palestine Government: *Statistical Abstract of Palestine 1944-1945*, p. 22, and *A Survey of Palestine*, Vol. I, p. 151.

⁵⁸ The total number of Arab villages which existed in the territories occupied by Israel in 1948 and 1949 was 863. This number has since been reduced as a result of Israel's destruction of 161 Arab villages: see Section 1 (3), *ante*.

THE ARAB REFUGEES

A Zionist View

MARIE SYRKIN

IF THERE is anything which can be said to trouble Americans sympathetic to Israel, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, it is the problem of the Arab refugees. This problem, according to Mr. Laurence Michelmores, Commissioner-General for the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), has not grown "any less complex or less dangerous to the peace and stability of the region," nor has the desire of the refugees to return to their homes grown any less intense. "From their standpoint," Mr. Michelmores recently told the current session of the General Assembly, "a nation has been obliterated and a population arbitrarily deprived of its birthright. This injustice still festers in their minds."

Though it is obvious that the Arab refugees are being used by the Arab states as pawns in a political game, such exploitation does not necessarily invalidate claims put forward on their behalf. The Arabs continue to call for "repatriation," Israel continues to refuse, and people whose scruples can only be those of conscience and not of *Realpolitik*, continue to wonder how Jews, themselves such recent refugees, can bear to add to the sum of human suffering by declining to admit Arab refugees into Israel. Even committed Zionists are disturbed by this question. Exile and longing for Return—key words in Jewish national experience—carry powerful echoes. Am I as a Zionist insensitive to these echoes? Do I ignore them, hoping solely for the success of Israeli arms? Despite the hazard of self-righteous protestations by a partisan, let me address myself here to the ethical issue.

I write, of course, on the premise that the establishment of Israel was an act of historic justice and that its continued existence is to be desired. On the Arab postulate that Israel must be obliterated and its inhabitants driven into the sea, there is no room for discussion. On the assumption,

however, of Israel's right to survival, is the Jewish state facing in the Arab refugees a reverse Zionism whose impulse it should be the first to meet with sympathy? The comparison, superficially intriguing, is essentially false. Jews were driven to the "national home" granted by the Balfour Declaration by homelessness, necessity, a centuries-old historic attachment, and a search for national identity. They purchased and reclaimed its deserts and swamps, acre by acre, and finally defended a shrunken area of it against the attack of the combined Arab armies. None of these elements, physical or emotional, lies behind the Arab will to return.

The very origin of the Arab refugee problem indicates the difference. The tragedy of the Jewish refugee lay in his absence of choice. He was driven out by force or by decree and he fled from a real, not a mythical, terror. His only refuge was the remote "homeland" which the Arab refugee left of his own will; the Arab was free to remain. There is a crucial distinction between fleeing to a land because of desperate need, and fleeing from the same land without need. But perhaps the simple historical record makes the point best.

I arrived in Palestine in June 1948, when the Arab exodus was in full swing. One of my tasks was to draw up a report on the subject for the newly formed Israeli Bureau of Information. There were no documents and no studies. All that was available in those days were the fresh reactions of Jews and Arabs—as yet undoctored by policy. From my interviews with Arabs in villages which had accepted the authority of the state of Israel instead of fleeing to the enemy, and from my discussions with clergy of various denominations who had helplessly watched the departure of their flocks, the chief impression I got was one of astonished dismay on all sides. The Arabs agreed that the villagers who had fled could have stayed as they themselves had stayed, but the refugees had "listened to the Mufti"; and the Christian clergy described scenes of ungovernable fear which no reassurance had been able to stem. One sturdy Mother Superior told me, "I said to them, 'Don't be afraid; I'll protect you,' but they ran." The Jews to whom I spoke were still bewildered by the spectacle of tens of thousands of Arabs

MARIE SYRKIN is associate professor of humanities at Brandeis, the editor of the *Jewish Frontier*, and a recently elected member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency. Her most recent book is *Golda Meir, Woman with a Cause*.

Reprinted by permission; copyright © 1966 by COMMENTARY.

This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

leaving their homes and possessions and rushing in wild panic toward the sea or the mountains. The deserted Arab villages, the abandoned Arab quarters of Jaffa and Haifa, presented the same baffling picture. I heard many conflicting explanations: the Arab leaders had ordered the exodus; the British had instigated it; the Mufti's "atrocities-propaganda" had backfired, the Irgun massacre at Deir Yassin had terrified the Arabs.

THE TWO SCHOOLS of thought—that the exodus was a deliberate part of Arab military strategy, or that it was an uncontrollable stampede which the Arab leadership strove unsuccessfully to check—were not contradictory. Apparently, what began as a calculated move degenerated into irrational frenzy. The development of the exodus as well as Arab statements indicate that the flight was at first stimulated by the Arab leadership to inflame the populace (since the Palestinian Arabs had shown little stomach for battle), to create an artificial Arab "refugee" problem which would elicit world sympathy to counterbalance the claims of Jewish refugees, and to prepare the ground for invasion by the Arab states who could then appear as the saviors of their brethren. An additional reason was no doubt the desire to evacuate Arab civilians from territory which the Arab states expected to bomb. But the smooth functioning of this scheme was impaired by the very completeness of its success. A considered evacuation turned into a hysterical stampede.

Wealthy Arabs began to leave Palestine shortly after the passage of the UN Partition Resolution and the outbreak of disturbances in December 1947, planning to return after the Jews had been liquidated by the Arab states. As early as January 30, 1948, a Palestinian Arab newspaper (*As Shaab*) took occasion to chastise the first wave of refugees:

The first group of our fifth column consists of those who abandon their houses and business premises to go to live elsewhere. Many of these lived in great comfort and luxury. At the first sign of trouble they took to their heels in order to escape sharing the burden of the struggle, whether directly or indirectly.

The departure of individual wealthy Arabs could, however, hardly be described as flight. The condition in which these Arabs left their homes, without bothering to remove even readily transportable valuables, indicated that they had complete confidence in the rapid success of the Arab invasion and were merely absenting themselves temporarily. They left neither in haste nor in fear; they merely locked the front-door, and drove off for what was to be a vacation at some distance from the local unpleasantness. And their departure was observed with understandable alarm by less moneyed Arabs unable to make sim-

ilar traveling arrangements.

The first signs of a large-scale exodus were noted in March 1948 (though several hundred Arab children had been evacuated previously from Haifa to Syria as a routine safety measure). In the last week of March and the first week of April, thousands of Arabs started to trek from the Sharon coastal plain to the Arab-controlled hill regions. Many sold their poultry and flocks to Jewish friends before leaving.

This first wave of departure was viewed with a mixture of fear and regret by their Jewish neighbors, who wondered uneasily what evil it might signify. The obvious explanation seemed to be the imminence of a full-scale Arab attack with heavy aerial bombardment. In those instances where Arab and Jewish farmers had been on friendly terms, there was a genuine desire to maintain relationships which boded well for the future. But the Arabs would not stay. Later it was learned that the Arab Higher Committee had ordered the evacuation of the coastal plain after the picking of the citrus crop. So calm and well-organized was this phase of the exodus that the cooperation of Jewish settlement guards was enlisted to provide transportation for women, children, and the aged through Jewish areas. The evacuation of the Sharon is notable because it disposes of the Arab charge that the flight started as a result of the massacre at Deir Yassin by Jewish terrorists. The massacre (April 9) took place after the evacuation of the Sharon.

Another example of evacuation by Arab command was provided by Tiberias. Since March, there had been sporadic clashes in this sleepy, idyllic little town on the shores of the Lake of Galilee. After Arab gangs infiltrated the Arab quarter and transformed it into a base against the Jewish residents, serious fighting broke out. On April 18, when the battle turned in favor of the small Jewish community of 2,000 souls, the 6,000 Arabs, obviously in obedience to a directive, suddenly began leaving in long convoys. The British, instead of aiding in the pacification of the town, provided transport.

The Jews of Tiberias were so startled by the unexpected departure of the Arabs that the Jewish Community Council of Tiberias issued a statement declaring: "We did not dispossess them; they themselves chose this course. But the day will come when the Arabs will return to their homes and property in this town. In the meantime, let no citizen touch their property." The months of savage warfare ahead were to change these kindly sentiments, but they are important historically as evidence of the original Jewish reaction to the Arab exodus.

PERHAPS THE clearest indication of why the Arabs fled is afforded by the events in Haifa. On April 22, after the breakdown of Arab resist-

ance in Haifa, truce terms were offered by the Haganah which specifically guaranteed the right of Arabs to continue living in Haifa as equal citizens under the then-existing bi-national municipal council. The British let it be known that they considered the terms "reasonable." The Arabs at first agreed, but changed their minds later in the day, explaining that they could not accept the terms for reasons beyond their control. The "reasons" were not far to seek. The Arab radio was broadcasting directives from the Arab Higher Executive ordering all Arabs to leave Haifa.

The reports of the Haifa British Chief of Police, A. J. Bridmead, suggest how earnestly the Jews tried to persuade the Arabs to stay. On April 26, Bridmead wrote: "The situation in Haifa remains unchanged. Every effort is being made by the Jews to persuade the Arab populace to stay and carry on with their normal lives, to get their shops and businesses open and to be assured that their lives and interests will be safe." In a supplementary report issued the same day, Bridmead repeated: "An appeal has been made to the Arabs by the Jews to reopen their shops and businesses in order to relieve the difficulties of feeding the Arab population. Evacuation was still going on yesterday and several trips were made by Z craft to Acre. Roads, too, were crowded. Arab leaders reiterated their determination to evacuate the entire Arab population, and they have been given the loan of 10 three-ton military trucks as from this morning to assist the evacuation." And on April 28, Superintendent Bridmead was still writing: "The Jews are still making every effort to persuade the Arab population to remain and settle back into their normal lives in the town."

However, no assurances could stop the flight. Very quickly, the proposed strategic evacuation turned into a panic, as the 70,000 Haifa Arabs began to flock wildly toward the port, seeking to "escape" by any craft available. Families crouched for days on the docks, refusing to move until some vessel took them to Acre. Unlike the quiet departure of the Arab gentry months earlier, this was a headlong stampede in which people seem to have jumped suddenly from a dinner table, from bed, or from their work, driven by an impulse to flee. Neighbor followed blindly after neighbor until the port was filled with terrified, squatting figures and every road was clogged.

An article in the London *Economist* (October 2, 1948) quoted a British eyewitness account:

During the subsequent days the Israeli authorities who were now in complete control of Haifa . . . urged all Arabs to remain in Haifa, and guaranteed them protection and security. So far as I know, most of the British civilian residents whose advice was asked by Arab friends told the latter that they would be wise to stay. Various factors influenced their decision to seek safety in flight. There is but little doubt that far the

most potent of these factors was the announcements made over the air by the Arab Higher Executive urging all Arabs in Haifa to quit. The reason given was that upon the final withdrawal of the British the combined armies of the Arab States would invade Palestine and drive the Jews into the sea, and it was clearly intimated that those Arabs who remained in Haifa and accepted Israeli protection would be regarded as renegades. At that time the Palestinian Arabs still had some confidence in the ability of the Arab League to implement the promises of its spokesmen.

The startling example of Haifa was bound to have a profoundly disquieting effect on the whole Arab population of Palestine. The subsequent flight from Jaffa can be viewed as a natural corollary of the exodus organized by the Arab leadership in Haifa. The mass hysteria which developed resulted in the abandonment of many Arab villages even before these were threatened by the progress of the war. After May 15, the process was accelerated. The extraordinary resistance displayed by Israel to the invasion of the Arab states added fuel to the "terror" propaganda of the Arab League. There are repeated instances of thousands of Arabs fleeing before a handful of Jewish troops.

In Safed, for instance, some 14,000 Arabs picked themselves up one night and fled from the 1,500 Orthodox Jews who lived in the winding, cobbled streets of the ancient town. One must see Safed to appreciate what this means, for the Arabs not only outnumbered the Jews but had every strategic advantage. They occupied all the strongholds of the town, as well as dominant positions on the surrounding hills. The Jews were caught in a kind of narrow trough.

I CAME TO SAFED on a late Friday afternoon. Amid the debris of recent battle, the Jews of the town were dressing up for the Sabbath. In the twilight, walking along the streets, one could already hear the chanting of prayers. Old men in round, furred hats and long cloaks were going to the synagogue. Women with lace shawls over their *sheitels* (wigs) sat in the doorways of their shelled homes. Up above, in the main streets, soldiers were strolling along with their girls; Jewish refugees, just a week from the British detention camp of Cyprus, were seeking lodging in the abandoned houses; but below in the old Jewish quarter, nothing had changed. "It is all in God's hands," the Orthodox Jews of Safed had declared in refusing to evacuate the town despite the urging of the British.

The Hotel Merkazit, where I stayed during my visit, had been completely riddled with bullets. Most of the windows were broken and many of the walls had been damaged. The place had obviously received a thorough shelling. But the age-

ing, bearded inn-keeper and his wife had stayed, despite their apparently hopeless position, exposed to the heavy fire of Arab citadels on three sides.

I asked the inn-keeper why the Arabs had suddenly decamped. His explanation, which I heard repeated by others, was that it had rained unseasonably on May 9. Because of this, the Arabs decided that the Jews had dropped an atomic bomb—they had heard of heavy rains in Hiroshima. The son of the inn-keeper, a member of the small Haganah force which had come to Safed, poo-pooed the atomic bomb theory. His explanation was simple: "We were few, but our aim was good. Our King Davids [mortars] hit the right spots."

Whatever the reason, the Arabs fled from Safed, as they had from Haifa, in the wake of their leaders.

It should be added that while it was not Haganah policy to encourage the exodus, some hostile villages threatening the road to Jerusalem were evacuated by individual Haganah commanders. The relief of Jerusalem, besieged by the Arab Legion (which had cut off the city's water supply), constituted one of the major struggles of the war. Consequently, a number of villages which served as bases for the enemy camped in the surrounding hills were forcibly cleared, and their inhabitants joined the exodus. But these were isolated instances, occurring late in the fighting, and involving numbers too small to affect the scope of the mass flight or to explain it.

To compound the confusion surrounding the flights from different towns and villages, the various Arab factions were not agreed as to the tactics pursued by the Arab Higher Committee, the tool of the Mufti. In Baghdad, on July 25, 1948, a radio commentator criticized refugees who complained of the treatment they were receiving in the Arab states and who wished they had stayed in Palestine with the Jews. Such people should be shot as spies, he said, and he added: "The Jews will make you their slaves if you return to them; they will feed you only on bread and water; they will force you to sleep in the open, five on one blanket; they will take your wives and daughters from you. Prefer death to the Jews."

But dissident voices could also be heard from the outset; and as the strategy turned to a calamitous defeat and the manufactured refugee problem became a genuine one, the chorus of dissatisfaction grew progressively louder. As early as March 30, 1948, a Palestinian Arab paper (*As Sarih*) wrote:

The inhabitants of the large village of Sheikh Munis and of several other Arab villages in the neighborhood of Tel Aviv have brought a terrible disgrace on us all by quitting their villages bag and baggage. We cannot help comparing this disgraceful exodus with the firm stand of the Haganah in all localities situated in Arab ter-

ritory or bordering on it. But what is the use of making comparisons; everyone knows that the Haganah gladly enters the battle while we always flee from it.

King Farouk of Egypt, in a broadcast to the Arab world on July 9, 1948, also expressed his dissatisfaction with "the Palestinian Arabs who ran away leaving their houses and lands behind, giving a chance for a large Jewish immigration and putting Palestine in danger of a Jewish majority."

In Damascus, too, the Arabic radio (August 3, 1948) had occasion to find fault with the refugees: "The Arabs of Palestine are responsible for the heavy losses of the armies in Palestine and the present unfavorable situation. They ran away in the face of a threat by a small minority and spent more time talking over their own affairs than fighting for their country."

BUT PERHAPS the most telling comment was made by the Near East Arabic radio broadcast on May 15, 1949, a year after the establishment of the Jewish state:

If the Arab leaders had not spread the most horrible and frightening stories of Deir Yassin, the inhabitants of the Arab areas of Palestine would never have fled their homes and would not today be living in misery. The Arab leaders and the Arab press and radio announced on May 15 that the Jews were scared to death and would soon be thrown into the sea by the advancing Arab armies; but it wasn't long before opinions had to be changed as the Jews scored nothing but victories and the Arabs suffered nothing but defeats.

A curter summation was offered five years later by the Jordan daily, *Al-Difad*: "The Arab governments told us, 'Get out so that we can get in.' So we got out, but they did not get in" (September 6, 1954).

This is neither ancient nor irrelevant history. That the Arab refugee chose to cast his lot with the Arab invaders of Israel is a matter of record. The aggression in which he joined in defiance of the Partition Resolution of the United Nations created new circumstances, and by no rational, legal, or moral standard could the fledgling state, unexpectedly victorious, be asked to welcome its enemies.

Such champions of the Arabs as Soviet Russia and Communist China have been somewhat less than cordial to those of their citizens who sided with opponents, and the emigrés from those countries are somewhat less than eager to return, knowing the reception that would await them. It is even more instructive to recall the attitude of the American revolutionaries toward the Tories who fled the Thirteen Colonies and made cause with the British. The Founding Fathers, notably Benjamin Franklin, objected not only to their re-

turn but to the granting of compensation for their confiscated estates. So long as the young republic was in danger, Franklin, who conducted negotiations with the British in regard to the Tory refugees, refused to countenance their return. In 1789, he wrote of a group of Loyalists who had settled in what was then British territory: "They have left us to live under the government of their king in England and Nova Scotia. We do not miss them nor wish their return." Though the Loyalists were of the same stock as the revolutionists and there was no scarcity of land for them to return to, the Americans were not disposed to trust their good faith: "I believe the opposition given by many to their re-establishing among us is owing to a firm persuasion that there could be no reliance on their oaths" (Benjamin Franklin, in a letter dated June 26, 1785).

I WILL NOT deny that after the war was over I heard few expressions of regret from Israelis for the departed Arabs. The months of bitter fighting in which 600,000 Jews repelled the onslaught of five Arab states had changed original attitudes. Now the flight of the Arabs was viewed by many Israelis as another in the series of "miracles" which had made possible the emergence of Israel, for the tiny state had been obliged to offer refuge not only to the survivors of Hitler's death camps but to Oriental Jews fleeing from persecution in Moslem lands. An unofficial population transfer took place. Somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 Palestinian Arabs left; approximately the same number of destitute Oriental Jews came in from Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

The exact number of *bona fide* refugees has become a matter of contention, with the numbers varying according to who is doing the counting. In answer to the present Arab claim of over a million refugees, Israel cites the figures supplied in December 1946 by the Government of Palestine (the British) to UNSCOP. According to these figures, the total number of Arabs in unpartitioned Palestine was 1,288,000; of these 500,000 resided in mandated territory later annexed by Jordan; 100,000 lived in the Gaza Strip, later annexed by Egypt; and 140,000 Arabs remained in what became Israel. The total number of Arab refugees, then, could not have exceeded 550,000. That there are today more than a million on UNRWA's relief rolls can be explained by a combination of factors: a high birth rate; a low death rate (achieved by good sanitary conditions, along with the failure to report deaths so as not to lose ration cards); the padding of relief rolls; and the registration of local Arabs eager to enjoy free lodging and better diet than are available to the indigent in the Middle East.

An even more striking conclusion emerges from

the figures supplied in 1946 by the Government of Palestine. Most of the refugees now reside in Jordan and Gaza in territory which was formerly Palestine. Thus it is clear that the majority has merely moved from one area of what was mandatory Palestine to another. They left their native villages, not their native land. This, too, must be borne in mind when an attempt is made to picture the Arab refugee as dwelling in an alien *galut* and passionately fixed upon his Palestine Zion.

In 1946 I visited DP camps in the American Zone of Germany. There I saw Jewish children poring over home-made maps of Palestine labelled simply, *Artzenu* (Our Land), pretty much as I am told Arab children study the geography of a country they have never seen. But with this difference: in Jordan the Arab children are in an Arab land among brothers who are concerned for their destiny (even if this concern is subordinated to political considerations). In no fundamental sense are they homeless. They are not the few accidental survivors of a terror which pursued them wherever they sought to escape. If they continue to live in UNRWA camps, it is not because of necessity but because they are being held hostage by Arab belligerence which refuses to permit their absorption in Arab host countries.

Were it possible for one wild moment to imagine that the Jewish children I saw in 1946 had not been on German soil but in a Jewish land surrounded by large, independent Jewish states, every significant element in the comparison would crumble. Let me continue the fantasy: suppose the talk I heard in the bleak barracks had been not of quotas barring survivors from every country except the one remote, besieged "homeland"; suppose, instead, the survivors had been informed that huge international funds were available for their immediate resettlement, without perilous journeys, in their familiar environment, Hebrew in speech, Jewish in tradition and religion, and governed by Jews. So nonsensical a speculation points up the hollowness of attempted parallels between the status of the Jewish survivors of the war and that of the Palestinian refugees. Every detail of the fable, consisting as it does of impossibilities which do violence to the whole course of Jewish history, highlights the difference between the Arab and Jewish plight. What the Jew would have hailed as Utopia, the Arab can afford to reject as injustice.

Certainly it is true that the Palestinian Arabs left homes and villages dear to them, and no supporter of Jewish nationalism like myself has the right to minimize the intensity or equivalent dignity of Arab nationalism. What may legitimately be questioned, however, is the existence of a genuine *Palestinian* nationalism as distinguished from an attachment to the home town. While Palestine has for Jews been the two-thousand-

year-old Zion of history and religious tradition, for Arabs it was a geographical locality, a small sector among huge Arab lands whose independent sovereignty was secured by the Allied powers after two world wars. The most extreme of the Arab spokesmen, Ahmed Shukairy, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, while developing his case for the UN Security Council (May 31, 1956), categorically stated: "It is common knowledge that Palestine is nothing but southern Syria." Historically, Shukairy is right, just as he was right when he recently included several prominent Jordanians in the executive of his organization on the theory that there was no difference between a Jordanian and a Palestinian and that both sides of the Jordan might just as well be called Palestine. More astute Arab propagandists, notably the editor of the Amman weekly, *Amman al Masa*, warned that this thesis was bound to make resettlement in the underpopulated Arab territories up to the border of Iraq more "respectable," since the advocates of resettlement would be able to claim with justice that the Palestinian Arabs were merely being urged to move to another part of their country. On this point Zionists agree with Shukairy.

Insofar as the Arab refugee case rests on the satisfaction of a unique Palestinian nationalism which can be gratified only in the particular town or village that was abandoned in the exodus, it breaks down on the basis of what Shukairy admits is "common knowledge." For the Arab, Palestine is a geographic fact, not a historic concept—and a very recently created geographic fact, at that. According to the 1922 census taken by the British Government, at the beginning of the British Mandate, only 186,000 Arabs lived in the area which is now Israel. The present state of Israel represents a second partition of the original area designated by the Balfour Declaration as the Jewish homeland. In 1922, the two-thirds of Palestine east of the Jordan was set up as the independent Arab state of Transjordan, and the UN Partition Resolution of 1947 further divided an already truncated country.

It is hard for Israelis to understand what violence is done to the national ego of the Palestinian Arab if he is resettled in Jordan (only forty years ago the major part of Palestine) or another underpopulated Arab land. The change from Louisiana to New York or from New York to Nebraska is more dramatic than a move across the borders of the neighboring Arab lands. The same landscape, the same climate, the same language, the same religion, the same ethnic community remain to the Palestinian refugee.

Does the loss of a particular village or courtyard constitute exile as the term is normally understood? In the course of the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt, thousands of villagers were relocated by government decree. In preparation

for filling the Bratsk reservoir in Siberia, more than a hundred villages and towns, including the 300-year old settlement of Bratsk, were moved to other sites. Nasser and the Soviet authorities acted in the name of progress, whatever the sentiments of the villagers. This is not a frivolous comparison written in disregard of the deep passions generated by the Arab-Israeli conflict, or of the suffering and dislocation that followed in its wake for both sides—in this connection the half-million Jewish refugees from Arab lands should not be forgotten. But most of the subsequent suffering of the Arab refugees has been deliberately provoked for reasons bearing little relation to the needs of the individuals involved.

NO ONE IN HIS RIGHT mind would expect Nasser to equate the viability of Israel and the answer it provides to unprecedented human suffering with progress or with any positive achievement. But is it far-fetched to suggest that if relocation may be accepted matter-of-factly for a dam or a reservoir, it can be countenanced where large historic issues are at stake? In the narrow confines of Israel, twice whittled down from the original boundaries of the Promised Land of the Balfour Declaration, there is no room for an uncontrolled Arab influx—not unless the objective of an independent Jewish state be abandoned after the brave resurgence of hardly two decades. Were Israel to be swamped by an Arab tide, its inhabitants lost in an Arab sea or, as is daily threatened, driven into the sea, would justice be served?

Admittedly, the lot of the Arab refugee is miserable. Even though physical conditions in the camps maintained by UNRWA compare favorably with the standard of living of the local population, no one will pretend that camp existence is normal. However, the refusal of the Arab countries to permit the liquidation of the Arab refugee problem, their artificial maintenance of the refugees as a rallying-cry against Israel, is motivated by purely political considerations. Arabs make no secret of the fact that they view the refugees as "the corner-stone of the Arabs' struggle against Israel . . . the refugees are the armament of the Arabs and Arab nationalism" (Egyptian Government Radio, Cairo, July 19, 1957).

From the point of view of Arab belligerence, this makes good sense; it keeps the pot boiling and prevents a peaceful accommodation to contemporary realities. Nasser put it succinctly when he told an interviewer in *Zuercher Woche* (September 1, 1961) that "If the Arabs return to Israel, Israel will cease to exist." It is pointless to multiply quotations from Arab statesmen—Iraqi, Saudi Arabian, or Syrian—since none pretends to any other purpose. A resolution adopted at a Conference of Refugees in Syria in July 1957 makes Arab past and current policy crystal clear: "Any discussion aimed at a solution of the Palestine problem which will not be based on ensuring

the refugees' right to annihilate Israel will be regarded as a desecration of the Arab people and an act of treason."

Those who share the Arab conviction that Israel should be destroyed have good reason to applaud such declarations. I find it hard, however, to understand those who on the one hand accept the existence of the Jewish state as a fact of contemporary history, and at the same time urge the "repatriation" of what has to all intents become an invading army. Israel, a country the size of New Jersey with a population of two-and-a-quarter million, already has an Arab minority of 286,000 (10 per cent) within its borders. The original group of Arabs who chose to remain in the Jewish state has doubled through natural increase and the return of members of families whose admission was permitted by the Israel government. An exercise in arithmetic readily indicates what would happen were a million hostile—or, for that matter, hypothetically friendly—Arabs to enter the country. Israel would cease to exist as a Jewish state even if we assume that the threatened physical obliteration of its inhabitants would not take place. That Israel should decline to collaborate in its own destruction is at least as reasonable as the Arab zeal to destroy it.

Were the same criteria applied to the Palestinian Arabs as to other victims of postwar dislocation, resettlement would be viewed as a satisfactory solution. Vast exchanges of populations have taken place in the postwar world. As the result of territorial partitions, there has been an exchange of fifteen million refugees in India and Pakistan; 400,000 Karelians in Finland have been absorbed by the Finns without appeal to the outside world, and 350,000 *Volksdeutsche* by Austria; the West German Government has successfully integrated nearly nine million refugees from Eastern Germany; the UN Agency for Relief to Korean Refugees, established in 1951 on the pattern of UNRWA, was dissolved in 1956, by which time at least four million Korean refugees had been absorbed. Only the Arab refugees, constantly increasing in number, remain—as a monument to Arab intransigence.

Neutral students of the refugee problem have reached the same conclusion:

I hold the view that, political issues aside, the Arab refugee problem is by far the easiest postwar refugee problem to solve by integration. By faith, by language, by race and by social organization, they are indistinguishable from their fellows of their host countries. There is room for them, in Syria and Iraq. There is a developing demand for the kind of manpower they represent. More unusually still, there is the money to make this integration possible. The United Nations General Assembly, five years ago, voted a sum of 200 million dollars to provide, and here I quote the phrase, "homes and jobs" for

the Arab refugees. That money remains unspent, not because these tragic people are strangers in a strange land, because they are not, not because there is no room for them to be established, because there is, but simply for political reasons which, I re-emphasize it is not my business to discuss. (From the report of Dr. Elfan Rees, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs and World Council of Churches' Adviser on Refugees, Geneva, 1957.)

In the years since Dr. Rees rendered his report, the Arabs have continued for "political reasons" to oppose the implementation of all constructive proposals for resettlement. Only on the assumption that Israel must be destroyed does the Arab tactic acquire cogency. Otherwise, the resettlement of Palestinian Arabs among their kith and kin with full international assistance and Israeli compensation for abandoned properties outrages neither the heart nor the imagination. Unless, of course, totally different standards of rectitude are applied to Arabs than obtain for any other group, particularly Jews.

IN THIS DISCREPANCY lies the glaring injustice. Jews can live as an independent national entity only in the minuscule area of the state of Israel. If their longing for national independence is dismissed as a chauvinistic throwback, then the overnice regard for the full appetite of Arab nationalism, including the manufactured one of Palestinian Arab nationalism, is hard to justify on moral grounds. Nationalism cannot be revered in one and condemned in the other. To the primitive argument of ownership—this is ours and we want it back, and your need and our abundance have nothing to do with the case—one would have to counter with the history of Zionist colonization. Israel did not appear as a conquering invader. The state represents the culmination of decades of peaceful settlement sanctioned by international agreements, just as the sovereign Arab states liberated from the Turks are the result of such agreements. It would be pointless at this stage to rehearse such familiar events.

When Mrs. Golda Meir, Foreign Minister of Israel, was asked by a correspondent how the Arab refugee problem would be solved, she answered, "When the Arabs love their children more than they hate us." She might just as well have said grandchildren, for in this current General Assembly debate on the Arab refugee problem the question of UNRWA support for the grandchildren of refugees has arisen. For how many generations is a refugee a refugee? By now UNRWA has spent \$450 million without being allowed by the Arab states to utilize these enormous funds to implement any of the constructive proposals for resettlement which have repeatedly been made. Another curiosity of the UN relief program is the maintenance on its rolls of members of the

Ahmed Shukairy's Palestine Liberation Organization, a frankly revanchist army sworn to the destruction of a member state of the United Nations, and held temporarily in check only by Nasser's declared unreadiness for hostilities in Israel. The debate at the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly has been enlivened by the pressure of thirteen Arab states for the recognition of the Shukairy battalions; in the same breath they interpolate into these demands equally impassioned ones for "repatriation—basing themselves on Paragraph 11 of a UN resolution of 1948 which recommends that "*refugees wishing to live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date*" (my emphasis).

None of this makes sense except from the point of view of Arab war aims. But I am concerned here not with the rationale of Arab hatred nor with the reasons governments of East and West may have for wooing oil-rich Arabs rather than a handful of Israelis. In each instance the motivations for belligerence or compromise are self-evident. But I do remain troubled by the moralists, Jewish and non-Jewish, who blandly, and I think sanctimoniously, fail to weigh the Arab and Israeli case in the same scale.

AN OLD Druse Sheikh whom I encountered in my tour of Arab villages in 1948 volunteered an explanation of the Arab defeat. He made his point through a tale of the dog and the deer, translated to me by an Israeli interpreter. The dog's master had bidden him to catch the deer but the deer always outran the dog. Finally the dog asked the deer, "I am stronger than you; why do you always win?" The deer answered, "I can run better than you because you run at your master's bidding only to do me hurt, whereas I run for

my life." Some will no doubt assume the Sheikh was brainwashed by the Israeli victors; I prefer to believe that he was exceptionally perceptive. He understood the nature of necessity and how it differed for Arab and Jew.

The difference remains. While no people has known such extremity as the Jews, of no people is so much demanded. No other people is high-mindedly adjured to collaborate in its own effacement (repatriation); no other people is expected routinely to perform the David-Goliath act (little Israel can take care of itself, whatever the disparity in arms and numbers); no other people is accused of national greed for treasuring a crumb from the banquet where others feast; and no other people castigates itself with such perverse enthusiasm.

Finally, no other people has witnessed such a travesty of its bitterest agony. The dread terms of recent Jewish experience—camp, homelessness, refugee—are used to describe a situation so fundamentally different that the adoption of this nomenclature becomes a mockery. Repatriation is another term too lightly used. Those who for humanitarian rather than political reasons support repatriation for the Arab refugees fail to distinguish nostalgia for a home town—no doubt intense originally and now inflamed by two generations of enforced abnormal living—from the actuality of exile. This uncritical and perhaps unwitting readiness to sacrifice Israel in the name of justice shows again by what dissimilar yardsticks the respective situations of Arab and Jew are measured.



SUSPICION, VIOLENCE AND TERROR IN A TORN LAND

"A land without a people for a people without a land," was the way one of the early Zionist leaders described Palestine. But the territory the Jews had left nearly 2,000 years earlier was not vacant when their descendants returned; for centuries it had been inhabited by Arabs. Now the Arabs of Palestine are "a people without a land."

Some of them still live in the state of Israel, created by the partition of Palestine in 1948. Others live in parts of Palestine occupied by Israel since the 1967 war, and the rest are scattered among neighboring Arab states. About half of the three million Palestinian Arabs are registered as refugees; many of them were made refugees for the second time in 1967. The victims of repeated Arab defeats, living in bitterness and often in poverty, lacking a territory they can call their own and a state to represent them among nations, this hapless people nonetheless has seized the attention of the entire world. One hundred five governments voted, against precedent, to let the Palestinians' leader address the United Nations General Assembly, and the great powers of the world worry about the threat the Palestinians pose to international peace. How has such a small and unfortunate people gained such attention?

Palestinian organizations trace their growing influence to their reliance on violence, and many observers would agree. "It is sadly true," an American diplomat in the Middle East observed, "that you seem to have to hurt someone to get any attention, and the Palestinians didn't get any attention for 20 years."¹

But the record of terrorism by which the Palestinian organizations forced the world to consider their demands may exclude them from negotiations to deal with those demands. The Israelis refuse to talk with "murderers," and the Egyptians fear that Palestinian intransigence may prevent a peace they need to regain their own occupied territory and to rebuild their economy. As the Arab states coalesce behind Egyptian leadership for renewed peace talks, the Palestinians fear that their allies may sacrifice their goals in a compromise with Israel. The possibility of a compromise peace divides the Palestinians, whose leaders already may be losing some of their newly won influence.

Recognition of the PLO

The United Nations General Assembly voted Oct. 14, 1974, to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a federation of Palestinian groups, as "the representative of the Palestinian people." The vote was 105 to 4, with 20 abstentions; only Israel, the United States, the Dominican Republic and Bolivia voted against the resolution. On Nov. 13, 1974, Yasir Arafat, leader of the PLO and head of its largest guerrilla group, Al Fatah, addressed the assembly. It was the first occasion when a non-governmental organization participated in one of the assembly debates. "I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun," Arafat said. "Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand." (*Speech excerpts, box, p. 56*)

¹ Quoted by Al McConagha, *Minneapolis Tribune*, June 1, 1975.

Arafat's speech followed a unanimous agreement by 20 Arab heads of state, meeting in Rabat, Morocco, Oct. 26-28, to recognize the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people on any liberated Palestinian territory." Jordan's King Hussein, whose government had ruled the West Bank territory from the 1948 partition of Palestine until it was occupied by Israel in the 1967 war, abandoned his bitter opposition to the PLO claims and accepted the agreement "without any reservations."

The removal of the moderate Hussein from negotiations regarding the West Bank dismayed western countries hoping for a compromise peace in which Israel would yield territories occupied in 1967. Because Israel refuses to deal with the PLO, the prospects for peace talks appeared grim after the Rabat conference. Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin, in an interview with *U.S. News and World Report* after talks with President Ford in Washington June 11 and 12, 1975, reiterated the Israeli refusal to negotiate with the PLO, let alone accept its rule of the West Bank, because its goal, he said, is "the elimination of Israel." Rabin said that a "Jordanian-Palestinian state" is "the solution of the Palestine issue."²

Post-Rabat developments indicate that the setback to Hussein may have been temporary. The PLO failed to form a government in exile and to prepare for negotiations with Israel, as intended by the conference. Although its official position toward Israel has softened somewhat since it achieved its new status, the PLO still refuses to acknowledge the permanence of Israel. To do so would split the organization and give extremist groups an opportunity to win the support of the many rank-and-file Palestinians unwilling to abandon their dream of returning to their homeland.

But the new willingness of most Arab states to recognize Israel's permanence within its 1967 boundaries makes the PLO an embarrassment to their negotiations. As a result, Hussein's influence was again in the ascendancy as momentum toward peace talks picked up in mid-1975.

In May, Anwar Sadat paid the first visit by an Egyptian leader to Jordan, and Syrian President Hafez Assad arrived June 10 for three days of talks with Hussein. The meeting stood in dramatic contrast to years of bitter feuding between Jordan and Syria, which in 1970 sent tanks across the border in an effort to keep Hussein from smashing the Palestinian guerrillas who were challenging his regime. This time the two leaders agreed to coordinate their defenses, and Assad promised to protect Hussein from PLO infiltration, thus permitting the Jordanian king to concentrate more of his forces along his border with Israel. A few days later, Hussein reportedly agreed to a limited presence within his kingdom of PLO forces, which had only a token office in Amman.

Changes Within the PLO

Growing unity among the governments seeking to negotiate with Israel brings pressure on the PLO to

² *U.S. News and World Report*, June 23, 1975, p. 30.

Reprinted by permission of the publishers from **THE MIDDLE EAST: US POLICY, ISRAEL, OIL AND THE ARABS**, second edition, copyright © 1975 by Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Washington, DC. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be reproduced further in whole or in part without express permission by the copyright owner.

moderate its stand, but in the process alienates the radical groups within the organization. The extremists, however, are being wooed by Libyan strongman Muammar el Qaddafi, who still vows the destruction of Israel.

As part of an intensified campaign to thwart peace negotiations, Qaddafi in June 1975 invited to Tripoli two radical Palestinians—George Habash, who organized a series of airplane hijackings in 1970, and Ajmad Jabril, whose exploits include plotting the April 11, 1974, massacre in Qiryat Shemona, in which 18 Israelis, including eight children, were killed by terrorists infiltrating from Lebanon. Egyptian intelligence sources told *Newsweek* that Qaddafi offered Habash \$16-million to kill Sadat, a proposal allegedly accepted with the boast: "If we can penetrate the heart of Tel Aviv, you can imagine how much easier it will be in Cairo or Alexandria."³

The popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Marxist group which crystalized under Habash's leadership in 1967, withdrew from the PLO executive council in September 1974, accusing it of "deviation from the revolutionary course" and alleging that the organization had made contacts with the United States aimed at peace negotiations. In February 1975, Habash offered to bring his group back into the PLO if Arafat would reject any settlement involving recognition of Israel. Arafat has not agreed to recognize Israel, but his public position has become more moderate.

Arafat's goal of a "secular democratic" state for all of Palestine by definition excludes a distinctly Jewish state and raised deep fears in Israelis about their future status and even their presence amidst an Arab majority. But in his United Nations speech, Arafat repeatedly referred to this goal as a "dream," and he has indicated PLO readiness to accept a Palestinian state in the occupied territories as an interim arrangement.

David Holden of the *Sunday Times* of London observed that "For the present, probably, no Palestinian leader could survive without paying lip service to that vision of paradise regained, any more than Israeli politicians can get by without espousing the sacred 'law of return' and its vision of the ultimate ingathering of Jews throughout the world."⁴ Holden suggested that before Arafat can relegate that dream to the indefinite future (much as the West Germans have done with their dream of a reunited Germany) and accept the partition of Palestine, he needs assurance that the Israelis also will move from established positions toward compromise. The Israelis, however, feel that any compromise they offer would be only a first step toward the dissolution of their state, and the loss of the security it provides, unless they first secure explicit pledges recognizing its permanence.

Struggle Over Homeland

The Palestinians were the chief victims of Zionist insistence on the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Palestine and Arab insistence on destroying the new state. Who shoulders the major blame for the Palestinian plight—the Zionists, the Arab countries of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, or the Palestinians themselves—depends to a large extent on the allegiance of those affixing blame.

Thus, the pro-Zionist publication *Near East Report* argued on July 17, 1974, that "those familiar with the

history of 1948 [the year Israel declared its statehood] know that the Palestinians could have had their national homeland and that the Israelis accepted the establishment of a Palestinian state and at that time were ready to live in peace with it. But the neighboring Arab states invaded Palestine in order to crush the Jewish state and divide it up. The Palestinians were the victims of the Arab war against Israel."

A totally different account came from Sami Hadawi, a Palestinian refugee. Hadawi wrote that as soon as the United Nations adopted its resolution of Nov. 29, 1947, calling for the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, "Zionist underground forces came out into the open and began to attack Arab towns and villages, driving out all the non-Jewish inhabitants and massacring those who stood by their homes...."⁵

Similarly, Zionists and Palestinians blame each other for the massacres that followed partitioning and for an Arab exodus then and also after the establishment of the Jewish state on May 14, 1948.⁶ Israel contends that Arab governments broadcast appeals to the Palestinians to leave until Arab armies liberated their homelands—a contention that Arabs label as a "myth."⁷ Regardless of the truth or falsity of the matter, it is generally acknowledged that Israelis razed property abandoned by Palestinian Arabs to discourage their return.

Whatever the basic reasons for the departure, some 525,000 to 900,000 Palestinians—there is no agreement as to exactly how many—had fled their homeland by the end of 1948. Most of them left with no material possessions and were dependent on the good will of Arab countries where they sought refuge—or on the United Nations—for food, clothing and shelter.

Soon after independence, the Knesset (Parliament) passed the "law of return," which provided that "every Jew has a right to immigrate to Israel." Don Peretz noted in his famous study, *Israel and the Palestine Arabs* (1958), that the abandoned property of the refugees "was one of the greatest contributions toward making Israel a viable state." He reported that of the 370 new Jewish settlements established between 1948 and the beginning of 1953, 350 were on absentee [owned] property, and nearly a third of the new immigrants (250,000) settled in urban areas abandoned by the Arabs."

Treatment of Israeli Arabs

The Israeli Declaration of Independence called on the "sons of the Arab people dwelling in Israel to keep the peace and play their part in building the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its institutions, provisional and permanent." How well the 160,000 Palestinians who remained in the country were treated remains a subject of dispute.⁸

A pro-Palestinian study in 1973 was highly critical of the military administration under which Israeli Arabs lived until 1966. Military rule, the study asserted, deprived the Palestinians in Israel "of their human and political

³ Sami Hadawi, *Palestine: Loss of a Heritage* (1963), p. 2.

⁴ See David Pryce-Jones's *The Fact of Defeat: Palestinian Refugees and Guerrillas* (1972), p. 15. See also "Arab Guerrillas," *Editorial Research Reports*, 1969 Vol. I, pp. 316-323.

⁵ Fawaz Turki, for example, wrote in *The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian Exile* (1972): "An examination of the monitoring records in the West revealed no such appeals to the population of Palestine from neighboring states; rather it was revealed that the Palestinians were exhorted not to leave." [His emphasis.]

⁶ Almost 60 per cent of the Israeli Arabs today live in Galilee, particularly in the all-Arab towns of Nazareth and Shafa Amr. More than 20 per cent live in the Little Triangle, the region east of the coastal plain and south of Tel Aviv. Seven per cent live in the Haffa area and in the Negev. The rest are scattered throughout the country.

⁷ *Newsweek*, June 30, 1975.

⁸ David Holden, "Which Arafat," *New York Times Magazine*, March 23, 1975.

'I Am a Rebel, and Freedom Is My Cause'

Following are excerpts from the address by Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to the United National General Assembly Nov. 13, 1974:

If we return now to the historical roots of our cause, we do so because present at this very moment in our midst are those who, while they occupy our homes, as their cattle graze in our pastures, and as their hands pluck the fruit of our trees, claim at the same time that we are disembodied spirits, fictions without presence, without traditions or future. We speak of our roots also because until recently some people have regarded—and continued to regard—ours as merely a problem of refugees. They have portrayed the Middle East question as little more than a border dispute between the Arab states and the Zionist enclave. They have imagined that our people claims rights not rightfully its own and fights neither with logic nor valid motive, with a simple wish only to disturb the peace and to terrorize wantonly. For there are amongst you—and here I intend the United States of America and others like it—those who supply our enemy freely with planes and bombs and with every variety of murderous weapon. They take hostile positions against us, deliberately distorting the true essence of things. All this is done not only at our expense, but at the expense of the American people, and of the friendship we continue to hope can be cemented between us and this great people, whose history of struggle for the sake of freedom we honor and salute....

Mr. President, the roots of the Palestinian question reach back into the closing years of the 19th century, to that period we call the era of colonialism as we know it today. This is precisely the period during which Zionism as a scheme was born; its aim was the conquest of Palestinian land by European immigrants, just as settlers colonized, and indeed raided, most of Africa....

The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists cannot possibly be called terrorist. Otherwise the American people in their struggle for liberation from the British colonialists would have been terrorists; the European resistance against the Nazis would be terrorism; the struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples would also be terrorism. This, Mr. President, is actually a just and right struggle consecrated by the U.N. Charter and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As to those who fight against the just causes, those who wage war to occupy, colonize and oppress other people, those are the terrorists....


I am a rebel, and freedom is my cause. I know well that many of you present here today once stood in exactly the same adversary position I now occupy, and from which I must fight. You were once obligated by your struggle to convert dreams

into reality. Therefore you must now share my dream. I think this is exactly why I can ask you now to help, as together we bring out our dream into a bright reality, our common dream for a peaceful future in Palestine's sacred land....

In my formal capacity as chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and as leader of the Palestinian revolution, I proclaim before you that when we speak of our common hopes

for the Palestine of tomorrow we include in our perspective all Jews now living in Palestine who choose to live with us there in peace and without discrimination.

In my formal capacity as chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and leader of the Palestinian revolution, I call upon Jews one by one to turn away from the illusory promises made to them by Zionist ideology and Israeli leadership. Those offer Jews perpetual bloodshed,



endless war and continuous thralldom.

We invite them to emerge from their moral isolation into a more open realm of free choice, far from their present leadership's effort to implant in them a Massada complex.

We offer them the most generous solution that we might live together in a framework of just peace, in our democratic Palestine....

Later Dismay

Arafat later expressed dismay that his speech, which he considered a conciliatory move toward compromise, was viewed as militant in the western press. In an interview with Eric Rouleau, published in *Le Monde* Jan. 7, 1975, he said:

...the Zionist propagandists have emphasized one phrase from my speech taken out of context to give support to the despicable theory according to which we are really trying to throw the Jews into the sea.

Yes, I did say that I dreamt—I emphasize the word—of a unified and democratic Palestine. But is it a crime to dream? Is there a law against imagining the change which would come about in years to come?

Do I have to force myself to forget the house where I was born in Jerusalem a few yards from the Wailing Wall, a house whose destruction Mrs. Golda Meir ordered under the occupation regime? Do I have less right to be there than this Russian lady, naturalized American, who has come to install herself in my ancestral land?

rights." It "provided for administrative detention, even for unspecified reasons, for an unlimited period without trial or indictment, for the banishment of a person from the country, for confiscation of the property of those who violate military laws and for the imposition of total or partial curfew." Jacob M. Landau offered another viewpoint in his book, *The Arabs in Israel* (1969). "These restrictions applied to Jews as well as to Arabs, and, in fact, only a few Arabs and Jews were closely affected," he wrote. "And even they could apply to Israel's Supreme Court...for redress."

⁹ Al-Hakam Darwaza, "The Palestine Question," a study prepared for the Khartoum Conference on African-Arab Problems of October 1973, pp. 82-83.

Just as there are conflicting and generally subjective reports on the treatment of Israeli Arabs, there is also wide disagreement about how the Arabs who came under Israeli occupation after the June 1967 war have fared. Hisham Sharabi reports that their treatment has become increasingly repressive. And the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, led by Israel Shahak, professor of organic chemistry at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a former Zionist and survivor of the Nazi concentration camp at Bergen-Belsen, has been critical of the government's policy of destroying the property of suspects and expelling them.

Israeli officials typically say that while a few injustices may have been committed, the government's policy in this potentially explosive situation has been liberal, fair and enlightened. If Israeli policy were as repressive as its critics claim, they add, the Arabs under Israeli rule would have shown far more sympathy for the aims and terrorist activities of the guerrillas. That there has been relatively little collaboration between the PLO and the Palestinians in Israel proves, according to these spokesmen, that the vast majority of Arabs are willing to coexist and cooperate with the Jewish state.¹⁰

Hanna Nassir, president of Bir Zeit College, on Israel's West Bank, says that Israeli claims that the PLO lacks support in the occupied territories are self-serving. Nassir and four compatriots were deported to Lebanon Nov. 21, 1974, after student demonstrations and a shopkeepers' strike in Ramallah expressing support for the PLO during U.N. debate on the Palestinian question.

Nassir "categorically and emphatically" denies reports that he organized the demonstrations and instigated the strike, calls his deportation illegal, even by Israeli law, and a violation of the Geneva Convention, and points out that "there was no charge, no trial and no court decision." He says he was summoned to the military governor's office, where, after midnight, police handcuffed and blindfolded him and drove him with the other detainees to the Lebanese border. "There cannot be any leadership in the occupied territories," Nassir says. "That is why the people of the West Bank have accepted the PLO as its leadership. They have more freedom."¹¹

Palestinians charge that since 1967, more than 1,500 of them have been expelled without charges or trial from the West Bank and Gaza, including many doctors, teachers, mayors and other professional people capable of leadership.

West Bank Economy

Israeli occupation unquestionably has improved economic conditions." Wherever one goes on the West Bank," John M. Goshko wrote June 1, 1975, in *The Washington Post*, "the eye constantly is struck by those symbols—late model cars on the roads, forests of TV antennas sprouting over every town, running water in remote villages—that are the physical evidence of growing affluence. From what was essentially an area on relief only a decade ago, the West Bank today stands on the threshold of becoming a consumer society."¹²

The territory has no natural resources, and half its population is under age 14—conditions which make its economic prospects bleak. But West Bank agriculture has benefited from expanded markets and Israeli technical assistance. A 10-fold increase in the number of tractors in the area since 1967—from 120 to 1,200—is one indicator of the change under occupation. Agricultural production has increased 12 per cent annually in real terms, and the West Bank's gross national product has risen by an average of 18 per cent annually since 1967.¹³

About one-third of the West Bank labor force (40,000 out of 120,000 total) now work in Israel. "Palestinian workers in Israel have become a vital element in Israel's economy," according to John Richardson, president of American Near East Refugee Aid. "They are 45 per cent

cheaper to employ than Israelis, and they are available in large numbers to do the menial work that Israelis are learning to disdain." Richardson sees the integration of the West Bank and Gaza into the Israeli economy as deliberate policy and cites an Israeli Defense Ministry document:

The areas are a supplementary market for Israeli goods and service on the one hand and a source of factors of production, especially unskilled labor, for the Israeli economy on the other.¹⁴

Rise of Terrorists

Israel's refusal to repatriate more than a handful of Palestinian refugees and the Arab countries' hesitation about resettling them¹⁵ led to the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to care for the refugees. Describing the plight of those in the refugee camps in the mid-1950s, Don Peretz wrote: "Many living in leaky, torn tents were middle-class urbanites who had owned modest but adequate houses in their native land.... The self-reliance and individual initiative of former tradesmen and farmers were drowned in the boredom and frustration which the camps bred...."

This resentment and frustration contributed to the growth of terrorist groups and the eventual formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization. In the early 1950s, some of the Arab governments trained and subsidized groups of Palestinian guerrillas. Egypt, for example, set up battalions of "Palestinian Fedayeen" under the direct command of Egyptian officers in the Gaza Strip. But according to Fawaz Turki, "the first clandestine organization that was a truly Palestinian expression" was Al Fatah ("conquest"), formed in the early 1950s by Palestinian students at Stuttgart University in West Germany.

One of these students was Yasir Arafat, alias Abu Ammur, who left Jerusalem with his family during the 1948 war and settled in Gaza. Arafat had become convinced that the Palestinians must look to themselves, not the Arab governments, for the recovery of their homeland. Within a few years, Al Fatah and other Palestinian groups were established in Europe and the Middle East to coordinate Palestinian liberation strategy. Members of the groups received military training in Algeria and by the early 1960s were conducting terrorist raids in Israel.

The Palestine Liberation Organization was established by Arab heads of state at the first National Palestinian Congress—held in the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem in May 1964—before the sector was seized by Israel in the 1967 war. The delegates declared that "the Palestinian problem will never be resolved except in Palestine and by the force of arms."

The PLO did not actually emerge as an autonomous faction in the Arab world, however, until Israel's victory in the Six-day War. Yehoshafat Harkabi maintains that the defeat of Arab armies raised the stature of the guerrillas, because only they were carrying on the fight. The Palestinians, he wrote, "were transformed from an inferior factor into standard-bearers of Arab nationalism and a source of pride."¹⁶ The PLO became more militant. The incident which more than any other gave the PLO stature in

¹⁰ See "Israeli Society After 25 Years," *Editorial Research Reports*, 1973 Vol. 1, pp. 315-322.

¹¹ Interview with *Congressional Quarterly*, June 25, 1975.

¹² John M. Goshko, "The West Bank: Going it Alone," *The Washington Post*, June 1, 1975, p. C 1.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. C 5.

¹⁴ John Richardson, "Special Issue on the West Bank and Gaza," *The Link*, published by Americans for Middle East Understanding, spring 1975, pp. 2, 6.

¹⁵ The one exception was Jordan, the poorest of the Arab countries, which accorded the Palestinians citizenship.

¹⁶ Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Position of the Palestinians in the Israeli-Arab Conflict and Their National Covenant," *New York University Journal of International Law & Politics*, spring 1970, p. 218.

the Arab world was an Israeli attack on an Al Fatah camp in the Jordanian village of Karamah on March 21, 1968. In a 12-hour battle, about 300 guerrillas held off Israeli attackers, inflicted heavy losses and forced them to retreat. Young Palestinians rushed to join the movement.

The increased confidence and militance of the PLO were evident in the Palestine National Covenant, adopted by the National Congress in Cairo in July 1968. It held, among other things, that "armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine" (Article 9) and that "the partitioning of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal" (Article 19). In the new state the PLO proposed to create, only "The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians" (Article 6).

Although the first Zionist immigrants arrived in the 1880s, Palestinians have used various dates at different times as the cutoff point in determining which Jews could remain in a Palestinian state. Sometimes 1917, the date of Britain's Balfour Declaration supporting a Jewish "national home" in Palestine, is used; at other times 1947, the date of partition, has been invoked. Palestinians now state that all Jews presently in Israel could remain, but past inconsistency on this point does not reassure Israelis, who in any case have no intention of living in a non-Jewish Palestinian state.

Guerrilla-National Uneasiness

One of the ironies of the Palestinian predicament is that PLO sympathizers often display as much animosity toward their supposed benefactors and friends, the Arab states, as they do toward the Zionist enemy. And the Arab states directly involved—Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon—have, while paying lip service to the Palestinian cause, tried to restrain the commandos. Jordan and Lebanon have even used their armed forces against them.

The Palestinian presence has created a dilemma for Arab governments. A complete assimilation of the refugees would probably have destroyed the delicate political and religious balance in Lebanon and caused a dislocation of the Egyptian and Syrian economies. To allow the guerrillas to use their territory as a base from which to attack Israel invites quick and strong retaliation on and around the refugee camps. And to permit PLO terrorist attacks would make Israel even more reluctant to return to Egypt, Jordan and Syria any of the territory it seized from them in the 1967 war.

The strongest action against the guerrillas was taken by King Hussein of Jordan in 1970 after years of seeing their raids from Jordan bring Israeli reprisals against his country. In trying to stop the raids, he incurred the wrath of extreme leftist guerrillas, who threatened his life and promised to "revolutionize" his kingdom. Hussein's troops clashed with the guerrillas in September 1970 and succeeded in closing all but a few of their bases.¹⁷ The next July, the Jordanian army attacked the remaining outposts. Some of the guerrillas were captured and imprisoned, while others fled to Israel or Syria. Under pressure from the other Arab governments, Hussein later declared an amnesty for all terrorists except those who had been convicted of murder or espionage. This did little to lessen PLO demands

¹⁷ During the fighting, a secret terrorist arm, Black September, was set up. It claimed responsibility for, among other things, the murder of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in Cairo Nov. 29, 1971, and the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich in September 1972.

Defining Palestine, Palestinians

The word "Palestine" is of Roman origin, referring to the biblical land of the Philistines. The name fell into disuse for centuries and was revived by the British as an official title for an area mandated to their control by the League of Nations in 1920 after the breakup of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in World War I.

The British mandate also applied to Trans-Jordan (now Jordan), although it did not lie within the area designated "Palestine." Trans-Jordan lay entirely east of the River Jordan, and Palestine lay entirely to the west.

However, because the mandate applied to both regions, there is the argument that "Palestinian" applies to persons east as well as west of the River Jordan. There is a further argument that it applies not just to Arabs—as is common practice today—but also to Jews and Christians in the former mandated area.

Palestine as a legal entity ceased to exist in 1948, when Britain, unable to keep control, relinquished its mandate and Israel declared its independence. The previous year, Palestine had been partitioned by the United Nations into Arab and Jewish sectors. Israel enlarged its partitioned areas in a war of independence in 1948-49. Other parts of Palestine fell under the control of Jordan and Egypt.

for his overthrow and the destruction of the "reactionary" Hashemite kingdom.

Lebanon, too, has taken military action against the guerrillas. After armed clashes in 1969, the PLO was restricted to bases in southern Lebanon under the supervision of the Lebanese army. Then, in May 1973, after Israeli retaliation in Lebanon for commando attacks in Israel, the army again fought with the PLO. The fighting lasted two weeks and resulted in more than 350 deaths and 700 injuries. As was the case with Jordan, Syria threatened to send military aid to the Palestinians while Israel was ready to assist Lebanon. Syrian troops did cross the border, but their quick withdrawal prevented a widening of the conflict. Further armed skirmishes between Lebanese rightists and guerrillas broke out in 1974 and 1975. The rightists have been demanding that the government take control of the refugee camps. The PLO is equally insistent that the Palestinians retain control. By mid-June 1975, a series of efforts to form a new government had failed, and recurrent outbreaks of fighting in the previous two months had left at least 300 dead. (*Lebanon profile*, p. 91)

The PLO fears that the Arab governments will make deals with Israel at the Palestinians' expense. The possibility of a sell-out has been expressed more openly since the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 242 on Nov. 22, 1967. The resolution called for, among other things, "the withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied" in exchange for recognition of Israel by the Arab countries. Jordan and Egypt endorsed 242, provided that it was interpreted to mean all, not part, of the territories Israel seized. Syria did not accept the resolution until after the October 1973 war. The PLO has repeatedly denounced the resolution on the ground that it refers to refugees, not Palestinians, and puts forth no specific plan for a "just settlement."

Proposals to End Problem

Proposed solutions to the Palestinian problem are as numerous and varied as the interests of the parties involved. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that none of the major proposals has been acceptable to all parties. These include:

- A separate Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza.
- Palestinian-Jordanian federation.
- Assimilation of the refugees in the Arab countries where they are now living.
- Their repatriation followed by the establishment of a secular Palestinian state incorporating Israel.

Probably the most-publicized proposal is for a separate state on the West Bank and in Gaza. The Soviet Union, the Arab states and even the PLO now support the idea of creating a separate Palestinian state in territory now occupied by Israel. The United States has not yet taken an official position. Israel has opposed it on the ground that radical Palestinians would control any such state and use it as a base from which to work for Israel's destruction. In addition to the security problem that a Palestinian state could create, there are political reasons for opposition in Israel. Religious and conservative groups probably would bring about the downfall of any Israeli government that advocated giving up Israeli-held land to the Palestinians.

For the United States, Israel and Jordan, a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza would pose innumerable difficulties and dangers. For American policymakers, there is the fear that it might turn to the Soviet Union for military and political support. Israelis are aware that even if PLO leaders were denied any significant voice in the Palestinian government, there would be pressure on that government to seize more of the territory that was formerly Palestine.

Some regard a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza as impractical. Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Chatti wrote in *The Washington Star-News* on March 24, 1974: "The only workable solution to the Palestinian problem—and one which we are sure their leaders would accept—is the creation of a new Palestinian state. But the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip...would not suffice for such a state. The Palestinians would need more than these overcrowded bits of territory—and additional land would have to come from Israel and Hussein's Jordan."

Neither Israel nor Jordan would welcome such a state. However, Jordan's King Hussein reluctantly acquiesced in the Rabat Conference legitimization of the PLO on "liberated Palestinian territory." Some observers thought he expected the PLO to fail in its aim and thus give him opportunities to reassert his claims to the West Bank.

United Arab Kingdom

In an address to the Jordanian parliament on March 15, 1972, Hussein proposed a restructuring of the country into a federal state made up of two autonomous regions, Transjordan and the Israeli-occupied West Bank, with equal representation in the national parliament in Amman. The central government would be responsible for defense, foreign affairs and other matters of purely national interests. Hussein implied that residents of the Gaza Strip could freely join the new state, which would be called the United Arab Kingdom.

His plan received a cool reception in Israel and was denounced by the PLO and its supporters as a sellout.

Nevertheless, Jordan now hopes for a return of at least part of the West Bank and a plebiscite by its inhabitants. Some observers believe that the West Bank Arabs would opt for a separate non-PLO type of state with close ties to both Jordan and Israel. The Israeli position appears more flexible than in the past as to returning part of the West Bank to Jordanian "administrative control"—while maintaining Israeli security outposts along the Jordan River. On Aug. 15, the Israeli Parliament rejected a motion by conservative members to require a national referendum in advance of yielding any part of the West Bank. The Rabin government has promised, however, to hold new elections before agreeing to turn over any West Bank territory to Jordan.

Probably the most difficult and emotional issue to resolve in any Israeli-Jordanian negotiations is the fate of Jerusalem, a city holy to Jews, Moslems and Christians. Israeli leaders have repeatedly and insistently declared that Jerusalem is "not negotiable." But it is unlikely that such diverse but devout Moslems as King Khalid of Saudi Arabia or Prime Minister Muammar Qaddafi of Libya would accede to any over-all peace settlement in the Middle East that did not provide for at least shared control of Jerusalem.

Any settlement that brought more Palestinians under Jordanian rule would present grave dangers to Hussein and Israel. Palestinians already account for a large part of Jordan's 2.6 million population; the addition of those on the West Bank would increase existing pressures for replacement of the Bedouin-controlled Hashemite kingdom by a Palestinian state. A national Palestinian state bordering Israel would bring little comfort to the security-minded Israelis.

However, Shlomo Avineri, chairman of the political science department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, suggests that the replacement of Hussein by a Palestinian state "could be more conducive to eventual peace than his continuing presence has proved itself to be." Even if the more radical Palestinians were to control the new government, "it is a historical truism that an underground movement, once come into formal political power, tends to become responsible and respectable, in the exercise of authority. In all, I think it eminently worthwhile for Israelis, who shudder at the thought of Al Fatah taking over Jordan, to have second thoughts on the matter."¹⁸

Prospects for Eventual Resettlement

The issue of Palestinian refugee repatriation or resettlement has been debated endlessly for a quarter century or more. In countless resolutions on the subject, the United Nations has vacillated, calling at one time for a return, at another for assimilation and finally for a "just settlement of the refugee problem." The U.N. had little choice. The Arab states, except for Jordan, refused to assimilate the refugees, and Israel refused to repatriate them. In addition to the immense security problem that large-scale Palestinian repatriation would create, refugee resettlement in Israel would give the country an Arab majority much sooner than anticipated.

Due to high Arab and relatively low Jewish birth rates in recent years, Israeli officials had been expecting an Arab majority in the country by the 1980s unless it received large numbers of Jews from abroad, particularly from the Soviet Union. But Terence Smith reported in *The New York Times* on Aug. 15, 1974, that Jewish immigration to Israel

¹⁸ "The Palestinians and Israel," *Commentary*, June 1970, pp. 38-39.

dropped by 33 per cent in the first half of the year because of extremely high inflation and the "political uncertainty caused by the October [1973] war."

Many American leaders have advocated that Israel, the United States, the United Nations or the rich Arab countries allot as much money as needed to assist the host governments in assimilating the refugees. Israel contends that the less populated Arab countries, notably Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, could easily accommodate thousands of Palestinians without endangering national stability. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, in a radio address on Sept. 28, 1972, proposed that the Palestinians form a government in exile. While he promised immediate Egyptian recognition of such a government, he did not specify whether it could be established in Egypt. The PLO rejected the proposal.

Commenting on a recommendation by British historian Arnold Toynbee that the Palestinians be given the option of returning to their homes as "loyal citizens of Israel" or generous monetary compensation for resettlement elsewhere, Fawaz Turki wrote that Toynbee "was right in asserting that most refugees would not return to Israel on the condition that they live as 'loyal Israeli citizens.' In toto, his solution, not unlike others before it, denied the Palestinians the opportunity for a decent existence in their own homeland and guaranteed their ultimate disappearance as an entity and a people—a fate they had tenaciously fought against."

Similarly, Cherif M. Bassiouni, an Arab-American and professor of law at DePaul University in Chicago, told the U.S. House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements on April 4, 1974: "I must emphasize the importance to the Palestinians of their Palestinian entity.... They don't want to be assimilated anywhere regardless of the economic benefits they can derive from it; they want to be once again a people in their own country." While Turki and many of his fellow refugees believe that the struggle for Palestine will continue and perhaps even intensify, others think that with the passage of time the irredentist fervor will lessen. Yehoshafat Harkabi feels that "as recognition grows that there is no future for the idea of Palestinian sovereign independence, it will lose much of its hold on the Palestinians as a political ideal."¹⁹

Secular Democracy

Dreamers on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle often view the ideal solution as the establishment of a secular, democratic state where Jews, Christians and Moslems could coexist peacefully. In recent years, Palestinian spokesmen, including most PLO leaders, have tried to draw a distinction between Jews and Zionists. Palestinians and Jews have lived and can again live in friendship, they insist, once the "exclusivist, discriminatory, imperialist Zionist state" is abolished. Jews sympathetic to a secular state have urged PLO leaders to put their words into practice by amending the 1968 Palestinian National Covenant to permit all Jews, regardless of their date of immigration, to remain once the new state is established.

¹⁹ "The Problem of the Palestinians," *op. cit.*, p. 10.

How Many Palestinians?

Spokesmen for both Israel and Arab governments tend to use the figure three million when called on to state the size of the Palestinian population in the world. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) offers a lower estimate, 2.7 million, of whom 1.5 million are registered as refugees.

How the Palestinian population is distributed today involves another numbers game. Sets of statistics offered by different sources may correspond in broad outline, although not in specifics. Palestinian Arabs living in territory occupied by Israel in 1967 may exceed one million. According to the Israeli census of 1972, a total of 1,029,000 non-Jews—nearly all of them Arabs—were counted there, as follows:

West Bank of the River Jordan	639,000
Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai	390,000

In addition, the non-Jewish population of Israel proper (476,900) is overwhelmingly Palestinian. Thus it can be assumed that about half of all Palestinians live under Israeli rule.

As for the others, the biggest group, perhaps 900,000, is found in Jordan. It is believed that 250,000 live in Lebanon, Egypt and Syria. Still others, in unknown but presumably smaller numbers, have dispersed to other countries, both Arab and non-Arab.

Among the anti-Zionist Israeli Jews are Israel Shahak and Uri Avnery. Shahak, in a meeting with American journalists in Jerusalem on June 6, 1974, said he favored a federation of Arab and Jewish states, similar to Swiss cantons, with Jerusalem as the capital and with a bill of rights protecting all groups within the federation. Uri Avnery's proposal is the most far-reaching of any to date. In 1968, Avnery submitted a resolution in the Knesset which called for the creation of a Palestinian state and a federation between Israel and the new state. After the establishment of the federation and the resettlement of the refugees, a Semitic Union, "a great confederacy of all the states in the region," would be set up. "A solution in Palestine is almost a prerequisite to a general Semitic peace settlement, and at the same time, a Semitic peace is necessary to make the Palestinian solution meaningful and enduring," Avnery wrote in *Israel Without Zionists* (1968).

Avnery's proposed Semitic Union would put an end to "mutual fear and suspicion" and would permit a peaceful pooling of political power and economic resources. "Joining a great Semitic confederacy would mean, for Israel, putting an end to the Zionist chapter in its history and starting a new one—the chapter of Israel as a state integrated in its region, playing a part in the region's struggle for progress and unity. For the Arabs it would mean recognition of a post-Zionist Israel as part of the region, a part which could and should not be abolished because, in its new form, it is a factor in the struggle for the common good."

ISRAEL AND THE ARABS: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF CONFLICT

Since the establishment of Israel little more than a quarter of a century ago, Israel and its Arab neighbors have engaged in more or less continuing hostilities, punctuated by four major wars.

Having failed in the first place to prevent the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, the Arabs have fought variously over the years to seize territory from Israel or to destroy it altogether. Arab enmity has stiffened Israel's resolve to attain "secure and defensible borders," and this in turn has fostered Arab fears of Israeli "expansionism." The problem of the Palestinian Arabs who were made refugees by one or another of the four Arab-Israeli wars has remained a continuing obstacle to peace.

The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been marked by a gradual movement toward Arab solidarity. Arab participants in the first war of 1948-49 distrusted each other almost as much as they distrusted the hated Zionists. By the time of the fourth war, in 1973, Arab unity had advanced to such a point that Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states and several North African countries could join with Egypt, Syria and other "first-circle" Arab states (states closer to Israel) in a common effort to recapture the territories lost to Israel in the 1967 war.

For its part, Israel has suffered growing isolation in the world community. Its refusal to give up Arab territories occupied in 1967 cost the country many friends in the third world, while the October 1973 Arab oil boycott forced Japan and most western European governments to adopt a pro-Arab stance. The Arabs' decision to use oil as a political weapon also had an effect on U.S. policy in the Middle East.

The 1973 war gave the lie to the assumption that—despite U.S. backing for Israel and Soviet support for the Arabs—the two superpowers could avoid a confrontation during an Arab-Israeli war. The specter of superpower conflict arose as first the Soviet Union and then the United States felt compelled to resupply the belligerents with arms on a massive scale and later when the United States ordered its forces on worldwide alert following the threat of a possible unilateral Soviet troop movement into the Middle East.

By the time the first Arab-Israeli peace conference opened in Geneva in December 1973, it appeared that a permanent resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict had become a real possibility at last. The 1973 war demonstrated the dangers of continued stalemate, while the Arabs' use of their oil weapon assured the interest of outside powers in promoting a peace settlement. But awesome issues remained to be resolved. While many Arab leaders might no longer demand the liquidation of the Jewish state, Arab insistence that Israel withdraw from all territories occupied in 1967 collided with Israeli insistence on secure and defensible boundaries. The most difficult territorial issue to be resolved was likely to be the status of Jerusalem. The fate of the Palestinian refugees also remained in dispute.

War of Independence (1948-49)

The first Arab-Israeli war stemmed from Arab refusal to accept a United Nations plan to partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. The U.N. had been drawn into the Palestine dispute following the failure of Great Britain, which held a post-World-War-I mandate over Palestine, to hammer out a Palestine solution that would be acceptable to both Arabs and Jews.

In May 1947 the U.N. General Assembly established an 11-nation special commission to study the Palestine problem. A majority of the commission recommended the division of Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state and an internationalized Jerusalem. The Zionists endorsed the majority approach. A commission minority recommended a federal state with autonomous Arab and Jewish provinces and limits on Jewish immigration. Although the Arabs initially insisted on absolute Arab sovereignty over Palestine, they ultimately endorsed the minority plan.

For a time it appeared that neither plan could command the necessary two-thirds support in the United Nations, but on Nov. 29, 1947, the General Assembly approved the partition plan by a vote of 33-13, with 10 abstentions.


The Palestinian Arabs thereupon resorted to arms to prevent partition. In the civil war that followed, however, Palestinian Jews were able to win control over most of the territory allocated to them by the partition plan. Britain ended its mandate over Palestine on May 14, 1948, and the same day the Zionists proclaimed the establishment of the state of Israel. One day later, the armies of five Arab countries—Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon—invaded Palestine, and the first Arab-Israeli war began.

"The first Arab-Israeli war produced a shock from which the Arabs never truly have recovered—their defeat at the hands of the numerically inferior Jews," Harry B. Ellis wrote in a 1970 analysis prepared for the American Enterprise Institute, an independent research organization.

Although the Arab states involved had 40 times as many people as the infant Jewish state, the Arabs, torn by dynastic rivalries, never placed their armies under effective joint command and were unable to agree on common objectives. Meanwhile the outnumbered Jews profited from their sense of cohesion and their paramilitary experience fighting the Palestinian Arabs during the mandate period. Their war effort was augmented by the influx of men and equipment from abroad as the war went on.

The shooting war stopped on Jan. 7, 1949, and by Feb. 24 Egypt had separately signed an armistice agreement with Israel, followed by Lebanon in March, Jordan in April and Syria in July. Iraq refused to sign an armistice agreement and simply withdrew from Palestine.

Reprinted by permission of the publishers from THE MIDDLE EAST: US POLICY, ISRAEL, OIL AND THE ARABS, second edition, copyright © 1975 by Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Washington, DC. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be reproduced further in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.



When the fighting stopped, Israel held over 30 per cent more territory than had been assigned to the Jewish state under the U.N. partition plan. The Arab state envisaged by the U.N. plan never materialized; its territory was divided among Israel, Transjordan and Egypt. Israel gained about 2,500 square miles. Transjordan, which annexed the West Bank of the Jordan River and transformed itself into the state of Jordan, gained 2,200 square miles. Egypt took the Gaza Strip, about 135 square miles, which it held in the status of Egyptian-controlled territory. Jerusalem was divided between Israel and Jordan. U.N. mixed armistice commissions were established to police the frontiers, and several demilitarized zones were established between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

The U.N. also created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to assist Palestinian Arabs who had fled or been driven from their homes. It is thought that more than 700,000 Palestinian Arabs—the exact number is disputed—who had lived in the area that came under Israeli control became refugees—60 per cent in Jordan, 20 per cent in the Gaza Strip and the remaining 20 per cent in Syria and Lebanon.

Although the refugee problem was widely regarded as a major obstacle to the conclusion of peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Middle East specialist Nadav Safran, in *From War to War* (1969), held that other factors were more important in the refusal of Arab leaders to sign peace agreements. He quoted an interview with Azzam Pasha, first secretary general of the Arab League:

"We have a secret weapon which we can use better than guns and machine guns, and this is time. As long as we do not make peace with the Zionists, the war is not over; and as long as the war is not over there is neither victor nor vanquished. As soon as we recognize the exis-

tence of the state of Israel, we admit by this act that we are vanquished."

In addition to this psychological reluctance to accept defeat, Safran cited other considerations for the refusal of Arab leaders to make peace, including their fear of an outraged public opinion that had been encouraged to expect an easy victory and their apprehension that "peace would legitimize Israel's entry into the Middle Eastern political arena and allow it to maneuver freely among the rival Arab states and with interested outside powers in order to promote its suspected expansionist designs."

Although the refusal to sign peace agreements left open the possibility of future offensive action against Israel, Safran concluded that "there was not, at this stage, an active Arab commitment to a resumption of hostilities or to the total destruction of Israel."

But the absence of formal peace agreements resulted in continuing tension and bitterness, heightened by the Arab blockade of Israel and the barring of Israeli shipping from the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel's sea lane to Africa and Asia. In May 1950 the United States, Britain and France issued the Tripartite Declaration in which they pledged themselves to limit arms shipments to the area and to oppose any attempt to alter the existing armistice lines by force. Yet the armistice lines were repeatedly violated by Arab commando raids into Israeli territory and retaliatory raids into Arab territory by Israel. The level of hostilities escalated, culminating in the second Arab-Israeli war of 1956.

Suez War (1956)

The immediate cause of the second Arab-Israeli war was Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. Several events in the preceding year had emboldened Nasser to take this



step: the British had withdrawn their 80,000 troops from the Suez Canal zone; the Soviet Union had agreed to supply large quantities of arms to Egypt on advantageous terms; and the United States, piqued by Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact, had canceled its offer to help Egypt build the Aswan Dam.

Diplomatic efforts to settle the Suez Canal crisis foundered, and Britain and France—chief shareholders in the Suez Canal Company—determined to recapture the canal by force. They secretly enlisted Israel's participation in this effort.

On Oct. 26, 1956, the Israeli army invaded the Sinai Peninsula and in seven days had reached the Suez Canal. Egyptian troops were driven from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. On Oct. 31, French and British air forces began bombing Egypt prior to invading the country. The United Nations speedily achieved a cease-fire and demanded the withdrawal of invading troops from Egypt.

Responding to intense international pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, Britain and France withdrew the last of their forces from Egypt in December 1956.

The last Israeli units were not withdrawn from the Sinai until March 1957, and then only under the threat that the United States would impose economic sanctions upon Israel if it failed to do so.

Meanwhile, a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) took up positions on Egyptian territory at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula and along the Gaza frontier. Israel gained free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba, and it warned that the removal of U.N. troops from Sharm el Sheikh at the entrance of the gulf would constitute an act of war.

For a time Egypt also permitted Israeli cargoes on non-Israeli ships to transit the Suez Canal, but this concession was halted in 1959.

The 1956 war did not solve the Arab-Israeli territorial conflict and only temporarily altered the military balance in the area, since Russia immediately began replacing the military equipment lost by Egypt during the war. It did increase Arab hostility toward Israel, and as Nasser began to promote the concept of integral Arab unity this attitude intensified, since Israel was viewed as a physical barrier that split the Arab world.

The Arab-Israeli conflict became a "clash of destinies," in Safran's view, following the short-lived merger of Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic in February 1958. "Prior to the union with Syria, Egypt, along with the rest of the Arab League, stood for the application of the United Nations resolutions on partition and the return of the refugees, which admitted the right of Israel to exist; after the union, this line was abandoned for one that clearly intimated the liquidation of Israel under a variety of formulae, such as 'the restoration of the Arab rights in Palestine' or the 'liquidation of the Zionist aggression in Palestine,'" he wrote.

Although it had suffered a clear diplomatic defeat, Israel following the 1956 war "enjoyed ten years undisturbed by the border belligerence of its major and most dangerous foe, Egypt," Ben Halpern wrote in *The Idea of the Jewish State* (1969).

"The Negev, along the Sinai-Gaza frontier, was quiet, busy with civilian development. The continuing Suez blockade could be ignored because traffic flowed freely to and from Aqaba. While the UN Emergency Force was sketchily represented by troops in Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh and by a light patrol along the Negev-Sinai line, no one—certainly not Israel—considered the Emergency Force a major factor in securing the border peace. Its chief function was to give the Egyptians an excuse for not reopening hostilities at a time when they felt unprepared," he wrote.

Six-Day War (1967)

The Six-Day War of June 5-10, 1967, erupted after months of mounting tension. But its immediate cause was the failure of diplomatic efforts to lift the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba declared on May 23 by Egyptian President Nasser.

The gulf had been opened to Israeli shipping by Israel's victory in the Suez War of 1956, and it had been kept open by the United Nations Emergency Force stationed since then at the gulf's mouth on the Red Sea. Nasser's request on May 18 for removal of the U.N. force, from the Gaza Strip as well as from the gulf outpost, was accompanied by movement of substantial Egyptian forces into the Sinai Peninsula, raising Tel Aviv's fears of the long-threatened Arab attempt to terminate the existence of the Jewish state. When the United States and other western nations failed to act promptly to break the blockade, the third Arab-Israeli war was on.

The war substantially altered the power structure in the turbulent Middle East. Israeli planes in their first "pre-emptive" attack destroyed the bulk of the Egyptian air force while it was still on the ground. Israel's lightning move through the Sinai Peninsula broke the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and once again put its soldiers on the banks of the Suez Canal. In the east, Israel's forces ousted Jordanian troops from the old section of Jerusalem and seized control of all Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River. The last move foreclosed the possibility that in the event of all-out war Israel could be cut in half; at some points, Jordan's territory on the West Bank extended to less than 20 miles from the sea. Finally, Israel captured the Golan Heights, the borderland hills and fortifications from which Syria had for two decades harassed Israel's northeastern settlements.

Israel's smashing victory not only stunned the Arabs and their Soviet backers; it left Israel in a position of strength. In contrast to 1956, when Israeli forces were withdrawn in response to strong Washington-Moscow pressure, Tel Aviv at once announced that Israel would remain in the occupied territories until decisive progress toward a permanent settlement had been made.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel and began to rearm the Egyptians. Nasser, charging that U.S. aircraft had contributed to Egypt's defeat, severed diplomatic relations with Washington. Six other Arab states followed suit. With the Soviet Union providing military assistance to the Arab governments, the United States moved in to fill the vacuum created by the French government's 1967 decision to end its role as chief supplier of armaments to Israel.

On Nov. 22, 1967, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved a resolution (Security Council Resolution 242) aimed at bringing peace to the Middle East. The document called for withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab areas; an end to the state of belligerency between the Arab nations and Israel; acknowledgement of and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every nation in the area; the establishment of "secure and recognized boundaries"; a guarantee of freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; and a just settlement of the refugee problem. (*Text, box, next column*)

U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Nov. 22, 1967

The Security Council

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Although U.N. efforts to end the Arab-Israeli conflict once again foundered, the resolution remained the basis for subsequent peace initiatives. Prior to the 1967 war, the Arabs had insisted that Israel return all lands in excess of the territory assigned to the Jewish state by the U.N. partition plan, an action that would have erased the conquests of the 1948 war. After the 1967 war, however, the Arabs modified their demands, insisting only that Israel adhere to the principles of the 1967 Security Council resolution which called on Israel to return to its pre-1967 borders.

Fighting was renewed in 1969 after Egypt repudiated the cease-fire imposed at the close of the Six-Day War. Technically, the 1967 cease-fire continued in effect on

the Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese fronts, although it was violated repeatedly by both sides.

In June 1970, U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers proposed a cease-fire and a resumption of U.N. mediation efforts aimed at implementing the 1967 Security Council resolution to achieve a settlement based on withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territory and Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist within secure borders.

Egypt and Jordan, then Israel, agreed to invoke a cease-fire for 90 days, beginning Aug. 8, 1970, in their conditional acceptance of the Rogers peace formula. Once the agreement to seek a peace settlement was announced, however, public protest arose in many parts of the Middle East. Arab guerrilla groups and the governments of Syria and Iraq rejected the peace initiative and denounced Nasser for accepting it. In Israel, six members of the hawkish Gahal minority party quit the cabinet of Premier Golda Meir when she announced the government's acceptance of the Rogers peace plan. Palestinian commandos dramatized their opposition to peace negotiations through a spectacular series of commercial aircraft hijackings.

Hopes for a peace settlement were dashed Sept. 7, 1970, with Israel's announcement that it was withdrawing from the peace talks. Its ambassador had met only once with the United Nations mediator, Gunnar V. Jarring. Israel's decision followed its repeated charges that Soviet missile batteries had been emplaced in the Suez Canal cease-fire zone in violation of the standstill agreement.

In late 1971 and early 1972, the United States put forward a new proposal for indirect, American-mediated talks between Israel and Egypt on an interim peace settlement that included a troop pullback and reopening of the Suez Canal, but negotiations made little headway. Meanwhile, in what was an apparent effort to disassociate his regime from Soviet military support, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat requested the departure of Soviet military advisers from his country.

Israel's seemingly inflexible determination to hang on to Arab territory occupied in 1967 weakened the country's position in the international community and finally led to the fourth Arab-Israeli war, in 1973.

Yom Kippur War (1973)

Unprecedented Arab solidarity and the emergence of oil as an Arab political weapon marked the fourth Arab-Israeli war, which began Oct. 6, 1973. The war broke out on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, when Egyptian and Syrian troops in a surprise move crossed into Israeli-occupied territory in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.

By seizing the initiative, the Arab forces were able temporarily to dictate the conditions of battle most favorable to themselves. Whereas Israel excelled at a "war of rapid movement and envelopment," Safran wrote in the January 1974 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, the Arabs "forced the enemy to fight a set battle, where the undoubted courage of their own fighting men and their numerical superiority in manpower and equipment could be used to best effect."

This "slugging type of war," Safran went on, "turned out to be extremely costly in men and especially in equipment to both sides," leading first the Soviet Union and then the United States to intervene as equipment suppliers to their client states.

Cease-fire Agreement, 1973

On Nov. 11, 1973, at an Israeli military checkpoint 63 miles from Cairo on the road to Suez city, Egypt and Israel signed a six-point cease-fire agreement worked out by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The agreement reads as follows:

1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the cease-fire called for by the United Nations Security Council.
2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the Oct. 22 positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.
4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank.
5. The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez Road will be replaced by United Nations checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers can participate with the United Nations to supervise the nonmilitary nature of the cargo at the bank of the canal.
6. As soon as the United Nations checkpoints are established on the Cairo-Suez road, there will be exchange of all prisoners of war, including wounded.

Despite the success of the initial Egyptian and Syrian strikes into Israeli-occupied territory, Israeli forces subsequently succeeded in breaking through the Egyptian lines to the west bank of the Suez Canal and advancing to within 20 miles of the Syrian capital of Damascus. The United States and the Soviet Union then joined to seek a cease-fire through the auspices of the United Nations, and the Security Council adopted a cease-fire resolution Oct. 22. A cease-fire was to go into effect "no later than 12 hours" after adoption of the resolution.

Just as the truce appeared to be taking hold, however, it was threatened by a renewal of tension between the two superpowers. On Oct. 24, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States that the two nations join together to supervise the truce. The proposal was rejected by the United States, which backed the creation of a U.N. observer force without big-power participation. In the early morning hours of Oct. 25, U.S. armed forces were placed on worldwide alert in response to the possibility of a unilateral Soviet movement of troops into the Middle East to supervise the truce. The crisis was defused later that day when Moscow agreed to a Security Council resolution establishing an international peace-keeping force without big-power participation.

Israel and Egypt Nov. 11 signed a six-point cease-fire agreement worked out by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. The agreement was signed at a United Nations tent on the Cairo-Suez road by Israeli Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv and Egyptian Maj. Gen. Mohammed Abdel Ghany el-

Gamasy; it was the first face-to-face encounter between Israeli and Egyptian negotiators. The meeting resulted in an exchange of prisoners of war and the lifting of the Israeli siege of the city of Suez and the Egyptian Third Army. (Text of cease-fire agreement, box, preceding page)

The first Arab-Israeli peace conference opened in Geneva Dec. 21. The participants were Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations. Syria boycotted the meeting. The first round of the peace conference ended the following day with an agreement to begin talks on separating Israeli and Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal. Egypt and Israel signed a troop disengagement accord Jan. 18, 1974, and the troop withdrawal was completed March 4. Meanwhile, efforts to negotiate a similar agreement between Israel and Syria continued. Syria and Israel signed a similar agreement May 31. In early 1975, Kissinger sought a second-stage disengagement in the Sinai Desert, but after 15 days of shuttling between Egypt and Israel he declared March 23 that his efforts had failed and returned to the United States.

After the breakdown in the talks, Egypt formally requested a resumption of the full Geneva Conference. However, neither Egypt nor any of the other countries involved were in fact in any hurry to reconvene the conference. It was feared that a propaganda battle there would prevent resolution of the complex issues involved and that such a failure would increase the prospects of another war.

When Kissinger returned from his shuttle talks he and President Ford unofficially indicated their displeasure with Israel's negotiating position, and the United States began a "reassessment" of its policy in the Middle East. Meetings between Ford and Sadat in Salzburg, Austria, June 1 and 2, and a visit by Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin to Washington June 11 and 12 led to a resumption of step-by-step negotiations for troop disengagements, resulting in a limited agreement initialed by both sides Sept. 1. (*Middle East Diplomacy*, p. 3)

Yom Kippur War in Perspective

The latest war in the Middle East may be remembered as the war that broke the myths that three previous encounters between Israel and its Arab neighbors had built up. One casualty of the October 1973 fighting was the belief in Israeli invincibility which had prevailed since Israel's lightning victory during the Six-Day War in 1967. It was clear when the latest fighting stopped that the Israelis were on the brink of another military triumph prevented only by U.S. and Soviet intervention.

But Israel's failure to win a decisive victory, the success of the initial Egyptian and Syrian strikes into Israeli-occupied positions in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights and the high toll of Israeli casualties¹ laid to rest the assumption that the Israelis were supermen who could not be beaten in battle. Despite their later setbacks, the Arabs proved that they could fight and fight well. "No matter what happens in the desert, there has been a victory that cannot be erased," Egyptian President Anwar Sadat declared in a speech before his country's National Assembly on Oct. 16, 1973. "According to any military standard, the Egyptian armed forces have realized a miracle. The wounded nation has restored its honor, the political map of the Middle East has changed."

¹ The Israeli military command announced on Dec. 8 that 2,355 Israeli soldiers had been killed during the October war.

The key to Arab successes on both the military and diplomatic fronts was an unprecedented display of solidarity. Sadat was the principal architect of this cooperation among states noted for their mutual suspicion. Since coming to power in 1970, after the death of Gamal Abdel Nassar, Sadat had been busy mending political fences with his fellow Arabs, such as Syrian President Hafez Assad and Jordan's King Hussein. On Aug. 29, 1973, Sadat signed an accord with Libyan Prime Minister Muammar Qaddafi proclaiming "the birth of a new unified Arab state." (The accord later evaporated, but it had served Arab unity at the time of the Yom Kippur War.)

But the first priority in Sadat's campaign to harness the political, economic and military resources of the Arab world was his rapprochement with the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the sheikhs of the Persian Gulf states. Sadat's new alliance with the more traditional and conservative peninsula Arabs provided the Arab cause with its most potent weapon—oil. The political and economic balance of the Middle East was dramatically altered by the embargo on Arab oil exports to the United States imposed during the war in retaliation for U.S. aid to Israel. The embargo was lifted March 18, 1974, by seven of the nine participating countries (Syria and Libya lifted their embargoes later), but it had demonstrated its power and remained as a threat. It had been centuries since the Arabs had enjoyed so much influence in world affairs.

Although the outbreak of fighting seemed to catch the world by surprise, Sadat had been saying for some time that he might resort to war. Besides the purely military objective of recapturing the territories lost to Israel in 1967, Sadat's primary motive for going to war was to refocus world attention on the Middle East. "Everyone has fallen asleep over the Mid-east crisis," Sadat said in an interview with *Newsweek* senior editor Arnaud de Borchgrave in April 1973. "The time has come for a shock."

Sadat's main fear appears to have been that the spirit of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union would keep the big powers from pressuring Israel to return the occupied territories, and thus Israel's presence in these areas eventually would be legitimized. In his interview with de Borchgrave, Sadat recalled the Tet offensive in Vietnam, saying that while the Communists had suffered a military defeat, they had scored a decisive political and diplomatic victory. "It may be," de Borchgrave reported, "that Sadat is now willing to accept a military drubbing in order to weld Arab solidarity and step up pressure for an imposed international settlement."

Israel's Growing Isolation

The Israelis have been forced by the events of the war to take a new look at their Arab neighbors. For one thing, the war demonstrated that the Arabs are closing the technological gap that has in the past protected the vastly outnumbered Israelis. Unlike the 1967 war—when, during the first hours of fighting, Israel destroyed most of the Egyptian air force while it was still on the ground—Israeli planes this time encountered stiff opposition from Egyptian and Syrian MIGs and from anti-aircraft missiles supplied by the Soviet Union.

"This time they marshaled all their resources, including oil, to achieve their purpose," said Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. "They took the international climate into account, the role the Russians would play, the importance of the detente between the Americans and the

Russians. They realized that it was a changed world in 1973, and we have to realize it too."²

One of the changes made evident by the war was Israel's growing isolation in the world community. The threat of an Arab oil boycott forced the Japanese and most western European governments to demonstrate a decidedly pro-Arab "tilt" during the October war. Western Europe consumes about one-fourth of the world's oil production and relies on the Arab states for nearly 70 per cent of its imports. In an attempt to appease the Arabs, the European Economic Community (Common Market), including such normally pro-Israeli countries as The Netherlands and Denmark, issued a resolution on Nov. 6, 1973, calling on Israel "to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict in 1967."

The EEC declaration also pointed to the "recognition that, in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians." Japan, almost entirely dependent on outside sources for its oil—45 per cent of which comes from the Arab countries—also issued statements calling for an Israeli withdrawal.

An especially hard blow was the loss of support in black Africa, where Israel had courted friendship since the 1950s through technical assistance programs. After the outbreak of the October war, nine African states—Tanzania, Malagasy Republic, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cameroon, Dahomey, Upper Volta and Equatorial Guinea—broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. Togo and Zaire already had severed their ties with Israel.

Although the Arabs found themselves in a much stronger position after the war, the cost to Egypt had been high. Hopes for peace and prosperity followed what Egyptians felt had been a victory—but these hopes were disappointed. Egypt remained mired in poverty, burdened with the heavy costs of rebuilding its defenses.

Sadat insisted that he wanted to shift his country from military expenditures to economic development, and in early 1975, riots showed growing popular discontent with Egypt's sagging economy. But Israel still occupied Egyptian territory, and negotiations for withdrawal dragged on.

² Quoted in *The New York Times*, Nov. 27, 1973, in the second of a series of four articles on changing Arab attitudes.

In an effort both to help the economy and to demonstrate his commitment to peace, Sadat June 5, 1975, reopened the Suez Canal, even though he had not promised to do so before further Israeli withdrawals. The restoration of canal traffic and the repopulation of its adjacent cities—virtual ghost towns after the 1967 war—had been among the moves the Israelis sought as assurances that Egypt would not resort to war.

Another War?

The prospects for a lasting peace still seemed dim after the 1973 war, but they were substantially greater than after the previous wars. The fact that the Arabs were willing to begin direct peace negotiations with Israel at Geneva signaled a fundamental shift in their attitude. Previously the humiliation of defeat, an unwillingness to negotiate from a position of weakness and a refusal to concede the recognition of Israel implicit in negotiations had kept the Arabs from face-to-face talks.

Their military performance in 1973 erased their sense of shame, and the power of the oil weapon removed their fear of negotiating from a position of weakness. These factors, combined with the demonstration of Israel's military power after its initial setbacks, encouraged Sadat, Jordan's King Hussein and other Arab leaders to declare their willingness to acknowledge formally the permanent existence of Israel within its 1967 borders.

The mood in Israel, however, was grim. The euphoria that followed the 1967 triumph had given way to the feeling that even another military triumph would bring the country no closer to peace. Israelis recognized the power of the oil weapon and felt increasing pressures for peace concessions from the United States, on whom they were now more dependent than ever. The number of Israeli casualties in the war, and the heavy economic burden of constant preparedness for a resumption of fighting, undermined Israeli self-confidence. But the war did not increase Israeli confidence in Arab overtures for peace.

The high cost of the war to both sides may force them to recognize, at long last, their mutual interest in a compromise peace. But the desperation of an Israel that feels the new power of the Arabs, and the desperation of the Arabs who see their territory still occupied in spite of their new power, could produce another, larger war.

CHAPTER 2

THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF OIL

Section I. Introduction

The Middle East situation has taken on a new importance for most Americans since the development of oil as a strategic weapon. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) represents a powerful cartel which will demand higher and higher prices for the oil of its members and is capable of placing severe economic strains on the industrialized nations of the world, particularly Japan and Europe. Additionally, the US and its allies are now under a constant oil boycott threat should they aid Israel in any future conflict.

In this chapter, we will examine the significant role oil plays in the Middle East conflict and in America's activities in that part of the world.

Section II provides us a fairly detailed discussion of the oil situation as it exists today and its relationship to the US and the other industrialized nations.

Section III analyzes the development of the Middle East oil cartel, discusses the international character of oil producing and consuming activities, enumerates some of the basic energy problems faced by the US and formulates some proposals for domestic solutions.

Section IV presents the official US Government position on the energy crises and Middle East oil through excerpts of speeches made by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION GUIDANCE SERIES

The purpose of this program is to quickly disseminate to Armed Forces commanders and personnel current information and policy that will contribute to a better understanding of national defense programs and aid them in accomplishing their missions through increased professional knowledge.

OFFICE OF INFORMATION FOR THE ARMED FORCES



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(Installations & Logistics)

Number 6-2
March 1974

OIL AND ENERGY

1. Background: Oil has become the principal source of energy for the industrial countries. Rapidly increasing global demand has begun to outstrip available supply. Refinery shortages in major markets such as the U.S. have also emerged. In the shift from a buyer's to a seller's market, fuel prices have soared, more than doubling since 1970, and affecting industries dependent on oil in every country. Principal consumers include:

o-Western Europe: In 1960 oil supplied about 1/3 of Western Europe's energy requirements; by 1971 the figure had risen to 60%; present needs are 80%.

o-Japan: Currently depends upon oil for more than 75% of its energy, imports all of that and most of its other energy sources.

o-U.S.: In 1973, the U.S. overtook Japan as the largest single importer of oil. U.S. dependency on imports has increased from about 20% during the 1960's to 36% at present. Since 1971, we have increased our consumption by 1 million barrels a day each year. Unless recent steps to reduce the growth in demand and attain greater self-sufficiency through increased domestic production are successful, by 1980 our dependency on imports is projected to reach 50% -- at a very high cost to our balance of payments.

o-Communist Countries: Consume about 15% of world oil production.

2. Sources: Two-thirds of the world's proved oil reserves are in the area of the Persian Gulf and North Africa (410 billion bbls. out of a world total of about 610 billion bbls.) The 12-nation Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which includes 7 Arab countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Libya, Algeria), and 5 non-Arab countries (Iran, Venezuela, Indonesia, Nigeria, Ecuador), represents 70% of the world's proved reserves. Arab producers received \$8.6 billion in revenues from oil exports in 1972. They will be earning more in the future with sharply increasing prices.

3. Role of Oil Producers: Demand for oil now exceeds supply, giving oil-producing countries new political and economic leverage. These governments are determined to control their natural resources by determining price and by negotiating partial ownership in producing companies operating within their borders. Through recent cutbacks in production, and embargo of oil to the U.S.

Reprinted at USAADS.

and other countries they use their new-found power to achieve political objectives as well.

Availability of oil to world markets will be increasingly controlled by producing countries rather than by international oil companies. Major changes in the international monetary system also seem inevitable. Arab oil producers with substantial amounts of surplus revenues could become large equity holders in Western banks and industries. (In 1972, Arab oil-producing governments' claims on the U.S. in the form of reserves, deposits and investments were estimated at \$3 billion.)

4. Problems:

--Current:

o-Lack of cooperative international strategy on imports by consuming countries or consumer/producer understandings on future supply arrangements.

o-Lack of agreement to share supplies during shortage. Western Europe does have an emergency oil-sharing agreement, but has not yet decided to implement it in the current crisis.

o-Political pressures on Europe and Japan to adopt a more pro-Arab policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute through cutbacks in oil supplies. Such pressures create strains in the NATO alliance and within the European Community.

--Long-range:

o-For political and economic reasons, major oil producers may not see fit to increase production at rates necessary to satisfy global demand.

o-Time-lag in developing alternative sources of energy (e.g., solar energy, fast-breeder reactor, nuclear fusion, coal gasification and liquefaction, shale oil). Significant additions to supply are unlikely before 1980, even the President's proposed 5-year \$10 billion program to speed development of unconventional sources of energy.

o-Environmental constraints involved in development of new energy technology.

5. Alternative fuel sources:

o-Coal: With almost half the coal reserves in the world the U.S. can get natural gas and oil from desulfurized coal by technological processes developed over the past 25 years.

o-Alaska pipeline: Tapping Alaskan oil is 3 years away. At full capacity the pipeline will move 2 million barrels a day.

o-Oil Shale: More than 100 billion barrels of crude oil can be produced from the two trillion barrels of oil locked up in shale deposits in the west. Technological development has reached the pilot-plant stage; and environmental impact study has been completed by the Interior Department. If approved, the first commercial plant should produce 250,000 barrels a day by 1977.

o-Other hemisphere: Priority can be increasing supplies from Latin America, particularly Venezuela. Also, the Mexico Gulf Trans-Ecuadorian pipeline can be modified to carry 400,000 barrels a day instead of the present 250,000.

Reference: Department of State Publication, Foreign Policy Outlines, #33-99 dated November 1973, entitled: Oil and Energy.

o-OECD: The U.S. Government is working with other OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) nations to develop a catalog of prospective sources of oil, gas, and power, ways of making energy sources safer and more environmentally acceptable, and methods of improving the efficiency and conservation of energy.

o-Offshore drilling: Negotiation of a seabeds regime which would protect our national interests while allowing exploitation of the world's offshore oil prospects would help alleviate the supply shortage.



PETROLEUM POLITICS: VOLATILE ARAB WEAPON

When the Arab governments in October 1973 embargoed oil to the United States and, together with other oil-producing states in the following months, quadrupled its price, a historic change began. The first shock is passing, but the future is full of uncertainties.

The most obvious consequence of high-priced oil is a redistribution of wealth. While industrial countries sank into recession, oil-producing states were suddenly gorged with money. Developing nations not blessed with oil staggered under the new cost of fuels and fertilizers needed to lift them from poverty...and yet the success of fellow third world nations that used oil to gain wealth and power aroused new hopes that they, too, might somehow wrest a bigger share of the world's goods from the long-dominant West.

With the transfer of wealth went a shift in power.

States such as Iran and Saudi Arabi, to say nothing of petty sheikdoms along the Persian Gulf, were no match for the armed might of a United States or a Soviet Union. Western journals featured "scenarios" in which American armed forces seized Middle East oil fields in the event of another embargo, or even as a means to prevent ruinous prices. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger warned that

Kissinger on Using Force

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, in an interview with *Business Week* magazine made public Jan. 2, 1975, discussed the possible use of military force to deal with the oil situation. Kissinger Jan. 2 and 3 reiterated these views to newsmen and said that they reflected the views of President Ford. Ford's press secretary, Ron Nessen, confirmed Jan. 4 that Kissinger's statement "did reflect the President's views."

The following text is from the Jan. 13 *Business Week*.

One of the things we also hear from businessmen is that in the long run the only answer to the oil cartel is some sort of military action. Have you considered military action on oil?

Military action on oil prices?

Yes.

A very dangerous course. We should have learned from Vietnam that it is easier to get into a war than to get out of it. I am not saying that there's no circumstance where we would not use force. But it is one thing to use it in the case of a dispute over price, it's another where there's some actual strangulation of the industrialized world.

Do you worry about what the Soviets would do in the Middle East if there were any military action against the cartel?

I don't think this is a good thing to speculate about. Any President who would resort to military action in the Middle East without worrying what the Soviets would do would have to be reckless. The question is to what extent he would let himself be deterred by it. But you cannot say you would not consider what the Soviets would do. I want to make clear, however, that the use of force would be considered only in the gravest emergency.

this would be a "very dangerous course," but did not entirely rule it out if "there's some actual strangulation of the industrialized world." (*Box, this page*)

The Persian Gulf states eagerly buy hoards of modern weapons, which the United States as eagerly sells, competing with its allies to recapture some of the funds the West is pouring into the coffers of the oil states. The new arsenals of the gulf could not block a seizure of oil fields, although they might raise its risks, especially if a country such as Iran developed nuclear weapons. A greater danger arising from military intervention would be the uncertain response of the Soviet Union.

Shifting Power

It would be misleading, however, to formulate the shift in power in military terms. The "oil weapon" already has changed the balance of power between Israel and the Arab states. It has also wrought changes far beyond the Middle East.

During and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, disagreement over support for Israel created severe strains between the United States and its allies, who depend heavily on Arab oil; in another Middle East war these tensions might prove more damaging. The western alliance was further strained by competition to secure scarce oil, a competition that could grow more intense if supply were restricted and demand rose.

The damage oil prices have done to western economies handicaps them in the arms race with the Soviet bloc and increases pressures for reducing the West's overseas commitments, including those in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. As their monetary reserves grow to several hundred billion dollars, middle eastern governments will have much greater power to threaten western economies.

Within industrial societies, the discontent fostered by inflation and unemployment may feed authoritarian movements in countries such as Italy and, if it grows worse, in more stable democracies. In developing countries, governments struggling against worsening economic problems may grow more repressive. In both rich and poor countries if political unrest grows with economic decline, leaders will find assertive foreign policies more tempting. A rising level of international tensions thus may coincide with a proliferation of nuclear weapons, and those weapons will be accessible to more states as they hasten to develop nuclear energy as a substitute for high-priced oil.

If the world can respond creatively to this sea of troubles, the oil crisis may prove to be a blessing in disguise. The exploitation of natural resources by industrial societies was growing at a dangerous rate, and the huge gap between rich and poor nations showed no sign of abating. Both are built into ways of life that were taken for granted until the new price of oil hit home.

Impact on World Finances

In early 1974, the world's money managers were close to a state of panic at the enormous imbalance in the inter-

Reprinted by permission of the publishers from **THE MIDDLE EAST: US POLICY, ISRAEL, OIL AND THE ARABS**, second edition, copyright © 1975 by Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Washington, DC. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be reproduced further in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

national monetary system. The oil-producing countries had decreed huge increases in the price of petroleum, from an average of about \$2.40 a barrel to more than \$10. There seemed no way that oil consumers—the poor countries in particular—could afford to pay for their energy supplies, and no way that oil producers could spend their expected surpluses. On every hand, there were predictions of chaos and impending collapse of existing world monetary arrangements.¹

Somehow the international community limped through 1974, and the sense of panic seems to be subsiding. Optimistic statements about the resiliency of the world monetary system are being heard once again. Early in 1975, Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon told Congress that he believed "the international financial aspects of the oil situation are manageable." The sense of relief may be premature, however. Among economists, there remains a deep concern about the condition of the monetary system; it is still subject to severe strains. Many experts warn that a protracted imbalance of payments² will inevitably slow economic growth in the industrial countries, bankrupt the less-developed countries and throw the world into a massive recession or depression.³

The member countries of OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, rang up a spectacular \$97-billion foreign-exchange surplus in 1974. Exports by members of the cartel tripled in value during the year to \$133-billion, according to a report released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on March 9, 1975. In that

period, the industrial countries registered a \$67-billion trade deficit, three times larger than in 1973. The less-developed countries saw their deficit more than double to \$26-billion.

In general, oil exporting countries can "recycle" their huge surpluses in three ways: (1) by spending them on imports of consumer goods, military hardware, industrial equipment, food and other commodities; (2) by investing them, either in development projects at home or in foreign countries, and (3) by relending the money through official and private channels to oil-importing nations.

To a surprising extent, the exporting countries did all three things in 1974. They increased their purchases of goods from the United States, for example, by 80 per cent, to a total of \$8-billion.⁴ The United States, despite the high cost of oil, enjoyed a favorable balance of trade with the Arab countries in the first nine months of 1974, as is shown in the following Department of Commerce figures:

	1974	1973*
U.S. exports to Arab countries	\$2.3-billion	\$1.7-billion
U.S. imports from Arab countries	2.2-billion	1.0-billion

*Full year

At the same time, OPEC countries, and especially the Arab oil states, have stepped up their investments in, and their loans to, western enterprises. Arabs now have substantial holdings in American real estate and industries and have extended loans to several U.S. corporations. These developments are not entirely to the liking of many western political leaders, who fear the possibility of Arab takeovers of huge national and multinational enterprises. So far, though, the Arabs appear to be more interested in secure placement of their capital than in exercising management control.

Finally, a sizable amount of oil money has found its way into international lending channels, both official and private. By a United Nations estimate, commercial banks in the West absorbed up to \$30-billion in surplus oil funds in 1974. OPEC countries also have contributed increasing amounts to (1) a special oil "facility" fund set up by the International Monetary Fund to ease the balance-of-payments problems of consuming countries and (2) international development institutions, such as the World Bank and the regional development banks.

These measures evidently helped forestall the drastic results predicted in early 1974, when estimates of the peak accumulation of OPEC reserves reached \$600-billion and even higher. By June 1975, U.S. bankers were making more optimistic projections, with the time and size of the peak surplus depending on such factors as the impact on consumption of high oil prices, the growth of alternative oil supplies, the degree to which alternative sources of energy such as coal and nuclear power are developed, the policies of consuming countries and the cohesiveness of the OPEC cartel (to say nothing of the chances of another war in the Middle East).

The First National City Bank in its June 1975 newsletter projected four different scenarios. The most

U.S. Trade in Crude Oil

(bpd = barrels per day)

Year	Exports Thousand bpd	Imports Thousand bpd	Net Imports Thousand bpd
1947	126	268	142
1948	110	353	244
1949	90	422	332
1950	96	488	392
1951	79	490	411
1952	74	575	501
1953	55	649	594
1954	38	658	619
1955	33	781	748
1956	79	937	858
1957	137	1,022	885
1958	11	953	942
1959	8	964	956
1960	8	1,019	1,011
1961	8	1,047	1,038
1962	5	1,126	1,121
1963	5	1,132	1,126
1964	3	1,203	1,200
1965	3	1,238	1,235
1966	5	1,225	1,219
1967	74	1,129	1,055
1968	5	1,293	1,288
1969	3	1,408	1,405
1970	14	1,323	1,310
1971	1	1,680	1,679
1972	-	2,222	2,222
1973	2	3,244	3,242
1974 ¹	3	3,422	3,419

* Less than 500 barrels per day.

¹ Preliminary.

SOURCE: International Economic Report of the President, March 1975.

¹ See "Arab Oil Money," *Editorial Research Reports*, 1974 Vol. I, pp. 365-381.

² When income from abroad is less than a country's foreign spending on trade investments, tourism, military and foreign aid.

³ See, for example, Robert V. Roosa et al., "How Can the World Afford OPEC Oil?" *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, pp. 201-202. Roosa was under secretary of the treasury for monetary affairs in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

⁴ *Development Forum*, publication of the U.S. Centre for Economic and Social Information, March 1975, p. 3.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' Revenues, 1960-1974¹

(in millions of dollars)

Country	1960	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	Per cent Increase, 1973-74
Saudi Arabia	\$ 355	\$ 655	\$1,200	\$2,149	\$3,107	\$5,100	\$20,000	292.2
Kuwait	465	671	895	1,400	1,657	1,900	7,000	268.4
Iran	285	522	1,136	1,944	2,380	4,100	17,400	324.4
Iraq	286	375	521	840	575	1,500	6,800	353.3
United Arab Emirates ²	"	33	233	431	551	900	4,100	355.6
Qatar	54	69	122	198	255	400	1,600	300.0
Libya	"	371	1,295	1,766	1,598	2,300	7,600	230.4
Algeria	"	"	325	350	700	900	3,700	311.1
Nigeria	"	"	411	915	1,174	2,000	7,000	250.0
Venezuela	877	1,135	1,406	1,702	1,948	2,800	10,600	278.6
Indonesia	"	"	185	284	429	900	3,000	233.3
Total	\$2,303	\$3,831	\$7,729	\$11,979	\$14,374	\$22,800	\$88,800	289.5

¹ In November 1973, Ecuador became a member of the OPEC, and Gabon an associate member; they are not included in the above chart.

² A federation of the Persian Gulf states was formed in 1971; the figures before that year are for Abu Dhabi, the largest oil producer among the gulf sheikdoms.

³ Libya and Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates) began production in 1961 and 1962 respectively.

⁴ Not available.

SOURCES: Years 1960-1972, Petroleum Information Foundation; years 1973-74, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

pessimistic estimated a peak surplus of nearly \$300-million in 1981; the most optimistic placed the peak in 1977, at a level of about \$130-billion, which rapidly fell to an actual deficit in OPEC balances by 1983. (*Graph, p. 36*)

However, oil economist Walter Levy disputed such figures. He said he doubted that the OPEC countries could sustain their growth in imports because of bottlenecks developing from lack of expertise, trained manpower, port facilities and inland transportation. Levy also expects oil exporters to go on raising their prices, perhaps by 12 per cent in 1975 and 7 per cent annually in succeeding years. He estimates that by 1980 the total accumulated OPEC surpluses will reach \$450-billion, a sum that would jeopardize the world monetary system.⁵

At some point in the future, it is predicted, the private banking system will find itself unable to cope with the massive surpluses being acquired by OPEC members. And insofar as official efforts are directed at lending money to consuming countries to meet their rising energy costs, the problem is not solved but merely postponed.⁶

Disparities

The impact of the oil price rise has not been uniform on all the oil-importing countries. Among the industrial nations, the United States has fared better than most because of its lesser dependence on imported oil. According to the March 9, 1975, International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, the U.S. trade deficit in 1974 was \$9.5-billion, quadrupling the \$2.3-billion deficit in 1973. But western Europe fared worse. The combined trade deficits of western European countries rose to \$23.8-billion, up from \$7.6-billion the previous year. Japan has had to resort to a \$1-billion loan from Saudi Arabia to finance its oil imports, and Italy has received a series of credits from the European

Economic Community (Common Market), the IMF and West Germany.⁷

Still, the most severe impact is being felt by the poorer countries of the world—those without oil to sell or significant exports of other raw materials. These include 75 to 80 countries, or about three-fourths of the poorer nations. India, as the largest of the non-Communist developing countries, is the foremost example of a nation being driven to the brink of bankruptcy by the energy price crisis. In the best of times, India has had a difficult job providing food and other basic necessities for its nearly 600 million people. The huge jump in oil prices has made the task virtually impossible. India's oil import bill in 1975 is likely to reach \$1.5-billion, in contrast to only \$300-million five years earlier.⁸

In recognition of India's plight, both Iran and Iraq have offered New Delhi concessions in the form of loans and deferred payments for the purchase of petroleum. Such assistance is not likely in the long run to be sufficient to pull India out of the hole. This is also true for other countries whose commodity export earnings drop while their oil bills rise.

Agence France-Presse, the French news agency, reported from London that a number of developing countries "are finding it hard to honor their commercial debts, as a result of the world economic crisis." It cited the example of the African republic of Zaire, formerly the Belgian Congo, which has experienced declines in the prices of copper, diamonds, oil seeds, zinc, coffee, cocoa and cotton. Zaire's case is significant, because it points up a growing rift in the Organization of African Unity between the member states that produce oil and those that have to buy it. The oil consumers complain that the producers have turned a deaf ear to their pleas for economic assistance.⁹

⁵ *Time*, June 30, 1975.

⁶ Walter J. Levy, writing in the July 1974 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, remarked: "To the extent that oil imports are financed by a continued recycling of surplus oil revenues via investments or loans on commercial terms, oil importing countries will face pyramiding interest or individual charges on top of mounting direct oil import costs."

⁷ See "Italy's Threatened Democracy," *Editorial Research Reports*, 1975 Vol. I, pp. 1-20. West Germany, in contrast to its neighbors, enjoyed a trade surplus in 1974—some \$20-billion.

⁸ P.D. Henderson, *India: The Energy Sector* (1975), World Bank, pp. 107-115.

⁹ For background see "African Nation Building," *Editorial Research Reports*, 1973 Vol. I, pp. 355-372.

World Crude Oil Production, 1960-1974

(bpd = barrels per day)

Major Area and Selected Countries	1960		1965		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974 ¹	
	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent	1,000 bpd	Per cent
North America	7,845	37.3	8,925	29.5	11,373	25.1	11,451	23.8	11,498	22.7	11,452	20.5	11,170	20.0
United States	7,055	33.5	7,804	25.8	9,648	21.3	9,635	20.0	9,512	18.8	9,189	16.5	8,890	15.9
Canada	519	2.5	793	2.6	1,305	2.9	1,382	2.9	1,542	3.0	1,798	3.2	1,720	3.1
Mexico	271	1.3	328	1.1	420	.9	434	.9	444	.9	465	.8	580	1.0
Central and South America	3,470	16.5	4,285	14.2	4,758	10.5	4,634	9.7	4,393	8.7	4,666	8.4	4,220	7.6
Venezuela ²	2,854	13.6	3,472	11.5	3,703	8.2	3,541	7.4	3,219	6.4	3,364	6.0	2,970	5.3
Ecuador ²	7	.	8	.	5	.	4	.	87	.1	204	.4	160	.3
Other	609	2.9	805	2.7	1,050	2.3	1,089	2.3	1,107	2.2	1,098	2.0	1,090	2.0
Western Europe	289	1.4	402	1.3	375	.8	362	.7	371	.7	370	.7	390	.7
United Kingdom	2	.	3	.	2	.	2	.	2	.	2	.	.	.
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	.	33	.	32	.1	30	.1
Other	287	1.4	399	1.3	373	.8	354	.7	336	.7	336	.6	360	.6
Africa	289	1.4	2,226	7.4	5,982	13.2	5,554	11.6	5,616	11.1	5,902	10.6	5,330	9.6
Algeria ²	185	.9	554	1.8	976	2.2	656	1.4	1,022	2.0	1,070	1.9	940	1.7
Libya ²	0	0	1,238	4.1	3,321	7.3	2,762	5.7	2,215	4.4	2,187	3.9	1,500	2.7
Nigeria ²	16	.1	263	.9	1,090	2.4	1,526	3.2	1,818	3.6	2,053	3.7	2,270	4.1
Other	86	.4	171	.6	595	1.3	610	1.3	561	1.1	592	1.1	620	1.1
Asia-Pacific	554	2.6	683	2.3	1,340	3.0	1,595	3.3	1,832	3.8	2,272	4.1	2,300	4.1
Indonesia ²	419	2.0	501	1.7	855	1.9	904	1.9	1,056	2.1	1,339	2.4	1,360	2.4
Other	135	.6	182	.6	485	1.1	691	1.4	776	1.5	933	1.7	940	1.7
Middle East	5,269	25.1	8,369	27.7	13,937	30.7	16,364	34.0	18,106	35.9	21,158	38.0	21,710	38.9
Saudi Arabia ²	1,319	6.3	2,204	7.3	3,798	8.4	4,768	9.9	6,013	11.9	7,607	13.7	8,480	15.2
Kuwait ²	1,696	8.1	2,382	7.8	2,983	6.6	3,196	6.6	3,279	6.5	3,024	5.4	2,550	4.6
Iran ²	1,057	5.0	1,895	6.3	3,831	8.4	4,531	9.4	5,021	9.9	5,861	10.5	6,040	10.8
Iraq ²	969	4.6	1,311	4.3	1,563	3.4	1,720	3.6	1,446	2.9	1,964	3.5	1,780	3.2
Abu Dhabi ²	0	0	282	.9	691	1.5	126	1.9	1,050	2.1	1,298	2.3	1,410	2.5
Qatar ²	173	.8	227	.8	367	.8	429	.9	484	1.0	570	1.0	520	.9
Other	55	.3	68	.3	704	1.6	794	1.7	813	1.6	834	1.5	930	1.7
Total Non-Communist	17,718	84.3	24,890	82.4	37,765	83.3	39,960	83.1	41,816	82.7	45,820	82.3	45,120	80.9
Communist World²	3,310	15.7	5,327	17.6	7,610	16.7	8,122	16.9	8,738	17.3	9,865	17.7	10,650	19.1
Soviet Union	2,960	14.1	4,823	16.0	7,049	15.5	7,436	15.5	7,850	15.5	8,420	15.1	8,950	16.0
Other	350	1.6	504	1.6	561	1.2	686	1.4	888	1.8	1,445	2.6	1,700	3.1
Total World	21,026	100.0	30,217	100.0	45,375	100.0	48,082	100.0	50,554	100.0	55,685	100.0	55,770	100.0

² Production or percentage of production is negligible.
¹ 1974 figures are estimated.

² Member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

³ Includes Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact Nations, China, Cuba and Yugoslavia.

Source: International Economic Report of the President, March 1975.

Selected Consuming Countries' . . .

(Thousands of barrels per day and per cent of imports)

	Total Consumption	Total ¹ Imports	Total Arab	Total Non-Arab	Arab Oil			
					Saudi Arabia	Kuwait	Libya	Iraq
United States	16,632	8,090	1,250	4,840	740	20	150	10
Per cent	—	100	20.5	79.5	12.2	0.3	2.5	0.2
Total Western Europe	10,079 ²	14,400	9,320	5,080	4,410	1,090	1,260	880
Per cent	—	100	64.7	35.3	30.8	7.6	8.8	6.1
United Kingdom	1,670	2,380	1,530	850	720	350	180	60
Per cent	—	100	64.3	35.7	30.2	14.7	7.6	2.5
West Germany	2,405	2,210	1,440	770	510	90	350	80
Per cent	—	100	65.2	34.8	23.1	4.1	15.8	3.6
Italy	1,509	2,400	1,990	410	770	230	550	280
Per cent	—	100	82.9	17.1	32.1	9.6	22.9	11.7
France	2,097	2,650	2,100	550	640	250	70	340
Per cent	—	100	79.2	20.8	31.7	9.4	2.6	12.8
Netherlands	442	1,260	90	1,170	50	20	10	—
Per cent	—	100	7.1	92.9	4.0	1.6	0.8	—
Belgium-Luxembourg	440	600	440	160	300	60	40	—
Per cent	—	100	73.3	26.7	50.0	10.0	6.7	—
Spain	628	900	780	120	520	40	40	60
Per cent	—	100	86.7	13.3	57.8	4.4	4.4	6.7
Other Western Europe	—	2,000	950	1,050	700	50	20	60
Per cent	—	100	47.5	52.5	35.0	2.5	1.0	3.0
Japan	4,028	5,230	2,610	2,420	1,380	590	70	50
Per cent	—	100	53.7	46.3	26.4	11.3	1.3	1.0
Canada	1,625	1,000	210	790	100	20	10	10
Per cent	—	100	21.0	79.0	10.0	2.0	1.0	1.0

¹ Estimated imports of crude oil and refined products, traced to the original source.

² The consumption figure for western Europe includes only the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, France, Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, Spain, Austria and Sweden.

(Continued from p. 30)

Among the oil-exporting countries of the world, there is a wide divergence in their ability to make productive use of surplus revenues. Hollis B. Chenery, vice president for development policy at the World Bank, puts OPEC members into three categories:

- Countries with large reserves, small populations and little economic absorptive capacity. This group includes the primary Arab oil producers—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi. These countries account for most of the monetary imbalance that now plagues the world. Saudi Arabia, in fact, ranks third behind West Germany and the United States in foreign-exchange holdings.

- Countries with substantial reserves but large populations and ambitious development programs which can absorb most of the new oil money. This group includes Iran, Venezuela, Iraq and Algeria, all of which have reached a relatively sophisticated stage of economic development and are using up their oil money to finance the development effort.

- Countries with smaller reserves and large populations, whose development needs will eat up virtually every penny of the oil money now flowing in. The only two countries in this group are Nigeria and Indonesia.¹⁰

¹⁰ Chenery's analysis is contained in his article, "Restructuring the World Economy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, pp. 242-263. His breakdown does not include some of the

Coping with Petrodollars

The problem of recycling surplus oil revenues—"petrodollars"—and of cushioning the shock for consuming nations most seriously affected by high oil prices has been attacked in a number of ways. Two of the most important are the creation of the special oil facility within the IMF and the approval of a "safety net" fund by members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a group of major non-Communist industrial nations.

The IMF's special oil facility was set up in mid-1974, over U.S. objections. The United States felt that such a fund, specifically designed to ease balance-of-payments problems caused by high oil prices, amounted to an endorsement of "exorbitant" price levels. The fund is financed by borrowings from oil producers and can be tapped by any of the IMF's 126 member countries. When the fund went into operation in August 1974, its authorized capital was \$3.2-billion. Subsequently, the amount was doubled to \$6.2-billion.

The OECD's "safety net" fund of \$25-billion was approved in March 1975 at the urging of Secretary of State

smaller and less important oil producers such as Ecuador, Gabon and Trinidad. Per capita income figures are taken from the World Bank's *Atlas of Population, Per Capita Product and Growth Rates*, 1974.

... Dependence on Arab Oil, 1974¹

			Non-Arab Oil						
United Arab Emirates	Algeria	Other	Iran	Venezuela	Indonesia	Canada	Nigeria	Ecuador	Other
90	200	40	710	1,450	300	1,050	840	70	420
1.5	3.3	0.7	11.7	23.8	4.9	17.2	13.8	1.2	6.9
720	540	420	2,180	270	—	—	1,100	—	1,530
5.0	3.8	2.9	15.1	1.9	—	—	7.6	—	10.6
110	10	100	290	70	—	—	160	—	330
4.6	0.4	4.2	12.2	2.9	—	—	6.7	—	13.9
180	190	40	260	50	—	—	220	—	240
8.1	8.6	1.8	11.8	2.3	—	—	10.0	—	10.9
50	60	—	270	20	—	—	..	—	120
2.1	2.5	—	11.2	0.8	—	—	..	—	5.0
300	180	120	170	30	—	—	210	—	140
11.3	6.8	4.5	6.4	1.1	—	—	7.9	—	5.3
10	..	..	800	10	—	—	300	—	60
0.8	..	..	63.5	0.8	—	—	23.8	—	4.8
—	—	40	90	—	—	—	—	—	70
—	—	6.7	15.0	—	—	—	—	—	11.7
—	70	50	60	30	—	—	—	—	30
—	7.8	5.6	6.7	3.3	—	—	—	—	3.3
70	30	20	240	60	—	—	210	—	540
3.5	1.5	1.0	12.0	3.0	—	—	10.5	—	27.0
540	10	170	1,240	10	760	—	90	—	320
10.3	0.2	3.3	23.7	0.2	14.5	—	1.7	—	6.1
30	10	30	200	450	—	—	20	10	110
3.0	1.0	3.0	20.0	45.0	—	—	2.0	1.0	11.0

¹ Imports exceed consumption in several countries because they export products; The Netherlands, for example, tranships some crude oil to other western European countries.

* Not available.

** Negligible.

SOURCE: White House Council on International Economic Policy

Kissinger. It is made up of security pledges by participating nations under a formula based on national wealth. It is designed as a fund of last resort, to be used only when a member country has exhausted all other credit possibilities. Loans are limited to seven years at commercial interest rates. Because of rigid requirements governing loans, few requests are anticipated. However, the fund will provide psychological security for industrial nations with tottering economies.

Also at Kissinger's urging, an 18-nation International Energy Agency has been created, consisting of most of the larger industrial oil-consuming nations. Although U.S. officials refuse to say so, the agency is intended to present a united front of oil users in negotiations with OPEC. Preliminary talks in Paris between the oil-producing and oil-consuming nations collapsed April 15, 1975. The United States, the European Economic Community and Japan insisted that the international conference planned for later in the year be confined to energy and related problems; Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela demanded that the agenda be broadened to include consideration of other raw materials and development aid. They were joined in this demand by some of the non-oil-producing countries of the third world.

At a May 27 meeting of the International Energy Agency in Paris, Kissinger reversed the U.S. position, proposing that stability of raw material prices be included in future meetings with oil-producing countries. "It has become clear as a result of the April preparatory meeting," he said, "that the dialogue between the producers and the consumers will not progress unless it is broadened to include the general issue of the relationship between developing and developed countries." The OECD met the next day and issued a "declaration on relations with developing countries," pledging greater cooperation and a resumption of talks with third world countries which would deal generally with the problems of raw materials.

OPEC members themselves have made significant efforts to recycle their petrodollars, through bilateral lending arrangements and through contributions to international finance agencies. Abdlatif Al Hamad, director general of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, has told the Joint Development Committee of the World Bank and the IMF that OPEC members contributed \$14.3-billion in development assistance in 1974, including a \$3.1-billion loan to the IMF oil facility and \$1-billion to the World Bank.

In this hemisphere, Venezuela, the world's fifth largest exporter of petroleum, has set up a \$500-million fund in the

Inter-American Development Bank for lending to the least-developed countries of the region. In addition, Venezuela has allotted \$540-million to the World Bank, \$540-million to the IMF oil facility and \$100-million to the U.N. Emergency Fund, and is underwriting one plan to defer oil payments by Central American countries and another to stockpile coffee in the six coffee-exporting nations of the hemisphere.

Private Channels

The glut of petrodollars is obviously more than official channels—governments and international agencies—can handle. A substantial portion of the oil wealth is finding its way back to the West through private means, in the form of loans, bank deposits, investments and purchases of consumer and industrial goods. Western businessmen are suddenly in fierce competition with one another for the potentially lucrative markets of the Middle East.

The markets are obviously limited by what the national economies can comfortably absorb. Only so many cars and television sets can be sold in the tiny sheikdoms of Qatar and Abu Dhabi. But in a large and rapidly developing economy, such as Iran's, the sky is the limit. In the largest business arrangement ever signed, Iran and the United States in March 1975 agreed to a \$15-billion, five-year pact for exchange of goods. Included in the agreement is a provision for the United States to build eight nuclear reactors in Iran. Britain, France and West Germany also have concluded large trade deals with the Iranian government. Iran is also entering into trade agreements and joint ventures with numerous other countries, including some in the Communist bloc.

Other OPEC countries are active, too. Eight nations—Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Saudi Arabia—have contracted to acquire a fleet of supertankers that could cost upward of half a billion dollars in three years. Iraq has placed an order for

10,000 Mercedes-Benz trucks and has ordered \$300-million worth of jet planes from Boeing.

More unsettling is the rising level of armaments being purchased by Middle Eastern oil producers from the United States, western Europe and the Soviet Union. U.S. arms sales to Iran alone in fiscal year 1974 amounted to \$3.8-billion, according to Department of Defense figures. A report by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency showed that 13 developing countries had spent more than 10 per cent of their annual budgets on weapons. Among the countries are Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq.¹¹

Petrodollars are also being funneled to western Europe and the United States for deposit in banks and for the purchase of government securities. Treasury Secretary Simon estimated that OPEC countries in 1974 bought \$6-billion worth of government securities in the United States and put an additional \$4-billion into private U.S. banks. Some observers think the actual total may be as much as 50 per cent higher, and they predict an inflow of \$25-billion to \$30-billion in 1975.

Finally, OPEC businessmen are investing increasing amounts in commercial and industrial firms and real estate interests in the West. In some cases, Arabs have offered loans to prop up sagging enterprises, as in the case of Iranian aid to Grumman Aircraft Corporation, and the negotiations between Iran and Pan American World Airways. More often, however, they have purchased shares in U.S. and European corporations, attempting in some isolated instances to acquire majority control.

Arab investment in western corporations is a source of growing controversy among government officials in America and western Europe. In West Germany, where Iran already owns 25 per cent of the Krupp steel works and has tried to buy nearly 30 per cent of Daimler-Benz, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has expressed his misgivings. "In the long run," he said, "a sharper control by the state is

¹¹ World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-1973, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, February 1975. See also Dale R. Tahtinen, *Arms in the Persian Gulf*.

American Enterprise Institute, March 1974, and "Resurgent Iran," *Editorial Research Reports*, 1974 Vol. I pp. 305-322.

Persian Gulf Crude Oil Prices¹

(Dollars per barrel)

	Jan. 1, 1973	Jan. 1, 1974	Per cent Change, 1973-74	Jan. 1, 1975	Per cent Change, 1974-75
1. Posted price ²	\$2.591	\$11.651	+ 350.0	\$11.251	- 3.6
2. Royalty ³	.324	1.456	—	2.250	—
3. Production cost	.100	.100	—	.120	—
4. Profit for tax purposes (1 - (2 + 3))	2.167	10.095	—	8.881	—
5. Tax ⁴	1.192	5.552	—	7.549	—
6. Government revenue (2 + 5)	1.516	7.008	+ 362.0	9.799	+ 39.8
7. Cost of equity oil (2 + 6) ⁵	1.616	7.108	+ 340.0	9.919	+ 39.5
8. Cost of participation oil ⁵	2.330	10.835	+ 365.0	10.460	- 3.6
9. Weighted average cost ⁵	1.794	9.344	+ 421.0	10.240	+ 9.6
10. Weighted government revenue (9 - 3)	1.694	9.244	+ 446.0	10.120	+ 9.5

¹ Prices shown are for Saudi Arabian light crude oil 34 degree API (American Petroleum Institute) gravity. Saudi light is used as a standard for Persian Gulf crude because it is the largest single type of crude produced there and represents a good average between higher-priced low-sulfur crude and lower-priced heavier oil.

² The so-called "posted price" is a fictitious, artificially high price set by oil-producing countries for the purpose of producing the revenues—royalties and taxes—they receive from oil companies.

³ The 5% royalty was fixed at 12.5 per cent of the posted price for the 1973 and 1974 rates, and at 20 per cent for the 1975 date.

⁴ The Saudi tax was fixed at 55 per cent of the profit for tax purposes (line 4) for the 1973 and 1974 dates, and at 85 per cent for the 1975 date.

⁵ The oil companies pay two different prices, and the weighted average cost per barrel falls between the cost for equity oil and the cost for participation oil. Participation oil is oil in which the oil-producing country has part ownership in the oil companies operating in the country. The oil companies—because of their exploration and development roles—have a right to a certain percentage of production at a cost something less than the market rate, which also is figured in the weighted average cost.

SOURCE: International Economic Reports of the President, February 1974 and March 1975

unavoidable."¹² There has been the additional controversy on both sides of the Atlantic over attempts by the Arab Boycott Office to keep blacklisted "Jewish" banks and businesses in western countries from participating in international transactions involving the Arabs.

Response to Embargo

The immediate response of the U.S. government to the Arab oil embargo in the fall of 1973 was to rally the nation in support of a crash program aimed at removing dependence on foreign oil in a few years.

When President Nixon addressed the nation on Nov. 7, 1973, he couched his remarks in terms of that ambitious and lofty objective. "Let us set as our national goal...that by the end of this decade we will have developed the potential to meet our own energy needs without depending on any foreign sources," he said. He called it Project Independence, a name that fit snugly into the framework of the upcoming bicentennial anniversary. Nixon likened Project Independence to two other successful American ventures—the Manhattan Project, the race to develop an atomic bomb, and the Apollo Project, the race to put a man on the moon.

Hardly had the ring of Nixon's words died out when leaders both inside and outside the administration began to question the wisdom and practicality of total self-sufficiency in energy. The year 1974 was to become one of study and planning while the country instituted initial energy conservation measures by lowering highway speed limits to 55 miles per hour and turning thermostats down to 68 degrees.

The Arabs ended their embargo on March 18, 1974. By summer, the lines at American service stations began to dwindle, and energy seemed to be downgraded from a crisis to a problem of national consciousness. The United States was distracted by the more immediate crisis of Watergate. When Nixon resigned on Aug. 9, 1974, and Gerald R. Ford became the 38th President, the nation was already hearing about "reasonable self-sufficiency" in energy matters.

Ford's Modifications

Ford immediately endorsed the aims of Project Independence, but in one of his first important speeches as President, at the World Energy Conference in Detroit Sept. 23, he said that "no nation has or can have within its borders everything necessary for a full and rich life for all its people. Independence cannot mean isolation. The aim of Project Independence is not to set the United States apart from the rest of the world; it is to enable the United States to do its part more effectively in the world's effort to provide more energy."

Ford met no outcry at home against that move away from the original Project Independence goal of total self-sufficiency by 1980. To the contrary, informed opinion had found Nixon's goal unrealistic.

The Federal Energy Administration (FEA) formally unveiled its 800-page "Blueprint for Project Independence" on Nov. 13, 1974. Five days earlier, FEA Administrator John C. Sawhill had said, "Project Independence implies zero imports. I do not feel that this is either necessary or desirable as a goal for U.S. energy policy."

¹² "German Press Review," West German Embassy in Washington, D.C., Jan. 29, 1975. See "Foreign Investment in America," *Editorial Research Reports*, 1974 Vol. II, pp. 561-560.

World Proved Oil Reserves

(Estimate at the end of 1974)

Major Area and Selected Countries	Billion Barrels	Per Cent of Total
North America	58.3	8.2
United States	35.3	5.0
Canada	9.4	1.3
Mexico	13.6	1.9
Central and South America	27.0	3.8
Venezuela ¹	15.0	2.1
Ecuador ¹	2.5	.4
Other	9.5	1.3
Western Europe	25.8	3.6
United Kingdom	15.7	2.2
Norway	7.3	1.0
Other	2.8	.4
Africa	68.3	9.5
Algeria ¹	7.7	1.1
Libya ¹	28.8	3.7
Nigeria ¹	20.9	2.9
Other	13.1	1.8
Asia-Pacific	21.0	2.9
Indonesia ¹	15.0	2.1
Other	6.0	.8
Middle East	403.9	56.4
Saudi Arabia ¹	164.5	23.0
Kuwait ¹	72.8	10.2
Iran ¹	66.0	9.2
Iraq ¹	35.0	4.9
Abu Dhabi ¹	30.0	4.2
Qatar ¹	8.0	.8
Other	29.6	4.1
Total Non-Communist	604.3	84.4
Communist World ²	111.4	15.6
Soviet Union	83.4	11.7
Other	28.0	3.9
Total World	715.7	100.0

¹ Member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

² Includes Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact Nations, Cuba, China and Yugoslavia.

SOURCE: International Economic Report of the President, March 1975.

Impact on Imports

Whatever the goals of Project Independence—their implementation remained vague and confused by mid-1975—there was no doubt that the Arab states had used the oil weapon tellingly against the American superpower. American domestic oil production peaked in 1970, meaning that, before the Arab embargo of October 1973, the United States had expected to import larger quantities of foreign oil to meet ever-increasing demands.

In 1972, the United States received 850,000 barrels of Arab oil per day, which represented 17.9 per cent of total imports. In 1973, Arab oil imports increased to 1,590,000 barrels per day, despite the beginning of the embargo. But the percentage of Arab oil to total imports dropped to 9.2 per cent.

In 1974, with the embargo still in effect until March 18, Arab imports dropped to 1,250,000 barrels per day, but the percentage of Arab oil went back up to 20.5 per cent. The

Middle East Oil - 9

percentage was estimated at 22.7 per cent in the first quarter of 1975.

In other terms, the United States in 1973 imported from all foreign sources 6,200,000 barrels per day, or 35.8 per cent of its daily consumption of 17,300,000 barrels. Yet, by government estimates before the crisis, the United States expected to be getting 33 per cent of its total oil supply from Arab countries alone by 1980, or about seven million barrels daily.

Thus the Arabs employed their oil weapon as the United States was relying more and more on Arab sources. The deepening reliance came about as supplies began to dwindle from Venezuela and Canada, historically the two biggest suppliers of foreign oil to the United States. Canada planned to phase out all oil exports to the United States by 1983.

OPEC quadrupled its price between Jan. 1, 1973, and Jan. 1, 1974—from a posted price of \$2.59 per barrel of Persian crude oil to \$11.65. The U.S. economy was caught in the two-edged vise of embargo and skyrocketing prices. An FEA report of August 1974 estimated that the five-month embargo cost 500,000 American jobs and a gross national product loss of between \$10-billion and \$20-billion.

The United States faces, anytime that OPEC is emboldened to hike its prices, such results as a further drain on consumer purchasing power, another spur to inflation, deeper deficits in balance of payments and the federal budget, and an ever-increasing menace to the world economic system.

FEA Blueprint


The designers of the FEA blueprint for Project Independence opted for a goal of independence from "insecure" foreign oil by 1985 and an emphasis on strict conservation measures to reduce the volume of energy imports. FEA Administrator Sawhill said, "If we want to reduce our dependence on imports, we must reduce our energy demands. This is an inescapable conclusion." (He was to lose his job in a dispute about conservation measures with President Ford.)

The blueprint explored various alternatives, all of them presenting a multitude of problems and carrying enormous price tags. A Federal Energy Office (FEO)—forerunner of the FEA—report on Feb. 6, 1974, put the lowest estimate for energy self-sufficiency in terms of capital outlay at \$253-billion. Other projections have ranged as high as \$1-trillion. Highlights of the blueprint included:

- **Conservation**—An all-out conservation effort could reduce annual increase in energy demand from the existing 4 to 5 per cent to 2 to 3 per cent by 1980. The blueprint recommended a 15-cents-a-gallon tax on gasoline; mandatory fuel economy standards requiring that cars get at least 20 miles to the gallon; a 25 per cent tax credit for insulating existing housing; a 15 per cent tax credit for making commercial buildings more efficient users of energy; continued reduced speed limits, and more use of car pools and mass transit.

- **Conservation alternatives**—The study mentioned two possibilities. One was more intensive exploration and drilling for oil and natural gas, but the FEA said that environmental hazards and social and financial costs were a drawback to that approach. The other strategy was the establishment of a 1-billion-barrel oil stockpile in underground salt caverns, which would cost \$1.4-billion in maintenance each year.

OPEC Surpluses - Four Scenarios



SOURCE: First National City Bank of N.Y.

- **Coal**—"Coal and conservation will be most important in the short and intermediate terms," Sawhill's replacement as FEA administrator, Frank G. Zarb, has said. William E. Simon, who was the federal energy chief before becoming secretary of the treasury, said that coal could replace as much as 6 billion barrels of oil each day by 1985 if employed as a direct substitute for oil and gas in electricity production, space heating and industrial processes. The FEA study showed that coal production in 1974 amounted to 599 million tons—and that supply would last another 800 years at that rate. Most of the nation's coal is high in sulphur, and water shortages were possible consequences of some coal gasification plants.

- **Oil**—From the peak year of 1970, domestic oil production was expected to decline for several years, despite price increases awarded producers as incentives, because the development of new fields requires several years. By 1985, domestic output could rise to between 12 million and 20 million barrels per day, with production increasing as government-set prices were raised. The study said there are 200 billion to 400 billion barrels of undiscovered oil in the United States, one-third of it in offshore regions of the East Coast, California coast and Gulf of Alaska. The report minimized the danger of spillage from offshore drillings.

- **Natural gas**—"The outlook for increased gas supplies is not promising," the report stated. Reserves have been falling since 1967, and consumption is running as much as three times greater than annual discoveries of new supplies. Prices are federally regulated, and higher prices could stimulate recovery from offshore areas and Alaska.

- **Oil shale**—There are an estimated 1.8 trillion barrels of oil in shale deposits in Colorado, Wyoming and Utah. Production could reach 250,000 barrels per day by 1985, but

a strong push to recover oil shale could cause severe water shortages. Heavy federal subsidies also would be required.

- **Nuclear power**—Nuclear power plants for the production of electricity have fallen behind schedule for becoming operational; nevertheless, such plants were expected to produce 30 per cent of all electricity by 1985.

- **Exotic energy sources**—Solar energy was not expected to have an impact until after 1985, and the FEA study said that geothermal energy development might prove to be a significant energy source by the year 2000.

Ford vs. Congress

The 94th Congress convened in January 1975, and the burden of putting an energy program into action fell to the legislators and the White House. The Democrats had made sweeps in the November elections, especially in the House, where they won a two-thirds majority. While the Republican President prepared his legislative recommendations on energy, Democratic task forces in the House and Senate drew up their own legislative proposals. As soon as all programs were made public, it became apparent that Ford and the Democratic congressional majorities were heading in different directions less than a year after the Arab oil boycott had ended.

Ford stated as his goals "surplus capacity in total energy," which the nation had had in the 1960s, and the reduction of oil imports to "end vulnerability to economic disruption by foreign suppliers by 1985." He called for swift legislative action to allow commercial production at the Elks Hill, Calif., Naval Petroleum Reserve and to enable more power plants to convert to coal.

Recommending a 90-day timetable to the lawmakers, the President in January 1975 also asked for deregulation of natural gas to spur new production, a natural gas excise tax and a windfall profits tax by April 1, because he planned to act to remove controls from the price of domestic crude oil on that date.

Ford announced that he was using his presidential emergency powers to curb oil imports by making them costly. He would order crude oil tariff levels to be increased by \$1 a barrel on Feb. 1, by \$1 a barrel on March 1 and by \$1 per barrel on April 1. That action raised the first outcry from congressional Democrats and brought about the first confrontation between Congress and the administration on the energy package.

House Speaker Carl Albert (D Okla.) said the tax on oil imports would have an "astounding inflationary impact" on the economy. The speaker explained that the Democrats favored a "more moderate approach" which combined gasoline rationing, a graduated excise tax on automobiles based on their fuel consumption, gasless days and other measures. But Ford said that, after considering rationing and high gasoline taxes as alternatives, he had rejected them as ineffective and inequitable.

Other details of the Democratic program, developed in task forces headed by Sen. John O. Pastore (R.I.) and Rep. Jim Wright (Texas), included a 5-cent federal tax increase per gallon of gasoline (raising it to 9 cents from the existing 4 cents). Proceeds from this tax would raise \$5-billion a year to build an energy trust fund. The fund would be used for research and development of alternate energy sources—solar power, coal gasification, nuclear power and nuclear fusion projects.

Ford forged ahead with his \$1 fee on foreign barrels Feb. 1, rebuffing New England governors who met with him to protest the action. The region depends heavily on

foreign oil to meet its needs. Meanwhile, Democrats introduced bills in both chambers barring Ford's action hiking the fees for up to 90 days while the legislators considered alternative strategies.

The Democrats quickly moved legislation to delay the import-tariff action, and Ford vetoed the bill on March 4. However, in a conciliatory mood, the President held off on further fee increases, not adding the second \$1 until June 1. Democrats made no move to override the veto.

On May 20, the President vetoed the strip-mining bill, claiming that it would result in a loss of coal production—up to 25 per cent of annual tonnage—and cost 36,000 jobs. Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.), a principal sponsor (and a presidential candidate), accused Ford of a "lack of sensitivity to the need to balance energy production with protection of our land." The House gave Ford a victory by sustaining his veto.

The President went on television May 27, assailing Congress for having "done nothing positive to end our energy dependence." Accusing the lawmakers of "drift, dawdle and debate," he added, "Our American economy runs on energy. No energy, no jobs. It's as simple as that."

Cloudy Outlook

By mid-July 1975, several major energy bills were at various stages in the legislative process; but, with the White House-Congress deadlock continuing over many issues, the final shape of a broad energy policy remained unclear.

For example, the House was considering an omnibus bill that dealt with the price of domestic oil, a highly controversial issue. Moving counter to Ford's proposal to decontrol those prices, the Commerce Committee adopted a plan to roll back the uncontrolled price of "new" oil (from wells that went into operation in 1973 or later)—that sold at \$12 or \$13 a barrel—to \$7.50 per barrel. "Old" oil would remain under a \$5.25 price ceiling.

When Ford disclosed a compromise plan to decontrol oil prices gradually over a 30-month period, his proposal drew immediate and bitter Democratic opposition. Jackson called the total administration oil package "intellectually and morally corrupt." But the House rejected the Commerce Committee's rollback plan July 23.

Another key Ford proposal was an international floor under the price of oil, outlined by Secretary of State Kissinger on Feb. 3, 1975. It called on oil-consuming nations to set a base price that would protect their investments in new energy sources in the event that oil prices fell substantially. The price floor probably would be set somewhere between the existing world price of \$11 a barrel and the regulated domestic price of "old" oil at \$5.25. The plan was intended to cope with a dilemma: investments in alternative energy sources were sought as a means of forcing down foreign oil prices; but if they succeeded, competition from the lower oil prices would then bring losses to the investors. The purpose of the price floor was to ensure potential investors in costly energy sources against such losses and thus draw capital into the development of energy alternatives.

But on June 26, a joint House-Senate Subcommittee on International Economics, with only one Republican dissent, rejected the floor price scheme as "an undesirable way to achieve greater energy self-sufficiency and to bolster consumer solidarity." The subcommittee found that incentives for developing oil and coal resources were ample without a price guarantee and claimed that "a floor price could easily

Monetary Reserves, Middle East Oil-Exporting Countries*

(in millions of dollars)

Country	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	April 1975
Algeria	\$442	\$492	\$410	\$ 339	\$ 507	\$ 493	\$1,143	\$1,889	\$ 940
Egypt	195	166	145	167	161	149	391	342	1
Iran	324	291	310	208	621	980	1,237	8,363	9,200
Iraq	368	453	476	462	600	782	1,553	3,273	2,910 ²
Kuwait	184	173	162	203	288	363	501	1,397	1,526
Libya	385	539	918	1,590	2,665	2,925	2,127	3,616	2,621
Saudi Arabia	762	662	607	662	1,444	2,500	3,877	14,285	14,888 ³
Syria	74	67	59	55	88	135	481	835	1,240 ⁴

*A country's international reserves consist of its reserves in gold, SDRs (special drawing rights which are unconditional international reserve assets created by the International Monetary Fund), its reserve position in the Fund (unconditional assets that arise from a country's gold subscription to the Fund and from the Fund's use of a member's currency to finance the drawings of others) and its foreign exchange (holdings by monetary authorities—such as central banks, currency boards, exchange stabilization funds and Treasuries—of claims on foreigners in the form of

bank deposits, Treasury bills, government securities and other claims usable in the event of a balance of payments deficit).

1. Not available.

2. As of the end of March 1975.

3. As of the end of January 1975.

4. As of the end of February 1975.

SOURCE: Data from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics, June 1975

become a massive across-the-board subsidy for large energy producers." The subcommittee suggested direct federal support for developing new energy resources as an alternative and urged the administration to cease its efforts in the International Energy Agency to set a minimum price support "until such time as Congress authorizes the Executive to seek such an agreement."

In a September 1972 report—a year before the Arabs hit the United States and the rest of the West with the oil embargo—the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Near East said in a report: "Never before in the history of mankind have so many wealthy, industrialized, militarily powerful and larger states been at the potential mercy of small, independent and potentially unstable states, which will provide, for the foreseeable future, the fuel of advanced societies."

In mid-1975, a year after the embargo was lifted, neither the administration nor Congress would quarrel with that evaluation. But it seemed that the American people would witness a vehement political struggle before altering "the foreseeable future" and settling on a broad energy policy that would fulfill the goals of Project Independence.

Exporting Countries' Unity

A central factor in the growing strength of Middle East states in the world oil market has been their increasing ability to act in concert. Increases in oil prices, new formulas for calculating royalty payments and taxes, agreements on participation in ownership and changes in prices to reflect devaluation of the dollar have been relatively recent breakthroughs for the Middle East oil countries.

These countries allowed foreign oil companies to exploit their oil reserves under concessions granted at various times between 1901 and 1935. These agreements required the companies to pay only a nominal royalty—an average of 21 cents a barrel in the Middle East, according to Charles Issawi in *The Washington Papers: Oil, the Middle East and the World*. In return, the concessionaires were exempted from taxes and were free to determine production and pricing policy.

Issawi pointed out that these arrangements may have been fair enough in times when demand was slow, prices were fluctuating or dropping, prospects for discovering oil were uncertain and huge capital investments were needed. But during and after World War II, prices rose sharply, thus reducing the purchasing power of the fixed royalty and the government's share of the value of the oil.

Oil-producing countries pushed for a greater share, and by the early 1950s all the producing countries had negotiated agreements providing that revenues from oil production be divided between a country and a company or consortium on a 50-50 basis. These agreements—resulting in raising payments to 70-80 cents per barrel—multiplied the revenues of the Middle East governments almost tenfold between 1948 and 1960, from about \$150-million to nearly \$1.4-billion, according to Issawi.

OPEC and OAPEC

The Middle East countries had become acutely aware of the importance of maintaining a high price. Reductions in prices in the late 1950s by oil companies, without consultation with the producing countries, sparked a counter-move by the world's five largest oil exporting nations.

Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela in September 1960 established OPEC to keep oil prices from dropping further. The five countries agreed to prorate their future production, based on 1960 production levels, and to pool and prorate any future increases in world market demands. By 1974 OPEC also included Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Early in 1968, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya formed another group, called the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). The membership had been broadened by 1974 to include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Qatar, Syria and the United Arab Emirates.

OPEC was successful in preventing further cuts in posted prices for oil on which taxes were calculated but failed to restore prices to their earlier level or to agree on a formula for prorating to limit output. A 1965 attempt to agree on a uniform production plan also failed, but OPEC did manage to achieve some important financial gains, ac-

cording to Issawi. (A "posted price" is a fictitious, artificially high price set by producing countries for the purpose of boosting the royalty payments and taxes they receive.) (*Chart, p. 34*)

In the meantime, the 50-50 split of the oil profits came under increasing fire. As Simon pointed out in Senate testimony in May 1973, there had been virtually no increase in per-barrel payments in the 1950s and only a 12-cent-per-barrel increase in the 1960s. In the late 1960s, OPEC began its move toward increasing revenues.

An OPEC conference in Vienna in June 1968 produced a resolution that (1) cited the United Nations principle that all countries had the right to exercise sovereignty over their natural resources, (2) declared the desirability of exploitation of resources directly by the producing countries, (3) set forth a doctrine of "changing circumstances" to allow the countries to alter existing contracts and (4) expressed the right of governments to share in ownership.

OPEC also agreed on a minimum taxation rate of 55 per cent, establishment of more uniform pricing practices, a general increase in the posted or tax-reference prices in all member countries and elimination of allowances granted to oil companies.

Price Agreements

The 1968 conference marked the first significant step toward consolidation of OPEC power, and great strides have been taken since then. According to a January 1974 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on foreign sources of oil for the United States, OPEC members had negotiated eight agreements with oil companies that significantly increased the cost of crude oil.

Libya led the way toward exacting higher prices from the oil companies. In 1970, the companies held out for seven months while the Libyan government cut back production to force a price increase. The companies finally agreed to raise the posted price by 30 cents a barrel. Libya's success provided incentive to the Persian Gulf states.

A triple victory was scored in 1971 with the negotiation of the Teheran, Tripoli and East Mediterranean agreements. The Teheran agreement, reached in February 1971, involved Abu Dhabi, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

Following on the heels of a 9-cents-per-barrel price hike negotiated in 1970, the Teheran agreement raised the basic posted price of oil 35-40 cents per barrel and contained a formula for a four-step increase in posted prices through 1975. Prices increased from about 86 cents per barrel in 1970 to about \$1.24 per barrel in 1971—an increase of 43 per cent—with \$1.50 as the goal by 1975.

The Teheran agreement also hiked the countries' taxes from 50 per cent to 55 per cent of the net taxable income and established a system for adjusting the posted price according to the oil's gravity.

The Tripoli agreement, negotiated by Libya in April 1971, and the East Mediterranean agreement, negotiated by Iraq in June 1971, used the Teheran agreement as their base. Additional elements included an increase in the basic posted price, a further increase for low-sulfur oil and temporary increases to reflect the geographical advantage resulting from the closing of the Suez Canal and the high freight rates prevailing for oil tankers.

Critics' Position

Some critics of western negotiators have felt that these early agreements set the stage for spiraling Arab demands. In a controversial article in the winter 1973 issue of *Foreign*

Policy magazine, oil economist M. A. Adelman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology stated his belief that the steep price increases could be attributed to U.S. capitulation to OPEC during negotiations over the Teheran agreement.

"Without active support from the U.S., OPEC might never have achieved much," said Adelman. He called a January 1971 meeting of oil-importing nations the "turning point" and said that "there is no doubt that the American representatives and the oil companies assured the other governments that if they offered no resistance to higher oil prices they could at least count on five years' secure supply at stable or only slightly rising prices."

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations Jan. 31, 1974, a vice president of Hunt International Petroleum Corporation, third largest independent oil-producing venture in Libya, offered a similar view. Henry M. Schuler called oil policy and negotiations since 1971 an "unmitigated disaster" which had created the "unstoppable momentum" within the Arab world for higher prices.

"If a political and economic monster has been loosed upon the world," Schuler stated, "it is the creation of western governments and companies. Together we created it and gave it the necessary push, so only we, acting in harmony, can slow it down."

The GAO examination of the Teheran agreement negotiations noted that the oil companies had agreed among themselves to negotiate only on the basis of reaching a five-year settlement with all the producing countries, in order to avoid the leapfrogging effect of a series of agreements and to promote stability for those five years. But Libya and Algeria rejected any such joint bargaining. The negotiations, which lasted about a month, began under the threat of an oil production cutoff if OPEC demands were not met by a certain deadline. Negotiations broke down at one point but, with the urging of U.S. government officials, the companies continued the negotiations and an agreement was signed Feb. 14, 1971.

In an April 1973 *Foreign Affairs* article, James E. Akins, U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and former director of the State Department's Office of Fuels and Energy, dismissed charges that the United States had invited the threat of a cutoff of oil and thus had built up OPEC's bargaining position. Akins asserted that, upon the protest of the State Department, leaders from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had assured the United States that the so-called "threats" had been misunderstood, that they had been directed solely at the oil companies and that the oil would be available to consumers even if the negotiations broke down. He said that the State Department had also requested an extension of the deadline set by OPEC and an assurance that agreements reached with the companies would be honored for their full terms.

Dollar Devaluation

Another major agreement was negotiated in January 1972 in Geneva. Abu Dhabi, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia reached agreement with the major oil companies to increase the posted price to restore the purchasing power lost by the oil-producing countries because of the December 1971 dollar devaluation. According to the formula agreed upon, the posted prices would be adjusted every time the U.S. exchange rates differed from an index of nine major currencies by more than 2 per cent. Posted

prices rose by 8.55 per cent in February 1972 and 5.69 per cent in April 1972.

A second Geneva agreement on dollar devaluation and oil was reached in June 1973. Oil companies agreed to raise immediately the posted price of crude oil from Iran, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Nigeria by 6.1 per cent, making a total increase of 11.9 per cent since the February 1973 devaluation. The agreement, effective through 1975, also set a new formula under which posted prices would reflect more fully and rapidly any future changes in the dollar's value.

Escalating Demands

The Tehran agreement was laid to rest in October 1973 when Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar announced a unilateral price hike after negotiations had broken down. The new level was a 17 per cent increase in the market price of crude—raising it to about \$3.65—and a 70 per cent increase in the posted price—bringing that up to about \$5.11.

Yet another 70 per cent increase in prices, effective Jan. 1, 1974, was announced by these six Persian Gulf producers during a December 1973 meeting in Tehran. This brought the posted price to \$11.65. Other petroleum exporting countries have followed the initiatives of the Persian Gulf countries in raising their prices.

In 1974, a series of changes by oil-producing countries actually reduced the posted price slightly but increased the cost of oil by raising royalties and taxes. The actual prices charged the oil companies on terms that went into effect Jan. 1, 1975, were nearly 10 per cent higher than a year earlier. OPEC froze those prices for nine months, until Oct. 1. (*Chart, p. 34*)

Further increases were expected in the last quarter of 1975. The Shah of Iran, at a May 17 news conference in Washington, called for an increase to compensate for the loss of "between 30 and 50 per cent of our purchasing power because of world inflation." Western economists felt there was no justification for such a further increase, and President Ford warned June 25 that another price hike would be "very disruptive and totally unacceptable."

Largely because of the recession, but also because of conservation measures in consuming countries, demand for oil was falling in 1975. As a result, OPEC production dropped from 30.6 million barrels a day in 1974 to about 25 million in early June 1975, leaving its member countries with a surplus productive capacity of about 10 million barrels per day.

The oil-producing states with smaller revenues and larger development programs were beginning to feel the pinch from reduced sales. Western economists say that reduced prices would enable these countries to expand their output. In fact, by discreetly discounting its prices below the OPEC level, Iraq in early 1975 was producing at a rate 42 per cent above the same period a year earlier, while OPEC production in the same period fell by 16 per cent. In spite of this downward pressure on oil prices, experts expected some increase by the end of 1975 for the sake of keeping the OPEC cartel united and demonstrating its continuing effectiveness.¹²

Participation Agreements

Participation—part ownership by oil-producing countries in the oil companies operating in their countries—has become a significant issue in the world oil

¹² *Wall Street Journal*, June 27, 1976.

market. The concept was originated by Saudi Arabia's shrewd oil minister, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani.

A 1972 House Foreign Affairs subcommittee report on the Persian Gulf pointed out that many nationalists have found the concessionary system—which involved contracts between companies and exporting countries that enabled the companies to exploit oil deposits for a fixed period of time—degrading. They were said to believe that as concessions approached their termination it was natural for the countries to begin to participate in all operations rather than remaining in the passive role of collecting revenues and royalties.

The attitude of many oil companies, according to the report, was that oil exporting countries held all the trump cards and participation was inevitable. They faced the dilemma of balancing the cost of yielding to demands too soon against the risk of holding out too long and perhaps precipitating nationalization.

Algeria had nationalized its natural gas fields in 1971 and taken over 51 per cent of oil concessions on behalf of its national company, thus breaking the favored position of French oil companies. Libya expropriated British Petroleum Company holdings in 1971. Iraq nationalized the western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company in 1972.

In the OPEC participation agreement reached in December 1972, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar won an immediate 25 per cent interest in the companies' ownership which was to increase in steps up to 51 per cent by 1982.

Iran

In 1973, Iran took control of its oil industry. Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi had announced in June 1972 that Iran would extend the western-owned consortium agreement of 1954 when it came up for renewal in 1979. However, in January 1973, the Shah declared that the agreement would not be extended unless the consortium agreed to increase daily production from 4.5 million barrels to 8.3 million by 1977. But in March, the Shah nationalized the oil industry. A 20-year agreement was signed in May which provided for the National Iranian Oil Company to take control of all operations and facilities of the oil companies, with the consortium to have the role of technical adviser.

Libya

In June 1973 Libya nationalized a U.S. oil firm in retaliation for U.S. support of Israel. Libyan leader Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi told a rally that the United States "deserved a strong slap in the face." He warned: "The time might come where there will be a real confrontation with oil companies and the entire American imperialism."

The Libyan government acquired 51 per cent of the holdings of the Occidental Petroleum Company in mid-August 1973. Independent oil companies followed suit in sharing ownership, but the major companies held out. In September 1973 the revolutionary leader announced the unilateral takeover of 51 per cent of the operations of all the major companies. In February and March 1974, the government completely nationalized the operations of Texaco, Shell and subsidiaries of Standard Oil of California and Atlantic Richfield.

Oil Embargo

Oil production cutbacks and the embargo of exports to U.S. markets which began in late 1973 marked not only a

peak in Arab unity but also the first formal use of oil as a political weapon to pressure the industrial nations into forcing Israel to return to its pre-1967 frontiers.

The potency of the weapon became highly visible within a short period. Arab oil exporting nations succeeded in disrupting the life style of every major industrial power, caused fissures in the Atlantic alliance, precipitated upsets in international money markets and prompted the United States to make an intensive search for a peace settlement in the Middle East.

1967 Boycott

An attempt at using oil as a political weapon had been made after the 1967 war, but it met with little success. Within two days of the outbreak of fighting in 1967, every major Arab oil producer except Algeria completely shut down production. But consuming countries turned to the United States, Venezuela and Indonesia, and the Arab countries soon broke ranks.

Three weeks after the embargo went into effect, Iraq began shipping oil to Turkey and France through a pipeline to Lebanon. By mid-July the major Arab oil producers had restored shipments to all countries except the United States, Britain and, in some instances, West Germany. The participating countries agreed in August to leave up to the individual countries the question of whether to continue the boycott, and by mid-September the only interruption to normal oil supplies was the continued closure of the Suez Canal.

Saudi Arabia's Role

Saudi Arabia—the top Middle East oil producer and holder of about one-fourth of the non-Communist world's oil reserves—held the key to the success of a boycott. In 1967, Saudi Arabia had gone along reluctantly with the embargo because of pressure from Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. But the country had not enforced the embargo strictly and lifted it shortly after it was made voluntary.

However, Saudi Arabia, under conservative, pro-western King Faisal, led the way in 1973. The formal decision to use oil as a weapon came Oct. 17, 1973, at an OAPEC meeting in Kuwait. The members agreed to cut production monthly by 5 per cent over the previous month's sales until Israel had withdrawn from the Arab territories it had occupied since the 1967 war and had agreed to respect the rights of Palestinian refugees.

The following day, Saudi Arabia announced that it would cut back its oil production by 10 per cent and would cut off all shipments to the United States if the United States continued to supply Israel with arms and refused to "modify" its pro-Israeli policy. Libya imposed an embargo Oct. 19.

On Oct. 29—the day after President Nixon requested \$2.2-billion in emergency security assistance for Israel—Saudi Arabia announced a total embargo against oil exports to the United States. When four Persian Gulf states—Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Dubai—joined the embargo Oct. 21, the Arab boycott of U.S. markets was complete.

The reasons for Saudi Arabia's turnabout rested with inter-Arab politics and Faisal's anti-Zionism. Nadav Safran, writing in the January 1974 *Foreign Affairs*, attributed Faisal's previous reluctance to use the oil weapon partially to a fear that Egyptian President Nasser, who died Sept. 28, 1970, and other Arab radicals might

usurp control over when and how the weapon would be used.

Another factor, according to Safran, was that Saudi Arabia needed all the revenues it was receiving at that time and suspected the weapon could possibly be turned around and used against the Saudi regime.

In fact, according to an article by Benjamin Shwadran in the February 1974 *Current History*, the original purpose for the formation of OAPEC by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq early in 1968 was to block the other Arab countries—particularly Egypt—from interfering with their economic interests.

But, as Safran pointed out, the circumstances in 1973 were quite different than in 1967. Saudi Arabia was receiving vastly increased revenues, and Nasser was no longer around to threaten Faisal's autonomy. Saudi Arabia's decision to use the oil weapon, coupled with substantial financial assistance to Egypt, was seen as a move to minimize the principal appeal of radical Libyan leader Col. Qaddafi—self-proclaimed heir of Nasser—and prevent the proposed union of Egypt and Libya.

Another factor was the failure of Saudi Arabia's quiet diplomacy aimed at nudging the United States into what it hoped would be a more even-handed position in the Middle East. Faisal's reluctance to employ the oil option had been lessened considerably after Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972 failed to bring a change in White House policy.

Saudi Arabia's final move came after a series of pleas to Washington to tone down its support of Israel. The *Washington Post* reported Oct. 20, 1973, that Faisal had sent at least two letters to President Nixon with pleas for a more even-handed appearance. Petroleum Minister Yamani had made the same appeal during a visit to Washington in April 1973.

In a July 4 interview with two American reporters, Faisal delivered what was said to be his first public warning, when he stated that Saudi Arabia would like to continue its friendly ties with the United States but would find this "difficult" if the United States support for Israel remained at its existing level. The warnings continued, and the final decision to impose the embargo came only after Nixon's Oct. 19 request for money to rearm Israel.

Embargo Categories

The Arabs were systematic in their embargo, with countries being divided into categories. On the boycott list were nations considered to be friends of Israel. The United States was at the top. The Netherlands followed, because the Arabs were angered by what they saw as a pro-Israel stance and reports that the Dutch had offered to aid in the transit of Soviet Jewish emigrants to Israel. In late November, Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa were officially placed on the embargo list. Shipments of oil to Canada were cut off because the Arabs feared the oil might be reshipped to the United States.

Exempted nations included France, Spain, Arab and Moslem states and—on a conditional basis—Britain. These nations were permitted to purchase the same volume of oil as they had purchased in the first nine months of 1973, but, since the fourth quarter of a year is normally a heavy buying period, these nations were also expected to feel the pinch.

All the remaining countries fell into the non-exempt category, which meant that they would divide what was left after the needs of the exempted nations had been met.

Embargo's Effect

In addition to the embargo, the Arab states continued their monthly reductions in production. The effects of the oil squeeze were soon felt in the consuming nations. Measures taken to cope with the oil shortage included gas rationing, bans on Sunday driving, reduced speed limits, increased prices, restrictions on energy usage, cutbacks in auto production and reductions in heating fuels.

Although estimates varied, the embargo was said to have resulted in the loss to the United States of about two million barrels of oil per day. However, Arab oil did leak through the embargo, reportedly from Iraq and Libya. In October, the United States began classifying data on its oil imports to prevent these leaks from being plugged up.

Hardest hit were Japan and Western Europe, areas most dependent on oil imports. Most of northern Europe suffered from the total embargo against The Netherlands, because the Dutch port of Rotterdam was Europe's largest oil-refining and transshipment center.

U.S. Peace Efforts

The embargo proved effective. Although Washington repeatedly denounced the Arab tactics and declared it would not submit to such coercion, the oil squeeze undoubtedly was the driving force behind U.S. peace-seeking efforts.

Secretary of State Kissinger shuttled relentlessly throughout the Middle East in attempts to mediate a settlement. A series of peace missions produced the Nov. 11, 1973, cease-fire agreement between Israel and Egypt, resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Egypt, the Dec. 21-22 first round of Geneva peace talks, the Jan. 18, 1974, Egyptian-Israeli disengagement accord and the May 31 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria.

Atlantic Alliance

But in the meantime OPEC's policies took a deep toll from an already troubled Atlantic alliance. Washington was unable to prevent its allies from bending under the Arab pressure.

On Nov. 6, 1973, representatives of the European Economic Community (EEC), meeting in Brussels, adopted a statement calling on Israel and Egypt to return to the Oct. 22 cease-fire lines which had been drawn before Israeli troops completed the encirclement of Egypt's III Corps. They called on Israel to "end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967" and declared that peace in the Middle East was incompatible with "the acquisition of territory by force." Moreover, they declared that any settlement must take into account "the legitimate rights" of the Palestinian refugees.

Later in the month Japan followed suit. On Nov. 22, the Japanese cabinet announced that it might have to reconsider its policy toward Israel. The Arabs rewarded western Europe and Japan by exempting them from the 5 per cent cut in December.

On Dec. 13, Japan switched from a neutral position to appealing to Israel to withdraw to the Oct. 22 ceasefire lines as a first step toward total withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. On Dec. 25, the January cutback was canceled and OPEC announced that oil production would be increased by 10 per cent.

United Energy Policy

These statements by the EEC and Japan, while one-sided in favor of the Arabs, were in keeping with United

Nations Resolution 242. That resolution, approved by the Secretary Council in 1967, had called for a return to pre-1967 boundaries in the Middle East and a respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East. (*Text*, p. 24)

What caused the real strain in the Atlantic alliance was Europe's refusal to forge a united energy policy. U.S.-French relations suffered the most because of France's moves to negotiate bilateral arms-oil agreements with the Arab nations. On Jan. 10, 1974, Kissinger declared that "unrestricted bilateral competition will be ruinous for all countries concerned."

On Jan. 9, the White House announced that Nixon had invited the foreign ministers of eight oil-consuming nations to meet in Washington to discuss world energy problems. The eight were Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway and West Germany. Although all were not on the original invitation list, the foreign ministers of the nine EEC countries decided to attend. French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, however, withheld his acceptance until less than a week before the conference.

The meeting convened Feb. 11, with representatives from Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway and the United States. It was scheduled to end the next day but was delayed by a dispute between France and other EEC countries over their response to a U.S. proposal for a joint effort to meet the energy crisis.

Their final communique contained several points opposed by France, including a proposal to formulate a comprehensive action program to deal with the energy situation, establishment of a coordinating group to prepare for a conference of oil-producing and oil-consuming nations, formulation of a group to coordinate development of the actions recommended by the conference and adoption of financial and monetary measures to deal with the balance-of-payments impact of oil prices.

Jobert charged that energy matters had been a "pretext" and that the conference's real purpose had been the "political" desire of the United States to dominate the relationships of Europe and Japan. Kissinger, however, called the meeting a success and said that it was possibly a major step toward "dealing with world problems cooperatively."

Embargo Lifted

With the progress made toward a peace settlement in the Middle East, the United States became increasingly insistent on an end to the embargo. Kissinger told a Jan. 22, 1974, press conference that he had been given assurances by Arab leaders that when an Israeli-Egyptian accord was reached, the embargo would be lifted.

Egyptian President Sadat led the way to ending the boycott. On Jan. 22, Sadat said Arab oil states should take note of the "evolution" in U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Although he did not mention the embargo, he said that "now that the Americans have made a gesture, the Arabs should make one too." And at a Feb. 24 press conference, Sadat said that the United States would now probably pursue a more even-handed approach toward the Middle East.

OPEC's formal announcement of an end to the embargo against the United States came at a Vienna meeting March 18. Libya and Syria, however, refused to end the boycott until later in the year.

Oil and Middle East Politics

CHARLES ISSAWI

It will be assumed here that the huge increase in the world's demand for energy during the next ten or fifteen years can be met only by expanding the output of oil. Such an expansion would encounter great difficulties. In the advanced parts of the world, these difficulties are physical and have high financial and environmental costs. They include the gales and storms of the North Sea, the Arctic weather of Alaska and Athabasca, and the huge amounts of rock to be crushed and water to be pumped in order to extract oil from the shales of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming. In the less developed regions, where physical conditions are more favorable and costs of extraction low, the difficulties are primarily political. These areas include Venezuela, Nigeria, North Africa, and above all the Middle East. During the 1970s and 1980s the bulk of the increment in oil production will have to come from the Middle East, more particularly Iran, Abu Dhabi, Iraq, and especially Saudi Arabia, which have huge developed and potential oil reserves.

The problems posed for United States foreign policy in the Middle East arise from the vortex of regional and local forces in the oil-producing countries, as well as from the impact of powerful forces originating outside the region. But before discussing these forces, it is necessary to review briefly the recent economic and financial development of the Middle East oil industry in order to indicate future trends and their implications for the United States and for the world.¹

Developments in the Middle East Oil Industry

The development of the Middle East oil industry started before World War I. Until the early 1950s the region was politically and militarily dominated by Britain and, later, also by the United States. The world petroleum market was controlled by seven American and British companies that had full power in matters of production, pricing, and marketing. The Middle East governments merely received a fixed royalty averaging twenty to twenty-five cents a barrel.

¹ For further details see Charles Issawi and M. Yeganeh, *The Economics of Middle Eastern Oil* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Charles Issawi, *Oil, the Middle East and the World*, The Washington Papers, vol. 4 (New York: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1972); M. A. Adelman, *The World Petroleum Market* (New York: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); and James E. Akins, "The Oil Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* 51 (April 1973), 462-90.

Reprinted from The National Energy Problem, edited by Robert H. Connery and Robert S. Gilmour by permission of The Academy of Political Science. Copyright © 1974 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

The discontent and tension produced by World War II, the changes in Venezuela, the 1950 agreement in Saudi Arabia, and the Iranian nationalization crisis of 1951 set a new pattern. Instead of a fixed royalty, the governments received 50 percent of the profits made in producing operations, which included the extraction of oil and its delivery to tankers. In the 1950s, this averaged some 70 to 80 cents a barrel.

Since costs of production in the Middle East were low, the major factor determining profits became the "posted" price of oil. The Middle East governments became keenly interested in pricing. Hence the reductions in oil prices in 1959 and 1960, caused by increasing pressures in the market, disturbed the producing governments and led to the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). At present, OPEC includes Venezuela, Nigeria, Indonesia, and all the major oil-producing countries of the Middle East and North Africa. It accounts for over half the world's output of oil and for some 90 percent of oil exports. In its first ten years, OPEC failed to achieve its announced objective of restoring prices to their pre-1959 level, though it stopped further declines in posted prices. It did gain a series of minor though cumulatively important financial concessions, which together raised the average income of Middle East governments to 85 cents per barrel in 1969. More important, it accustomed these governments to working together and put them in an excellent position to take advantage of the unforeseen situation that arose in 1970.

The closure of the Suez Canal during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and the consequent strain on tankers had caused the companies to more than double their output in Libya, which was much closer to the European market. Thus Europe developed a great dependence on that country. In 1970 an unexpected shortage was created by the decline of supplies from Nigeria, because of the civil war, and from Saudi Arabia, because of the damaging of the pipeline carrying its oil through Syria. The revolutionary government of Libya took advantage of the situation to put pressure on the companies operating in that country, and succeeded in raising both the rate of income tax levied on the companies and the posted price of oil. These raises in turn made it possible for OPEC, in its Tehran meeting of January 1971, to score its greatest success. The Persian Gulf countries obtained an increase in their share of profits to 55 percent and in posted prices of 35 to 40 cents, to be raised about 5 cents a year until 1975. In return the governments would not make any new demands until 1975, but they did insist on being compensated for the devaluation of the dollar. By now their average receipt per barrel is about \$1.50.

Two further developments in 1971-73 should be noted. The entire oil industry in Algeria, most of it in Iraq, and some companies in Libya have been nationalized. Arrangements have also been made for "participation" with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi, under which these countries will acquire an increasing share of the capital of the companies operating there, achieving majority control by 1982. Various declarations by the government of Iran have made it clear that the major concession in that country will be considered to have lapsed by 1979 or at the latest 1984.

Developments of the past five years indicate trends that may be anticipated during the next five or ten. Nationalization, which until recently was regarded as the main danger, is of course still possible. Much will depend on how much profit Iraq will get from its nationalized industry compared to, say, Iran or Saudi Arabia. But the most probable and worrisome trends are the rapidly escalating prices of oil and a declining willingness of the main producing countries to supply the huge amounts that will be demanded in this decade and the next. Of course, these two forces can reinforce each other.

Compared to its extremely low cost of production, some 10 to 20 cents a barrel, Middle East oil is priced high, at present \$2.70. By any other measure, however, it is still cheap. Between 1948 and 1973 its price rose by some 35 percent, an average of less than 1.5 percent a year, which is low compared to most commodities. Compared to the price charged for petroleum products in consuming countries, the cost of Middle East *crude* oil is very low. Thus in 1970 the average sales taxes levied on petroleum products of six major countries in Western Europe was about \$7.53 per barrel-equivalent or some five times what is being received by the producing governments of the Middle East.² Lastly, compared to other sources of energy, such as coal, gas, and nuclear power—and, of course, oil produced in any other part of the world—Middle East oil is still very cheap. There is, then, every reason to believe that if world demand for oil continues to grow fairly fast, the OPEC countries will raise their prices steadily and perhaps even sharply. Such a raise will affect the balance of payments of the importing countries, of which the United States has become one of the most important. Recent calculations suggest that by 1980 oil imports may be costing the United States over \$20 billion a year and Western Europe and Japan over \$40 billion, compared to \$2 billion and \$11 billion in 1970.

But there is another more disturbing possibility. The major producing countries may deliberately curtail their output of oil. Indeed, some have already done so. Libya has drastically cut back its production while Kuwait and Venezuela have stabilized theirs. There are numerous interconnected reasons for such policies. The recent monetary instability, particularly the weakness of the dollar, has made the holding of cash reserves much less attractive than in the past. This instability is made worse by the powerful inflationary pressures operating throughout the world, which reduce the value of present earnings and make it increasingly desirable to spread out production and postpone as long as possible the depletion of oil reserves. It is true that in the coming decades oil will face increasing competition from other sources of energy, and it is probable that well before the end of this century it will have lost its leading place to nuclear power or some other new source. Even so, a market for all the world's oil is assured for the foreseeable future, as a feedstock for petrochemicals if not as a fuel. Because of the low-price elasticity of demand for oil, a restriction in supply should lead to higher prices and increased total receipts.

² M. S. Al-Mahdi, "The Pricing of Crude Oil in the International Market," Eighth Arab Petroleum Congress, Algiers, May 28-June 3, 1972.

Another important factor is that most of the major oil-producing countries already have huge reserves of foreign exchange—amounting to billions of dollars in the cases of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Venezuela. These reserves are bound to be swollen by the great increase in oil revenues, which for the Middle East and North African countries alone may reach \$40 billion (1973 value) annually by 1975. Although some of the main producers, such as Iran, Venezuela, and Iraq, could profitably invest all their potential oil earnings at home, the smaller countries could not. It may not be in the economic interest of the smaller countries to increase production at the rate demanded by the rest of the world, which will have to provide the required motivation for expansion.³ This motivation could be provided by enlarging these countries' absorptive capacity through a massive infusion of technical and managerial know-how and also by inducing them to invest heavily outside their borders. Such investments could be made in neighboring and other underdeveloped countries that are short of capital, in the petroleum industry itself, and in other branches of the economy in advanced countries.

Political Issues Within the Region

The problems for United States policy in the Middle East are caused by disruptive forces originating within the region and forces impinging on it from outside. The disruptive forces within the region may be divided into four categories: internal revolutions, territorial disputes, national rivalries, and ideological antagonisms.

Revolution is endemic in practically the whole Third World, and the oil-producing countries are no exception. Of course, oil acts as a lubricant, making it possible to raise living standards rapidly and to extend social services to large sections of the population. But, as is being increasingly realized, economic growth is a deeply unsettling process. It almost inevitably erodes the social and moral bases on which a community has stood since time immemorial. More particularly, economic development almost inevitably leads to greater concentration of wealth and a widening of the gap between rich and poor. This disparity often results in a great increase in corruption at the top. Such a process is both accelerated and magnified when wealth comes quickly, as has happened in the oil-producing countries. The very real achievements of the monarchies in Iraq and Libya were not sufficient to offset the resulting strains, and the revolutions in these countries will surely not be the last in the region.

A revolution, though disturbing, does not have to be disastrous for American interests. The new government is at least as dependent on oil revenues as the old and, after the initial fervor has cooled off, tends to take a pragmatic view of its own national interests. In this respect, the example of Algeria is both significant and encouraging. But since

³ Even countries that need capital very badly may decide to wait: "Algeria will become a world leader in the export of gas. But unless the right financial terms for deals can be agreed, the Algerians will just sit on their gas until the would-be purchasers change their tune." *The Financial Times* (London), June 27, 1973.

the United States and the oil companies have to deal with and support existing governments, they become identified with the old regime and are inevitably regarded with suspicion and hostility by the succeeding revolutionary government. In these circumstances, the United States has to carry out the diplomatic equivalent of a backward somersault, and the performance, though not impossible, calls for great agility. Such agility is going to be increasingly needed, since the probability of the overthrow of the existing regimes in all the oil countries is high, although in one or two—notably Iran—the political and social structure may by now be strong enough to stand.

Territorial disputes within the region are numerous. In the area of the Persian Gulf, many of them are very old, but all were frozen during the period of British domination of the gulf and emerged only when it became clear that Britain was about to withdraw and leave the local states to maneuver for position. Iran, for example, claims the three tiny islands at the mouth of the gulf, Abu Musa, and the two Tumb islands. Iran occupied these islands in November 1971, with almost no casualties, but the incident was used by a country as distant as Libya to expropriate a British oil company!

A much more serious dispute is that between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab River, which forms part of the boundary between the two states, constitutes Iraq's outlet to the sea, and provides access to Iran's two main ports, Khorramshahr and Abadan. Iraq has also laid claim to Kuwait; its attempt to enforce its claim in 1961 was thwarted by the other Arab states, led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but it is now being revived. The ill-defined boundary between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi has given rise to many controversies and some armed clashes; the stakes consist of billions of barrels of probable oil reserves. The frontiers between other Arab sheikhdoms are also ill-defined, and those between Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen, and South Yemen leave large areas of contention.

Outside the gulf, the main territorial disputes are ones between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which, however, are properly regarded as a national struggle. There are also latent disputes between Syria and Turkey over Alexandretta and the border areas. National rivalries, sometimes erupting into struggles, exist between the five main ethnic groups inhabiting the Middle East: Arabs, Turks, Iranians, Kurds, and Israelis. The Kurds have at various times risen against the Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi governments, among whom their country is partitioned; at present their main effort is in Iraq, where fighting may flare up again. Generally speaking, a common interest in preventing a Kurdish uprising has drawn the three governments together, but at various times one or another of them has supported an uprising in a neighboring state. Thus, at the moment, the Kurds in Iraq seem to be getting considerable help from Iran.

Turks and Arabs have not engaged in any armed conflict since the latter gained their independence following World War I. But border disputes have stirred animosities. The cold war and differences in approaches to Israel have often led to tensions. At present, however, relations between the two peoples are probably better than they have been

for a long time.

The Arab-Iranian rivalry for hegemony in the gulf developed recently, and it is increasing in intensity. At various times Iran has been confronted by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but now its main antagonist is Iraq. The latter, surrounded by unfriendly neighbors, has sought to strengthen its position by drawing closer to India in opposition to Iran and its close ally Pakistan. The Soviet Union has supported Iraq, while the United States has helped Iran and Pakistan.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is the most serious and intractable in the region and the one with the widest ramifications. It opened a way for Soviet penetration into Egypt and Syria, thus affecting the strategic and political balance in the Mediterranean. By dislocating a million Palestinian Arab refugees who see no hope for themselves within the existing order, it has generated the most powerful revolutionary force undermining the Arab governments, particularly those friendly to the United States, such as Jordan and Lebanon.

The effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the supply of oil, though indirect, are great and deeply disturbing. During both the 1956 and 1967 wars the flow of oil to the West was temporarily halted, partly because of deliberate policies of Arab governments and partly because of spontaneous disruption. Both types of action may be expected to recur, probably on a larger scale, in the event of another conflict, but this time the West is in a far weaker position to meet the crisis. For one thing, dependence on Middle East and North African oil has greatly increased, and the large reserve capacity that the United States and Venezuela had, and which was used to maintain supplies, no longer exists. There are fewer friendly governments that can be called upon to increase their output to offset declines elsewhere, as Libya did in 1967.

The Arab governments, including the one that is most important in this contest, Saudi Arabia, have repeated with increasing emphasis their intention to use oil as a weapon to bring about a change in American and European policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. This threat should not be lightly dismissed. No less serious is another potential weapon in Arab hands—the vast monetary reserves that will be accumulated over the next few years by the oil-producing countries and that could threaten the stability of one or more Western currencies.

The situation presents the United States government with grave dilemmas. Should it seek to conciliate the Arabs, who though increasingly resentful are not yet completely alienated and would probably respond to some positive moves on its part? Should it despair of Arab cooperation and base its policies on total commitment to Israel and Iran? Should it go further and make it clear that a stoppage of oil would be met by military countermeasures? All these policies have their advocates and all can be more or less persuasively defended, but it seems unlikely that any of them will be wholeheartedly pursued to the exclusion of the others. The outside observer can only urge that another powerful effort be made to settle at least some of the outstanding Arab-Israeli issues, preferably by concentrating on the one that seems most amenable to a solution, that between Egypt and Israel.

Finally, there are the ideological antagonisms, usually considered a conflict between "conservative" and "progressive" forces. This distinction is rather meaningless if applied to the domestic policies of the two groups, but it does denote opposite attitudes toward revolution. The conservative states are the large oil producers—Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait; the small oil sheikhdoms; Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen; and, in North Africa, Tunisia and Morocco. On the other side—but by no means working in harmony—are Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, and Libya, which in various ways are putting pressure on the conservative states. South Yemen is in a category apart. Its main activity is to sustain the rebellion against the sultan of Oman, with the hope of eventually spreading revolution to the whole Arabian side of the gulf. The conflict between conservatives and revolutionaries—the former long on wealth, the latter on ideology—is bound to be intense and prolonged, and adds one more element to the Middle East turmoil.

The United States and the Other Powers

United States policy is entangled with those of all the other major powers, mainly though by no means exclusively because of oil. First, there are its European allies, particularly Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy. In judging current United States-European relations, it should not be forgotten that the United States is a newcomer in the Middle East. Until after World War II the region was to all intents and purposes a British preserve, with France playing a secondary part. Similarly, the Middle East oil industry was overwhelmingly controlled by British capital, with American and French companies holding minority shares. In the 1950s, American capital became predominant in the oil industry, and the United States became the major guardian of Western strategic and political interests. The Europeans accepted this change, though not without resentment, particularly when the United States used its power to coerce its allies, as it did during the Suez crisis of 1956. But as long as Europe was weak and disunited and the United States ensured the defense of the Mediterranean region and the supply of oil, Europeans had little choice but to acquiesce and cooperate.

Now, however, Europeans are becoming seriously concerned about their future supplies of oil from the Middle East and North Africa, which currently account for 60 percent and 20 percent of West European imports. They are alarmed at the prospect of separate deals between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and perhaps between the United States and Iran, which would give the United States a privileged position in the marketing of oil from those countries and, in a time of scarcity, ensure that its needs are met, if necessary, at the expense of Europe. There has been much talk of such deals and indications that they might be welcome to some Middle East exporters. Europeans are worried by the possible effect of present United States policies in the Middle East on Western oil supplies. More specifically, they fear that the pro-Israel policy of the United States will result in either an Arab embargo or a disruption that could stop the flow of oil.

If the Europeans could act as a bloc, they would be in a very strong

position in this as in many other matters. But at present each major country believes it is in an advantageous position and therefore prefers to play a lone hand—Britain because of its international oil companies and North Sea deposits, France because of its good relations with the Arabs, and Germany because of its great economic strength and lack of a colonialist past in the Middle East, and so on. Hence, while Britain seems to be following the American lead, France has negotiated separate agreements with Algeria and Iraq, Italy is continuing the policy initiated by the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi in the 1950s of breaking into various areas, and Germany and other European countries have set up national companies which are seeking concessions in the Middle East and North Africa. Competition between European and American companies may have far-reaching consequences in the oil market and may also strain relations between governments. And it must not be forgotten that oil, though important, is only one strand in the complex web of economic, political, and strategic cooperation and competition binding Europe and the United States.

This analysis also applies to Japan, which obtains nearly 80 percent of its oil from the Middle East. It too has depended entirely on the United States to safeguard its supplies, and it too is becoming alarmed. Japan is in no position to exert any political pressure in the Middle East, but it has much to offer economically. Hence it too is seeking to obtain new concessions in Abu Dhabi, for example, and to dissociate itself to a certain degree from the United States.⁴ It is also making every effort to diversify its sources of supply by developing oil in Indonesia, Siberia, and offshore, while realizing quite clearly that for a long time to come its dependence on the Middle East will continue to be considerable.

The policy of the People's Republic of China in the Middle East, on the other hand, seems not to be in any way influenced by oil, in which it is at present self-sufficient. China's growing involvement in the region, including an expanding volume of trade with most countries and a small amount of economic aid to some, seems to have two aims. First, it is trying to help such revolutionary movements as the guerrillas in Oman and the Palestinian Arabs by providing weapons and training. Second, and probably more important, it seeks to prevent the extension of Soviet influence in the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas. Hence the paradoxical spectacle of its excellent relations with regimes commonly regarded as reactionary, e.g., Iran and Pakistan.

India has, since its independence, enjoyed the friendship and goodwill of the Middle East, but the recent war in Bangladesh put a strain on its relations with all Muslims, including those in the Middle East. At present, its main diplomatic thrust is to get closer to Iraq, partly to ensure future oil supplies. To some extent it has a strategic and political aim: cooperation against Iran and Pakistan, which are aligned with the United States and China respectively. This move surely has been encouraged, if not inspired, by India's new ally, the Soviet Union.

⁴ *The Financial Times* (London), July 16, 1973.

Soviet influence in the Middle East has greatly expanded in the past fifteen years and may be expected to grow further. It now takes the form of access to naval and air bases, supply of arms, treaties of alliance, predominant influence in several important countries, notably Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and a foothold in the oil industry. The cost of all this to the Soviets has been high, running into very many billions of dollars—and rapidly increasing unpopularity in the region—but not necessarily excessive given the magnitude of the stakes.

There have, of course, also been some important reverses. The Middle East policy of the Soviet Union is part of a large and complex whole. One main element seems to be fear of China, with a consequent desire to establish a commanding position in the Indian Ocean. Another is a détente with the United States that would lead to a withdrawal of American troops from—and a weakening of American influence in—Europe, thus opening the way for Soviet predominance in that continent—and at the same time greater access to American and European capital and technology.

The weakening of United States influence in the Middle East is part of this design, which has to a large extent been already achieved by backing local nationalist and radical forces in their struggle against Western economic and political positions in the area and supporting the Arabs against Israel. But the Soviets also seem anxious to avoid a direct clash with the United States or even one by proxy through another Arab-Israeli war. As has been aptly said, they want the Middle East pot to simmer, not boil over. Moreover, their very involvement has limited their freedom of action. For example, they encourage Iraq in its activities in the gulf, but not to the point of ruining their relations with Iran.

As for oil, the Soviet Union's aim is first and foremost to end Western control. Any rise in oil prices that may occur would be to their advantage by handicapping Western industry. At the same time, they are slowly increasing their imports of Middle East oil, partly to meet the rapidly growing needs of the East Europeans and partly to free some of their own oil for export to Western markets in exchange for highly desirable machinery and technology. Such a policy runs counter to the interests of the Middle East oil producers, who increasingly refuse to deliver oil in exchange for Soviet goods and demand convertible foreign currency. If the nationalist sentiments of the oil producers point in the direction of the USSR, their economic interests point to the West, and their attempts to secure both political and economic objectives are often incompatible.

Thus the United States is confronted with a complex situation in the Middle East, full of tensions and contradictions. The implementation of United States policy over the next few years will demand statesmanship and skill of the highest order, and the government will need much support from the American public in its difficult task.

Oil: Co-operation or Conflict

MELVIN A. CONANT

The spectacular increase in the use of oil with which we are familiar will soon be overshadowed by the staggering volumes of oil to be used in the rest of this decade and anticipated for the next. Far more oil will be consumed in the next several decades than has been consumed in all of history. Oil is now the prime energy supplier of the non-Communist world. Since it has been one of the peculiarities of oil that the largest proven reserves still lie in the Middle East, industrial states will continue to consider the region as a truly key source. The terms on which this vital commodity will be available become of vital concern to governments. Central to their considerations must be the point that for the next generation, at least, nothing presently on the energy horizon will modify the observation that assurance of oil supply is bound to become ever more enmeshed in the policies and actions of states, and perhaps nowhere more importantly than in the Middle East.

There are many questions to be asked by governments in defining their energy objectives and fashioning policies on oil. Each of these questions is of fundamental importance. All of them must be asked and answers attempted, in the next few years, if we are to avoid political and economic conflict and possibly war itself over the control of great oil resources.

Ten Facts About Oil

Certain observations about oil today and throughout the next decade and a half help set the scene:

(1) The industrial world – the United States, Western Europe and Japan – together consume about 80 per cent of the world's energy. There is no reason to believe this preponderant share will alter in the next decades; if anything, their share will probably increase. In the time period 1972–85 there will be no state in this group depending for less than 50 per cent of its energy require-

ments on oil; in the case of Japan, the figure could reach as high as 85 per cent.

(2) Today, these states use about 80 per cent of the world's daily production of 43 million barrels of oil. By 1985 they will still consume a comparable share of what is foreseen to be a daily production of possibly 100 million barrels of oil.¹

(3) These industrial economies depend significantly upon imported oil to meet their requirements. In the case of Japan, virtually all of her daily consumption must be imported; Europe is similarly dependent upon oil imports while for the United States about 25 per cent is presently secured from foreign sources.

(4) The total capital requirement for meeting oil demand between now and 1985 is estimated at a staggering \$400 billions

(5) By 1985, Japan will almost certainly still be importing far and away most of her daily oil requirement; Western Europe will remain critically dependent on imported oil and the United States may then be importing over two-thirds of her daily oil consumption, an amount from overseas sources (perhaps 15 million barrels per day) almost equal to the entire production today of the Middle East.

(6) Today, member states of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)² control some 85 per cent of the world's crude oil reserves (excepting those of the Soviet Union); by 1985 OPEC states are expected still to control a very substantial part of the world's reserves.

(7) Of all the world's great oil reserves (550 billion barrels) 9 per cent lies in North America, 5 per cent in Latin America, 9 per cent in Africa and 12 per cent in the Communist world; the Middle East alone has some 62 per cent of the world's proven oil reserves.³

(8) For the Soviet Union, as for the other great

¹ 1 barrel of oil per day represents about 50 tons a year.

² Iran, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Libya, Indonesia, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Nigeria and Trinidad and Tobago.

³ *The Energy Outlook*, Shell Briefing Service, Royal Dutch/Shell Group, September 1972, p. 5. A most useful survey of the outlook for oil, gas and other sources of energy.

The author is with the Exxon Corporation (formerly Standard Oil Company of New Jersey), New York. This article expresses his personal view.

Reprinted from *Survival*, Vol. XV, No. 1 (Jan/Feb 73), by permission of The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

industrial complexes, a mix of considerations of quality, cost, availability and perhaps adequacy of domestic oil reserves may make it attractive, and possibly necessary, to supplement her production from foreign sources. Her proximity to Middle East reserves gives the Soviet Union a particular geopolitical advantage denied all other industrial states.

(9) These states, to a varying extent but all of them importantly, will *continue to depend upon the Middle East* – essentially the ‘Gulf’ – as a very major source of oil. Without confidence that the oil will be available, each of the giant industrial states would have to consider what alternatives are open to them to secure its access to this vital commodity. Rivalries within the Gulf – between Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – could take on new dimensions. Of the 367 billion barrels estimated in the Middle East reserves, Iran has 55, Kuwait 78, but Saudi Arabia alone has some 160 billion barrels. How will the apparent intent of Iran to be of paramount influence in the ‘Gulf’ rest with Saudi Arabia as, in the near future, the latter’s share of oil production outstrips by far that of Iran?

(10) While there are other regions which are of prospective interest⁴ – including the continental shelf of the United States – even the discovery of vast new reserves within the next few years will not serve to alter basically the geopolitics of oil for the next decade and a half. Unprecedented efforts to exploit other sources of energy, and to obtain oil from shale, tar sands, coal, etc., could modify dependence upon imported oil but as of now no great industrial state has even begun to embark on such a programme – a programme which would take years of intense effort and immense sums to bring to fruition, with luck. Let us assume major efforts begin shortly; we will still face at least a decade and a half of continued and major dependence upon the Middle East. It is this period of time which appears to be so critical. Afterwards, it has been suggested, other great reserves which may have been discovered will become important, energy from other sources will grow in significance and dependence upon the Middle East might lessen. But time and effort alone will *not* be sufficient. It does not now seem likely that either Western Europe or Japan will ever have the fossil-fuel alternatives available to North America with its immense shale and tar sands deposits and prospects on the continental shelf.

In summary, spectacular increases in oil consumption on the part of all the industrial world are clearly to be anticipated. Throughout

the next decade and a half it is improbable that the critical importance of the ‘Gulf’ as the greatest source by far of oil will be very effectively diminished. Moreover, two new factors in the situation will serve to heighten awareness of the region and of the relations of great consuming states with major exporting countries. The United States consumes today nearly one-third of the world’s energy; by 1985 imports could account for two-thirds of her requirements – with reason to believe that a large part of that oil will come from the Middle East. For the first time, therefore, we can anticipate that the United States will herself be a very major competitor for Middle East crude. By 1970 it had become clear that the United States could no longer be an emergency source of crude for Europe in time of trouble; that very important capability has vanished. American strategic interests in the Middle East are, therefore, going to be increasingly important. Previously, her strategic oil interest in the region lay in helping to assure a steady flow to Europe and Japan. Tomorrow, she will have her own stake in direct access to Middle East oil.

The second new factor is that not only may the Soviet Union possibly also become a competitor for Middle East crude for the reasons indicated in (8) above, she may within the decade be a major exporter of gas, and thus an important supplier of energy in her own right. The reasons why the Soviet Union is suddenly accepting significant foreign help in developing her immense reserves is very far from clear. The strategic implications of a Soviet Union interested in Middle East crude and a competitor for supply with Europe, the United States and Japan, and, at the same time, a major source for them of natural gas merits careful study.

Adequate Supplies

We are told that the general prospect is for continuing cost increases, largely as a result of the growing interest by major exporting countries in maximizing their return on what has been called a ‘wasting resource’. As long as no new vast source of energy is available, as long as no other means exists of deriving oil from shale, sands or coal on a competitive basis and in significant volume, and no truly immense new reserves are found and brought into production, there would appear to be little that consuming governments will be able to do to lower costs of ‘OPEC’ oil. However, of the three factors – cost, adequate volume and continuous supply – cost *per se* is perhaps the least important in the strategic sense, although the economic impact of ever-increasing prices could become a serious domestic issue with foreign policy implications.

It is probably true that there will be ‘physical’

⁴ The North Sea seems to constitute a reserve of considerable consequence; it will help to a degree in diversifying sources of supply.

adequacy of supply through the 1980s, and hopefully new discoveries will extend that period. It will be the possibility that *artificial* limits to supply will be imposed by major exporting countries that must be of major concern to importing states. Producing states could do so for a variety of reasons: political, economic (increase prices through scarcity) and for sound conservation reasons. Their ability to do so will depend importantly upon their cash position. In the year 1985, revenues to producing governments from oil could amount to \$50 billions. Not all the major exporting states will be able to absorb sums of such magnitude usefully into developmental projects or into their economies generally. The prospect is, therefore, one of very large holdings. If several or more key exporting states, possessing very substantial financial reserves, should act in unison and reduce the amount of crude available for export, very considerable pressure could be brought upon importing states in order to secure political or other objectives. Their financial reserves could carry them in the interim.

Similarly, major exporting states could threaten to interrupt supply. It is in the very nature of oil supply that the huge volumes which flow daily to consuming states around the world must do so *continuously*. Emergency stockpiling of oil can moderate the seriousness of such a challenge but the cost and physical requirements of meaningful storage are immense. The OECD estimates the yearly capital and operating costs of compulsory storage (90 days) – at the 1971 consumption level – approximates \$604 million. Not before 1975 can all European member states of OECD achieve moderate security of supply through storage – and how much security would ninety days supply provide? – and they could do so only by a major effort.

By suggesting that the oil agenda of governments revolves around questions of the *adequacy* and *continuity* of oil supply, it is not, of course, a foregone conclusion that exporting governments will wish to exert the influence their oil reserves give them, or that several or more could act in unison long enough to achieve their objective. But in the nature of things consuming governments cannot prudently assume all will be well; the stakes are great and growing and precautions will be felt necessary. No government has yet tackled the issues comprehensively, although Japan may have given more sustained thought to the subject; every consuming government is being seized with the importance of the topic.

The International Oil System

Under present arrangements the major inter-

national companies continue to play a very major role in every aspect of oil and its continuity of supply. The discovery, production, movement and marketing of oil – and its capital costs, technology and management – have been and remain largely the function of commercial enterprises still primarily American or British-owned. It is an immensely complicated undertaking, quite easily the largest of any commodity in international trade. The system has never functioned entirely free from government influence or policy; for one thing, through the 'accident' of geology, oil has often been found in the non-industrial world and much of it located in what was at one time the 'colonial belt'. Between the two world wars, but especially since 1950, the politics of developing states, and the policies and programmes of consuming governments have modified, shaken or transformed the 'system' by which oil has been supplied.

By and large, the familiar 'system' of international commercial enterprises has been the vital factor linking oil-in-the-ground to the market place. As the system becomes an object of government policy, or becomes assimilated in part or in whole into the operations of government, its ability to function with maximum flexibility and with economic considerations paramount is progressively circumscribed. The functions which the commercial system performs are irreplaceable in the sense that the complex, international character of oil movement requires an operation which, if it is not to be performed by commercial enterprises, will still have to be performed by whatever succeeds it.

The issue, then, is whether it is to evolve into something 'better', into something which a government likes to say will be more 'responsive' to national objectives and, at the same time, perform with maximum effectiveness in the international management of oil. There may be nothing really clear about these matters save this: it is inconceivable that any single great industrial state, or any single major producer nation can dispense with what the 'system' does or, from its resources alone, fashion an acceptable substitute. The world of oil is an interdependent one. The international movement of capital required to mobilize the sums to finance oil, the world tanker-fleets required to transport it, the necessity to receive many varieties of crude from different sources all preclude, as a practical matter, a nation from taking its own steps to organize its energy imports on a strictly unilateral basis. This is not to suggest that nothing can be done to modify the system further; it is obvious it is presently being altered especially in its ownership and control; it is to emphasize that governments must exercise particular care not to

attempt to find exclusively 'national solutions' to what is, and will always be, an *international* operation. The superficial attraction of 'special relationships' between a consuming government and a major producing country will probably tempt some to 'assure adequate supply' through bilateral arrangements. The efforts could become contagious as one consuming interest after another makes its own effort to link with a producing state. Saudi Arabia's mention of such a relationship with the United States is a case in point. Given the importance of the United States as a major consumer of oil, and Saudi Arabia as the major exporting state, European states (and Japan) could interpret a 'special relationship' as limiting their own access to Saudi crude. The potentialities for trouble are self-evident.

American and British 'Domination'

Still, it seems axiomatic that a government – producer or consumer – will still try to strengthen its own reach over oil and its supply. One of the aspects of the present system which causes concern to governments is that the system is *international* in its functions, but there is as yet no truly *international* management in the pure sense of the word – that is, a management free from single-nation considerations or interests – and reflective therefore of the interests of the community of states depending upon oil. Such an international management is, as yet, a wholly theoretical concept. However, governments are focusing attention on the point that for all practical purposes nearly all of the oil consumed within the free world today is handled by American or British companies, a fact which has implications to a Japanese, a German, a Frenchman, an Italian, as it does to an Iranian, a Libyan, a Venezuelan or a Saudi Arab; it also has implications to an Englishman and an American who will continue to be regarded by some as having secured an early and paramount place in supply.

For the foreseeable future and despite the greater control by producing states over the disposition of their oil resources, it is likely to remain a fact that the companies which will continue to be the dominant factors in Saudi Arabia's growing production and truly immense reserves will still be American-owned. Iranian oil is next in importance in the Middle East and there the American share is now 40 per cent; in Kuwait it is now 50 per cent. If one adds British holdings to these percentages, the share of Middle East or 'Gulf' oil managed by American and British enterprises is for all practical purposes nearly total – and two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves lie in that region.

Will British membership in the Common

Market give a new and different perspective to the problem of who 'controls' the system? As North Sea oil production develops, will Britain come to be regarded as less dependent upon traditional supply sources and therefore less dependent perhaps on overseas earnings from oil? Britain certainly expects to be a key factor in the development of a Common Market energy policy. If her traditional and her new-found oil resources come to be identified with the 'Community', some of the concern voiced in some consumer governments today over Anglo-American 'domination' of oil might fade – or at least as far as the 'Anglo' part is involved. But important as North Seas discoveries are, they do not suggest that a major shift away from Middle East supply is likely for Europeans. The North Sea resources do not begin to compare with those of the Middle East; European dependence upon that region is certain to increase greatly over the next decade and a half. (The longstanding attitude of many producing and other developing states towards the companies – chiefly British and American – which controlled their oil interests for so long will not fade for many years, and will probably cease to be a significant factor only after still more far-reaching changes occur in the international system.)

To what extent will American international oil companies, whose supply role to Europe and Japan is so important, be regarded as inextricably linked to Washington's policies in the Middle East? Will Europeans and Japanese think themselves increasingly vulnerable to oil interruptions as a result of American policies which may not necessarily be their own?

Moreover, the Japanese have been asking if the United States – or someone – will ever again apply oil leverage upon their country. Tokyo advances the view that because Japan has not been involved in Middle East issues Japan stands a better chance of keeping her supply intact while other countries, more politically vulnerable, could suffer. Such arguments discount the probable interest of producing states in using oil to get nations involved on their side of disputes, and hence Tokyo's wistful hopes of remaining disengaged, and more secure, remain just that.

In a period when American influence is seen by many to be clearly waning, and when questions are asked about the likely extent to which the United States will remain linked to post-World War II alliances, the question of American control over so much of the international movement of oil may become more important. When American leadership of the free world was indisputable, suggestions of vulnerability because of the American role in oil were largely absent – or perhaps muted. The United States

will now have to pay more attention to the signals indicating concern on the part of consuming countries and, since they may become louder, be prepared to deal responsibly with them. This will be a new situation but possibly one of serious consequence should consumer states begin separately, or together, to adopt policies which limit the role or continued growth of American companies, explaining that American policies in the Middle East make these companies and their client consumers more vulnerable. Once again, it will be important for all the great industrial consuming states to bear carefully in mind their common interest in maintaining the 'international' or multilateral basis by which oil is obtained; fragmentation of the system will lead inevitably to dissension and put states in competition.

There are no easy answers. Some should come from the industry itself, since it has long sought to emphasize its a-political role in oil supply. Could new arrangements encouraging shareholding by nationals of the consuming states be a partial answer? Might the United States government have a major role in stressing its own stake in such international organizations as the OECD, or in whatever other inter-governmental organizations affecting oil are created, and do so in ways which emphasize the American recognition of the interdependence of oil? Only by doing so in practical ways – such as participation in emergency stockpiling and ration planning – can the mutuality of American oil interests with that of other consuming states be made clear. It may be the only significant way of stemming the anticipated tide of oil nationalism which will run stronger if other consuming states see, or fear they see, an American initiative begin to take advantage, for American interests, narrowly defined and pursued, of the important oil-role American companies play especially in the Middle East.

What Role for Governments?

In the light of these considerations it seems inevitable that consuming and producing governments will continue to seek to increase their own role in oil, thereby diminishing its foreignness – an inadequate but expressive term which reflects a common denominator or objective underlying energy policies of consumers and producers alike. We return almost hypnotically to the questions: can governments' role be enhanced by government-to-government deals, by-passing the present system, and thus bring oil more 'firmly' under its national control? If imported oil originated chiefly in one particular source, the argument might be more appealing

for engaging all the range of economic and political powers available to states in arrangements with one another. Moreover, if two states had enduring common political interests in which oil could be an underpinning, the argument would be stronger. There could, of course, be some economic advantage if a consuming state offers technological assistance, barter or economic aid to the producer as added benefits; but which major oil exporting state lacks the means to obtain these for itself? They may be accepted as 'sweeteners' to a contract; they are unlikely to be of such attractiveness as to give binding force to an agreement for oil.

Since no major consuming state obtains its imported supply from a particular source but from many, albeit perhaps from the Middle East generally, a deal with one government in the region would seem to lead nearly inescapably to another; the likelihood that enduring common political interests could hold these disparate interests together through bilateral agreements would seem to be remote.

Can a single consumer government take other actions which might serve to extend its national reach over oil? One of the most obvious, and presently most widely pursued policies, is a search for oil by national companies (public or private) alone or in combination with others. If discovered, the oil becomes 'privileged', usually getting priority of import. The successful search for oil can result in very great financial rewards; the cost of failure can be shattering to a legislature which has many demands upon the budget. Another action is to apply pressure upon the present system to admit other national interests by stipulating that continued participation in one's home market, or continued share in its growth, depends upon a certain level of national involvement in oil.

Can a government help diminish its risk of interrupted (or decreased) supply by a stockpiling programme? An existing emergency stock would be of undoubted assistance in the event of an interruption; time, at least, would be afforded for other pressures to work upon the producer government to relax. In order to be effective, however, the programme, according to the OECD, should aim at ninety days' supply, and there are only several consuming governments which meet that requirement. Moreover, single-nation efforts should be accompanied by comparable efforts on the part of other consumers with some agreed-upon multinational sharing formula for oil which may be in shorter supply for some states than it is for others. While such a programme is recommended by the OECD it has little practical effect in the absence of adequate emergency stocks.

This brief consideration of the more obvious

moves by government to increase its oil security leads once again to the conclusion that truly enhanced security is not likely to be found in single-government policies and programmes. Oil remains a vital commodity with its inherent international aspects; they cannot be ignored as long as a state depends upon imported oil. The search for greater security must take place in the international arena.

Can consumer nations band together in a bloc providing countervailing power to that presently seen to rest with producing governments through OPEC? (The argument for this approach rests on the assumption of continuing solidarity on the part of producing governments.) Given emergency stockpiling, could not a bloc exert theoretically great leverage upon a major producer or group of producers?

Whether in the event this would be so is debatable. The European Economic Community has failed so far to agree upon a common energy policy; Japan may ask if she has anyone to agree with or on whom she believes she could rely for equitable sharing of the burden of a consumer bloc action. The United States which, in a few years, will be a major importer (and thus a competitor) for oil, is far from defining her own energy objectives, policies and programmes. No small grouping of states can suffice to constitute an effective bloc; nor can a group of consuming states which involve themselves in only a small part of supply be consequential. Consideration of a bloc of consumer states arrayed against producer states can help meet a 'gut reaction' to the seeming consolidation of power on the part of the latter, but such a bloc implies probably an unattainable consolidation of many national interests. It is unlikely to stand the test of time and pressure.

A New Accommodation of Interests

In formulating a strategy for oil, it may not be one bloc against the other which will prove helpful, but a quite different approach which does not array interests against each other but seeks to accommodate them.

Could governments encourage accommodation of interests by further internationalizing the system? By increasing their respective stakes in the international operations of oil? There are at least two possible routes. One could be a kind of international commodity agreement in which producing and consuming states determine periodically amongst themselves the volumes required and prices; the present international system, providing technology, capital, participation in production, logistics and marketing outlets through commercial enterprises, could continue as the essential links between one function and the next. But why should producing governments, presently organized in a coalition,

find their interests enhanced through a commodity agreement? If they believe their OPEC coalition can endure, there would seem to be little that the commodity approach could offer. If Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Venezuela, etc. do not continue to find their individual interests best furthered through OPEC, an international commodity-type agreement might be attractive. Oil is vital to a great many states; the number is growing. Can the commodity agreement approach contain those interests? It has one clear advantage over 'bloc' proposals; it seeks to accommodate interests, not raise issues of confrontation.

Presently, national interests in oil are expressed primarily in producing or refining and marketing; logistics is provided for by tanker fleets chiefly owned or chartered by the commercial enterprises who are in both the producing and marketing parts of the oil spectrum. Producing states have considered the advantages to them of moving 'downstream' into logistics and marketing; consuming states have considered the advantages to them of acquiring a stake 'upstream' with producing investments. Might even more be accomplished if means were found to bring all interests, governmental and commercial, into a 'triangular' relationship in which producers, consumers and enterprises would each have a share in each of the aspects of oil supply? If such a complex arrangement could be achieved, so the argument goes, it would give each interest a stake, and a responsibility, along with the others, for the common welfare. Could it help strengthen the international system for oil? Would it give governments greater confidence in the reliability of supply? Would it make sufficient place for the commercial enterprises to encourage them to continue to mobilize capital, technology and management skills? Would it make less attractive to consuming governments the pursuit of bilateral 'special relationships' with major oil-exporting countries and thus serve to de-fuse the explosiveness of a situation in which the great industrial states might follow policies aimed at cornering supplies of a strategic commodity?

If some means for encompassing the interests of all concerned cannot be found, the search for single-government answers will lead to chaos and conflict. There is a limited period of time in which to work towards a multilateral solution. Pressures to arrive at some answers will increase as oil demands soar and the vital interests of states become ever more inextricably involved in its supply. Unless substantial progress is made towards a community solution the temptation to reach a 'national' one may then prove irresistible, and to our common loss.

The Energy Crisis

RICHARD P. RUNYON
LAWRENCE ROCKS

The mass media's proclamation of an energy crisis in the United States has evoked a widespread sense of dismay that an energy shortfall could have developed without anyone's being aware of it. The crisis exists nonetheless. The sporadic shortages during the winter of 1972-73 were mere portents of a chronic, severe, and perhaps irreversible energy shortage. Although the catastrophe will not unfold fully for approximately ten years, it will take at least that much time to develop and implement solutions. Environmental concerns and demands for energy are clearly on a collision course. The various and legitimate strategies for controlling and abating pollution have made increased demands upon energy resources. To complicate matters, both oil and natural-gas production in the United States, which provide a major portion of the nation's energy, are not sufficient for its needs.

Some energy experts proclaim the crisis a temporary problem brought about by the sudden environmental conscience that precipitated the 1969 Environmental Protection Act and the 1970 Clean Air Act. They point to the delays in the construction of the Alaska pipeline, the long court disputes over siting of power plants, the energy-profligate antiemission valve in the automobile, and the organized opposition to nuclear energy. Others blame the utilities for encouraging greater uses of energy faster than they were able to supply electricity and natural gas. Still others blame the crisis on a conspiracy of the major oil companies seeking to crush opposition to offshore drilling and the Alaska pipeline and to drive up the prices of gasoline and heating oil by creating a false shortage. Despite these views, the energy crisis is real and may be demonstrated by an objective appraisal of the facts.

The entire crisis can be summed up in three words, exponential growth rates. The population has been growing exponentially; of all the people who ever lived, approximately one-third are alive today. Because energy consumption per person has also grown exponentially, total energy consumption now outpaces the nation's capacity to produce sufficient energy from domestic sources.

Man is a 100-watt machine. In his primitive state he depended almost exclusively on these 100 self-generated watts for survival. Muscle and brain power were directed to exigencies of day-by-day existence. With the advent of agriculture, he began to harness the power of domesticated animals to supplement his own limited energies. Eons later,

Reprinted from The National Energy Problem, edited by Robert H. Connery and Robert S. Gilmour by permission of The Academy of Political Science. Copyright © 1974 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

during the Industrial Revolution, man erected a vast technology to do his work.

Technologies, however, extract exorbitant energy demands. In the United States the per capita use of energy has nearly doubled in the past three decades while total energy consumption has tripled. Moreover, the per capita energy consumption in the United States is enormous compared to the rest of the world—10,000 watts to 1,200 watts. In other words, an American citizen uses about eight times as much energy as other persons on the planet. This prodigious demand for energy coupled with dwindling supplies of the most accessible and most utilized energy resources, natural gas and petroleum products, is the crux of the energy crisis in America.

There is, furthermore, a high positive relationship between per capita energy expenditure and the per capita gross national product.¹ The relationship between energy and material living standards indicates that solutions to the energy crisis must not be allowed to lead to a deep economic depression with all the personal, social, and political upheavals of massive unemployment.

The Nature of the Energy Crisis

The heart of the energy crisis is the great disparity between the rapid rate of oil and natural-gas depletion and the protracted rates at which any other sources can be phased in to replace them. The United States's production of oil and natural gas is now at its peak. Henceforth, these resources will be discovered and recovered at a diminishing rate, for the most part in the next two decades. The phasing in of other energy sources, however, will take many decades. For example, atomic power has two fundamental drawbacks. The supply of uranium 235 according to the most optimistic estimates is only equal to the total energy content of domestic oil. The breeder reactor can create plutonium fuel from inert uranium 238, but the breeding rate would only double the fuel inventory in ten years. This means that the breeder reactor could not possibly supply even one-half of the nation's present electrical needs until well after the year 2000. Furthermore, atomic energy is delivered as electricity, which cannot replace gasoline or oil in transportation, space heating, and power plants.

Geothermal energy is another potential source. Like atomic energy, however, geothermal energy is obtained as electricity. Optimists see a potential of 100 billion watts of electricity from geothermal sources. At present the United States uses 400 billion watts of electricity. Besides being insufficient, geothermal energy is also problematic. The heat-flow characteristics of geothermal dry sources have been determined by theoretical computer runs done at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories. It will take years of research and development to ascertain whether the 100 billion watts of presumed geothermal electricity

¹ Lawrence Rocks and Richard P. Runyon, *The Energy Crisis* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1973), p. 10.

can be developed. Thus geothermal activity is a highly romanticized energy source with a protracted phase-in time.

Solar power has similar drawbacks. While it can indeed supply power to the nation, it cannot be phased in before the depletion of oil and gas, and it would also be delivered as electricity. Placing solar stations in space requires a space-shuttle program, which will take \$5 billion and at least a decade to complete. Unless the cost of silicon cells comes down by a factor of 500, the prices of electricity generated in outer space will be preposterously high, at least 500 times the present cost. If solar stations are put on the ground, the sunshine gathered by day will be deployed during the night. Thus, a secondary fuel capacity—the so-called hydrogen fuel economy—is needed. To gather enough energy to electrify the power-grid would require the capture of about 10,000 square miles of sunshine. Building the necessary equipment, either parabolic mirrors and steam turbines or silicon cells, would require decades. Furthermore, hydrogen cannot be used as a fuel in cars, buildings, and power plants. It will take several generations of Americans to build systems to capture and deploy solar power. Meanwhile, this generation faces depleting domestic oil and gas reserves.

Domestic Issues

Shortages of natural gas and petroleum products have already produced modest price increases in energy. As the United States participates more and more in the international energy markets, it will have to compete directly with Japan and the European Economic Community for energy supplies. For political, economic, and technological reasons, it is highly unlikely that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will be able to increase the supply sufficiently to meet the demand. In the sellers' market that is rapidly developing, Americans may anticipate that oil and natural gas will be auctioned off to the highest bidder at prices impossible to estimate at this time.

Inflation will probably affect all energy-intensive activities in the American economy—agriculture, goods, and services (except communication). Together these activities amount to about 60 percent of the GNP. Increased oil and natural-gas prices would greatly increase production costs for these activities. Agriculture, for example, is almost totally mechanized. Energy is required to run the variety of farm machines that plant the crops, tend them during the growing season, and harvest them. Many of these crops must then be dried prior to processing. A substantial portion of the sugar-cane crop was lost during the winter of 1972-73 because shortages of natural gas forced the facilities that dry the harvest to be shut down. Finally, farm products must be shipped to market via carriers that are also energy-intensive. Clearly, increased energy costs will raise agricultural prices. A similar scenario can be written for all energy-intensive industries.

The facts of the energy crisis will demand that Americans carefully weigh all energy costs. Conservation of energy will become a major theme of national policy and will cause major industrial and commercial realignments. There will be movement toward more intricacy and intercity mass transit and toward smaller, fuel-efficient automobiles.

There may be lower suburban real estate values and repercussions on savings banks holding first mortgages, because homes in remote suburbs will become an economic liability.

Several energy-intensive industries may leave the country. The fertilizer industry has already left because of the more plentiful supplies of methane in Europe. The steel industry may be drawn away by Saudia Arabia's claims of producing steel at half-price by using gas supplies normally flared off at the wellhead. When a nation becomes energy-poor, it does not merely experience a shortness of breath—it runs out of heartbeat.

There is a strong temptation to lay all energy ills at the feet of the environmentalists. It is true that they strongly oppose virtually every energy procurement and deployment option, such as offshore drilling, the Alaska pipeline, deep-sea ports, supertankers, siting of power plants and refineries, strip mining for coal, and development of the breeder reactor. The Environmental Protection Act of 1969 gave teeth to the environmental movement, providing the legal machinery to delay various energy options. Moreover, the environmental movement appears to be ensnarled in many contradictions. Some environmentalists urge antipollution devices on automobiles but support the trans-Canada pipeline, which would be two to four times longer and almost certainly more destructive to tundra and forests than its Alaskan counterpart.

The environmental movement, however, is not to blame for the energy crisis. Oil and natural gas are running low because these finite resources are being used faster than they can be supplied. Man will continue to reach farther out to sea, deeper into the ocean floor, and farther into the Arctic Circle with a diminishing return for his efforts. It is clear, however, that the environmental movement has exacerbated the present energy shortfall and has accelerated the timetable for future shortages.

But to blame the environmental movement for the energy crisis is to reveal a myopic view of the past, present, and future. The environmental movement reveals the greatness in man, his concern for the quality rather than the quantity of life, and his recognition that he is both heir of past generations and trustee for future generations. Energy has been wasted without regard to the future. There has not been the necessary funding of research, neither scientific nor technological, to develop one or more of the eternal energy sources.

International Issues

To mention Middle East oil is to evoke conflicting and contradictory images. Many analysts see the danger of depending on the Middle East with its explosive political climate. Others see the possibility that the nations of OPEC will unite to blackmail the energy-dependent nations into modifying their positions on Israel and into paying increasingly exorbitant prices for oil and natural gas. What many energy analysts fail to perceive is that OPEC cannot supply enough oil even if these dire events do not happen. The rising rate of oil consumption in Japan, the European Economic Community, and the United States will require

the importation of 20 billion barrels a year by 1985. OPEC produces only 9 billion barrels a year, and 40 percent of that is frozen for political and geological reasons. The remaining 60 percent capacity would have to be increased fourfold by 1985 to meet projected export demand. Such a rapid increase in oil exploration and production is held unlikely by most oil observers.

Moreover, the United States balance-of-trade deficit for energy alone could amount to between \$30 billion and \$40 billion a year by 1985. It is unlikely that the United States's exports to OPEC could cover this sum. Nor is it likely that these nations could consume the volume of imports necessary to effect a trade balance. Already Saudi Arabia, which has reached its saturation point for income, is putting extra oil income into world money markets. The Saudis must look hard to find places for additional investments. Hence they have little financial incentive for further exploration of their oil resources. It is more likely that excess dollars will be a source of mischief on the international money markets or come back in the form of investment in United States industry.

Another point, often overlooked, is that it is not in the best interest of OPEC to expand production to meet world demands. As a fuel, oil has a life span measured in decades. When the OPEC nations run out of oil, they are out of business. As a petrochemical, however, oil has a life span of at least 1,000 years. The OPEC nations would be well advised to put to work the billions of dollars that will come into their treasuries to develop indigenous petrochemical and allied industries. Such industries would create an educated middle class and sophisticated infrastructure. The secretary general of OPEC, Dr. Abderrahman Khene, has recently endorsed this view:

The only way to deal with such a vital resource, taking in account the interests of the forthcoming generations, is to begin now to curb the trend of consumption of petroleum and gas as sources of energy. Indeed, it seems to me that it would be wise to replace, at least partially, the quantities to be saved by other sources, namely by coal, the reserves of which are almost unlimited, and possibly by cleaner sources of energy, as solar power for example. . . .

OPEC countries will welcome such new trends for the use of petroleum and gas, in that way securing for the forthcoming generations a long-term period of important income, and a better possibility of access, on a large-scale basis, to advanced technology which can assure them a higher standard of living.²

The depletion of oil resources will also affect relations with other areas. Although Canada remains a friendly neighbor to the north, there are growing strains over both energy and economic matters. Many citizens of the United States look hopefully to Canada's presumed reserves of 20 billion to 80 billion barrels of oil as an ace in the hole. However, it should be recognized that Canada is energy-rich only

¹ Khene to Rocks and Runyon, April 20, 1973, files of Rocks and Runyon, Greenvale, New York.

² *New York Times*, June 29, 1973.

in relation to its small population. Massive exports of oil to the United States would rapidly deplete these energy reserves. Donald S. McDonald, minister of energy, mines, and resources, opposes too great an energy outflow to the United States. John Turner, minister of finance, has expressed deep concern about growing United States economic control over Canadian finances—two out of every three dollars in Canada are presently controlled by the United States. As recently as June 28, 1973, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau warned, "While Canada is self-sufficient in terms of energy production, it does not have the potential to play a major role with regard to total North American needs."⁸

A third area of international activity involves the Soviet Union. It is estimated that the USSR has approximately four times America's reserves of oil and three times its natural-gas reserves. Because the Soviet Union's rate of utilization of these resources is low relative to population, it is expected that it will not be seriously affected by the energy shortage for several decades at least. In the meantime, the Soviets have offered to sell natural gas and enriched uranium to the European Economic Community (EEC), natural gas and oil to Japan, and gas to the United States in return for investment capital and technological talent to develop their oil and gas fields. Simultaneously, the USSR is in the process of expanding its capacity to refine Arab oil and serve as middleman in the oil markets, knowing that the United States has a retarded refining capacity because of environmental opposition to the siting of refineries.

In summary, the United States will soon become estranged from Canada over energy, will see its trading partners, Japan and the EEC, gravitate to the USSR for energy, and will fall into conflict with these countries over Arab oil, which is insufficient and will become too costly.

Solutions

The facts of energy require consideration of both the present and the future. Immediate steps must be taken to obtain sufficient energy to avoid an economic collapse within a decade, to build an energy bridge to the next century, and to find an eternal energy source, or a combination of several sources, to ensure future energy availability. Since the lead times required to phase in the energy options vary from years to decades, it is absolutely essential to take these steps now.

Several courses of action seem to be necessary: energy conservation, development of synthetic fuels from coal, and massive, immediate funding of research for the development of an additional long-lived energy source, such as fusion, sunlight, wind, and geothermal.

Energy conservation must become a major concern for these times and perhaps for the remainder of man's life on earth. Historically, energy has been used without regard to environmental consequences and the finite nature of the supply. Two-ton vehicles have been built to transport 150-pound persons, and buildings have been constructed without regard to heating and air-conditioning efficiency. Energy-profligate carriers, such as jet planes, have been used instead of energy-efficient carriers, such as river barges and railroads.

Space heating and transportation consume almost 45 percent of the nation's energy budget. If all ground transportation in the United States were conducted by railroad, the energy savings would be almost 20 percent of the nation's total needs.⁴ Obviously, such a massive shift from automobile and truck to train is unlikely. If it were to occur, the economic and social dislocations resulting from a widespread abandonment of the automobile would be awesome. Nevertheless, enormous savings are possible by diverting some of the Highway Trust Fund to mass transit and by replacing the automobile emission standards of the Clean Air Act of 1970 with efficiency provisions. For example, by moving to fuel-efficient automobiles (smaller ones that necessitate fewer power options), Americans could save 1.5 billion barrels of oil a year by 1985. That would be 15 percent of the country's anticipated oil needs.

Similar energy savings could be effected in space heating. To cite one example, freezer and refrigerator units in most supermarkets vent their waste heat to the outside. By making minor structural changes, this heat could be circulated through the market, thereby alleviating the need for a separate heating plant.

Positive and negative incentives are the key to the success of conservation. By revising the rate structure of utilities to increase the cost per unit of energy consumed, rather than the reverse that now prevails, major users would discover that they can get along with less energy. Positive incentives can also be provided for individuals and businesses desiring to make structural changes in buildings for purposes of energy conservation. At the municipal level, a home should not be reassessed when the owner makes structural improvements to conserve energy. At the federal level, energy-conserving innovations should qualify as tax deductions for the individual home owner and as operational costs for the businessman.

As important as energy conservation is, it is not a final solution to the energy crisis. It will take many years to phase in the various energy-conserving options. For example, the 110 million automobiles on American highways cannot be replaced overnight with energy-efficient automobiles. Such an accomplishment would take about ten years after passage of automobile-efficiency legislation. Similarly, all the homes and buildings in the United States will not suddenly and magically require less heating. Certainly, given the best of incentives, total energy conservation in space heating can be achieved only in decades. Meanwhile, the United States population continues to increase, and reserves of oil and natural gas continue to decline.

The energy bridge to an atomic- or solar-powered future appears to be coal, the giant of the fossil fuels. It can be directly burned or chemically converted into both a liquid and a gaseous fuel. When employed as a synthetic fuel, its potential life span may be measured in centuries. Moreover, the processes for synthesizing gas and oil from coal will require no scientific breakthroughs. Any one of several methods could be used by the end of the 1970s. There are environmental and economic

⁴ Rocks and Runyon, p. 131.

problems that have to be solved before a synthetic-fuel industry can be developed. The enormous quantities of coal that will be needed can be obtained quickly and inexpensively only through strip mining. Without proper safeguards to assure restoration of the land, huge tracts of beautiful terrain west of the Mississippi will be desecrated. However, if strip-mined land is restored (at a cost of about \$1,000 an acre), the dangers of economic collapse can be avoided and the surface use preserved for future generations.

The economic problem is, in many ways, more difficult to solve. If the United States presently had the capacity to produce synthetic fuels in commercial quantities, the cost would be too high to compete successfully with imported oil and natural gas. However, before the decade is over, the cost of these natural resources will unquestionably soar. Thus, before the end of the 1970s, synthetic fuels will surely possess a competitive advantage. The economic dilemma can be stated succinctly: How can the best chance of energy survival be phased in when initially it will not be economically competitive? It is clear that the United States must develop a financial strategy that will permit the synthetic-fuel industry to grow during a time when it will be expensive. A possible solution is price averaging, that is, the consumer pays for gas and oil in accordance with the industry's average costs, whether he uses natural or synthetic fuel.

Coal is a bridge, not a crutch. Coal could be of great value to future generations as a source of petrochemicals and high-grade proteins. If it is burned as a fuel now, this resource will be forever denied to following generations. To preserve America's coal heritage, the nation must be willing to make an immediate scientific and financial commitment to developing a long-lived and nonpolluting energy source, even though it may take as long as fifty years.

To date, most money for energy research has been spent on nuclear fission, particularly on the burner and breeder reactors. Fuel for the burner is too short-lived, and the breeder represents an environmentalist's nightmare. The greatest long-term hopes appear to reside in the fusion process, which has not yet been achieved in a controlled reaction. Fusion power would be essentially nonpolluting and eternal.

Some observers see solar power as the solution. And it is a fact that every day the sun sheds on the earth a power equivalent to 30,000 times present power needs. Others point to wind power, sea-thermal power, and geothermal power as major sources of future energy. No one will ever know which source or combination of sources will be the best unless an effort is made to develop them. In this respect, it is encouraging that President Nixon had advocated the expenditure of \$2 billion a year over the next five years to support energy research.

However, science and technology alone cannot solve the energy problem. If the nation's institutions are to survive the power-base transformations that will take place during the next five decades, talent must be pooled from all areas of the physical and social sciences, as well as the oft-ignored humanities and the arts.

Outlook on the Middle East and Energy

Middle East and Energy

Excerpt dealing with the Middle East from Secretary Kissinger's address to the Pilgrims of Great Britain, December 12, 1973.

The Middle East crisis illustrates the importance of distinguishing the long-range from the ephemeral. The differences of recent months resulted not so much from lack of consultation as from a different perception of three key issues: Was the war primarily a local conflict, or did it have wider significance? Has the energy crisis been caused primarily by the war, or does it have deeper causes? Can our common energy crisis be solved by anything but collective action?

As for the nature of the Middle East conflict, it is fair to state—as many Europeans including your Foreign Secretary have—that the United States did not do all that it might have done before the war to promote a permanent settlement in the Middle East. Once the war began, the United States demonstrated great restraint until the Soviet effort reached the point of massive intervention. Once that happened, it became a question of whether the West would retain any influence to help shape the political future of an area upon which Europe is even more vitally dependent than the United States. We involved ourselves in a resupply effort not to take sides in the conflict but to protect the possibility of pursuing after the war the objective of a just, permanent settlement which some of our allies have urged on us ever since 1967.

At the same time, we must bear in mind the deeper causes of the energy crisis: It is not simply a product of the Arab-Israeli war; it is the inevitable consequence of the explosive growth of worldwide demand out-running the incentives for supply. The Middle East war made a chronic crisis acute, but a crisis was coming in any event. Even when prewar production levels are resumed, the problem of matching the level of oil that the world produces to the level which it consumes will remain.

Global Approach to the Energy Problem

Excerpts from an address by President Ford to the World Energy Conference at Detroit, September 23, 1974.

Many people became aware that there was an energy problem for the first time last October when the oil embargo was imposed. But those who were well informed about the energy situation had known for some time that a crisis was coming.

With burgeoning demand all over the world, they knew that we could not forever expect a steady supply of low-priced fuel. The embargo merely brought to a head what experts had known for many years: that energy sources must be expanded and wasteful use eliminated to keep pace with the needs of a growing and modernizing world.

All nations have been adversely affected by price increases. When nations use their resources as political weapons against others, the result is human suffering. It is then

Reprinted from Department of State Special Report No. 12, "US Policy in the Middle East, December 1973 - November 1974" released January 1975.

tempting to speculate on how much better off man would be if nature had distributed vital resources more evenly around the world, making every nation self-sufficient. But perhaps nature had a better idea; because vital resources are distributed unevenly, nations are forced to choose between conflict and cooperation.

Throughout history, nations have gone to war over natural advantages such as water or food or convenient passages on land and sea. But in the nuclear age, when any local conflict may escalate to global catastrophe, war brings unacceptable risks for all mankind. Now, more than any time in the history of man, nations must accept and live peacefully with the fact that they need each other. Nations must turn to international cooperation as the best means for dealing with the uneven distribution of resources.

Economic Aspects of Energy

Excerpts from the address by Secretary Kissinger to the U.N. General Assembly September 23, 1974.

Both producers and consumers have legitimate claims. The problem is to reconcile them for the common good.

The United States is working closely with several oil producers to help diversify their economies. We have established commissions to facilitate the transfer of technology and to assist with industrialization. We are prepared to accept substantial investments in the United States, and we welcome a greater role for the oil producers in the management of international economic institutions.

The investment of surplus oil revenues presents a great challenge. The countries which most need these revenues are generally the least likely to receive them. The world's financial institutions have coped thus far, but ways must be found to assure assistance for those countries most in need of it. And the full brunt of the surplus revenues is yet to come.

Despite our best efforts to meet the oil

producers' legitimate needs and to channel their resources into constructive uses, the world cannot sustain even the present level of prices, much less continuing increases. The prices of other commodities will inevitably rise in a never-ending inflationary spiral. Nobody will benefit. The oil producers will be forced to spend more for their own imports. Many nations will not be able to withstand the pace, and the poorer could be overwhelmed. The complex, fragile structure of global economic cooperation required to sustain national economic growth stands in danger of being shattered.

The United States will work with other consuming nations on means of conservation and on ways to cushion the impact of massive investments from abroad. The preliminary agreement on a program of solidarity and cooperation signed a few days ago in Brussels by the major consumer countries is an encouraging first step.

But the long-range solution requires a new understanding between consumers and producers. Unlike food prices, the high cost of oil is not the result of economic factors—of an actual shortage of capacity or of the free play of supply and demand. Rather it is caused by deliberate decisions to restrict production and maintain an artificial price level. We recognize that the producers should have a fair share; the fact remains that the present price level even threatens the economic well-being of producers. Ultimately they depend upon the vitality of the world economy for the security of their markets and their investments. And it cannot be in the interest of any nation to magnify the despair of the least developed, who are uniquely vulnerable to exorbitant prices and who have no recourse but to pay.

What has gone up by political decision can be reduced by political decision.

Strategy for Cooperative Action on the Energy Crisis

Excerpts from the address by Secretary Kissinger at the dinner of the Board of

Trustees of the University of Chicago
November 14, 1974.

I speak, of course, of the energy crisis. Tonight I want to discuss how the administration views this problem, what we have been doing about it, and where we must now go. I will stress two themes that this government has emphasized for a year and a half:

—First, the problem is grave but it is soluble.

—Second, international collaboration, particularly among the industrial nations of North America, Western Europe, and Japan, is an inescapable necessity.

The economic facts are stark. By 1973, worldwide industrial expansion was outstripping energy supply; the threat of shortages was already real. Then, without warning, we were faced first with a political embargo, followed quickly by massive increases in the price of oil. In the course of a single year the price of the world's most strategic commodity was raised 400 percent. The impact has been drastic and global:

—The industrial nations now face a collective payments deficit of \$40 billion, the largest in history and beyond the experience or capacity of our financial institutions. We suffer simultaneously a slowdown of production and a speedup of an inflation that was already straining the ability of governments to control.

—The nations of the developing world face a collective yearly deficit of \$20 billion, over half of which is due to increases in oil prices. The rise in energy costs in fact roughly equals the total flow of external aid. In other words, the new oil bill threatens hopes for progress and advancement and renders problematical the ability to finance even basic human needs such as food.

—The oil producers now enjoy a surplus of \$60 billion, far beyond their payments or development needs and manifestly more than they can invest. Enormous unabsorbed surplus revenues now jeopardize the very functioning of the international monetary system.

Yet this is only the first year of inflated oil prices. The full brunt of the petrodollar flood is yet to come. If current economic trends continue, we face further and mounting worldwide shortages, unemployment, poverty, and hunger. No nation, East or West, North or South, consumer or producer, will be spared the consequences.

To carry through the overall design, the consuming countries must act in five inter-related areas:

—First, we must accelerate our national programs of energy conservation, and we must coordinate them to insure their effectiveness.

—Second, we must press on with the development of new supplies of oil and alternative sources of energy.

—Third, we must strengthen economic security—to protect against oil emergencies and to safeguard the international financial system.

—Fourth, we must assist the poor nations whose hopes and efforts for progress have been cruelly blunted by the oil price rises of the past year.

—Fifth, on the basis of consumer solidarity we should enter a dialogue with the producers to establish a fair and durable long-term relationship.

It is now a year and a month since the oil crisis began. We have made a good beginning, but the major test is still ahead.

The United States in the immediate future intends to make further proposals to implement the program I have outlined.

Let there be no doubt, the energy problem is soluble. It will overwhelm us only if we retreat from its reality. But there can be no solution without the collective efforts of the nations of North America, Western Europe, and Japan—the very nations whose cooperation over the course of more than two decades has brought prosperity and peace to the postwar world. Nor, in the last analysis, can there be a solution without a dialogue with the producers carried on in

a spirit of reconciliation and compromise.

A great responsibility rests upon America, for without our dedication and leadership no progress is possible. This nation for many years has carried the major responsibility for maintaining the peace, feeding the hungry, sustaining international economic growth, and inspiring those who would be free. We did not seek this heavy burden, and we have often been tempted to put it down. But we have never done so, and we cannot afford to do so now—or the generations that follow us will pay the price for our self-indulgence.

For more than a decade America has been torn by war, social and generational turbulence, and constitutional crisis. Yet the most striking lesson from these events is our fundamental stability and strength. During our upheavals, we still managed to ease tensions around the globe. Our people and our institutions have come through our domestic travails with an extraordinary resiliency. And now, once again, our leadership in technology, agriculture, industry, and communications has become vital to the world's recovery.

Woodrow Wilson once remarked that "wrapped up with the liberty of the world is the continuous perfection of that liberty by the concerted powers of all civilized people." That, in the last analysis, is what the energy crisis is all about. For it is our liberty that in the end is at stake and it is

only through the concerted action of the industrial democracies that it will be maintained.

The dangers that Woodrow Wilson and his generation faced were, by today's standards, relatively simple and straightforward. The dangers we face now are more subtle and more profound. The context in which we act is more complex than even the period following the Second World War. Then we drew inspiration from stewardship; now we must find it in partnership. Then we and our allies were brought together by an external threat, now we must find it in our devotion to the political and economic institutions of free peoples working together for a common goal. Our challenge is to maintain the cooperative spirit among like-minded nations that has served us so well for a generation and to prove, as Woodrow Wilson said in another time and place, that "The highest and best form of efficiency is the spontaneous cooperation of a free people."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8799

Near East and South Asian Series 84

Released January 1975

**Office of Media Services
Bureau of Public Affairs**

CHAPTER 3


SOVIET INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Section I: Introduction

The Soviet Union has a continuing interest in the Middle East. What is the source of this interest? What are USSR goals in the Middle East? In this chapter we will examine some of the goals and the policy of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

Section II is a brief summary of great power involvement in the Middle East through the June War of 1967.

Section III contains a discussion of the events leading up to the Yom Kippur War, the war itself and the Arab/Israeli agreements which ended the war. Section III also contains statements of US policy made by various governmental officials.



GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT

Prior to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, rivalry in the Middle East among the great powers of Europe was largely commercial. Russia's gradual expansion toward the Black Sea into Central Asia had brought it into chronic conflict with the Ottoman Empire, and reached as far as Iran. In the 19th century commercial rivalry was converted to political rivalry aimed at the acquisition of colonial possessions and the dismemberment of the declining Ottoman Empire. The final disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in World War I left an enormous power vacuum in the region. Russia, then in the throes of her own revolution, could not exploit the opening. The League of Nations allowed Britain and France to fill the vacuum by establishing mandates in territories which were no longer administered by the old Ottoman regime. Most of the mandates continued in effect under British and French administration until World War II.

BRITAIN

In the late 19th century and until World War I, Iran was an object of contention between Russia and Britain as part of the larger rivalry between the two imperial powers for control of Central Asia.

Although historians often refer to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 as giving rise to the earliest Arab nationalism, the modern Arab nationalist movement was triggered in 1916, during World War I, when the Arabs, angered by Ottoman "Turkification" measures of 1908-12, revolted with British encouragement. After World War I, under the unique mandate concept attributed to

Jan Christian Smuts, many former Ottoman territories were mandated by the League of Nations to Britain (Palestine and Iraq) and France (Syria and Lebanon). Iraq became independent and was admitted to the League of Nations in 1932. Syria and Lebanon achieved independence during World War II. Control of Palestine remained in British hands until May 1948, following the United Nations partition of Palestine in 1947. Thus, the British mandate ended, and the State of Israel was proclaimed on May 14, 1948. Britain in 1914 voided Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt and declared that country to be a British protectorate.

Apart from the mandates between World War I and World War II, British influence was exercised throughout the region through economic, political, and military means. British firms were dominant. The currencies of Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan were based on sterling; a major share of oil production and refining was controlled by Britain. Militarily, British control of the Middle East between World War I and II was virtually complete.

After World War II British power contracted. Starting in 1947, with Soviet pressure on Iran, Greece, and Turkey, Britain was forced more and more to seek U.S. involvement to augment the declining power of the Empire. The U.S. fleet in the Mediterranean soon exceeded the Royal Navy strength there.

In the 1950's Britain withdrew from Suez and the Sudan. With the transfer of its military base from the Suez Canal zone to Cyprus, which since 1925 had been a British Crown Colony, Britain ceased to be the predominant power on the mainland shores of the southern Mediterranean. Cyprus in turn was given independence in 1960, but Britain retained the base. Britain's last military position in the Arabian Peninsula will be

Reprinted from US Department of State Publication 8409, Issues in United States Foreign Policy, No. 1 - "The Middle East," released October 1968. This article was written after the June 1967 War but before the Yom Kippur War. For an update of events since the June 1967 War, see Section III which follows.

given up with the withdrawal of British troops from the Persian Gulf in 1971. Britain withdrew from Aden in November 1967.

However, Britain still retains important commercial interests—notably in oil—throughout the region.

U.S.S.R.

From the 18th century, Russia and Britain were rivals for influence in Turkey and Iran, as well as Afghanistan. As one historian expresses it, the roles of the two powers differed in this respect: While Britain was a power *in* the Middle East, Russia remained *outside* it. That basic position continued throughout World War II, even as British power was augmented and finally replaced by the power of the United States. Russia's goal consistently has been to exchange these roles—to replace Anglo-American power with Russian power. Russian policy in the area is to promote instability in relations between local states on the one hand and the U.S. and U.K. on the other and to exploit local quarrels to that end. In so doing, Russia has used the weapons of diplomacy, propaganda, and economic and military aid.

Immediately after World War II, the Soviet Union made her first moves toward extending her influence in the Middle East, in Iran and Turkey: Soviet armored units moved into Azerbaijan Province in an effort to establish a Communist government in northern Iran.

Later in 1945 the Soviet Union unilaterally denounced the Soviet-Turkish neutrality pact and demanded military bases in the Turkish Straits and the cession by Turkey of Kars and Ardahan.

Both moves were frustrated, primarily by strong Anglo-American opposition.

But since 1956, when the U.S.S.R. agreed to arm Egypt, the Soviet presence in the eastern Mediterranean has been an important and growing factor in the affairs of the Middle East. The 1967 Arab-Israeli crisis was precipitated mainly by a Soviet attempt to exploit Syrian-Israeli tension against the U.S. and U.K.

As a result of the Israeli victory and the flareup of anti-U.S. sentiment among the Arabs, the Soviet Union increased its influence in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and strengthened its naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean.

The rise in Soviet fortunes in the region must be kept in perspective. While it is of deep concern to the United States, it is, based upon a coincidence of interests, limited in nature. While Arab socialism and nationalism, plus the intense anti-Israeli sentiment, are all skillfully exploited by the Soviet Union, there are other factors which may ultimately have even greater effect. These include the common Arab need for economic development, which in turn requires peace and reduction of military expenditures; the need of oil and non-oil states alike to maintain Western markets; the fundamental differences between communism on the one hand and nationalism and Islam on the other; and a long history of Russian expansion. Considerations such as these tend to temper Arab enthusiasm for the embrace of the U.S.S.R.

RUSSIA'S AMBITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE LONG HISTORIC ROOTS

Early History

The Greeks who made war on Troy probably were more concerned about Trojan control of the Hellespont (Dardanelles) than with the rescue of Menelaus' wife, Helen, for even then the Black Sea trade was a rich prize. After the fall of Troy the Greeks rapidly expanded around the shores of the Black Sea where there were gold and grain, and terminal points for overland trade routes to the Orient.

Control of the Black Sea Straits then fell in turn to Rome, Byzantium, and the Ottoman Turks.

In short, the Straits have been through history a key strategic point and as such, a prize objective of all powers seeking to control the Black Sea and to play a dominant role in the area.

Ever since its formation as a national state, Russia has consistently sought to expand south along the rivers flowing into the Black and Caspian Seas. Over the centuries, efforts to gain access to those seas and egress through the Straits into the Mediterranean brought Russia into conflict with Byzantine, Persian, Turkish, and British power in the South.

The Mongol conquest of the early Russian state and the southern steppes in the 13th century interrupted Russian expansion to the south until the princes of Moscow threw off the Tartar yoke and slowly began to unify the Russian state in the late 14th and 15th centuries. As the power of the tsars of Moscow increased, they claimed succession to the Khan of the Golden Horde and jurisdiction over the Tartar tribes of Eurasia. After Constantinople fell to the Turks, the tsars considered themselves successors to the Byzantine Empire and the new protectors of the Orthodox faith. These claims were used to strengthen the authority of the tsars and to justify the process of territorial expansion.

During the 15th and 16th centuries Russian efforts were directed at national consolidation with only occasional forays to the south—most of these against the Crimea. In the 17th century the tempo of expansion toward the south increased. Cossacks crossed the Black Sea in 1614 A.D. and burned the Turkish port of Sinop. They captured Kava in the Crimea in 1616 A.D. and then raided Trebizond to free Christian captives of the Ottoman.

Despite the early Russian forays into the south, however, until the 18th century the thrust of power was generally from south to north—from the Middle East upward against Russia and the Balkans. During the reign of Peter the Great of Russia the power of the Ottoman Empire began to wane, and the thrust of power was reversed—swinging north to south—driving out of Russia and Europe against the Middle East.

Eighteenth Century

At the beginning of the 18th century Russia was sufficiently consolidated under Peter the Great to implement a long-term expansion along five lines:

1. In the northwest, to force Sweden from the Baltic littoral and establish the Russian frontier on that sea. The push in this direction had been begun 2 centuries earlier by Tsars Ivan III and Ivan IV;
2. In the West to gain Little and White Russia from Poland. The push west was begun by Tsar Alexai-Michaelovitch;
3. In the east, to move toward the Pacific and India;
4. In the south, to gain the Black Sea, and to create unrest in Turkey preparatory to invasion. This push was initiated in the 9th and 10th centuries by the Grand Dukes of Kiev, Oleg and Sviatoslav; and
5. In the southeast on the Iranian front, to secure the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus. This work had been begun by

the Tsars Theodore-Ivanovitch and Boris Godunov around the end of the 16th century.

During the 18th century three of these goals were achieved:

- In the northwest, Russia dominated the Baltic after destruction of Swedish power at the battle of Poltava.
- In the west, after three wars with Poland, Little and White Russia were secured and Polish power was destroyed.
- The movement to the Black Sea was achieved after four wars with Turkey. The first, in 1711, ended in defeat, but the fourth in 1774 was a victory which gave the Russians possession of the Crimea.

Nineteenth Century

With solid footing on the northern shores of the Black and Caspian Seas, Russia now had a base for a drive into the pivotal regions of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The most significant aspect of 19th century Russo-Turk relations is, perhaps, the fact that even in victory, the Ottoman Empire continued to weaken, and even in defeat, the power of Russia continued to grow. After the Turkish victory at Prut in 1711, the Ottoman Empire was permanently on the defensive. As Russian power grew, so did Russia's desire to control the Straits.

In the Crimean War, 1854–56, the Anglo-French plan was to localize the war in the Black Sea area and force Russia to renounce some of her rights in the Ottoman Empire, relieving pressure on the Straits. This was, in effect, an exercise in containment. The naval base of Sevastopol was selected as the main pressure point. In September 1854, an Anglo-French-Turkish expeditionary force of 60,000 was landed to the north of Sevastopol. The allied siege dragged on for 349 days with both sides suffering terribly from disease and privation. Russia finally capitulated.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 went more in Russia's favor, militarily. The Russian Army advanced on the Balkan front, taking the Bulgarian city of Plevna and then Shipka Pass from the Turks. As a consequence, the Turks sued for peace early in 1878. One result of this was the acquisition by Russia, in the Peace of Stefano, of Batum on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, and Kars in the Transcaucasus, strengthening her position opposite eastern Turkey and northern Iran. Turkey also ceded to Russia the region of the lower Danube, which Russia then exchanged with Romania for Bessarabia. Thus Russia was firmly established near

the mouth of the Danube and in the valleys south of the rebellious Caucasus, with strong lines of communications running from Batum on the east shore of the Black Sea to Baku on the southwest shore of the Caspian, cutting off the rebellious Caucasian tribes from support from Persia in the south.

In 1888 Russia joined the European powers in the Constantinople Convention guaranteeing the right of passage through the Suez Canal. So, as the world moved into the 20th century, Russia finally seemed well on her way to maritime power in the south.

End of Two Empires

On the eastern flank of the Ottoman Empire Russia achieved a coup in 1907 with the Anglo-Russian convention which established northern Persia as part of Russia's sphere of influence and southern Persia as Britain's. (This pact made it possible for England and Russia to join with France in the Triple Entente against the rising power of Germany.) In 1912 the thrust came in the west as Russia successfully backed the Balkan League against Turkey. It was a Pyrrhic victory for Russia; the defeated Turks turned to Germany and the Central Powers in despair, and Turkey's role in World War I was to cost Russia and the Allies dearly.

Both the Ottoman Empire and Imperial Russia died with World War I, but the contest continued. Turkey still seeks to parry the Russian thrust to the south.

UNITED STATES

Despite some oil interests, and educational and religious activities by private institutions, the United States was not deeply involved in the Middle East until World War II. U.S. policy largely followed the lead of Great Britain.

After World War II, growing Soviet pressure from the north and declining British power combined to create a dangerous imbalance in the Middle East. The imbalance was compounded by the Greek Communist rebellion and the establishment in 1948 of the State of Israel. These factors resulted in a major commitment of U.S. power to give the region time to get on its feet. Important U.S. policy developments in the postwar period include:

- The Truman Doctrine: In a piv-

otal decision, President Truman reversed the historic U.S. tradition of isolation and sent massive economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey to help those countries in resisting Soviet expansion. President Truman then promised aid to any democratic nation threatened from the outside. This became known throughout the world as the Truman Doctrine.

- Collective defense: In 1955, with U.S. and U.K. support, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact for mutual security and economic development. This pact was strongly opposed by the U.S.S.R., by Iraqi public opinion, and by the Arab opponents (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen) of British and Hashemite influence in the Arab world. To counter the Pact, the U.S.S.R. and Egypt made their well-known arms deal in 1955, and other Arab countries followed suit. This event opened the door to expanded Soviet influence in the Near East.

After a *coup d'etat*, Iraq withdrew, and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) emerged as a successor alliance in 1959. Though not a full member, the U.S. has played an active supporting role.

In 1957, the U.S. invited the Arab states and Israel to subscribe to the Eisenhower Doctrine aimed at opposing the spread of Communist influence in the area. Both the U.S.S.R. and the revolutionary Arab states violently opposed the Eisenhower Doctrine under which the U.S. stood ready to intervene in defense of threatened states.

- Lebanese crisis: In 1958, during the last 2 months of President Chamoun's term, an insurrection broke out in Lebanon intensely aggravated by Lebanese and non-Lebanese Arab Nationalist and Communist forces. On July 15, 1958, President Eisenhower responded to an appeal for help from President Chamoun, and U.S. troops were landed to safeguard the independence of the country. The troops were completely withdrawn by October 25, 1958, after peace had been restored.

- Arab-Israeli dispute: U.S. sup-

port of the United Nations partition of Palestine in 1947 antagonized the Arabs and was the source of a long series of disputes between the U.S. and the Arabs. The Arabs have particularly resented continued U.S. support of Israel. Since the establishment of the State of Israel the United States has tried to maintain friendly, impartial relations with all Middle East countries. In 1950 the United States joined with Britain and France in a Tripartite Declaration opposing the use of force or threat of force between any of the states of the Middle East. In the same spirit, we have extended substantial economic aid to both sides. By the end of fiscal 1967 the United States had delivered more than \$3.5 billion in economic aid to Arab countries, \$1 billion to Israel, and nearly \$10 billion to the entire region, including Greece (\$1.9 billion), Turkey (\$2.3 billion), and Iran (\$960 million) as well as military aid sent largely to Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Of this economic aid, \$425 million was contributed to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. Despite such attempts to be helpful and impartial, the United States has been able to satisfy neither the Arabs nor Israel. The U.S. is now more exposed on the issues because of the decline of United Kingdom influence combined with France's independent policy in the area. The U.S.S.R. has assiduously cultivated the tensions between Israel and the Arabs, and represents Israel as the instrument of anti-Arab U.S. policies. After the Israeli attack in June 1967, desperate Arab leaders erroneously charged the United States with participation in the attack and a number of Arab states severed diplomatic relations with Washington.

U.S. Policy

Since 1956, U.S. policy has been scrupulously aimed at preserving the peace of the region in order to give all nations the fullest opportunity to develop economically and socially into modern states. Principles of U.S. policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute since the hostilities of June 1967 were summed up by

President Johnson on June 19, 1967. These are:

1. Each nation in the area must have the right to live without threat of attack or extinction.
2. More than a million homeless Arab refugees must be settled justly before a lasting peace can be achieved.
3. Maritime rights must be respected; rights of innocent passage through international waterways must be preserved for all nations.
4. Arms shipments into the area should be reduced and limited on all sides, thus reducing tensions and freeing capital for vital economic development.
5. Secure and recognized territorial boundaries must be established in order to achieve respect for the political and territorial integrity of all states in the region.

Today there are three broad categories of problems for the United States in our relations with the countries of the Middle East:

1. The complex of problems stemming from our interest in the territorial integrity and stability of both Israel and the Arab nations.
2. Those problems stemming from the impact of Western ideas and living standards on the emergent nations, adding to the ferment of Arab nationalism and desire for progress.
3. Efforts of the Soviet Union to reduce and eventually eliminate Western influence and to expand its own power in the Middle East.

It is fundamental U.S. policy to seek the preservation of peace, stability, and genuine economic and social progress in the region. To this end, the Government of the United States has established several broad guidelines of policy:

- Prevention or containment of armed conflict. Too many scarce resources already have been wasted in war by people whose needs are great. The United States has looked primarily to the United Nations in this regard as the best body to hold down conflict and

mediate disputes; the United States has given full diplomatic and material support to the United Nations peacekeeping machinery.

- Maintenance of good relations with all states of the Middle East, and some U.S. assistance to encourage their economic progress.

- Opposition to aggression, terrorism, or territorial conquest by any state or group.

- Assistance—financial and other—in maintaining the million Arab refugees and in seeking a permanent, just solution to their plight.

- Consistent efforts to stop the arms race.

THE USSR AND THE MIDDLE EAST: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE SOVIET DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

by Uri Ra'an

MOST observers will agree that the origins, course and outcome of the 1973 "October War" in the Middle East cannot be elucidated without a simultaneous analysis of the Soviet Union's policies and decision-making process. Some will emphasize that the very key to contemporary developments in the region must be sought in the recesses of the Kremlin; few will deny that there is, at any rate, a link between two decades of conflict in the area and Soviet attempts to establish a powerful presence along the southeastern rim of the Mediterranean.

Of course, it may be argued that a new phenomenon, generally described as "détente," has appeared and that, consequently, Soviet actions and motivations must be judged now by criteria that differ entirely from those which applied during the "Cold War." When challenged to produce evidence that the spirit of détente is really present in the Eastern Mediterranean, the protagonists of this view usually will refer to the Brezhnev-Kissinger "Little Summit" of October 1973 and the piece of paper it produced for endorsement by the UN Security Council. A little reflection will show, however, that this retort does not begin to answer the three crucial questions:

(1) What was the Soviet role with regard to the outbreak of the October War, and why did Moscow not only refuse insouciantly to assist early efforts to terminate it, but actually escalated the level of conflict by initiating massive airlifts of weapons to Egypt and Syria?

(2) What caused the subsequent shift in the Kremlin's performance on the international stage, and why was it suddenly in the Soviet interest to bring military operations to a halt — at least for a while?

(3) Why, immediately after succeeding in extracting significant concessions from Dr. Kissinger in Moscow, did the USSR crudely threaten to resort to unilateral military action in the Middle East, in breach of all previous understandings with Washington?

To tackle such questions, especially at a time when the political processes associated with the October War are still in high gear, is a complex task. Perhaps the simplest approach would be both to analyze Soviet decision-making patterns in general and to examine a previous Soviet policy episode toward the Middle East in particular — a period for which, to use election jargon, "all the returns were in" some time prior to the October War. In this way, it may be possible to reconstruct enough of the mold within which Soviet policy has been, and continues to be, shaped to make current

Reprinted from ORBIS, Vol. 17, No. 3, Fall 1973, pp. 946-977, by permission of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

I

Readers of the Soviet press and other forms of official literature will search in vain for a Kremlin equivalent of "The Pentagon Papers," or the minutes of Washington's "Special Action Group" on the Indo-Pakistani crisis, or some other publication of contemporary, classified documents that may throw light on a superpower's decision-making process. Nor does the Soviet Union's electoral process encourage the regular, peaceful change of administrations, with yesterday's leader retiring unmolested to publish memoirs based on personal papers illuminating policies that were initiated a mere year or two ago and that may still be in effect. No serious historian, for instance, would place quite the same evaluation upon the memoirs of Lyndon B. Johnson and the alleged "Memoirs of Khrushchev" — "smuggled out" of the USSR under suspicious auspices at a time when the ousted Soviet leader was under house-arrest, or dacha-confinement, surrounded by KGB personnel.

Under these circumstances, any attempt to analyze the Soviet decision-making process, not to speak of documenting such analysis, seems to be beset by well-nigh insuperable obstacles. The observer of the Soviet political scene is confronted by an old and well-known dilemma: Either he can confine himself to a mere uncritical and unanalytical narrative, rehashing in chronological order various quotations from articles in the Soviet press or statements by Soviet leaders, thus playing it safe. Or he can undertake, within the limits of his ability and understanding of the subject, a logical reconstruction of the course of events, in which causes and effects are linked coherently and motivations are explained lucidly, and in which he is aided: (a) by a knowledge of events or scraps of significant information that have become accessible to some Western analysts; (b) by a comparison with analogous situations in the past or in similar communist countries; (c) by "leakages" emanating from defectors and dissidents or by "revelations" made in the course of a purge or during an attack on the policies of a deposed leader; (d) by content analysis in depth of spoken and written words originating in the USSR; (e) by some understanding of ideological terms as a Soviet operational code; and (f) by a (hopefully) sophisticated instinct for deciphering and comprehending political processes in the Soviet Union as a special category of general bureaucratic models. If the Western observer chooses this second approach, he leaves himself wide open to charges of having taken a "speculative" rather than "documentary" path and, especially in circles not inured to the difficulties and peculiarities of Soviet and communist studies, he might well become suspect of resorting to methodologies that do not enjoy full academic respectability. It is perhaps largely because of this factor that the number of scholars willing to brave the hazards and perils of "Sovietology" has remained small, indeed has declined somewhat since the 1950's and early 1960's. Another reason for this phenomenon, no doubt, is to be found in the inexorable processes of biology that have decimated the ranks of elderly émigrés and ex-communists who once constituted the core of the pro-

fession.

These are some of the considerations that ought to be borne in mind when evaluating this study. They are given not by way of apology but to explain why any attempt at reconstructing the origins and development of Soviet politico-military actions in the Eastern Mediterranean from 1969 to the present cannot avoid a certain speculative flavor. Whether this aspect renders such an attempt less useful than some safe, chronological narrative, amply documented by footnotes that merely point to the obvious and the generally-known, without shedding any light on the motivations and intricate conflicts underlying the Soviet decision-making process, is an entirely different question.

II

One method of attempting to reconstruct the genesis and evolution of the Soviet "forward" policy in the Eastern Mediterranean since 1969 is to review extant beliefs — or myths — concerning this topic and see to what degree, if any, they are plausible, i.e., compatible with the contemporary behavior patterns of the USSR and other regimes in question. The generally and somewhat unquestioningly accepted view of this important issue in international affairs runs more or less along the following lines:

In the spring of 1969, the late President of Egypt, Colonel Nasser, declared that he was unilaterally abrogating the unconditional and unlimited cease-fire between Egypt and Israel along the Suez Canal which had been imposed by the UN Security Council and accepted by the parties at the end of the Six-Day War of June 1967. Nasser ordered his forces to open a War of Attrition against Israeli forces positioned along the Suez cease-fire line, utilizing massed Egyptian artillery barrages in the classical Soviet style. His aides expressed the conviction that, although both sides would suffer casualties, Israel, with a mere one-tenth of Egypt's population and a much lower national "threshold of pain" concerning loss of life, would soon feel it was being "bled white" and would be forced to retreat unconditionally from the canal. Thus, Egypt could once again occupy the Sinai Peninsula without having to pay any political price in return.

For a while the Egyptian plan appeared to be working. However, the Israelis turned the scales by establishing heavy fortifications along the canal and by using their superior air force as "flying artillery" to destroy the massed Egyptian artillery formations on the far side. As a result, it was the Egyptians who began to suffer serious casualties, but, to the surprise of the Israelis, Nasser persisted with his War of Attrition, even though it was clearly failing to achieve its objectives. Israel, as the satisfied, status-quo power, had much to gain by achieving a reinstatement of the cease-fire along the canal; since Nasser was not deterred from his course by increasingly massive military losses, the Israelis apparently felt that the addition of visible political pressure to the setbacks along the canal (which the regime was able temporarily to hide from the Egyptian masses) might help to change the Egyptian leader's mind. Consequently, by December 1969, the Israeli air force extended its mission from the area of the canal to

the interior, flying deep penetration sorties in the vicinity of the Egyptian capital, so that the facts of the military situation could be withheld no longer from the population of Cairo and neighboring cities. It was hoped in Jerusalem that Nasser would now call off his War of Attrition.

Instead, so the widely-accepted version claims, in January 1970 the Egyptian leader suddenly took off on a secret mission to Moscow to appeal to his friends in the Kremlin to rescue him from his plight by dispatching to Egypt Soviet crews for surface-to-air missiles and interceptor pilots in order to defeat the Israeli air force, for which Egyptian anti-aircraft units and pilots had proved no match. Allegedly, the Soviet leaders swiftly acquiesced and, within a couple of weeks — by February 1970 — the first Soviet combat personnel had appeared in the area of the Nile Delta. However, the story continues, the Soviet leaders warned their Egyptian clients at an early date that Soviet contingents and hardware, whether deployed around the cities on the Nile as in the beginning, or pushed to the very banks of the canal as during a subsequent phase, were to be regarded as purely "defensive" and could not be drawn into "offensive" operations.

While Nasser had to submit to this restriction with more or less good grace, the widely-accepted version claims that dissatisfaction began to grow in Cairo after his death, especially since his successor, President Sadat, reportedly suspected the Soviet presence in Egypt of being utilized to extend covert support to rival claimants to the leadership, such as Ali Sabri. Sadat was also frightened by the temporarily successful coup in the Sudan, prematurely supported and acclaimed by the communists, which almost succeeded in replacing a relatively centrist regime with a leftist coalition. It was under these circumstances that the Soviet leadership attempted to create more binding links with the new and somewhat disgruntled Egyptian leadership by means of the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty of 1971. Cairo seems to have regarded this treaty as an earnest of Soviet intentions to aid Egypt directly in an offensive amphibious operation across the canal sometime during 1971, and as a Soviet undertaking not to negotiate behind Egypt's back about the Middle East with the United States or any other state. By the spring of 1972, according to this version, the Egyptians had come to realize that the Kremlin was acting in lofty disregard of both these supposed commitments and, what was more, was refusing to deliver certain unspecified "offensive" weapons. After a warning and subsequent ultimatum, the Egyptian President therefore ordered a withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Egypt in midsummer of 1972, excepting only certain technical advisers and some Soviet naval contingents along the northwestern coast of the country. The USSR immediately complied.

To put it mildly, this version reflects a somewhat simplistic view of the Soviet leadership, its behavior patterns and decision-making process, and its attitude toward small countries in general and client states in particular; nor is it consonant either with various data that have become available in the meantime or with certain basic requirements of technology and logistics.

It is not at all typical of Soviet behavior, either under the "collective" headed by Brezhnev or its Khrushchevian predecessor, to comply meekly and even abjectly with the peremptory demands of small and weak states, least of all clients dependent on Soviet protection and hardware, especially concerning such "minor" issues as whether and when Soviet military personnel with its acouterment is to come in or leave. Questions of security, particularly military security, are zealously safeguarded as the particular prerogative of the Soviet leadership. Only simpletons are likely to believe that the real reason why the Red Army entered Czechoslovakia in 1968, or for that matter Hungary in 1956, was because Prague or Budapest (or, rather, certain minute, Soviet-suborned elements in those capitals) "invited" the Russians; nor has the Red Army since then seen fit to leave these countries, the ardent desires of the overwhelming majority of Czechoslovaks and Hungarians notwithstanding (and in spite of the official demands and protests of the legitimate and recognized Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments at the time of the respective invasions).

The plain fact of the matter is that Soviet forces come into or evacuate foreign countries in line with decisions made by the Soviet leadership and at its initiative, in accordance with its evaluation of the Soviet interest, shaped by the contemporary situation as viewed from Moscow, and influenced considerably by the internal balance of power between competing factions in the Kremlin. For instance, the Red Army entered Czechoslovakia largely because the "interventionists" in Moscow, although apparently originally a minority within the Politbureau, were able to take the wind out of the sails of their opponents (reputedly including such surprising names as Suslov), who expressed their reservations concerning the proposed venture not so much because they were "doves," but because they hoped to inflict a serious setback upon their personal rivals among the "interventionists" by exposing them as irresponsible adventurists. The supporters of bold offensive action reportedly were able to overcome such objections by producing convincing evidence that the leaders of the Czechoslovak forces had decided not to resist, that Washington had no inclination to make a reactive move, near Czechoslovakia or elsewhere, and that no other Western state would take action. The proposed move, therefore, was quite safe and not at all adventurous; that was the ultimate *reason* for the Kremlin's decision, and it remained merely then to manufacture some *pretext*, preferably plausible, but if necessary as barefaced as an alleged Czech "invitation."

It was a somewhat similar constellation in 1956 that, after some factional jousting in the Kremlin, led to the final Soviet decision to resort to military intervention in Hungary. One of the critical factors in 1956 was not so much the unwillingness of the Hungarian forces to resist as the preparation of what the Red Army regarded as a practically foolproof plan — which, indeed, succeeded — to decapitate the Hungarian resistance by entrapping its naive military leadership into Soviet captivity. Again, in the Cuban case in 1962, as in the subsequent Czechoslovak instance, it is believed that a factional "debate" in the Kremlin, centering on

Soviet global considerations rather than anything said or done by Castro, led to the inception of the missile crisis and its outcome. Some elements in the Soviet leadership, reportedly including old Kuusinen, asked whether the emplacement of Soviet military personnel and nuclear-tipped missiles in an island off the U.S. coast could not be put in the category of adventuristic acts, thus implying that the more offensive-minded faction, supported by Khrushchev himself, ought to have its wings clipped. These objections and misgivings were overruled apparently on the basis of (erroneous) Soviet intelligence that Washington was willfully shutting its eyes to Soviet actions in Cuba, partly because of demoralization following the Bay of Pigs, and would therefore take no serious counteraction. In this case, the Kremlin's "interventionist" group turned out to be mistaken, a factor that played no minor part in Moscow's rapid reversal of direction during the crisis and in Khrushchev's subsequent, if somewhat delayed, ouster.

The important point here is that the Kremlin's actions in dispatching and withdrawing military elements in disregard of clients' wishes applied not merely to states immediately adjacent to the USSR and considered part of its continental empire, but also to overseas clients, such as Castro's Cuba. (Indeed, in the Cuban instance, Soviet withdrawal of missiles and their crews took place against Castro's express demands and over his official protests.) What really mattered, in all of these instances, were Soviet interests, defined by Moscow's view of the general situation, as established by the momentary factional balance within the Kremlin.

While there are individual and peculiar factors to be found in each instance, it is significant that on each occasion the *initiative* on whether to send in Soviet military forces, and whether they should stay or leave, emanated from the Kremlin; the wishes of the client either constituted a fraudulently manufactured pretext, such as the Hungarian and Czech "invitations," or were blatantly ignored, as were the protests of Nagy, Dubcek and Castro. (Of course, where the desires of a client coincided conveniently with Soviet plans and decisions, as with Castro's initial enthusiasm for the clandestine importation of Soviet personnel and missiles, the Kremlin was happy to exploit this fact.) The Egyptian case, if the generally current version is accepted, would be practically *sui generis* since the initiative supposedly always came from Cairo, with Moscow merely following suit. On these grounds alone it would warrant skeptical scrutiny. Nor would it be a valid objection that the other instances mentioned are simply nonanalogous precedents, since at least Cuba involved a somewhat difficult, semi-autonomous, overseas client, much like Moscow's friends in the Middle East, rather than a member state of the Warsaw Pact, along the very borders of the USSR.¹

¹It is true that even in Eastern Europe there have been instances in which, despite Soviet desires, the dispatch of Soviet military elements has had to be canceled or delayed, e.g., Yugoslavia 1948 and probably 1968, and Rumania 1968. However, the factor that made Moscow hesitate in these cases was not the absence of an "invitation" from the governments of the countries to be entered, but rather the *deterrent* effect created by the prospect of protracted local resistance to the Red Army, consequent possible foreign reaction, and the potential damage to Soviet interests that might be caused by both.

III

The *modus operandi* of the Soviet leadership in the decision-making process, as evidenced by the instances cited in this article, seems to follow certain patterns. I have attempted elsewhere² to explain and describe the functioning of the Soviet bureaucratic model:

Although factions and factionalism are formally prohibited, political processes, of course, cannot be outlawed by fiat or ukase, even in the U.S.S.R., and there are kaleidoscopic formations and re-formations of alliances and coalitions within the leadership each time a specific decision has to be reached. These factions are not necessarily stable, since they are not specifically issue-oriented — at least not at the very top (groups with a vested professional bias are to be found slightly lower down the ladder, including, of course, the military services); rather, the leadership reveals a strangely "feudal" pattern, with each top personality "investing" subordinates wherever possible with power and position in return for personal "fealty" and allegiance, and these subordinates similarly distribute whatever privileges they command among their various personal collaborators in return for political support and loyalty, until a veritable "feudal" pyramid of "enfeoffments" is created from one of the top leaders all the way down the ladder to minor local functionaries who may not be in direct touch with him but belong to his "party" through a chain of personal links of allegiance. Sometimes, these links are even reinforced by familial ties, including political marriage to create bonds of blood, in truly "feudal" style. This system strongly influences the *modus operandi* at the very apex of the Soviet leadership. Given a delicate balance of "collectivity" at the top, each one of the main leaders, conscious of the particular power structure he personally commands and which he attempts to preserve and enhance, will attempt temporary coalitions with his colleagues and competitors, above all to prevent the strongest and, therefore, most dangerous among them at any one moment from gaining the degree of overwhelming power, momentum and control which would lead to the total subordination and possible elimination of the weaker members. The actual issues over which these conflicts are fought out are not necessarily of overriding importance to the various competitors, nor are they inevitably tied to a consistent line on specific issues. The real battle concerns personal power and influence rather than a particular political question, but the latter can and does serve a useful tactical purpose in gathering recruits and allies for one group and alienating supporters from another. Moreover, the outcome of a conflict over a specific issue can be of great symbolic and psychological impact in demonstrating which factional alliance is gaining and which is declining. Thus it is almost axiomatic that the advocacy of a proposal by one group will lead to some measure of opposition by various of its rivals and adversaries. There is reason to believe, however, that such opposition rarely takes the form of outright confrontation or rebuff, but rather is expressed by way of carefully worded reservations and caveats, for the record.* On at least three occasions (the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and, as hopefully will be demonstrated, the dispatch of Soviet pilots and ground crews to Egypt), and probably on several others, it seems that a proposal supported by the number one leader in the "collective" favoring military or semi-military action of a potentially

²"Some Political Perspectives Concerning the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance," paper presented to the May 1973 Conference on the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Doctrine and Nuclear Multipolarity, held under the auspices of the International Security Studies Program of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The proceedings of the conference, including this paper, will be published by D. C. Heath.

*There is evidence to the effect that this is the traditional way in which communist leaders express their opposition to proposals advanced by rival factions; a prominent member of Imre Nagy's entourage, who was able to reach the West, has described such scenes, and similar evidence has been received from leading émigrés from other communist countries, as well as from various leaks and revelations.

risky nature, has led to the expression of such reservations by other members of the leadership, not necessarily because they were more "dovish," but because they felt that they had been given an opportunity for clipping the wings of the "*primus inter pares*" or even for removing him altogether, should the venture misfire and he could then be accused of "adventurism" — one of the most damning of pejoratives in the Bolshevik dictionary. In such circumstances, the various opposing elements have always been delighted to use as ammunition and to maximize the spectre both of potential local resistance to the direct involvement of Soviet forces and of conceivable U.S. counteraction as a reason for suggesting caution and thus implying imprudence on the part of those advocating a forward thrust or offensive action. It is not so much that, in such cases, the "moderate" groups in the Kremlin would warn of the likelihood of U.S. counter-intervention, but rather that they would put the onus of proof on the advocates of a Soviet politico-military offensive move to demonstrate that U.S. reaction was definitely precluded. In other words, they would expect to be shown that the odds were at least 99 to 1 or higher that America would remain passive. A 5-10% chance of U.S. action would, under these circumstances, be regarded as prohibitively high — certainly high enough to smear the more militant Kremlin group with the tag of "adventurism."

The detailed considerations presented here suggest that the Soviet leadership does apparently operate within a general and consistent framework, especially where major security questions are concerned, such as the dispatch of military forces and hardware to foreign countries and their subsequent withdrawal. The salient points of the Soviet *modus operandi* as outlined so far are: (1) In all the cases examined, the Kremlin was "acting," not "reacting," i.e., it always took the initiative and never awaited "invitations" or "demands" from client states. (2) In all instances under review, the Soviet decision-making process appears to have been far from monolithic; on the contrary, it seems to have proceeded invariably against a background of factional infighting within the Kremlin which influenced, indeed shaped, the conditions that had to be met before a final policy was adopted.

The generally accepted version of the Soviet military entry into and exit from Egypt, 1969-1972, is strangely inconsonant with both of these saliences of the general Soviet pattern of decision-making; the Kremlin's role as portrayed in that story would render Soviet relations with Egypt a most special, even unique, case, negating all that we know or have been able to gather about the Soviet *modus operandi* on military and security questions. On these grounds alone, the 1969-1972 story, as presented earlier, must be regarded as highly suspect. Moreover, this version is also contradicted with regard to its basic chronology by sporadic but significant data that gradually have become available. These include, for instance, an approach by Soviet military personalities to the Kremlin with suggestions that Soviet military elements be dispatched to take over a portion of actual combat duties in Egypt, and a subsequent expression of support for this proposal at a Warsaw Pact gathering — both occurring *well before* the Israeli deep penetration raids and Nasser's subsequent secret visit to Moscow in which he allegedly originated the proposal and "invited" Soviet units to come and help him combat the Israelis.

Another consideration that renders the current version highly implausible concerns logistics and technology: Nasser supposedly dropped from the skies in January 1970 to surprise his hosts in

Moscow with his "invitation," and by February 1970, a mere couple of weeks or so later, Soviet combat units and their sophisticated electronic gear had appeared in Egypt. It seems most unlikely that as complex, hazardous and difficult an enterprise as the Soviet buildup in Egypt, in the face of a hot war with a skillful and daring adversary like the Israelis, a long distance from the Soviet homeland, connected by a slender lifeline that might be cut at any time by a hostile U.S. Sixth Fleet, could have been conceived, planned *ab initio* in all its mass of details — especially considering Egyptian conditions — and actually implemented in a matter of a few weeks.³

IV

These various considerations and data, as well as other evidence that has been sifted in the West, sketch a rather different story, which, if interpreted correctly, sheds interesting light on policy processes within the Kremlin and suggests suitable Western counterploys.

In the summer of 1969, after Nasser's War of Attrition along the Suez Canal had been proceeding for some months — but long before Israeli deep penetration air raids of December 1969 and Nasser's Moscow visit of January 1970 — Soviet advisers to the Egyptian forces apparently communicated to their superiors in Moscow their serious misgivings regarding the chances of the Egyptian venture's success. If they did express their concern in this manner, they may have done so for two reasons: (1) Because of their unlimited access to and influence on all aspects of Egyptian military activities, from the planning to the operational stage, they were uniquely situated to observe the fundamental weaknesses of their clients, including a lack of improvisation, adaptability and initiative, at a much earlier stage of the War of Attrition than other experts, even the Israelis on the other side of the canal. (2) Expecting a renewed Egyptian defeat, they were probably in no mood to take a share of the blame once again. In 1956 and in 1967, the alleged shortcomings and unsuitability of Soviet weapons and advice had been used repeatedly as an alibi for the failure of Egyptian commanders, and it may well be that, on occasion, even some of their superiors in Moscow were inclined to reprimand the military advisers for not having done a better job with their Egyptian charges. It seems likely that, on this occasion,

³As for Cairo's complaints that the USSR allegedly reneged on commitments to deliver certain "offensive" weapons to Egypt, it is difficult to find an item to which this could apply seriously. Prior to the events of midsummer 1972, the Kremlin had sent to Egypt one of the Warsaw Pact's main battle tanks, the T-62, the latest all-weather versions of the MiG-21, practically the entire SAM series (2, 3, 4, 6), the TU-16B, with a sophisticated air-to-surface missile, and other modern weapons. All of these items were emplaced in Egypt, even if some were still operated by Soviet personnel. Both the SAM's and the interceptors, although tactically "defensive," were "offensive" in the Egyptian strategic context. The War of Attrition was intended to enable the Egyptians to launch an offensive across the Suez Canal; the Israeli air force was neutralizing the War of Attrition; the Soviet SAM's and interceptors were intended to neutralize the Israeli air force and, by so doing, enable the War of Attrition to succeed in its offensive aims. Under these conditions, none of the Soviet hardware mentioned could be considered "defensive." The only item of significance coveted by Cairo and not delivered by the USSR, although available there, was a tactical nuclear delivery system, the warheads of which, as is well known, Moscow refused to hand over even to its most reliable Warsaw Pact allies. The Egyptians hardly could have expected that they would be given such a weapon or have voiced genuine grievance at its non-delivery.

Soviet officers in Egypt were determined to forestall such a development, by going on record in good time with predictions of a new setback, plus an analysis of the real causes for their pessimism.

In any case, there are reasons to believe that in the summer of 1969, several top Soviet military figures managed to obtain an invitation to appear before the Kremlin leadership (in all probability before a subcommittee of the Politbureau dealing with military and security affairs) and there conveyed the information that yet another defeat in the Middle East seemed in the offing. It appears that they urged the political leadership to avoid a repetition of the debacles-by-proxy. Soviet prestige had suffered through Nasser's military failures of 1956 and 1967, when, as in 1969, Egyptian troops were known by the whole world to have been armed and trained by the USSR. Consequently, Soviet military representatives are believed to have suggested two options to their civilian colleagues: (1) Sever all military links with Egypt, publicly, so that the next military setback would be Nasser's alone. (2) Come in directly, in a combat capacity, at least with Soviet crews for sophisticated surface-to-air missiles and Soviet interceptor pilots, to bolster the Egyptian forces in their weakest sector, thereby averting defeat. In all likelihood, this second, rather hazardous alternative was proposed as a carefully planned and supervised probing operation, with Soviet elements first being installed in the Nile Delta, then gradually and carefully being pushed eastward toward the Suez Canal; if they were able successfully and without untoward reactions to ensconce themselves on the banks of the canal, thus establishing Soviet-Egyptian air supremacy over the canal, its far side and the adjoining edge of Sinai, they might even assist in an Egyptian amphibious operation across the canal to capture the Sinai Peninsula. Apparently, the Soviet military leaders recommended option (2) as their own preference and as the best way of furthering Soviet prestige and influence.

We do not know the precise composition of this Soviet military delegation. However, it seems likely that it included some three or four high-ranking officers, in all probability Defense Minister Grechko and/or Chief of Staff Zakharov, a representative of P.V.O. Strany (the Air Defense Forces, from the ranks of which the proposed Soviet elements in Egypt were largely to be drawn and, as it turned out, their commander was also to be chosen), and, almost inevitably, Admiral Gorshkov, who had been intimately involved in Soviet-Egyptian relations and Eastern Mediterranean affairs for at least four to five years prior to this development. There is no way of ascertaining whether the recommendation of this group was unanimous and, if not, who favored which approach. However, the arm of the services least likely to favor Soviet Mediterranean ventures and most inclined to regard them as a wasteful diversion of resources that would have minimal effect on the really decisive military arenas, namely, the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, apparently remained unrepresented on this occasion.

Those present, if the guiding assumptions are correct, probably backed the interventionist recommendation with varying degrees of warmth and for somewhat different reasons: (1) Both Grechko and Gorshkov had become linked rather closely with the fortunes

of Soviet policy toward Egypt, including (certainly in Gorshkov's case) the fateful decision after the Six-Day War not to abandon Nasser, but to resupply him massively with Soviet hardware, using the Soviet navy as a protective screen for the operation. Both men had emerged as vociferous protagonists of a new emphasis on the *political* task of the armed forces, namely, "extending Soviet prestige and influence" — i.e., utilizing these forces, by means well short of nuclear war or the danger thereof, for missions that would create a wide periphery of Soviet protectorates and client states in key areas overseas, especially the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Neither officer, therefore, could afford to watch with equanimity yet another Egyptian defeat (and vicarious blow to Soviet prestige in the area), or the complete abandonment of existing Soviet policies and politico-military investments in Egypt.

(2) In Gorshkov's case, the Soviet navy required air cover and other essential services from Egyptian shore-based facilities, at least until a new Soviet aircraft carrier (or carriers) could be launched from Black Sea shipyards in a building program apparently approved in principle before the War of Attrition. While Egypt increasingly had made such facilities available to the USSR during previous years, Soviet advisers seemingly had become convinced of Egypt's incapacity to provide adequate air cover and defense for these valuable establishments, which would be unacceptably vulnerable to air attack and, therefore, useless to the Soviet navy, unless protected by sophisticated Soviet military equipment operated by *Soviet* crews. At least as an interim measure, therefore, Gorshkov apparently favored the new project, even if, most probably, he regretted the fact that it would place the Soviet presence in Egypt primarily under the supervision of P.V.O. Strany.

(3) With regard to P.V.O. Strany, it may be surmised that its representative regarded the interventionist recommendation with mixed feelings, welcoming the proposed ascendancy of this arm of the Soviet services in a new arena and, more importantly, rejoicing that a hot war "realistic proving grounds" would be provided in Egypt for testing the efficacy of sophisticated Soviet electronic and other equipment and personnel in battle conditions against high-quality Western aircraft, at a safe distance from the Soviet homeland and without having to depend on Chinese "good will." On the other hand, P.V.O. Strany must have felt great reluctance to emplace valuable equipment in an area where it would be protected *on the ground* against eager pro-Western hands only by the Egyptian army.

In any case, whatever the precise considerations of the various military representatives may have been, it is clear that their recommendations were not accepted by the civilian leadership without further evaluation. Several months elapsed before the appearance of the first sign (from the data now available) that the Kremlin had reached a general decision, at least in principle, favoring the military recommendation to build up a Soviet combat capability in Egypt, including interceptor pilots and crews for sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. At a meeting of members of the Warsaw Pact, sometime in November 1969 (i.e., four to five months after the military recommendation was made, one month

prior to the Israeli deep penetration raids, two months before Nasser's secret Moscow visit, and three months before the first Soviet combat elements actually appeared in Egypt), Soviet representatives mentioned the plan to their allies, possibly because it was originally intended to stage this operation as a Warsaw Pact rather than purely Soviet action, perhaps by including some symbolic East European contingents.⁴

The reason for this prolonged delay in reaching a decision was almost certainly factional dissension within the Soviet civilian leadership concerning the wisdom of accepting the military recommendation. Diligent studies have been made elsewhere of perceptible differences of emphasis and approach toward Egypt and the Middle East in general on the part of certain Soviet organs and some figures in the leadership; they leave little doubt that this issue and related Middle East problems have continued throughout the whole of the period, and up until now, to be a subject of contention within the Kremlin. On the basis of the detailed considerations and analogies presented earlier in this article, as well as the more directly related analyses mentioned above, it is possible to reconstruct the general form and much of the content of this factional dispute, with a reasonably educated guess as to who some of the protagonists⁵ may have been:

The opponents of a potentially risky further Soviet involvement in the Middle East are unlikely to have expressed their antagonism boldly, in frank confrontation with the more interventionist group, especially if, as seems almost certain, the military recommendation from the very beginning, or from an early stage, enjoyed the support of the *primus inter pares*, Brezhnev himself. As explained earlier, such behavior would not be considered proper "form" among communist leaders in the USSR or elsewhere; instead, as various precedents indicate, opposition of this kind usually is expressed by way of caveats, warnings, misgivings, or even polite requests for the fulfillment of certain conditions (sometimes specifically written into the record), rather than through a futile attempt to veto a proposal supported by the number one member of the "collective leadership."

As indicated by the succession of developments that will be analyzed and that apparently had to take place before the interventionist group in the Kremlin could gather sufficient support — or produce sufficiently convincing replies to the misgivings expressed by its more cautious opponents — for the actual dispatch of Soviet combatants, it would seem not too fanciful to speculate that the anti-interventionists made the following points: They would not, of course, stand in Brezhnev's way, if he was really convinced that the military recommendations were appropriate and wise

⁴An abortive move in this direction appears to have been made subsequently.

⁵Throughout this reconstruction of developments in Moscow, such terms as "interventionists" and "anti-interventionists," "forward" faction and "moderates," will be employed merely as convenient shorthand to describe the protagonists in the "debate," rather than to imply that there are permanent "hawks" or "doves" in the Kremlin. As we have noted, the various factions in the leadership are perfectly capable of changing sides, of adopting and dropping various issues, as tactical considerations may require; with some exceptions, these issues are exploited as convenient tactical weapons in a struggle for power, rather than regarded as platforms to which the respective factions must be wedded eternally.

under current conditions. However, for the record (and they would appreciate it if this appeared in the minutes for future reference) they would like to express these caveats and misgivings:

(1) Could one really assume that, because of severe constraints on the U.S. administration, the Viet Nam syndrome, neo-isolationism, and the like, the White House would simply stand by and watch Soviet combat personnel being introduced into a key East-West contest area like the Middle East? Could one ignore the fact that the Soviet buildup would take place in the midst of a hot war, for the specific purpose of helping Egypt to overcome an adversary like the Israelis, who had repeatedly proven the quality of their armed forces as well as their utter determination if threatened with extinction, and who undoubtedly would regard Soviet intervention as a threat to their survival and would react with desperate measures? Would this not confront the USSR with another "Finland," with all the ignominy that memory recalled, and would it not require a Soviet buildup of some 150,000 Russians in Egypt rather than 20,000, if a victory over Israel really was to be achieved? Would these Soviet troops then not constitute a veritable hostage to fortune, at the mercy of NATO, linked to the far-off Soviet homeland by a slender lifeline passing through NATO territory (Turkey), a line practically begging to be cut by superior NATO elements in the Mediterranean? Was the onus not on those comrades advocating such a venture to demonstrate convincingly that the eventualities mentioned were not merely unlikely but practically out of the question? Was not even a 5 per cent chance of a total confrontation with the United States over the Suez area prohibitively high, nay suicidal? Should there not be some practical proof that the chances were less than one in a hundred?

(2) If, to avoid such contingencies, the Soviet buildup were of relatively modest proportions, how would that help Egypt to win? And if it did not achieve that objective, would it not arouse Arab feelings of frustration, disappointment and ingratitude toward the USSR rather than scoring a Soviet triumph in the Arab world? What kind of leadership, regime, state, army and society did Egypt have, anyway, to warrant such intimate linking of her fortunes with those of the USSR? Everyone knew how fickle Nasser was and how he had quarreled with Khrushchev; moreover, had not Soviet doctors reported that he was a very sick man? Who would his successors be and how reliable were they? Was it not a typically Middle East habit to play off the various great powers against one another? Would Egypt not continue playing this game, even with Soviet combat elements emplaced there and would this not endanger them? Was not the whole policy of buttressing military dictatorships in the Middle East unprincipled, since it led to the deliberate sacrifice of the local communist parties and their future? How many times did the Egyptian army have to be defeated and lose its Soviet equipment, including sophisticated items abandoned and captured intact by the adversary, thus exposing them to eager NATO eyes, and how many times would the USSR have to replace such equipment? Was this not a case of "throwing good money after bad"? Would the proposed Soviet move really make a decisive difference in this situation? If it did, it

would have to be of such proportions as to invite U.S. counter-intervention which was unacceptable, and if it did not, remaining within more modest parameters, would not its vulnerability outweigh its utility? In any case, under these circumstances, was not the onus on those comrades favoring the venture first to produce the necessary conditions to ensure that Egypt now could be relied upon, that it would act in accordance with Soviet desires, and that it would respond favorably to various essential Soviet demands?

Content analyses and various data indicate that the above points reflect the general lines of contention within the Kremlin concerning Middle East policy during this period, and it is not of primary importance whether or not these precise arguments were voiced at one particular session of the top Soviet leadership. It does seem reasonably likely, however, that caveats and conditions of this kind were advanced by the supporters of a more cautious and anti-interventionist line in the Middle East, as part of an ongoing debate in the Kremlin after military representatives had submitted their recommendations. It may also be presumed that support for a forward policy was not strong enough initially to sweep aside these serious objections and that the protracted delay in reaching a final decision was due to attempts by the interventionists to meet some of their opponents' conditions, and, by so doing, take the wind out of their sails.

V

The most important of these conditions concerned the United States and its possible reactions, should Soviet combat personnel be sent to Egypt and, in its gradual probe toward the Suez Canal and Sinai, clash with the Israelis while providing an umbrella for an Egyptian operation to breach Israeli canal lines. The interesting fact is that, sometime in October 1969, the U.S. State Department, unknowingly, acted in a way that appeared to provide an answer to this vital question — an answer seeming to sustain the contention of the Soviet interventionists that the proposed venture was quite safe and to undermine the argument of their more cautious opponents that U.S. inaction could not be taken for granted and that Moscow should therefore refrain from the dispatch of combat personnel.

Late in 1969 Secretary of State Rogers delivered a policy address on the Middle East in which he presented a detailed blueprint for an Arab-Israeli settlement, subsequently known as the Rogers Plan. In the section concerning Israel and Egypt, he called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula, all the way back to the pre-1948 Egyptian-Palestinian frontier. It is now known that this section of the Rogers Plan was the result of prolonged, secret U.S.-Soviet contact (covering the very months when the Soviet military recommendation to send combat personnel to the area was the subject of prolonged argument in the Kremlin) and that Washington submitted it secretly, as its final official offer to the USSR, in *October*, some *six weeks before* the Secretary of State delivered his speech. It is most unlikely that the State Department was aware, at that time, of the "debate" in the Kremlin or of the way in which Moscow was bound

to interpret the U.S. offer within the context of that "debate." However, there can be little doubt that the Soviet interventionist group waved the U.S. proposal triumphantly in the air, so to speak, as constituting the evidence its more cautious opponents had requested — that Washington did *not* regard the Suez Canal as the demarcation line between the Western and Eastern spheres and would, therefore, *not* regard clashes there as requiring any U.S. reaction. On the contrary, Washington seemed to be ready to concede both Suez and Sinai to the Eastern sphere, at least vicariously via the USSR's friend and client, Egypt. Consequently, the dispatch of Soviet combat personnel to Egypt and the gradual probe toward the canal, and possibly beyond it, was not at all "adventuristic" as the more cautious elements in the Kremlin had intimated. (This, no doubt, was the reason why Moscow initially encouraged the United States to go ahead with the Rogers Plan, although the USSR subsequently reneged because Arab leaders believed even better conditions could be extracted from Washington.) At any rate, it was probably not coincidental that in November 1969, a bare week or two after the U.S. plan was submitted to Moscow, Soviet representatives informed their Warsaw Pact allies that the recommendation for combat intervention in Egypt had become Soviet policy — in other words, that the Soviet leadership had finally decided in favor of this move and that the forward faction in the Kremlin had overcome the objections of its more moderate opponents. The chronology strongly suggests a cause-and-effect relationship between the transmission of the Rogers Plan in October and the signs in November that a decision in principle had been reached.

At this point, no doubt, planning and essential preparations for the complex logistic and other aspects of the operation were under way in the Soviet Union, and it remained only to meet some of the caveats and misgivings of the Kremlin "opposition" concerning Egypt's future conduct and reliability. With this aim in mind, the Soviet leadership was surely pleased to take advantage of Nasser's military and political plight at the end of 1969, when his War of Attrition had turned against him, by suggesting that, if he came to Moscow, he might find the USSR willing to rescue him. This is a far more likely explanation of his secret Moscow visit in January 1970 than the version that he decided, on his own initiative, to fly suddenly to the Soviet capital and ask for help. First, it would have been quite sufficient to transmit a personal letter via the Soviet ambassador; and in the second place no one, including friends and clients, drops in uninvited on the Kremlin. The reason why Soviet leaders may have preferred to bring the Egyptian President secretly to Moscow was to confront him, almost alone, with the full, united and awesome pressure of the Kremlin, at a time when he was in dire need of Soviet help.

It seems highly likely that Nasser — almost certainly unaware that the USSR, independently of his requests, had decided in principle to send combat elements to Egypt — was presented with a Soviet "offer" of military forces, contingent on certain undertakings from the Egyptian side. Some such understanding was presumably reached during the Moscow visit, whether formally or informally, dealing with Egypt's future policies vis-à-vis the USSR.

and the United States, and with special military security provisions concerning not only the Soviet combat elements to be dispatched shortly to Egypt but also the facilities already granted there to Soviet naval and air units patrolling the Mediterranean. In this way the interventionists in the Kremlin apparently were able to meet at least some of the conditions their opponents had laid down for any Soviet combat role in Egypt. By the time Nasser returned home, Moscow's planning and preparations for the new Soviet military presence in Egypt were well advanced, having proceeded for at least three months; consequently, the first Soviet combat elements arrived within a comparatively short period, by February 1970.

VI

What happened between February 1970, when the "forward" group in the Kremlin seemed to have won all of its internal battles against opponents of Soviet intervention, and July 1972, when everything apparently turned sour and Soviet combat elements were suddenly withdrawn, amid public signs of conflict between Cairo and Moscow?

The simple fact is that the anti-interventionists in the Kremlin were proven, during this period, to have been right in almost all of their contentions.⁶

The United States and Israel

Precisely as the more cautious group of Soviet leaders had feared, the United States, despite appearances during February-September 1970 to the contrary, turned out to be far from a "paper tiger." After prolonged indecision following the first establishment of the Soviet combat crews in the Nile valley, which lasted even for a short while after these crews pushed forward toward the banks of the Suez Canal, the Nixon-Kissinger team suddenly implemented its new policy of "planned U.S. unpredictability" by pouring sophisticated planes, electronic equipment, drones and artillery into Israel to balance the new factor on the other side of the canal. This left little doubt about U.S. unwillingness to permit a Soviet combat role in assisting Egypt to cross the canal and confounded earlier Soviet expectations.

If Moscow still harbored any uncertainty about U.S. determination in the Eastern Mediterranean, it was rapidly dispelled by the reaction of the White House to Soviet behavior during the Jordanian civil war. While King Hussein and his Arab Legion were taking action against the extremist elements that had almost seized power in Jordan, Syrian armor, organized, trained and perhaps even accompanied by Soviet military experts, poured across the Jordanian frontier to assist the king's adversaries. The U.S. Sixth Fleet rapidly moved in the general direction of the Syrian-Lebanese-Israeli coast, and Washington signaled Moscow that, unless Syrian armor were withdrawn immediately, not only might

⁶The events described here are not presented in chronological order, but rather are grouped according to topic.

there be action by Sixth Fleet aircraft, but the U.S. government would prove quite understanding if Israel decided to unleash its air force to prevent a hostile Syria from establishing a puppet regime in Jordan. Moscow apparently understood the message, since the Syrians immediately turned around and retreated across the frontier.

The United States had thus shown that it was a far more formidable adversary in the region than the Kremlin's forward group had believed in 1969, and the Soviet anti-interventionists were proven equally correct with regard to the possible complications and dangers of tangling with the Israelis. When Soviet interceptor and missile elements first appeared in the Nile Delta, Israeli Defense Minister Dayan warned that Israel was prepared to accept the *fait accompli* only as long as these elements did not move much closer to the canal bank. This was apparently misconstrued in Moscow as evidence that the Israelis were shrinking away from confrontation. Consequently, Soviet interceptor crews, speaking Russian over open communication channels (as a warning to the Israelis that they were not dealing with Egyptians), were sent to fly missions over the canal. To the amazement of the Kremlin interventionist faction, the Israelis promptly ambushed these Soviet pilots and their advanced MiG-21 planes and shot down four or five of them. This was but an earnest of Israeli determination when confronted by a real threat, precisely as the more cautious Kremlin group is believed to have warned in the summer of 1969.

The scenario ascribed to the Soviet anti-interventionist faction thus turned out to be all too real: a Soviet combat buildup of the relatively modest proportions first planned would fail to frighten off the Israelis, but would constitute enough of a threat to provoke some fairly desperate measures on their part. Therefore, if the Soviet intervention was to have worthwhile results, it would require a massive Soviet buildup in Egypt. However, the U.S. government had also demonstrated that it was far less impotent and far more unpredictable than the Kremlin interventionists had originally believed, so that a really large-scale Soviet influx into the area might provoke Washington into cutting the slender lifeline linking the Soviet presence in Egypt to its home base via NATO territory. Under these circumstances, it was evident that Soviet combat elements in Egypt could not become engaged in an offensive across the Suez Canal, i.e., could not really help the USSR's client militarily, but, at most, could assist Egypt in exerting politico-psychological pressure upon Israel and the United States.

Egypt

With regard to Egypt, too, the more pessimistic, anti-interventionist Soviet view was gradually borne out by events. President Nasser died and, with him, whatever mutual understanding may have been reached during his Moscow visit. A struggle for succession broke out in Cairo, during which both contending parties expected Soviet support and were angry when the Kremlin adopted a cautious, neutralist course — President Sadat because he regarded himself as Nasser's legitimate successor, and Ali Sabri because he saw himself as politically closer to the USSR. After

winning, Sadat showed his displeasure with Moscow for its attitude during the struggle and for the communist role during the upheaval in neighboring Sudan, by resorting to the old game of playing off the great powers against each other. He appeared unwilling to implement the commitments Moscow believed it had extracted from his predecessor in January 1970.

It was to reinforce these commitments and to place Soviet-Egyptian relations on a more permanent footing, irrespective of internal changes in Cairo, that Soviet President Podgorny suddenly appeared in the Egyptian capital in the spring of 1971, pulled out of his pocket a prepared text, and told the Egyptians that they would have to sign on the dotted line if they expected sustained Soviet support. Sadat did sign what became known as the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship, but each side chose to interpret it differently. The Egyptian President claimed subsequently that he understood the USSR to have promised certain "offensive" weapons and Soviet direct combat support during a crossing of the canal. The Soviet leaders apparently retorted that the Soviet Union had delivered all of the offensive weapons it could spare and that Egypt was capable of absorbing and utilizing; as for direct combat support in an offensive across the canal, the Kremlin, following its chastening experiences with unexpected U.S. and Israeli toughness, must have informed Cairo that direct involvement of Soviet military elements in such a crossing was now out of the question.

As long as this Soviet decision remained unknown in the West, as Sadat understood it would remain, the continued Soviet military presence in Egypt was still useful to him, since it constituted a politico-psychological means of pressure on both the United States and Israel. However, even this aspect lost its utility when, in the spring of 1972, the Soviet leadership, which had already decided in principle not to intervene directly in the Eastern Mediterranean, felt that it might as well "sell" this decision to Washington in return for certain American concessions. During the Moscow Summit of 1972, therefore, the Kremlin as much as told the U.S. President that it was prepared to abstain from such interventionist action — as a special "favor" to its guests, of course — if in return it obtained some *quid pro quo*. Both sides left the summit with a clear impression that such a deal had been made.

From the Egyptian point of view, the Soviet military presence became useless at this point: if both the United States and Israel *knew* that the Soviet forces would not engage in combat, their presence could not be exploited even as a politico-psychological threat; moreover, Sadat was bound to, and did, regard Soviet behavior at the summit as a breach of the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty, which had been interpreted by both parties as an undertaking not to make deals about each other's vital interests behind each other's backs. The Soviet leadership was aware of this aspect, but was unconcerned inasmuch as it was quite prepared to withdraw its combat elements now that their utility was exhausted and the original plans for their employment had been proven infeasible.

Beyond doubt developments involving the United States, Israel

and Egypt had demonstrated that the misgivings and warnings apparently voiced by the anti-interventionists in the Kremlin during the 1969 debate (and duly recorded, in all likelihood, in various official minutes), had been amply warranted. As a result, sometime in 1971-1972, the original supporters of the forward move in the Eastern Mediterranean must have lost strength, until the Kremlin's decision was finally reversed. This undoubtedly became clear to the Egyptians sometime after the Moscow Summit in spring 1972, and Sadat was merely "saving face" when he anticipated the obvious next Soviet move by asking Soviet combat elements to leave. They left, not because they had been requested to go, but because the Kremlin must have decided weeks earlier that this should be done in the near future.

VII

In a tentative and speculative way, partly by means of content analysis,⁷ an attempt can be made to establish some of the protagonists in the Kremlin debate.

There is little doubt that Brezhnev originally favored intervention, and although he reversed himself when it became tactically necessary, he probably did so reluctantly and apparently under pressure. Shelest seems to have supported him, although it is not clear whether he participated in the original "debate." (His subsequent purge was due to other causes.) Suslov appears to have been skeptical about the proposed military move, and is believed to have had consistent reservations about Soviet support for Third World military dictatorships, since it has usually (and especially in Egypt) entailed Soviet sacrifice of the local communist parties — Suslov's own "constituents." (Suslov's aide, Ponomarev, has made no bones about his feelings on this matter.) Podgorny seems to have joined the anti-interventionists at times when the whole venture appeared to be going sour, although he may not have been consistent throughout the whole period. Shelepin may or may not have participated in the original "debate," but he seems to have been sniping fairly persistently at Brezhnev's Middle East policy, if the organ *Trud* is an indicator of his views. Shelepin's rivalry with Brezhnev is no secret; he had been prominent in the conduct of Soviet Middle East policy in 1964-1965 and then had been demoted gradually on all sectors by Brezhnev. There are no indications concerning the views of other members of the leadership.

Brezhnev's own part in this affair seems to demonstrate that he is far from being a "dove" or a consistent supporter of détente, as it has become fashionable in the West to claim. He may have reversed himself in time not to suffer serious political damage, but the episode certainly did not prove helpful to his career and ambitions. Given his well-known persistence, it should have been clear that he would not accept this reversal as the final word, but would attempt to achieve his goals in the region in less direct and overt, and therefore less risky, ways.

In retrospect, it would seem that he found an opening for the

⁷Unfortunately, documentation here would be far too bulky, requiring lengthy and tedious interpretation. Moreover, much of this particular type of content analysis has been done by others.

pursuit of a new, slightly more circumspect, but nevertheless forward and offensive policy, in the Soviet-U.S. "deal" made at the 1972 Moscow Summit (which found expression in the joint statement published by the superpowers at the conclusion of the summit). Brezhnev could, and probably did, tell his colleagues in the months following the summit that all the United States had a right to expect after the 1972 meeting was that, in the Middle East, Soviet forces would not be used directly in a combat capacity. He knew, of course (since he and other Soviet officials had done their best to foster American illusions by discreet nods and smiles on appropriate occasions), that his U.S. guests had left Moscow with the distinct impression that Soviet promises not to take unilateral advantage of crisis situations in regions of conflict implied much more. To be precise, Washington now believed that Moscow would not only refrain from direct Soviet combat intervention in areas like the Eastern Mediterranean rim, but would (1) ensure that other communist states did likewise; (2) discourage the USSR's Arab clients from resorting to force, by curtailing rather than escalating Soviet arms deliveries, as well as by employing the required amount of diplomatic pressure; (3) inform the United States immediately of any evidence that these clients were bent upon war, Soviet efforts notwithstanding; and (4) collaborate promptly with Washington, both directly and in the UN Security Council, to prevent, or immediately terminate, armed incursions against neighboring states by these Soviet clients.

However, Brezhnev presumably argued in the Kremlin that, given an appropriate occasion such as a U.S. crisis, domestic or other, it would be entirely possible for Moscow to ignore the outer parameters of Washington's understanding of the 1972 summit deal; as long as direct Soviet combat intervention did not actually take place in the Middle East, the U.S. administration probably would be too eager to salvage something from its cherished new achievement of détente to permit itself or others to admit that the USSR was violating most of the spirit and some of the letter of the 1972 superpower "declaration of intent."

It appears that Brezhnev and his forward faction assuaged the misgivings in the Soviet leadership by pointing out the following: (1) A major concession already had been made to the "moderates" in the Kremlin by assuring the U.S. government that the USSR would eschew direct intervention and by actually withdrawing sizeable Soviet combat elements from Egypt. (2) The proposal now was merely to return to Moscow's pre-1969-1972 Middle East policy, but to pursue it with greater efficiency, refinement and sophistication so as to recoup Soviet prestige in that part of the world.

Brezhnev's new plan, as submitted to his colleagues, seems to have consisted of these interconnected elements:

(1) A further Soviet buildup of the forces of the "progressive" Arab regimes — Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria — starting in the fall of 1972 and escalating gradually during the subsequent year. They would be supplied with highly sophisticated weapons which the USSR had been unable to spare previously and which would extend even to items not previously given to noncommunist states, but they would be accompanied this time by intensive training of

the most thorough kind.

(2) As extra insurance against renewed failure or incompetence on the part of the Middle East recipients, some of the most complex new hardware would be handled in combat not by Arab or Soviet or Warsaw Pact personnel, but by military elements from other communist countries, whose death or capture would not involve a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.

(3) Most remaining Soviet military advisers would be withdrawn in a demonstrative fashion once the USSR's Middle East clients were ready for combat and had decided to proceed to war, as an "alibi" to convince Washington that Moscow at least had not defaulted on its basic commitment to eschew direct combat involvement.

(4) Moscow's clients then would go into offensive deployment, exploiting an occasion when the United States was distracted by a domestic or other crisis, and the Israelis would be forced to mobilize their citizen army, a costly operation that they could not sustain for long or repeat continuously.

(5) Once the Israelis had mobilized, their opponents would back off, but would return to offensive dispositions as soon as the Israeli alert was called off, and the whole maneuver would be replayed until the Israelis, because of economic drain or because their vigilance gradually had become dulled, were caught responding tardily.

(6) Moscow's clients would thus, at the least, achieve a tactical surprise which, if it did not suffice for them to gain a final and decisive victory, would probably be enough to drag Israel into a relatively long, defensive struggle, the attrition of which might prove too much for a small state.

(7) To ensure its clients "longer breath" than Israel during such an attrition period, the USSR would rapidly launch a massive air-and-sea lift to its Middle East friends.

(8) As long as fighting favored its clients sufficiently for them to seize and hold ground, and to recoup prestige, the USSR would sabotage U.S. efforts, at the UN and elsewhere, to terminate the bloodshed.

(9) The moment the war turned against its clients, the Kremlin would insist on an immediate cease-fire in place, and would embarrass Washington into agreeing to it by suddenly offering at least partial support for the kind of proposals Washington undoubtedly would have made earlier, at the outbreak of war.

(10) If the Israelis demurred at being thus robbed of the fruits of victory and insisted that the invading forces be thrown back at least to the pre-conflict lines, Soviet leaders could always dramatically go through the motions of preparing the dispatch of an intervention force to the area; at this point Washington no doubt would attempt to deter Moscow, but at the same time would be only too eager to avoid an actual confrontation and, as a "compromise," would agree jointly with the USSR to impose a cease-fire upon the combatants.

(11) Such a naked demonstration of Soviet determination and might would have the additional advantage of making Cairo and Damascus say "thank you, Moscow" rather than "thank you,

Moscow and Washington" for being rescued in time. Moscow's clients would end up with some symbolically important territorial gains and would have caused Israel painful losses, and Soviet prestige would be triumphantly restored — all this without real danger of nuclear confrontation with the United States, since Soviet combat forces would not actually be involved. Above all, Washington, frightened by this dramatic orchestration of the Arab-Soviet claim that the Middle East really was a "tinderbox," would pressure Israel into a basically pro-Arab settlement to avoid further dangers. This would constitute substantial proof that it paid to be a client of Moscow rather than of Washington.

It is not too difficult, *ex post facto*, to reconstruct these basic elements of Brezhnev's scenario, and it appears unlikely that his Kremlin opponents could have mustered as much political ammunition against it as they did against the far more risky and adventurous intervention plan Brezhnev initiated in 1969-1970.

VIII

Various parts of this scheme were, indeed, implemented during the year or so that preceded the "October War" and during subsequent weeks:

(1) The four "progressive" Soviet Middle East clients, whose forces and weapons were to be wholly or partially committed against Israel, received during this rather brief period of twelve or thirteen months the following weapons: some 450-500 additional medium, heavy and amphibious tanks (including a sizeable number of the T-62, the main Warsaw Pact tank never previously⁸ sent outside the bloc); more than 100 additional self-propelled guns; some 1,400 additional armored personnel carriers; about 1,200 additional medium and heavy field guns and howitzers; several hundred additional anti-aircraft guns; at least 150 additional surface-to-surface missiles (including FROG 3 and FROG 7, and, for the first time outside the Warsaw Pact, the Samlet and SCUD); some 30-35 additional naval units (including more Komar and Osa missile boats); some 350-400 additional warplanes (including Tu-22 bombers, sent for the first time to countries outside the Warsaw Pact, more Tu-16 bombers, a sophisticated version of the MiG-21,⁹ additional Su-7, some large transport planes and many new helicopters, including Mi-6 and Mi-8); and, finally, enough additional SAM's to equip some 35-40 new SAM sites (not only more SAM-2 and SAM-3, but at least 120 of the mobile and highly sophisticated SAM-6 batteries,¹⁰ as well as the SAM-7 Strela, which can be employed by infantry against warplanes, and which had never previously been handed over to noncommunist forces). These deliveries did not taper off, but escalated as October 1973 approached; for instance, the Tu-22

⁸Except for a small advance shipment dispatched to Egypt for training purposes earlier in 1972.

⁹These aircraft had been entrusted only to Soviet combat personnel prior to July 1972 and were then withdrawn; but subsequently they were dispatched back to Egypt, although the lack of properly trained Egyptian pilots required that they be flown in many instances by North Koreans.

¹⁰Of the SAM-6 there had been a much smaller number, entrusted only to Soviet combat personnel, in Egypt prior to July 1972; later large quantities were dispatched to Egypt and Syria, although their operation was usually supervised by North Vietnamese.

bombers and massive supplies of SAM-6, as well as surface-to-surface missiles, arrived just weeks before the outbreak of the war. Moreover, major Soviet resupplies of munitions arrived by sea at the very onset of hostilities; in view of the length of the sea journey, this indicates Soviet collusion at least two weeks before the war. Thus, there can be little doubt that the USSR was not only aware of the projected date of military operations, but approved and supported them, rather than attempting to restrain its clients."

(2) The most complex and sophisticated of the Soviet systems were handed over some weeks prior to hostilities to non-Warsaw Pact communist personnel — North Korean, in the case of the latest versions of the MiG-21, and North Vietnamese (trained during the air defense of Hanoi and Haiphong), in the case of some SAM-3 and many of the SAM-6 batteries. It is inconceivable that this could have occurred without Soviet approval, indeed without the Kremlin's active help and initiative.

(3) It was after this development that some of the Soviet advisers were flown out of the Middle East, rather openly and visibly, for political reasons that have already been explained, but reinforcing the evidence that the USSR knew precisely of the projected time of hostilities.

(4, 5, 6) Once its clients went into offensive deployment, Moscow not only did nothing to dissuade them, but did its best to help confuse foreign intelligence into believing that mere political and psychological maneuvers, rather than military operations, were contemplated.

(7) Almost immediately after the outbreak of fighting, the USSR prepared and then implemented its massive air-and-sea lift of arms and supplies to its clients, days before the United States responded by reinforcing the rapidly diminishing Israeli supplies.

(8) As long as Egyptian forces were advancing across the canal into Sinai and the Syrians into the Golan Heights, Moscow insouciantly sabotaged all U.S. attempts to activate the UN Security Council and rebuffed other U.S. approaches to bring hostilities to an end.

(9) Once it was apparent that the Israelis had regained the initiative and were about to crush their adversaries, the Kremlin summoned Secretary Kissinger to Moscow to initiate joint Soviet-U.S. moves to stop the Israeli army before it could complete its task and while a remnant still remained of the original Egyptian bridgeheads east of the Suez Canal.¹¹

¹¹As part of this agreement, and to reward, as it were, the sudden Soviet willingness to "cooperate," the United States was persuaded to approve the imposition, through the UN Security Council, of an almost immediate cease-fire "in place" — despite the fact that the combatants were almost inextricably intertwined, with several enclaves east and west of the Suez Canal; that there was no immediate way of separating them; that there was a glaring lack of reference to any machinery for establishing just where "in place" was. Indeed, all the elements ensuring further bloodshed and dispute were present. Thus, the invading force, at least on the Suez Canal front, was awarded some of the territory it had seized in the initial days of the war. Moreover, the U.S. government consented to the omission in the proposed new Security Council resolution of any mention of an exchange of prisoners of war, despite the fact that the Israelis had always insisted that this be an integral part of the cessation of hostilities, and that Kissinger himself had made a final political set-

(10) The resulting UN Security Council cease-fire order was followed, under the circumstances, by entirely foreseeable chaos, since it came at the climax of a military campaign rather than after its natural culmination. Hurried attempts to achieve last-minute advantages were bound to cause escalation rather than diminution of fighting. The Egyptian Third Army, encircled at the southeastern end of the Suez Canal, and equipped apparently with highly sophisticated and sensitive Soviet weapons, accompanied perhaps by supervisory personnel from communist countries, tried desperately to break out, while the Israelis attempted to strengthen their ring of encirclement. It was this situation that Moscow utilized for one of its most dramatic maneuvers. A few days after the Moscow "Little Summit" and the joint U.S.-Soviet resolution at the Security Council, the USSR placed six of its seven airborne divisions on emergency alert and dispatched a crudely threatening note to Washington, which warned the U.S. government to pressure Israel into permitting the trapped Egyptians on the Israeli side of the Suez Canal to reopen their link with Egyptian forces west of the canal — otherwise, Soviet troops would have no choice but to come in and crush Israel. This was an obvious psychological maneuver. Had Moscow seriously intended to move in, there would have been no preliminary note and no other visible signals, until Soviet units actually descended from the skies. The note produced the expected U.S. counterploy of a stern reply and an American military counteralert. However, it also led to the equally expected U.S. attempt to salvage some remnant of détente by offering Moscow compromises in the form of considerable American pressure on the Israelis to permit vital supplies to pass to the surrounded Egyptians, as well as American acceptance of a renewed UN Emergency Force¹² that, late in October 1973, could serve only as a screen behind which the retreating Egyptians could find shelter and reconsolidate their forces, instead of confronting their Israeli adversaries in truly direct and untrammelled negotiations, free of preconditions.

(11) Brezhnev clearly expected the result to be a major recouping of Soviet prestige, which had been seriously weakened in 1967 and again in 1972, and a strengthening of his own power and

tlement concerning Viet Nam hinge almost entirely on this question.

Finally, Washington accepted a text with some Soviet overtones regarding essential elements of a political settlement to follow the cease-fire. UN Resolution 242, of November 1967, with all its famous ambiguities, had been specifically declared by its original authors, Britain's Lord Caradon and America's Arthur Goldberg, to be a skeleton of general principles that was not self-implementable but could lead to a settlement only if the parties directly concerned negotiated the essential details, which had been intentionally omitted or left vague. Yet, the 1973 Moscow "Little Summit" produced a Security Council resolution which, in addition to a prompt cease-fire, called for "immediate implementation" of Resolution 242, a patently infeasible undertaking. Negotiations between the parties "under appropriate auspices" were mentioned in a subsequent paragraph of the joint U.S.-Soviet resolution of October 1973, but without explicitly linking these negotiations to the "implementation" of the November 1967 resolution. If that resolution indeed were "implemented," there would be nothing left to negotiate about; if, on the other hand, it could not be "implemented" without negotiations, the latter obviously had to *precede* "implementation." The U.S.-Soviet agreement was worded in a way that was more likely to prevent than to further a final resolution of the conflict.

¹²The UNEF had been anathema to the Israelis ever since its pitiful performance in withdrawing precipitously in May 1967 at Egypt's request, and thus rendering hostilities inevitable.

prestige within the Kremlin "collective," where the developments of 1969-1972 had proved less than helpful to him. The Arab world seemed bound to regard new U.S. concessions (to all appearances at the expense of America's friends and, perhaps, her own security interests) as a sign of Western weakness, since they followed in the wake of a dramatic Soviet threat. Moscow had persistently told its Middle East friends ever since 1967 that, if only they proved patient and followed the Soviet lead, they would find that the USSR would not only aid them directly to restore their self-confidence, but would successfully pressure the United States and, through it, the Israelis, into far-reaching concessions.

IX

At the end of October 1973, it appeared that Brezhnev's calculations might be paying off, although time alone would tell. If by some chance his forward policy in the Middle East should prove a failure once more, his more cautious and non-interventionist rivals in the Kremlin, disparate though their factions and motivations might be, could be expected to combine to clip his wings and lead Soviet policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean, at least temporarily, into quieter and less disturbing channels. In that eventuality, the West might well discover that it had "bet on the wrong horse" in the Kremlin. However, the forward faction in Moscow, as of now, must be generally satisfied with the results of its policies. Given the record of that faction, including Brezhnev, as analyzed in this article, this development should give rise to serious misgivings in the West, rather than engendering premature feelings of relief.¹³

¹³The author is well aware of the "speculative" flavor of portions of his reconstruction of developments, but he believes the exercise is useful nonetheless, at least by posing serious questions that previously have been by-passed or overlooked, and, hopefully, by shedding some light on the general nature of the Soviet policy and decision-making process.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN SOVIET STRATEGY

DR. WYNFRED JOSHUA

THE AUTHOR: Dr. Wynfred Joshua, Assistant Director of the Stanford Research Institute Strategic Studies Center, at Arlington, Virginia, is a specialist in European and Middle East areas, with particular focus on defense issues. She received her B.A. degree from the University of Amsterdam, M.A. degree from Western Reserve University and Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. She has contributed extensively to professional journals. She was co-author of *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy*, co-author of *Strategy for the West: American-Allied Relations in Transition*, and author of *Soviet Penetration in the Middle East and Nuclear Weapons in the Atlantic Alliance*.

IN BRIEF

Ancient Russian dreams of hegemony in the Mediterranean and the Middle East approach fulfillment in the Soviet presence and influence in the area. Aside from the ideological struggle and the goal of removing U.S. influence from the region, the Soviet Union had more immediate needs for oil, for liberation from the restraints imposed by British imperial policy and for opening a new naval strategy with worldwide horizons. The Arab-Israeli conflict has provided a basis for expanding Soviet influence in the Arab states. Soviet aid to the Arab states and influence on U.S. policy made new gains in the October 1973 war. Despite the brilliant diplomatic success of Secretary Kissinger's mediation, strategic success lay with the Soviet Union.

If Peter the Great could look at the Middle East today, he would no doubt feel that his dreams of a Russian Empire extending southwards into the Mediterranean and across the Middle East were being realized. Soviet presence and influence can be found throughout the area: from Algeria at the Western Gate; Egypt, Syria, Iraq at the Center; to Yemen, Southern Yemen and Somalia at the Eastern entrance. Most Arab states, notably the radical Arab states, remain heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for political support, military aid and some economic and industrial know-how.

One strategic result of the Six-Day War in 1967 was the permanent entry into the Mediterranean of a sizeable Soviet fleet. The more recent Yom Kippur War legitimized Soviet involvement in the Middle East. Furthermore,

the Soviets once more re-established their claim of being the true friends of the Arab world.

In addition, the anticipated opening of the Suez Canal will soon enable the Soviets to augment and support the naval units they maintain in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets would then be in a position to control the shortest water route from the Black Sea or Europe to the Persian Gulf. In almost all the main ports along the Suez-Red Sea route, the Soviet Union is the principal external power.

Soviet penetration is not simply the result of fortuitous circumstances which Moscow knew to exploit, such as the erosion of the West European presence in the Middle East, the British withdrawal from east of Suez, or even the Arab-Israeli conflict. These developments have, of course, been very conducive to Soviet

Reprinted from *Strategic Review*, Vol II, No. 2, (Spring 1974), pp. 61-67, by permission of The United States Strategic Institute, Boston. This article was reproduced at USAADS with special permission, and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

inroads. But it would be a mistake to assume that Soviet policies and strategy were largely reactive to opportunities that presented themselves. Soviet strategy has an integrity of its own and is conditioned by historical and ideological factors. Without necessarily having a master plan on which each future move is charted, Soviet policies are designed toward a set of global strategic objectives. It is the movement toward these basic objectives as well as the global objectives themselves which lends the ideological cast to Soviet policies and strategy. Within this framework, however, the Soviets have proven themselves to be flexible and pragmatic, and can act unencumbered by ideological constraints.

Soviet Aims Old and New

For the Soviet Union, as the principal Eurasian landpower with naval-maritime aspirations, the Middle East with its strategic character has been a target since the days of the Czars. The Middle East countries near or adjacent to Soviet borders formed a barrier protecting Russia's southern flank; at the same time, they rendered Russian expansion southwards more difficult. The Turkish straits limited the usefulness of Russian Black Sea ports. Penetration into the Middle East and access to warm water ports on an open sea have traditionally been Russian goals.

But the vestiges of Czarist aspirations are not sufficient to explain Soviet interests. Soviet policies are also formulated within an ideological framework and in a coordinated fashion towards the achievement of major Soviet goals. Within this broader framework the neutralization and eventual Finlandization of Western Europe remains one of the most basic Soviet objectives. Another fundamental Soviet goal is to keep Chinese influence out of the Indian Ocean perimeter, isolate Red China, and neutralize it as a military factor.

Soviet hegemony in the Middle East would mean, on the one hand, that Western Europe would have been outflanked from the south. On the other hand, it would make Soviet control over the Suez artery possible, and, by facilitating thereby the support and expansion of the Soviet Indian Ocean task force, a major step towards the encirclement of Communist China. Also within an ideological framework,

Soviet efforts and activities in the Middle East are at least in part designed to prove to their Chinese rivals that they continue to be the vanguard of the world communist movement.

At the same time, Soviet domination over the waterways and water masses around the Middle East fit into a global maritime strategy. While Soviet strategists originally viewed the role of the Soviet navy as protecting the Soviet land mass, since the 1960s they have stressed its utility in extending Soviet power and reach throughout the world.

Beyond strategic and ideological considerations, Moscow has a growing interest in Middle Eastern oil. First, while estimates of Soviet oil needs in the short- and long-term vary, most projections indicate that Soviet domestic consumption is expected to outrun Soviet production. Indeed, it is a telling point that the Soviets started some years ago with energy saving measures at home. So far, prospects for exploiting the Siberian oil reserves to meet rising domestic demands are limited at best. Second, the USSR provides more than half of the East European oil requirements, which are expected to rise substantially by 1980. Soviet control or influence over these oil supplies—whether directly from Middle East producers or indirectly through Soviet channels—would be a powerful lever to retain Moscow's sway over Eastern Europe. Third, probably even more important is the heavy dependence of Western Europe and Japan, and, to a lesser extent, of the United States on Middle East oil as the current energy crisis so dramatically shows. Soviet hands on the oil spigots of the Middle East would give them a unique instrument for exploiting the fissures in the Western Alliance as the Yom Kippur War and its aftermath painfully demonstrated. Fourth, the interruption of oil supplies to NATO-Europe, the Sixth Fleet and other U.S. military forces in the theater would inevitably reduce NATO's defense capability and drastically narrow the range of options open to the Alliance in a crisis or war situation. Even the Seventh Fleet operating in Southeast Asia receives some 75 per cent of its black oil from the Persian Gulf. In short, the oil resources of the Middle East have added a major dimension to Soviet concern with the region.

Given these Soviet interests, Soviet objectives can best be divided into long-term and short-term goals. The long-term goal is to eliminate the

Western, notably the American, presence and influence, and to become the hegemonial power in the region, on the land mass as well as in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. The USSR aspires to change the political climate throughout the region into one favorable to Soviet interests and susceptible to Soviet coercion.

Naval Expansion

The short-term goals are of a tactical nature and vary from area to area and from situation to situation. Probably the most important short-term objective is the opening of the Suez Canal, which would enable Soviet ships to use the 2,200 mile route from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Currently most Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean are attached to the Pacific Fleet and have to make an 11,000 mile journey from their home bases around Vladivostok to the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region. Since 1968, when the Soviet Union introduced a permanent task force in the Indian Ocean, it has steadily increased its naval presence, as can be seen in the rise of Soviet ship-days from about 1,000 per year to some 9,000 ship-days in 1973. By the time of the Yom Kippur War Soviet ship-days had increased to a point where they exceeded those of the United States by a factor of four to one. It should not be forgotten that the political, economic, and military orientation of the coastal states will be conditioned by their perception of which super power appears to be gaining hegemony in the region.

Other short-term goals include the creation of a Montreux-type convention governing the transit through the Straits of Gibraltar. Soviet researchers visiting the United States have bluntly stated that such an arrangement was an objective of Moscow's maritime strategy. Soviet membership in a Montreux-type convention would score a major political victory for the USSR; it would accord international legitimacy to Soviet interest and involvement in controlling the gateway to the Mediterranean. The restrictive regulations covering the transit of naval ships would inevitably curtail the freedom of American and allied naval vessels.

The USSR also seeks to change the Mediterranean from an American into an international sea. With nearly 100 Soviet ships operating in the Mediterranean during the October 1973

War, this short-term objective appears to have been achieved. The Soviet naval presence is partly directed at the southern NATO members, notably Greece and Turkey. It creates a sense of encirclement and isolation, which feeds existing doubts as to the credibility of NATO's pledge to defend its members against attack. Strategic nuclear parity between the super powers, SALT and the détente climate have compounded these doubts. Soviet short-term objectives in the Mediterranean clearly indicate the value the Soviets attach to their longer-range goal of outflanking Europe at the south and becoming the most influential power in the Mediterranean. Other tactical objectives in the Center and in the Persian Gulf area similarly reflect broader Soviet concerns.

Aid Programs

In pursuit of their objectives the Soviets have been ready to take advantage of every opportunity that came along. Soviet policies in the Middle East testify to Soviet willingness to use political, economic and military instruments towards broader goals. Soviet economic and technical aid to Somali to develop its harbors has at the same time provided the Soviet Union with the use of naval facilities at the entrance to the Indian Ocean. In the late fifties and early sixties the Soviets developed the port complex at the Yemeni port of Hodeida on the Red Sea and built a jet airport at Sana that could accommodate the largest Soviet jets operating at that time. Given the minuscule naval and air forces of Yemen, it is reasonable to suggest that the Soviets were aware of the broader military benefits of the aid program to themselves.

Soviet aid to Afghanistan is a similar case in point. The Soviets have been active in Afghanistan with economic and military aid since 1955-56. Soviet support in the construction of airfields and transportation routes through the Hindu Kush mountain range has given the USSR year-round access to the Indian subcontinent. Moreover since the 1973 coup in Afghanistan, the Soviets have stepped up their military aid to the Afghan forces, which are already totally dependent on Soviet arms and equipment. The Russians have also sought to encourage Daud, the new President, to settle the Pushtunistan issue. The Afghans have long hoped to create a province of Pushtunistan by

annexing part of the northwestern frontier province of Pakistan which is inhabited by Afghan tribes. President Daud, who is a Pushtun himself, is known to be passionately committed to solving the Pushtunistan issue in this way. If he were to succeed in incorporating Pushtunistan into Afghanistan, and the Russians were to succeed in other measures to create a new client state of Baluchistan from provinces of Iran and Pakistan, the Soviet Union would have land access to the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, from the vantage point in Washington as well as Teheran, the key pro-Western state in the Persian Gulf, Iran, would be encircled by hostile powers.

Probably the most successful instrument of the Soviet Union in eliminating U.S. influence and replacing this with its own has been the Soviet military aid program. Indeed, the crucial factor that permitted the USSR to make its initial inroads in the region in the 1955-1960 period was the receptiveness of the radical Arabs to offers of Soviet military aid.

The leadership in Egypt, Syria, Kassem's Iraq, and Imamic Yemen exploited the anti-Western and anti-American sentiments of their constituents. The radical Arabs were not Communists, but their political bias caused them to look to the East for support. While in their view this did not necessarily preclude accepting American aid, their hostile attitudes made it extremely difficult for Washington to provide them with anything but economic assistance. Responsive to whatever opening presented itself, Moscow moved to fill the vacuum as donor of military aid. When necessary, the USSR acted highly pragmatically and jettisoned ideological inhibitions, as was the case with extending military aid to the reactionary Imam of Yemen in 1956.

Exploiting Arab-Israeli Hostility

The Arab-Israeli conflict was another major factor that facilitated the consolidation of Soviet influence in the Middle East. The USSR benefited greatly from the widely held belief that Washington was beholden to Israeli interests. Yet Arab antagonism to Israel was not the only factor that permitted the USSR to score its gains in the Middle East. It had little or no bearing on the initial acceptance of Soviet arms aid by Egypt in 1955, Syria in 1956, Iraq in

1958, Algeria in 1963, or Yemen in 1956 and again in 1962. In most cases the recipient sought to express defiance of Western policies or acted against a local enemy.

The Soviet Union skillfully exploited the split between the radical Arabs and the traditional and hence politically conservative regimes. However, once the arms aid relationship with the Soviets had been established, the belief that the USSR was the only reliable ally of the Arabs against the Israelis paved the way for further entrenchment of the Soviet Union in the region. By the time of the 1967 Six-Day War and afterwards, the radical Arabs were so deeply committed to the defeat of Israel and so dependent on Soviet support, that the Arab-Israeli issue dominated their relations with the USSR and the United States as well.

The years after the Six-Day War showed a growing Soviet involvement in the Middle East and an increasing Soviet effort to tie the radical Arabs to the USSR. The massive Soviet arms build-up in the area has been widely reported in the press, as has the highly effective antiair defense network in Egypt that can cover both high and low-flying aircraft. The Soviets had learned a major lesson of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War which showed the devastating results of Israeli pre-emption and air superiority.

Two developments occurred, however, which slowed down Soviet penetration in the Middle East. One was Nasser's death. The Soviets lost in Nasser the cornerstone of their Middle East policies. Nasser's preoccupation with being the leader of the Arab world repeatedly led him to initiatives and policies unfavorable to the West or regimes friendly to the West. Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor, who leans more toward concentrating on domestic concerns than adventurism abroad, has been cool to the Russians.

The second development which was even more detrimental to Soviet interests was Soviet heavy handedness in dealing with the Arabs. Relations between the Soviets and the Arabs are strained at best. Neither party trusts the other; the Russians frequently displayed their contempt for the Arabs. One of the reasons for Sadat's ouster of Soviet troops in July 1972 was the rapid deterioration in relations between the Egyptian officers and their Soviet advisors.

The Russians have sought to offset their somewhat tenuous position in Egypt by culti-

vating Iraq and Syria. Some fifteen years earlier Khrushchev employed similar tactics when Soviet-Egyptian frictions intensified. In April 1972 Moscow concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Iraq, which again reflects broader objectives. Under the Treaty the Soviets are modernizing the naval port of Umm Qasr. As one observer points out, the Iraqi navy has only relatively small craft; it would not be surprising if the Russians were developing Umm Qasr in order to serve their own ships.¹ If the United States were forced to withdraw its naval presence from Bahrein, as appears likely, the Soviets with facilities at Umm Qasr would be left as the only external power in the Gulf.

The October War

The Soviets have tried to restore their position in Egypt by continuing to provide Egypt with arms and training. In equipping and training the Egyptian armed forces, they have stressed the value of surprise attack with massive blitzkrieg thrusts, followed by quick dispersal with envelopment of enemy forces. The initial success of the Arab forces in the October 1973 War was at least partly the result of applying Soviet doctrine; it was also the result of the advanced weapons in which the Egyptians had a preponderant quantitative advantage over the Israelis. True, some press reports indicated that this time the morale, discipline and the training of the Egyptians was much better than in the previous Arab-Israeli wars. But these had not improved that much. The Soviets had armed the Egyptians with massive quantities of weapons which were very easy to operate, did not require high technological skills, and yet yielded sure hits. The October 1973 War showed that it would henceforth be possible to arm a developing nation and have that nation fight a war way beyond its socioeconomic infrastructure and technological and educational level.

In examining Soviet policy in the recent Middle East conflict the following factors stand out. The Soviets had apparently estimated that the Nixon administration, beset by the Watergate problems, would be unable to respond effectively to a crisis in the Middle East. It is unlikely that Moscow had anticipated the U.S. forces alert. The Soviets, however, correctly assessed that Sadat could not afford to wait in-

definitely and would sooner rather than later feel forced to launch an attack, if only for limited political objectives.

Given these assessments, the Soviets probably decided to be as helpful as possible to the Arabs in order to retain their credibility in the Arab world. When war would erupt the Soviets hoped to manipulate events so that they could legitimize a Soviet troop presence in the Middle East; Soviet troops could serve, for example, to protect Soviet interests in the Suez Canal. Because the Soviets find the Arabs too volatile to depend on, they wanted to introduce their own combat forces, if necessary with those of the United States or otherwise under United Nations auspices.

The Soviets were further determined to open the Suez Canal. In addition, they encouraged and expected that the Arabs would apply the oil weapon against the United States and its allies, thereby undermining the Western Alliance. Finally, while not necessarily wishing to see Israel destroyed as a nation-state, the Soviets were prepared to see Israel eliminated as a military factor in the Middle East if the Arab troops could succeed in doing so.

Whether the Soviets helped to plan and coordinate the actual Egyptian-Syrian attack of October 1973 is not certain. But it is clear that Soviet involvement was substantial, as the following indicates.

- By equipping and training the Arabs they encouraged the Arabs to launch the Yom Kippur War. The crossing of the Suez Canal on October 6 followed Soviet tactical doctrine, although the Arabs failed to exploit subsequently their bridgehead at a time when they had a marked superiority in armor. The failure of the Egyptians to press on and keep their momentum, however, may have been deliberate. If the main Soviet objective was the opening of the Canal and the Egyptian goal a limited political victory, then the Egyptian crossing of the Canal would have achieved this.
- The Soviets provided the Egyptians with some of their most modern weapons systems. The anti-air and anti-tank weapons were equipped with automatic guidance systems. In accordance with the Soviet

doctrine's stress on mass, the weapons had been supplied in such lavish quantities that they threatened to offset Israeli qualitative advantages in aircraft, armor and tactics.

- The Soviets apparently had foreknowledge of the attack on October 6. They recalled their military dependents and other personnel from Egypt and Syria a few days before the Arab attack, but left key technicians and advisors behind to aid the Arabs. Furthermore, on October 3 before the outbreak of the war, a number of Soviet space satellites that could observe the Middle East were launched. After the outbreak, the satellites were commanded to come down after only a week instead of after the standard twelve or more days.
- The Soviets graphically demonstrated their commitment to the Arab cause by delivering to Egypt and Syria SCUD surface-to-surface missiles which can reach Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Whether the Soviets actually brought in the nuclear warheads is less important than the message which the Soviets sought to convey with the deployment of the SCUDs. The SCUD has a highly inaccurate delivery system; without nuclear warheads its effectiveness would be severely limited. By bringing the SCUDs into the Middle East, Moscow sought to convey to Washington that there were limits to the extent of an Arab defeat which it would tolerate. The Soviets undoubtedly also sought to deter the Israelis from consummating a major military victory or from using nuclear weapons. To the Arabs the Soviets hoped to project the image of being a reliable protector.
- As long as the Egyptians and Syrians were winning, the Soviets strongly urged the other Arab nations, including Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, to support Egypt and Syria.
- The Soviets, already long before the October War, called upon the Arabs to use oil as an instrument of coercion against the West. If the Arabs could forge a common front, the Soviets maintained, they could

reduce the NATO military machinery to a "heap of rusting metal."² Many factors went into the development of the Arab oil strategy. A major factor, however, was the patient Soviet effort to foster the conditions in which the oil instrument could be used politically and to persuade the Arabs to employ the oil weapon.

It is not improbable that the Soviets advised the Arabs to select the Netherlands as a target in Western Europe for the Arab oil embargo. The Netherlands draws less than 70 per cent of its domestic oil requirements from Arab sources, while Italy, France and West Germany depend on Arab oil for 79, 77 and about 75 per cent, respectively, for their domestic requirements. The major oil refinery and distribution complex for Western Europe, however, is in Rotterdam; West Germany, for example, gets more than 30 per cent of its oil requirements through Rotterdam. By targeting the Netherlands, the Arabs would strike at Western Europe and even to some extent at the United States, which draws a modest percentage of its oil requirements from the Rotterdam refineries.

The Russians must have greatly welcomed the disarray in the Western Alliance which the oil crisis engendered: Moscow's goal of the Finlandization of Europe is now closer within its reach. That the Soviets do not lose sight of such broad goals can also be seen in Soviet urgings to the Arabs to withdraw their funds from Western banks. The Arabs could create a profound monetary crisis in the West if they would withdraw all or a major part of their deposits from Western banks. A more likely Arab course would be to apply financial pressure more selectively and single out one or more particular banks for withdrawals. Even such a limited application of the monetary instrument could trigger a crisis in the target country and disrupt the international monetary system.

- Virtually from the beginning of the War, the Russians started a massive resupply of weapons to the Arabs. Press reports indicate that Soviet arms shipments

started as early as October 7, a day after the War. Syria and Egypt by 1974 were just as amply equipped as before the October War.

- When the Arabs were threatened with defeat, the Soviets were ready to intervene and save them. Seven Soviet airborne divisions in Eastern Europe were on a standby alert and several landing craft were noted in the eastern Mediterranean. Mr. Brezhnev's note of October 24 to President Nixon went so far as to threaten unilateral intervention.

Strategic Success

All these factors combine to indicate the depth of Soviet commitment. Moscow's policies have brought Soviet strategic goals closer within its reach. The Soviets apparently feel that on the whole the Yom Kippur War constituted a strategic success for them. They can point to the disruptive impact of the oil crisis on the cohesion of the Western Alliance; they warn that the use of oil as a weapon is merely a first step and has set an example for using other diminishing strategic resources and raw materials in similar ways. They can further point to the gain in confidence of the Egyptians and Syrians for whom the war was clearly a political success. More important, the Soviets are acutely aware of the advantages which the opening of the Suez Canal will bring them.

Still there are other aspects of the Middle East situation which the Soviets are bound to contemplate with less equanimity. First, the oil weapon can be a two-edged sword. At some point the Soviets need to consider what a major economic crisis in the West would mean for their hopes of acquiring Western technologies and trade. The spiraling rise in oil prices, moreover, will affect the USSR as well as the West. Second, in spite of Soviet military largesse to the Arabs, Soviet relations with their Arab clients remain tense. In contrast, Ameri-

can relations with Egypt have improved—no mean feat—which can be ascribed in large measure to Secretary Kissinger's virtuoso diplomacy. Third, the American initiative to call for a peace conference in Geneva was a brilliant move. The Soviets were tied down in Geneva, but the real negotiations occurred through Secretary Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in Egypt and Israel. The Soviets were, for all intents and purposes, locked out of the actual negotiations. Fourth, President Nixon's invitation to West European allies, Canada and Japan, to the February meeting in Washington to consider the energy crisis was a step toward repairing the damage in U.S.-Allied relations. Despite the French dissent, the U.S. initiative could result in a reassertion of the American commitment to the Western allies and Japan. If the United States and its allies should succeed in coordinating a joint effort to develop other energy resources and in formulating a concerted position *vis-à-vis* the oil producing states, allied cohesion, which has been so sadly lacking, would at least partly be restored. Finally, Soviet activities in the Middle East should alert Western policy-makers that there are limits to the Soviet concept of détente, which is, moreover, quite different from the Western notion.

These setbacks for the Soviets may be, however, primarily transitory and may affect only the local theater in the Middle East. Whether they can be translated into more lasting and broader reversals depends to a great extent on the ability of the United States and its allies to compose the discords in the Alliance and on their success in harnessing their political, military, economic and technological resources in a concerted effort to meet the Soviet challenge.

NOTES

1. Alvin J. Cottrell, "The Political Balance in the Persian Gulf", STRATEGIC REVIEW, Vol. II, No. 1, Winter 1974.

2. Victor Zorza, "The Kremlin Reacts", Washington Post, December 11, 1973.

CHAPTER 4

TOWARD A SOLUTION

Section I. Introduction

How close is a final solution to the Arab-Israel conflict? Is the interim agreement between Egypt and Israel the first step toward a final Middle East settlement? The material in this chapter analyzes the interim agreement, then makes some proposals for future peace agreements.

Section II explains the interim agreement itself.

Section III contains two analyses of the interim agreement.

In Section IV two proposals for a lasting solution are discussed.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Section II: The Sinai Accords

News Release

September 1, 1975

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services
[Revised Release]

Following are the texts of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel, the Annex to the Egypt-Israel Agreement, and the U.S. Proposal for an early warning system in Sinai.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that:

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be

deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armaments and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached Annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as defined on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming

Done at _____ on the _____ 1975,
in four original copies.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt

For the Government of Israel

WITNESS

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT

Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.

1. Definitions of Lines and Areas

The deployment lines, Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000—U.S. Edition).

2. Buffer Zones

(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step towards a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J on an agreed schedule.

(c) In the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J, there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M

(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or para-military forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(b) Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in

such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through the United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.

(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

4. Aerial Surveillance

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between Lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7 - 10 days, with either Party or the United Nations Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East.

5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between Lines J and K and Lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

(1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions.

(2) Seventy-five (75) tanks.

(3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e., with caliber larger than

120 mm.), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.

(4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).

(5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.

(6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between Lines J and K, and between Line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and Line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments will be:

(1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.

(2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.

(c) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

6. Process of Implementation

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to Line E and Israeli troops to Line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within 2 weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than 8 weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt

For the Government of Israel

WITNESS

PROPOSAL

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred

to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement will be

entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations:

a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1 a. above, United States civilian personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force.

b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1 b. above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

c. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the System.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force Agreement of February 13, 1957.


7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.

8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

Accepted by:

Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State



The Secretary of State



Press Conference

September 9, 1975
Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

MAJOR TOPICS: Agreement between Egypt and Israel, Detente, Portugal, Cuba

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will go right to questions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in view of Soviet unhappiness over your latest peace mission in the Middle East, and in view of what appears to be growing skepticism at home about detente, I wonder whether you would tell us how you feel today about detente, whether you are satisfied that it works or perhaps disappointed by the interpretation in Moscow?

A: Detente has become almost a slogan in our public debate, and I think it is important to summarize again what it means to the United States.

The policy of relations with the Soviet Union, and of attempting to ease the tensions between the two great nuclear superpowers, derives from the conditions in which we find ourselves. The United States and the Soviet Union have the capability of destroying humanity. Their conflicts, therefore, are different from the conflicts between nations throughout history. They have a special obligation to conduct their affairs in such a manner that the risk of war is minimized if this is at all possible.

It is this conviction that has led successive administrations in attempting to find a relationship with the Soviet Union less prone to the dangers of conflicts that can arise sometimes even without the direct intentions of the two countries.

Now this attempt to ease tensions takes place at several levels:

First, it takes place on the level of the control of arms, especially nuclear arms, and in that connection the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]—the agreement that has been concluded and the agreement that we are attempting to conclude—are of prime significance. The problem of

the nuclear arms race is a problem that must be dealt with, that will be solved at some time, and the sooner the better.

Second, we are attempting to bring about restraint in areas of direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as in central Europe. That has been reasonably successful.

Third, there is the problem of conflicts, disagreements, tensions in areas where there is no direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, such as the Middle East. In such areas, the conflict can develop as a result of the tensions that are inherent in the area, the lack of restraint of the superpowers, and other factors.

In the conflict in peripheral areas, the process of relaxing tensions has not made as much progress as in the area of the control of armaments and in the areas where there has been a direct confrontation. In those areas, further efforts and mutual restraint are necessary.

We do not believe that relations with the Soviet Union are idyllic. We are ideological opponents. We have conflicting national interests in addition to the ideological differences. Nevertheless, we believe we have an obligation to attempt to ease tensions, if only to demonstrate to our own people that if there is a conflict we have done everything in our power, honorably, to avoid it.

So, on the whole, we believe that the policy of relaxation of tensions is essential, that we are going to continue to pursue it, and that it can be done only on the basis of reciprocity. We will not give up vital American interests. We will resist attempts to exploit it, but we will cooperate on the basis of reciprocity with any effort that can ease tensions on both sides, on the basis that the process is a two-way street.

Q: Mr. Secretary, with regard to this easing of

tensions in the Middle East, you say that the United States won't give up any of its vital interests and presumably the Soviet Union won't give up any of its vital interests. In peripheral areas such as these, is it not possible that what is considered progress by one side may be considered dangerous provocation by the other—and thereby have an adverse effect on your general picture?

A: Of course when you assess vital interests, you also have to remember that in order to vindicate them you have to survive. So that the definition that "both sides have a vital interest" must take into account the realities of the contemporary period. I believe that it is . . .

Q: I wasn't talking about that . . .

A: I will come to your question in a minute—or in five minutes. [Laughter.]

In the Middle East I do not believe that the essential interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are, in any sense, incompatible. I do not believe that the recent agreement between Egypt and Israel is, in any sense, detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union or a unilateral advantage for the United States.

The significance of the agreement is that it defuses the tensions in the area and if it is implemented properly will open, or can open, a door to general peace in the area. And if we consider that every war in the Middle East has involved the danger of confrontation of the two nuclear superpowers, it is in the mutual interest of both the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the tensions of war.

The United States seeks no unilateral advantage in the Middle East. The United States recognizes that in a final settlement in the Middle East, a Soviet role will be important and, therefore, we are debating now certain/procedural questions about the Soviet role in the recent negotiations—rather than a unilateral advantage gained by the United States at the expense of the Soviet Union.

Q: Mr. Secretary, a number of Pentagon officials have been saying that there is no military role that can be played by the 200 American civilian technicians in monitoring the agreement that could not be played by either airborne or satellite intelligence.

Can you say, apart from the political or psychological effect of having these Americans in the Sinai passes, whether there is any monitoring function that is essential to their being there? In

other words that they have to be physically in the passes?

A: These "Pentagon officials" have not shared their judgments either with me or with the President. And therefore, I don't know who they are and on what their opinion is based.

The monitoring that is going to be done in the limited area in the Sinai—that is, the area that is geographically bounded by the Giddi Pass in the north and the Mitla Pass in the south—it is about a distance of roughly 20 miles. The monitoring has two strategic warning stations, one by Israel and one by Egypt, under American custody; and there will be Americans stationed at each of these stations.

And secondly, three manned tactical warning stations.

In the negotiations extending over several weeks that we participated in, neither of the parties thought that either of these types of stations was dispensable.

And I might also point out that there was a unanimous vote in the National Security Council before I left, which included the participation of the Defense Department, that agreed that as a last resort, if it was necessary to make the agreement, we should go ahead with the American technicians.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what about the risks that may emerge as a result of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] threat that the "Palestine revolution regards the U.S. military presence in the Sinai as an enemy target and should be shot by every struggler and every nationalist in our Arab nation?" How do you plan to handle that?

A: There aren't that many strugglers in the Sinai because it is a substantially unpopulated area and the American warning stations are located in an area between the two armies, in an area that contains several thousand of the U.N. personnel and in which there is no civilian population of any kind.

Secondly, we believe that once the immediate passions have died down, and the various Arab nations and the various groupings look at the agreement, they will realize that it was the only step possible toward peace that could now be taken, and that compared to the alternative of a stalemate, it was the best course for all of the parties in the area.

So we believe, when a more sober calculation is

undertaken, that all of the parties in the area will return to the realization that the process of negotiation is the only road by which peace can be achieved.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there is a good deal of backing and filling going on at the Hill about the issue of what is "classified" and what is "secret" and how to handle it, involving the U.S. commitment. And there does seem to be some confusion about secret or classified commitments made by the United States—either verbally or written—in the interim agreement, and I wonder if you could clear this up with answering two simple questions:

First, will the American people know every detail of any U.S. commitment to the parties? And will all of Congress know these commitments in toto? Or will full disclosure be made only to committees or to certain members of certain committees?

A: We have made an unprecedented effort to put before the Congress any American undertaking to either of the parties. We have gone not only through any written undertakings that may exist, but through the entire negotiating record to extract from it any undertaking of the United States. We have put those before the relevant committees.

In addition, we have gone over the negotiating record with other members of the committees, in order to make sure that their definition of what constitutes an undertaking does not differ from ours. And if there is a disagreement, we will work it out.

Now with respect to what we consider to be undertakings, we are now working out with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and we will work out with the House International Relations Committee, a form in which these undertakings can be made public—the difficulty being that a few are not really "undertakings" in the strict sense, but general diplomatic statements of intention.

But any "undertaking" will be put before the entire Congress and before the public in a manner agreed to between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, and the Administration.

Q: Do I get from that that there is a portion of—what? the diplomatic intent?—that is not going to be made public under any circumstances?

A: Any undertaking of the United States will be made public. There is, however, an area of diplomacy that no country has every made public and

that does not involve undertakings, commitments of the United States.

We will go to the absolute limit and we have made an absolutely unprecedented effort in making available documents that have never been made available to congressional committees before. We will then work with these committees on an agreed method of publication. And it will be the fullest disclosure of a diplomatic record that has ever been made.

Q: Mr. Secretary, have you told these committees of Congress that the United States will pay for 55 to 75 percent of the oil supplies of Israel, for years to come?

A: First of all, that is not a correct statement of . . .

Q: What is a correct statement in regard to what we will pay for Israeli oil for years to come?

A: May I answer the first question? We have put before these committees—and no doubt we will make public—any commitment, any undertakings of the United States with respect to the oil supply of Israel.

The United States has not committed itself to a separate funding of the oil purchases of Israel. The United States has agreed that it would take into account in its total aid package the additional sums that Israel has to spend for foreign purchases of oil. There is no precise sum, in fact there is no sum, attached to this general proposition, as will become apparent when the documentation becomes available.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you have said repeatedly—you have said repeatedly on this last trip—that the momentum now toward peace must be maintained. What does that mean in a specific practical way, beyond the rhetoric?

A: We have maintained—and, indeed, it is part of the agreement—that the agreement between Egypt and Israel is not a final peace settlement. The agreement states it is considered a significant step toward peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

It has always been understood that a final settlement must involve the question of frontiers, must involve the question of reciprocal Arab commitments to peace, must involve some solution of the Palestinian question, and it must involve international guarantees of some sort. This can be pursued either by step-by-step policy—for example, through negotiations between Syria and Israel—or

by a reconvening of the Geneva conference, or by both efforts being pursued simultaneously.

The United States has repeatedly stated its commitment to promote a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We will be prepared to help the parties either in a multilateral framework or in a bilateral framework. And we believe—and we believe that the parties agree—that the process toward peace cannot be arrested.

Q: What is your appraisal of the Syrian and Israeli interest in another step along this process?

A: Well, in the immediate future Israel and Egypt will have to negotiate the practical arrangements involved in their current agreement. That will take some weeks. Then the process of implementation will have to begin. But somewhere in this process, if Syria and Israel are prepared to start negotiations, and if it is their judgment that the United States can be helpful, we will be prepared to play a role.

Q: Mr. Secretary, has the interim agreement had any visible effect on other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations? And, in addition to that, whether it has or not, could you give us an assessment of the current state of SALT negotiations in particular—what obstacles there are, if you can tell us—and what the prospects are for the visit by Mr. Brezhnev [General Secretary of the Communist Party] to the United States?

A: As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko is going to visit the General Assembly and on that occasion will pay his customary visit to Washington. I expect to meet with him several times while he is here. The President will meet with him for an extended review of the situation. On that occasion we will certainly review the situation in the Middle East, and—at least from our side—we will make every effort to overcome whatever misunderstandings may exist.

As far as SALT is concerned, the basic issues of principle were settled at Vladivostok. Several other issues of great consequence have been settled in the meantime. We are now down to two or three issues of great importance on which agreement has not yet been reached but on which, if agreement were reached, the negotiation could be concluded within 6 to 8 weeks after that.

We expect to discuss those issues with Foreign Minister Gromyko when he is here, and we still expect to receive the General Secretary in Washington before the end of this year.

Q: Mr. Secretary, that timetable would seem to run awfully late into the year. You say 6 to 8 weeks after a breakthrough. And what is your estimate of a foreseeable date, even if all things would go somewhat . . .

A: I cannot give an estimate of a date, but I have said that we still expect to see Mr. Brezhnev here before the end of this year.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did the somewhat unprecedented intervention of your African Desk with the Governor of Delaware on behalf of two members of ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union]—an African terrorist group without U.N. diplomatic credentials—did this have anything to do with the widely reported resignation of Ambassador [Nathaniel] Davis?

A: No, because I don't even know what you're talking about.

Q: It's been reported on page one of the Star and the Post, Mr. Secretary.

A: Well . . .

Q: You don't read those papers, or . . .

A: I don't want to offend the press, but I regret to say that I am not familiar with this particular incident; but I will be within 15 minutes of leaving here. [Laughter.]

Q: Mr. Secretary, in a memorandum of understanding some months ago the Administration announced there was a policy reassessment taking place regarding the Middle East. Are we ever to hear of that again or, if we're not, can you give us some tentative conclusions that may have been drawn as the result of this months-long reassessment?

A: The reassessment had two aspects. It had the aspect of the diplomatic framework within which progress toward peace could be pursued in the Middle East, in the wake of the failure of the March shuttle. And, secondly, it had the aspect of the aid levels that were requested for both Israel and some of the Arab countries. Both of these issues were clearly related to each other.

In the wake of the March failure, we had to assess whether the step-by-step approach was still valid or whether a more comprehensive approach offered the only possibility. I think that the diplomatic framework of the reassessment has been settled by the recent negotiation between Egypt and Israel. Similarly, the problem of aid levels is in the process of being settled. It's been substantially settled. And these will be submitted to the Congress before the end of the month, I would expect.

Q: Yes, but to follow for a minute, in response to a question a while back I got the impression that we still have not made a decision whether step-by-step from here on in is the preferred approach. Is that correct?

A: Which approach should be pursued depends not only on the preferences of the United States but on the preferences of the parties, and the issue was not only which of these should be approached but in what manner it should be approached.

I believe that as a result of the examination here of recent months and of the events of recent weeks there is now a much greater clarity of the limits and the possibilities that exist in moving the process forward toward peace.

Similarly, as I pointed out, we will submit aid levels. And, of course, we had the benefit, during the reassessment, of learning the congressional judgment of appropriate aid levels in the letter of the 76 Senators and in other approaches. And therefore, in assessing the aid levels as I pointed out previously, what one has to consider is the difference between what would have been submitted or voted anyway and what is being requested as a result of the agreement. And we do not think that that is a very significant figure.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is there an inter-government study under way now concerning the recruitment of American personnel to be sent to the Sinai? And if so, will these personnel be recruited from the Defense Department, from any of the Government intelligence agencies—or, if not, will these personnel reflect that work experience? And will the organization established to administer the monitoring function in the Sinai be a private corporation—perhaps like the Vinnell Corporation—or more like Air America? [Laughter.]

A: I am not sure that I quite get the implication of that last remark. And I don't want you to explain it. [Laughter.]

We are undertaking a study, on an urgent basis, of all of these questions. Our preference is to recruit people out of civilian life. We have not yet made a decision as between a private organization or a governmentally sponsored one. It is clear that the personnel will not be under the Defense Department, because we do not want to give them a military role. The personnel will report to both sides and to the United Nations, as well as to the U.S. Government. But the questions you ask,

which are important ones, we will be able to answer within about 10 days.

You have to remember, incidentally, that American personnel will not begin manning these stations for 5 months after the implementing protocol has been signed; and that is about 2 to 3 weeks away. So we have about 5½ months to work out all the details.

Q: I was going to ask you to evaluate the recent developments in Portugal with regard to your earlier statements on that country—also with regard to the role of the Soviet bloc in Portugal—and with regard to the possibilities for American assistance to Portugal, economic assistance.

A: I have made so many statements about Portugal that I'm not absolutely sure which ones you are referring to.

I was concerned, as were my colleagues, that events in Portugal might be dominated by a minority group—the Communist Party—distinguished primarily by its discipline and its dogmatism, against the expressed wishes of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese people. And the United States, together with its West European allies, repeatedly pointed out its dismay at an evolution in which such a small minority would take over the effective control of Portugal.

Now, recent events have reduced at least some of the manifestations of this dominance. We are not yet clear what will emerge out of the deliberations, both with respect to the formation of a new government and with respect to the organization of the Revolutionary Council.

The Communist Party still remains a significant political force in Portugal—probably out of proportion to its numerical strength—and we cannot yet fully assess what is taking place within the military movement. But, on the whole, we believe that the events of the last 2 weeks have been encouraging. The United States supports the emergence of a pluralistic system there reflecting the public's views as they were expressed in the election to the constitutional assembly. And we are working in the closest harmony on this problem with our European allies.

With respect to the Soviet Union, we have made clear our view about possible Soviet intervention in Portugal and those views have not changed.

Q: Will it be a matter of U.S. policy that any aid to Portugal will depend on whether or not we

still think that the Communist Party remains a force beyond its numerical strength?

A: That will certainly influence our judgment.

Q: You said the Soviet Union would continue to play a procedural role in the Middle East. Will it be just procedural? Could it be more than procedural?

A: No, I did not say the Soviet Union would play only a procedural role. I said that the Soviet objection to the recent negotiation between Egypt and Israel seems to me to have concerned procedure more than substance. And I also said that in a final settlement in the Middle East, Soviet participation would be important, and not only procedural but substantive.

Q: I meant to ask whether you could conceive of the possibility that the Soviets could play an actual peacekeeping role in the Middle East in the same way we will be in the Sinai passes?

A: Well, the role that the United States is playing is at the request of both parties. It was not proposed by the United States. In fact, I am giving away no secrets if I point out that we were not particularly anxious to play this role.

If both parties should ask the Soviet Union in some other area to play a similar role, that would be for both parties to discuss with the Soviet Union. I do not see that this is the most immediate foreign policy problem before us, however.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is there, in the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Israel, any sort of formal commitment to consult with Israel on the nature of assistance in the event of an attack by an outside power, and if so, why is it necessary?

A: The memorandum of understanding between us and Israel—which is not incidentally unprecedented, because this has been concluded after many previous diplomatic watersheds—has traditionally been classified.

We will make public, as I have stated before, all of the essential undertakings, and I would rather deal with them as a unit than to deal with speculative clauses before the committees have fully considered them. This will be fully discussed.

Q: Mr. Secretary, why in your judgment has the Middle East agreement been such a hard sell for you and the Administration, especially in the Congress?

A: First of all, let me state my judgment of the agreement. I consider this agreement more

significant than the previous two disengagement agreements that received much less criticism. It certainly gained some time for the peace process, and it may open the door to a general peace settlement.

Now, why has it been more difficult to present? I think part of the reason is that it involves, in the year of the collapse of our Indochina effort, a commitment of some American personnel in a faraway part of the world. To be sure, the commitment is different from the Indochina commitment. It is for a peacekeeping role and not for participation in a military conflict. But I think there may be a sort of subconscious rebellion against this.

Secondly, it coincides with our submission to the Congress of a substantial aid bill at a time when our country is undergoing a recession. And it may not be fully realized, first, that a substantial aid bill would have been submitted in any event, even without the agreement; and that, secondly, the costs of a war have been demonstrated to be incomparably higher than any aid bill that will be submitted this year.

So, for all these reasons, it has been a somewhat more complex case to make. And there may be the general attitude of suspicion that has befallen this town as a result of Watergate and other events.

But I must say, in fairness, that the questioning before the congressional committees has been very constructive. We have no complaint about harassment or negativism. I think serious people have made an effort to look into the implications for the United States of a major foreign policy move, and we think that the debate is, on the whole, a healthy one.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on a related part of the Middle East, do you think there is a compromise possible between the Administration and Congress on the projected sale of 14 Hawk missile batteries to Jordan?

A: First of all, the issue is not between the Administration and the Congress so much as between Jordan and the Congress, in the sense that a compromise must be acceptable to the Government of Jordan, in order to be viable.

We are prepared to discuss with the congressional committees whether we can find some formula that would ease their concerns. There are definite limits to what can be done, because King

Hussein has pointed out on innumerable occasions that he will not compromise on the numbers.

Now, whether any compromise is possible with respect to deployment, rate of delivery, or similar matters, we are now exploring with the congressional committees in both the House and the Senate; and then of course we will have to discuss it with the Government of Jordan.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is there any basis for a new German-American offset agreement now that the deficits and the American balance of payments have disappeared?

A: Well, I think it is no secret that your Chancellor is not an unqualified admirer of offset agreements. We have had some discussions on that subject, and we have not yet reached any conclusions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects now for the normalization of relations with Cuba, especially in view of the recent forum being held in Havana for the so-called independence of Puerto Rico?

A: We have pursued a policy with respect to Cuba of moving by reciprocal steps toward an improvement of relations. This policy has shown some progress and we are prepared to continue this policy.

At the same time, the meeting in Havana can only be considered by us as an unfriendly act, and as a severe setback to this process, and as a totally unwarranted interference in our domestic affairs.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union's grain shortfall is estimated by U.S. Government agencies as anywhere from 20 to 50 million tons, and there has already been considerable opposition to shipping the 10 million tons that they have purchased. How do you see the Soviet grain deals relating to our foreign policy and detente as you have described it this morning?

A: Well, 50 million tons is a wild exaggeration. I have not seen any estimate like this. But, at this moment, we are not undertaking any new contracts for sale to the Soviet Union until the crop returns for October are in.

We are also interested in discussing with the Soviet Union the possibility of a long-term agreement which would avoid the fluctuations and the sudden invasions of our market, and which would enable our farmers to plan over a more extended period of time, and which would therefore have

less of an impact, or a minimal impact, on our prices.

All of these are now under consideration, and they are not directly related to detente. They are being discussed on a general level.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is there some consideration being given to a long-term agreement which would involve a trade-off for oil or other Soviet resources?

A: There has been a very general discussion on that subject. There are no negotiations on that subject going on right now. In fact, there are no negotiations going on either about the long-term agreement or about a possible use of Soviet resources. But if a long-term negotiation should begin, that is one of the factors that might be considered.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Church committee [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities] claims to have evidence that the CIA violated a Presidential directive on the destruction of biological toxins. What are the diplomatic consequences of this, and when did you first learn about it?

A: Frankly, I first learned about it on television this morning.

Q: Ambassador Helms [former Director of the CIA] apparently has been recalled to testify tomorrow.

A: That is right. I would assume that there has been some discussion between the White House and the Church committee on this subject, but I have been away for recent weeks.

I would have to know the quantities that are involved before I can make a judgment. We committed ourselves by treaty to destroy biological warfare agents.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you have talked an awful lot about the momentum—of the need for momentum—and certainly the Egyptians are discussing the need for momentum. On the other hand, the Israelis, in all of their public statements since the agreement, have indicated they have virtually nothing more to give; Premier Rabin talked about a few hundred yards in the Golan. In this case, have you perhaps simply postponed the inevitable, or do you think perhaps the Israelis are posturing at this stage?

A: Well, I do not want to speculate about a negotiation that has not even been agreed to in principle at this moment, and in which I have not heard the detailed position of either side.

Inevitably, somewhere along the line, there must be further progress toward peace. And therefore any progress that has been made, even if it gains only time, permits time for the peace process to occur under conditions of less pressure and less tension. What will develop in the Syrian-Israeli

negotiation I would have to leave to the beginning of such a negotiation, and I do not want to prejudge it now.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

Now, whether my response to the question of the report to the House of Representatives is the best, or whether it is the best of the House of Representatives, I do not know. I do know that I am not a member of the House of Representatives, and I do not know what the House of Representatives will do with the report.

Q: Mr. Secretary, a question about the report. The report says that the Government of Israel is not a member of the House of Representatives, and I do not know what the House of Representatives will do with the report.

A: Well, I think it is a matter that you should know. I am not a member of the House of Representatives, and I do not know what the House of Representatives will do with the report.

Q: Mr. Secretary, a question about the report. The report says that the Government of Israel is not a member of the House of Representatives, and I do not know what the House of Representatives will do with the report.

A: Well, I think it is a matter that you should know. I am not a member of the House of Representatives, and I do not know what the House of Representatives will do with the report.

Q: Mr. Secretary, a question about the report. The report says that the Government of Israel is not a member of the House of Representatives, and I do not know what the House of Representatives will do with the report.

A: Well, I think it is a matter that you should know. I am not a member of the House of Representatives, and I do not know what the House of Representatives will do with the report.

Q: Mr. Secretary, a question about the report. The report says that the Government of Israel is not a member of the House of Representatives, and I do not know what the House of Representatives will do with the report.

A: Well, I think it is a matter that you should know. I am not a member of the House of Representatives, and I do not know what the House of Representatives will do with the report.

Q: Mr. Secretary, a question about the report. The report says that the Government of Israel is not a member of the House of Representatives, and I do not know what the House of Representatives will do with the report.



SINAI ACCORD: POSTPONEMENT OF BASIC ISSUES

When Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger negotiated an agreement in January 1974 between Egypt and Israel, it was hailed as a major breakthrough in Middle East diplomacy. The terms of the agreement were not very significant, but the fact that an agreement had been reached broke the tragic pattern of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A generation of wars, hatred and deep distrust had kept Arabs and Israelis from even entering negotiations. Kissinger succeeded in breaching these entrenched attitudes, because he focused negotiations on minor issues.

He adopted the same approach to secure a second Israeli-Egyptian agreement in September 1975. Compared with the basic issues of recognition of Israel, the future of the Palestinians, permanent boundaries, the status of Jerusalem, and peace guarantees, the issues settled in the second Sinai troop disengagement accord were trivial. The tactic of avoiding basic issues succeeded again in producing an accord, but the success might have the opposite effect of the 1974 agreement. If the earlier talks showed that agreement is possible, the latest negotiations might have strengthened the impression that agreement is possible only as long as fundamental issues are not faced.

In one respect, however, the September accord would produce a fundamental change. It would introduce Americans, for the first time, into the midst of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Congress was expected to approve, however hesitantly, the stationing of American technicians between Israeli and Arab armies in the Sinai Desert to monitor military activities. The Israeli government made clear that its ratification of the agreement hinged on such congressional approval. When the agreement was ratified by Israel and Egypt, Middle East tensions might ease for a time. But the combination of avoiding issues and injecting Americans left in doubt the direction of the path toward a permanent peace.

Initial Success

The temptation to continue the step-by-step approach to peace arose partly from its initial success. The 1974 military disengagement agreements that Kissinger negotiated between Egypt and Israel and between Syria and Israel defused the explosive situation that existed after the 1973 war. But they accomplished much more. Although limited to military arrangements, the meeting between Israeli and Egyptian officers in the tent at Kilometer 101 produced the first agreement between Israel and an Arab state in 25 years—since the armistice of 1949, ending the Israeli war of independence. Scarcely a month before the Egyptian-Israeli accord was signed, representatives of the warring governments for the first time ever met face-to-face in search of a political settlement.

The experience of negotiating and agreeing, Professor Nadav Safran of Harvard observed, challenged deep-seated Arab and Israeli attitudes toward the very notion of settlement and mediation. It not only "cracked...mental molds

Key Features of Pact

On Sept. 4, 1975, in Geneva, Israel and Egypt formally signed a new Middle East accord, intended to provide another stepping-stone toward a final peace settlement between the Arab nations and Israel.

The key feature of the pact required the Israeli army to withdraw from the Sinai mountain passes of Gidi and Mitla. These areas were to be included in a new United Nations demilitarized zone. However, Israel would still control 87 per cent of the Sinai Peninsula, seized from Egypt in the 1967 war. (1967 map, next page; 1974, 1975 maps, p. 5)

Egyptian forces would be allowed to advance to the eastern edge of the old U.N. zone established by the January 1974 accord. Egypt would resume possession of the Abu Rudeis oil fields along the Gulf of Suez, also held by Israel since 1967.

Egypt pledged that it would not resort to the threat or use of force or continue a military blockade against Israel in the straits of Bab el Mandeb linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. The Egyptians also agreed to a provision stating that "nonmilitary cargoes destined to or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal," opening the waterway to Israel for the first time since 1956.

Both belligerents pledged that "the conflict between them in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force, but by peaceful means," and that they "are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations."

The agreement also limited military forces that each side was permitted to station adjacent to the U.N. buffer area, and called for the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping mission to be renewed annually rather than for shorter periods.

As for the new U.S. role, the proposal asked that American civilian personnel monitor Egyptian and Israeli activities in the Sinai. The plan would deploy two warning stations operated separately by Egypt and Israel and three other stations in the Mitla and Gidi Passes manned by American technicians.

that had made for rigidity, fatalism, and despair," but gave rise to "vested interests, intellectual or political, in depicting the other side's intentions and behavior in a favorable light," he wrote. Previously each side had placed the worst possible interpretation on every word, act or alleged thought of the other side—interpretations that became self-fulfilling prophecies. But now, Safran noted:

...The world [was] treated to the novel spectacle of Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan [Israeli defense minister] urging in the Knesset [Parliament] that there was no need to assume the worst about Sadat [Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt], arguing that he seemed to be genuinely desirous of

peace and eager to turn his attention to the tasks of reconstruction and developing his country, and stressing that he had scrupulously observed the terms of the agreement in letter and spirit.

On the other side, one could hear Sadat reassure his people that they need not worry about the possibility of Israel's sitting tight and trying to freeze the situation created by the disengagement agreement; and one could see him hopping from one Arab capital to another in an effort to allay this and other doubts and justify the "gamble" he took on the grounds that the United States and Israel had changed.¹

While the initial Egyptian-Israeli accord established the minimum basis of trust necessary to pursue more basic issues, the second accord still did not come to grips with them. Whether or not an opportunity was thus lost, the nature of the issues places limits on step-by-step diplomacy.

The Egyptians seek, above all, the return of territory; the Israelis want credible pledges of peace. Territory can be yielded in stages, but peace is difficult to slice into segments. Indeed, efforts to dilute a promise of peace may arouse the very suspicions the promise is supposed to allay.

The Israelis fear that their territorial security will be whittled away in exchange for verbal assurances whose calculated vagueness invites a renewal of hostilities on disadvantageous ground. The Egyptians fear that once they have clearly and unequivocally promised peace, the Israelis will feel no incentive to return still-occupied Egyptian territory. The other Arabs fear that Israel, with U.S. connivance, will make a separate peace with Egypt and thus leave the Syrians, Jordanians and Palestinians powerless to regain territory occupied by Israel since the 1967 war.



Territories occupied by Israel after 1967 war

The Geneva Conference

The approach to peace most often considered as an alternative to step-by-step diplomacy is a resumption of the Geneva Conference. This forum, unlike Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy," would consider those ultimate issues that have produced four wars in one generation. But the difficulties of step-by-step negotiations would be replaced by other hazards.

In Geneva, each side would be tempted to use the conference as a platform for appeals to world opinion. Declared positions would necessarily be the maximum demands, and retreats from these maximum positions would be made difficult by public commitment to them. For the sake of support at home, the participating Arab governments would compete in militancy, or at least take pains to avoid accusations by their allies of being soft on Israel. The presence of the Soviet Union at the conference might encourage Arab intransigence, and the Israelis could ill afford to offer concessions in front of the Russians and a coalition of Arabs which they had refused even to consider in negotiations with Kissinger and Sadat.

Even before it resumed, the Geneva conference might break down over the question of the Palestinians. The Israelis refuse to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, but the Arab states at a conference in Rabat, Morocco, Oct. 28, 1974, agreed to recognize the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people on any liberated Palestinian territory."²

Kissinger had urged the Israelis to avoid the pitfalls of Geneva by reaching agreement in his shuttle negotiations, but a few Israelis professed hopes for such a conference. Professor Stanley Hoffman of Harvard observed that there is a "bizarre coalition" of Israelis favoring the Geneva approach—those who see a chance for a general settlement which "the step-by-step method squanders by running into too many obstacles," and those "who believe that Geneva would show once and for all that one cannot really reach peace with the Arabs."³

Hoffman urged the Israeli government to avoid the problems of both step-by-step and Geneva negotiations by taking a bold initiative. He would have Israel announce a plan under which, in return for peace treaties with adequate supervision and guarantees, the country would return substantially all the territory it occupied in the Six-day War in 1967. Hoffman recognized the risk that "whatever are presented as maximum concessions and minimum demands become treated as minimum concessions and maximum demands." But, he added, "there are greater risks in the present stance: especially the risk that it leads nowhere or only to unmatched concessions by Israel."

The Israeli government, however, would risk its continuation in office if it produced an over-all settlement the Arabs would even consider. Premier Rabin heads a shaky coalition of political parties that hold only a six-member majority in the Knesset. Moreover, he took office as a compromise candidate with no political base of his own. Rabin has promised that there will be no withdrawal from the West Bank prior to a general election, thus giving voters a chance to express themselves on the question. The Likud opposition party in March 1975 obtained 600,000 signatures—44 per cent of all who voted in the previous

¹ Nadav Safran, "Engagement in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1974, pp. 48-49.

² For background, see "Palestinian Question," p. 54.

³ Stanley Hoffman, "A New Policy for Israel," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1975, p. 412.



Knesset election, Dec. 31, 1973—on a petition opposing withdrawal from the West Bank of the Jordan River even in exchange for peace.

Arab leaders are unanimous in demanding such a withdrawal, and any who deviate from this position would be branded as traitors by the others and risk overthrow at home. Even by negotiating separately, Sadat aroused fears among other Arabs that Egypt would sell out the Palestinians in return for restoration of its own territory. After a visit to Damascus by Kissinger, en route home from his successful negotiation of the September accord, the Syrian government issued a statement condemning that accord as a "setback to the march of the Arab struggle." While a Syrian-Israeli agreement for further military disengagement in Syria's Golan Heights was expected to be the next objective in Kissinger's peace efforts, the situation there left little room for compromise. To secure an agreement might require stationing American technicians, as in the Sinai accord, on this highly volatile frontier.

The American role in the Middle East agreement was not limited to supplying technicians. The United States was expected to supply large sums of money. Israel reportedly was promised about \$2.5-billion in military and economic assistance (including a \$350-million subsidy to aid in oil purchases) for fiscal 1976. In addition, the United States was expected to provide Egypt about \$600-million to \$800-million annually in economic assistance. —

The aid raised other questions besides its economic cost. The United States had held up consideration of Israeli arms requests before the September accord as a means of pressuring the Israelis to reach agreement with Egypt on the Sinai issues. Critics of this pressure contended that Israel could not afford to give up territory unless it felt militarily strong, and that psychologically it would be readier to compromise if it felt secure in U.S. support.

⁴ For background, see "Middle East Reappraisal," *Editorial Research Reports*, 1973 Vol. II, pp. 947-966, and "Arab Oil Money," *E.R.R.*, 1974 Vol. I, pp. 363-382.

Attitudes Since 1973 War

Sadat could afford to take his "gamble" on negotiating with Israel—even though Arabs had hitherto regarded such behavior as traitorous—because of the changes wrought by the 1973 war. Although Israeli forces were poised on the brink of military victory when Soviet and American pressures imposed a cease-fire, the Arabs had fought well, erasing the humiliation they had suffered in the 1967 war. Equally bolstering to the Arabs' self-respect was the impact of their oil embargo and price increases on the industrial West, before which generations of Arabs had felt impotent. The oil weapon also freed the Arabs from a fear that always discourages talks with an enemy—the fear of negotiating from a position of weakness.⁴

The Israeli position also has changed since the October war. The initiative, unity and determination of the Arab fighting forces punctured the sense of security Israelis enjoyed after the easy triumph of 1976. The initial shock on the battlefield gave way to more lasting doubts. If even the smashing victory of 1967 could not bring peace and safety any closer, what faith could be placed in military superiority?

A popular Israeli stereotype portrays the Arabs as people who "only understand the language of force," but the application of overwhelming force in 1967 widened the conflict, provoking greater Arab unity and enlarging the roles played by more distant Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia. King Faisal, by embargoing oil, abandoned his policy of keeping oil out of Arab-Israeli politics, and the Israelis faced a profound shift in the balance of power. Even if the Israeli army "won" the next war, countries dependent on Arab oil would face terrible pressure to "undo" the victory.

The positions have been reversed to some extent since the 1973 war. Now the Israeli government seeks to limit negotiations, calling for a period of stabilization after

another limited troop withdrawal. It hopes Arab unity will dissipate and the West will gradually wean itself from dependence on Arab oil, enabling Israel to negotiate later from a position of strength.

Rabin, in a plea reminiscent of Arab speeches after the 1967 war, has called on his people to dig in for "seven lean years."⁶ It is Sadat, now, who seeks to keep up the momentum of peace talks. The 1973 war, he said in a 1975 May Day speech, broke the "wall of frustration and self-doubt" that had surrounded the Arab, enabling him to "speak with anybody and everybody without fears."

Intangibles in the Conflict

The problem, Kissinger explained to the House International Relations Committee March 25, 1975, after the collapse of his Middle East negotiations, "was balancing tangible positions on the ground against less tangible assurances which have symbolic meanings and importance." The power of symbols in the Arab-Israeli conflict has, from the very beginning, baffled and thwarted diplomacy.

In the first phase of the conflict the issue was, simply, Israel's existence, an issue which scarcely lends itself to compromise. It was in this period, historian Bernard Lewis observed, that the question of direct negotiation became crucial for both sides. "By entering into direct negotiations with Israel, the Arab states would be giving her a vital token of recognition," he wrote. "By refusing to negotiate they were maintaining their refusal to recognize her existence. For Arabs and Israelis alike the question of direct negotiation thus acquired a symbolic significance which it has retained for both sides ever since."⁷

Direct negotiations had symbolic significance, because the issue was Israel's existence. But from the beginning, the existence of Israel has itself been a symbol.⁸ For nearly 2,000 years, Jews throughout the world have intoned the Passover slogan, "Next year in Jerusalem." For a scattered, persecuted, stateless people, the ritual could be little more than a fantasy, and its credibility scarcely grew with the passing ages.

But at the end of the 19th century, the Jews of eastern Europe, oppressed by poverty and brutal pogroms, began to act on this fantastic hope. Modern Zionism grew from such unpromising ground, and within two generations the movement had carved out a sovereign state of its own. "If you will it, it is no dream," the Zionist leader Theodor Herzl had asserted, and soon the ancient dream of "next year in Jerusalem" was a reality. Most Israelis today insist that their sovereignty over the entire city of Jerusalem, whose Arab sector they conquered in the 1967 war, is "not negotiable."

Jerusalem symbolizes the Jews' ancient dream; in Jerusalem is a symbol of their recent nightmare. Yad Va'shem is the memorial center dedicated to recalling the Nazi holocaust and its six million Jewish victims. This unfathomable horror, as much as the Zionist ideal, is a foundation of the state of Israel, and, "In the rituals of government and diplomacy, Yad Va'shem is given a role parallel, and at times equal in its solemnity, to the role of national symbols that extol military glory, sovereignty, and independence."⁹

The trauma was real and could not fail to affect perceptions of reality, including the reality of being surrounded by Arabs calling for an end to Israel. "The effects of the Nazi holocaust upon the national psychology," wrote Israeli author Amos Elon, "reached a new peak in the weeks preceding the Six Day War of 1967. Israelis, including many young people, were seized by abysmal fears; many were certain that another holocaust was being prepared for them by the rulers of Egypt, whose bloodthirsty statements were resounding hourly on the radio. Many impartial foreign observers have testified to the breadth of such feelings at the time, and how genuine the fears seemed."

Ambivalence Toward the Arabs

Fears aroused by the Arabs may be complicated by less obvious sentiments. In an article in *Commentary*, Hillel Halkin, an American-born Israeli, recounted how scenes in occupied Arab communities prompted reflections on the way in which the Jew, while assimilating so much of European culture, preserved his identification with a lost land. The Jew clung to symbols which in biblical times were part of every day life. Halkin wrote:

The flat, round bread he ate with every meal, dipping it in oil or vinegar when there was nothing else, is now eaten once a year in the form of the Passover matzah.

The headcovering worn out-of-doors to protect himself from the blazing Palestinian sun, blackens, shrivels into round little *yarmulke* of the synagogue; his blowing, toga-like robe becomes the fringed *tallit* or prayer shawl.

Once or twice each year, on Rosh Hashanah or Tu B'shvat, he spends extravagant sums to buy exotic fruits of the Holy Land, dates and olives, almonds and figs....

But when the Europeanized Jew returns, after millenia, he finds "the Arab, the usurper, living there in his place, eating round, flat bread with every meal, covering his head with an elegant *kaffia* against the sun, wearing a long flat robe that ripples when he walks, eating figs and olives, almonds and dates for his daily fare, and living as a perfect matter of course the agricultural rhythms, the seedtimes and the harvests, of the Bible, Talmud, and prayerbooks. An upside-down world!"¹⁰

Whatever ambivalence such biblical scenes may stir in the westernized Jew, another aspect of the Arab condition resonates with Jewish experience. The Arabs as a colonized people, like the Jews as a persecuted minority, have experienced powerlessness and humiliation at the hands of European civilization.

Empathy with the Arabs on this ground finds only limited expression in Israel, and is not generally shared by Israeli immigrants from Arab countries, but the plight of the Palestinian refugees suggests parallels that are difficult to ignore. Especially since the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with their refugee camps, Israelis have been forced to recognize their Palestinian enemies as suffering exiles craving a return to their homeland. The fact that the Palestinian diaspora resulted from the creation of Israel does not make it easier for Israelis to face the Palestinian problem.

Problems of Palestinian Identity

One way to deal with the problem is to refuse to recognize the Palestinians as a separate nationality. Golda

⁶ Interview in the Tel Aviv daily *Haaretz*, Dec. 3, 1974.

⁷ Bernard Lewis, "The Palestinians and the PLO: A Historical Approach," *Commentary*, January 1975, p. 43. *Commentary* is published by the American Jewish Committee.

⁸ See chapter on Israel, p. 43.

⁹ Amos Elon, *The Israelis, Founders and Sons* (1971), p. 200.

¹⁰ Hillel Halkin, "Driving toward Jerusalem: A Sentimental Journey through the West Bank," *Commentary*, January 1975, p. 51.

Meir, as premier, said in 1969 that there was no such nationality as Palestinian. It might seem inconsistent for Israelis, so anxious themselves for recognition, to deny it to another displaced people. But even the Palestinians were slow to regard themselves as a distinct people; in the past, many sought their destiny as part of a larger Arab nation. Only the repeated failures of the neighboring Arab states to restore them to their homeland drove the inhabitants of the former British Mandate of Palestine¹⁰ to pursue a separate nationalism of their own.

The fact that Palestinian nationalism is new and fragile creates psychological problems for negotiation quite apart from such substantive issues as territory and sovereignty. Throughout history, hatred of a common enemy has helped forge new national identities, and hostility to Israel is the most powerful force binding together the scattered Palestinians.¹¹ The expression of that hostility thus serves the creation of the Palestinian identity, but it scarcely encourages the Israelis to recognize it. The fragility of the Palestinian movement also discourages moderate Palestinians from disavowing the statements and actions of their own most militant factions.

Israeli unwillingness to recognize rival claims to the ancient land of Israel did not begin with Palestinian hostility. Amos Elon quoted the late David Ben Gurion, a founding father, as saying in 1917 that in the "historical and moral sense" Palestine was a country "without inhabitants." Elon went on to describe the attitudes of early Zionist leaders toward the native Arab population:

Like most visionaries their eyes were hung with monumental blinkers.... They did not imagine that the Arabs who had been living there for centuries could possibly object to becoming a minority—a fully respected minority that would live in more comfort and wealth under the most liberal of regimes—through the advent of massive Jewish immigration from abroad.

"Later," Elon added, "a defensive mechanism of great complexity would be employed to protect this naive innocence from being contradicted by facts."¹²

Nationalism Versus Arab and Jewish Traditions

If Zionist attention to Arab nationalism was slow in developing, it was at least in part because that nationalism was still nascent. The kind of identification with the nation-state which westerners take for granted did not characterize the Arab world, where loyalties were divided among Islam, the Ottoman state and local or kinship groupings. These divided loyalties left the Arabs vulnerable to domination by homogeneous European nations. When the Arabs finally reacted with a nationalism of their own, it had to contend with the deepest strata of their own culture.

Bernard Lewis compared this inner conflict with the great struggle at the birth of Islam, when monotheism fought the idols of pagan Arabia. Now, however, the struggle is "against a new set of idols called states, races and nations; this time it is the idols that seem to be victorious. The introduction of nationalism, of collective self-

worship, is the best founded and least mentioned of the many grievances of the Middle East against the West."¹³

The Jews, like the Arabs, were late in embracing the kind of nationalism that evolved in Europe. For centuries they sustained a double identity in which they were Germans or Russians or Americans or Moroccans as well as Jews, and prided themselves on their universality as well as their uniqueness. This divided identity left them, like the Arabs, vulnerable to European nationalism, especially when it went berserk in Nazi Germany. There is terrible irony in the fact that Jews and Arabs now kill each other in the name of the very nationalism which so long victimized both peoples.

The struggle of Israelis and Arabs to make nationalism dominant over traditional identities creates deep conflicts within each culture. The ambivalence is painful and often consciously denied; it is easier to confront an external enemy, projecting inner conflict onto hostile neighbors only too ready to reciprocate. Lebanese scholar Fouad Ajami wrote in *Foreign Policy* magazine: "Arabs and Israelis have yet to accept themselves, let alone one another. People cannot be at peace with others unless they are at peace with themselves."¹⁴

Both Jews and Arabs have felt their historical uniqueness primarily through their religious achievements. As their religions now yield to nationalism, they cling all the more fervently to the traditional spirit of historical mission. The burden of the past thus assumes extraordinary power in the politics of the Middle East. Each people, Ajami wrote, is "haunted by its own ghosts, and tormented by deeply felt historical grievances that seem to justify its own violence and insensitivity."

Overcoming Enmity

Arab-Israeli wars are not really between governments but between peoples, and the enmity between these peoples springs from depths that diplomacy can scarcely touch. The Israelis, newcomers seeking acceptance in the region but finding themselves barricaded in a national ghetto, openly plead for non-governmental relations with the Arabs. Communication, commerce, travel and cooperation, they feel, can be both cause and effect of peace. They will feel safe, it has been said, when they can go shopping in Cairo.¹⁵

President Sadat, however, has said the attainment of such calm relations must be the work of the "next generation." A report by the American Friends Service Committee in 1970 also supported this view: "It is not realistic to assume, after all the bitter conflict of these many years, that 'normal' political and economic ties will be quickly established between Israel and the Arab states and that mutual trust and friendly personal relations will rapidly develop between Jews and Arabs."¹⁶

However, certain steps toward that goal can be taken prior to a peace settlement and can foster the minimum trust necessary to conduct negotiations. Sadat's decision to reopen the Suez Canal June 5, 1975, was in part a gesture to promote a climate of good faith for further talks.¹⁷ The

¹⁰ The word "Palestine" is of Roman origin, referring to the biblical land of the Philistines. The name fell into disuse for centuries and was revived by the British as an official title for an area which was mandated to their control by the League of Nations in 1920 after the breakup of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in World War I.

¹¹ Spokesmen for both Israeli and Arab governments tend to use the figure three million when called on to state the size of the Palestinian population in the world. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency offers a lower estimate, 2.7 million, of whom 1.5 million are listed as refugees. About half of all Palestinians live under Israeli control.

¹² Amos Elon, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-157.

¹³ Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (1968), p. 70.

¹⁴ Fouad Ajami, "Middle East Ghosts," *Foreign Policy*, spring 1974, p. 94.

¹⁵ Remark attributed to Golda Meir.

¹⁶ American Friends Service Committee, *The Search for Peace in the Middle East* (1970), p. 57.

¹⁷ The *Washington Post* commented editorially June 5 that Egypt had made a "pledge" to reopen the canal as "part of the first Egyptian-Israeli disengagement accord." However, Israeli Premier Rabin was reported in the Tel Aviv daily *Ha'aretz* on Dec. 2, 1974, as indicating that "there was no commitment that it [the canal] would be reopened before another move takes place."

likelihood of Egypt's renewing hostilities is reduced by the resumption of traffic through the canal and the return of people to cities along the banks that were virtually ghost towns for years after the 1967 war. In fact, the Israelis proposed that the canal be reopened and the towns revived as evidence of Egypt's good faith in its promises of peace.

Economic Pressures in Egypt and Israel

Egyptians, of course, will benefit economically from the renewed traffic through the canal. An Egyptian shift in priorities from confrontation to economic development would not only add credibility to its promises of peace but build vested interests in Egypt opposed to a new war.

Sadat already faces compelling economic pressures. In the euphoria after the 1973 war, his government raised hopes of more consumer goods, less inflation and an influx of foreign investment. But the continuing, costly confrontation with Israel, and Soviet refusals to postpone debt repayments, have thwarted these hopes. Inflation in Egypt was running at 30 percent in mid-1975, and economic conditions provoked a series of violent protests.

Continuing domestic unrest would threaten Sadat's progress toward greater political freedom in Egypt. Reduced tensions with Israel, on the other hand, would free desperately needed resources for economic development. Planning Minister Ismail Sabry Abdullah said that Egypt had spent \$25-billion for military purposes since 1967 and had suffered an equal loss in war-related costs. Meanwhile, he said, Egypt received less than \$900-million in financial aid from other Arab states.¹⁸

Israel, too, pays a heavy price for the lack of movement toward peace. The 1973 war wiped out the economic boom fostered by the 1967 triumph. Rabin spoke in 1974 of "the necessity to shock the public in order to return our consumer society to sanity." The inflation rate in Israel is 15 per cent, and the Israeli pound was devalued by 43 per cent the "Israelis are ready to live with a 20 per cent lower living

standard so as not to endanger themselves and their future." Yet Rabin talked of Israel's economic situation approaching a state in which it would be necessary to restrict growth in military strength.¹⁹

In both Israel and the Arab countries, a reduction in tension would permit a shift to economic priorities. The resulting internal development might, in turn, divert energies from belligerence. However, the absence of external pressures could also release internal conflicts in both camps.

The Priority of Fear

But a shift to internal priorities seems unlikely as long as Arabs and Israelis do not feel safe from each other. Egypt and Syria will not relax their military efforts as long as an enemy army occupies part of their territory; Israel will not risk a repeat of the 1973 war, which caught it off guard.

Israeli President Katzir, noting that Israel spends 33 per cent of its gross national product for security, told western journalists: "It would be a good thing if we could divert these resources to civilian purposes. However, a dead man cannot engage in agriculture or industry. Therefore we must care first and foremost for our existence, which is why we invest in security." In the same speech, Katzir said that "Israel has a nuclear potential." Asked if this is not a subject of concern, Katzir replied, "Why should this subject trouble us—let the world worry."²⁰ He later clarified his remark, indicating that he meant the general potential of scientists and the scientific-technological experience exist in Israel which could be put into effect if Israel wanted.

The Arabs, too, have a weapon the entire world has reason to fear—oil. If the Sinai agreement is not followed by further steps toward peace, the Arabs may soon feel that they have no alternative but another war. If another war occurs, another oil embargo can be expected.

¹⁸ Quoted in *The New York Times*, April 9, 1975.

¹⁹ Rabin was quoted in *Ha'aretz*, Dec. 3, 1974, and the *Jerusalem Post*, Dec. 4; Ya'acobi

in *The Wall Street Journal*, April 25, 1975.

²⁰ Quoted in the Tel Aviv daily *Ma'ariv*, Dec. 2, 1974.

BEYOND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI INTERIM AGREEMENT OF 1975 IS LESS IN ITS SPECIFICATIONS THAN IN ITS IMPLICATIONS, AND THESE, AS MATTERS STAND, ARE BY NO MEANS CLEAR. IF THE DISENGAGEMENT GENERATES MOMENTUM TOWARD FURTHER, MORE SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENTS AND TOWARD A GENERAL SETTLEMENT, DR. KISSINGER'S DIPLOMACY WILL BE VINDICATED AS SUCCESSFUL AND FAR-SIGHTED. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE AGREEMENT BECOMES AN EXCUSE FOR ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE, EXTREMISM ON THE PART OF ONE OR MORE OF THE ARAB PARTIES, AND A HOLIDAY FROM STATESMANSHIP DURING THE FORTHCOMING AMERICAN POLITICAL SEASON, THE SINAI ACCORD WILL STAND -- DEPENDING UPON EVENTS -- AS SOMETHING BETWEEN A FUTILE EXERCISE AND AN OUTRIGHT DISASTER.

ONE POINT I CANNOT EMPHASIZE TOO STRONGLY IS THAT THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT, IN ANY RESPECT, BE APPROVED UNTIL ITS FULL IMPLICATIONS HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY EXAMINED BY THE RELEVANT COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS. IT IS JUST 11 YEARS SINCE THE CONGRESS, UNDER A MISAPPREHENSION OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE, APPROVED THE TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM THE PRESIDENT AND WITHOUT THOROUGH CONSIDERATION, AND THE RESULTS WERE DISASTROUS.

GIVEN THE EXTRAORDINARY DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAD TO BE OVERCOME TO REACH THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, THE TEMPTATION TO OVER-CELEBRATE IS NATURAL. IF ARDUOUS EFFORT WERE THE SOLE CRITERION OF DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS, PRESIDENT FORD WOULD PERHAPS BE JUSTIFIED IN HAILING THE SINAI AGREEMENT AS "A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT, ONE OF THE MOST HISTORIC CERTAINLY OF THIS DECADE AND PERHAPS OF THIS CENTURY." IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE TAKE THE SCOPE AND SWEEP OF AN ACHIEVEMENT AS THE MEASURE OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE, I DO NOT THINK THE SINAI ACCORD IS TO BE COMPARED WITH, SAY, THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, THE WORLD WAR II PEACE TREATIES, OR EVEN MORE RECENT AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON SALT OR ON THE STATUS OF BERLIN. PERHAPS, WHERE ARABS AND ISRAELIS ARE CONCERNED, THE TRULY REMARKABLE FACT IS THAT, AFTER DECADES OF INTRANSIGENCE, THEY FINALLY AGREED ON SOMETHING, HOWEVER LIMITED. AS DR. JOHNSON SAID OF THE DOG WALKING ON HIS HIND LEGS, "IT IS NOT DONE WELL; BUT YOU ARE

SPEECH PRESENTED TO THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE ON 3 OCTOBER 1975. REPRINTED AT USAADS BY PERMISSION OF J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT.

SURPRISED TO FIND IT DONE AT ALL."

AN OBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF THE AGREEMENT REQUIRES A CLOSE, DISPASSIONATE EXAMINATION OF ITS SPECIFICATIONS -- EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT, PUBLIC AND SECRET -- AND ALSO OF ITS COSTS. EQUALLY IF NOT MORE IMPORTANT IS AN APPRECIATION OF THE INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES OF ALL THOSE INVOLVED. BEFORE COMMENTING FURTHER ON THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ITSELF, THEREFORE, AND ON WHAT MAY BE BEYOND IT, I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THE CENTRAL, CRUCIAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- INTERESTS WHICH MUST SERVE AS GUIDEPOSTS TO A RATIONAL, RESPONSIBLE POLICY.

I. UNITED STATES INTERESTS

THE CATALOGUE OF OUR INTERESTS IS WELL-KNOWN AND HARDLY CONTESTED: THE SURVIVAL OF ISRAEL; ACCESS TO OIL AND THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE ARABS; THE AVOIDANCE OF CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION; AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AGENCY. WHAT WE EVIDENTLY DO NOT AGREE UPON AMONG OURSELVES IS THE PRIORITY OF THESE INTERESTS AND THE APPROPRIATE MEANS OF RECONCILING THEM WHERE THEY CONFLICT. TO THE ISRAELI LOBBY -- IF I MAY USE THE NEWSPAPER TERM -- WITH ITS EXTRAORDINARY INFLUENCE ON OUR POLITICS -- THE REQUIREMENTS OF ISRAELI SECURITY, AS JUDGED BY THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES, ARE THE COMMANDING OBJECTIVE OF AMERICAN POLICY. IN MY VIEW -- WHICH IS A MINORITY VIEW IN CONGRESS AND THE PRESS BUT WHICH I HAVE A HUNCH IS MORE WIDELY SHARED AMONG THE PEOPLE AT LARGE -- THE COMMANDING AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS ACCESS TO OIL. OUR INTEREST IN ISRAEL IS EMOTIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL; IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS FOR ISRAEL TO SURVIVE BECAUSE WE WISH ISRAEL TO SURVIVE. OUR INTEREST IN ARAB OIL IS A MATTER OF VITAL ECONOMIC NECESSITY, TANGIBLE AND URGENT -- MORE URGENT INDEED THAN IS NOW RECOGNIZED BY ANY BUT A FEW ENERGY EXPERTS.

THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO HOPE -- AND MUCH REASON TO DOUBT -- THAT THE TRUMPETED "PROJECT INDEPENDENCE" IN ENERGY IS GOING TO SUCCEED WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE OR TEN YEARS. ONE REASON FOR THIS IS POLITICAL: AS OF NOW CONGRESS SIMPLY DOES NOT HAVE THE WILL OR CAPACITY TO ADOPT A RATIONAL PROGRAM OF ENERGY CONSERVATION AND OF INCENTIVES FOR NEW PRODUCTION. BESET BY POLITICAL PRESSURES, THE MAJORITY IN CONGRESS SEEM COMMITTED TO A NATIONAL POLICY -- IF IT CAN BE CALLED THAT -- ALLOWING RISING CONSUMPTION OF A DIMINISHING RESOURCE AT ARTIFICIALLY SUPPRESSED PRICES.

SINCE EVEN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS CANNOT LEGISLATE INTO BEING RESOURCES WHICH DO NOT EXIST, THE INEVITABLE RESULT HAS BEEN RAPIDLY RISING IMPORTS. BETWEEN 1967 AND 1974, WHILE OUR OVERALL OIL CONSUMPTION ROSE FROM SOMETHING OVER 12.5 MILLION BARRELS A DAY TO MORE THAN 16.5 MILLION BARRELS A DAY, THE PROPORTION OF OUR OVERALL OIL REQUIREMENTS IMPORTED ROSE FROM JUST OVER 20 PERCENT TO ALMOST 37 PERCENT, WHILE THE PROPORTION OF OVERALL IMPORTS COMING FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA MORE THAN DOUBLED -- RISING FROM 10.2 PERCENT TO 20.6 PERCENT.

OF AND BY ITSELF THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH MODERATELY INCREASED DEPENDENCE ON ARAB OIL. BUT CONGRESS, WHILE ALLOWING THE DEPENDENCY TO GROW, AT THE SAME TIME GIVES ALL-OUT MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE ARAB OIL PRODUCERS' MOST FEARED ENEMY, ISRAEL. DOUBLY RECKLESS, CONGRESS BOTH REFUSES DOMESTIC CONSERVATION AND JEOPARDIZES FOREIGN SOURCES, AND WITH THIS THERE IS A GREAT DEAL WRONG. ONE DOES NOT HAVE TO BE A MASTER POLITICAL STRATEGIST -- ONE ONLY NEEDS AN IOTA OF COMMON SENSE -- TO RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS NOT PRUDENT TO ALLOW YOURSELF TO BECOME ECONOMICAL-
LY DEPENDENT ON A FOREIGN SUPPLIER WHILE AT THE SAME TIME YOU PURSUE POLITICAL POLICIES GUARANTEED TO ANTAGONIZE THAT SUPPLIER. WE MAY DENOUNCE THE THREAT OF EMBARGO AS BLACKMAIL, AND PERHAPS THAT IS THE RIGHT NAME FOR IT, BUT IT IS MORE TO THE POINT TO NOTE THAT IF THE ARABS DID NOT USE THEIR ECONOMIC POWER IN THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST, THEY WOULD BE THE ONLY NATIONS IN THE WORLD -- MOST ASSUREDLY INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES -- AND PERHAPS THE FIRST NATIONS IN HISTORY -- WHO DECLINED TO DO SO. IN SHORT, TO GIVE PRIORITY TO ISRAELI INTERESTS WOULD LOGICALLY REQUIRE DRACONIAN MEASURES OF CONSERVATION, SUCH AS HIGH PRICES AND RATIONING, WHILE TO GIVE PRIORITY TO DOMESTIC ENERGY REQUIREMENTS WOULD REQUIRE AN ISRAELI PULL-BACK TO THE '67 BORDERS AND A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN ACCORD WITH RESOLUTION 242. IT IS A HARD DILEMMA, BUT IT IS INESCAPABLE.

BESIDES THE POLITICAL REASONS, THERE ARE WEIGHTY ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL REASONS WHY "PROJECT INDEPENDENCE" IS UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED WITHIN THE NEXT TEN YEARS. THE SO-CALLED EXOTIC NEW SOURCES OF ENERGY -- NUCLEAR FUSION, SOLAR AND GEOTHERMAL ENERGY -- CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO CONTRIBUTE IN ANY IMPORTANT DEGREE TO OUR ENERGY SUPPLY WITHIN THE NEXT DECADE. THE MORE PRACTICAL SHORT TERM ALTERNATIVE TO PETROLEUM -- COAL AND NUCLEAR ENERGY -- WILL CERTAINLY BE USED IN FAR GREATER QUANTITIES, BUT IT NOW SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THEY CAN COME ANYWHERE NEAR FILLING OUR FAST-RISING DOMESTIC ENERGY DEFICIT OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS. THE OPENING OF THE

ALASKA PIPELINE, EXPECTED IN 1977, WILL GIVE A WELCOME BOOST TO OUR DOMESTIC OIL SUPPLY, AND THE DECONTROL OF DOMESTIC OIL PRICES -- IF IT OCCURS -- MAY PROVIDE INCENTIVE FOR NEW DOMESTIC EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION. BUT THESE TOO WILL BE INSUFFICIENT TO FILL THE GAP, ALL THE MORE FOR THE FACT THAT ANY SHORT-TERM GAINS IN DOMESTIC OIL PRODUCTION WILL BE COUNTERACTED BY THE STEADY, RAPID DECLINE IN OUR DOMESTIC NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION.

NOT ONLY IS ENERGY SELF-SUFFICIENCY A VIRTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY OVER THE NEXT DECADE OR MORE; OUR DEPENDENCY ON IMPORTED OIL PRODUCTION HAS PEAKED AND IS NOW DECLINING, AND CANADA HAS ADOPTED AN OFFICIAL POLICY OF PHASING OUT OIL AND GAS EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES -- A POLICY, I MIGHT NOTE PARENTHETICALLY, WHICH HAS ELICITED NO CALLS FOR THE INVASION OF CANADA. BY 1974 ONLY 60 PERCENT OF OUR OIL IMPORTS WERE COMING FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. AT THE SAME TIME -- AS ALREADY NOTED -- THE PROPORTION OF OUR IMPORTS COMING FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA DOUBLED BETWEEN 1967 AND 1974 -- RISING FROM 10 TO OVER 20 PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS.

WE MAY EXPECT IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS TO BUY MORE OIL FROM NIGERIA AND INDONESIA AND A FEW OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT MOST OF OUR RISING IMPORT REQUIREMENT IS GOING TO HAVE TO COME FROM THE MIDDLE EAST. THE REASON, QUITE SIMPLY, IS THAT THAT IS WHERE THE LARGE RESERVES ARE; THAT IS WHERE PRODUCTION CAN BE INCREASED TO MEET OUR NEEDS. AND THERE IS NO OTHER PLACE IN THE WORLD, SO FAR AS ANYONE KNOWS, WITH COMPARABLE RESERVES -- EXCEPT POSSIBLY SOVIET SIBERIA. A FORTHCOMING LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY PROJECTS THAT WITHIN THE NEXT DECADE WE WILL BE GETTING ABOUT HALF OF OUR TOTAL OIL AND NATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST.

SAUDI ARABIA POSSESSES NO LESS THAN 25 PERCENT OF THE WORLD'S OIL RESERVES, AND ANOTHER 22 PERCENT LIES BENEATH THE TERRITORY OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. THESE COUNTRIES -- ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA -- HAVE GOVERNMENTS WHICH GREATLY DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES FOR REASONS OF THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. THE SAUDIS HAVE MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT THEY WISH TO TRADE THEIR OIL, IN EFFECT, FOR OUR TECHNOLOGY, AND FURTHER THAT THEY WISH TO INVEST MUCH OF THEIR SURPLUS CAPITAL IN OUR ECONOMY, WHILE RELYING PRIMARILY UPON THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES FOR THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY. THE SAUDIS DO NOT PROPOSE -- NOR SHOULD WE SEEK -- AN EXCLUSIVE ASSOCIATION TO THE DETRIMENT OF OTHERS. BUT THEY OFFER US AN ARRANGEMENT OF SPECIAL COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ADVANTAGE WHICH

I HAVE NO DOUBT THE FRENCH OR JAPANESE, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD SEIZE UPON AS A GIFT FROM HEAVEN.

IF ALL THIS DOES NOT ADD UP TO SOMETHING WHICH DESERVES THE NAME OF "VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST," I CANNOT CONCEIVE OF WHAT WOULD. AND THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR GOOD RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER GULF STATES IS REINFORCED BY THE FACT THAT AS OUR SHORT TERM IMPORT DEPENDENCY GROWS, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO ASK THE SAUDIS TO DO CERTAIN THINGS WHICH ARE NOT NECESSARILY TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE. WHEN THE CURRENT RECESSION OF THE WESTERN ECONOMIES ENDS AND THE DEMAND FOR OIL RISES ACCORDINGLY, SOAKING UP OPEC'S CURRENT SPARE PRODUCTION CAPACITY, WE SHALL HAVE TO ASK THE SAUDIS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN RESISTING LARGE NEW PRICE INCREASES -- AS THEY ARE NOW DOING -- AND IN INCREASING OIL PRODUCTION BEYOND THE LEVEL OF THEIR OWN GREATEST ADVANTAGE. AS OF NOW THERE IS REASON TO HOPE THAT THEY WILL DO BOTH, BUT THEIR FUTURE RESPONSIVENESS TO OUR NEEDS WILL OF COURSE DEPEND UPON OUR OVERALL GOOD RELATIONS.

TO THIS END IT WOULD SEEM PRUDENT, TO SAY THE LEAST, TO RECONSIDER OUR CURRENT ATTITUDE OF AMBIVALENCE AND SUSPICION TOWARD THE ARAB OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES. INSTEAD OF TREATING THEIR PROSPECTIVE INVESTMENTS AS A THREAT, WE OUGHT TO WELCOME THEM AS A BOON TO OUR ECONOMY. EVEN INDEED IF WE DO MISTRUST THEM, WE SHOULD KNOW FROM OUR OWN FOREIGN INVESTMENT EXPERIENCE THAT SIZABLE ASSETS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY SERVE MORE NEARLY AS A HOSTAGE THAN AS A THREAT TO THAT COUNTRY. SIMILARLY, I THINK IT BOTH UNFAIR TO THE SAUDIS AND DETRIMENTAL TO OUR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST WHEN THE PRESS AND CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES REAP HARVESTS OF SELF-SERVING PUBLICITY FROM THE FACT THAT CERTAIN COMPANIES HAVE SOUGHT TO ADVANCE THEIR BUSINESS BY THE PAYMENT OF WHAT IN SOME CASES HAVE BEEN COMMISSIONS, AND IN OTHERS MORE ACCURATELY BRIBES, TO CERTAIN SAUDI NATIONALS. IT IS RUMORED THAT THE PRACTICES IN QUESTION ARE NOT UNKNOWN HERE IN OUR OWN COUNTRY. ONE WONDERS, THEREFORE, WHETHER THE RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION NOW BEING DIRECTED TOWARD REFORMING THE BUSINESS ETHICS OF FOREIGNERS COULD NOT MORE USEFULLY BE APPLIED AT HOME.

THE DEEP SUSPICION DIRECTED TOWARD ARABS IN GENERAL -- AND TOWARD THE SAUDIS IN PARTICULAR -- IS NOT, I THINK, REALLY ROOTED IN QUESTIONS OF BUSINESS ETHICS, OR FEAR OF THE TAKEOVER OF IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF OUR ECONOMY. NOR, I SUSPECT, IS IT ROOTED IN GENUINE FEAR THAT A CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND THE OTHER

ARAB OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES WILL BE BAD FOR THE UNITED STATES. IT IS RATHER ROOTED, I SUSPECT, IN A DEEP-SEATED, PERHAPS NOT EVEN WHOLLY CONSCIOUS FEAR THAT THE ASSOCIATION WILL BE GOOD FOR THE UNITED STATES -- SO VERY GOOD INDEED AS TO ERODE OR UNDERCUT OUR ALL-OUT EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL.

IT IS AT THIS PRECISE POINT THAT OUR INTERESTS IN ISRAEL AND IN THE ARAB WORLD INTERSECT. FAR FROM BEING SEPARATE AND DISTINCT, AS WE ARE OFTEN ASKED TO BELIEVE, THE INTERESTS INVOLVED ARE INSEPARABLE, SO MUCH SO, IN MY OPINION, THAT NEITHER CAN BE REALIZED IN ANY SATISFACTORY, ENDURING WAY EXCEPT WITH REFERENCE TO THE OTHER. TO STATE THE MATTER IN CONCRETE TERMS: OUR EMOTIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INTEREST IN ISRAEL MUST BE RECONCILED -- NOT SACRIFICED BUT RECONCILED -- WITH OUR INEVITABLY GROWING ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON THE ARAB OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES.

THIS NECESSITY, IF WE ARE RATIONAL, NEED NOT STRIKE GLOOM AND FEAR INTO OUR HEARTS. THE ARAB STATES, FOR REASONS OF THEIR OWN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -- WITH PERHAPS ONE OR TWO MINOR EXCEPTIONS -- ARE WILLING AND EVEN EAGER TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES. NOR IS THERE ANY DIRECT CONFLICT OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE ARAB COUNTRIES IN GENERAL AND THE UNITED STATES. THE ONLY ISSUE THAT SETS US AGAINST EACH OTHER IS OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT, THROUGH MILITARY ASSISTANCE, OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB LANDS TAKEN IN 1967. THE ARAB LEADERS WHO PLAY DECISIVE ROLES IN THIS ISSUE -- PRESIDENTS SADAT AND ASSAD, KING KHALID AND PRINCE FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA, KING HUSSEIN, AND I BELIEVE TOO MR. ARAFAT -- ARE RATIONAL AND MODERATE MEN WHO ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ISRAEL WITHIN ITS 1967 BOUNDARIES WITH ALL APPROPRIATE FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES. "THE ARABS," KING KHALID SAID RECENTLY, "HAVE LEARNED TO BE MODERATE, REASONABLE. GONE ARE THE DAYS OF NASSER'S PERIOD WHEN THE ARABS THREATENED TO EXTERMINATE THE ISRAELIS."

OUR JOB IS TO GET ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW -- NOT TO SACRIFICE OR SELL ISRAEL OUT, BUT TO PERSUADE HER TO A COURSE CONSISTENT WITH UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ITSELF, WITH DECLARED AMERICAN OBJECTIVES SUCH AS THE ROGERS PLAN OF 1969, AND WITH OUR OWN TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLE OF THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION. WE DO NOT HAVE FOREVER TO CARRY THE ASSIGNMENT OUT: IF THE INTERIM SINAI AGREEMENT IS NOT SOON FOLLOWED BY OTHER, MORE SUBSTANTIAL STEPS -- ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS -- FRUSTRATIONS WILL INCREASE AND TENSIONS WILL RISE; MODERATE ARAB LEADERS WILL EITHER BE

RADICALIZED OR DISPLACED; AND A FIFTH WAR WILL FOLLOW. NOW IS THE TIME OF OPPORTUNITY -- AND IT MAY NOT SOON BE REPEATED.

AS WE CONCENTRATE OUR ATTENTION ON THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE TRAGEDY WHICH IS UNFOLDING IN LEBANON. IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED THAT AS MANY AS 3500 HAVE BEEN KILLED AND 13,000 WOUNDED IN LEBANON SINCE APRIL. IT IS REPORTED THAT RADICAL TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN INFILTRATED FROM VARIOUS AREAS AND THAT ARMS AND MONEY ARE SUPPLIED TO THEM FROM THE MOST EXTREME, RADICAL REVOLUTIONARY SOURCES. IF LEBANON IS TORN APART BY VIOLENCE, AND A RADICAL LEFT WING AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT IS SET UP, ALL THE PLANS FOR PRESENT OR FUTURE PEACE AGREEMENTS WILL BE SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON EMPHASIZES THE URGENCY OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBORS AND THE FACT THAT WE CANNOT AFFORD TO DELAY THAT SETTLEMENT.

II. THE SINAI AGREEMENT

MEASURED AGAINST THE DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY, AND ALSO IN TERMS OF OUR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST, THE SINAI AGREEMENT CAN BE REPRESENTED AS NO MORE THAN A MODEST GAIN AT BEST, PURCHASED AT AN EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH COST. IT IS NOT MY PURPOSE HERE, HOWEVER, TO REVIEW ITS SPECIFIC TERMS, WHICH HAVE BEEN MUCH DISCUSSED IN THE PRESS IN RECENT WEEKS. RELUCTANTLY, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT I WOULD NOT WISH AT THIS LATE DATE, DESPITE MY APPREHENSIONS AND RESERVATIONS, TO SEE THE PACT COMPLETELY REJECTED, BUT I THINK IT COULD BE MODIFIED. I WOULD HOPE INDEED THAT ALL CONCERNED WOULD PROCEED TO MAKE THE BEST OF IT -- THE ISRAELIS BY ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH WITH SYRIA, AND FOR SOMETHING MORE THAN A "COSMETIC" AGREEMENT; THE EGYPTIANS BY CARRYING OUT THEIR REPORTED PROMISES IN GOOD FAITH, ESPECIALLY THOSE PERTAINING TO MATTERS ON WHICH THE ISRAELIS ARE MOST SENSITIVE SUCH AS THE SUEZ CANAL, THE BOYCOTT OF FIRMS WHICH DEAL WITH ISRAEL, AND THE SUPPRESSION OF OBSOLETE PROPAGANDA. THE UNITED STATES, FOR ITS PART, MUST NOT SLIDE INTO A PERIOD OF ELECTION-YEAR COMPLACENCY ON THE STRENGTH OF DR. KISSINGER'S "CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITIES." LIKE THE 1973 PARIS ACCORD ON VIETNAM, THE ARTFUL GENERALITIES IN THE SINAI AGREEMENT ARE FRAUGHT WITH PERIL FOR THE FUTURE -- AND NOT NECESSARILY THE FAR DISTANT FUTURE -- UNLESS THE UNITED STATES ACTS PROMPTLY AND VIGOROUSLY TO LEAD THE MIDDLE EAST PARTIES TOWARD A GENERAL SETTLEMENT BASED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. IN SHORT, SINCE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT HAS BEEN MADE, WHAT NOW FOLLOWS IT IS OF

UTMOST IMPORTANCE.

THROUGH THE COURTESY OF THE NEW YORK TIMES AND THE WASHINGTON POST, INTERESTED OBSERVERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE A CLOSE STUDY OF MANY OF THE "SECRET" AS WELL AS PUBLIC SPECIFICATIONS OF THE SINAI ACCORDS. I POINT TO CERTAIN POTENTIALLY TROUBLE-SOME PROBLEMS NOT WITH A VIEW TO UNDERCUTTING THE AGREEMENT BUT IN THE HOPE THAT CARE WILL BE TAKEN TO OVERCOME THE DANGERS AND DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED. I MIGHT MENTION THAT ALTHOUGH I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE USE OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL, I AM NOT ABSOLUTELY OPPOSED TO THE PARTICIPATION OF AMERICAN TECHNICIANS IN THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM UNDER THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY CONGRESS -- THEIR IMMEDIATE REMOVAL IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES AND THE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO REQUIRE THEIR REMOVAL AT ANY TIME.

MY MORE SERIOUS APPREHENSIONS ARE DIRECTED TOWARD TWO BASIC AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SHORTCOMINGS IN THE OVERALL AGREEMENT: ONE IS THE EXCESSIVE, SWEEPING UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO ISRAELI MILITARY, ENERGY AND ECONOMIC NEEDS AS THESE ARE PERCEIVED BY ISRAEL; THE OTHER IS WHAT COULD BE A DE FACTO AMERICAN ACQUIESCENCE IN THE NEW STATUS QUO FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, MASKED BEHIND SEVERAL LESS-THAN-CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITIES.

IT MAY BE NO MORE THAN A CODIFICATION OF LONG-STANDING PRACTICE, BUT THERE IS POTENTIAL TROUBLE IN THE AMERICAN PROMISE, HOWEVER QUALIFIED, TO BE "FULLY RESPONSIVE" TO ISRAEL'S MILITARY, ENERGY AND ECONOMIC NEEDS AS ISRAEL PERCEIVES THEM. THE PROSPECTIVE SALE -- OR GIFT -- OF PERSHING GROUND-TO-GROUND MISSILES SEEMS PARTICULARLY UNWISE AND DANGEROUS. DESIGNED TO CARRY EITHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS, THE PERSHING HAS A RANGE OF 450 MILES -- SUFFICIENT TO STRIKE CAIRO OR THE ASWAN DAM; ALL OF JORDAN, MOST OF SYRIA AND PARTS OF SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAQ. DEFENSE MINISTER PERES'S PLEDGE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WARHEADS IS WELCOME BUT INSUFFICIENTLY REASSURING, OWING TO THE HIGH PROBABILITY THAT ISRAEL HAS IN FACT A STORE OF NUCLEAR ARMS, OWING TOO TO THE FACT THAT EVEN A CONVENTIONAL ROCKET ATTACK ON CAIRO OR DAMASCUS -- OR BY THE ARABS ON TEL AVIV -- WOULD REPRESENT A RADICAL ESCALATION OVER THE PREVIOUS ARAB-ISRAELI WARS, GREATLY INCREASING THE RISK OF SOVIET-AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT AND CONFRONTATION.

AT THE VERY LEAST ISRAELI ACQUISITION OF SOPHISTICATED NEW AMERICAN WEAPONS WILL ADD FUEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS RACE. EGYPT AND SYRIA ALREADY POSSESS SOVIET

SCUD MISSILES, SHORTER IN RANGE THAN THE PERSHING BUT STILL LETHAL AND ALSO CAPABLE OF CARRYING NUCLEAR WARHEADS. ISRAELI ACQUISITION OF THE PERSHING MAY WELL PROVOKE ARAB COUNTRIES TO SEEK SOVIET MISSILES OF EQUAL RANGE AND YIELD. AND IF CONGRESS IS AS LAVISH AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST IN PROVIDING SOPHISTICATED ARMS TO ISRAEL, AND AT THE SAME TIME AS UNRECEPTIVE TO THE ARMS REQUESTS PRESIDENT SADAT HAS WARNED US TO EXPECT, WE MAY SUCCEED IN DRIVING EGYPT BACK INTO CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- SOMETHING THE RUSSIANS CAN HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF ACCOMPLISHING WITHOUT AN ASSIST FROM THE AMERICANS. IN ANY EVENT IT NOW SEEMS PROBABLE THAT ANOTHER ARAB-ISRAELI WAR WILL EXTEND BEYOND DESERT BATTLEFIELDS TO POPULATION CENTERS ON BOTH SIDES.

THE ASYMMETRY OF OUR MILITARY AID POLICY IS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE DIFFICULTIES ATTENDING THE PROPOSED SALE OF HAWK GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES TO JORDAN. ON THE ONE SIDE WE ARE READY TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH A FULL PANOPLY OF SOPHISTICATED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE PERSHING AND LANCE MISSILES AND THE FORTHCOMING F-16 AIRCRAFT. ON THE OTHER HAND THE GRUDGING, SUSPICIOUS ATTITUDE OF CERTAIN SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN TOWARD THE SALE TO JORDAN OF AN EFFECTIVE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM HAS HAD THE EFFECT OF INSULTING, HUMILIATING, AND PERHAPS ALIENATING ONE OF THE MOST MODERATE, RESPONSIBLE AND PRO-AMERICAN LEADERS IN THE ARAB WORLD.

THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO SUSTAIN ISRAEL'S ECONOMY AND SATISFY HER ENERGY REQUIREMENTS IS NO LESS SWEEPING THAN THE UNDERWRITING OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY ARSENAL. THE LANGUAGE OF THE SPECIFIC ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS, AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS, IS PROVISIONAL, BUT HARDLY SO PROVISIONAL THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT CHARGE -- AND BE JUSTIFIED IN CHARGING -- BETRAYAL IF WE FAIL TO DELIVER IN ALL CATEGORIES. IT IS TECHNICALLY TRUE, AS STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE POINTED OUT, THAT THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WILL REMAIN BINDING REGARDLESS OF AMERICAN COMPLIANCE OR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ANCILLARY MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INDUCEMENTS. BUT AS WAS DISCOVERED FOLLOWING THE PARIS ACCORDS ON VIETNAM, THERE IS DANGER IN THIS KIND OF SLEIGHT OF HAND -- DANGER OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISCALCULATION, OF BLUFFS BEING CALLED AND DELICATELY BALANCED STRUCTURES COMING UNGLUED.

I NOTE WITH PARTICULAR APPREHENSION THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE OIL TO ISRAEL EVEN IN THE EVENT OF AN EMBARGO, AND ALSO TO COMPENSATE ISRAEL THROUGH FOREIGN AID FOR THE LOSS OF THE ABU RUDEIS FIELDS IN SINAI. ONE WONDERS WHY IT SHOULD BE NECESSARY TO COMPENSATE A COUNTRY FOR GIVING UP RESOURCES WHICH

DID NOT BELONG TO THAT COUNTRY IN THE FIRST PLACE. CONSIDER TOO THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENERAL EMBARGO -- ONE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS ISRAEL -- IN WHICH EVENT WE WOULD STILL BE BOUND TO MAKE OIL AVAILABLE TO ISRAEL, UNDER THE ALLOCATION FORMULA OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, AND ALSO HELP TO TRANSPORT IT. A PERIOD OF SUSTAINED OIL EMBARGO WOULD NOT SEEM THE IDEAL TIME FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE ON ADDED ECONOMIC BURDENS. EXTRAPOLATING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1973 EMBARGO, A LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EXPERT CALCULATES THAT A SIX-MONTHS' EMBARGO IN 1977 WOULD RESULT IN ADDITIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF A MILLION TO A MILLION AND A HALF AND A LOSS IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT RANGING FROM \$39 BILLION TO \$56 BILLION.

IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT AN EMBARGO IS ONLY LIKELY TO OCCUR IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER ARAB-ISRAEL WAR, THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER WE WOULD PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH OIL REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE EMBARGO AND TO THE CONSEQUENT HARDSHIPS IMPOSED ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. WOULD WE PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH OIL EVEN IF THE EMBARGO WERE PRECIPITATED BY A WAR STARTED BY ISRAEL? UNDER THE AGREEMENT AS IT STANDS, IT WOULD SEEM WE WOULD BE BOUND TO DO EXACTLY THAT. HOW MUCH PREFERABLE -- AND HOW MUCH MORE RESPONSIBLE -- IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IF WE HAD QUALIFIED THIS COMMITMENT, AND USED IT AS LEVERAGE, TO DISCOURAGE ANY POSSIBLE ISRAELI PREEMPTIVE STRIKE.

THE OVERALL COST OF THE SINAI AGREEMENT TO THE AMERICAN TAXPAYERS IS NOT EASILY CALCULATED -- AMONG OTHER REASONS BECAUSE THE COMMITMENT -- OR PROVISIONAL COMMITMENT -- TO "MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BE FULLY RESPONSIVE" TO ISRAEL'S MILITARY, ENERGY AND GENERAL ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS IS OPEN-ENDED AS TO TIME, AMOUNT AND CIRCUMSTANCES. THE "MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT" DEFINES NO CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE RELEASED FROM ITS PROMISES, EVEN IF ISRAEL WERE TO INITIATE A FUTURE CONFLICT. THE COST OF THE FOREIGN AID COMMITMENTS IN THE PACKAGE, HOWEVER, ARE MORE PREDICTABLE. IT HAS BEEN WIDELY REPORTED THAT THE COST OF THE SINAI AGREEMENT FOR THIS FISCAL YEAR WILL BE ABOUT \$2.9 BILLION -- \$2.3 BILLION FOR ISRAEL AND \$600 MILLION FOR EGYPT. AND ISRAEL'S DEFENSE MINISTER, MR. PERES, WAS RECENTLY QUOTED AS SAYING THAT ISRAEL WILL NEED \$1.5 BILLION IN MILITARY AID ANNUALLY FOR AT LEAST FOUR OR FIVE YEARS. IN ADDITION THERE WILL BE THE COST OF THE COMMITMENT TO PAY FOR THE OIL ISRAEL WAS DRAWING FROM EGYPT'S FIELDS IN THE SINAI, AT LEAST \$350 MILLION ANNUALLY. ALL THESE ELEMENTS ADD UP TO A TOTAL OF

ABOUT \$1.9 BILLION FOR THE ANNUAL FOREIGN AID PACKAGE FOR ISRAEL. PROJECTING THIS CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, TOTAL AID TO ISRAEL WILL COME TO \$9.9 BILLION. WHEN AID TO EGYPT AT THE LEVEL NOW BEING DISCUSSED IS ADDED IN, THE TOTAL DIRECT COST OVER FIVE YEARS FOR THIS MODEST PULLBACK, IN FOREIGN AID ALONE, WILL COME TO \$12.9 BILLION. THIS TURNS OUT TO BE SOME \$7.5 MILLION FOR EVERY SQUARE MILE OF SAND TO BE GIVEN UP BY ISRAEL, MORE PER SQUARE MILE THAN WE PAID FOR ALL OF ALASKA BACK IN 1867. IT STAGGERS THE IMAGINATION TO CONTEMPLATE WHAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS MIGHT COST. THE COST TO OUR ECONOMY OF CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY REGARDING ACCESS TO OIL IS INCALCULABLE, QUITE IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE, BUT IS SURELY VERY GREAT.

THE SECOND BASIC DIFFICULTY WITH THE SINAI ACCORDS IS THE FAR-RANGING, POTENTIALLY CONFLICTING POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC PROMISES MADE BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH SEEM TO ADD UP TO A DE FACTO UNDERWRITING, FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, OF THE NEW STATUS QUO. THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE NO TECHNICAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE ACCORDS -- ONLY SUBSTANTIVE ONES WHICH ARE NOT EASY TO RECONCILE, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, A SERIOUS AND DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL AS WELL AS SYRIA.

THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN DENOUNCING THE SINAI ACCORDS BOTH LONGER AND MORE INTENSELY THAN THEIR ERSTWHILE EGYPTIAN ALLIES EXPECTED, EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF THREATENING THAT SYRIAN WILL NOT DEAL WITH EGYPT AS LONG AS THE "STRANGE AND DISGRACEFUL" AGREEMENT -- AS THEY DESCRIBE IT -- STANDS. THE EGYPTIANS, EMBARRASSED AND DISCOMFITED, POINT WISTFULLY TO THE UNITED STATES ASSURANCE THAT IT "INTENDS TO MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO HELP BRING ABOUT FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL . . ." THE ISRAELIS, FOR THEIR PART, NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THE UNITED STATES ASSURANCE THAT IN ITS VIEW THE AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT STANDS ON ITS OWN AND THAT THE EGYPTIAN COMMITMENTS ARE "NOT CONDITIONAL UPON ANY ACT OR DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN THE OTHER ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL." THIS IS UNQUESTIONABLY READ BY THE ISRAELIS -- AND PERHAPS MEANT TO BE READ BY THEM -- AS A PROMISE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT APPLY PRESSURE ON THEM TO NEGOTIATE WITH SYRIA. THOUGH NOT INCONSISTENT IN A PURELY TECHNICAL WAY, THE AMERICAN ASSURANCES TO EGYPT AND TO ISRAEL REGARDING SYRIA ARE SCARCELY RECONCILABLE IN SUBSTANCE. BEHIND THE ARTFUL DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE WE SEEM TO HAVE COME PERILOUSLY CLOSE TO HAVING PROMISED ONE THING TO ONE SIDE, SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT TO THE OTHER.

AT LEAST FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION THE ISRAELIS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY EXPECT NO AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA, EXCEPT PERHAPS A "COSMETIC," WHICH IS TO SAY, MEANINGLESS, AGREEMENT. PRIME MINISTER RABIN DECLARED IN JERUSALEM ON SEPTEMBER 17, "I SEE THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IN THE GOLAN AS VERY DOUBTFUL. AND EVEN THIS MAY BE AN UNDERSTATEMENT." AND ON SEPTEMBER 5 HE HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS "VIRTUALLY NO CHANCE" FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA, AMONG OTHER REASONS BECAUSE THE EXTENSIVE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE OCCUPIED LANDS "WERE NOT ESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO BE EVACUATED." PERHAPS SECRET ARRANGEMENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND THE TOUGH ISRAELI RHETORIC IS ONLY A SMOKESCREEN FOR DOMESTIC OPINION. BUT UNTIL AND UNLESS EVIDENCE OF THIS IS FORTHCOMING, INTERESTED OBSERVERS MUST BASE THEIR JUDGMENTS ON WHAT IS PUBLICLY KNOWN. WITH THIS QUALIFICATION, MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT PROSPECTS FOR A NEW, SIGNIFICANT SYRIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ARE BLEAK.

WHAT NOW OF STEP-BY-STEP? WHERE AND HOW IS FURTHER MOMENTUM TO BE GENERATED TOWARD PEACE? IN THE BASIC EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT THE PARTIES SOLEMNLY AFFIRM THAT THEIR AGREEMENT IS NOT FINAL, THAT THEY ARE "DETERMINED" TO REACH A "FINAL AND JUST PEACE SETTLEMENT." AS WE CONSIDER HOW THIS GENERAL RESOLVE MAY BE REALIZED, IT IS PERTINENT TO NOTE THAT IN THE TWO MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT THE UNITED STATES CONCURS WITH ISRAEL THAT ANY FURTHER AGREEMENTS WITH EGYPT OR JORDAN SHOULD BE PART OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT, AND THE UNITED STATES FURTHER PROMISES THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO BOYCOTT THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AS LONG AS THE PLO DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. ADDING THESE CONDITIONS TO ISRAEL'S ADAMANCY ABOUT SYRIA, ONE DOES NOT READILY DISCERN WHERE THE NEXT STEP IS GOING TO BE TAKEN, OR HOW AND IN WHAT FORM PROGRESS MAY BE EXPECTED AT A RECONVENED GENEVA CONFERENCE.

THERE MAY BE PROMISE IN SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PROPOSAL OF SEPTEMBER 22 TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT A "MORE INFORMAL MULTILATERAL MEETING" BE CONVENED TO "ASSESS CONDITIONS," BUT THE PROPOSAL NEEDS TO BE THOUGHT THROUGH AND SPELLED OUT, ESPECIALLY AS TO THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF THE PALESTINIANS, WHICH CANNOT BE FOREVER POSTPONED AND EVADED, HOWEVER CONVENIENT THAT MIGHT SEEM DIPLOMATICALLY AND POLITICALLY. PENDING FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE FORD ADMINISTRATION'S FUTURE POLICY -- OR SOME AS YET UNAVAILABLE EVIDENCE THAT THERE REALLY ARE GOING TO BE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA -- ONE CAN ONLY DISCERN FROM

THE PACKAGE OF SINAI AGREEMENTS A DE FACTO AMERICAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEW STATUS QUO.

IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH THE AMERICAN ROLE IN THESE AGREEMENTS. IN ADDITION TO THE FAR-REACHING AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO MEET ISRAEL'S MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND ENERGY NEEDS, THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO "VIEW WITH PARTICULAR GARVITY THREATS TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY OR SOVEREIGNTY BY A WORLD POWER," AND ALSO IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE TO "CONCLUDE THE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A MILITARY SUPPLY OPERATION TO ISRAEL IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION." THESE ARE NOT ABSOLUTE, UNQUALIFIED COMMITMENTS, BUT NEITHER ARE THE NATO TREATY OR OUR SECURITY TREATIES WITH JAPAN AND OTHERS, ALL OF WHICH ALLOW FOR ACTION THROUGH OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES. IF THESE WERE THOUGHT OF SUFFICIENT SOLEMNITY TO JUSTIFY TREATIES RATIFIED BY THE SENATE, WHY ARE THE EQUALLY IF NOT MORE FAR-RANGING PROMISES TO ISRAEL IN THE SINAI ACCORDS CONTRACTED THROUGH SEMI-SECRET "MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT?" WAS THE CONGRESS'S VIGOROUS AND VAUNTED REASSERTION OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY POWERS RESTRICTED TO MATTERS OF THE LATE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, OR TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, OR AID TO TURKEY? IN SHORT, DOES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE VARY WITH THE ISSUE? AS CONGRESS CONSIDERS THE VARIOUS AID PACKAGES AND OTHER PROPOSALS CONNECTED WITH THE SINAI AGREEMENTS, I MOST RESPECTFULLY URGE MY FORMER COLLEAGUES TO BEAR IN MIND THE RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH THEY THEMSELVES AFFIRMED THROUGH THE WAR POWERS ACT OF 1973, THE CASE ACT OF 1972 REQUIRING THE REPORTING OF ALL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, AND THE NATIONAL COMMITMENTS RESOLUTION OF 1969 IN WHICH THE SENATE EXPRESSED ITS SENSE THAT "A NATIONAL COMMITMENT BY THE UNITED STATES TO A FOREIGN POWER NECESSARILY AND EXCLUSIVELY RESULTS FROM AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TAKEN BY THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THROUGH MEANS OF A TREATY, CONVENTION, OR OTHER LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTALITY SPECIFICALLY INTENDED TO GIVE EFFECT TO SUCH A COMMITMENT."

THE FORD ADMINISTRATION IN GENERAL -- AND SECRETARY KISSINGER IN PARTICULAR -- ARE UNDOUBTEDLY TAKEN ABACK TO SEE THEIR MIDDLE EAST HANDIWORK CRITICIZED FOR ITS LIMITED ACHIEVEMENT AND HIGH COST. IN THEIR VIEW -- AND I BELIEVE IT TO BE ACCURATE -- THEY WERE DOING ALL THEY COULD DO WITHIN THE CONFINES OF POLITICAL REALITY, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC. HOW, THEY ASK, COULD ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO A GENERAL SETTLEMENT WHEN IT TOOK ALL THE DIPLOMATIC SKILL WE COULD MUSTER -- AND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS BESIDES -- TO BRING EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO

THIS VERY LIMITED AGREEMENT? HOW TOO, THEY MUST ASK -- AND THIS WITH NO SMALL IRONY AND VEXATION -- CAN CONGRESS EXPRESS APPREHENSION AT THE MAGNITUDE OF OUR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL WHEN ONLY FIVE MONTHS AGO 76 SENATORS SIGNED A LETTER VIRTUALLY DEMANDING -- AND IN EFFECT COMPELLING -- THESE VERY COMMITMENTS?

ALL OF WHICH POINTS UP ONE VERY CRUCIAL, CENTRAL FACT: THAT THE KEY TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS IN THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES. AS LONG AS THE ISRAELI LOBBY RETAINS ITS EXTRAORDINARY POWER TO MOBILIZE LARGE MAJORITIES IN CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE WILL BE ACCORDINGLY HOBbled IN ANY EFFORTS IT MAY CARE TO MAKE TO BRING THE MIDDLE EAST ANTAGONISTS TO A PEACE BASED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. AS LONG AS CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS ARE UNWILLING TO FACE THE POLITICAL RISK, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND PERSONAL UNPLEASANTNESS OF WELL-ORGANIZED PRESSURE CAMPAIGNS, WE CAN EXPECT LITTLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST EXCEPT DEADLOCK, TERRORISM, TEDIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH LITTLE IF ANY RESULT, AND IN DUE COURSE, SOONER OR LATER, THE FIFTH ARAB-ISRAELI WAR.

PERHAPS, NOT FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE AHEAD OF THEIR LEADERS. A POLL TAKEN FOR THE GANNETT NEWS SERVICE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER SHOWED 64 PERCENT OPPOSED TO THE UNITED STATES COMPENSATING ISRAEL FOR THE LOSS OF EGYPTIAN OIL. A NATIONAL OBSERVER READERSHIP "PLEBISCITE" TAKEN IN MID-SEPTEMBER SHOWED ALMOST 77 PERCENT OPPOSED TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF AMERICAN TECHNICIANS TO THE SINAI. A POLL TAKEN BY CONGRESSMAN MCCLORY IN HIS ILLINOIS DISTRICT EARLIER THIS YEAR SHOWED 60 PERCENT FAVORING ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL TO SECURE PRE-1967 BORDERS, AS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNITED NATIONS, AS A CONDITION OF CONTINUED AMERICAN MILITARY AID.

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DICTATE FOREIGN POLICY, BUT NEITHER SHOULD ORGANIZED MINORITIES. A RATIONAL AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST BE SOLIDLY ROOTED IN THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST, MODIFIED SO FAR AS NECESSARY BY A SENSE OF DECENCY AND COMPASSION TOWARD THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED SO MUCH IN THIS DECADES-LONG TRAGEDY. THE ASPIRATIONS OF ALL CONCERNED -- OF ISRAEL TO A SECURE NATIONAL EXISTENCE, OF THE ARAB STATES TO THE RECOVERY OF THEIR TERRITORIES, OF THE PALESTINIANS TO A NATIONAL HOMELAND, AND OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE REST OF THE WORLD TO A RELIABLE SUPPLY OF OIL -- ARE, I BELIEVE, ESSENTIALLY RECONCILABLE WITH EACH OTHER. SACRIFICES WILL BE REQUIRED, TO BE SURE, ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS WHO HAVE BEEN RIVAL CLAIMANTS TO THE SAME

LAND. BUT IF THEY CAN BRING THEMSELVES -- OR BE BROUGHT BY OTHERS -- TO RECONCILE THEMSELVES TO EACH OTHER'S NATIONAL EXISTENCE, THE WAY WILL BE OPEN TO A NEW ERA OF PEACE AND UNRIVALLED PROSPERITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT IS IN THIS RESPECT, FROM AN AMERICAN STANDPOINT, THAT THE MIDDLE EAST DIFFERS SO RADICALLY FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA. THERE NEVER WAS ANYTHING GOOD TO BE ACCOMPLISHED FROM THE INDOCHINA WAR, ONLY A TRAGEDY TO BE LIQUIDATED. IN THE MIDDLE EAST THERE IS MORE THAN A CONFLICT TO BE ENDED AND CONFRONTATIONS TO BE AVOIDED. GREAT BENEFITS ARE WAITING TO BE REAPED FROM A PEACEFUL MIDDLE EAST, AND THEY CAN BENEFIT THE WHOLE WORLD. ONE CAN ENVISION A WHOLE NEW SET OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH WHICH THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD WOULD EXCHANGE TECHNOLOGY FOR A STEADY AND RELIABLE SUPPLY OF OIL WHILE DEVELOPING NEW ENERGY SOURCES; THE ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD BE FREE TO DEVOTE THEIR NEW WEALTH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR SOCIETIES; AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES MIGHT BENEFIT THROUGH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS JOINTLY SUPPORTED BY THE INDUSTRIAL AND OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES. IN SUCH SURROUNDINGS THERE WOULD SURELY BE A SPECIAL ROLE -- IN SUCH FIELDS AS SCIENCE, MANAGEMENT AND EDUCATION -- FOR THOSE MIDDLE EASTERN PEOPLES MOST NOTED FOR THEIR RICH HUMAN RESOURCES: THE JEWS OF ISRAEL AND THE ARABS OF PALESTINE.

ALL THIS MIGHT SEEM LIKE A DISTANT, IF NOT ALTOGETHER FANCIFUL, VISION OF THE FUTURE. BUT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE, AND IF REASON CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR, NEITHER IS IT UNREALISTIC. IT IS, I BELIEVE, THE OBJECTIVE ON WHICH WE MUST FIX OUR VIEW AS WE LOOK BEYOND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

Beyond Step-by-Step: Action Proposals

In the aftermath of the setback in March to the efforts to negotiate a step-by-step disengagement between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai, attention must turn back to the more fundamental issues that divide Arabs and Israelis. Even if it had succeeded or if it can once again get on the track, step-by-step was never intended to address the basic issues which now cry out for new concepts.

In this issue FOREIGN POLICY presents two major proposals to break the logjam. They proceed from a relatively similar perception of Israeli and Arab needs to highly different conclusions. Each goes further than most recently published serious proposals. In the first, three distinguished public figures, from three different continents, put forward a single proposal that would bring major influences from outside the Middle East into the region to participate in a settlement. In the second, an American observer offers a proposal in which the United States plays a unique (and highly controversial) role.

These articles are not a debate. They were written without reference to each other. We hope that in presenting them together we will help move the current debate beyond its present, sterile boundaries.—The Editors.

PEACE IN AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK

*by Zbigniew Brzezinski, François Duchêne,
and Kiichi Saeiki*

There is increasing evidence that the impetus to peace in the Middle East, provided by the October war, is grinding to a stop.

Reprinted with permission from FOREIGN POLICY 19, September 1975. Copyright by National Affairs, Inc. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be reproduced further in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

If so, this is not merely a disappointment, but a lost opportunity that could lead back to war. Admittedly, a new spirit of realism and popular readiness for peace, though not on any terms, is evident in the Middle East. But peace needs to feed on hope. Frustrated, the very expectation could add to the explosiveness of the region. In these circumstances a basic "reappraisal," even if not implying a threat in the style of President Ford's March letter to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, is imposed by the situation itself, irrespective of any belated renewal of separate Israeli-Egyptian accommodation.

The outcome of that reappraisal ought to be an overt American initiative, outlining both the substance of an eventual settlement and the required international framework for it. Such a framework is needed, since the United States alone cannot both impose and maintain a settlement that excludes the Soviet Union entirely: the substance of the settlement must also be previewed, in order to break the political and psychological Arab-Israeli stalemate which the step-by-step approach cannot overcome.

Ford publicly blamed Israel's lack of flexibility for the failure of the March 1975 negotiations, and thereby raised a furor. The U.S. government had hoped that Rabin and his Foreign Minister, Yigael Allon, would be able to enforce acceptance of the proposed compromise with Egypt that the Israeli cabinet subsequently refused to endorse. In a way it was a sign of increased flexibility that the March breakdown came over the details of an agreement for Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai. When Moshe Dayan first proposed such a deal in 1971, it aroused more interest in Washington and even in Cairo than in Jerusalem. But that flexibility is only relative. The Israeli political situation is inherently rigid. The siege of the tiny state is in itself the very type of crisis that creates inflexible men, a "worst-case" view of the situation and of the enemy, and a sense of permanent isolation and defensiveness which make far-sighted statesmanship

almost impossible. This is compounded by the complex system of proportional representation in Israel, which gives marginal political groups a power of life or death over the inevitable coalition government. This irresistibly reminds one of the inability of the French Fourth Republic to change policies toward the Algerians, even though wiser heads among the leadership knew some accommodation had to come. In such circumstances, it is to Rabin's credit that his government has resisted the campaign of religious sects to establish new settlements in occupied territories.

Yet, in the end, the limitations of the step-by-step approach transcend the internal problems of Israel, or, for that matter, the divisions among the Arabs. The approach is itself irremediably ambiguous, and Israel cannot give up land in return for inherently ambiguous assurances. This is all that it has so far received or could receive—even from President Anwar el-Sadat. It is true that Sadat badly needs peace to exploit the Suez Canal fully, to rebuild its shattered cities, and to concentrate on improving the standard of living of the *fellahin*, not to speak of controlling the political restlessness of the towns. This alone is some assurance. That assurance is there anyway. But promises of nonbelligerence for a finite five-year period made not publicly to Israel but privately to the United States are no guarantee that when the time that Israel has bought with its withdrawal from the West Sinai runs out, it will not find itself more politically insecure than ever because of its lost military advantages.

The ambiguity is not resolved by the fact that the step-by-step approach might divide the Egyptians and the Syrians. So long as the major aims of Arab diplomacy, particularly the problem of the Palestinians, were not broached, any apparently genuine offer by Sadat of safeguards for Israel in return for a partial settlement of a narrow Egyptian interest in Sinai could only appear a betrayal of the Arab cause. This forced him

to insist on a bargaining advantage, so as to be able to claim that he had promoted wider Arab interests. Thus, with the assumption that political confidence can be sliced up into neat parcels like territory, the step-by-step approach has proved inadequate in an area where hatred and mistrust of future intentions are the heart of the problem.

No Peace, No War?

In these circumstances, it may be tempting for some Israelis to argue that the simplest, safest, and most effective way to face the breakdown of negotiations is to accept it and survive as before. There are a number of superficially plausible justifications for such an attitude. One is that there is no obvious alternative: a shift of the negotiations to the Geneva conference is most unlikely to produce any improvement. Sadat seems as convinced of this as the Israelis. With the Soviet Union and a number of the Arab states beating the radical drum, the green table will not be comfortable for anyone who actually wants to negotiate—Egyptian, American, or Israeli. The multilateral forum is not likely to correct the weaknesses of bilateral diplomacy; on the contrary, there is a risk that it will compound them. Such a conference would be quite likely to discomfort not only Israel but the conservative Arab alliance, based on Cairo and Riyadh, which has asserted its pre-eminence in the Arab world since the October war. It would simply maximize the complications.

Moreover, since the October war and its shocks, the military and energy balances have both changed somewhat in Israel's favor. Much of the partially revived self-confidence of the Israelis now comes from the fact that their stocks of war equipment are sufficient to make them independent of American resupply for perhaps three weeks or more, a significant period by the standards of the Middle East wars. They would be that much less dependent on an American airlift, likely to be hampered by the conspicuous neutralism in a Middle East conflict of Por-

tugal, Spain, and the NATO allies with U.S. air bases. The Egyptians have confessed that they are short of arms, and though they are being resupplied via Saudi Arabia, and increasingly also again by the Soviet Union, they are made more vulnerable by the reopening of the Suez Canal. Just as significant for the military planner, the technological surprise, so important for the initial successes of the Arabs against Israeli tanks and aircraft in 1973, will be absent. In addition, the West's policies of oil conservation and the building up of oil stocks, coming on top of recession, have blunted the oil weapon which was so effective in 1973. To cap it all, there is every sign that Sadat has been increasingly forced to concentrate on domestic economic development so that internal restlessness in Egypt not threaten his rule.

Arguments that Israel's best friend is its strong right arm, and that Henry Kissinger in effect robbed Israel in 1973 of a military victory against Egypt even more substantial than in 1967, have begun to be heard. These support the view that if Israel sticks to its guns, the signs of new domestic priorities in the Arab countries may put time on Israel's side. Such a policy ensured Israel's survival for a generation. There is not much of an alternative anyway. The pro-Israel lobby in Congress remains powerful enough to ensure U.S. support even if the U.S. Administration becomes critical. No peace, no war may not be very comfortable but it does make clear the fact that the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.

However, to assume that time is on one's side is always hubris and in Israel's present case a particularly dangerous gamble. The power and prestige of the Arabs have grown immensely as a consequence of the new symbiotic relationship created by the industrialized world's dependence on Arab oil. The Arabs' advantages may decline to some extent in the future, but the implicit pressures on the West are likely in one way or another to continue for as far ahead as one can see. It may be that the highly unheroic bending

of Europe, Japan, and black Africa to the Arab wind can be shrugged off so long as the United States supports Israel. But the United States is also keenly aware that its relations with the Arab world impinge on its status as a superpower, and its support of Israel cuts across American *raison d'état*. Israel's very success in enlisting U.S. support could lead it to overplay its hand, even while making it more dependent on the U.S.

U.S. arms, U.S. vetoes in the United Nations, U.S. economic and moral support, U.S. diplomatic patronage, U.S. intervention to neutralize the Soviet Union in a crisis, all make Israeli policy increasingly dependent on a single life line. Israeli inflexibility places maximum strain on that vital support. An appearance of intransigence is itself an important factor in an age when public opinion counts. It could sap the good will of statesmen whose own careers, like Kissinger's, are marred by failure in the Middle East. It could strengthen the very forces in the Arab world which are most likely to threaten the existence of Israel. The frustration of hope would undermine the efforts of Arab moderates to negotiate. It would increase the reliance on armaments and war which the Arabs are now rich enough to acquire and wage when they choose. It could bring the Soviet Union deeper into the Middle East, and even unleash oil embargoes. For Israel, it would offer a prospect of more wars with total victory beyond its grasp, opponents whose performances gradually improve, and the specter of total defeat.

It was, after all, the shock of discovering that time might not be on Israel's side which gave a new quality to the October war. To forget that now would be to take inexcusable risks with Israel's future. The tour de force of enjoying complete freedom of maneuver despite unique reliance on the United States, and of exercising military superiority against a potentially more powerful enemy in the hopes of wearing him down, has worked only at increasing cost for 25 years.

Since 1967, Israel has been increasingly on the political defensive. A policy of force might still work, but it could also lead to the loss of more Israeli lives without buying any greater security. It would offer no fall-back position, no alternative resource, no prospect of the exploitation of the occupied territories for any normal relationship with the Arabs. However understandable in terms of a desperate struggle, it seems self-defeating and shortsighted in terms of establishing Israel's future on more solid foundations.

A Settlement

Israeli regression to a policy of force would pose intolerable risks because it increases the very tensions that threaten Israel while trying to suppress them. To be effective, a solution must thus attempt to treat the whole problem and not simply bits of the infection. This has always proved impossible, of course, because until now the Israelis have assumed that recognizing the central demand of the Arabs—the right of the Palestinians to self-determination—would mean setting up an irremediably irredentist state 12 miles from the sea. The Arabs, whose commitment to the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" would under the traditional interpretation mean the demise of Israel, would be bound to follow in its wake. The Soviet Union, as the probable patron power of the Palestinian state, would egg it on and gradually control more and more of the region. No peace, no war would continue, but with Israel in an infinitely weaker and more dangerous situation than in 1967, let alone in 1975.

This underlying and understandable fear is so strong that unless it is squarely faced it will totally paralyze Israeli policy—if it has not already done so. Of course, the maximum objectives of the Israelis and the Palestinians are quite irreconcilable. Palestinians and Israelis cannot both have exclusive control of the whole of the former Palestine mandate territory. But that does not rule out

a solution short of the maximum Palestinian demand which Yasir Arafat himself carefully called a "dream" when he spoke to the U.N. General Assembly. Essentially, Israeli policy should aim at trading the occupied territories for Arab acceptance of the partition of the old Palestine mandate territory between Israel and what would probably be the PLO-dominated state of Palestine on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since the real issue for the Israelis should be security and not territorial expansion, the predisposition to seek security through territorial acquisition should be shifted to a policy of seeking security through the denial of the use of territory to potential aggressors.

It is possible, of course, that an agreement which involved Arab recognition of Israel's pre-1967 frontiers, or something very close to them, could not be reached. But even if it were not, at least the negotiations could be based on real political problems and not an evasion of them. Much of Israel's political case could then come back to the fore, in a way that has been impossible since the victory of 1967 put Israel in a public position of seeming to hang on to what does not belong to it. The mere offer of the occupied territories and willingness to countenance a Palestinian state would accentuate the divisions between the Arabs.

Moreover, if an agreement were actually reached, the Arab interest in maintaining it would be very considerable. Egypt has already been trying to settle separately with Israel in the Sinai, at considerable risk to Sadat's position as heir to the leadership of the Arab world, basically because the tensions of a country of 40 million people trying to live in an arable territory the size of Belgium are infinitely more urgent than the grievances of the Palestinians. Egypt cannot say so, with no Palestinian solution in sight, but the situation would be quite different—for Egypt, the major oil producers, and probably also for a realist radical state like Algeria—if a Palestinian entity were set up by an international treaty to which their own sig-

natures were appended. The Arabs' other interests would loom larger than now.

In addition, daily life in a Palestinian state, set up on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, would be inextricably bound to Israel. The relations with a neighbor formidable in economic development as well as in conflict would generate powerful Palestinian opinion in favor of cooperation. That realistic view has been emerging even in the present state of conflict. It would be reinforced by a settlement. Thus, both for external and internal reasons, a political process would be set in motion, downgrading the frustrations on which Arab militants have thrived for the past generation. For the first time, Israel's policy would not be swimming against, but potentially with, the tide. A favorable political process of this kind is the only basis on which Israel's true security can be founded.

Even more than security—for looking beyond the mere threshold of peace one can make a powerful case for an Israel that in time would become the Singapore of the Middle East, a source of technological innovation and financial brokerage for a region that is bound to become increasingly important in the world economy. Israeli know-how and inventiveness could become an asset that the Arabs would come to respect and value. It is not visionary—once peace has been attained—to consider Arab-Israeli economic cooperation, perhaps even institutionalized through some form of a regional economic council, with the Common Market and Japan heavily involved in long-term investment and development schemes. Indeed, increased involvement of both Europe and Japan in arrangements that themselves enhance the value of peace would be most desirable, for their presence would have the effect of spinning an ever larger web of cooperative arrangements and commitments.

Superpower Guarantees

It would, of course, be naive to rely on gradual Arab-Israeli accommodation for this

kind of a reconciliation. It needs to be shaped. This is where superpower guarantees of a territorial arrangement—as the precondition of peace—are not, as Kissinger has recently called them, “icing on the cake,” but central to the whole prospect of a peace treaty. The guarantee of any territorial settlement by the superpowers would add a further, and in practice overwhelming, deterrent to those who would wish to overthrow a settlement, and weight the scales in favor of those ready to cooperate. A guarantee by the United States alone might be adequate for Israel, but a joint guarantee by the superpowers, backed up by their participation in an international force patrolling safety zones on either side of the agreed frontiers, would reduce the danger of Soviet exploitation of such a solitary American guarantee to enhance its presence in the Middle East. (One danger to be carefully avoided is that the superpowers allocate themselves separate safety zones, each with its own territory and client. This could bring the Soviet control Israel rightly fears.) Without involvement in such a force, the Soviet Union could pose as the enigmatic supporter of last-resort of Arab irredentists and perhaps even begin to exert direct control over some of the mini-states in the area. But it would be very difficult for the Soviet Union to refuse to cooperate in such guarantees, if it were made clear that the return of the occupied territories depended on Israel's security being established in this way. Like the Palestinian extremists, Moscow would then be the obstacle to the return of those occupied territories.

The argument that the Russians might be able to use their restricted presence as a guarantor to threaten the existence of Israel hardly holds water. The nature of the nuclear stalemate is such that cooperation between the superpowers has always gone through direct confrontation and is inseparable from it. There is, if one thinks about it, no situation more impossible than that of Berlin, and yet the rules of superpower

caution were never violated even in the Cold War. With joint guarantees providing the basis for a settlement, any disturbance of the Israeli-Palestinian frontier would thus endanger relations between the superpowers themselves. Thus, the Russians, like the Americans, would by necessity be committed to resolving the crisis. It is not a question of trusting the Russians, but of engaging their self-interest.

Soviet self-interest is also the answer to the objection that the Soviet Union is not likely to want to participate in such a solution. Until now, Moscow—despite its protestations—probably found the conflict in the Middle East to be a unique asset, making possible its penetration into the Mediterranean and the Arab regions. But that has been the case as long as neither war nor peace could endure. With war now the more likely consequence of a stalemate, the Soviet Union has to consider the risks that Syria's defeat by Israel would pose for Soviet interests. Moreover, the Soviets have become increasingly aware of the fact that the conflict in the Middle East adversely affects—indeed, endangers—U.S.-Soviet détente, in which Moscow has an understandable stake.

Finally, an important reason for engaging the Soviets in a constructive approach is that the Soviet Union, while lacking the capacity for imposing its will on the Middle East, possesses the means for obstructing any solution that completely excludes it. This is why a purely American solution cannot work. Moreover, Soviet involvement in joint guarantees could pave the way toward wider international agreements on controlling exports of arms to the Middle East, a necessary element in assuring longer-term stability. Again, a purely American solution could, in contrast, prompt a new regional arms race.

It might be objected that joint superpower guarantees of frontiers would give Israel nothing it does not have now. If the guarantor force were small, a determined assault could breach the superpower screen.

If it were large, the American presence would be overwhelming and Israel would no longer feel free. It is, in any case, most unlikely that the United States could afford, politically or militarily, to make it large. There are four answers to this, corresponding to the different phases of the build-up to a potential crisis. The first is that the presence of the superpowers would reinforce the arguments of the moderates against conflict throughout the Arab world and shift the focus from military confrontation to politics. The second is that the superpowers would see the build-up if there were one and that it would become a critical political issue between them before it ever happened. The third is that if the Arabs did attack in force, it would be difficult for them to know what their war aims were, since they would be attacking the superpowers and ranging them, or even only one of them, on the side of Israel. The fourth is that if the attackers did break through, the pressure from the superpowers to re-establish the pre-existing frontier would be enormous since their own prestige would be at stake.

The second objection might be that Israel cannot afford to rely on others, since the United States might sacrifice it to other ambitions elsewhere or the Soviet Union might make threats of withdrawal from the joint guarantor force for reasons which have nothing to do with Israel itself but with superpower relations. The point here is that U.S. credibility toward all its allies will depend upon its credibility to Israel and vice versa, especially after Vietnam. Moreover, Israel will not be giving up its military capability simply because the Americans guarantee its frontiers.

In short, if a settlement could be reached broadly along the lines of Resolution 242 (1967) of the U.N. Security Council but including the foundation of a Palestinian state and guaranteed by some form of presence of the superpowers on the agreed frontiers, the security structure and political process would reinforce each other in creating a

gradual d tente between Israel and the Arabs. Israel would be a great deal more secure than it is today, facing war at any moment, with no escape from the nightmare that at the end of a chain of expensive victories a single defeat might spell catastrophe.

All this, of course, is what Israel at present will not hear of doing. The reason is simple enough: The Israelis fear that acceptance of a Palestinian state is tantamount to acquiescing in the potential destruction of Israel. But if Israel continues to ignore this problem, or to insist that only it can choose the Palestinians with whom to negotiate, it will condemn itself to living perpetually at war, and bring about the very danger that the refusal to speak to the PLO is designed to avoid. One of the aspects of the diplomacy since the October war has been the Israeli attempt to settle the Palestinian negotiation with Sadat and Hussein of Jordan over the heads of the Palestinians. One of the reasons for the failure of these negotiations has been that the chances of Hussein speaking for the Palestinians, and in some sense containing them within his regime, have become more remote than ever. The problem, then, is to find a policy which, in contrast to the step-by-step approach, at one and the same time outlines a goal, provides pressures to maintain movement toward that goal through negotiation, and offers time within which political change can take place. In practice, the only policy that would seem to meet all these needs is one initiated by the United States which would publicly set that goal as the aim of U.S. policy.

The Next Phase

The point of suggesting the conditions of an ultimate settlement which cannot be immediately implemented is that without a vision of a reasonable goal which takes account of the deepest hopes of the contestants, it is not possible to obtain agreements even on parts of the problem. The Palestine issue is not the only one. The exact delimitation of Israel's frontiers, Jerusalem, compensa-

tion, freedom of trade, the policing of security zones, these and many others raise problems in their own right. Nevertheless, all but trade and compensation are linked to the territorial issue; and the solution of all is ultimately conditioned by the extent to which both the Israelis and the Palestinians feel that a settlement which offers political assurances for the future in place of the military ones they now seek, can be devised and sustained. Without a willingness to face this central issue, there is no hope of finding—in the state of suspicion generated by the lack of discussion of the basic issues—interim solutions with advantages that are equally balanced for both sides at once.

Accordingly, the United States should announce its conviction that the only settlement which can be sustained is one which respects the security and right to self-determination of both the Israelis and the Palestinians in their different parts of the old mandate territory. Such a solution calls for superpower guarantees which should be jointly accorded, but, if not, will be accorded by the United States alone. Conceivably, especially given the Gromyko statements of April 1975, the United States and the Soviet Union might together negotiate a statement in which they would announce their willingness to provide a joint guarantee for the 1967 frontiers, while leaving the question of devising a scheme for Israeli and Arab presence in an otherwise united Jerusalem to be negotiated separately. Such a joint declaration would put great pressure on the Arabs and Israelis, especially if it were then endorsed by Western Europe and Japan. This might not have immediate effect on Israeli policy, and Israel would no doubt do all it could through the U.S. Congress to change that policy, but a public U.S. posture in favor of such a settlement would exert powerful influence and would probably gain both domestic and international support.

There are obviously difficulties with such a policy. It will certainly be argued that it

goes too far, and that it puts pressure on Israel when it is Israel's life, not that of the United States, which is at stake. It can also be argued that it does not go far enough: it would not of itself put immediate pressure on Israel to change course and might be constantly under fire from Congress. But if the United States were to make such a declaration, it would maintain the momentum at a time when there is a danger of negotiations running out of steam; it would dramatize the need for a change of course in a way that would impinge on both the Israelis and the Arabs as no other external—or probably internal—influence could; and by pointing to a viable solution when most other indications point only to uncertainty, it could begin to impose a constructive image of an attainable alternative to endless destruction.

It is also true that an interim agreement in the Sinai may still be possible if either Sadat were willing to give a public pledge of temporary nonbelligerence (which might make him appear to be abandoning his allies) or the Rabin government were to accept a private Egyptian pledge to the United States (which is precisely what it has rejected). But even if that were to happen, events since the October war have demonstrated two things. One is that there is no more room for agreements without an attempt to tackle the central problem of the Middle East conflict, the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians (which almost certainly means, in practice, the PLO). The second is that for reasons that are too humanly understandable but risk being politically disastrous, none of the parties to the conflict seems capable of making a breakthrough to peace spontaneously and simultaneously. In that case, the United States, as the only power with the capacity to give long-term solidity to coexistence within the old Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab state, must now take the initiative for an international settlement.

ALLIANCE WITH ISRAEL?

by Richard H. Ullman

The time has come for new efforts, using new instruments, to break out of the Middle Eastern maze.

Step-by-step diplomacy—even at its most successful—can only postpone, but not avoid, the moment of impasse between Israel and its Arab enemies. The shuttle negotiations this spring demonstrated these shortcomings. Their focus on only one part of the Middle East problem has meant that, for Egypt, at least, the most difficult, sensitive, and, indeed, important issue was not a subject of negotiation. This issue was, in one sense, the very nature of Egypt's place in the Arab world. Yet, in another sense it was the place of the Palestinians in that world. Much as the Egyptians might prefer it to be otherwise, at the present moment these are opposite sides of a coin. Events since the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser have demonstrated fairly conclusively that there are no fundamental issues strictly between Israel and Egypt which prevent them from reaching an agreement. President Anwar el-Sadat implicitly recognizes this fact when he says, as he has on many occasions, that Egypt would be perfectly ready to recognize Israel's existence and come to terms whenever Israel satisfies her other Arab claimants.

Since the conference of Arab heads of government at Rabat last October, satisfying other Arab claims has, in effect, meant satisfying those of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Yet the PLO and its leader, Yasir Arafat, have been judiciously vague regarding the extent of these claims; any explicit claim less far-reaching than one for all of pre-1947 Palestine would expose Arafat to intolerable risks from Palestinian militants. And the Arab heads of government, like Sadat, know that no Palestinian

leader could guarantee their safety—or even, perhaps, want to—if new withdrawal agreements with Israel meant that their forces would not be available to fight for the larger Arab cause. The difficulties are thus manifold and formidable, and they are all subsumed into one overarching dilemma—namely, how to give the Israelis sufficient assurance of future security from Arab attacks so they will give up the territory they now hold and at the same time satisfy the Palestinians to the extent that they will stand firm against the extremists in their own midst. One need not be a pessimist to feel that the chances for achieving such a solution in the absence of outside intervention are exceedingly slight. One also need not be a pessimist to assert that a solution more than minimally satisfactory to the majority of Israelis and the majority of Palestinians is impossible, because Israel will not permit inroads into the territory it held—and with enormous dedication developed—between 1948 and 1967. Therefore, if there is to be peace in the Middle East, the Palestinians will have to accept the fact that while they may achieve a state of their own on the West Bank of the Jordan (perhaps eventually on the East Bank as well), they will never—at least for all practical purposes, never—achieve the Palestinian irredentism of Arafat's famous dream.

The Role of Guarantees

To give the Israelis the assurances they will need to withdraw from the occupied territory, and to persuade the Palestinians that the cause of Palestinian irredentism is forever beyond reach (although a circumscribed Palestinian state is very much within their reach), the intervention of powerful outsiders will be necessary.¹ Unless Israel's survival and security is made, in effect, into a nonissue by virtue of outside guarantees, the Palestinians will always be able to in-

¹ See my "After Rabat: Middle East Risks and American Roles," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, pp. 284-296.

Reprinted with permission from *FOREIGN POLICY* 19, September 1975. Copyright by National Affairs, Inc. This article was reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be reproduced further in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

flame the political rhetoric of the Arab world—and the “real” politics, too. By constantly holding out the hope of being able to satisfy maximal claims, they will make moderation and a lasting settlement extraordinarily unlikely. The purpose of outside guarantees, therefore, would in effect be to remove the issue of Israel’s “existence” from the politics of the Arab world by confronting with *force majeure* those who would deny it. Best of all, of course, would be multilateral guarantees of the security and territorial integrity of all the states of the area. So long as they were credible, such guarantees might satisfy all but that very small fraction of the Israeli population which really believes that Israel has a God-bestowed right, and therefore duty, to hold the territory occupied in 1967, and all but those Palestinians (undoubtedly a larger fraction) who would be satisfied with nothing short of all of Palestine. Multilateral guarantees might, in fact, be achievable after a settlement between Israel and its neighbors. But if a settlement were achieved, guarantees, while still desirable, would be less necessary. The very circumstances making them less necessary would make them possible.

Desirable as multilateral guarantees might be, the only essential and meaningful guarantee is that of the United States for the security of Israel: Israel (withdrawn, of course, behind roughly its 1967 frontiers) is the only one of the confrontation states with good reasons to fear that its future security would be undermined by armed attack from outside, and the United States is the only power capable of giving the Israelis sufficient confidence to trade the territory upon which they now depend for that security.

When I first put forward this argument on the crucial importance of a U.S. guarantee in the present Middle East dilemma, this spring’s round of shuttle diplomacy had not yet begun. Now, in its aftermath, I more than ever think that the vital next step, in

order to avoid new war, is for the United States to come forward as a guarantor, and that contingents of U.S. military forces be stationed in Israel to make the guarantee credible. These arrangements would guarantee Israel’s survival. More important, they would remove the issue of Israel’s survival from the daily crisis agenda of the Middle East. They would present all the nations of the region with a situation that would force them to look beyond the issues which have ensnared them for years. Here I would like to be more specific regarding these arrangements, and would like, as well, to attempt to meet some of the very cogent arguments that can be raised against such a U.S. role.

U.S. Forces in Israel

Regarding U.S. military forces, I have in mind naval and air units—specifically, some units of the Sixth Fleet based permanently at Ashdod or at other port facilities along Israel’s Mediterranean coast, and perhaps two or three squadrons of fighter-bombers at air bases in central Israel or the Negev.² U.S. ground units should probably not, I think, be stationed in Israel on a standing basis, although heavy equipment for rapidly deployable ground units should be pre-positioned at Israeli depots. I would not station U.S. ground units in Israel for two reasons. First, American personnel stationed in Israel should be as few as would serve to maintain a credible guarantee, and air and naval units would do that. No country enjoys having foreign military forces on its territory; Israel obviously would be no exception. Second, ground forces would not be necessary except in the event of a large war, and for that purpose they could be introduced by air to join pre-positioned equipment. Israeli ground forces are more than capable of

² It can be argued that the Negev is too much a front-line position, whereas U.S. forces should clearly be in a reserve role. A better location—and one with some symbolic significance—might be the large military airfield at Ekron, south of Tel Aviv, from where U.S. bombers flew in raids against southern Europe in World War II.

handling all but the largest incursions against Israel, and Israeli forces would be responsible for perimeter defense of U.S. air and naval bases.

The problem of base security raises one of the important objections to a U.S. guarantor role. We learned from bitter experi-

"Israel is not Vietnam."

ence that U.S. bases in South Vietnam were far from secure, and it was an attack on a U.S. base (Pleiku in February 1965) which the Johnson Administration used as a pretext for active combat participation in the war. Israel is not Vietnam, however. Indeed, there are virtually no points of comparison. U.S. air bases there, so long as they were not near the frontier, would be in the midst of a united, rather than divided, population, uniformly vigilant and fiercely hostile to terrorist infiltrators. Seaports, of course, are more difficult to secure—witness the terrorist infiltration of Tel Aviv by raft in March—but a combination of technology and vigilance would make attacks against U.S. naval facilities, like attacks against Israeli naval facilities (contrasted with relatively undefended civilian structures), very difficult indeed. It should not be forgotten, incidentally, that a likely concomitant of the kind of guarantee and Israeli withdrawals proposed here would be a strengthening of the forces of moderation within the Palestinian movement: As the recovery of all lost territory becomes ever more unlikely and a Palestinian state with its own territorial identity (the West Bank and Gaza, and perhaps part of Jordan) emerges, zeal and support for terrorism would be likely to diminish.

"Rules of Engagement"

The security of U.S. military installations is one face of a two-sided issue, summed up as "rules of engagement," whose other side is Israeli freedom of action to

launch retaliatory or pre-emptive strikes against terrorist facilities and bases in neighboring countries. This is an extraordinarily difficult and sensitive issue. Would the Israelis, under the sort of guarantee contemplated here, need to "clear" such strikes in advance with U.S. authorities? The answer is in some cases yes, in others no, depending upon circumstances. That is why the issue really comes down to "rules of engagement."

Hot pursuit would certainly be permissible even without consultation. At the other end of the spectrum, long-range air or commando interdiction would necessarily require specific U.S. approval, as it would raise the possibility of triggering a new war in which U.S. forces, by virtue of their guarantor role, would be involved. Between these extremes there is a range of difficult, but not insoluble, issues.

There is no evidence, indeed, that recent Israeli air strikes deep into Lebanon have done much more than raise Israeli morale; it is arguable (although Israelis are not likely to make the argument) that the raids have very little effect upon the planning or the morale of the Palestinian militants who, indeed, may well initiate incursions partly in order to induce the Israelis to retaliate, with consequent exacerbation of Israeli-Lebanese relations. Outsiders—and some Israelis—would argue that, all things considered, the reduction or elimination of fierce Israeli retaliatory strikes would not be a bad thing: the Israelis are highly successful at retaliating directly against individual terrorists who perpetrate outrages within Israel. A U.S. guarantee would not interfere with this admirable efficiency.

A second argument against a U.S. guarantee was put to me by an Israeli officer. The debilitating effect on Israeli morale of dependence upon foreign forces would be profound, he said. The mystique of self-reliance is a force of incalculable importance in Israeli society: Foreigners may provide financial and material resources, but Israelis must provide the blood themselves. Golda

Meir puts it another way: "The day the first American G.I. sets foot in Israel is the day we lose our independence," she has frequently said. The point is well taken, so long as one accepts a world in which things are always black or white, with no grays. But there are many Israelis whose perceptions of independence, and of threats to it, are quite different from those of Meir, and who feel that a discreet but palpable presence of U.S. military units would not be crippling to Israeli self-esteem. Independence is a state of mind, powerfully affected by the perceptions of opinion leaders, who do much to affect the views of a society. Israel, as a small, beleaguered nation, has its independence constantly impinged upon in all sorts of ways, some perhaps even more constraining—although not as visible—as the presence of relatively small contingents of friendly armed forces. I do not suggest that a U.S. guarantee of Israel's security, and the military presence necessary to make it credible, would be in itself desirable. Rather, it is the least unsatisfactory way out of a dilemma from which all the exits are costly.

A third argument against the U.S. guarantor role proposed here is that Israel must come to terms with its neighbors and coexist with them as one Middle Eastern state among others. A U.S. guarantee would emphasize Israel's anomalous nature as an outpost of U.S. imperialism, rather than an integral part of the region. The latter is an attractive but also a highly romantic notion. Two counterarguments seem each in its own way persuasive. First, it is a delusion to suppose that Israel, a highly modernized, essentially European state (despite the large influx of North African and Middle Eastern Jews), could for the foreseeable future be regarded as a "Middle Eastern state" by neighbors so profoundly different in their culture. For Israel even to begin the process of gaining real acceptance as a part of its region, it must first come to terms with its neighbors. The arrangement contemplated

here, by removing Israel's survival as an issue in the politics of the several Arab states of the region, and thus denying to the more militantly irredentist Palestinians the ability to manipulate those politics, is the best practicable way to prepare the ground for that eventual coming to terms. The nearest analogies—and they are not really good analogies—are guarantees of the security of West Germany and South Korea. With security comes an easing of tensions and, eventually, a beginning to normal relationships across frontiers.

Israel and Vietnam

I have left until last the most persuasive arguments against a U.S. guarantee. They pertain less to Middle Eastern than to American politics. First, is it remotely likely that at a time when high officials of the Administration in Washington vie with each other in announcing just how unreliable the United States is as an ally, the type of commitment which would be required to give the Israelis sufficient assurance to withdraw from occupied territory might be forthcoming from this country? And second—the other side of the coin—is it conceivable that the Israelis would regard *any* U.S. guarantee as credible? To the first of these questions, one must again assert that Israel is not Vietnam. U.S. interest in Israel's survival is not fundamentally strategic, but stems from a need to assure the survival and, indeed, well-being of political systems whose values are fundamentally like our own.³ Israel is such a society. Vietnam was not. The conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors is not a civil war; Israel is not a divided society in which the United States would be supporting one faction against another. There is not even a remote possibility of U.S. forces becoming involved in the same kind of terrible and difficult civil warfare that characterized the U.S. role in

³ I have developed this point at length in the article cited above (footnote 1) and therefore will simply assert it baldly here.

Vietnam. Indeed, the effect of a U.S. guarantee, and of U.S. forces in Israel, would be to make it exceedingly unlikely that those forces would ever be involved in combat. Their introduction in time of peace would deter the grimmest of Middle Eastern eventualities—war between Israel and its better-armed and more numerous neighbors, into which, with Israel suffering unexpected setbacks, U.S. forces would be introduced in order to preserve Israel's existence. In such a situation, U.S. forces would necessarily suffer losses, and they would not have played the deterrent role which would have prevented war in the first place.

A determined and confident administration could make such a case to the public and to Congress by clearly emphasizing that the purpose of taking on a commitment now would be to forestall a vastly more difficult and costly introduction of U.S. forces later. Reports indicate that allies of the United States worldwide are mystified at the Administration's contention that because of congressional refusal to commit still more aid to South Vietnam, they will lose faith in the United States and will adjust their policies accordingly. As Willy Brandt (to name only one example) emphatically stated, Germans have no fear that the United States will cease being a staunch ally because of our refusal to preserve indefinitely a corrupt and fundamentally weak government in Saigon. One cannot help but think that the Administration, also, is aware of the profound differences between West Germany or Israel, and Vietnam, and that the argument of the undifferentiated nature of U.S. commitments was aimed at blackmailing the public and Congress to agree to yet additional flows of U.S. aid to our clients in Indochina—an expediential argument to buttress an expediential policy.

The Problem of Credibility

What about the Israeli side of this equation? Why should Israelis be willing to trust U.S. assurances sufficiently to trade occupied

territory for them? After all, Israel has seen promises before. The Tripartite Declaration of Britain, France, and the United States in 1950 turned out to be a dead letter. So did U.S. pledges not to allow the closure of the Strait of Tiran in 1967, the year which also saw the removal at Nasser's request of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from its peacekeeping role in the Sinai. These were guarantees which failed. Indeed, UNEF's removal triggered a new war. Why should new guarantees be any more successful, or credible?

Here I would argue that there are fundamental differences between the "guarantees" of the past and the military alliance—for that is what it is—contemplated in this article. The appropriate analogues are not those from recent (and not so recent) Middle Eastern diplomacy, but the U.S. guarantees, made visible by the presence of U.S. forces, of the security of West Germany or South Korea. Yet, one observes, the United States can remove its forces from West Germany or South Korea at will; indeed, there is not inconsiderable, although far from majority, congressional support for their removal. Would not the same be true for U.S. forces in Israel? And if they were suddenly removed, would not Israel be gravely endangered?

These questions may be answered at two levels. First, on the formal, institutional level, it is of course true that treaties can be abrogated, or not renewed, and forces deployed in accord with them removed. But second, on the psychological level, it seems to me that the odds are sufficiently great that a U.S. commitment to Israel of the sort proposed here, once entered into, would not easily be broken, so that the Israeli government would find it at least as satisfactory a source of security as continuing to hold occupied territory. Israel—it must again be asserted—is not Vietnam. Relationships between Israeli society and American society are qualitatively so different that a confident Israeli administration, like a confident

American administration, could argue the case for a U.S. guarantee and do so persuasively.

In making such a case, the government of Israel should be mindful of several aspects of the situation. First, the role of a U.S. guarantee would not be to make the United States responsible for Israel's security. Man for man and weapon for weapon, Israel possesses perhaps the most efficient fighting force in the world. Israeli forces would continue to be the main guarantee of Israel's security. The role of a U.S. guarantee would be to signal to Israel's neighbors that the forces behind Israel's defense would be, in effect, inexhaustible. It would do no good, in short, to wear down Israeli forces, because at the end of that line, U.S. units would stand ready to pick up the burden. But that line is a long line, and Israeli forces would be at its head. Israel capably looked after its own security during those now seemingly far-off days before 1967 without the benefit of the present frontiers. Nor, in those days, did it have the very considerably enhanced strength afforded by the massive U.S. arms flows of recent years. It may be argued, incidentally, that these arms, and the equally sophisticated arms now possessed by Israel's neighbors, have reduced, rather than augmented, the security accorded by the possession of territory as such.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that U.S. forces stationed in Israel to buttress a formal U.S. commitment would not simply be introduced into a situation in which no other aspect had changed. Properly negotiated, a security system for the Middle East could be accompanied with measures which would reduce the chances of confrontation. The *quo* for the *quid* of such a U.S. commitment would be Israeli withdrawal from essentially all of the territory occupied in 1967. There should also be a *quid* from the Arab side—namely, a pledge that while Arab authority would be restored over these territories, they would not be substantially remilitarized. Only limited contingents of

forces could be moved into them. There is no reason for the Egyptians to remilitarize the Sinai peninsula except in the immediate vicinity of the Suez Canal. Nor would there be any necessity for the Syrians to move military forces back into the Golan Heights. They would have ample security against the unlikely eventuality of an Israeli armed move back upward from the underlying plains and the Sea of Galilee. Just as the presence of U.S. forces in West Germany has provided assurance (if, indeed, such assurance was needed) that West German forces would not move eastward, so U.S. forces in Israel would provide something like the same assurance to Israel's neighbors. Israeli forces have reached for territories beyond the limits of their own state only when its security has perceptibly been critically endangered. A U.S. military commitment could insure Israel's neighbors against such Israeli perceptions in the future.

Israeli Initiative, U.S. Response

It is useful to speculate briefly upon the circumstances in which the U.S. commitment proposed here might be given. At least in public, it would be presented not as an American but as an Israeli initiative, put forward within the context of a new Geneva conference. There, as Stanley Hoffmann suggests, the Israelis should announce their willingness to withdraw from virtually all of the territory they have occupied since 1967, and they should spell out what they would require from their neighbors to make such a possibility into a reality. (Jerusalem, of course, presents special difficulties; the city must not be divided again, nor can it ever again be closed.) As Hoffmann recommends, Israel should define its security needs, and then specify not only how they might be satisfied, but what Israel would be prepared to do to obtain that satisfaction.⁴ One way, of course, would be through multilateral guarantees, with not only the United

⁴"A New Policy for Israel," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1975, pp. 405-431.

States, but with the Soviet Union and other powers participating. In this connection, there is much to be gained and little to be lost from the presence of Soviet forces as guarantors of the security of Israel's neighbors. Rather than offering a threat to Israel, as many Israelis seem convinced would be the case, Moscow would surely take every step to avoid armed conflict between Soviet and U.S. forces, just as it has done in Europe. Nor, it may be argued, would Moscow be likely to be able to take advantage of the situation in order to impose Communist, or even Soviet-sympathizing regimes on Israel's neighbors. If Israel were seen to be contained, Soviet assistance would lose much of its attractiveness. Soviet access to Arab politics would surely be limited (as, indeed, it has been in Egypt). The "bottom line" of such an Israeli overture would be guarantees—multilateral if possible but unilaterally American if not. Similarly, the United States, as a co-chairman at Geneva, would appeal for multilateral guarantees—of all the states in the region—to accompany Israeli withdrawals; but the "bottom line" for the United States, also, should be a declared willingness to provide a commitment, and forces, whether or not it were joined by others.

What is proposed here, then, is something like a *de facto* settlement, set in motion by Israeli withdrawals and the simultaneous assumption by the United States of the role of guarantor. Clearly it would have to be accompanied by at least tacit assurances from the Arab governments that reclaimed territory would not be converted into a theater for military operations. There is, in fact, every reason to expect that these assurances would be forthcoming precisely because they might remain tacit. None of the neighboring Arab governments wants new war. All want to recover the territory which Israel has occupied. Yet none dares give Israel explicit assurances. That is why—in Egypt, in Jordan, in Lebanon, and (even) in Syria—responsible political leaders would be able

to welcome a U.S. guarantee which made possible Israeli withdrawals.

In such a case, the West Bank would pose special problems. There seems little doubt that King Hussein would welcome the arrangement proposed here. But would the PLO? Hussein has indicated his willingness to turn over to the PLO any liberated territory on the West Bank. Presumably he has sufficient power not to do so unconditionally—and his condition would be that the PLO tacitly accept the *de facto* rules of the game, and not build the West Bank into a base for anti-Israeli adventures. It should not be forgotten that Hussein and the Israelis have cooperated before in operations against the Palestinian guerrillas; they could do so again against a Palestinian state.

"Peace" vs. Peace

It is instructive to note the difference between the arrangement proposed here and the one proposed by the Israelis themselves in 1968, in which they offered to withdraw from the occupied territories in exchange for "peace." It was precisely "peace" that they did not get, for "peace" was defined not only as the absence of warlike acts, but also as recognition of Israel and of its boundaries, and the beginning of "normal" state-to-state relations. These conditions were unacceptable to the Arab governments, and without them the Israelis could not take the domestic (and international) risks involved in ceding captured territory and the safety it represented. Essentially, the Israelis sought security assurances in the form of normal relations with their neighbors. The U.S. guarantee proposed here would thus be a substitute for that normalization of relations, designed to give the Israelis the confidence they require (individually and collectively) to withdraw, without requiring their enemies to reach a formal agreement with them. *De facto* peace—an absence of actual warlike acts—would thus be sufficient; further steps might gradually be taken over the course of future years as psychologi-

cal wounds gradually healed. Thus the U.S. guarantee would offer one form of security in place of another.

As Henry Kissinger tells us in all his writings, there is no absolute security. The Israelis have sought, since their victory of June 1967, to trade territory for treaties. Since the Yom Kippur war, however, it has become more clear that the occupied territory is a wasting asset. What makes it so is not so much changes in military technology (which, it may be argued, cut both ways) as it is the gigantic sums of money which Israel needs to keep pace with the technology that the Arabs can now buy in limitless quantities by virtue of the fourfold increase in the price of oil. This money can come to Israel from only one source—aid appropriations from the United States. And this source is in trouble.

A Growing Impatience With Israel


Last year Congress appropriated \$2 billion in aid so that Israel could make up the losses in military equipment it suffered during the October 1973 war. This year the Israelis have apparently requested \$1.8 billion more in order to modernize important elements of their armed forces. While Congress is likely to grant this specific request, there is a growing impatience with Israel, even among its supporters. This criticism, much of it still private and muted, will only grow over the next few years if influential members of Congress—most of whom consider themselves friends of Israel—continue to view Israel's posture as "intransigent."

Thus the Israelis are placed in a cruel dilemma: they can remain "intransigent," and hold on to territory, thus risking further drop-offs in U.S. support, or they can continue with withdrawals (the process begun last year on the Sinai and the Syrian fronts) with no assurance that, at the end of the line, they will find either a more obliging attitude among the Arabs or an undiminished willingness for indefinitely continuing support from Washington.




This cruel dilemma is perhaps the best argument for proceeding now to place the U.S.-Israeli relationship on a new basis by entering into the type of guarantee I have urged. Because it would be accompanied by Israeli withdrawals, Israel would no longer appear intransigent. On the U.S. side, it would make explicit what is now vague. Once the guarantee were extended, it would make much less likely an annual debate over levels of assistance, and whether or not the Israelis "deserved" on the basis of their diplomatic behavior one level or another: following Israeli withdrawals, the burden of becoming less intransigent would fall clearly upon the other side. Stationing U.S. forces in Israel would not make unnecessary the continuing modernization of Israel's own armed forces, but the sums required for Israel to mount an effective *joint* deterrent posture would surely be much less than they would be in the absence of a U.S. role. And the incremental effect on the U.S. defense budget would likely be very slight: the forces based in Israel would, after all, not be additions to the total U.S. force posture, but rather, a relocation of existing units.

Whether or not these arguments might persuade the Israeli government or the U.S. Congress I cannot know. But if they are not persuasive, there is one more argument that should be: The guarantee proposed here may well offer the best chance for avoiding another round of Middle East warfare, this time a potentially much more devastating round. Israeli interests in forestalling renewed warfare are clear. So, it cannot be overemphasized, are U.S. interests. The United States of course has a humanitarian interest in preventing many more Israeli and Arab deaths. But it has a much greater interest in preventing a war in which the chances for U.S. involvement, despite any plans which may be laid in advance, will always be substantial.

APPENDIX A: Maps



Reprinted from Department of State Special Report No. 12, "U.S. Policy in the Middle East December 1973-November 1974," released January 1975.



© 1973 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission. These maps were reproduced at USAADS by special permission and may not be further reproduced in whole or in part without express permission of the copyright owner.

APPP-FBT

