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REFERENCE BOOK

EUROPE: NATO AND WTO



TACTICS DEPARTMENT

US ARMY AIR DEFENSE SCHOOL

FORT BLISS, TEXAS

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US ARMY AIR DEFENSE SCHOOL

Fort Bliss, Texas

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EUROPE: NATO AND WTO

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CHAPTER 1

SECURITY IN EUROPE

Section 1. Introduction

In forming a basis for analyzing the issues involving European security, this chapter: (1) outlines some of the major problems dividing West and East Europe, (2) summarizes Soviet interests in East Europe, and (3) provides US policy in regard to the American commitment to West Europe.

Section II. Problems Which Divide Europe

(Source: Department of State, Issues in United States Foreign Policy No 2, "NATO and the Defense of Europe," p. 7.)

A number of fundamental problems still divide Europe. Limited progress has been made in improving bilateral relations, international cooperation, arms control, trade, and other contacts, but basic political differences persist.

The issues are, of course, highly complex, but they include the following:

DIFFERING WORLD VIEWS: The Western democracies believe that international relations should be based upon full respect for the principles of independence and the territorial integrity of states, noninterference in their affairs, and the obligation of states to refrain from the threat or use of force. Communist leaders view the world as in a state of inevitable class conflict; they believe international relations should be conducted in such a way as to achieve an ultimate world Communist order.

DIVISION OF GERMANY: A German peace treaty has not yet been concluded. As a result, the German nation is divided between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Zone of Germany (the "German Democratic Republic").

BERLIN: The four powers (US, UK, France, and USSR) continue to have primary responsibility for Berlin. Berlin remains a source of potential conflict and has been the cause of successive crises.

SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: The countries of Eastern Europe still have not regained their full independence as sovereign states. Through successive repressions--e.g., the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia--the Soviet Union has made clear its intention to control tendencies toward liberalization in Eastern Europe and contacts between these countries and the West. The nature of Soviet intentions was clearly stated in the fall of 1968, when Soviet leaders promulgated the doctrine of "limited sovereignty," i.e., "... When the internal and external forces hostile to Socialism seek to turn back the development of any Socialist country toward the restoration of the capitalist order...this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country, but also a common problem of concern for all socialist countries."

SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES: The presence of extensive Soviet forces throughout the Warsaw Pact area produces serious dangers of conflict. Agreed formulas have not been worked out on mutual reduction of armed forces in Europe with adequate control and inspection.

Section III. Soviet Interests in Europe

(Source: Department of State, Issues in United States Foreign Policy No 2, "NATO and the Defense of Europe," pp. 22-24).

Because of the geographical vulnerability on her western frontier, and for other reasons of national interest, for the past several hundred years, Russia has pursued major territorial goals in Central Europe, goals shared by both the Tsars and their Communist successors.

The geographic expansion of Russia from Moscow outward has been continuous since the 14th and 15th centuries when the Duchy of Muscovy drove back the Golden Horde and ended two centuries of Mongol (Tartar) domination. Russian rulers--having few natural barriers to rely on in the vast Russian tableland--believed that survival meant expansion in all directions. In addition, there were large numbers of Russians or Slavs of the Orthodox faith living outside Russian boundaries whom the Tsars wanted to bring under their control.

Russia's western frontier has always been vulnerable to invasion from Europe. There are two natural invasion routes across Russia's western frontier zone. The first is along the north side of the Pripet Marsh in a direct route from Berlin through Warsaw to Moscow; the second runs across the treeless plain between the Pripet Marsh and the Carpathian Range. (Napoleon chose the first of these routes for his 1812 invasion of Russia; Kaiser Wilhelm's army used both routes in 1914-17, and Hitler followed both routes in 1941).

EARLY HISTORY

Ivan the Great, in the 15th century, warred against the Poles and took Novgorod.

Ivan the Terrible, in the 16th century, was also concerned with lessening the danger of Polish expansion into Russia and sought unsuccessfully to extend the Russian frontier to the Baltic Sea.

Peter the Great defeated Charles XII and destroyed Sweden's power at the Battle of Poltava in 1709 and subsequently acquired Ingria, Karelia, Estonia, and Livonia, thus giving Russia an outlet on the Baltic. The Peace of Nystad in 1721 confirmed the incorporation of these territories. Peter built his capital St. Petersburg on the Baltic. This symbolized Russia's coming of age as a major European power. Peter was unsuccessful, however, in winning Little and White Russia from Poland.

Under Elizabeth and Catherine the Great in the 18th century, Russia came to dominate the Baltic. Through the three partitions of Poland, the last occurring in 1795, Little and White Russia were secured and Polish power was effectively destroyed.

19th CENTURY

Tsarist successors continued this expansion, gradually acquiring Finland and most of Poland. The Congress of Vienna settlement of 1815 gave Russia most of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Russia now, for the first time, controlled the Central Vistula Basin and the city of Warsaw. Thus, by the end of the Napoleonic era, Russia was the predominant military power on the continent and had extended her borders deep into central Europe and Scandinavia.

In the century between the Congress of Vienna and World War I, Russia's borders in Eastern Europe, with minor exceptions, remained stable. This was in great part due to Western European resistance to Russian efforts to encroach further. However, Russia did provide increasing assistance and encouragement to the Slav nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Balkans in the latter half of the 19th century as a means of extending Russian influence. Russia's traditional strategic and economic reasons for expansion southward and westward became transformed into a Messianic, Pan-Slavic movement which helped arouse the nationalist passions that in part led to World War I.

20th CENTURY

Most of the western territories annexed by Peter I, Catherine II, and Alexander I were lost to Russia within a year after the Russian Revolution and the fall of the Tsarist Empire in 1917. Russia's role in World War I ended with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918--the price paid was the surrender of Russian Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and several Baltic cities. The independence of Finland was reaffirmed. Despite the subsequent abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by the allies, these countries either achieved or reaffirmed their independence. Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland all declared their independence in 1918. Except for Poland, the USSR concluded peace treaties with these new states by 1920.

Poland, on the other hand, launched a military campaign in the Ukraine shortly after her declaration of independence, and it was not until 1921 that the Peace of Riga ended military activities. The Peace of Riga left Poland larger than the 19th century Poland, at the expense of Russia, but it was still not as large as the Poland of 1772.

During this period Romania took advantage of the turmoil in the USSR to seize Bessarabia in January 1918. Unlike other border changes, this loss of territory was never formally recognized by the Soviet Government. These frontiers remained the same until 1939. Russia was left with a tiny outlet on the Baltic at Leningrad, and with the age-old problem of security on her western frontier.

A small number of buffer states were created after World War I from the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in part to prevent war between the two great central European powers, Germany and Russia. Once Russia and Germany had recovered their strength, however, the buffer states could not stand on their own, and they created an inviting power vacuum in Central Europe. One by one they were drawn into an alliance with or military occupation by Nazi Germany, their territories used finally for staging the invasion of the Soviet Union in World War II.

AFTER WORLD WAR II

After the defeat of Nazi Germany, as after every successful war, Russia again expanded her boundaries westward. This was facilitated by the fact that by agreement among the Allies, Soviet armies were to be responsible for "liberating" most of central Europe from Nazi occupation. The liberation became a Stalinist occupation.

Under Red Army occupation, Soviet pressure forced the formation of Communist governments in each Eastern European country, with foreign policies aligned to that of the USSR. An exception was Yugoslavia which was never actually occupied by the Red Army.

In addition, the USSR annexed the northern part of East Prussia, including Königsberg and the Polish borderlands--the same borderlands she had obtained as a result of the third partition in 1795.

The Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had been annexed in 1940.

Czechoslovakia ceded Ruthenia--also known as the Transcarpathian Ukraine--to the USSR. This area never had been part of Russia, and with it, she obtained for the first time an important foothold west of the Carpathian Mountain Range in the Hungarian plains.

A peace treaty between the USSR and Romania confirmed the Russian annexation of Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and the Gertsa region.

Except for Finland, central Poland, and the net addition of Ruthenia, northern Bukovina, and the northern part of East Prussia, Russia's western gains as a result of World War II gave her almost the same boundaries she possessed in 1914, on the eve of World War I. Once more Russia was in a strong position on the Baltic, and the dominant power in Eastern Europe.

HISTORY AND DOCTRINE

In Soviet relations with the Middle East, there is a fairly clear historical watershed: Prior to the 18th Century, the thrust of power was nearly always from the south--from Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, and Turks against Russia. From the 18th Century, the thrust of power was reversed, pressing from Russia in the north against the Middle East in the south.

There is no such watershed in Russian relations with Europe. Even after she achieved great power status, her strength could not protect her from invasions from the west. Napoleon, the Kaiser, Hitler--each was defeated only after all of western Russia was scorched and soaked in blood. These are historical factors having little to do with Communism but which still must affect the judgment of Soviet leaders as they are concerned with questions affecting the security of their western frontiers.

THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE

Soviet troops can be viewed as having two roles in East Europe. One is to deter invasion by the western nations and to fight if deterrence fails and secondly, to deter East European countries from undertaking any important, independent changes in their political, social, or economic policies. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Leonid Brezhnev defined publicly the Soviet Union's basic policy toward relations among the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Mr. Brezhnev said, in Warsaw, November 12, 1968:

"When the internal and external forces hostile to Socialism seek to turn back the development of any Socialist country toward the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of Socialism in that country, a threat to the security of the Socialist commonwealth as a whole, emerges, this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country, but also a common problem of concern for all Socialist countries. It goes without saying that such an action as military aid to a fraternal country to thwart the threat to the Socialist order is an extraordinary, enforced measure. It can be caused only by direct actions of the enemies of Socialism inside the country and beyond its boundaries, actions creating a threat to the common interests of the Socialist camp."

Section IV. US Policy: Commitment to Europe

(Source: Department of State GIST, "Europe: US Forces," January 1973. Department of State Pamphlet, "Why We Maintain US Forces in Europe," July 1973)

US POLICY

A friendly, prosperous, and stable Western Europe is indispensable to fundamental US national security. Two world wars have made this fact clear. Five Presidents have concluded that US security requires the presences in Europe of substantial US military forces, complementing the forces of our allies.

In light of the current security situation in Europe, NATO's military forces, including US NATO-committed forces in Europe, can be reduced only if accompanied by reciprocal Warsaw Pact reductions. At the present time, the military facts provide no justification for a unilateral reduction of American forces in the European area.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

The USSR and its allies are continuing to increase their military capabilities in Europe. The Warsaw Pact forces maintain some 2.8 million men under arms. The most ready of these forces are massed in the central region of Europe with a ground force of some 45-50 highly mobile and heavily armored divisions. The Soviet Union contributes about 31 divisions of this number, of which some 20 armored and mechanized infantry divisions are stationed in East Germany alone.

NATO, in response to these powerful Warsaw Pact military capabilities, is improving its defense. Our allies maintain about 3 million men under arms. Turkey and France have about 500,000 each; the Federal Republic of Germany has more than 460,000; and Italy slightly more than 400,000. In addition, several allies (Britain, France, Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands) station about 150,000 land and air forces in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The US share of this defense force totals about 300,000 military personnel in the European area, as follows: Army 190,000; Air Force 70,000; the Navy and Marines 40,000 including the 6th Fleet. The bulk of the US air and land forces (about 215,000) are in the Federal Republic of Germany, an area which is the key to the defense of Western Europe. Most US naval forces are in the Mediterranean area.

NATO STRATEGY

The plans of NATO are based on flexible response and forward defense. Flexible response means that NATO must be prepared to respond to a wide range of Warsaw Pact challenges--from threats to use of force, to limited aggression, to all-out nuclear attack. Forward defense means defense mounted as far forward as possible to provide maximum protection of NATO territory.

NATO conventional forces in this age of rough nuclear parity assume a more important role in defending NATO territory as far forward as possible. This vital function cannot be performed if these conventional forces are reduced by US withdrawals in the absence of comparable Soviet reductions. The idea of nuclear weapons alone as an inexpensive panacea for the defense of Europe is an illusion. This NATO strategy, made credible by maintaining adequate NATO forces in being, has enabled the alliance to successfully deter aggression against NATO for more than 20 years.

CONSEQUENCES OF US WITHDRAWAL

A significant unilateral reduction in the US military presence would, among other things:

a. Weaken significantly NATO's conventional defense and create the impression the US does not believe in the need for a high level of conventional forces. Other NATO members might be tempted to follow suit with additional reductions. In the event of aggression, a weakened NATO alliance might be forced to resort more quickly to nuclear weapons.

b. Weaken our bargaining position in efforts to improve East-West relations, particularly in seeking mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe;

c. Undermine the credibility of our commitment to the defense of Western Europe, thereby encouraging Warsaw Pact nations to take more risks;

d. Increase European fears that we might disregard allied interests in order to reach agreement with the USSR. This is of particular concern when Phase II of the strategic arms limitation talks are under way between the US and USSR.

CHAPTER 2

EAST AND WEST EUROPEAN MILITARY ALLIANCES


Section 1. Introduction

The emphasis of this chapter is on basic NATO structure and defense policies. A brief description of WTO is given, WTO strengths and weaknesses are summarized, and a comparison with NATO is made. The material in this Chapter has been extracted from the following source:

(Source: Department of State, Issues in United States Foreign Policy No 2, "NATO and the Defense of Europe").

Section II. NATO

STRUCTURE



FRENCH WITHDRAWAL

In March 1966, the French Government announced its intention to withdraw the French staff from integrated NATO Military Headquarters, to cease the assignment to international commands of all French armed forces, and to call for the removal from France of NATO's International Headquarters, Allied units, and installations or bases not under sole French authority. These measures inevitably brought about changes in the structure of NATO, principally on the military but also on the civilian side of the Organization:

- a. France is no longer a member of the Military Committee with which, however, it maintains a military liaison mission. The Military Committee now comprises 13 members.
- b. France also withdrew from the NATO Defense College as well as from all other integrated military headquarters. As with the Military Committee, France is represented at SHAPE by a military liaison mission.
- c. French representation has been maintained in some NATO activities, notably the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) System, NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, the HAWK Missile System, The Central Europe Operating Agency (Pipelines), the Military Agency for Standardization, The Allied Long Lines Agency, the Allied Communications Security Agency, Allied Naval Communications Agency, and the Conference of National Armament Directors.

Although France remains a member of the alliance and has a Permanent Representative to the Council and contributes to the International Staff Secretariat, it no longer takes part in NATO defense policy discussions. It follows, therefore, that the Council had to find a forum wherein to discuss military affairs. A ready-made solution lay in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) which has existed since 1963. This Committee, under the chairmanship of the Secretary General, meets semiannually at the ministerial level and weekly at permanent representative level. It has become the coordinating body of the "Fourteen" for all matters concerning integrated defense. France retains the right to sit in the DPC but since 1966 has not done so.

DEFENSE POLICIES

From the beginning, NATO defense policy had to be hammered out under pressure of a variety of conflicting interests. The collective defense of 15 countries and several hundred million people posed enormous practical problems. For example, in the late 1940's, when the strength of the Soviet Army far exceeded that of the ground forces of the West, some asked if a sensible defense policy should not be based on a rapid withdrawal to the Pyrenees Mountain Range at the Franco-Spanish border. Holding the Red Army at the Pyrenees, the theory ran, the Allies could then build up their forces on the Iberian Peninsula and eventually counterattack against the overextended Communist forces, driving them back and liberating the occupied countries.

As an academic problem in military strategy, the logic of a retreat to the Pyrenees was conceivable. However, a policy which planned for the bloody conquest of 100 million people, followed in due course by their bloody liberation could not possibly be acceptable to people who so recently had suffered the agony of occupation and liberation from the Nazis. The great need was first to avoid war at all reasonable cost, and second, in the event of an attack, to prevent Soviet occupation of Western Europe.

From the start, therefore, NATO's strategy was based on holding the enemy as far forward as possible--the concept of forward defense, as it eventually was labeled, under which the territory and people of Western Europe would receive maximum protection against invasion. Obviously, such a strategy has meaning only if the defending forces have the strength to absorb the impact of an initial surprise attack without breaking.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

As the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, NATO strategy was altered on the assumption that any major aggression would have to be met with nuclear weapons at the outset, in order to make the forward defense strategy credible. This led, in turn, to the stockpiling in Europe after 1957 of tactical nuclear warheads for infantry and airborne weapons. The most important aspect of this policy lay in its deterrent effect.

GRADUATED RESPONSE

By the mid-1960's, additional considerations had appeared affecting NATO's strategic concepts:

- a. Relaxation of tensions between East and West in Central Europe raised the hope that a major attack on that front was less to be feared.
- b. Increased Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean posed an increased potential threat on NATO's southern flank.
- c. The missile became the principal means of delivering nuclear warheads. Hundreds of hardened launch sites on both sides, as well as nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarines made it possible for either side to survive a surprise nuclear attack and retaliate within a matter of minutes. Even the most effective surprise attack would result in annihilation of a large proportion of the attacker's own population. Considering these developments, NATO Defense Ministers met in December 1967 and adopted a more flexible strategic concept than that of massive retaliation.

The new concept, while retaining the principle of forward defense, was based on the requirement that a credible military response of all kinds is necessary, and this must be secured through a wide range of forces equipped with a well-balanced mix of conventional weapons and tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.

The flexible response is based on two principles:

- a. Deterrence of attack through the possibility of escalation.
- b. Retaliation to attack with direct defense at approximately the same level.

Keystone of the new strategy is that an aggressor must be convinced of NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons if necessary, yet he must be uncertain as to the timing or circumstances. While this policy involves, as before, the possibility of escalation to nuclear war, it is based essentially upon controlling the progress of escalation of any conflict rather than planning to meet any attack with instant massive retaliation.

MOBILE FORCE

In 1960 another important change was made:

PROBLEM: Relatively lightly defended, smaller countries out on the flanks of NATO might tempt the Soviet Union to try a quick limited aggression against purely national defending forces in the hope of facing the alliance with a fait accompli. This possibility increased the danger of war by miscalculation.

SOLUTION: The Mobile Force made up of well-equipped land and air units from a variety of NATO countries. This multi-national unit would be immediately available for dispatch by air to any part of the alliance. Their rapid use, committing the combined armed forces of NATO, would insure against the mistaken notion that a Norway, a Turkey, or a Greece might stand alone in the event of invasion.

WARNING BEFORE ATTACK

Even in the age of "push-button warfare" total surprise would be extremely difficult to achieve although a measure of tactical surprise is conceivable, permitting an aggressor to achieve greater concentration of forces at the point of attack. Various types of warning are likely to precede an attack on any NATO state. These might include: political, strategic, and tactical.

Political warning: Modern full-scale war is likely to be so destructive for both sides--the attacker as well as the victim--that the decision to attack would be an agonizing one, even for the most totalitarian government. Such a decision is not likely to be made in periods of political tranquility; more likely, it would be preceded by a severe rise in political tensions, crises, and efforts to achieve national ends short of war. Such developments automatically draw the closest scrutiny by NATO political and military leaders, and the intelligence effort inevitably is brought to a peak of intensity.

Strategic Warning: The complex preparations necessary for a massive surprise attack of any kind make total concealment virtually impossible. Such preparations might be indicated by such bits of intelligence as:

- a. An unusual rise in frequency of unidentified submarine contacts in potential missile launch areas off European and American coasts. 2-3

b. Sudden disappearance from view of certain types of troops, indicating canceled leaves and possible mobilization.

c. The shift into forward areas of large numbers of armored divisions and tactical air squadrons--possibly under the guise of "maneuvers" as in the case of the Czechoslovakian invasion.

d. Signals of unusual preparations in other Warsaw Pact governments which might have to be given at least limited advance warning in order to prepare logistical support of a massive invasion. (Overhanging the whole preparatory effort would be the question of the dependability of the satellite governments and troops. Also, faced with such a calamitous war, might not there be security breaches among the people who must, of necessity, be involved in various bits and pieces of the planning?)

Tactical Warning: It is here that the warning time might indeed be only minutes. First warning of the actual launching of an attack might be the initial appearance of missiles on a radar screen. Or, the first clear warning might be the movement of divisions across a border, as in Korea. Or the sudden appearance of flights of tactical combat aircraft in surprise air strikes, such as the devastating Israeli air strikes or Egypt's airfields at the opening of the campaign of June 1967. In Czechoslovakia, the first tactical warning came with the unscheduled, unauthorized landing of Soviet civilian planes in Prague. Passengers on these planes took control of the Ruzyně airport and directed the landing of airborne troops.

Until the final commitment to battle none of these forms of warning is likely to be clear and unarguable. Options would be kept open till the last minute, and very likely there would be conflicting and confusing reports and circumstances which complicate evaluation. Indeed, a power preparing a surprise attack would probably make every effort to insure such confusion. Nevertheless, modern warfare requires such an elephantine effort that the chance of successful concealment, even for totalitarian governments, is very slim.

Section III. WTO

A "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" between the Soviet Union and seven East European countries was signed on May 14, 1955, at Warsaw. Just preceding this event, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) had acceded to NATO membership--a development denounced by the Soviet Union. Whether Germany's membership in NATO was a reason or an excuse, traditional East European fear of German militarism was played upon by the Soviets in bringing about the Warsaw conference.

Signatories of the Warsaw Pact were: USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, and Albania.

When the ideological quarrel broke out between Moscow and Peking in 1960, Albania chose to follow Peking. Albania broke diplomatic relations with Moscow December 1961, and from then on, took no part in the Warsaw Pact's military activities. Finally, in September 1968, following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu called upon his People's Assembly to withdraw formally from the pact, and the Albanian Assembly complied.

It is interesting to note the preponderance of Soviet conventional power in the Warsaw defense system compared with the balanced or even minority role played in NATO by the United States in every respect except strategic nuclear power.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Military strength is always relative. A rifle is powerful against a spear, but is impotent against a hydrogen bomb. Thus, NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are best judged together. Each side has advantages and disadvantages, strengths and weaknesses. These change with time and must be constantly reevaluated. At the present time the Soviet Union and the Warsaw powers appear to have strengths which include the following:

a. **Military initiative:** NATO will not strike first, but is committed by its very nature as a defense force, and by the firm policies of the governments of the Western Allies, not to initiate a war in Europe. Therefore, if war should come, it probably would come at a time and place and in a manner of the Soviet's choosing. To the extent that surprise is achieved, permitting concentration of available forces, the advantage would appear to lie with the Soviet Union.

b. **Mobility:** Adding weight to the advantage of initiative is the high mobility of Warsaw Pact divisions. Western military observers in Czechoslovakia were greatly impressed by the

speed and efficiency with which massive troop movements were carried out. The rapid shift in August 1968 of a quarter million Communist troops into Czechoslovakian territory provides an unwelcome example of one of the main Communist strengths.

c. Armor; Warsaw Pact medium and heavy tanks are believed to outnumber those of NATO by more than two to one. This may be somewhat offset by the number and quality of NATO anti-tank weapons.

Some of the disadvantages or potential weaknesses believed to exist among the Warsaw forces include:

a. The long, vulnerable perimeter of the Soviet landmass ties down forces to guard against counterattack.

b. Satellite divisions might prove unreliable under pressure. How much, for example, could the Soviet Union depend on the important 14 Czech divisions at the present time? The impossibility of assessing such psychological factors must create planning problems for the Soviet high command.

c. More and more, China exerts pressure in the East--though the military effect of this should not be overstated. Of more than 100 Soviet divisions, less than 20 are believed to be east of the Ural mountains. Nevertheless, China must be a factor in Soviet military planning.

Section IV. NATO/WTO Comparison

NATO:

a. Freely negotiated by signatories and ratified after full debate in national parliaments.

b. Concluded in 1949 to contain the political and territorial expansion of the USSR, after Soviet-instigated crises in Turkey, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Berlin.

c. Provides for political alliance; the military organization is subordinate to the highest civil authority, the North Atlantic Council.

d. First and only defense agreement linking the US and Canada with Western European states.

e. The quantitative strength of US ground and air forces in NATO is less than that of other member countries taken together. The United Kingdom and France also possess nuclear arms.

f. The highest military authority is the Military Committee composed of the chiefs of staff of the member countries. The presidency of the Military Committee is rotated among the chiefs of staff of member countries. Supreme Allied Commanders receive orders only from the Military Committee.

g. The Secretary General, who is also Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, is a statesman or diplomat from one of the member countries. There is no prerequisite as to his nationality.

WARSAW PACT:

a. Imposed by USSR on Eastern European countries whose one-party governments did not permit dissent.

b. Concluded in 1955 after the Paris Agreements admitted the Federal Republic of Germany to membership in the Western European Union and NATO.

c. Primarily a military system; arrangements for multilateral political consultation are underdeveloped. A "Permanent Commission" responsible for foreign policy decisions exists, but its role is obscure and of relatively minor importance.

d. Duplicates a series of bilateral treaties which already linked Communist countries to the USSR.

e. The position of the USSR vis-a-vis other member countries is very preponderant and in the ratio of 3:1. The USSR alone possesses nuclear weapons.


f. All key military positions are held by Russians. The head is the Soviet Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact; Chief of Staff is also Russian; special branch of the Soviet General Staff serves as the planning and coordinating center of Warsaw Pact forces.

g. A Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister fills the nominal position of Secretary General, but this appears to be a minor adjunct to his regular ministerial responsibilities.


Section V. The Military Balance in Europe:
Ground Manpower and Armor

(NOTE: For a comprehensive and unclassified report of NATO/WTO military strength comparison, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance-Annual Reports).

(Source: Department of Defense, Commanders Digest, Vol 16, No. 20, Nov 14, '74, p. 6)



Section VI. Traditional East/West European
Invasion Route



(Source: Dept of State, Issues, "No. 2--NATO and the Defense of Europe," 1970, pp. 16-17.)

CHAPTER 3

US/WEST EUROPEAN ISSUES

Section I. Introduction

Since the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization many questions have been raised over the issue of US participation in the defensive alliance. For the United States, the questions of how many troops, what organizational mix, which strategic/tactical deployments, and whether a new alliance charter have dominated US defense debates within the US and European NATO governments for years. The following readings provide US policy and provide analysis of this policy and of other questions.

Section II. US Policy - Troop Levels in Europe: Two Readings

First Reading: Department of State

This reading consists of the text of testimony of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush on July 25, 1973, before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organizations.

UNITED STATES TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE

Since the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, Congress has supported the continued presence of U.S. forces in Europe. I believe that there are convincing reasons to continue that presence and to avoid unilateral cuts in our European troop strength. I should like to discuss these with you today.

Our forces in Europe serve several objectives of U.S. policy. In my remarks I will address each of these in some detail. But at the start I think it would be useful just to go over them.

First: Our European forces play an important role in *deterrence*. Relations between East and West in Europe have not been smooth these past 25 years. But they have not come to military conflict. It is our defensive posture and the incalculable consequences of war for an aggressor that have time

and again turned us back from war in Europe and toward negotiation.

Second: U.S. forces in Europe make a significant contribution to *defense*. In the unlikely event of military conflict, they would pose a formidable fighting force. NATO's conventional strength—to which we make an important contribution—must be capable of meeting a Warsaw Pact attack without early use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear strength is not enough.

Third: The presence of U.S. forces plays a vital *political* role in our relations with western Europe. It is the visible evidence of our commitment to NATO's security. Our allies, confident of that commitment, are making significant strides in assuming an increasing share of the common de-

fense burden. But if we pull our troops out prematurely, that process will be jeopardized. And the goal of a strong, united Europe, self-reliant but closely allied to the United States, may never be realized.

Finally: Of special interest to this Subcommittee is the role of our forces in *East-West negotiations*. We have made significant progress in the past several years toward our goal of a stable and secure world at lower levels of cost and risk to the United States. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), the Berlin agreements, the Viet-Nam accords, new relations with China—all these are tangible evidence of progress. But much remains to be done. We are engaged in the second phase of SALT, in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in



U.S. forces in Europe are visible evidence of our commitment to NATO's security, from Norway (NATO exercise Strong Express, September 1972) . . .

Europe (CSCE), and in negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). To succeed in these negotiations, we cannot withdraw from the world. We cannot negotiate from a posture of weakness and retreat.

In my opinion, we should not consider *unilateral* withdrawals of our troops from Europe when we are only 90 days away from negotiations to lower these forces *mutually*. For the first time since the cold war began, the Soviet Union has agreed to negotiate about a reduction of its forces in the heart of Europe. This is a remarkable accomplishment — almost unthinkable just a few years ago.

There are good reasons for believing that the Soviets are entering these talks with serious intent. But it is obvious that they will have no incentive to negotiate with us if we cut our own troop strength unilaterally. The essence of negotiations is that you must have something to give in order to get something you want.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are an example of this rule familiar to all members of this

Subcommittee. Last year we reached agreement with the Soviet Union to limit offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. In that agreement we halted our ongoing anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program, and in exchange the Soviets agreed to limit their own ABM deployments and the further deployment of their giant SS-9 missiles.

If we had followed the advice of some to give up the ABM program unilaterally or to reduce our offensive strategic programs unilaterally, I do not believe there would have been a SALT agreement last year, let alone prospects for a follow-on agreement next year.

This same natural logic applies to our forces in Europe. Unless we enter the force reduction negotiations this fall with our troop strength intact, the Soviets will have no incentive to bargain. And the process of normalization and reduced confrontation in which we have invested so heavily over the past 25 years will be placed in jeopardy.

As you well know, arms control discussions can yield not only

substantial military results but a continuing political discourse of considerable value. In SALT, our candid discussions with the Soviet Union did much to dispel common misconceptions and to create a new atmosphere of greater confidence and trust. That same possibility lies before us in the mutual force reduction talks. Thus, proponents of unilateral American force withdrawals would not only sacrifice the military benefits of negotiating Soviet force reductions but also the significant political benefits of such negotiations.

IMPETUS FOR FORCE CUTS ANALYZED

I have tried to determine in my own mind why there is such a strong urge at this particular time to reduce our forces unilaterally.

Part of the reason is clearly that after our long and frequently frustrating experience in Viet-Nam there is an understandable desire to bring our forces home. But our problems and policies in Europe are clearly different from those in Southeast Asia. The stability and prosperity made possible by our postwar commitment to Europe have taught us the wisdom of this commitment. Any reduction in our force levels must take account of this approach and not come as reflex action to our policies in some other part of the world.

The Viet-Nam experience is clearly not the only reason for the current disenchantment with our contribution to NATO. It seems to me that the drive to cut our forces substantially derives in large measure from some basic misconceptions about current international realities.

At the risk of over-simplification, let me briefly list what I believe to be the major misconceptions:

First, that with progress toward détente a strong defense is no longer required;

Second, that our balance-of-payments problems and pressing domestic needs leave us no choice except to cut our forces substantially and unilaterally;

Third, that our European allies are getting a free ride by not making a significant contribution to the common defense; and

Fourth, that our conventional forces are merely a symbolic "tripwire" and not a serious military machine, and that in any case they are unnecessary as we can rely upon a nuclear deterrent.

Let me deal with each of these in turn:

Détente and a Strong Defense

There are some who argue that in fact no military threat exists in Europe, that progress in moving toward détente removes the need for a strong defense.

The military facts of life provide no justification for this point of view. Over the past decade the Soviet Union increased its total military manpower by 30 percent, doubled its published military budget, and vastly increased its nuclear forces.

While the United States has decreased the number of its forces in Europe over the past decade by over one-third, the Soviet Union has since 1968 increased the number of its divisions from 26 to 31. In recent years we have observed an increase in the number of Soviet tanks in eastern Europe, the introduction of new air defense missiles for the protection of Soviet ground forces, and an increase in nuclear-capable rocket launchers and cannon artillery. Thus the military forces posing a potential threat to NATO, rather than diminishing, have substantially increased both in quantity and quality.



... to Greece (exercise Alexander Express, June 1973).

If the military facts provide no justification for unilateral American withdrawals, do political realities permit such a step? We have made substantial progress in moving from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. Tensions in Europe have declined.

But we have made this progress not by wishful thinking about our adversaries nor by abandoning commitments to our allies. On the contrary, we have reduced tensions by demonstrating to our adversaries that our continuing strength and determination left them no alternative but to negotiate.

The progress we have made in recent years is not irreversible. In fact Europe's history gives more grounds for pessimism than optimism about the possibilities for a durable peace. Throughout a large part of modern history, Europe has been either preparing for, actually fighting, or recovering from war.

We do not believe that this periodic recurrence of war in Europe has to continue to be the case. But to change Europe's history we must understand the continuing realities of international life. In President Nixon's words:

"War is caused not by the strength of one nation alone but by the weakness of one nation in relation to another. Strength and resolution are an incentive for negotiation leading to peace. Weakness and naive sentimentality are an open invitation to pressure tactics and aggression leading to war."

Some seem to believe that the western Europeans are strong enough to provide for their own defense without a significant American presence. History refutes this contention. Twice in this century we have had to intervene militarily in western Europe to protect freedom and our own security.

It was our decision in 1949 to change course and to maintain a tangible and significant defense commitment in western Europe which has made the past quarter of a century one of Europe's most stable and prosperous eras. This stability and prosperity have been of great benefit to us as well as to the Europeans. Why should we abandon such a successful policy?

It is simply fostering a misconception to talk about our forces being in Europe for the defense of Europe alone. Our contribution to NATO must be understood for



The U.S. Army's newest missile, the Lance, provides fire support for NATO troops beyond the forward edges of the battlefield areas.

what it is: a matter of U.S. self-interest. Western Europe is the second greatest economic power in the world, linked to the United States by innumerable strategic, political, cultural, and economic ties. It is American security which dictates the necessity to deter not only a full-scale Soviet attack on western Europe but also the application of Soviet political pressures—for such pressures could give the Soviets veto power over western European cooperation with the United States.

There is another dimension as well. A primary objective of American foreign policy this year is to reinvigorate our relationship with

our allies, and to establish a framework within which we can deal with pressing problems of trade, finance, and security.

We and our NATO allies have been able to forge a prosperous and dynamic world economy from the ruin of war because we worked together, not only to rebuild the world economy, but also to provide for our common security. There can be no prosperity without security just as there can be no security without a sound economy.

We cannot abandon cooperation in one sector without gravely damaging the other. It is that

knowledge which has always provided the common-sense bounds to our differences on any matter.

That is a reality that I hope you will take into account as you consider proposals to act unilaterally to reduce our contribution to the common defense. It would not be prudent to assume that the good will and constructive effort that our allies have brought to the solution of our common trade and monetary problems could be quite the same if our cooperation in our common defense had been eroded by substantial unilateral troop reductions.

Balance-of-Payments Issue

Let me turn now to another source of pressures for unilateral American reductions. We are all agreed that this country has a serious balance-of-payments problem and pressing domestic needs. But we have been moving vigorously on both these fronts and with considerable success.

The results of our monetary actions are beginning to take effect. We believe the currency realignments provide the basis for elimination of the longstanding U.S. deficit and restoration of international payments equilibrium.

Department of Commerce data show a drop in our balance-of-payments deficit from \$3.8 billion for the first quarter of 1972 to \$1.2 billion this year. That is a very impressive improvement.

Plainly, the speed of our return to equilibrium will depend, as always, upon our ability to restrain inflation at home and vigorously push our exports abroad. But we have made good progress, we are capable of reaching payments equilibrium, and we can do so with economic policies which leave us with a significant military capability overseas.

There is considerable misunderstanding about the impact our

troops in Europe have upon both our balance of payments and the Federal budget. The result of our having 300,000 men and their dependents in Europe in FY 1972 was a payments deficit of \$1.5 billion. That is, after subtracting the value of our military exports and services to western Europe from the value of our military expenditures in western Europe, there was a difference of \$1.5 billion. This figure includes West German purchases of U.S. military equipment in fulfillment of the U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany offset agreement. But it does not include the provisions in this offset agreement for assistance to our payments burden in the form of substantial West German purchases of U.S. Government securities and West German rehabilitation of U.S. military facilities.

Equally important, the \$1.5 billion figure must be looked at in the context of our overall balance of payments. It is comparable, for example, to the \$1.2 billion deficit caused by the larger number of American tourists visiting western Europe than western European tourists visiting the United States. And it was only a sixth of our total basic payments deficit of over \$9 billion in 1972.

Moreover, the deficit in the military balance of payments was not a major cause of our deteriorating balance-of-payments situation. The major problem was the increasingly adverse balance in nonmilitary goods and services.

And while the decline in value of the dollar increases the cost of our troops abroad, it has a more significant and favorable impact upon the competitiveness of our exports. Thus, while the local costs of our troop deployments in Europe have increased, this increase is small compared to the favorable impact the new ex-

change rates are having on our \$80 billion annual exports of goods and services. It is in this nonmilitary area where our increasingly successful efforts to reestablish payments equilibrium must continue to be focused.

Domestic Requirements

We have also been told that pressing domestic needs force us to cut our forces in Europe unilaterally. But surely this a false choice. We always have had and always will have both domestic and national security needs. The point is that we must devote adequate resources—in a carefully balanced way—to both.

Let us look at the record. In 1968 almost one-half of the Federal budget went for defense, while only a third was devoted to human resources. Today these proportions are reversed with human resources receiving half the Federal budget and defense receiving less than a third.

In 1968 the defense budget was

9 percent of GNP. It is now just 6 percent. Surely this is not an unacceptable burden for a country with a GNP of well over \$1 trillion.

Since 1968 we have reduced the size of our armed forces from 3.5 million to 2.3 million. And in Europe over the past decade, we have reduced our armed forces by a third, from 465,000 to 300,000.

I believe that this is a remarkable record of force reduction and cost control. It certainly demonstrates our commitment to spend no more of the Nation's limited resources on defense than is absolutely necessary.

Some seem to believe that by bringing our forces home from Europe we would save money. Force withdrawals will not save money unless the forces that are returned home are demobilized. But our military establishment today is already at its lowest level in two decades and trails well behind those of the Soviet Union and China. If we demobilize large



U.S. force structure is being examined to determine what changes might be possible to improve the combat-support ratio.

numbers of our standing forces, we cannot maintain our NATO commitments or keep our pledges under the Nixon doctrine.

The budgetary outlay for keeping our 300,000 men in the European theater, and that includes the Mediterranean Sea, is \$4 billion for fiscal year 1974. This is the cost of pay and maintenance of these men and their dependents in Europe.

However, if we consider the cost of the support facilities in the United States for these forces and the cost of their arms and equipment, the cost rises to \$7.7 billion for fiscal year 1974. That includes the \$4 billion figure.

Within these costs there is an incremental cost to the stationing of our forces in Europe additional to the cost of similar forces in the United States. It runs to about \$400 million per year and is composed largely of such expenses as transportation.

However, if you bring these men home and maintain our NATO

commitment, you will have to keep them in uniform and provide the added transport and duplicate heavy arms in Europe so that they can be rapidly returned to fight there. In that case, the annual budget cost will actually be more than at present. Thus, those whose aim is reduced budget costs must be speaking not about unilateral reductions from Europe but rather about unilateral demobilization. This administration rejects such an approach.

You will also have heard the figure of \$17 billion. That is the cost of all the U.S. armed forces, wherever located in the world, that are committed to NATO and would be deployed in the event of hostilities. It is not the cost of our troops now in Europe, nor would this amount be saved even if we withdrew all of our forces from Europe.

In sum, I hope you will agree with me that even substantial reductions of our forces in Europe will neither save money nor re-

solve our balance-of-payments problems.

Allies' Contributions

Let me turn now to the role of our allies. We are urging our partners in NATO to do more for the common defense, but we by no means carry the entire burden. While the U.S. contribution is highly significant, our allies contribute to NATO nearly 90 percent of its ground forces, 80 percent of its seapower, and 75 percent of its airpower. In central Europe, the allies supply 25 of the 29 combat-ready divisions. They have over 3 million men in active service today—one-third more than the United States has throughout the world.

Perhaps most important, our NATO partners have substantially increased their defense effort in recent years. Since 1970 they have raised their defense expenditures by 30 percent to a level of \$35 billion in 1973.

Through the European Defense Improvement Program they are fulfilling their commitment to procure major new items of military equipment and to construct installations, in order to achieve a more effective conventional defense.

Our allies are also taking a number of steps to help the United States with both its military balance-of-payments and budgetary problems.

As I have already noted, the German Government, in addition to substantial arms purchases in the United States, has also purchased \$621 million in U.S. Government medium-term securities on which it pays the interest and has put \$186 million into the rehabilitation of U.S. barracks in Germany, benefiting both our balance-of-payments and our budget costs. The total value of this offset



Members of West Germany's 200th Panzer Regiment move into position near Mörlbach, West Germany, in a NATO exercise involving some 40,000 men. Some U.S. NATO-committed units were airlifted from the U.S. to participate in the January 1973 exercise.

agreement to the U.S. has been approximately \$2 billion over a two-year period. We are now negotiating another offset agreement with the Federal Republic.

In addition, and important for the long run, NATO's defense ministers last month agreed to examine the problem of finding additional multilateral means to reduce the adverse economic consequences borne by the United States as a result of its stationing forces in Europe. We consider this a major step that can reduce the balance-of-payments impact and the incremental budgetary burden of stationing forces abroad rather than at home.

Effectiveness of NATO Militarily

Let me turn now to the fourth basic area of misunderstanding. Some argue that American and NATO forces are not a serious fighting force and could not withstand a Soviet assault. This is simply not true. NATO is a formidable defensive force and not just a "tripwire" as some believe. In central Europe, for example, NATO has available roughly the same number of forces as the Warsaw Pact. And NATO is now engaged in developing a further program of specific force improvements that will ensure an adequate defense for the rest of this decade.

But NATO could be forced into a "tripwire" posture, into having

to resort to nuclear weapons in a matter of days or even hours, if the United States were to unilaterally withdraw a substantial number of its forces.

This would be an extremely dangerous situation in today's world. The doctrine of "massive retaliation" became inadequate when the Soviet Union became a real nuclear power able to retaliate in kind. That is why it is surprising to hear proposals to defend western Europe by dependence upon nuclear weapons alone. This backdoor revival of the doctrine of massive retaliation coincides with the emergence of something like parity in strategic weapons systems between the United States and the Soviet Union. But nuclear parity makes massive retaliation less believable as a means of deterring all forms of aggression in Europe. The proposed return to this concept, whether it is called "massive retaliation" or "tripwire," as a substitute for NATO's agreed flexible-response capability reflects one of two things: either a misunderstanding of the implications of strategic parity, or a cavalier dismissal of the possibility of less than all-out war in Europe.

U.S. POLICY

We are not asking the Congress to agree that we should retain the present level of our forces in

Europe indefinitely. We are convinced that this is neither wise nor necessary.

But we are equally convinced that the manner in which we reduce these forces is at least as important as the reductions themselves.

We want to bring about these reductions in a way which will neither damage the Atlantic alliance nor tempt our adversaries to return to a policy of aggressive confrontation.

As I have already noted, we are moving vigorously on three fronts:

—**First**, in NATO we are developing a multilateral mechanism for more equitable burden-sharing and we are revising some basic defense concepts to allow for more efficient use of scarce defense resources;

—**Second**, in this Year of Europe we are seeking to resolve the interrelated issues of trade, finance, and security in a cooperative and mutually beneficial manner; and

—**Third**, in slightly more than 90 days we will begin unprecedented negotiations with the Soviet Union and the nations of eastern Europe to mutually reduce the forces still confronting one another in the heart of Europe.

Surely this is a program worth this Congress' most serious consideration. We ask only for the time to carry it out.

Second Reading: Department of Defense

This reading provides the Defense Department's view of the role of US Armed Forces in Europe.

EUROPE, THE U.S., AND NATO

What role do the United States Armed Forces have in Europe and NATO?

1. General: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown, USAF, covered the role that American servicemen and women have in Europe in his recent report on United States Military Posture for FY 1976.

2. Europe-Background: Western Europe's strategic importance to U.S. national security interests is second only to that of the territorial United States itself in strategic importance. U.S. Forces are located in Western Europe to contribute to an effective deterrent against the threat to U.S. interests represented by the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe.

The best place to begin the defense of the United States is as far forward as possible. Our European Command acts as a viable force protecting U.S. national interests, and through the NATO Alliance, supports the mission of deterrence against all forms of aggression. However, should aggression occur in Europe nonetheless, then the mission of our forces will be to: conduct an initial conventional defense as far forward as possible, preserve or restore the integrity and security of the NATO area, conduct deliberate escalation of the conflict if aggression cannot be contained, and provide an appropriate nuclear response if the aggression is in the form of a major nuclear attack.

3. The Threat: In recent years, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have substantially improved their forces in Central Europe. Over the next five years, we believe they will continue to improve their military posture to be able to negotiate from a position of visible strength. The USSR, while developing a whole new family of strategic missiles, is cooperating with its East European allies to increase qualitatively the strength of the Warsaw Pact general purpose forces. Currently there is a force of some 58 divisions capable of attacking Central Europe. Given one month to mobilize, this force could be increased to 80-90 divisions. Since 1971, we have seen the capability of these forces improve through advances in mobility, weaponry/firepower, improved logistical support, more effective command and control, and increased numbers.

As I have previously noted, a continuous upgrading of Soviet/Warsaw Pact aviation forces has been underway in recent years. The emphasis has been and continues to be on the ability of those forces to fight a conventional war in Europe.

Within the Pact, the naval threat is posed primarily by an emerging Soviet Navy more capable every day of conducting extensive combat operations worldwide, as well as supporting peacetime political objectives. It is clear that the Soviet Union deliberately and resolutely is striving to develop a powerful Navy. The home base of most of this force and its prime operating areas lie within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility from which it can seek to perform its mission of interdiction of NATO's lines of supply and reinforcement.

4. NATO And Warsaw Pact Comparison: Improvements in U.S. and NATO forces during the past several years have increased capabilities considerably, with particular emphasis on conventional warfare. The thrust is to avoid being forced into nuclear war as the only alternative to unacceptable losses in a conventional battle. Strengthening conventional capability will raise the nuclear threshold, but this requires a tailored force with capabilities adequate to both initial and sustained combat. Toward this end, in the last two years, headquarters and support manpower spaces numbering 17,000 have been reduced—98 percent of which are being added to combat units. An additional 18,000 "support" spaces will be eliminated beginning this year and added to combat strength in the theater. The ratio of combat to support ground force manpower has been altered from 58/42 percent in 1968 to a current 62/38, and by the end of FY 1977, it should be 73/27. As I have noted, we plan to deploy two additional brigades to Europe. This increase in initial combat power at the expense of sustaining capability can be accomplished only with some risk, but it is a calculated risk based upon the threat. In an effort to reduce the risk flowing from a shortfall in essential support elements, we have been working with our NATO allies to ensure adequate support. Overdependence on others, however, is not desirable. We must be careful not to upset the balance through reduction of support forces without obtaining firm assurance that their missions will be accomplished by other resources. To do so would result in a certain degradation of our ability to conduct a conventional defense which, in turn, would cause a lowering of the nuclear threshold.

Overall, NATO has the forces and equipment for a successful

defense, particularly in view of the improvements in the Alliance's conventional capabilities now being implemented. In all three NATO regions, national ground forces amount to 1.78 million, while Warsaw Pact forces amount to 1.62 million in the East European Pact countries and the three Western USSR military districts abutting NATO territory. Pact forces, however, have increased by over 120,000 since late 1971, while NATO forces have remained relatively static. Pact increases appear to be related to upgrading of weapons systems, as noted above.

NATO tanks, while outnumbered by a factor of 2½ to 1 or 3 to 1, are, in general, superior to those of the Warsaw Pact, particularly in first-shot kill probability. Pact artillery, however, outnumbers that of NATO by a factor of 2 to 1 and the larger caliber weapons have greater range. With respect to available tactical aircraft, at the beginning of hostilities, Pact outnumbers NATO by a factor of about 2 to 1; but in general, NATO aircraft have greater range and payload capability, with crews that have better night and all-weather training. NATO's ground air defense provides an effective high- and medium-altitude air defense capability. In addition to conventional strength, NATO maintains an ability to carry out tactical nuclear operations in conjunction with the strategy of flexible response. Security measures for protection of weapons have been improved over the past year, and new devices and weapon designs have reduced the likelihood of unauthorized detonations. Our ability to conduct selective tactical nuclear operations would be enhanced by an improved and more survivable command and control communications system.

Overall, the asymmetries in NATO and Warsaw Pact tactical nuclear weapons and employment concepts enhance the NATO deterrent by complicating enemy judgments of possible allied responses. In either a conventional or nuclear conflict, however, a significant advantage to the Warsaw Pact rests in the initiative. The Pact ability to select the time, places, and nature of the attack requires great flexibility in defense by NATO forces. Currently, NATO possesses considerable flexibility in responding.

A broad spectrum look at NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities reveals that NATO currently has a firm basis for successfully implementing the flexible response strategy, is aware of those areas needing upgrading, and is studying programs to ensure the adequacy of the defense. Improvements are required in the critical areas of force modernization, war reserve stocks, and resupply arrangements. Accordingly, NATO's air-ground team is capable of conducting an initial defense in Western Europe.

5. Military Balance By NATO Region: In the Northern Region, USSR M-Day forces opposite Northern Norway outnumber those of CINCNORTH, but geography and climate aid in the defense, and NATO can augment with troops and tactical fighters. NATO can control access to and egress from the Baltic through coverage by land-based air and mining, but Pact forces may be able to control the Eastern Baltic, employing air and naval forces to protect the flank of Pact forces along the Littoral.

In the Central Region, Warsaw Pact M-Day ground forces significantly outnumber NATO-assigned and earmarked forces. Counting all the forces of the NATO Central Region nations together with the in-place forces of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Pact superiority is reduced. Pact tactical fighters in the Central Region outnumber those of NATO by a factor of almost 2 to 1, but numbers of fighters with an attack role are almost equal on both sides.

Comparisons of NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities in the Southern Region are complicated. NATO M-Day ground forces outnumber those of the Pact in the South almost 2 to 1.

6. Special Problems: Of note is Section 302 of the 1975 Military Procurement Authorization Act, which has had an immediate effect because it requires, *inter alia*, that U.S. military non-combat strength in Europe be reduced by 18,000 men by June 30, 1976. At least 6,000 of that number must be removed from Europe by June 30, 1975. On the other hand, the law allows the Secretary of Defense to increase the combat strength in Europe by amounts equal to the reduction in support forces. Specific proposals for implementing this requirement are being examined now. The bulk of the reduction must come from U.S. Army Europe units. The law has a narrow definition of combat units. As defined in the statute, the combat component of the Army only includes the Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Armor, Combat Engineers, Special Forces, Attack Helicopter Units, Air Defense, and Missile Combat Units of battalion or smaller size. Omitted from this definition are many military personnel whose duties require that they close with the enemy and apply fire to him, with all the hazard that this entails. This portion of the law dictates that combat increases made to offset "support" reductions must be made in front line battalion-sized or smaller units. Problem areas associated with the implementing of this law are: (1) stationing, (2) local training areas, (3) hiring of civilians, and (4) costs.

Stationing and the associated problems of adequate training areas are the major complications we will have to overcome. Unlike the Continental United States, where large multipurpose military reservations such as Fort Hood and Fort Bragg provide considerable flexibility in organizing and training additional combat units, the U.S. Army Europe primarily is located on numerous small "Kasernes" scattered throughout Southern Germany. Most of these Kasernes are pre-World War II German Army installations established in the 1930's on the outskirts of major cities. During the past two decades, the German population and economy have expanded, and these Kasernes have become surrounded by industrial complexes, high-rise apartments, homes, parks, and the like. This leaves little or no room for expansion and creates a premium on real estate. U.S. Army Europe is faced with added requirements for training combat units when these Kasernes and training areas already are crowded. Support activities withdrawn under the law will free some facilities, but such activities are largely to the rear and do not have the hard stands, maintenance facilities, and maneuver areas required by tank, mechanized infantry, and artillery battalions. The construction of new facilities will require additional funds, and such funds will be extremely hard to find. It will be difficult and probably impossible to acquire additional training areas as well.

As support units are reduced, it will be necessary to hire local civilians to perform certain tasks previously done by military men, e.g., providing transportation, maintenance, and medical support. Whether these local nationals can be attracted in sufficient numbers for an acceptable wage is subject to some doubt. Inflation has struck Europe hard. In the past five years, the average dollar cost for local national labor in Europe has risen from approximately \$3,400 per man year to almost \$10,000 per man year.

It is estimated that negotiations with host nations on wages and fringes in FY 1976 will result in approximately the same rate of an-

nual escalation of costs, that is, between 14 and 17 percent. Thus, there are preliminary indications that Section 302 will cause an increase in the US Army Europe budget. The European Command is now formulating its recommendations for the implementation of Section 302. The thrust of those recommendations—and the law itself—is a conversion of a sizeable amount of manpower from support to combat rather than a reduction in total strength. It is likely that the peacetime impacts of such conversion can be overcome by diligent effort.

Aside from the issues associated with Section 302, logistics remain of continual concern. Increased emphasis has been placed on logistical aspects of all exercises, to include US unilateral and NATO exercises.

7. Recent Accomplishments And Planned Improvements: Among significant accomplishments is the marked improvement in automated intelligence data handling systems as well as in the area of electrical transmission of imagery. The latter is of substantial importance both for the warning of potential enemy intentions and for the planning and conducting of military operations. Nonetheless, there is a need to improve further our capability to provide the right photography to the right man at the time he needs it. We continue to emphasize electrical transmission of imagery to obtain full value from our expensive, sophisticated national systems.

Among the other areas where accomplishments are noted, but in which further improvements are necessary, are communications in EUCOM. Communications are furnished primarily by the Defense Communications Systems, Europe, as a part of the worldwide DCS. The DCS-EUR, with organic, service-owned systems, provides USCINCEUR with communications in support of the WWMCCS and USCINCEUR's command and control, including information on: status of forces, surveillance, intelligence, alert/warning, consultation/decisions, nuclear weapons custody and release, reconnaissance, logistics, augmentation control/coordination between lateral and subordinate headquarters, SAS sites, airfields and combat elements within the theater. The reliance on out-dated equipment and the lack of redundant circuitry in automatic switching facilities continue to hamper this important upgrade of NATO communications system.

8. The Military Worth And Value Of NATO: NATO has served and will continue to serve U.S. security interests. The Alliance has continued to carry out successfully for 25 years its mission of defense and deterrence while, at the same time, supporting solidarity and formulating the initiatives of detente. It has demonstrated that it is adaptable to a greater degree than is generally recognized. The Alliance is beset by economic difficulties and marked by social changes. The cumulative results of these factors have placed pressures on NATO at a time when the Alliance also is faced with the difficulty of repairing the damaged security of the southern flank following the Cyprus affair. These problems do not lend themselves to simple solutions by the military staffs since the breadth and influence of their scope are highly pervasive and therefore fall in the political structure of NATO.

Common problems, such as inflation and scarce resources, demand economic cooperation, standardization, shared research endeavors, and a closer mutual look at common political problems. The problems, old and new, which are now arising exceed the classic military concerns, such as a massive land attack or

confrontation. The continued solidarity of NATO and the composition of its member states are critically important assumptions underlying U.S. military strategy. Any significant disruption or fragmentation of the NATO Alliance will have a profound effect on the U.S. strategic outlook, and hence, the strategy for meeting the security objectives of the United States.

9. Atlantic: The Soviet strategic threat in the Atlantic is embodied in its submarine-launched ballistic missile force, including YANKEE patrols in the Western Atlantic. The newest weapon in the Soviet naval strategic inventory is the DELTA-class SSBN with its SS-N-8 missile. From existing YANKEE patrol areas, the DELTA could target the entire Continental United States, and from areas as distant as the Barents Sea, a DELTA can cover any target along the eastern seaboard now being targeted by YANKEE SSBNs.

Soviet general purpose naval units represent a substantial and capable force equipped with modern multipurpose platforms, weapons, and sensors. The primary weapons system of this force is the cruise missile, which is deployed on most classes of surface combatants as well as in submarines. A new antiship missile system, the SS-NX-13, is currently under development by the Soviet Union.

An important mission of the Soviet Navy is to counter the POLARIS/POSEIDON deterrent. In the Atlantic, the Soviet Union has the capability to conduct coordinated antisubmarine warfare against the U.S. submarines, with a quality force of major surface combatants, fixed-wing ASW aircraft, plus other forces which are supported by capable intelligence, surveillance, and adequate command and control systems.

After the POLARIS/POSEIDON, the major naval deterrent to the Soviet Union is the aircraft carrier task force. To neutralize this deterrent, the Soviet Union is capable of utilizing BADGERS, BISOs, BLINDERS, cruise missile/torpedo submarines, and conventional submarines plus surface-to-surface missile ships and BEAR D targeting support aircraft.

The Soviet Northern Fleet has the capability to conduct amphibious landings with a regimental-size naval infantry force, which could be reinforced by administrative lift of Soviet Army motorized rifle units. These forces could be brought to bear in Northern Norway or Iceland. Continued improvement of Soviet capabilities for sustained deployment can be anticipated.

10. Atlantic Regional Considerations: From the Soviet point of view, the Northeast Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea constitute the primary threat area for SLBM and other seaborne attacks against Northwestern Russia. We see the North Atlantic air and sea LOC as the avenue for U.S. reinforcements and resupply of Western Europe. The Soviet Union maintains significant sea and air surveillance in this region, and its objectives in wartime almost certainly include denying us its use.

Because of its strategic geographic location in relation to the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea LOC, Iceland is an element of major importance in the equation of Atlantic power.

By virtue of its strategic location, the air base at Lajes, in the Azores, is important to the control of the Atlantic.

11. Achievements And Shortfalls: The Atlantic Command must be able to contribute to deterrence in the face of the anticipated threat. The strategic forces can perform their mission.

In the area of achievements, the Atlantic Command's contribution to the Nation's strategic forces will continue to grow as POSEIDON-equipped SSBNs enter the fleet. In addition, the CINCLANT Airborne Command Post attained final operational capability on January 1, 1974, significantly increasing CINCLANT's capability for ensuring continuity of operations in the execution of strategic nuclear war plans.

In spite of the shortfalls noted above, the overall readiness of the Atlantic Command forces has remained constant over the past years. Also, CINCLANTFLT was able to deploy an impressive augmentation force to USCINCEUR during the Middle East conflict last year and for the mine-clearing operation in the Suez Canal which followed. Some problem areas were noted, however, particularly during the past two years, when it has been necessary to increase the level of naval units deployed to the Mediterranean in order to help counter the Soviet presence in that area.

Furthermore, the material condition of some of our surface ships continues to be a problem. It is aggravated by the shortage of enlisted supervisory personnel to provide routine preventative and corrective maintenance, and by the fuel crisis and increase in fuel prices which have necessitated a curtailment of fleet operations. This, in turn, resulted in inadequate opportunities to conduct at-sea exercises, type training, and individual ship exercises with a consequent degradation in training readiness.

In addition, our Navy has lagged behind the Soviet Union with respect to surface-to-surface weapons, but it is anticipated that a significant improvement will be realized with the introduction of the HARPOON.

Because of budgetary problems and inflation, antisubmarine

warfare systems are not being upgraded as fast as they could be. Support of essential fleet training operations and base support requirements has been highly diminished. Substantial FY 1975 shortfalls in ship, aircraft, and base operating funds could have serious short- and long-term effects. It is anticipated that inflation and the cumulative effect of funding shortfalls in FY 1975 will negate the prospect of any substantial improvement in fleet mission readiness in FY 1976. In addition, personnel deficiencies continue, with serious shortages in certain ratings, particularly in the middle pay grades E-4 through E-6 of the electronic warfare and tactical missile technician and engineering rate areas.

12. Strategic Problems: From the beginning of NATO, we have proceeded on the basis that the NATO Alliance would be able to control and use the high seas; and up to the present we have planned on the ability to carry out, more or less simultaneously, the full range of CINCLANT/SACLANT tasks, such as the conduct of operations to gain control of the sea, to contain the threat posed by Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile and attack submarines, to deal with Soviet surface forces, to protect the transit of the combined amphibious force and strategic reserves, to defend the Iceland Command, and finally, to defend merchant shipping carrying economic cargo essential to the Alliance. Reinforcement of Europe will depend on our first getting the submarine threat under control. This reinforces the Secretary of Defense's urgent action to have our NATO allies upgrade their conventional forces, including their maritime forces, which are essential as a complement to our own, and highlights the problems associated with reduction of prepositioned equipment required by a reduction in support personnel.

Reference:

United States Military Posture for FY 1976, a report by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown, USAF.

Section III. A Congressional View:
One Reading.

This reading consists of an extract of a report submitted by Senator Nunn to the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

"POLICY, TROOPS, AND THE NATO ALLIANCE"

It is clear that debate concerning the continued viability of the Alliance and the size of the U.S. commitment to Europe's defense will be intense. It is essential that our committee, the Congress, and the American public understand the problems of the Alliance and have access to information relating to those problems. It is in that spirit that this report is being made public.

This report is intended to present an individual assessment of some of the major issues involving the United States and the NATO Alliance. It is based on studies and discussions with American and Allied officials in Washington as well as in Europe. It is not intended to be exhaustive and some key issues such as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions are only tangentially covered. A more thorough examination of the MBFR negotiations is clearly needed. In a sense, then, this report is interim and presents findings and conclusions to date.

THE NATO ALLIANCE AND AMERICAN POLICY

The United States continues to have major national interests in Europe and remains the leader of the West. These major interests include long and deep historical and cultural ties with European countries. A full one-third of all Americans claim England, Germany, Italy and France as their origin or descent. In 1972, about 3,666,000 Americans visited Europe as tourists, and 1,300,000 Europeans visited the United States. In economic terms, the United States in 1972 had a cumulative investment of \$30.7 billion in Western Europe, up from \$14 billion in 1960. The United States imported over \$15.5 billion worth of goods and services from Europe in 1973 while exporting \$16.7 billion to Europe.

Matched with these cultural and economic American interests in Europe is the security interest of insuring that an area which contains a greater combined population than either the United States, or the Soviet Union, and has a combined Gross National Product (GNP)

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which has moved to near equality to that of the United States and is almost double that estimated for the Soviet Union, remains independent and free of Soviet influence.

Détente between the United States and the Soviet Union is marked by a number of negotiations which may affect our European relationships. The second Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II), the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are all negotiations between East and West currently taking place. Each complicates U.S. decision-making for the long term with respect to defense issues and our relationship with Europe.

While it is important to pursue these negotiations in an attempt to reduce tensions and slow down the arms race with the Soviet Union, it is equally important to recognize military and political realities and avoid decisions which fundamentally jeopardize our long term security or economic interests.

Although many plausible reasons exist for the Soviet move toward détente, it also is apparent that they have strengthened their conventional and nuclear capability in Europe and throughout the world.

Détente does not lessen the need for strong military defense in Europe. To pursue détente without a strong defense is self-delusion. Rapprochement with the Soviets and increased cooperation on cultural and carefully-planned economic fronts is useful in reducing world tensions and moving toward more normal relations. However, we must not confuse improved feelings and a better political and emotional atmosphere with a lessening of military capabilities.

There are strong feelings in Europe that the Alliance is still needed to provide military and political power for offsetting the Soviet challenge in Europe. However, it is also felt that frictions have developed within the Alliance, perhaps demonstrating an inability thus far to reconcile the goal of European unity with the NATO Alliance and the United States. Neither European nor American policy has yet come to grips with how to adapt and reconcile the NATO Alliance with the effort toward European unity.

As a result, the NATO Alliance is in a watershed period. Either the Central European Allies will pull together to improve their conventional capabilities, and to bring about equity in contributions to the NATO defense effort, or the Alliance will continue its drift to increased bickering and unilateral national action. The Allies together must do more to improve NATO's real conventional defense capability, thereby reducing the U.S. share of the conventional defense burden in Europe and providing a long-term basis for a strong European conventional deterrent with full U.S. commitment and support.

France is a major problem because the French government will not officially participate in any meaningful military cooperation and will not permit the use of French bases or territory for training and exercises, or the use of a French line of supply and communication for U.S. forces in Europe. Even the use of French territory to plan and exercise the emergency evacuation of U.S. dependents from combat areas in Central Europe is denied our Nation which fought two world wars with our French allies.

While French representatives argue that France is committed to NATO under Article V of the NATO treaty and would fight with

NATO against a Soviet attack, they also say they wish to reserve all military decisions until such an attack occurs. However, France also expects any conventional war to be very short and has announced she will use nuclear weapons in the event of an attack by which Russia threatens France. Thus, as a practical matter, France by its policies reduces the possibility of a conventional defense, and significantly lowers the nuclear threshold by refusing to collaborate in advance for a strong conventional defense. In addition, by refusing to allow use of French territory for practice or detailed planning for dependent evacuation, France jeopardizes the safety of some 250,000 U.S. women and children who are dependents of U.S. personnel in Europe.

Actual French participation with NATO is an entangled deal, and includes some limited cooperation on a military but not a political level. Evidently the situation within the French government is also confused, with some senior Frenchmen talking about increased cooperation but without any action.

Paradoxically, the French insist that U.S. conventional forces must remain in Europe. However, without French conventional military cooperation and with unilateral French planning and control of their nuclear capability French tactical nuclear weapons, if used in the midst of a conventional engagement between NATO (including U.S.) and Warsaw Pact forces, could force the U.S. into a nuclear war. The Alliance has been able to tolerate this bad situation during the period of U.S. nuclear superiority, but strategic parity makes the French position totally at odds with the best interest of NATO and stability in Central Europe. The French position is also incompatible with a long-term U.S. commitment in Europe and the Alliance must find ways of resolving this dangerous situation.

THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD

The nuclear threshold in Europe is quite low. There is a considerable danger that tactical nuclear weapons would be used at the very outset of a war, leading to possible, or even probable, escalation to strategic nuclear war. Our plan to use tactical nuclear weapons "as soon as necessary" is heavily emphasized—but "as late as possible" does not get enough emphasis. I believe that much more emphasis should be given to the latter.

The nuclear threshold is low because of the short time that NATO military commanders feel that they could fight conventionally, and because of the psychological reliance by Allied military and political leaders on a rapid American nuclear response. In a Warsaw Pact attack, the initial shock of conventional fighting, probably with some initial military setbacks, combined with the desire to insure a U.S. nuclear commitment, could result in enormous and possibly irresistible pressure to use nuclear weapons at the outset.

This dependency on the early use of nuclear weapons against a major conventional attack is reinforced by a number of important political and military considerations. Some German representatives view U.S. forces as a necessary "big bell" which would bring nuclear weapons into use early near the border, and thus achieve the German goal of avoiding the spectre of the populated and industrial areas of West Germany becoming either a nuclear wasteland, or a conventional battleground.

Some military commanders may tend to exaggerate the need and accelerate the request to use nuclear weapons because they fear that political decisions to use nuclear weapons would take so long that all the conventional forces would be destroyed. As a result, ground commanders might call for using nuclear weapons when they decided to commit their tactical reserve forces so that they would retain some conventional forces after a nuclear exchange. Finally, there is a very large and ready-to-use tactical nuclear force in Europe. This includes some 7000 U.S. weapons in addition to the English and French nuclear forces. The U.S. maintains a substantial number of aircraft and missiles on a 5-minute alert with tactical nuclear weapons.

The long history of NATO despair on conventional capability, the reliance on the nuclear crutch, and the stated policy of France to go nuclear early in any threat on France could foreclose American options on the use of nuclear weapons. It is possible that the French independent nuclear capability could be used to escalate any conventional war to a nuclear engagement with or without American approval.

This dependency on the nuclear crutch in Europe is no longer feasible. Nobody has any experience in fighting nuclear wars and nobody knows what would happen if one were to start. Some people feel that NATO could use tactical nuclear weapons without much chance of a similar response from the Warsaw Pact, and that escalation from tactical nuclear to strategic nuclear weapons could be controlled because the Soviets would have to calculate homeland losses before using nuclear weapons. Other people feel that there is a possibility that the Soviets could launch a preventive tactical nuclear attack along with a conventional attack. This is based on the theory that the Soviets believe that the U.S. would use tactical nuclear weapons unless they were destroyed, but would not escalate to strategic nuclear weapons. Still others feel that any use of nuclear weapons would escalate to strategic nuclear war. The point is that nobody is certain about what would happen. Some reduction of the size and alert status of the tactical nuclear weapon force in Europe, if done very selectively, could still provide an effective deterrent and enhance the conventional capability by providing troops for conversion to combat forces. It would also decrease the expense involved in providing for the maintenance and security of the very large number of diverse nuclear weapons now in Europe.

It is clear that in a period of strategic nuclear parity between the United States and Russia, the credibility of using nuclear weapons against a conventional attack is substantially reduced. Thus, nuclear deterrence of major conventional attacks has been weakened by overall nuclear parity. This places more reliance on effective conventional forces to stop and contain a conventional attack, or to require that the conventional attack be so large and overwhelming as to demand the use of nuclear weapons.

NONNUCLEAR STRATEGY AND PLANNING

War in Central Europe at present is unlikely. But, given strategic parity and appropriate conditions in Europe, the most likely form that Warsaw Pact aggression might take appears to be a very short but

sizable non-nuclear attack with conventional forces moving toward the Rhine to grab a considerable piece of German territory. If successful this would radically change the balance of power in Europe, cut the heart out of the Alliance and greatly enhance the Soviet political position through limited military action. From a long range view, the Soviets may conclude that the cheapest and safest method to achieve dominance in Europe would be to create a four to five year period of detente. During this period, the Warsaw Pact could build up its forces, while there was a corresponding relaxation of U.S. and Western defense efforts. After this, even without an attack, the political results which could flow from a European and American perception of the possibility of a successful attack, could give the Soviets political dominance in Europe.

On a more technical level, there are two fundamental disagreements within NATO on conventional strategy. The first disagreement is on the amount of warning time NATO would have and the particular kind of Soviet attack that should be anticipated. The second disagreement is the length of time that NATO should plan to fight conventionally.

More of our European allies think that the most logical case for NATO to plan for would be a major Soviet attack that came after a relatively short mobilization period—measured in days—using the Pact forces that are located in Eastern Europe. As the battle developed, more Soviet forces could be committed in echelons behind the first elements. NATO's weakness is seen as having to defend an extended border with the Warsaw Pact able to concentrate its forces where it chooses. This scenario practically eliminates the usefulness of U.S. forces based in the United States because they could not be brought across the Atlantic in time to help.

The Americans think that the most logical case for NATO to plan for would be a Soviet attack after a longer period of Pact buildup—measured in weeks. This would allow the U.S. "reforger" and "two plus ten" divisions to be deployed to their prepositioned equipment in Europe.

The Allies believe NATO should be prepared to fight conventionally for a relatively short time—measured in weeks. Their ammunition and supply stocks reflect this belief. The concept underlying this plan is that NATO should not prepare to crush the Red Army in a long, conventional war that would destroy much of Western Europe, as in World War II. Rather, NATO should be prepared to fight very hard at the outset to stop any conventional attack on the border before it penetrated very far.

The Americans believe NATO should be prepared to fight conventionally for a longer period and we are postured to fight that way if a line of communications can be established to resupply men and materiel. The concept behind this strategy is to eliminate the risk of conventional forces running out of supplies, and thus require the use of nuclear weapons to avert defeat. However, the U.S. forces and supply lines are designed to resupply only U.S. forces, not the Allies.

These differences in strategic assumptions tend to weaken overall NATO conventional capability because they provide differing bases for force planning and resource allocation among the NATO Allies.

THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE

While conventional forces must be linked to nuclear forces in order to represent an effective deterrent, now that the USSR has achieved strategic nuclear parity with the U.S., Warsaw Pact conventional superiority in Europe can be very dangerous.

In terms of overall conventional resources, NATO is roughly equivalent to the Warsaw Pact. NATO can and should achieve a conventional balance with the Pact with the resources that are now available. Overall, we have a strong deterrent in Europe, but a poor defense posture if deterrence fails. Our goal should be to strengthen our defense capabilities without weakening our deterrent.

At present, although resources are roughly equal, the NATO conventional defense posture is somewhat inferior to the Warsaw Pact because:

(1) the difference in deployment assumptions within NATO (i.e., long war vs. short war and linear defense vs. mobile defense to meet quick thrusts) is inefficient for structuring forces and providing support.

(2) the diversity and differences of equipment and operations among NATO forces weakens their overall power and ability to work together.

(3) the long years of reliance on the U.S. nuclear crutch have given NATO psychological conventional inferiority.

(4) the failure of the Alliance to coordinate support and logistics leads to a wasting of NATO resources and a weakening of conventional capability.

(5) the French insistence on ordering "a la carte" from the NATO menu (i.e.: accepting the benefits but not the burdens), weakens NATO and causes uncertainty as to what to expect from French forces. This contributes to the pessimism on NATO's conventional capability, and threatens to spread to the smaller NATO countries.

There are three general indicators of the relative conventional balance in Central Europe: (1) The estimated length of time conventional forces could hold out before using tactical nuclear weapons; (2) comparisons of force units (divisions or battalions on each side), and (3) the overall levels of resources on both sides. In Europe and the United States, there is a considerable variance among the estimates of each of these indicators, and thus the conclusions about the precise balance vary considerably.

Estimates of the time conventional forces could hold out against a Soviet conventional attack vary from 4 to 90 days, depending on the intensity of the Warsaw Pact attack. Officials in Europe estimate on the lower side and officials in Washington estimate on the higher side. Most of those located in Europe anticipate early use of tactical nuclear weapons subsequent to a worsening conventional combat situation.

The ground force balance, as measured by divisions, reflects an almost 3 to 1 ratio, Warsaw Pact to NATO (not including French divisions). Manpower, on the other hand, is roughly equal. The discrepancy between the division numbers and the manpower numbers is partly a result of the difference in the sizes of Warsaw Pact versus NATO divisions. The Warsaw Pact has about a 2½ to 1 advantage over NATO in tanks. Military theory generally calls for the offense to generate a 3 to 1 advantage in force strength. However, there is considerable disagreement as to whether this applies to small unit actions or to larger scale battles.

In terms of the relative balance of air forces, experts rate the numbers of aircraft available on the central European front to the Warsaw Pact and NATO as roughly equal. These same experts give NATO a significant edge in both aircraft and personnel quality. In addition, NATO air forces are structured offensively to carry the battle to the enemy, while Pact air forces are structured defensively. This gives NATO an advantage in their ability to attack ground forces. Another significant NATO asset is the large number of U.S. pilots who have had actual combat experience, whereas few, if any, Warsaw Pact pilots have ever seen combat. Both the Warsaw Pact and NATO air forces are seen as having command structure problems, but NATO's is seen as less severe, and Air Force commanders are reportedly working on solutions to NATO's problem.

The Defense Department has studied the overall conventional resources available in Central Europe to the Pact and to NATO. This study shows that when measured by available resources NATO is closer to a conventional balance than previously thought.

The study counts ground force manpower, tanks and other weapons available to both sides. It shows more of these resources available to NATO than previously thought. This is because it includes French and other national forces, that could be available in Europe in wartime, but are not formally committed to the NATO command in peacetime. Like earlier NATO studies, it assumes that sufficient warning time is available prior to a Warsaw Pact attack and that the necessary political decisions are made in time for the mobilization of opposing forces.

The study concludes that after mobilization NATO can be expected to outnumber the Warsaw Pact in terms of manpower and anti-tank weapons, but the Warsaw Pact would retain an advantage in tanks and artillery. With this rough numerical balance in conventional forces, the study concludes that NATO could hold in the face of the expected commitment of forces by the Warsaw Pact. If the Warsaw Pact were to commit a higher than expected level of conventional resources, the Pact could probably take a sizable land area of West Germany in a relatively short time measured in weeks.

An interesting and controversial element of the study is that although NATO has somewhat more manpower, it will generate significantly less combat forces. These figures point up an area that needs intense review, study, and action. The critical question is why does NATO have a parity in manpower but generate substantially less combat forces than the Warsaw Pact.

A CRITIQUE OF CONVENTIONAL BALANCE COMPARISONS

The position stated by some American military leaders in Europe, some Europeans, and some writers in the U.S. outside of the Pentagon that the Warsaw Pact could completely overwhelm NATO in days, falls into the worst case category. The worst case approach has dangers which have long been at work among the NATO allies and our own military men in Europe. It argues for a quick use of tactical nuclear weapons to block off and impede a conventional attack. The availability of this nuclear crutch, coupled with overstated Warsaw Pact capabilities, seems to stifle plans or studies to change the status quo

in response to the perceived threat. It contributes to despair among the Allies on the conventional balance and could lead to conventional force reductions particularly by the U.S. It has already been used by some allies as an excuse not to build-up, reorganize, or re-equip their own forces to provide a more effective conventional force. Thus, the worst case approach tends to become self-fulfilling: i.e. *"The threat is too great—we cannot approach—conventional parity, thus why spend more money to improve European conventional capability. Rather, rely on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons which the U.S. forces must use to preserve their own security."* The result of this reasoning inevitably leads to a tactical nuclear trip-wire.

The new approach used in the Defense Department study of conventional resources is valuable and refreshing as a counter to the "worst case" approach; but suffers from some of the shortcomings of the more pessimistic analyses. It relies heavily on quantitative measures, and leaves out many of the qualitative differences between forces. It also leaves out the different ability of both sides to produce combat power out of available resources. NATO, being a collection of independent democratic countries, is less efficient in producing combat power out of available resources than the Pact. However, the gap between the resource balance of the Pact and NATO shown in the DOD study and the estimates of the combat balance between the Pact and NATO is so vast that the major effect should be to raise the question as to why NATO, with its considerable resource commitment, is so inefficient in producing combat power, and what can be done to correct this problem.

The Defense study has the key assumption that NATO will mobilize given adequate warning. The failure to make proper political assessments given hard intelligence data could reduce the time available for NATO mobilization. The Czechoslovakian crisis and the recent Middle East crisis illustrate the danger inherent in such an assumption. Politicians may refrain from making what appears to be politically unacceptable decisions to move forces until it is too late to adequately prepare. In such a case, the forces available to NATO could face not only the standing Warsaw Pact forces, but additional forces mobilized and deployed from the Soviet Union. This assumption helps cause major differences on how many U.S. forces could be deployed to Europe in a contingency. The Defense Department study assumes a considerable number of U.S. based divisions would be deployed to Europe in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack. Almost everyone in Europe writes off the usefulness of forces that must be transported by sea, i.e., would take more than 10-20 days to arrive. Thus the only U.S. forces that really count in European eyes are tactical air units that arrive within 3-4 days; Army Reformatory units; and 2 Army divisions and 10 brigades (2+10 units). Both of the latter have all their equipment prepositioned in Europe.

What is needed is an approach which, though it takes into account worst-case factors, would be both a quantitative and qualitative measure of the real existing balance. Such an approach should resolve some of the anomalies in both cases, such as why manpower is fairly equal but combat units are not. It should also ensure that where disparities exist, such as in number of tanks, appropriate defensive weapons are available in sufficient numbers and appropriate quality to offset acknowledged superiority in that category. Further, it must

integrate the tactical air, logistics and supply and naval force capabilities and problems on both sides. Achievement of conventional parity requires a well thought-out, comprehensive re-ordering of the way in which U.S. and NATO forces are supported and deployed in the Central Region.

RESTRUCTURING U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

Top priority must be given to restructuring NATO forces, in particular U.S. forces in Europe, to produce more combat capability out of the resources that are available. This will take considerable pressure on our own military commanders and could set a favorable example for the Alliance.

There is a major debate starting within the U.S. Defense establishment about restructuring U.S. forces in Europe to provide more combat capability and reduce support troops. While they are reluctant to criticize their U.S. counterparts in the open, some of our Allies believe the U.S. forces are too heavy on support and logistic forces at the expense of combat power. As one allied critic expressed his oversimplified and perhaps unjust critique of the U.S. Army in Europe, "They are well prepared to land on the beaches of Normandy and fight inch by inch to Moscow."

Major studies on this subject, both governmental and non-governmental, reach two major conclusions.

First, U.S. forces in Europe are structured for a longer war than the European and Warsaw Pact forces. Therefore, they have relatively more support troops than other forces. A U.S. division, plus its support slice, has about 45,000 troops, compared with about 25,000 for the Allies and 12-15,000 for the Warsaw Pact. Within a fixed troop ceiling, the U.S. can produce fewer combat units than either our Allies or our adversaries.

Second, U.S. forces in Europe are structured as an expeditionary force, meaning they have their own logistics support and can operate autonomously. Within NATO, logistics is a national responsibility, but this leads to a duplicative and layer-cake approach that reduces the combat strength of NATO as a whole. Considerable savings in support troops and costs can be achieved by relying more on host-country support, but to do this the U.S. would sacrifice some autonomy and this requires a major policy decision.

The estimates by critics of how much troop strength could be saved by restructuring U.S. Army forces and still retaining the same combat unit strength range from 29,000 to almost 60,000, out of the total Army strength in Europe. This saved strength would be used to form more combat units, thereby increasing conventional capability and raising the nuclear threshold. It could also be a means of satisfying MBFR agreements without diminishing combat capability.

EFFECT OF U.S. TROOP REDUCTIONS

Opinions in Europe vary on the likely effect of a U.S. troop reduction on the NATO Alliance. The following summarizes the range of these opinions:

A 20-30,000 cut in U.S. troop strength, particularly if accomplished by an increase in combat-to-support power, would not create intense public concern in Europe and could be managed

and absorbed. However, such a cut would be detrimental to the MBFR talks and should take place pursuant to and not independent of an MBFR agreement.

A 75-80,000 man U.S. unilateral reduction would cause Europeans to distrust the validity of the American commitment and to withdraw from the MBFR talks.

A cut of 100,000 or more in U.S. troops would destabilize the overall military posture, but would have even more effect on the NATO political posture. The psychological and political impact of such a cut could lead to the "Finlandization" of Europe and Soviet political dominance in Europe.

REFOCUSING CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE

Although American troop levels in Europe are important, Congressional debate on the Mansfield and other amendments has not focused on the most important questions confronting our nation regarding our NATO commitment. These questions include:

(1) What is the danger of nuclear conflict in Central Europe and what will be the effect of unilateral U.S. withdrawal on the nuclear threshold?

(2) What long range U.S. commitment to NATO is America willing to make? (i.e. ten years from now will we have a continuing U.S. nuclear commitment with mainly air and naval power in Europe and with token ground forces.)

(3) Are we willing for Germany to fill the vacuum left by our ground forces in both numbers and real conventional capability?

(4) What will be the effect of a unilateral U.S. withdrawal on detente and more particularly on not only the MBFR talks, but also on the SALT II negotiations?

(5) What will be the consequences and dangers of a U.S. unilateral withdrawal on the troops, families and other Americans remaining in Europe?

A Congressional debate on these points is not only essential for developing U.S. policy—but whatever the result, it would lend clarity to the U.S. position and enhance NATO's long range policy.

The weakness of the present debate and its focus is that the Alliance cannot proceed in any direction with confidence because of the great disparity between long range perceptions by the Administration and Congress.

In short, our Nation must find and adopt a long range NATO stance that we are willing to live with, politically, economically and militarily. MBFR will not do this for us regardless of its outcome.

This long range NATO plan should logically have preceded MBFR but now can parallel MBFR in order to prevent the negotiations and any agreement pursuant thereto from "locking in" either the U.S. or the Allies into a long range stance incompatible with the best interest of the Alliance and political reality.

Whatever the final answers are to these hypothetical questions, they certainly must be part of the policy foundation for meaningful U.S. MBFR discussion. Likewise debate in Congress on the "Mansfield" amendment and similar unilateral withdrawal debates should focus on the long range desired result.

APPENDIX

THE MBFR TALKS

While this report does not cover detailed studies of MBFR or meetings with the U.S. MBFR delegation, discussions with other people produced a number of interesting views of MBFR. These views produce the paradox that NATO views MBFR as a way to get Soviet troop reductions in return for U.S. troop reductions, and thus prevent European conventional defense from disintegrating in the face of U.S. unilateral reductions. On the other hand, the Soviets, view MBFR as a way to control West European (in particular West German) troop strengths and thus prevent a strengthening of European conventional defense in the face of unilateral U.S. reductions.

One thing on which most agree with respect to MBFR is that the main Soviet motivation in seeking an MBFR agreement is to prevent the Alliance from filling any vacuum that might be caused by U.S. withdrawals. In this context, the Soviets are especially concerned and opposed to any increases in West German forces. Their overriding objective appears to be the prevention of West German dominance within NATO and Western Europe. The Soviets also fear a strengthening of the European Economic Community, and feel MBFR could stop that trend.

German feelings are that the Soviets would like to decrease the NATO conventional capability to the point it is so weak that the nuclear capability is not credible, and Germany is determined that MBFR not give the Russians a control over German forces by putting a sub-ceiling on them.

The Norwegians and Turks fear that Soviet troops released from Central Europe by an MBFR agreement would be moved to pose a greater threat to the flank nations.

The United States must insist that there be no reduction by the allies of their conventional defense capability. In fact, we should emphasize the importance of conventional forces in raising the nuclear threshold and encourage the Allies, particularly the Germans and English, to increase their conventional strength. The United States should not yield to the Soviet demand to put ceilings on European military strength in MBFR because it would tend to permanently lock the United States into being the major contributor to European defense and greatly constrain American defense policy.

The most important outcome of the MBFR talks may *not* be troop reductions, but instead, a lowering of tensions caused by increasing the conventional warning time. This might be done by permitting observers and restricting maneuvers on both sides as well as other confidence-building measures such as prior announcement of troop movements, aircraft deployments and military exercises.

BURDEN SHARING

There is a continuing frustration with the expenditure of billions of dollars by our nation and the Allies, only to have our military commanders frankly admit that our conventional capability can be counted on only for a matter of days and we would quickly have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Some say, "Why spend so much when you can buy a trip wire a lot cheaper?" The Alliance and the Administration must address this problem in a meaningful way with meaningful answers, in order to avoid a major unilateral American troop withdrawal.

In addition to the frustration about the difference between levels of spending compared with real defense capability, a number of senior U.S. and Allied officials in Europe expressed the general idea that the Allies are not pulling their share of the conventional defense load, and, in fact, were decreasing their conventional defense contributions. In this regard, the Jackson-Nunn amendment is an expression not just on the balance of payments problem, but more nearly reflects an underlying feeling that the Allies should do their fair share in the real conventional defense of Europe.

Some Europeans assert that people in the United States are not aware of how much the Europeans are doing for NATO and should be made more aware of the European contribution of defense forces. For example, the offset contributions of the Europeans, particularly Germany, and other important help the Europeans have given the U.S. in financial, economic, and trade matters should be made more public in the United States.

Top level Europeans and the Secretary of Defense state that the Allies have the biggest share of the overall force levels in Europe as shown below:

	Ground forces (manpower)	Naval forces ¹ (ships)	Air forces (airplanes)
Percent United States.....	10	19	24
Percent allies.....	90	81	76

¹ Good capability major warships.

However, this overall picture is somewhat misleading for three reasons: First, almost one half the Allied manpower counted in this picture are in Southern Europe but there are no significant U.S. ground forces in Southern Europe (Turkey, Greece, Italy). The land force problems in Southern Europe are completely different than those in the NATO guidelines area of Central Europe. Second, the quality of U.S. ground and air forces tends to be much higher than that of most allies. A simple percentage calculation on the number of aircraft tends to mask this fact. Third, the allies have nothing which begins to compare with our carriers, so the 81% is also misleading. Thus far, I have seen no completely valid comparison of the relative contributions to conventional capability.

The problem of burden sharing is complicated because there are no established criteria on how the burden should be counted (each country has different budgeting and accounting procedures) and the actual measurement is made more complex by international economic and

financial transactions. One of the side-benefits of the Jackson-Nunn amendment was to force attention on this long neglected but important area. In effect, the entire Alliance, including the U.S., has been playing a numbers game as to the relative contribution of each Ally and more must be done to improve understanding in this area.

In general our Central European Allies have been increasing the total amounts of their defense budgets each year. But, Europe has also undergone dramatic economic growth, which means they should be able to shoulder more of the burden. Further, severe price inflation and increases in manpower costs have tended to offset defense budget increases, because they mean each European "dollar" buys less. The relative contribution of the U.S. and NATO Allies can be measured by the percentage of Gross National Product spent for defense and active duty military manpower. According to these measures, Europe has not increased its share of the conventional defense burden. Some fear there will be reductions in the future. On balance, Europeans have reduced their defense burden in the last ten years, but have kept a relatively constant burden in the past few years, as shown in the chart below.

	1964	1968 ¹	1970 ¹	1971 ¹	1972	1973
Percent of GNP for defense:						
Central Europe ²	4.5	3.9	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.5
United States.....	8.7	10.1	8.7	7.8	7.3	6.8
Active military manpower (in thousands):						
Central Europe ²	1,803	1,665	1,664	1,639	1,632	1,618
United States.....	2,690	3,500	3,161	2,695	2,301	2,253

¹ Significant U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia.

² Includes France.

Many Europeans think that the European Allies are decreasing their efforts. At the present time, there is considerable doubt that the Europeans will substantially increase their defense contributions and it seems that some smaller NATO Allies are showing less willingness to cope with that segment of public opinion within their own countries calling for reduced defense expenditures.

Burden sharing is definitely one of the subjects that causes friction between the U.S. and the NATO allies. Hopefully the recently reported progress in the offset negotiations between the U.S. and Germany will lessen the friction. Equity in burden sharing is hard to define in specific terms, but a continuing effort must be made by the Alliance as a whole to assess and understand the problems that confront it and to meet the Pact threat in a way which is as rational and as equitable as possible.

SOUTHERN EUROPE

While this report and the reviews behind it mainly focused on Central Europe where the main U.S. ground and air forces in Europe are located, one of the most likely forms in the future of Soviet political brinkmanship could involve strong pressure by naval forces in the Mediterranean. This could be aimed at splitting the NATO Alliance and increasing the Soviet influence in the Mediterranean area.

The NATO situation in Southern Europe (including Italy, Greece and Turkey) differs substantially from Central Europe in the following ways:

Except for the narrow part of Greece, opposite Bulgaria, the terrain is ruggedly mountainous, crossed by rivers, and undeveloped. This would make a quick tank thrust by the Soviets very difficult.

There are no U.S. ground combat troops in this area, and very little land-based U.S. tactical air. The Allies in the south rely on their own manpower for ground forces and rely largely on their own air forces.

The southern countries have substantial pools of relatively low-cost manpower, while there is a labor shortage in Central Europe with the attendant increased manpower costs.

Allied supply stocks are minimal in Southern Europe, compared with fairly adequate stocks maintained by the Allies and U.S. forces in Central Europe.

The conventional balance in the South reflects a Warsaw Pact advantage of approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 in numbers of divisions, tanks and tactical aircraft. The Pact may also have a qualitative advantage in aircraft, as many of the NATO Allied aircraft are older or less capable aircraft. On the other hand the NATO Allies in the south have about a $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 advantage in manpower in the area.

A good deal of concern has been voiced about the Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterranean. At present, U.S. and NATO commanders in Europe rate the U.S. Sixth Fleet as strong and as having a qualitative edge over its Soviet counterpart. The Sixth Fleet was seen as capable of handling the Soviet naval threat in the recent middle East crisis.

The Allied Mediterranean fleets are a different story. At present, there is inadequate NATO naval contribution in the Mediterranean by our Southern European allies. The southern NATO allies have cut back on their fleets in the Mediterranean over the past several years and naval budget trends are down. The French Mediterranean fleet is rated as modern and larger than the Sixth Fleet, but is uncommitted to the NATO command. As a result, more and more reliance is placed on the Sixth Fleet to meet any Soviet threat.

The U.S. 6th Fleet cannot and should not have to "go it alone" in the Mediterranean. While it is a strong fleet, even if augmented it is unlikely that the 6th fleet could singlehandedly control the entire Mediterranean against the naval and air forces of the Soviets and their allies in waters close to their home-lands. Without the help of our Allies, particularly in naval support facilities, tactical air and ships, the 6th Fleet would be vulnerable. On the other hand, the combined fleets of the NATO Allies (including France) appear strong and together with NATO tactical air forces should be able to control the Mediterranean in a major conflict if they act jointly. As previously set forth, the lack of a French commitment also greatly weakens the NATO Mediterranean force and increases the temptation for Soviet brinkmanship. Considerably more effort is needed to improve the Allied fleets in the Mediterranean.

The following article provides an analysis of some factors bearing on the use of nuclear weapons to defend West Europe.

A CREDIBLE NUCLEAR-EMPHASIS DEFENSE FOR NATO*

by W. S. Bennett, R. R. Sandoval and R. G. Shreffler

THIS is a proposal of long-term goals toward which changes in NATO's defense posture should be directed. Its primary aim is to increase the effectiveness of NATO defense against Warsaw Pact aggression and to make that increase manifest and credible to both NATO and Warsaw Pact decision-makers. Negotiation of the issues dividing East and West in Europe could then be approached by the NATO governments, secure in the knowledge that the West's military posture was adequate to repel any invasion.

An effective defense threatens nothing but the ambitions of an adventurous aggressor. If a similar posture were acquired by the Warsaw Pact, no harm would be done to NATO's defense. Instead, the parties would enjoy a mutual state of confident deterrence, or stalemate — a situation even more stable than that now existing between the U.S. and USSR strategic forces.

The primary aim of making NATO's defense effective, and therefore credible, cannot be achieved without careful consideration of the prevailing political, military, economic and technical conditions affecting both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The necessary changes must be planned and accomplished deliberately to avoid disturbing the foundations on which the North Atlantic alliance is built. In particular, positive attitudes toward the existing NATO political and military posture must not be weakened during the conversion to an effective defensive posture. Finally, it is assumed that the configuration of a credible NATO defense must result in a decreased economic burden.

APPROACH

NATO's military posture has always been regarded as a counter to a formidable Warsaw Pact threat — a threat inferred as much

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from Soviet ambitions as from pure military capability. In the mid-1950's, our NATO allies concurred in U.S. plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe to offset the disparity between conventional forces on the two sides. Since then, the Soviet Union has acquired intercontinental nuclear capabilities that have changed the strategic context in which the United States views its worldwide relationships. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has acquired and fielded nuclear weapons in the Warsaw Pact framework that more than suffice to deter any attack by forces based in Western Europe. These weapons also provide a *de facto* capability to destroy most of Europe should the Soviet Union choose to do so, for whatever reason. Meanwhile, the conventional forces of the Pact, characterized by large numbers of armored and mechanized units, provide a disturbingly credible instrument for Soviet adventurism ranging from political pressure to massive invasion.

Flexible response, NATO's declared strategy for coping with these various contingencies, attempts to combine military and political measures to contain the more limited forms of aggression and to deter the wider forms by threatening to inflict damage that the Soviets would find either unacceptable or out of proportion to any prospective gains. To many analysts, including the present authors, there is something illusory about this strategy. First, the ability of the NATO force to defend effectively against a massive attack is seriously questioned. Second, actual use of the nuclear deterrent component of the force would result in unacceptable damage to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The result is NATO's reliance on a military instrument inadequate for effective defense and unusable if it fails to deter. Faced with this dilemma, how do our allies hope to prevent a war in Europe from proceeding beyond a defensive engagement on the battlefield to an exchange of high-yield nuclear weapons on a theater-wide scale? They see no alternative but to rely on the mutual restraint imposed by the possible involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in a war of mutual destruction. So far, Washington appears to have resigned itself to this formulation, which it actually helped to devise.

Several factors currently tend to deny stability to the situation just described. Political discussions that may result in a reduced NATO military structure have already begun. All alliance members are feeling economic pressures to reduce forces. Another factor, inherent in NATO's nuclear weapons and in the pro-

cedures prescribed for their use, is the enormous potential for collateral or unintended damage even if NATO fights only a defensive war. All these factors suggest the need for a detailed examination of the NATO military posture.

The most obvious deficiency of the NATO posture is the limited ability of present defenses to deny territory to a determined Warsaw Pact attacking force. To stop an invasion and retake lost territory, NATO would be forced to depend on mobilization and reinforcement. This buildup would take time, during which an invading force could be expected to have penetrated deep into the Federal Republic of Germany. West Germans thus face the prospect, if the Pact attacks in force, of a prolonged war fought over their territory, quite possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons by both sides. Our other NATO allies, fearful of their fate in such a conflict, join the FRG in the hope that the Pact will be deterred from attacking by the threat of our use of nuclear weapons, including strategic weapons. There is, however, little hope among our allies that defensive action against a massive ground attack would be effective enough to forestall escalation to theater-wide use of nuclear weapons. Understandably, then, they would want the destruction of the United States and the USSR indissolubly linked to their own demise through our commitment of intercontinental strategic nuclear capabilities.

Discriminate use of nuclear weapons from the outset would enable NATO to conduct a successful defense. Western policymakers should aim to replace, in Pact calculations, the uncertainty of an irrational NATO response with the certainty of an immediate, effective response to attempts to take NATO territory. Dealing with threats of irrational attacks to destroy all or part of NATO is a problem for our European allies to face without counting on U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. It is their survival that such attacks threaten. However, they should recognize that the existence of European retaliatory forces cannot be ignored by the Pact, and might provide an otherwise absent incentive for a pre-emptive disarming attack. It is true, after all, that retaliatory forces can also be used pre-emptively.

The strategy proposed in this article departs radically from present plans to try first to defend conventionally in Europe: It calls for immediately engaging an attacker with low-yield nuclear weapons for all but the most trivial incursions. Yet this concept would require no change in NATO's accepted strategy of forward defense, only in its interpretation. We admit there is no place in

our proposal for any U.S. forces whose useful purpose in a defensive role on the battlefield cannot be defined. We acknowledge the utility of an undeclared reliance on the U.S. Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for an indeterminate contribution to the deterrence of high-intensity theater war in Europe. We hold that a NATO force optimally configured to employ nuclear weapons defensively would require a smaller U.S. investment and would accommodate the many constraints that now prevent NATO from mounting a realistic deterrent to Warsaw Pact pressures.

First, we will address the political, military, economic and technical factors bearing on this proposed solution to NATO's defense under the following headings:

- (1) Our perspective of nuclear weapons.
- (2) U.S. courses of action with respect to NATO.
- (3) Defensive capability and deterrence.
- (4) Escalation of a nuclear war in Europe.
- (5) The NATO force and its interactions with the threat.

Then we will identify the general characteristics of a future NATO force posture consistent with our analysis of these factors. Finally, we will indicate some directions that development of the future NATO force structure should take to reflect the recommended posture, and suggest ways to adapt the alliance's present force.

Some aspects of our proposal are extremely controversial. A number of strategic analysts have warned that our suggestions could undermine NATO. In particular, some critics feel strongly that Europeans do not want a defense of any kind, that they rely on the fact that any conflict on their territory would rapidly involve a U.S.-USSR intercontinental exchange, and that this fact is the only deterrent that protects NATO. Whatever the merits of that position, it strikes us as a holdover from the days of unquestioned faith in U.S. strategic superiority. This argument has been overtaken by the conditions of strategic parity, so we believe NATO must take a new look at its own defenses. If it can find a credible defense posture for its European members, military aggression will be deterred. And if the Europeans gain confidence in this posture, it will give them the courage to resist the more likely threat of political coercion. Conjecture of this kind is clearly subjective, but our aim is to strengthen NATO and to make the U.S. contribution meaningful rather than illusory.

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

In some instances, the following factors are little more than

definitions; in others, they are matters of substance that can severely restrict our choice of realistic solutions to the problem. All must be understood, however, if a dialogue on this complex subject is to be intelligent.

Our Perspective of Nuclear Weapons

The numerous complex parameters required to define nuclear weapons and the infinite set of political-military situations their existence influences make them difficult to classify. Are they defensive, retaliatory, or both? Confusion is especially evident in this period when the United States is obliged to formulate its world position accurately.

For example, the 7,000 U.S. weapons in Europe would be regarded by many as a stockpile of defensive nuclear weapons. One would do better, however, to take the opposite view and acknowledge that, although the NATO General Strike Plan (GSP) is directed against military targets, its execution with NATO's present high-yield weapons would cause widespread collateral damage in Warsaw Pact homelands. This situation arises because we usually consider the GSP in the same context as the U.S. SIOP — i.e., as a deterrent only. But because the Warsaw Pact perceives the GSP to be coercive (or even pre-emptive) in intent, weapons assigned to the plan cannot be regarded as relating solely to the defense of NATO. Only those weapons put to use directly on the battlefield can be properly described as defensive.

One reason for the present confusion (and we must recognize that some of it flows from deliberate decisions) is our past practice of designing weapons systems and forcing them into the existing military structure. A more rational approach is to decide what political and military needs exist, develop an accommodating force structure, and then call on the technical community to build weapons that support that force structure. Each theater has different demands. The political-military confrontation between the USSR and the United States varies from one part of the world to another; for example, the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation differs from the situation confronting the United States in Asia. When we evaluate a nuclear weapon or a nuclear arsenal, weapon characteristics should be chosen to ensure that they best meet the demands of a particular theater, or even a particular area within a theater.

Let us consider how some of these characteristics relate to our assessment of political acceptability and military utility. The first

essential is what might be called weapon controllability. To be politically acceptable as an instrument of national policy, a nuclear weapon must be capable of manufacture, deployment and use under conditions that make unauthorized detonation virtually impossible. Deployment and use, in particular, must unquestionably support the achievement of a clearly defined objective, and, in the case of defensive weapons, must be carefully limited. On the other hand, if a weapon is to be militarily useful, the control apparatus must be responsive to military exigencies and must not impose an inordinate security, storage and maintenance burden on the force.

Another important characteristic is the destructiveness of the weapon. NATO's political leadership wants no weapon explosion to expose people or their cultural heritage to indiscriminate destruction. This collateral damage can be largely controlled by the choice of target area and target damage criteria. The military commander, however, should have weapons whose use can effectively attain military objectives. Delivery accuracy, range and responsiveness of the delivery system, weapon yield and fuzing, target acquisition, damage assessment, and battlefield survivability of the system all play an obvious role in assuring effectiveness.

Economic considerations involved in developing a new stockpile which can best meet these effectiveness criteria include (1) the transition from a present force representing sunk costs; (2) the resources already committed to, and the costs still to be paid for, weapons in development; and (3) the relationship of these factors to other costs of fielding and maintaining forces, all of which have a profound influence on the defense decisions of NATO leaders. Ultimately, as experience has shown us, military planners will probably have to settle for less than they feel is enough; but they will still want to make sure that the force structure we can afford has military utility.

Other weapon characteristics affecting political acceptability are the image the weapon projects into the minds of our allies and adversaries and the weapon's ability to conform to constraints explicit in policy or implicit in the doctrine of use.

U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to NATO

Before addressing the NATO defense problem, it is appropriate to consider a range of future U.S. military linkages with Western Europe. At the risk of oversimplification, one might consider four courses of action: (1) Complete removal of U.S. military forces

from Europe as quickly as possible. (2) Complete removal of U.S. military forces from Europe according to a schedule set by the U.S. government. (3) Retention of present U.S. military forces in Europe indefinitely into the future. (4) Retention of a reduced U.S. military presence in Europe indefinitely into the future.

If any of the first three courses is pursued, there is no need to develop a rationale to support refurbishing stockpiles of nuclear weapons or redesigning the U.S. contribution to the military force. The action required to follow the fourth course is less clear. U.S. international responsibilities and domestic considerations should induce us to choose the fourth course, but drastic revisions of the U.S. force will be necessary to make this a feasible course to follow. Associated revisions of the NATO force as a whole would likewise be mandatory to ensure the military compatibility of its components. Our proposal addresses this problem.

U.S. political decision-makers can hardly choose intelligently unless they are given carefully evaluated military options from which to select. In February 1971, President Nixon documented his frustration in developing these options:

The basic problem was not technical or esoteric. It was an absolute necessity to devise a sensible posture of defense we can plausibly ask our peoples to support. Many voters, legislators, and officials in Western countries have raised questions about the continuing burden of defense budgets—not because they did not see the need for security, but because they did not see a clear rationale for the forces proposed. Our armies are not ends in themselves, or merely tokens of a commitment. They have a function to perform: to aid in deterrence and to defend if deterrence fails.¹

As the leader of the NATO alliance and the Free World, the United States should play a leading role in developing the required military solutions. In addition, Washington has by far the greatest potential for resolving these issues, particularly when the options may depend on the essential defensive use of tactical nuclear weapons — weapons over which the U.S. government may feel obligated to retain control.

Whatever military solution is selected, the obvious principal goal is to create a deterrent force posture that minimizes the possibility of war. The issue is how to develop such a deterrent force consistent with the other constraints previously identified.

¹*United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace. A Report by President Nixon to the Congress, February 25, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 33.*

Defensive Capability and Deterrence

There is a great deal of discussion and confusion over whether and how deterrence is associated with a war-fighting capability, which we prefer to call a defensive capability. The following argument is presented for consideration: First, we hypothesize that deterrence is a function — possibly some product — of how an adversary views the military potential of your force and your willingness to use that force. It is not hard to associate this definition of deterrence with a conventional or a defensive nuclear force. For either force, one associates military potential with defensive capability, and the close connection is understandable if you assume willingness to commit the nuclear force. We maintain that the U.S. President would encounter great reluctance, and therefore great difficulty, in releasing defensive nuclear forces in NATO as long as the NATO stockpile contains so many high-yield, indiscriminate weapons. The present NATO force accordingly has little or no real deterrent value beyond that attributed to the uncertainty of its use.

The situation is not so clear with respect to strategic forces. The military potential of the U.S. or the Soviet strategic force can be placed near infinity on any scale. Even as willingness to use the force approaches zero, deterrence can be large, or at least indeterminate. Not only is the military potential enormous, but it has an impersonal and unreal character — a far cry from the concrete features that define a conventional or defensive nuclear force. U.S. strategic forces, however, constitute the only significant deterrent we have in Europe — a deterrent conceived before the advent of strategic parity.

Escalation of a Nuclear War in Europe

There is a puzzling ambivalence in current attitudes toward escalation. On the one hand, it has been contended that any use of nuclear weapons introduces a qualitative change in the nature of the battlefield. Allegedly, one side or the other will find this change intolerable and attempt to redress it by widening the conflict in some fashion that will initiate an irreversible escalatory process ending inevitably in the intercontinental strategic exchange, an unthinkable denouement. On the other hand, once the introduction of nuclear weapons is postulated, escalation is viewed by the same people as the only credible threat one can hold over an adversary to restrain him from taking escalating steps himself. The positive feedback potential of this scheme is self-evident. If

war should occur while we possess our present strategy and military force, the intercontinental strategic exchange may well come to pass. But if our security needs are to be truly met, it is essential that a war fought with nuclear weapons should not escalate out of hand. Any employment doctrine must be fashioned to this end.

Escalation is defined as an extension or amplification of a war in one or more of the following directions: (1) The war might become intense. More yield would be delivered in a given engagement area. (2) The area over which the war is fought might be expanded. (3) The distance from which weapons are launched might be increased.

To minimize the possibility of a nuclear war escalating out of hand, the following steps must be taken:

(1) We must construct a defensive force that can use low-yield nuclear weapons to stop the enemy before he becomes irreversibly committed through seizing a significant part of NATO territory, or through suffering nuclear retaliation that forces him to escalate.

(2) In conducting and terminating a conflict, the NATO objective must be to preserve or re-establish the pre-conflict border. Insistence on wider goals in an engagement supported by the USSR and the United States can lead to escalation involving a release of their strategic forces.

(3) We must exclude the planning option of using U.S. nuclear forces in Europe — primarily our Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft — which are capable of striking the territory of the USSR. To this end, such forces now in Europe should be removed. The United States should dissociate itself from allied forces possessing a comparable capability, and discontinue its declared policy of promising to defend NATO with U.S. CONUS-based and otherwise strategically-oriented nuclear forces. The importance of an undeclared policy in this regard is vital. Under these conditions, the President's options for defending NATO can be weighed separately from the problem of releasing forces meant only for deterrence, not for defense.

(4) Other steps doubtless need to be taken to relieve the President's concern over escalation, but they are more tenuous. For example, we should consider advertising the ground rules by which NATO would fight a war. These rules could cover such matters as number and yield of nuclear weapons in stockpile. In

this regard, NATO could consider a low maximum yield (in the neighborhood of a kiloton). The rules could also specify the policies under points (1), (2) and (3) above. In short, NATO could advertise its constraint policy.

By taking the foregoing steps, we would avoid the enormous risks of depending on a controlled, but possibly uncontrollable, escalation to halt a Pact invasion and then retrieve lost ground. With the suggested approach, planning for NATO's defense becomes a much simpler problem: We would be able to meet aggression at the border with only the requisite nuclear force to bring it under control. This concept is compatible with accepted NATO strategy, except that current interpretations stress a conventional-emphasis phase while ours relies on immediate nuclear emphasis. Current fears about escalation are warranted, but they result from the commingling of defensive and offensive (even if called counter-offensive) nuclear forces in Europe. Removing U.S. offensive forces allows us to rely on the defensive forces.

We see no possibility of effective military action in defense against an irrational attack on Europe: for example, Soviet release of IRBM/MRBM weapons to destroy all or part of it. There can only be suicidal retaliation for such an act, authority for which is present in the President's ability to release the SIOP. This capability provides strategic deterrence based on the balance of terror. It is more a political counter than a military one. The danger is that political adventurism by the Soviets, combined with military thrusts for limited objectives, could escalate uncontrollably. Nothing can guarantee that this will not happen, but we believe the purely defensive force we propose will minimize the risk. If, in addition, the NATO force lacked offensive capability, the chances would be minimized that the Soviets would fear the force to the point where they felt they had to strike first to blunt our threat to them.

The NATO Force and Its Interactions with the Threat

The character of the NATO force has varied little since shortly after its origin. Briefly, NATO relies on a large conventional army, air force and navy; the protection of the U.S. SIOP, if necessary; and nuclear weapons deployed in the European theater, both as an ill-defined backstop of the conventional force and as a coercive deterrent, deliberately implying a trigger to the SIOP.

This combination of forces would seem unrealistic in light of the previous discussion and the following points in particular:

(1) The inflexibility the current NATO force causes in addressing problems that arise in debates on SALT, MBFR and other security matters.

(2) The lucrative targets offered to Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons by a conventionally deployed NATO force.

(3) The consideration of nuclear weapon use *in extremis*, particularly if the conventional force has insufficient time to mobilize.

(4) The difficulty concerning Presidential release of nuclear weapons in the theater, where the stockpile and delivery systems include threats to the territory of the Soviet Union.

(5) The absence of suitable military doctrine for using nuclear weapons in a purely defensive war.

(6) The fundamental difficulty of warping a conventional-force structure to meet the demands of nuclear war and the associated difficulty of structuring a sensible stockpile of defensive nuclear weapons.

(7) The probable Soviet intention to expand Moscow's influence without a major war — certainly without a strategic nuclear exchange.

It is frequently asserted that the Soviets still view our NATO force with considerable apprehension and respect. Quite the reverse may actually be true. They may dismiss our NATO deterrent force as a noncredible planning option. They may well attempt to extend their influence into Western Europe against a defensive force they consider a façade — a military force in which NATO pretends confidence but which the Soviets fear very little. Given time, and merely flexing the muscles of their massive force, they might expect to accomplish their goals with little risk of reaction.

A decision to retain the present NATO force has the attractive feature of requiring no change in current political or military posture. This factor alone is probably sufficient to argue for continued endorsement. The additional fact that there has been no conflict in Europe in over two decades of East-West antagonism encourages some to extrapolate the present state of affairs into the indefinite future. Also, recent negotiating efforts to resolve East-West differences at the diplomatic level are used as a basis to argue in favor of maintaining the present posture, i.e., "don't rock the boat." We can only reply that, should the Warsaw Pact countries,

particularly the Soviet Union, choose to invade Western Europe either with or without nuclear weapons, the political leadership of our alliance would have distressingly few choices of response, with widespread destruction almost certainly the only alternative to humiliation. Moreover, the present force provides a poor bargaining position from which to resist Soviet political pressures.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A FUTURE NATO FORCE POSTURE

NATO should be extremely cautious in considering any change in its military force without first giving careful consideration to its long-term goals. Although the present force posture is not altogether rational and cries out for revision, it still has some value. We contend, however, that if Warsaw Pact forces were to attempt to seize Western Europe, as opposed to an attack intended to devastate it, our force could be decimated. If NATO's purpose is to be fulfilled in the future, it follows that the present conventional-emphasis force posture should be changed drastically over the long term. Because of the early decisions to be made at SALT, MBFR and CSCE, and because of possible force reductions, it is essential that NATO adopt a military design which gives direction to the necessary changes in force posture.

The foregoing leads us to visualize the desirable characteristics of a future military posture predicated on the following considerations:

- (1) The U.S. SIOP has some indeterminate residual value in deterring irrational forms of Warsaw Pact aggression or escalation, but this role should not be articulated in declared policy.
- (2) No U.S. capability for other than defensive war should be retained on European soil.
- (3) Any NATO forces deployed in Europe that are solely deterrent (i.e., punitive or retaliatory) should be provided and controlled by Europeans.
- (4) The defensive capabilities of the NATO force should be tailored to the characteristics of each prospective battle area in which these capabilities may be exercised. The force should be constructed in each case around U.S.-supplied and U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons and should be designed to defend NATO at its borders.
- (5) The design of the force should accommodate to economic pressures to reduce the cost of acquiring and maintaining forces.

In particular, the size of the U.S. manpower commitment in Europe should be reduced. Since the NATO force will depend largely on nuclear weapons to defeat massed attacks by Warsaw Pact armor, our goal should be eventually to restrict the U.S. role to command and control of these weapons. The Europeans should be left to provide those elements of the force that would cope with other than massed armor attacks. This goal seems to be a clear application of the Nixon Doctrine to the defense of Europe. Also, emphasis should be placed on procuring weapons that minimize acquisition and maintenance costs.

(6) The force must be usable and effective without exceeding collateral-damage constraints. We offer two thoughts on the control of collateral damage, defined as unintended destruction which should be minimized or avoided if possible: (a) To make a nuclear-emphasis defense acceptable to our allies, the goals for minimizing expected collateral damage must be set at levels at least equal to and preferably even lower than would be associated with a conventional defense. (b) Concern about collateral damage stems largely from the presence of high-yield weapons (greater than a few kilotons) in our NATO stockpile and from vivid memories of wars as long engagements that ravaged the continent. We contend that a nuclear-defensive war by NATO, fought in proximity to the border with low-yield weapons and discriminating delivery systems, would result in a short conflict. Under such conditions, collateral damage is far less an issue, and the criteria set forth in (a) are reasonable.

(7) We are fated to pursue the brinkmanship game of strategic deterrence (assured destruction) in the NATO theater until NATO adopts this new defensive stance. The problem is far more one of policy and doctrine — and U.S. leadership — than it is one of technology. There are advantageous changes possible in both weaponry and forces, but the first step is a recognition that a new approach is necessary. As NATO comes to this realization, there is much to trade the Warsaw Pact in MBFR negotiations: our theater-range weapons for theirs, for example. We need not develop expensive new “bargaining chips”; both sides have many of them already. Because Europe is the issue, this is a problem for the multilateral MBFR talks, not for bilateral SALT II negotiations. In any case, our negotiating position does not become worse by NATO’s acquiring an effective defense.

If plans for the force proposed here were generated by the

United States and clear steps were taken toward ultimate implementation, a number of benefits would result:

(1) The inevitable changes to be made in the present force could be planned to advantage for political bargaining power in such matters as SALT and MBFR talks.

(2) Internal pressures to reduce the U.S. contribution to NATO forces could be accommodated.

(3) The deterrent value of NATO's defensive force would be enhanced if the President were confident that release of weapons for defensive purposes would not inevitably be followed by execution of the SIOP. He would also be far more likely to establish peacetime consultation procedures with our NATO allies for the release and employment of defensive nuclear weapons.

(4) The United States and its NATO allies could possess a truly effective defensive force and supporting arsenal that would take maximum advantage of nuclear weapons as the dominating presence on the battlefield. Planning for the use of this force would be uninhibited by the dogma associated with the present force and the deployment of U.S. strategic capabilities in the theater.

(5) The United States could initiate the creative development and implementation of the political, military and technical elements of command and control systems required for nuclear defense. These difficult tasks become more tractable when divorced from their strategic counterparts.

(6) The Soviets would be far more cautious in dealing with an alliance whose deterrent would be a credible nuclear defensive force marked by high confidence and resolve. At the same time, the stage would be set for détente through military stalemate, and ultimately for further, major mutual force reductions.

Several problems are doubtless associated with proposing such a force: (1) The force has yet to be defined in detail. (2) The existing force structure would certainly have to be reoriented and, possibly, drastically changed. (3) Definition of the force and transition from the present force to the new one would take a number of years.

The United States should — and apparently intends to — remain in Europe indefinitely, though at lower force levels. This necessitates that serious consideration be given to adopting a NATO military posture having the characteristics identified above. If we can configure a force clearly capable of conducting a nuclear defense of NATO's borders for as long as the Warsaw Pact

forces can mount an invasion attempt, we will have removed the one Warsaw Pact option most dangerous to Europe's future, namely, the extension of Soviet hegemony over the entire continent. Of course, it must be reiterated that the Soviet Union can maintain indefinitely the capability to destroy Europe.

We recognize that the task is most difficult. It prompts a quotation from *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783*, by Alfred Thayer Mahan:

The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the methods of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage—a lesson in itself of no mean value.

FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION

We have searched for a new configuration for a NATO defensive force. This force, hypothetical at present, would derive its credibility from a manifest capability (lacking in the present force) to deny success to any Warsaw Pact attempt to seize NATO territory. In the preceding sections, we identified what might be regarded as a set of conditions to be satisfied by such a force. We then derived the general characteristics of the military posture NATO should assume in preserving its territorial integrity. What remains to be done to lend form and substance to this concept is outlined as follows:

(1) Development of alternative force structures, each conforming to the new posture. These will be designed specifically to engage in defensive nuclear operations. They will include an evident capability for accurate, responsive, low-yield nuclear weapon delivery. Battlefield survivability will also be a prominent characteristic. The design of such forces is an appropriate task for military agencies already engaged in configuring force structures

to support national objectives. It can also be addressed usefully by others having a special interest and knowledge.

(2) Extension of the methodology for evaluating force structures to permit the selection of optimal forces for the nuclear battlefield, subject to appropriate constraints. Provisions for objective testing would include: (a) Scrutiny equaling that accorded in the cost-effectiveness analyses to which force proposals are now subjected. Among the tests to be applied should be one for compatibility with the factors we have set forth, arranged in some order of priority. In this way, appropriate trade-offs can be identified. (b) Field exercises to evaluate organizations, doctrine and tactics successively in the U.S. military CONUS base, in the U.S. NATO component, and in NATO as a whole.

(3) Review of the present force to identify elements that could be used in configuring the kind of defensive capability we are seeking. Those weapons and delivery systems capable of engaging battlefield targets with appropriate (no larger than necessary) yields and at appropriate distances would have obvious utility. Similarly, some conventional elements of the force would have relevant tasks in the nuclear environment. The review should assess realistically the capability of the present force to conduct nuclear defense. In particular, the analysis should proceed without the complications arising from consideration of an initial conventional phase of battle and the attendant difficulties of a transition to the nuclear phase.

The essence of our proposal is the substitution of an effective forward defense for a NATO force which, if attacked, would today pin all its hopes on a questionable ability to counterattack after trading space for time until mobilization could be realized. Hovering in the background in this unlikely scenario are panoplies of nuclear power possessed by both sides. For too long we have depended on U.S. strategic power based in this country and around the world to frustrate Soviet expansionism. It is increasingly evident that those forces are mutually deterred by similar Soviet capabilities, so that neither can be used in times of crisis. For either nation to seek the attainment of any political objective at the risk of destroying both is nearly inconceivable. For either to declare that it would do so seems naive.

The matter of greatest priority to the U.S. national security interest, short of survival itself, is the preservation of a healthy NATO Europe sharing its essential goals with America. We urgently need decisions at the highest political level to direct the

configuration of a military force which can indefinitely maintain an effective defense against encroachments of NATO territory. Further, that force must be releasable by an American President, mindful of the risks of escalation. If those decisions are not forthcoming, present pressures to reduce forces will lead to further diminution of an already inadequate defensive strength. Should the decisions we advocate be made soon, however, U.S. force reductions can be implemented without disturbing the present shaky military equilibrium in Europe. Most important, our NATO allies will acquire a renewed confidence in the efficacy of NATO's defenses.

The following reading addresses the question of whether NATO is the best instrument to insure America's and Europe's interests.

AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE 1970'S: INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION?

by Simon Serfaty

IN 1965 Dr. Henry Kissinger wrote: "The most constructive American foreign policy since the end of World War II has been the development of Atlantic relationships." Yet, he went on, the promises stemming from such a policy were "flawed by increasingly sharp disputes among the Allies." As America dealt with these disputes, Kissinger warned, it would have to avoid the "danger of becoming mired by the prudent, the tactical or the expedient" and, in the process, "[confusing] creativity with a projection of the present into the future."¹ Shortly afterward, the coming of a new era of "genuine partnership" in American-European relations was heralded in the first Presidential State of the World message.

Significantly, this "genuine partnership" was not expected to extend to such key areas as the preservation of a nuclear deterrent and the maintenance of a balance of conventional power. There, the uniqueness of America's contribution was still accepted as a self-evident feature of the "new" relationship. But these were precisely the unresolved issues of the 1960's: instead of discussing situations in which there might be real differences of assessment, and even differences of interests among the allies, the Nixon Administration continued to assume that such differences would be muted by the same dominant set of vital and mutual interests that had linked America and Europe since World War II. In doing so, it adopted, in Hans Morgenthau's words, "the solution of business as usual, of the continuation of institutional arrangements and procedural routines."² Such a solution, it will be argued here, is no solution at all, as it fails to deal with the changing realities of America's and Europe's security requirements and interests.

Admittedly, the area of permissible changes cannot be defined and constricted by the dominant power only. It is also sharply defined by the less powerful states whose ambitions and fears cause

¹Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 4-5, 248-249.

²Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 5-6.

them to vacillate between a desire for change and a need for security. Obviously, changes in the status quo bring about new situations in which security tends to fluctuate depending on developments that are not easy to predict. Thus, what makes the security of Europe relatively stable is an implicit recognition of the status quo. Yet it is precisely because of this resulting sense of security that the status quo is being challenged, thereby releasing, however timidly, forces for change that may themselves lead to security problems. This is what Pierre Hassner has called the paradox of self-denying security, whereby the main threat to security is to take it too easily for granted.⁸

Such paradoxes abound, and we now see nations which seek security even though they already have it, nations which gain insecurity as they gain power, and nations which advocate change in the name of status quo (and vice versa). West Germany, for example, advocates change in at least three major areas of German interests: frontiers (for purposes of reunification), alliances (to pull East Germany out of the Warsaw Pact), and status (for regaining an international equality still denied to her). Yet, West Germany can succeed in her revisionist endeavor only to the extent that she accepts the status quo; too much revisionist *élan* might bring about a reaction from foes and friends alike. Hence, the paradox of a West German state which seeks revisionist objectives and advocates a status quo policy.

China is another state whose revisionist ambitions (vis-à-vis frontiers, her military encirclement, and her international status) can be expressed only within a framework that recognizes the legitimacy of the status quo. China must speak both a language of power which she does not have and a language of harmony which she does not want. Neither language can be expected to improve substantially with time. To other nations, harmony implies status quo; to China, harmony requires change. To force change, China must display her power. Today her power stems essentially from her ability to bridge the technological gap with human masses; however effective in the short term, this is in the long term a most fragile bridge. But as this technological gap is filled more substantially, China's deterrent posture may become even weaker as, during the process of industrialization, she becomes increasingly sensitive to a nuclear attack that would today be relatively harmless.

⁸Pierre Hassner, *Change and Security in Europe: I, The Background* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 45, February 1968).

Standing on the verge of a "new era," the United States registers the departure of old fears but somehow fails to record the arrival of new realities. Thus, we periodically dismiss the threat of Soviet military aggression in Western Europe as unlikely. President Kennedy noticed it as early as 1963 when he told Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, "the whole debate about an atomic force in Europe is really useless, because Berlin is secure and Europe as a whole is well protected. What really matters at this point is the rest of the world."⁴ Yet we still hold on to the notion that such aggression, regardless of Soviet intentions, is being deterred primarily by the Atlantic Alliance and the troops stationed in the area. This may represent another form of self-denying security — a self-induced insecurity whose main source is a stubborn refusal to recognize security where it presently exists.

Nearly everyone would agree with President Nixon's assertion that we are deep into the age of conciliation, but most would also agree that the tools of coercion must still be preserved, almost untouched. Senator Mansfield, for example, is in favor of a troop withdrawal from Western Europe; yet, even though he has been raising this issue for the past twelve years, the Senator from Montana remains remarkably patient and defensive about his request. He would not go so far as to recommend a full withdrawal. "I am not advocating," he emphasizes, "and I have not advocated that all U.S. troops be removed from Europe."⁵ At most, the debate is over numbers. The principle of a considerable military presence in Western Europe is not at stake: "A U.S. presence should remain," but it should be a "smaller" one. Why? Because today, as before, "our vital interest in what transpires in Europe remains. In this day and age," continues Mansfield, "an armed attack on Western Europe will certainly involve us almost from the start."

But would it? The answer appears to be so self-evident that it is usually not necessary to go beyond Secretary Rogers' laconic assertion in March 1972: "... we must not forget for a moment that Western Europe's security is indivisible from our own."⁶ How can one forget it when it is repeated so frequently by foreign policy critics and apologists alike? Yet, it would be helpful, as a reflection of the undisputed transformation of America's and Europe's physical and economic interests, to examine more critically this

⁴Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 872.

⁵*Congressional Record*, January 24, 1970, p. S496.

⁶*United States Foreign Policy, 1971: A Report of the Secretary of State* (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. viii.

notion of Atlantic inseparability and, in the process, raise the question whether in the 1970's the Atlantic Alliance will remain the instrument best qualified to safeguard America's and Europe's interests.

STRATEGIC REALITIES: THE LIMITS OF ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

Since 1949 it has been argued that the Atlantic Alliance is essential to the Western effort to deter the Soviet Union from, at worst, militarily invading Western Europe, and, at least, extending its influence to the point of totally excluding the United States from Europe. Concurrently, a secondary, and understandably less publicized, objective of the alliance has been that of containing Germany from within by serving as a safeguard against a revival of German militarism. Nations on both sides of the ocean had a stake in Atlantic cooperation. The case made in 1949 continues to be argued today: There can be no security for America if there is no security for Europe, because Europe's industrial base, population and institutions remain essential to the physical security and economic and spiritual health of America.

This security equation prevailed even though the perception of the Soviet threat differed among the members of the alliance. Strongest concern was felt in the United States and West Germany; the weakest was usually found in France and even in Great Britain. To the French, Atlantic integration, like European integration, was accepted reluctantly as a means toward other ends, including the securing of American assistance (not just military but also, and perhaps above all, economic and political) and the containment of Germany. In Britain, perception of the Soviet threat increased in the aftermath of World War II because of imperial rather than national considerations.

In the United States, the Soviet threat peaked in the summer of 1950 when, rightly or wrongly, the invasion of Korea was seen as the prelude to a large-scale invasion of Western Europe. "From now on," emphasized Secretary Dean Acheson at the time, "it is action which counts and not further resolutions or further plans or further meetings."⁷ Thus, the misgivings of the other allies were put aside, and Washington's view of the Soviet threat became the basis on which the military integration of the Atlantic area was undertaken.

⁷News conference of December 22, 1950. *Department of State Bulletin*, January 2, 1950, p. 3.

A more limited perception of the Soviet threat emerged in Western Europe in the early 1960's. Especially in Gaullist rhetoric, the "decline" of this threat was explained in terms of Western Europe's political and economic recovery; the displacement of the focal point of superpower confrontation away from Europe and toward such peripheral areas as Southeast Asia and the Middle East; and, in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the military ascendancy of the United States. Even the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia failed to revive significantly East-West tensions in Europe.

Throughout this period, however, Washington continued to reason that, despite the waning of the Soviet military threat and the Kremlin's willingness to discuss the specific modalities of the resulting stalemate, it was more urgent than ever to preserve the cohesion of the alliance — especially at a time when serious negotiations were about to begin. There was concern that détente was a policy of deception, representing no more than Moscow's application of the old technique of dividing to conquer. Obviously, discord within the Atlantic Alliance would create opportunities that Soviet diplomacy might be able to exploit for political advantage. By abandoning their threatening posture the Soviets could exploit such discord and achieve peacefully what their hostile behavior had failed to secure. This was in essence Washington's answer to those who, in pre-Viet Nam days, were already forecasting the end of alliances.

The case for the alliance rested then — and it still rests today — on two assumptions: first, despite détente, Moscow's ultimate objective remains the control of the rest of Europe; and second, despite its recovery, Western Europe remains impotent in the face of a Soviet attempt at communization. Even if these two assumptions are correct, we would still have to measure the contribution of the alliance toward making up for Europe's lack of power and containing Moscow's persistent ambitions. A key factor is said to be the 310,000 American troops stationed in the area, which, it is argued, play the same essential roles as they did throughout the 1950's. On the one hand, they symbolically assure the Europeans (and the Soviets) that should a war break out in Europe, America will be involved from the start of hostilities. On the other hand, these troops reinforce Europe's nonnuclear capabilities, thereby fulfilling two related objectives: preventing a conventional *fait accompli* and raising the nuclear threshold.

There is no need here to discuss whether such assurances were

ever needed or whether such objectives were ever realistic. Assuming that they were, one may still question whether it remains necessary for the United States to station troops in Europe in order to assure Europe of its good faith and the USSR of its commitment. Even if hostages continue to be required, can they not be found in the tens of thousands of tourists and other American citizens who are in Europe at any time of the year, or in the billions of dollars America has invested in Western Europe over the past twenty years? And if a tripwire is needed, is it America's role to provide it? Conventional forces in Europe are not expected to fight a nonnuclear war; they are expected merely to contain a potential aggressor for a limited amount of time. Cannot the Europeans themselves fulfill this minimal objective? With regular armed forces equal to approximately half of the Soviet forces and military expenditures equal to about half of the Soviet expenditures, a "Europe" limited to its four major states (France, Great Britain, Italy and West Germany) already has the required means. All that it lacks, apparently, is the will. But then, why would it be willing to assume the burden of conventional defense (which it does not believe in anyway) as long as Washington, its bitter complaining notwithstanding, agrees to assume such a burden itself?

What is surprising about such questions is that, although raised frequently over many years, they continue to be dismissed by a majority of policymakers and analysts. The formula for defending Europe has worked up to now, it is argued, why change it? Fear of the future appears to be based on the unshakable premise that an American withdrawal from Western Europe cannot be considered, let alone implemented, without jeopardizing America's and Europe's security and other vital interests. In view of the vast international changes that have taken place during the past ten years, the persuasiveness of such a premise appears today to be much weaker.

The end of America's nuclear monopoly, followed by the end of its nuclear supremacy, and combined with successive technological revolutions in nuclear weaponry and means of delivery, have modified the security relationship between America and Europe. It was possible for Europe to rely on America's nuclear arsenal as an instrument of policy as long as America's superiority in such weapons was unchallenged. But when this advantage receded and America's threat of retaliation was balanced with a Soviet counter-threat, both Europe and America asked whether any nation

should risk destruction for the sake of another nation. Even assuming that America was willing to risk its cities for the defense of European cities, would such a commitment be credible to partners *and* potential enemies? Thus, the question is no longer whether the alliance is necessary; it is also whether what might make the alliance necessary also makes it desirable and credible.

The uncertainty of America's guarantee may actually contribute to Europe's security. Moscow does not have to be sure of America's retaliation to be deterred; all that it needs is to be in doubt. To this extent, de Gaulle's former complaint about such uncertainty reflects, paradoxically, the very reason why deterrence works.⁸

In a general vein, alliances in the nuclear age go in contradictory directions. National commitments, if they are to be credible, must be made within a more "integrated" framework, that is to say, a framework that automates the implementation of the commitment. In Thomas Schelling's words, this is being "rationally irrational": an irrational policy that calls for the potential destruction of one's national self in defense of another is made rational if alternatives to the irrational option are simply preempted, for example, by making nuclear retaliation against an aggressor automatic, through one device or another. At the same time, alliances tend to be disintegrative precisely because of the practical irrationality of the commitment; nuclear or otherwise, war is divisible in the nuclear age because destruction might otherwise be indivisible. A nation is not going to commit itself to destruction merely so that another nation may live. To argue differently may be neither credible nor desirable to potential victims or potential aggressors.

This dilemma — imperial convictions versus national responsibilities — is especially acute in the case of the Atlantic Alliance, where the security gap is widened even farther by conflicting defense requirements. Throughout the past few years many in Europe have argued that toughening the terms of deterrence through a strategy of massive retaliation would increase the security of Europe by decreasing the likelihood of war. Yet, such reasoning implies that the irrational is rationalized into a national policy; what is desired is to paralyze the other side with fear. It is

⁸"No one in the world," noted de Gaulle on May 15, 1962, "particularly no one in America can say if, or where, or when, or how, or to what extent American nuclear weapons would be used to defend Europe." This is true, of course: no one can say, especially no one in the Soviet Union.

then assumed that a rationally irrational policy will not be met with a similar dose of irrationality. But what if irrationality prevails on the other side as well? In other words, what if deterrence fails? Can the question of defense still remain a collective question, or should it become, instead, everyone for himself? To make deterrence possible, Washington must pledge its national body to the nuclear defense of Western Europe. But to make defense possible, Western Europe may have to give its continental body so that America may survive a nonnuclear war. What is rational on one side of the Atlantic may be irrational on the other.

Although it stressed deterrence, massive retaliation was a policy of minimum deterrence calling for minimum involvement in world affairs, because the situations where the use of such retaliation would be acceptable and credible were by definition severely limited.⁹ On the other hand, even though it stresses defense, flexible response is a policy of maximum deterrence because making retaliation as minimal as possible permits maximum involvement in international crises. The fact that the European allies have been generally disturbed by flexible response is not surprising as it reflects a real deterrence gap between America and Europe. Obviously, what seems controlled on one side of the Atlantic does not look quite the same on the other side. Conventional or nuclear, a war waged in Europe will be limited only from a non-European viewpoint.

Is there any American (or European) strategy that will ever gain Europe's (or America's) favor? If the Soviet Union's capabilities are overlooked and the devastating nature of a thermonuclear war is ignored, Europeans may regard the military status quo as satisfactory and decrease their defense expenditures. Conversely, if Soviet capabilities are "realistically" estimated and the horrors of nuclear war correspondingly emphasized, Europeans may feel constrained to develop their own nuclear forces to ensure a security for which, they may think, America will not fight. Since Soviet conventional (nonnuclear) capabilities are conceded to be large, Europeans argue that their contribution in the field of conventional weapons is not adequate to shift the balance. Were Soviet capabilities thought to be small, Europeans might argue that any contribution of theirs was unnecessary. In the 1950's, Europe found massive retaliation highly dangerous because it implied the escalation of any armed confrontation in

⁹Much of this discussion is adapted from my *The Elusive Enemy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), pp. 136-142.

Europe into total nuclear war. In the 1960's, Europe found flexible response no less dangerous because it might encourage Soviet aggression in Western Europe — through the implied reduction in the scope of U.S. retaliation and hence a decrease in its threat value. Europeans, who charge both Moscow and Washington with the intention of confining a war over Europe to Europe, would prefer to see the war confined to American and Soviet territories.

In the age of flexible response, the European allies in effect complained that the United States had achieved additional security at the expense of Western Europe. Yet the inescapable fact is that, regardless of U.S. strategy, Western Europe remains more insecure than America by definition — the obvious implication of its geographical location. Situated between both superpowers, Europe holds the same position as Poland held in the past, located between two of the great powers of the time, Prussia and Russia. Ultimately, a war between the superpowers could remain "limited" to Europe while their own territory would be totally spared, and the only balance America can restore between itself and Europe is a balance of *insecurity*.

"Who can say," asked de Gaulle at his apocalyptic best, "that if the occasion arises . . . [the Soviet Union and the United States] while each deciding not to launch its missiles at the main enemy so that it should itself be spared, will not crush the others? It is possible to imagine that in some awful day Western Europe [would] be wiped out from Moscow and Central Europe from Washington."¹⁰ No one can say, to be sure. Yet Western Europe's reluctance to be wiped out from Moscow, possibly for the sake of Washington, can only be matched by Washington's reluctance to be wiped out from Moscow, possibly for the sake of Western Europe. Herein lie the limits of Atlantic integration.

OTHER REALITIES: THE LIMITS OF ATLANTIC DISINTEGRATION

The ineluctable fact is that there exists a security gap between the United States and Europe. The search for security within the Atlantic Alliance is being transformed into a zero-sum game wherein America's security is sought, in part at least, at the expense of its European allies, and vice versa. In other words, while both sides can do much damage to one another (either Europe or America can force the other into a war it did not want for the sake of interests it did not share), it still remains to be seen whether

¹⁰De Gaulle's news conference of November 10, 1962.

either side can do much to enhance its partner's security and other interests. Is Western Europe indispensable to America's security? Or to put it differently, in the most extreme case of one state gaining imperial control of Europe, would America's physical security be directly threatened?

The only current threat to a European balance of power is obviously raised by the Soviet Union. Any threat to such a balance that would not come from Moscow would undoubtedly be contained by Moscow itself. Thus, what Washington is concerned with is Soviet control of the European continent. Yet one is tempted to ask, "So what?" Deterrence is not based on resources only, though clearly Soviet control of Western Europe's resources would greatly enhance Soviet capabilities.¹¹ Deterrence is based on the ability to retaliate and destroy. Soviet control of Western Europe would affect America's physical security only to the extent that it would reduce America's retaliatory capability. Such a situation is not an easy one to foresee. It might be speculated that Moscow would use the resources found in Western Europe to accelerate the arms race until America is reduced to economic exhaustion. Yet, even a comparison of U.S. economic resources with those of a joint Europe-Soviet condominium leaves the outcome of such a race in doubt.

The above assumes both Moscow's desire to overrun Western Europe and the latter's impotence in the face of it. Granting Moscow's desire, it is the latter assumption that is said to make the Atlantic Alliance necessary. All technicalities aside, this notion of West European impotence is surprising, given Western Europe's capabilities, real and potential. Indeed, America's protection of such a powerful group of states is without precedent in history. Does U.S. policy in Europe today aim at containing the Soviet Union or Western Europe — or even both? Could not deterrence of the perceived Soviet threat be achieved more effectively on a nuclear and regional basis? Clearly, the Europeans have the resources — human, financial and technological — to attain a credible level of deterrence (which is not to say, of course, that they could attain a level of nuclear parity with the superpowers).

On the face of it, the key problem is said to be one of political organization. But an effective West European nuclear deterrent does not require the political integration of Europe. At most it

¹¹For a refreshing and stimulating analysis of the requirements of America's physical security, see Robert W. Tucker, *A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?* (New York: Universe Books, 1972).

assumes a coordination of national nuclear strategies, a coordination justified by the assertion that in the nuclear age a war in Europe cannot be limited to any one state but is likely to spread to all key European states. The point is that if France or Great Britain can deter the Soviet Union, either separately or in common, it follows that Europe can deter the Soviet Union. A Soviet invasion of Germany, for example, in face of the threat of a substantial French and British retaliation, as well as a possible U.S. retaliation, makes sense only in the case of a major threat raised by West Germany against Soviet interests — in which case it is likely that Moscow would not be the only party interested in pre-empting the FRG.

America might in the near future quietly invite the Europeans — on a national or regional basis — to replace American leadership in the task of containing the Soviet Union. To gain time, Washington might even grant the Europeans the technical assistance in nuclear weaponry that it gave London but denied Paris. To be sure, nuclear proliferation would take place in the process, not only in Western Europe but possibly in other areas of the world. What is less sure is whether nuclear proliferation is automatically harmful to U.S. interests. The self-evident assumptions here are twofold. First, nuclear proliferation increases the risks of nuclear war. Second, in any nuclear war the United States will be an active participant and, hence, its security will be endangered. The first of these assumptions is probably true — not because the prudence and rationality of the nuclear states are in doubt, but because the risks of irrationality and accidental wars are quantitatively increased through proliferation. The latter assumption is based on the more dubious notion that a nuclear peace is indivisible; this notion was rejected above, as it was suggested instead that a nuclear peace may prove at least divisible along narrowly defined regional lines.

A militarily independent Western Europe, it will be argued, might seek economic independence as well and erode America's economic interests on the continent. Two assumptions underline these fears. First, it is implicitly suggested that military and economic links go hand in hand; therefore, as the U.S. military presence in Western Europe is rolled back, so is America's economic presence. There is little logic in this argument. The rollback of America's economic empire can be expected to take place regardless of the evolution of its overall foreign policy. The question is not whether it will occur but how far it will go.

The second assumption is that Western Europe's political and military dependence on America is the safest guarantee against excessive economic nationalism in Europe. This is doubtful. In the realm of trade, for example, America's best guarantee is less geared to Europe's security requirements than it is to Europe's economic requirements. Of course, the American economy would suffer should international trade decrease. But America's partners might suffer even more. Consider the following figures: In 1970, the value of U.S. international trade equaled 8.4 per cent of its gross national product. But foreign trade accounted for 33.7 per cent in Great Britain, 23.1 per cent (1969) for France, 34.3 per cent for West Germany, and 29.3 per cent (1969) for Italy. For the EEC as a whole it was 35.3 per cent. For exports only, these figures were 4.3 per cent for the United States, as compared with 15.8 per cent, 10.7 per cent (1969), 20.7 per cent, and 14.2 per cent (1969), for Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, respectively.

The extent of economic interdependence between Western Europe and the United States is even greater if we consider their export relationships. In relation to its total exports, the percentage of American exports to Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy was 5.9, 3.4, 6.3 and 3.1, respectively. In turn, in relation to their total exports, the percentages of the four states' exports to the United States were 11.5, 5.3, 9.1 and 10.2, respectively. Notice that the dissymmetry of such interdependence grew in the 1960's despite the emergence (and alleged related independence) of Western Europe as a bloc.

The point is fairly obvious. It has been made before, and it has been ignored before: An American military withdrawal from Western Europe does not need to be accompanied by an economic withdrawal. This is so because it is not in America's interest to end such a relationship, and perhaps even less in the interest of Western Europe to end it. This reasoning holds true even in the farfetched case of a Soviet-dominated Western Europe. If nowhere else, it is in the consideration of such economic factors that the limits of Atlantic disintegration lie.

A NONALIGNED EUROPE?

Ambiguity is the main characteristic of a period of transition. The 1970's can be expected to be a period of transition as the structure of a new multipolar system slowly takes shape. Yet certain patterns seem predictable. In the years to come, both halves of Europe will be moving away from the formerly hegemonial states.

To be sure, they will do so in a dissymmetrical fashion, slower in the East, faster in the West. But neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can now maintain the same control they exerted during the era of tight bipolar confrontation. With particular reference to America, this situation is heartening since it indicates that, in part at least, America's post-World War II policy toward Europe has succeeded. Nevertheless, we must assure that this process of de-Americanization of Western Europe unfolds primarily with, rather than against, the United States.

As detachment takes place, several disquieting situations may emerge in Europe, all of which, however threatening they may appear to be to American interests, are matters best left to the West Europeans to cope with alone: a *relance communiste* in several West European states, particularly in Italy and perhaps in France; a renewed wave of anti-Americanism directed against American investments in Europe; increasing flirtation between Western and Eastern Europe, even as Eastern Europe remains under Soviet "protection"; and finally, an even closer West European rapprochement with the Soviet Union independent of American participation.

Western Europe itself can go in many directions, between the two extremes of supranational integration and national disintegration. These extremes are themselves highly unlikely. Since the days when the perception of Soviet imperialism combined with a fear of German militarism to give birth to Pleven's call for a united European army, the prospects for Europe's political unification have been slim, notwithstanding predictions to the contrary — predictions that emanated primarily from the American side of the Atlantic. Nor is a dismemberment of existing institutions likely. All ten states have too much to lose from such a breakdown now that they have surmounted the many obstacles that stood in the way of economic integration throughout the 1960's. The outlook for Western Europe is probably the status quo, plus some further economic integration.

A Europe that clings to the status quo cannot expect to be taken seriously as a global power. To assume that in the 1970's European statesmen will pursue in concert a global and far-reaching foreign policy is unrealistic. They have neither the power nor the interest to do so. Western Europe is more likely to practice increased political nonalignment — not to be confused with international abstentionism. In certain areas West European states, alone or as a group, may, in Anthony Hartley's words, "play the honest broker

or the candid friend — both of them ungrateful enough roles to be undertaken with considerable caution.”¹²

However attractive they might be, nuclear weapons would not be essential to the defense of Western Europe and its nonalignment policy. From a European viewpoint, the states with imperial designs over Europe clearly stalemate one another. In case of confrontation between the two superstates, it is highly doubtful that Europe would be spared or that Europe's contribution would be considerable. If Western Europe was to opt for nuclear status, there would still be little room left for defense once and if deterrence failed. A nonaligned Western Europe, nuclear or not, could still have close relationships with the two island powers (the United States and Japan) as well as with the two land powers (the Soviet Union and China) and Eastern Europe, too. The advantages of nonalignment, from a European viewpoint, would be manifold. Remaining disengaged from international ideological contests might prove to be a valuable aid in promoting domestic unity; internal support for nonalignment would be strengthened by the economic gains resulting from reduced defense spending; and European economic influence — free of political ambitions — would be more readily acceptable abroad, especially in Third World countries.

The withdrawal of American troops and a serious reappraisal by the Atlantic Alliance of its goals would increase the likelihood that a nonaligned Europe would emerge. Western Europe would not be left at the mercy of Soviet power, for the Kremlin's intentions would still be shaped by its perception of American intentions. A U.S. withdrawal would not mean that, when the chips are down, America would find it impossible to return. What has been argued is that the alliance itself adds little to Western Europe's security. What has also been argued is that in terms of its physical security and economic interests, the United States could indeed afford not to return. Implicit in this argument is a certain trust in Soviet intentions. Yet, this trust need not be a matter of conviction alone. A withdrawal of American power from Europe would not lessen the potential of U.S. retaliatory power. The credibility of America's willingness to retaliate might be weakened, but not to the point of incredibility — at least not significantly closer to this point than it is today.

¹²Anthony Hartley, *Western Europe in the 1970s: Possible Roles. Part One: Europe and America in the 1970s* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 70, November 1970), pp. 24-31.

Whether or not this de-Atlanticized Western Europe chooses to go nuclear, or whether it moves closer toward supranational integration, are questions to be left to the Europeans. America's rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in Europe are taking place in spite of the Atlantic Alliance, not because of it. It is time to cope with the realities of the 1970's and to encourage the evolution of new relationships, not because the old ones have failed but because their very success has finally made it possible to discard them.

CHAPTER 4

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE WARSAW PACT

Section I. Today and the Future: One Reading

The Warsaw Pact Today

MALCOLM MACKINTOSH

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The Warsaw Pact came into being in May 1955, at a time when NATO and Western defence organizations were developing into an effective counter to the tremendous military power which the Soviet Union deployed in Europe, and when the Soviet military system was itself emerging from the stagnation of the Stalin era. Officially the Pact was supposed to be 'NATO's opposite number', and almost at once the Soviet Union offered to disband it in return for the abolition of NATO. Some attempt was made to give it external similarities to NATO – for example, a Commander-in-Chief (drawn from the strongest power) and a Secretary-General were appointed, and a Political Consultative Committee set up – but here the similarities ended (as we shall see later). At its foundation the Warsaw Pact provided the Soviet Union with three advantages: politically it represented an organization for transmitting Soviet foreign and military policy requirements to the East European countries, in international and propaganda terms its abolition was offered as a *quid pro quo* for the disbandment of NATO, and militarily it created an organization through which the Soviet High Command could bring order out of the confusion of the Stalinist armies (with their Soviet officers disguised as East Europeans and their outdated strategic and tactical doctrines) and rationalize the use of East European military manpower.

As far as we have been able to tell, the military headquarters of the Warsaw Pact has been located in the Soviet Ministry of Defence in Moscow since its foundation in 1955. From 1955 to 1969 its Political Committee met only rarely, and then mainly to echo Soviet decisions on foreign policy. The Pact has never 'hammered out' a common foreign or defence policy, as NATO does. From 1961 onwards the Pact organized a series of multi-national military exercises, many of which were well-publicized (for instance, *October Storm* in 1965, *Vltava* in

1966, *Vesna 1969*, etc.), most of them amounting in practice to large-scale politico-military demonstrations emphasizing the enthusiasm, inter-alliance solidarity and friendship of the component national armies.

However, it was the unsatisfactory nature of this aspect of the alliance which caused the Soviet Union most trouble. In 1956 Hungary, under a revolutionary government, tried to resign from the Pact and had to be invaded and re-conquered by the Soviet Army. Albania effectively ceased to be a member from 1961 (she formally resigned in 1968), and from 1964 onwards Rumania adopted independent foreign and military policies which included a refusal to hold multinational exercises on her territory. Even the Czechoslovak press criticized the alliance as early as 1966.¹ But it was the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, and the subsequent Soviet invasion, which caused the Soviet Union to re-think some of her policies towards the Warsaw Pact – and also gave us the most important piece of contemporary evidence about the Pact's military role.

During the early stages of the Soviet military build-up round the Czechoslovak frontiers, from May to July 1968, the Warsaw Pact HQ was in control of all military movements, and in June it also conducted inside Czechoslovakia an exercise – or reconnaissance in force – known as *Exercise Sumava*. When the build-up was complete, in early August, Marshal Yakubovski (the Pact C-in-C) and his staff handed over command of the multinational invasion force to a forward HQ of the Soviet High Command under General Pavlovski, C-in-C of the Soviet Ground Forces. This strongly suggests that the Warsaw Pact is not intended to be a wartime or operational command-and-control headquarters. In the Czechoslovak crisis it acted much more like an administrative, politico-military authority, designed to organize and co-ordinate the activities of the armed forces of six very different East

Malcolm Mackintosh is Consultant on Soviet Policy to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

¹ O. Mahler and L. Kopecky in *Mezinárodní Politika* (Prague), July 1966.

European countries in the most rational way in the interests of Soviet defence policy and strategy. On the basis of the Czechoslovak evidence, command in wartime would almost certainly be assumed directly by the Soviet Supreme Headquarters, to which all Soviet and East European forces would be subordinated.

The Budapest Reforms of 1969

Once the Czechoslovak crisis had been settled, through the occupation of the country by Soviet, Polish, Hungarian and Bulgarian troops (five Soviet divisions remain in garrison there today), the Soviet leaders got down to the task of reorganizing the Pact in order to try to eliminate some of the national resentments which had obviously contributed to its turbulent history since its foundation. It is interesting to note that after the crisis some East Europeans were even allowed to criticize the Pact's organization in retrospect: a Hungarian journal, for example, wrote in September 1970 that 'in recent years the highest military authority of the Pact had not worked as smoothly as it ought to have done, because of faults in the chain of command and in the work of the military staffs and the member countries' liaison officers'.² It is also noteworthy that the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Budapest on 26 March 1969, which authorized the reorganization of the Pact's structure, lasted for only 2 hours – presumably all the hard preparatory work had already been done in Moscow.

Under the terms of the reorganization the Soviet C-in-C, Marshal Yakubovski (who remained a First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Soviet Union), was provided with two multinational committees to advise him.³ The senior of the two is the Committee of National Defence Ministers, composed, as its name indicates, of the Ministers of Defence of each member country. It meets at irregular intervals to review and approve the decisions taken by the other, much more substantive, body: the Military Council.

The Military Council is the major innovation of the 1969 reforms. It appears to be modelled on

the Military Councils which exist at high level throughout the Soviet armed forces to control the activities of arms of service, military districts (or groups of forces) and fleets. A Soviet Military Council is chaired by the commander of the formation or HQ, and includes most of its senior officers and at least one political officer (in territorial commands within the Soviet Union it includes civilian Party Secretaries: e.g. the council for the Moscow Military District includes a Moscow Party Secretary). The chairman of the Warsaw Pact Military Council is Marshal Yakubovski, and the members include the Deputy C-in-C (Engineer Lieutenant-General Stepanyuk), the Chief-of-Staff (General Shtemenko), probably the Inspector-General (Lieutenant-General Pastushenko) and a senior Soviet political officer (Lieutenant-General Truzhennikov) – all Soviet officers. The Council also includes a military representative of Lieutenant-General or Vice-Admiral rank from each of the East European armed forces; this means that the East European countries now have greater access to discussion of Warsaw Pact policy (if not decision-making) than ever before. In Soviet terms the creation of the Military Council probably represents a significant concession to its allies and, for the East Europeans, an improvement over the situation which existed before 1968.

Working directly under the C-in-C is the Warsaw Pact Staff, known officially as the 'Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty States'. The Chief-of-Staff (General Shtemenko) and his First Deputy (Lieutenant-General Pashuk) are both Soviet officers, but each of the member countries provides the Pact with a Deputy Chief-of-Staff of Major-General or Rear-Admiral rank. Recent Soviet and East European press articles have provided the names of the Bulgarian General Krustev, the Polish Admiral Studzynski, the East German General Lange, the Rumanian General Trutsa and the Hungarian General Sziladi as Staff representatives; there is also a Soviet political officer, Colonel Bychkov, attached. Very little is known about the Staff's structure, but it is clear from an article by the Pact's Deputy C-in-C in the Soviet military press⁴ that it is responsible for preparing and supervising training schedules, co-ordinating the conduct of military exercises

² *English Bulletin* (Budapest), vol. IX, no. 38.

³ Since 1967 command of the Warsaw Pact has been a full-time job, and Yakubovski has no other responsibilities within the Soviet armed forces, unlike his predecessors Marshals Grechko and Konev.

⁴ *Red Star*, 14 May 1972.

and war games, and for the standardization of weapons and equipment. (The importance of the last function is underlined by the fact that the Deputy C-in-C is an Engineer General with a background in the armaments field.) A Hungarian article has also stated that in 1969 a new body for co-ordinating the use of military technology was established at HQ, probably in the Staff.⁵

It seems likely that the Staff also controls the Soviet Military Liaison Missions which are attached to each national Ministry of Defence. Each mission is headed by a two- or three-star General with a considerable staff, on which the Soviet Army, Navy and Air Force are normally represented. The heads of these missions are named from time to time in the Soviet and East European press, and their responsibilities appear to be liaison, supervision and co-ordination. Although they obviously have great influence over the national armies, there is no indication that any of them have command functions, and the majority are in the older age groups – one is known to be approaching 70 and others have held very senior posts in the Soviet Defence Ministry. There is no evidence that the East European allies have similar missions in Moscow, so this is probably a one-way traffic.

Two main points seem to stand out about the organization of the Warsaw Pact. First of all, there is no indication that the HQ or the Staff has any operations, signals, transportation or supply services which would enable it to function as an independent HQ in wartime. Indeed, we know from press material covering the big exercises in Poland, East Germany and Hungary immediately before the invasion of Czechoslovakia that the multinational force was supported logistically by the supply, communications and transport elements of the Soviet Ministry of Defence.⁶ Secondly, there appears to be no integral element in the Warsaw Pact HQ responsible for air defence. The reason seems to be that the Soviet Air Defence Command, under Marshal Batitski, has overall responsibility for the air defence not only of the Soviet Union but also of the East European countries. Articles in the Soviet press by a senior Soviet Air Defence Commander, General Podgorny, suggest that

he is the Deputy C-in-C of the Soviet Homeland Air Defence Command for the East European area. If so, this implies that air defence also falls outside Marshal Yakubovski's responsibilities, and that the Soviet Union's air defence 'frontier' in the West lies along the western borders of the East European members of the Pact, each country being, in effect, an air defence district.

The Warsaw Pact Today

If this evidence is correct, we have a picture of the Warsaw Pact today as fundamentally a peace-time administrative and co-ordinating body, designed to organize to the best advantage of the Soviet Union the military effectives and resources of the East European countries. It is, as it were, a kind of multinational 'War Office' grafted on to the Soviet Defence Ministry.

The Political Consultative Committee, composed of the most senior Soviet and East European Party and Government leaders, meets once a year to co-ordinate foreign policy views, one of its most important functions being to publicize East European support for Soviet views and policies in foreign affairs – as can be seen in the current CSCE and MFR negotiations, as well as during the 1973 Middle East crisis. The Pact also stands ready, on paper at least, to dissolve itself in return for the disbandment of NATO, through it should be mentioned that a network of bilateral defence treaties, binding most Pact members to the Soviet Union and each other, has been in existence for some years.

In the military field, there is no doubt that the Warsaw Pact has achieved a great deal in co-ordinating the training of the East European armies, conducting large-scale exercises, and developing weapons standardization. Details of the military strengths of the East European countries, are available in *The Military Balance 1973-74*,⁷ but East European force strengths have remained relatively static for the last few years. Current strengths are:

Bulgaria:	8 divisions
Czechoslovakia:	10 divisions
East Germany:	6 divisions
Hungary:	5 divisions
Poland:	15 divisions
Rumania:	9 divisions

The Soviet Union, which has 31 of its own divisions in Eastern Europe, keeps its allies

⁷ *The Military Balance 1973-74* (London: IISS, 1973).

⁵ *English Bulletin* (Budapest), vol. IX, no. 38.

⁶ For example *Exercise Nieman*, reported in *Red Star*, 31 July and 9 August 1968.

supplied with up-to-date weapons and equipment, including tanks, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles (though without custody of nuclear warheads, which, we believe, remains firmly in Soviet hands), aircraft and naval vessels. Each country's forces seem to be adapted for their likely tasks in the event of general war in Europe: for example, only Poland has a tactical air strike capability, an airborne division⁸ and a sea-landing division – presumably for operations in the Baltic area. There were also Western press reports in 1973 that a forward administrative HQ of the Pact has been set up at Lvov in the Western Ukraine – this would be a logical development for an organization responsible for improving the co-ordination and control of the East European forces.

The one big question-mark with the Warsaw Pact forces is how the East European armies and navies might be used in war. On this we simply have no reliable information. Would they, for example, be included in Soviet army groups and employed in front-line operations, or would they be kept in reserve, for the defence of internal order in their own countries? Could they operate on their own in some areas? Are certain units and formations of these armies already earmarked for service with Soviet troops (which would obviously form the bulk of the Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO in the event of war)? Unfortunately we do not know the answers. We can only assume that the Soviet High Command, taking into consideration political loyalty, military efficiency and geographical deployment, would select those elements of the East European armies, navies and air forces which it believed it would require for any specific operation. On a logical basis, we must assume that joint planning has produced contingency plans embodying the detailed division of labour for the various members of the Pact, but it is impossible for us to divine what the allocation of forces might be.

One additional point may be raised here. It is often asked whether the Soviet Union would want to use Warsaw Pact forces on the Chinese border. A Polish book on the Pact, published in 1970, has given us at least the constitutional answer: 'The Warsaw Pact embraces exclusively

the European part of the Soviet Union. Thus, in the event of a threat to the Far Eastern area of the USSR, the joint defence, foreseen in Article 4 of the Treaty, cannot be set in motion.'⁹ This would not, of course, rule out voluntary assistance by East European armies to Soviet forces in the Far East.

The Future of the Warsaw Pact

As we can see, within the framework and limitations of the Soviet concept of defence and military strategy the Warsaw Pact performs useful political and military functions for the Soviet Union, and through it the military manpower, skills and resources of the East European countries are being rationally used to help fulfil Soviet defence requirements on Soviet terms.

The fundamental weakness of the Warsaw Pact is summed up by the historical fact that the only occasions on which the Soviet armed forces have been in action since the Second World War have been against their own allies: East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 – and action in Poland was only narrowly avoided in 1956 and, possibly, 1970. The hard fact of life for the Soviet leaders is that they must always regard the populations of their allies as potentially unreliable politically, so that, if they believe (as they do) that the ultimate guarantor of Soviet security and support for Soviet foreign policy is the Soviet Army, they can neither rely fully on international treaties nor admit their East European allies into full partnership in the military side of the alliance – and the East Europeans know this. And if we add to this the Soviet Union's obsessive degree of secrecy in military matters, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, the gap between her and her Warsaw Pact allies is seen to be very wide.

We have seen how many key posts in the Pact HQ are still held by Soviet Officers: the C-in-C, his deputy, the Chief-of-Staff, the First Deputy Chief-of-Staff, the two most senior Political Officers and the Inspector-General. We have seen that the HQ (an administrative and co-ordinating body) is located in Moscow and is really part of the Soviet Defence Ministry, and that the only probable forward HQ, at Lvov, is on Soviet territory. We have observed that air

⁸ Units of this division are now serving with the UN Force in the Middle East.

⁹ *The Warsaw Pact* (Warsaw: Ministry of Defence, May 1970).

defence is the responsibility of a purely Soviet Command. All this, and the Soviet Union's pride in her status as a super-power, make it almost inconceivable that she would allow the selection of an East European for a key post that could in her view be better filled by a Soviet officer. A genuine rotation of posts between Soviet and East European officers is extremely difficult for her to accept, and the overwhelming majority of today's Soviet political and military leaders would recoil in horror at the thought of a Rumanian Chief-of-Staff, a Polish deputy C-in-C, or even a Bulgarian Secretary-General.

It is partly East European objections to this attitude of fear and exclusiveness which has led Rumania, for example, to refuse to hold Warsaw Pact multi-national exercises on her soil, and to pass a law restricting the use of Rumanian forces to Rumanian territory. Perhaps it also led to the publication in the Rumanian press in March 1969 of the details of her higher military structure:¹⁰ something the Soviet Union would regard as betraying national and Warsaw Pact military secrets. It may, in addition, have contributed to Albania's disillusion with the Pact in the 1960s. We also know from statements by high-ranking Czechoslovak officers during the 1968 'Prague Spring' how dissatisfied their countrymen were with Soviet domination of the Pact. All this adds up to a fundamental divergence of interests between the Soviet Union and her East European allies.

¹⁰ *Scintea* (Bucharest), 15 March 1969.

The task of the Warsaw Pact in the eyes of the Soviet Union, as I have mentioned, is to provide an administrative HQ through which to harness the resources of Eastern Europe to the job of protecting Soviet security and supporting Soviet foreign policy. For the East Europeans the need is for a much greater degree of participation in policy- and decision-making. Of course the Warsaw Pact brings some benefits to the smaller East European countries: it relieves them of the burden of individual defence and places them under the protection of one of the nuclear super-powers; it provides their armed forces with up-to-date weapons which they might not otherwise be able to afford. But these are proud nations with centuries of contribution to European civilization to their credit, and, to them, being harnessed to Soviet defence needs can never make the Pact an alliance of equals. It is true equality which the rising generation of East European Communist leaders seek for their peoples. They want to be able to prove that the Warsaw Pact is a genuinely equal grouping which benefits all its members. The dilemma therefore is: should the Pact be a military-administrative organization primarily protecting the security interests of the Soviet Union and its buffer zone in Eastern Europe, or should it be an alliance of equals on the NATO pattern? There seems little doubt that, with the outlook on military affairs now prevailing in Moscow, it cannot be both, and the chances of evolution towards the latter in the foreseeable future are slim indeed.

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The Warsaw Pact in the Era of Negotiation

DAVID HOLLOWAY

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It is widely believed that a new stage in the politics of East-West relations has been ushered in by the four-power agreement on Berlin, the West German treaties with Poland and the Soviet Union, and the strategic arms limitation agreements. The Conference on European Security and Co-operation for which the Warsaw Pact powers have been pressing since the mid-1960s now seems certain to take place; and it is likely that talks will be held about the reduction of forces in Europe. Whatever procedural arrangements are devised for the Conference and the talks on force reductions, it is clear that a period of protracted and intricate negotiations is beginning in Europe which will place new demands on the Warsaw Pact.

The Pact and the Socialist Commonwealth

The Warsaw Pact is formally presented as an alliance of sovereign states, yet its military organization and policy are decided primarily in Moscow.

The Soviet desire to organize the Warsaw Pact as an effective extension of its own military power generates friction with the other members, who are formally equal and sovereign allies. But there exists in Soviet thinking a more profound contradiction, which was evident at the very genesis of the Pact. From the start the Soviet leaders disagreed about the Pact's primary function: Molotov saw it as an instrument of socialist consolidation, safeguarding the boundaries of the socialist camp, but the Treaty itself presents the Pact as a military-political alliance of sovereign states. It does not mention the socialist camp, and declares that membership is open to other states 'irrespective of their social and political systems'. Nevertheless, as early as 1955 the Soviet press was using the terms 'participants of the Warsaw Pact' and 'members of the socialist camp' interchangeably.¹

David Holloway is a lecturer in Political Science at the Department of Politics, Edinburgh University, and author of *Technology, Management and the Soviet Military Establishment*, Adelphi Paper No. 76, 1971.

Consequently the Soviet Union has at times viewed the Warsaw Pact as something more than an alliance of sovereign states: relations between its members were to be governed by principles appropriate to a socialist organization which might ultimately be transformed into a form of political organization higher than the nation-state. The Warsaw Pact has been seen to derive its substance from the political systems of its members rather than from the formal obligations and purposes set out in the Treaty; and as Soviet interests have been threatened the Soviet Union has resorted to this interpretation of the relationship between the Pact and the socialist camp to justify its demands and interventions. This was most clearly seen in the Brezhnev Doctrine which declared that socialist states could not 'remain inactive in the name of some abstract idea of sovereignty when they saw how the country [Czechoslovakia] was exposed to the danger of anti-socialist degeneration'.² It was the Soviet stress on this interpretation after August 1968 that gave rise to such widespread fears of Soviet armed intervention in Rumania and Yugoslavia. Rumania has consistently put forward an alternative definition of the socialist bloc which stresses independence of national development as opposed to the creation of supranational organizations. There has thus been a constant battle of interpretations about the nature of the relationship between the socialist camp and the Warsaw Pact.

This problem is fundamental, for besides being a military alliance, the Warsaw Pact is the main body for co-ordinating the foreign policies of the member states. It serves also as one of the main institutional instruments for resolving disputes among the socialist states. The Soviet attitude to dissent is now rather different from that which lay behind the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform. It has sought not so much to exclude all conflict and disagreement as to contain and

¹ See Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact*, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, chapter 2.

² *Pravda*, 26 September 1968.

manage it within the Pact. Albania, the only member to leave, ceased to play an active role after 1961, but was not expelled, and withdrew formally only after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The differences between the Soviet Union and Rumania have constituted the most protracted of the crises within the Pact. Both sides have tried to use the Pact to achieve their own ends. The Soviet Union has pressed for a more unified and integrated alliance, including military exercises on Rumanian territory, while Rumania has tried to increase her independence and gain acceptance for her own interpretation of the nature of the Pact and the socialist camp. Differences remain, but so does Rumanian participation in the Pact; and Rumania has withstood severe Soviet pressure for Warsaw Pact exercises on its soil.

The attempt by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to prevent or restrain the improvement of relations between the Federal Republic and the other Eastern European powers provides another example of a non-Soviet member trying to use the Pact to achieve its own ends. It also provides further evidence of the fact that in questions of foreign policy the Pact is much more (or – from the Soviet point of view – less) than a transmission belt conveying Soviet orders to responsive and receptive subordinates. For the manoeuvring by the GDR and Rumania generated considerable discussion and consultation, and led to a great increase in the number of meetings of the Political Consultative Committee. Both Rumania and the Soviet Union appear to have been aware of the dangers of pressing their claims too far, and to have been prepared – and able – to draw back from a complete breakdown of relations.

In the other crises which have taken place since 1955 – Poland and Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1970 – problems of internal political change played a dominant role. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia internal political crisis was closely related to major changes in foreign policy: Hungary withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet leaders evidently feared that, in spite of protestations to the contrary, Czechoslovakia would do the same. Nevertheless, the basic cause of the crisis was in each case internal; and the same point can be made of Poland in 1956 and 1970. Yet it is a consequence of the way in which the Pact is seen

both as an alliance, and as an instrument of socialist consolidation, that internal change or crisis should tend to become internationalized. This tendency exists because in an alliance formed of socialist states internal change in one nation can help to legitimate demands for similar changes in the others, and any falling away from socialism can be seen as endangering the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the alliance.

This tendency was clearly exemplified in 1956 when de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union helped to precipitate political crises in Hungary and Poland. It can be seen today in the problems which face Communist parties in ruling post-Stalinist societies. The fundamental issue is whether or not the existing political arrangements, based on the monopoly of power by the party and centralized control of the economy, are appropriate for governing what are sometimes called 'advanced industrial' or 'modern' societies. More specifically, among the problems now facing the Eastern European Communist parties are: what kind of planning system and planning techniques can cope effectively with increasingly complex economies; can the party achieve a responsive unity with the people and avoid degenerating into an atrophied bureaucracy; can the various forms of group and class conflict be contained or eradicated? The crises in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in 1970 were intimately bound up with, on the one hand, the attempt and, on the other, the failure to find answers to these questions.

These schematically expressed problems manifest themselves in different ways in different societies, but nevertheless they do face, to a greater or lesser extent, all the ruling parties of the Warsaw Pact countries, including the CPSU. The degree of latitude which the Eastern European parties will enjoy in trying to solve them will depend in part on political change and development in the Soviet Union. The present orthodoxy was clearly set out in the Warsaw letter of 15 July 1968, from the five Communist and workers' parties to the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee.³ Besides expressing fears about Czechoslovakia's foreign and defence policy, the letter demanded that the party remain in control of the mass media, that it remain united and free from factional splits and –

³ *Pravda*, 15 July 1968.

most important of all – that it retain its monopoly of political power. It appears therefore that the primary lessons to be drawn by the Eastern European ruling parties from the Soviet military intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the failure to intervene with armed force in Poland in 1956 and 1970 are: remain in the Warsaw Pact; and retain a monopoly of political power.

It would be a mistake, however, to seek clear-cut ground-rules for the alliance, because the interpretation of these principles, and the decision by the Soviet Union to use force, will depend on specific circumstances. Moreover, the military and political aspects of the socialist commonwealth have until now been indivisible, since the defence of the Soviet Union through the Warsaw Pact has been seen by Moscow to depend on the political reliability of the member states, and the reliability and survival of those states to be based, in turn, on Soviet military power.

Effects of East-West Contacts

It is generally acknowledged that the Warsaw Pact is a much more cohesive and unified organization than the Western Alliance. Nevertheless, the complex inter-relationship of bloc security and internal political development suggests that it will be less flexible and adaptive in a period of more intensive East-West contact. The Soviet Union has shown no signs of forfeiting its dominant position in Eastern Europe. It maintains this position for three reasons: the defence arrangements of Eastern Europe form an integral part of the Soviet defence effort; control of the area helps to prevent the emergence of a powerful united Germany which might rival or threaten the Soviet Union; the societies of Eastern Europe have attained socialism and must not be allowed to regress.

Changes in European security, by lessening the tension between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, might reduce Soviet defence requirements in Eastern Europe and thus make it possible to uncouple the question of political development in the area from that of the defence of the Soviet Union. It is at least conceivable that, with a much reduced level of armed confrontation in Central Europe, the cohesion of the socialist camp would be secured by other than military means. The degree to which the socialist regimes of Eastern

Europe depend on Soviet military force for their survival is problematical,⁴ but if the question of defence of the Soviet Union were uncoupled from that of political development in Eastern Europe it might be possible for the Soviet Union to tolerate a greater degree of diversity in socialist development, and thus for the Eastern European regimes to secure greater stability and legitimacy.

But it is by no means clear what effect any substantial lowering of tension and lessening of armed confrontation would have on Eastern European politics. An atmosphere of *détente* might precipitate political crisis in these countries and Soviet military intervention, thereby raising the level of tension in Europe once again; alternatively it might increase the possibilities for internal political change in Eastern Europe. It is also possible that force reductions in Central Europe could lead to a streamlined Warsaw Pact under Soviet control, containing only part of the national military establishments in the Eastern European states. Prediction is made especially difficult by the complexity of the relationships that exist in the Warsaw Pact region between domestic political change and international relations, and between military and political factors at the international level. This complexity characterizes the whole problem of European security, and makes it impossible to say with any certainty what new arrangements will emerge from the current changes. One can outline alternative new security arrangements for Europe, but one must also allow for the possibility that the Soviet Union's desire to secure its own interests may ensure that, for Eastern Europe at least, the present changes mark yet another turning point that fails to turn.

New Pact Structures

The Soviet Union has been aware of the contradictions within the Warsaw Pact and has sought to resolve them in two ways: by changing the structure of the Pact; and by fostering non-military forms of integration and co-ordination. In the socialist camp a greater emphasis has been emerging on multilateral relations and on bilateral relations between the non-Soviet members, as opposed to reliance solely on bilateral

⁴ See Zygmunt Bauman, 'Social Dissent in the East European Political System', in *European Journal of Sociology*, 1971, No. 1, pp. 25–51, along with Leszek Kolakowski's rejoinder, pp. 52–60.

relations between the Soviet Union and the individual states. This trend was indicated by the political pressure exerted on Czechoslovakia before the invasion, and further illustrated by the programme of visits to Moscow and other capitals which the new Polish leadership undertook early in 1971.

The 1969 reorganization of the Pact's military organization, with its greater – albeit largely symbolic – emphasis on mutual consultation, reflects this multilateralism. The Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in March 1969 approved the setting up of a Committee of Defence Ministers, which apparently serves to advise the Political Consultative Committee. As the Hungarian Defence Minister pointed out, 'this is actually a new body only in an organizational sense because these ministers have also conferred among each other regularly in the past'.⁵ A Military Council of the Joint Command was also set up. This is chaired by the Commander-in-Chief (always a Soviet officer) and includes the Chief of Staff (likewise Soviet) and the Deputy Commanders-in-Chief, who are normally Deputy-Defence Ministers appointed by the individual member states.⁶ The precise powers and functions of the Military Council are not known, and it is not clear whether it is merely advisory or constitutes something akin to the military council of a Soviet military district. The importance of these changes lies in the fact that the non-Soviet Ministers of Defence are no longer directly subordinate to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief of the Pact, but constitute, together with the Soviet Minister, the highest military body in the coalition. The Deputy Commanders-in-Chief are not, as before, the non-Soviet Defence Ministers, but the Deputy Ministers of Defence. This change is tied in with changes in the command arrangements of the Pact. In contrast to what was earlier believed to be the case, it now seems clear that the different national establishments have earmarked troops to the Warsaw Pact. These troops are commanded by the national Deputy Ministers, who are responsible both to their own Ministers of Defence and to the Pact Commander-in-Chief.⁷ The latter has no

rights or powers over the forces not assigned to the Pact.⁸

The same meeting established a joint committee for 'the co-ordination of military technology', which appears to have responsibilities in either weapons development or procurement or both. There has been a good deal of open discussion in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe about the need for greater economy in the defence effort. It is likely that new management and analytical techniques are being employed in the Warsaw Pact organization to help in problems of co-operation in weapons development, selection and procurement.

Two potentially contradictory trends can be discerned in the 1969 reorganization of the Pact. The first of these lies in the attempt to provide a greater role for the non-Soviet members in the Joint Command. How far this amounts to a genuine increase in influence on planning rather than a symbolic increase in status is difficult to say. In any event there is as yet no sign that any of the really important posts – those of Chief of Staff or Director of Training, for example – have been filled by a non-Soviet officer. Secondly, the reorganization of 1969 appears to have created a more integrated command, with Soviet and earmarked non-Soviet forces more closely linked. The fact that the Pact's Chief of Staff is no longer a First Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff may indicate somewhat greater autonomy for the Joint Command within the context of Soviet defence organization. At the same time it seems likely that the Joint Command has been given greater powers over non-Soviet forces, especially in the co-ordination of combat training. This might mark a further step towards an autonomous and centrally administered Warsaw Pact military force, only tenuously connected with the national defence forces of the non-Soviet member states. Further evidence of this trend is provided by reports of efforts which the Warsaw Pact is making to improve its airlift capability. The Committee of Defence Ministers is said to have agreed, in February 1972, to the formation of new military air-transport regiments in Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hun-

⁵ Quoted in Remington, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁶ See Marian Jurek and Edward Skrzykowski, *Układ Warszawski* (2nd ed.), Warsaw 1971, p. 67.

⁷ On the bifurcation in the Polish forces see Marian Dowda and Maciej Janislowski, *Obrona kraju – obowiazek*

kazdego obywatela, Warsaw 1970, p. 37 and p. 64. The reforms do not appear, however, to have turned the Pact into a command and control organization.

⁸ A. S. Bakhov, *Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora*, Moscow 1971, p. 86.

gary; these regiments are to come directly under the Joint Command.⁹

Soviet efforts in this direction seem to run directly counter to the repeatedly declared aim of the Warsaw Pact powers to seek the abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as military blocs. Nevertheless, while it may become increasingly difficult after an abrogation of the Pact, to co-ordinate military planning from Moscow on the basis of bilateral arrangements alone, there is no evidence to suggest that this would be impossible. The Soviet Union might be willing to pay the price of those difficulties in order to secure the abolition of NATO. Yet such a step would have to be accompanied by the creation of a new forum in which to co-ordinate foreign policy and resolve disputes within the socialist camp.

There is no reason to suppose that such a forum could not be established within the framework of a security system in which military blocs

⁹ *International Herald Tribune*, 7 March 1972.

were abolished. The Soviet Union has sought also to strengthen the cohesion of the socialist camp by fostering economic and political ties. Early in 1969, in the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis, efforts to achieve closer economic co-ordination and integration in COMECON were intensified. These efforts reached fruition in the long-term programme of co-operation and integration adopted by COMECON in Bucharest in July 1971. Like a previous attempt at integration in the early 1960s, this programme has had to recognize that supranational planning is not yet possible; and it declares that socialist economic integration must proceed on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless, greater economic co-ordination may facilitate greater political cohesion. This suggests that if negotiations lead to a continuing relaxation of tension in Europe, the Soviet Union will seek increasingly to ensure the cohesion of the socialist camp by economic and political, rather than by military, means.

* * *

CHAPTER 5

DETENTE AND THE ALLIANCE SYSTEMS

Section 1. Introduction

Detente, manifest in part by the CSCE, MBFR, and SALT negotiations, complicates the issues involving NATO and WTO. The following sections not only point out some of the complications but provide copies of historical documents, statements of US policy, and critical analysis of the agreements reached to date.

Section II. CSCE: Three Readings

These readings deal exclusively with CSCE. The first two provide the US Government's (Executive Branch) policy of CSCE. The third reading provides a scholarly analysis of Soviet objectives in the CSCE.

FIRST READING: POLICY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GIST

—A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations
primarily for Government use. Not intended
as a comprehensive U.S. policy statement.



BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (correction)

1. **Background:** The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies have pressed for a European conference on security and cooperation since 1954, initially to be limited to European states. In 1970 they agreed to US and Canadian participation, as NATO members with vital interests in the area. NATO took the position that concrete progress must be made in the Berlin Four-Power negotiations before preparatory talks on such a conference could be opened, and this condition was fulfilled with the implementation of the Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin in June 1972.

The Multilateral Preparatory Talks beginning in November 1972 established enough common ground among the participants to warrant reasonable expectations that a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would produce satisfactory results. CSCE opened formally at the foreign minister level in July 1973 at which time the agenda was adopted and it was agreed that decisions would be taken by consensus. The working phase of CSCE began in Geneva in September 1973 and concluded on July 19, 1975 with the announcement that a final document would be signed by the 35 participants at a July 30-August 1 summit meeting in Helsinki, Finland.

2. **The document** is a political statement of intent; it is neither a treaty nor a legally binding agreement under US constitutional usage. It will, however, carry considerable moral and political weight since it is to be signed at the highest level. There are four main sections:

- Security in Europe: Ten principles of interstate relations deal with respect for sovereignty; non-use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; cooperation among states; and fulfillment of international obligations. These principles are manifestly incompatible with the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.

At Western insistence the principles include a statement that borders may be changed by peaceful means. There is also provision for announcement 21 days in advance of largescale military maneuvers and for invitations to interested observers.

- Economic, scientific, technical, and environmental cooperation: commercial exchanges, industrial, scientific, and technological cooperation, and promotion of tourism.
- Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields: freer movement of people, ideas, and information, with texts on family reunification and visits, binational marriages, access to printed, broadcast, and filmed information, improved working conditions for journalists, and increased cultural and educational exchange.
- Action to follow-up the present conference, including a meeting in 1977 in Belgrade to review results and decide on further activities.

In addition there is a separate text on the relationship to the CSCE of the nonparticipating Mediterranean states.

3. Significance: The emphasis of the Western and neutral participants at CSCE has been on improving, not freezing, the status quo in Europe. The US has approached the conference on the premise that if detente is to endure, all sides must benefit. The fact that the CSCE produced agreements on detailed provisions emphasizing cooperation in place of confrontation is a significant event. It is, however, only one step in the detente process, not an end in itself, and its success will be judged by future implementation of its provisions -- particularly with respect to freer movement of peoples, ideas, and information.

CSCE does not reduce the need for strong NATO defense efforts, since the Warsaw Pact continues to strengthen its armed forces far in excess of its apparent requirements for self-defense. We look to the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks for progress in reducing the level of armed confrontation.

While seeking to enlarge the area of mutually-beneficial cooperation and the reasonable discussion of East-West differences wherever possible, we must bear in mind that the USSR has made clear that it intends to continue the ideological struggle by all means short of war. Thus, while CSCE has made a valuable contribution to the East-West dialogue by bringing new subjects into the realm of public discussion, major systemic differences remain.

Close coordination among NATO members at CSCE has reaffirmed Atlantic Alliance solidarity as well as the important role of the US and Canada in European affairs.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



News Release

August 1, 1975
Helsinki, Finland

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

President Gerald R. Ford addressed the following remarks to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at Finlandia Hall, August 1, 1975:

Mr. Chairman, my distinguished colleagues: May I begin by expressing to the Governments of Finland and Switzerland, which have been superb hosts for the several phases of this conference, my gratitude and that of my associates for their efficiency and hospitality.

Particularly to you, President Kekkonen, I must convey to the people of the Republic of Finland, on behalf of the 214 million people of the United States of America, a reaffirmation of the longstanding affection and admiration which all my countrymen hold for your brave and beautiful land.

We are bound together by the most powerful of all ties, our fervent love for freedom and independence, which knows no homeland but the human heart. It is a sentiment as enduring as the granite rock on which this city stands and as moving as the music of Sibelius. Our visit here, though short, has brought us a deeper appreciation of the pride, industry, and friendliness which Americans always associate with the Finnish nation.

The nations assembled here have kept the general peace in Europe for 30 years. Yet there have been too many narrow escapes from major conflict. There remains, to this day, the urgent issue of how to construct a just and lasting peace for all peoples.

I have not come across the Atlantic to say

what all of us already know: that nations now have the capacity to destroy civilization, and, therefore, all our foreign policies must have as their one supreme objective the prevention of a thermonuclear war. Nor have I come to dwell upon the hard realities of continuing ideological differences, political rivalries, and military competition that persist among us.

I have come to Helsinki as a spokesman for a nation whose vision has always been forward, whose people have always demanded that the future be brighter than the past, and whose united will and purpose at this hour is to work diligently to promote peace and progress, not only for ourselves but for all mankind. I am simply here to say to my colleagues: We owe it to our children, to the children of all continents, not to miss any opportunity, not to mangle for one minute, not to spare ourselves or allow others to shirk in the monumental task of building a better and a safer world.

The American people, like the people of Europe, know well that mere assertions of good will, passing changes in the political mood of governments, laudable declarations of principles, are not enough. But if we proceed with care, with commitment to real progress, there is now an opportunity to turn our peoples' hopes into realities.

In recent years, nations represented here have sought to ease potential conflicts. But much more remains to be done before we prematurely congratulate ourselves. Military competition must be controlled. Political competition must be restrained. Crises must not be manipulated or exploited for unilateral advantages that could lead us again to the brink of war. The process of negotia-

tion must be sustained, not at a snail's pace, but with demonstrated enthusiasm and visible progress.

Challenges and Opportunities

Nowhere are the challenges and the opportunities greater and more evident than in Europe. That is why this conference brings us all together. Conflict in Europe shakes the world. Twice in this century we have paid dearly for this lesson; at other times, we have come perilously close to calamity. We dare not forget the tragedy and the terror of those times.

Peace is not a piece of paper. But lasting peace is at least possible today because we have learned from the experiences of the last 30 years that peace is a process requiring mutual restraint and practical arrangements. This conference is a part of that process—a challenge, not a conclusion. We face unresolved problems of military security in Europe; we face them with very real differences in values and in aims. But if we deal with them with careful preparation, if we focus on concrete issues, if we maintain forward movement, we have the right to expect real progress.

The era of confrontation that has divided Europe since the end of the Second World War may now be ending. There is a new perception and a shared perception of a change for the better, away from confrontation and toward new possibilities for secure and mutually beneficial cooperation. That is what we all have been saying here. I welcome and I share these hopes for the future.

The postwar policy of the United States has been consistently directed toward the rebuilding of Europe and the rebirth of Europe's historic identity. The nations of the West have worked together for peace and progress throughout Europe. From the very start, we have taken the initiative by stating clear goals and areas for negotiation. We have sought a structure of European relations, tempering rivalry with restraint, power with moderation, building upon the traditional bonds that link us with old friends and reaching out to forge new ties with former and potential adversaries.

In recent years, there have been some substantial achievements. We see the Four-Power agreement on Berlin of 1971 as the end of a perennial crisis that on at least three occasions brought the world to the brink of doom. The agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the States of Eastern Europe and the related intra-German accords enable Central Europe and the world to breathe easier.

The start of East-West talks on mutual and balanced force reductions demonstrate a determination to deal with military security problems of the Continent. The 1972 treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit antiballistic missiles and the Interim Agreement limiting strategic offensive arms were the first solid breakthroughs in what must be a continuing long-term process of limiting strategic nuclear arsenals.

I profoundly hope that this conference will spur further practical and concrete results. It affords a welcome opportunity to widen the circle of those countries involved in easing tensions between East and West.

Detente

Participation in the work of detente and participation in the benefits of detente must be everybody's business—in Europe and elsewhere. But detente can succeed only if everybody understands what detente actually is.

First, detente is an evolutionary process, not a static condition. Many formidable challenges yet remain.

Second, the success of detente, of the process of detente, depends on new behavior patterns that give life to all our solemn declarations. The goals we are stating today are the yardstick by which our performance will be measured.

The people of all Europe—and I assure you the people of North America—are thoroughly tired of having their hopes raised and then shattered by empty words and unfulfilled pledges. We had better say what we mean, and mean what we say, or we will have the anger of our citizens to answer. While we must not expect miracles, we can—and we do—expect steady progress that comes in steps; steps that are related to each other, that link our actions with words in various areas of our relations.

Finally, there must be an acceptance of mutual obligation. Detente, as I have often said, must be a two-way street. Tensions cannot be eased by one side alone. Both sides must want detente and work to achieve it. Both sides must benefit from it.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, this extraordinary gathering in Helsinki proves that all our peoples share a concern for Europe's future and for a better and more peaceful world, but what else does it prove? How shall we assess the results?

Our delegations have worked long and hard to produce documents which restate noble and praiseworthy political principles. They spell out guide-

lines for national behavior, and international cooperation, but every signatory should know that if these are to be more than the latest chapter in a long and sorry volume of unfulfilled declarations, every party must be dedicated to making them come true.

These documents, which we will sign, represent another step—how long or short a step only time will tell—in the process of detente and reconciliation in Europe. Our peoples will be watching and measuring our progress. They will ask how these noble sentiments are being translated into actions that bring about a more secure and just order in the daily lives of each of our nations and its citizens.

The Documents

The documents produced here represent compromises, like all international negotiations, but these principles we have agreed upon are more than the lowest common denominator of governmental positions. They affirm the most fundamental human rights: liberty of thought, conscience, and faith; the exercise of civil and political rights; the rights of minorities.

They call for: a freer flow of information, ideas, and people; greater scope for the press; cultural and educational exchange; family reunification; the right to travel and to marriage between nationals of different States; and for the protection of the priceless heritage of our diverse cultures.

They offer wide areas for greater cooperation: trade, industrial production, science and technology, the environment, transportation, health, space and the oceans.

They reaffirm the basic principles of relations between States: nonintervention, sovereign equality, self-determination, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, and the possibility of change by peaceful means. The United States gladly subscribes to this document because we subscribe to every one of these principles.

Almost 200 years ago the United States of America was born as a free and independent Nation. The descendants of Europeans who proclaimed their independence in America expressed in that declaration a decent respect for the opinions of mankind and asserted not only that all men are created equal, but they are endowed with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The founders of my country did not merely say that all Americans should have these rights, but

all men everywhere should have these rights, and these principles have guided the United States of America throughout its two centuries of nationhood. They have given hopes to millions in Europe and on every continent.

U.S. Role

I have been asked why I am here today. I am here because I believe and my countrymen believe in the interdependence of Europe and North America, indeed in the interdependence of the entire family of man. I am here because the leaders of 34 other Governments are here: the States of Europe and of our good neighbor, Canada, with whom we share an open border of 5,526 miles, along which there stands not a single armed soldier, and across which our two peoples have moved in friendship and mutual respect for 160 years.

I can say without fear of contradiction that there is not a single people represented here whose blood does not flow in the veins of Americans and whose culture and traditions have not enriched the heritage which we Americans prize so highly.

When two centuries ago the United States of America issued a declaration of high principles, the cynics and doubters of that day jeered and scoffed. Yet, 11 long years later, our independence was won, and the stability of our Republic was really achieved through the incorporation of the same principles in our Constitution. But those principles, though they are still being perfected, remain the guiding lights of an American policy and the American people are still dedicated, as they were then, to a decent respect for the opinions of mankind and to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all peoples everywhere.

To our fellow participants in this conference, my presence here symbolizes my country's vital interest in Europe's future. Our future is bound with yours. Our economic well-being, as well as our security, is linked increasingly with yours. The distance of geography is bridged by our common heritage and our common destiny. The United States, therefore, intends to participate fully in the affairs of Europe and in turning the results of this conference into a living reality.

To America's allies: We in the West must vigorously pursue the course upon which we have embarked together, reinforced by one another's strength and mutual confidence. Stability in Europe requires equilibrium in Europe. Therefore, I assure you that my country will continue to be a concerned and reliable partner. Our partnership is

far more than a matter of formal agreements. It is a reflection of beliefs, traditions, and ties that are of deep significance to the American people. We are proud that these values are expressed in this document.

To the countries of the East: The United States considers that the principles on which this conference has agreed are part of the great heritage of European civilization, which we all hold in trust for all mankind. To my country, they are not clichés or empty phrases. We take this work and these words very seriously. We will spare no effort to ease tensions and to solve problems between us, but it is important that you recognize the deep devotion of the American people and their Government to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and thus to the pledges that this conference has made regarding the freer movement of people, ideas, information.

In building a political relationship between East and West, we face many challenges:

- Berlin has a special significance. It has been a flashpoint of confrontation in the past. It can provide an example of peaceful settlement in the future. The United States regards it as a test of detente and of the principles of this conference. We welcome the fact that, subject to Four-Power rights and responsibilities, the results of CSCE apply to Berlin as they do throughout Europe.

- Military stability in Europe has kept the peace. While maintaining that stability, it is now time to reduce substantially the high levels of military forces on both sides. Negotiations now underway in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions so far have not produced the results for which I had hoped. The United States stands ready to demonstrate flexibility in moving these negotiations forward, if others will do the same. An agreement that enhances mutual security is feasible—and essential.

- The United States also intends to pursue vigorously a further agreement on strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union. This remains a priority of American policy. General Secretary Brezhnev and I agreed last November in Vladivostok on the essentials of a new accord limiting strategic offensive weapons for the next 10 years. We are moving forward in our bilateral discussions here in Helsinki.

- The world faces an unprecedented danger in the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The nations of Europe share a great responsibility for an international solution to this problem. The benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, are becoming more and more important. We must find ways to spread these benefits while safeguarding the world against the menace of weapons proliferation.

To the other nations of Europe represented at this conference: We value the work you have done here to help bring all of Europe together. Your right to live in peace and independence is one of the major goals of our effort. Your continuing contribution will be indispensable.

To those nations not participating and to all the peoples of the world: The solemn obligation undertaken in these documents to promote fundamental rights, economic and social progress and well-being, applies ultimately to all peoples.

Can we truly speak of peace and security without addressing the spread of nuclear weapons in the world, or the creation of more sophisticated forms of warfare? Can peace be divisible between areas of tranquillity and regions of conflict?

Can Europe truly flourish if we do not all address ourselves to the evil of hunger in countries less fortunate than we; to the new dimensions of economic and energy issues that underline our own progress; to the dialogue between producers and consumers, between exporters and importers, between industrial countries and less-developed ones; and can there be stability and progress in the absence of justice and fundamental freedoms?

Our people want a better future. Their expectations have been raised by the very real steps that have already been taken in arms control, political negotiations, and expansion of contacts and economic relations. Our presence here offers them further hope. We must not let them down.

If the Soviet Union and the United States can reach agreement so that our astronauts can fit together the most intricate scientific equipment, work together and shake hands 137 miles out in space, we as statesmen have an obligation to do as well on earth.

History will judge this conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow; not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

by Michael Finkel

SINCE the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union has pursued three main goals in its relations with Western Europe. First, from Potsdam through the latest years of the Cold War, it has sought to combine a separate peace treaty with Germany and the renewed pressure on West Berlin, to the exclusion of the non-communist part with the Federal Republic of Germany and the proposal for a European security conference. The Soviet regime has the status quo and

Pages 5-7 to 5-11 not used.

the Soviet Union has never accepted their exclusion from Western Europe. Their early support for, and manipulation of, the West European communist parties and fellow-traveling movements, their diplomacy in Paris, London, and eventually in Bonn, their fight against West European integration, and their promise of a peace and stable future for Western Europe should it agree to the East on their conditions, bear witness to an active Westpolitik in search of the extension of Soviet influence.

First, the Soviet Union have understood that the American presence in Western Europe has severely threatened their freedom of movement in pursuit of the two goals. Consequently, their basic attitude toward the Marshall Plan and NATO, the 1954 proposal for a European system of collective security, the persistent pressure for all-European disarmament, and all the lesser moves in between have aimed at excluding the United States from playing a role in Europe.

In the second half of the 1950's all these threads were woven into the single scheme for a European security conference. The time had to be ripe for such a move. In the one hand, the only way to achieve a twenty-year term coming up in 1960, but the alliance was approaching it in the shadow of French disaffection and the movement and was a means of its continuing purpose. The only way to achieve this was to have a security conference. The only way to achieve this was to have a security conference. The only way to achieve this was to have a security conference.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE*

by Mojmir Povolny

SINCE the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union has pursued three main goals in her relations with Western Europe. First, from Potsdam through the fateful year of the Czechoslovak coup d'état and the Berlin blockade, to Khrushchev's threats to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany and his renewed pressure on West Berlin, to the conclusion of the nonaggression pact with the Federal Republic of Germany and the proposals for a European security conference, the Soviet regime has sought maintenance of the status quo and Western legitimization of its supremacy in Eastern Europe.

Second, the Soviets have never accepted their exclusion from Western Europe. Their early support for, and manipulation of, the West European communist parties and fellow-traveling movements, their diplomacy in Paris, London, and eventually in Bonn, their fight against West European integration, and their promise of a bright and stable future for Western Europe should it open up to the East on their conditions, bear witness to an active *Westpolitik* in search of the extension of Soviet influence.

Third, the Soviets have understood that the American presence in Western Europe has severely circumscribed their freedom of maneuver in pursuit of the first two goals. Consequently, their battle against the Marshall Plan and NATO, the 1954 proposal for a European system of collective security, the persistent pressure for an all-European conference, and all the lesser moves in between have aimed at excluding the United States from playing a role in Europe.

In the second half of the 1960's all these threads were woven into the single scheme for a European security conference. The time appeared to be propitious for such a move. On the one hand, not only was NATO's twenty-year term coming up in 1969, but the alliance was approaching it in the shadow of French disaffection and disengagement and was uncertain of its continuing purpose.

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Moreover, the deeper the United States became involved in Indochina, the less influence it had in Europe. On the other hand, the Soviets began to experience new difficulties in holding the East European bloc under their customary control, and the future course of their rivalry with China was unpredictable. Moscow tried, therefore, to engage the West at the moment of its weakness in order to gain its sanction of the Soviet solution in Central and Eastern Europe, to open the West European door to Soviet influence, to promote American disengagement from Europe, and to free Soviet resources for other places and objectives. Postwar Soviet conduct in Europe intimates that this would have been the essence of the concessions expected from a peace treaty with Germany. This essay will argue that in proposing a European security conference the Soviet Union has been promoting a substitute for a peace conference on Germany, the latter, in its traditional form, having been outdated by the course of postwar developments.

PRELIMINARY FORMULATION

The theme of a European security conference in its present form surfaced first in Warsaw at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in January 1965. It was attached, as a call for a "conference of European states to discuss measures for ensuring collective security in Europe," to a communiqué that violently opposed NATO's consideration of a NATO multilateral force or an Atlantic nuclear force.¹ The 1965 appeal echoed the arguments and purposes of a series of previous Soviet proposals. At the Berlin meeting of the Big Four foreign ministers in February 1954, Molotov had proposed a general treaty on collective security in Europe. Article 9 of the Warsaw Treaty, which also was concluded in 1954, opened the treaty to accession by other than the founding states "irrespective of their social and state systems," and Article 11 offered the disbanding of the Warsaw alliance in the event that an all-European security system was established. At the end of the same year, Moscow

¹*Pravda*, January 22, 1965, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter cited as *CDSP*), February 10, 1965, pp. 14-15. See also Y. Novoseltsev, "European Security and World Peace," *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1965, pp. 3-8. For an early analysis of the plans for a European security conference, see Andrzej Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," *International Conciliation*, May 1969, pp. 25-28; also, Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, *Détente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970's* (New York: Dunellen, 1970); Josef Korbel, *Détente in Europe: Real or Imaginary?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Robert Hunter, *Security in Europe*, 2nd edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972).

sponsored a "conference of European countries on safeguarding European peace and security."

In the summer of 1955, at the Geneva summit meeting, Khrushchev continued to promote the Soviet plan for collective security in Europe, and the heads of state instructed their foreign ministers to consider various proposals on this issue. The Rapacki Plan for an atom-free zone in Central Europe was first advanced in 1957. In 1958 the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact proposed the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and of a treaty of friendship and cooperation among European states. With some modifications and vacillation the proposal for a nonaggression pact combined with some version of the Rapacki Plan was repeated annually until it was transformed into the 1965 plan for a general conference on European security and cooperation.²

Throughout 1965 Moscow waged a relentless propaganda campaign against West Germany and hammered alarmingly on the danger of Bonn's access to nuclear weapons in any form. Finally, on March 24, 1966, the new West German government responded with the following offer: an exchange of bilateral nonaggression pacts with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and any other East European state; reduction of nuclear weapons maintained in Europe by the United States, Great Britain and France; renunciation of nuclear arms by nonnuclear nations; and agreement to control by the International Atomic Energy Commission of nuclear materials supplied to nonnuclear nations by the nuclear powers. No mention was made, however, of the existing boundaries in Europe.

Soviet and Polish reactions to the West German memorandum specified harshly what the Eastern bloc expected from Bonn in the interest of European security. At that point, especially for the Soviets, the West German proposal was no longer an acceptable alternative to their larger scheme of a security conference. In his report to the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU held at the end of March 1966, Brezhnev outlined the purposes for which he wished such a conference to be convened:

To discuss the existing proposals of the socialist and other states of Europe concerning a military détente and the reduction of armaments in Europe and the development of peaceful, mutually advantageous ties among all European states. . . . To continue to seek ways for solving one

²For a Soviet review of all the plans, see Y. Zhukov, "The Problems of European Peace and Security," *International Affairs* (Moscow), June 1965, pp. 3-9.

of the cardinal tasks of European security — the peaceful settlement of the German question with a view to eliminating completely the vestiges of World War II in Europe on the basis of recognition of the now existing European frontiers, including those of the two German states.³

The Polish reply called the West German initiative an act of "political hypocrisy" and demanded that the FRG prove its sincere interest in European security by repudiating territorial claims against Poland, accepting the Oder-Neisse boundary, annulling the Munich Agreement, and recognizing East Germany. Kosygin endorsed the Polish claim in no less explicit terms: "Europe has no unsolved frontier questions . . . there are two German states in Europe . . . and West Germany must accept existing postwar reality as the starting point."⁴ In Soviet pronouncements, however, the theme of a European security conference began to gain as much significance as the more specific solution of the German issue. Its emphasis was on Europe's independence. Kosygin went further than Gromyko at the Twenty-third Congress when he urged that the Europeans themselves should solve the continent's security problems and that foreign troops should be evacuated from Europe.

Through these appeals the USSR accomplished a number of immediate objectives. First, she seized the initiative over an issue of such magnitude that all her minor moves in Europe in the future could be presented as its integral part and charged with its moral weight. The West was simultaneously placed in the position of the reacting party who would ignore the Soviet proposal for a while, whittle it down, but never escape from its framework. Second, the Soviets defined the issue by combining the politically painful and specific problem of German settlement with the emotionally appealing and general theme of European security. Europe was invited to participate in a bookkeeping operation registering and sanctioning transactions that had been carried out long before. Furthermore, through their attempt to limit participation in the proposed conference to Europeans only, the Soviet leaders tried to align themselves with those in Western Europe who hankered after a lesser American influence, to discourage others from renewing their NATO membership when it was due to expire in 1969, and in the end to appear reasonable and conciliatory and exact a price for their obliging stance when the United States would have to be taken in.

³*Pravda*, March 30, 1966, translated in *CDSP*, April 13, 1966, p. 13.

⁴*New York Times*, June 18, 1966.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TERMS

Following this preliminary formulation of how to deal with the increasingly fluid situation in Europe, the Soviet Union had to ensure public support for her approach from the East European states and minimize their autonomous rapprochement with the West. Weight could be added to her proposal only if the Eastern bloc spoke with a single voice and if the European security conference did not appear merely as a Soviet scheme. For that purpose the foreign ministers of the WTO nations met in Moscow in June 1966 and, except for Rumania, lined up behind the Soviet Union.

The Rumanians were apparently unwilling to adhere to three basic ingredients of the Soviet plan: the accusation of West Germany for creating and perpetuating political problems in Central Europe at the moment when they were establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn; the charge of the United States with sole responsibility for the insecurity arising from opposing military blocs in Europe; and the need for an all-European conference to ensure progress on security problems. Where the Soviet Union looked for a European sanction of her control in the East, Rumania looked for emancipation from it and beyond.

Ceausescu, therefore, sent his foreign minister to Moscow with a message that had been heard from Rumania before at the Geneva disarmament conference:

We hold that peoples can live in peace in Europe. The military blocs are an obstacle to cooperation among peoples.

Therefore it is time to abolish the NATO aggressive pact and, as a consequence, also the Warsaw Treaty, so that relations on a new basis can be established between the European countries.⁵

TASS omitted the call for abolition of both military blocs in reporting on Ceausescu's appeal, and Brezhnev reportedly "described the desire to dissolve military alliances as naive and unrealistic as long as the Atlantic Alliance existed."⁶ At the Moscow meeting Rumanian Foreign Minister Cornel Manescu refused to agree to a joint declaration condemning West Germany as a troublemaker and was reported to have told Brezhnev "that Rumania would agree only to bilateral talks between Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic countries."⁷ On the other hand, the prospect of a settlement with West Germany on their terms, which kept escaping them in bilateral approaches, overshadowed any reserva-

⁵*Ibid.*, June 12, 1966.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷*Ibid.*, June 16, 1966.

tions Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland might have shared with Rumania, and their support for the Soviet initiative was at the outset publicly unequivocal.

The WTO foreign ministers' meeting was almost immediately followed by a conference of the pact's Political Consultative Committee in Bucharest in July 1966. This was the first in a series of major meetings of communist leaders substantially devoted to promoting the security conference idea. It is likely that the Rumanian hosts, having successfully resisted Soviet attempts at strengthening the Warsaw Pact military command structure on the one hand and condemnation of West Germany on the other, found it possible now to support a joint declaration on the subject.⁸

The principal objective of the suggested conference was set forth as an all-European commitment to cooperation for the purpose of maintaining and strengthening security in Europe. This security was to ensure the sovereignty, equality, independence, noninterference in domestic affairs, and territorial integrity of all European states. It was to be based on renunciation of the threat of force or use of force. International disputes were to be solved only through peaceful means. In specific terms, the Bucharest Declaration emphasized recognition of the existing European boundaries, exclusion of West Germany from access to nuclear weapons, replacement of military alliances with a new security system once the NATO countries have agreed to liquidate their organization, and promotion of economic, scientific and technical cooperation.

The last topic was a new item introduced into the consideration of European security to make up, as *Izvestia* explained later, for American disruption of East-West trade during the Cold War, which "strove to weaken not only the socialist countries" but America's European partners as well.⁹ In addition, the Declaration contained a package of suggestions on the regulation of armaments in Europe, which included most of the main themes of previous disarmament proposals: liquidation of military bases on foreign territory; withdrawal of all foreign troops from other countries' territory to within their national frontiers; reduction of the armed forces of the two German states; creation of denuclearized zones; and the banning from European skies of foreign aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and from European ports of foreign vessels with nuclear weapons on board.

⁸*Pravda*, July 9, 1966, translated in *CDSP*, July 27, 1966, pp. 3-7.

⁹*Izvestia*, September 13, 1966.

The speeches, commentaries and articles surrounding the Bucharest Declaration indicated that the Soviets were at that moment preoccupied with making it impossible for West Germany to have access to nuclear weapons. On the question of participation in the proposed conference the Declaration was ambiguous. It called for an "all-European conference" but added that any agreement reached by the conference "should be open for all interested states to join," and that the Warsaw Pact nations would make "no exceptions" as to the participants. Rumania, however, was quick to assume that the United States would be allowed to participate. Later, when Poland jointly with Belgium supported the proposal for a security conference, it also said nothing about limiting participation to European states only. Nevertheless, *Izvestia*, in urging "the representatives of all European countries to gather at a round table," implied the exclusion of the United States and supported this in the following manner:

The essence of the problem is not that anyone wants to force the USA out of Europe. It is not the Europeans who are depriving the USA of the right to participate in the solution of problems of European security and the establishment of peaceful cooperation; on the contrary, Washington wants to deprive the Europeans of this right.¹⁰

The Soviets must have understood that they could not bring the American allies in Western Europe to a conference table on European security from which the United States was excluded. But an ambivalent formulation of their own attitude toward American participation could test the solidarity of the West Europeans on this question and play on some of the residual anti-Americanism on the continent. More importantly, the Soviets may have anticipated that, by conceding American participation later, they could demand an equivalent American concession of their right to a role and influence in some other part of the world from which they had so far been barred.

After Bucharest the Soviets began a relentless diplomatic offensive in the noncommunist European states in support of the idea of the security conference. Kosygin, Podgorný and Gromyko traveled the circuit of West European capitals trying to promote the Soviet proposal.

In early 1967 the West European communist parties endorsed the Bucharest Declaration at their meeting in Vienna, and in April a full-fledged conference of all European communist parties, from the West as well as the East, was held for the same purpose in

¹⁰*Ibid.*

Karlovy Vary. After approving the Declaration, the assembled parties established their version of a German solution as the principal target of the proposed conference: recognition of West Germany, East Germany and West Berlin as three independent political units and normalization of relations among them as well as between all states and East Germany.¹¹ Thus the Berlin issue was introduced into the security conference plan.

Compared with these new concrete proposals, the appeal from Karlovy Vary to all nations to prevent renewal of the NATO pact in 1969 was only an echo of the previous demand that military alliances be replaced with a new security system. Brezhnev asked also for the liquidation of foreign radio stations and espionage centers in Europe and for the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean Sea. In its commentary on the Karlovy Vary meeting *Pravda* appealed to the European working class, socialist and social democratic parties, believers of all faiths, the intelligentsia, the younger generation, and all peace-loving forces — the standard targets of Soviet front-organization efforts — to support the idea of the European security conference against the danger created by “the collusion of American and West German imperialisms.”¹²

The emphasis on a specific solution of the German question obviously came in response to what the Soviets must have read into the Western debate about moves toward Eastern Europe: an attempt at isolating East Germany from the other East European states in order to obtain a solution in Central Europe on Western terms. It was supported by a warning to Western Europe against the dangerous automatism of its NATO obligations, its vulnerability in case of war, and the growing cost of military spending. On the positive side, the new system of European security was painted to the West Europeans as a defense against American scientific and technological domination, the brain drain, and the invasion by U.S. capital of the key sectors of their economy.¹³ Taking the wind from the anticipated Chinese argument against any rapprochement with the West, Brezhnev reiterated the post-Stalinist thesis that relaxed international relations tended to aid the cause of communism. Experience has taught the communists, he said, that

¹¹*Pravda*, April 25, 1967, translated in *CDSP*, May 17, 1967, pp. 5-11.

¹²*Ibid.*, April 27, 1967, translated in *CDSP*, May 17, 1967, p. 17. See also Y. Shvedkov, “West European Political Forces and European Security,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), March 1968, pp. 8-13.

¹³Y. Rakhmaninov, “Alternative to a Divided Europe,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1967, pp. 41-47.

the "cold war" setting, the confrontations of military blocs and the atmosphere of war threats encumber the activities of revolutionary, democratic forces. In conditions of international tension, reactionary elements in bourgeois countries become active, the military rears its head, antidemocratic tendencies and anticommunism intensify.

And conversely, recent years have shown especially clearly that in conditions of relaxed international tension the arrow of the political barometer moves to the left.¹⁴

Applying the general thesis to the European situation, Brezhnev saw the independent policies of some West European nations as an opportunity united communists could exploit.

Yet the absence of the Rumanian Communist Party from Karlovy Vary — not to speak of the absence of the Albanians and Yugoslavs — told more about dissension in the communist bloc than did Brezhnev's analysis of disunity among the Western nations. The Rumanians continued pressing for the dissolution of both NATO and the WTO on every occasion — at press conferences at home, in the United Nations and at the disarmament conference in Geneva — calling at the same time for the withdrawal of all troops stationed on the territory of other states and opposing interference in the internal affairs of other peoples. The emerging crisis over Czechoslovakia gave their proposals special urgency and their thrust a concrete target.

Czechoslovakia during 1968 proved that Moscow's capacity to handle foreign policy issues could be overtaxed. The communiqué issued from the Political Consultative Committee's meeting in Sofia in March 1968 did not even mention the European security conference. As the Soviet Union concentrated on saving the integrity of her domain, which eventually required the presence and deployment of her troops, she was not receptive to NATO's first official interest in mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe, nor was she prepared to tackle the issue of American participation in the security conference when Austria endorsed it in April 1968. Under the circumstances, the best Soviet policy was to stick to denying the United States the right to take part in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Once the Czechoslovak crisis was settled, however, in a way most favorable to Soviet long-term objectives in Central Europe, the USSR had a twofold interest in the renewed urgency with which she advocated a "system of collective security in Europe," as Kосygin called it in his 1969 New Year's message: to slow down

¹⁴*Pravda*, April 25, 1967, translated in *GDSP*, May 17, 1967, p. 11.

"the stepped-up activity" of NATO resulting from her invasion of Czechoslovakia and to insulate Eastern Europe behind the recognized boundaries and under the umbrella of the Brezhnev Doctrine.¹⁵

In order to obtain a more attentive hearing in the West, which had so far largely ignored the communist promotion of a European security conference, Moscow made three noticeable but gratuitous concessions at the Political Consultative Committee's meeting in Budapest in March 1969. First, the Budapest Message did not suggest replacing NATO and the Warsaw Pact with a new system of European security. Evidently the Soviets saw nobody deserting NATO in 1969 and in their own sphere, in the aftermath of the Czechoslovak crisis, felt just the opposite need for strengthening the WTO command. In reviewing the Budapest document, the CPSU Politburo and the USSR Council of Ministers noted that agreements of that conference, "aimed at further perfecting the structure and administrative bodies of the Warsaw Pact defense organization," were "of great importance in connection with the evident increase in the activity of the aggressive imperialist NATO bloc."¹⁶

Second, the old prerequisites for convening the conference — unconditional recognition of the existing boundaries in Central Europe and of West Germany, East Germany and West Berlin as separate political entities — were transformed into mere preconditions for safeguarding European security. At that time the Soviet Union was already seriously engaged with Bonn in considering a nonaggression pact and expected to obtain bilaterally what she was surrendering, to East Germany's chagrin, as a *sine qua non* to multilateral negotiations. But she understood that should West Germany, however tentatively and indirectly, accept these prerequisites as an integral part of the nonaggression pact, nobody in the West would either desire, or be in a position, to challenge them effectively.

Where the Soviets aimed at a specific and obtainable objective, East Germany would have preferred the absolutism of the original hard line. In the end, however, the reluctant Ulbricht accepted the Soviet approach, at least temporarily, and following his visit to Moscow shortly after the Budapest conference, the East German Politburo "issued a declaration that the security conference should

¹⁵*New York Times*, January 4, 1969. For a thoughtful analysis, see Josef Korbel, "West Germany's Ostpolitik: II, A Policy toward the Soviet Allies," *ORBIS*, Summer 1970, p. 337.

¹⁶*Pravda*, March 18, 1969, translated in *CDSP*, April 2, 1969, p. 11.

be organized 'without preconditions' to be fulfilled by either German state."¹⁷

Third, the obstacle of Soviet ambivalence toward the role of the United States in any future arrangements in Europe was removed. Even though the appeal for early multilateral consultations went from Budapest to all *European* states, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin reportedly told Under Secretary of State Richardson that Moscow had no objection to U.S. participation in the conference. This change in the Soviet attitude was also reported by Willy Spueller, the Swiss Foreign Minister, after he learned during a visit to Rumania that Moscow had changed its position because of the emphasis "some European countries" had placed on American participation. Because there could be no conference on European security without the United States, this Soviet concession was a gesture; nevertheless it strengthened the hand of those NATO members which had for some time been in favor of the Soviet approach to relations between East and West.

The indirect and cautious response to the Budapest Message, made by the NATO foreign ministers at their anniversary meeting in Washington on April 11, 1969, finally opened the dialogue the Soviets had hoped for. But the West established a negotiating position far apart from that taken and developed by the East. Against the Soviet Union's sweeping scheme NATO laid out its policy of small steps. (1) Instead of a multilateral conference, which the Americans tended to suspect as a pure propaganda forum, the West favored prolonged bilateral negotiations. (2) Solution of the long-intractable problem of access to West Berlin and progress on the issue of German unity were declared to be NATO's criteria for successful détente in Europe. (3) The North Atlantic Council was asked to draw up a list of critical issues that "best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and early resolution," and it was agreed to discuss these in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union.¹⁸

The effect of the NATO declaration was twofold. On the one hand, it acknowledged the Soviet initiative, and henceforth every move between Eastern and Western Europe would be related to the Soviet idea of European security. On the other hand, it put a damper on the propaganda aspects of the Soviet proposal, encouraged diversity in the Soviet bloc, and forced the Soviet Union to retreat from her original grandiose plan.

¹⁷*New York Times*, November 14, 1969.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, April 13, 1969, Section IV, p. 4.

Three developments in the spring and summer of 1969 confirm this conclusion. First, as the Soviets encouraged Finnish President Urho Kekkonen to make an official and public offer to serve in 1970 as host for the security conference and any preparatory meetings, they raised no objection to the Finnish plan to seat the United States and Canada. The only concern they expressed was about getting East and West Germany to sit at the same table. Second, the *New York Times* reported that while in their initial comments individual East European states had clung to the conference scheme, their diplomats claimed that their governments were much more flexible and primarily interested in détente and expansion of contacts with the West.¹⁹ Third, in late July 1969 Soviet leaders told visiting Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel that they would "agree to a European security conference with a limited agenda, leaving out the thorny German problem and concentrating on points that offer hope for agreement."²⁰ Gromyko was also reported to have agreed that the conference should be prepared through "more frequent bilateral and multilateral contacts."²¹

These suggestions marked a significant departure from the original Soviet position. In the Western press they were explained mainly as a reflection of Soviet concern for the threatening attitude of Communist China: a more secure position in Europe would strengthen the posture in the Far East. A cartoon in *Der Spiegel* showed Soviet Ambassador to Bonn Tsarapkin kissing Chancellor Kiesinger, with Foreign Minister Brandt saying "The way the Russian Ambassador has been greeting us lately, something must be brewing on the Chinese border."²² The Soviets were, however, already engaged in a separate approach to the German problem and the need for its overall solution had become less pressing. Moreover, their flexibility was to encourage the smaller West European states, by now sympathizing with the Soviet approach, to press for greater flexibility on the part of the West in its reactions to Soviet proposals. This, combined with what V. Matveyev in *Izvestia* called "the mobilization of public opinion" — the Soviet conference proposal was endorsed by the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in June, the World Peace Assembly in Berlin also in

¹⁹*Ibid.*, April 24, 1969.

²⁰*Ibid.*, July 30, 1969.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Ibid.*, July 29, 1969.

June, the International Conference of Journalists in Warsaw in September 1969, and the meeting of twenty-eight European communist parties in Moscow in January 1970 — was to speed the conference's convocation.²³

The next meeting of the WTO foreign ministers, held in Prague on October 30-31, 1969, formalized the modifications in the Soviet proposal made during the spring and summer contacts between East and West. Coming two days after Chancellor Brandt had publicly acknowledged the existence of two German states, it could the more easily remove the German question from the suggested agenda and recommend the following priorities for the conference: mutual security guarantees including renunciation of the threat and use of force, and agreements to widen economic, scientific and technical cooperation among all European states.²⁴

East Germany went along with this new version of the plan but its Foreign Minister, Otto Winzer, in an article published in *Neues Deutschland* on November 4, 1969, cautioned that "it would be false to view bilateral treaties as a necessary stage on the way to a security conference."²⁵ Obviously the East German government continued to worry about its cause being sacrificed to a series of bilateral rapprochements between West Germany and the several East European states. The Rumanians, on the other hand, concerned lest the proposed conference freeze the status quo and especially the Brezhnev Doctrine, renewed their advocacy of the withdrawal of foreign troops and the elimination of foreign military bases.

A *New York Times* editorial commented on the new approach of the Prague declaration: "The vague idea previously advanced by Moscow that a comprehensive new security system in Europe replace NATO and Warsaw Pact is no longer in the forefront of Eastern proposals . . . priority is given to a network of bilateral East-West treaties renouncing force and the threat of force."²⁶ But behind this change the *New York Times* continued to see the same central objective of Soviet policy in Europe: confirmation of

²³*Izvestia*, September 18, 1969. See also V. Matveyev, "Lessons of History and European Security," *International Affairs* (Moscow), June 1970, pp. 9-14. In the spring of 1968, representatives of scholarly institutions from the Warsaw Pact countries and Yugoslavia held a seminar on European security in Moscow, which was reported in detail in *International Affairs*, June 1968, pp. 68-76, and July 1968, pp. 68-75. The editorial board of this monthly journal published its own discussion of the issue in November 1971, pp. 64-88.

²⁴*Pravda*, November 1, 1969, translated in *CDSP*, November 19, 1969, pp. 18-19.

²⁵*New York Times*, November 14, 1969.

²⁶*Ibid.*, November 12, 1969.

the status quo, including the division of Germany, and recognition of Eastern Europe as an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence.

Although the lowered sights of the Prague communiqué evoked a generally positive unofficial Western reaction, NATO, at its meeting immediately following the WTO conference, was not so receptive. It was reported from the NATO meeting that "the United States view . . . was decisive in establishing a negative, if temporary, stance toward the Warsaw Pact proposal."²⁷ To the United States the Prague proposal still seemed ambiguous regarding the American and Canadian status at the conference and too fuzzy on the nature of security steps the Warsaw Pact would be willing to take. "Why not, the Americans said, get down to cases and ask the other side where it stood on balanced and mutual force reduction in Europe?"²⁸ Despite some dissension from a few smaller NATO members like Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and also Italy, it was the U.S. call for discussion of MBFR between NATO and the Warsaw Pact that carried the meeting. This was an area where American participation was of the essence, the American hand strongest, and the benefits and burdens of anticipated results balanced. Thus a year and a half after Reykjavik, where Brandt had pressed NATO to negotiate with the USSR on mutual arms reductions in Europe, MBFR began to emerge as the West's central alternative to the Soviet approach.

The Soviets were displeased with NATO's refusal to commit its members to a multilateral conference in 1970, blaming the United States and the "Atlanticists" in Bonn and London for sabotaging the Warsaw Pact proposal. At the December 1969 meeting of WTO leaders in Moscow, however, the communist countries implied their willingness to engage in bilateral negotiations with all countries, including West Germany, when they proclaimed that they were "fully determined to develop their relations with other European states that wish to cooperate on the basis" of the principles of equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing frontiers.²⁹ At the same time, the Soviet Union was directly and indirectly assuring the United States of her favorable attitude toward American participation in the all-European conference.

²⁷*Ibid.*, November 6, 1969.

²⁸*Ibid.*, November 9, 1969, Section IV, p. 6.

²⁹*Prauda*, December 5, 1969, translated in *CDSP*, December 24, 1969, pp. 24-25. For a wave of articles critical of NATO's position, see *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1970, February-March 1970 and May 1970.

The NATO reply to the Moscow communiqué, issued almost immediately, was described as both "receptive" and "a hesitant step, hedged with conditions, toward any meeting with the Soviet bloc powers."⁸⁰ It stressed again the need for guarantees of free access to West Berlin, establishment of a working agreement between East and West Germany, and mutual and balanced force reductions under conditions of adequate verification and control.

THE EXPLORATORY PHASE

These exchanges of late 1969 brought to a close the preliminary consideration of the European security conference. It had begun with a sweeping Soviet-bloc suggestion in 1966 and ended more than three years later with a modest scheme significantly influenced by the West. This shift was accomplished through an interchange of public declarations by the Warsaw Pact and NATO, with the minimum support of traditional diplomacy and maximum help from developments especially in Germany. In February 1970, *Pravda* could claim editorially that twenty-four European states had expressed themselves in favor of the conference.⁸¹

In 1970, however, the opposing alliances entered the more difficult exploratory phase during which a common understanding of the defined issue had to be established. At its foreign ministers' meeting in May 1970, NATO was first to invite the Soviet bloc to engage in "multilateral exploratory" talks to discuss the possibilities of MBFR in Central Europe as well as the convening of a conference or a series of conferences on European security.

The immediate Soviet and East European reaction was a mixture of denunciation and cautious consideration. TASS suspected the Western suggestion of being "full of reservations intended to confuse the clear-cut problem and to drown in endless procedural questions the urgent proposal that meets the most vital interests of the peoples of Europe."⁸² *Neues Deutschland* rejected it more flatly as "pure demagoguery." On the other hand, Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter reportedly wished the Warsaw Pact nations to take the NATO proposal into consideration.⁸³

More important was the collective response of the WTO foreign ministers who met in Budapest on June 21-22, 1970. In their

⁸⁰*New York Times*, December 6, 1969.

⁸¹*Pravda*, February 2, 1970, translated in *CDSP*, March 3, 1970, pp. 16-17.

⁸²*Ibid.*, May 22, 1970, translated in *CDSP*, June 23, 1970, p. 16.

⁸³*New York Times*, May 30, 1970.

memorandum, which they asked the Hungarian government to transmit to the governments of those states that would possibly take part in the conference and that for the first time explicitly included Canada and the United States, they enlarged the Prague agenda by extending the original proposal for cooperation to the fields of culture and environment and by proposing the creation at the conference of a permanent organ for questions of security and cooperation in Europe. They also authorized Hungarian representatives in various NATO capitals to indicate a new willingness on the part of the Soviet bloc to discuss reduction of military forces in Europe.⁸⁴

This apparent breakthrough, along with the signing of the nonaggression treaty between the Soviet Union and West Germany in August 1970, led authoritative sources in NATO to regard a European security conference as "quite likely in 1971."

A *New York Times* comment, however, correctly appraised the remaining obstacles to convening the conference. First, the removal of "foreign troops" from European soil was subject to varying interpretations not only between West and East, but among the communist countries themselves:

One East European government considers that "foreign troops" means all troops in other countries: Russians in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as well as Americans, Canadians and British in West Germany.

Other Communist countries regard the phrase as applying only to American and Canadian forces.⁸⁵

This long-standing difference of opinion between what obviously was Rumania and the other Warsaw Pact countries "appeared to American sources to demand a more definitive statement before preparations for a conference can be discussed," while the Soviet Union appeared "to want to hold a conference first and then discuss force reductions."⁸⁶ A second barrier to agreement on convening the conference was identified as American insistence on including the Brezhnev Doctrine in its agenda. The Soviets were expected to refuse to take part in any meeting in which this subject would come up for discussion.

Between the spring and winter 1970 meetings of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO, first the Soviet Union and then Poland signed

⁸⁴*Pravda*, June 27, 1970, translated in *CDSP*, July 28, 1970, p. 27. See also the editorial, "New Stage in Preparation for All-European Conference," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1970, pp. 3-6.

⁸⁵*New York Times*, August 19, 1970.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*

a nonaggression pact with West Germany. The treaties, which these two East European powers had for so long considered inadequate substitutes for an overall settlement, now brought them the first tangible victory in their approach to the West: Bonn's recognition in international law of their western frontiers and an implicit acknowledgment of the existence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of East Germany. They marked a long stride toward what the Warsaw Pact had hoped to obtain in a general peace treaty, and subsequently from an all-European security conference. They also set in motion a new consideration of the German question concentrating on the unfinished business of German-Czechoslovak relations, the position of West Berlin and the status of East Germany.

In 1970, the Political Consultative Committee of the WTO met first in Moscow in August to hear the Soviet report on the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty and endorse it as a further step toward the security conference. More important, however, was its second meeting, held characteristically in East Berlin in the first week of December, which raised the three issues explicitly and with renewed urgency. The Committee gave its support to the Czechoslovak demand that West Germany recognize the Munich Agreement as invalid *ab initio*; left the question of West Berlin for the four great powers to handle, but not without an admonition; and attached the greatest import to the cause of East Germany. Not since the Karlovy Vary meeting in the spring of 1967 had the Warsaw Pact put this last argument forward with so much emphasis. The Committee expressed its unanimous solidarity "with the peace-loving policy of the German Democratic Republic," urged the establishment of equal relations between East and West Germany, called for East Germany's admission to the United Nations, and warned that without East German participation it would be impossible to build "the edifice of lasting peace" in Central Europe. Procedurally, preparations for the security conference were to be hastened through bilateral and multilateral talks, especially since the Warsaw Pact countries assumed that the conference agenda had already been "largely outlined."⁸⁷

What the "largely outlined" agenda was, however, was not quite clear to the Western powers. If it was to be the one suggested in Budapest half a year before — a general nonaggression pact, wider

⁸⁷*Prauda*, December 3, 1970, translated in *CDSP*, January 5, 1971, pp. 1-3.

economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation, and the establishment of a security council for Europe, they were not prepared to commit themselves on that scale and in the abstract before some of their preconditions had been met. Instead, at the Brussels meeting of NATO foreign ministers the West asked for a Berlin settlement before even the first steps toward an East-West security conference could be taken. A satisfactory solution meant unhindered access to West Berlin, improved circulation between the two parts of the city, and recognition of the existing ties between West Berlin and West Germany. Furthermore, some progress had to be made in East-West German discussions and in the arms limitation talks, if the NATO countries were to go ahead with preparations for a security conference. To top its conditions, NATO injected into the agenda the request that all participants recognize the sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of every European country and the right of self-determination free of outside constraint — a euphemism for the abrogation of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The Soviets condemned the Brussels meeting as having been "dominated by 'hawks' led by the U.S.," with the Americans trying to "revive dangerous cold war methods" and creating "artificial obstacles to an improving atmosphere in Europe."⁸⁸ These arguments were then embraced in Bucharest by another Warsaw Pact meeting in February 1971. Repeating the substantive proposals of the preceding meeting in East Berlin, the Bucharest communiqué denounced what the East European bloc interpreted as an intensification of opposition to the security conference that "manifests itself in the setting of various preliminary conditions in order to complicate the preparatory work and to link the question of convening the conference with other problems."⁸⁹

To counteract the Western approach, the WTO ministers reaffirmed the importance of transferring exploratory talks from the bilateral to the multilateral level and their interest in holding a preparatory meeting — without knowing, however, how to bring the West to Helsinki with them. Through a procedural maneuver they sought a larger sanction of their partial settlement with Bonn and its extension. Since the Western powers were not prepared to grant either without substantive compensation from the East, the West found itself in control of a proposal it had not initiated, but

⁸⁸*New York Times*, December 5, 1970.

⁸⁹*Pravda*, February 20, 1971, translated in *CDSP*, March 23, 1971, p. 19.

which it now generally accepted and wished only to make suit its interests.

In Lisbon in June 1971, NATO said no more about the security conference than it had said in Brussels the preceding December. Yet subsequent reactions from the Soviet Union showed that the West was now in the driver's seat. Solution of the Berlin question remained NATO's precondition for the conference, while its interest was focused on MBFR. Senator Mansfield's call for a unilateral cut in American forces in Europe compelled the United States and NATO to give force reductions top priority, and for the first time the Soviets reacted positively to this new and specific version of a proposal about which they had forgotten after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In his electoral speech on June 10, 1971, Podgorny would have preferred that all European issues "be solved simultaneously, parallel with each other, and not wound together into one knot" — in other words, no preconditions for the security conference — but he conceded that on the question of troop and armaments reductions in Central Europe it was "necessary to start negotiations in order to define the volume and nature of possible agreements and to test the intentions of sides concerning these issues."⁴⁰ On the following day Brezhnev declared that MBFR was a "big and independent question" and that the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss both national and foreign armed forces in Central Europe.

This NATO-Moscow exchange laid down two tracks that would be followed by the Soviets in the next, preparatory phase of the European conference. On the one hand, the idea of a general conference was to be pursued, as Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Tsarapkin's visit to Denmark, Norway and Great Britain, shortly after Lisbon, indicated. On the other hand, through her embassy in Washington, allegedly acting on behalf of the entire Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union began exploring with the American Secretary of State the possibility of East-West negotiations on a mutual reduction of forces in Europe.

Nevertheless, the focus remained on the security conference, and the Soviets tried characteristically to turn their government's preoccupation into a popular issue. In June 1971 an array of Soviet organizations — trade unions, youth, women, scientists, cultural workers, parliamentarians — decided to establish a Soviet

⁴⁰*New York Times*, June 11, 1971. An editorial in the same issue of the *New York Times* suggested that Gromyko told Ambassador Beam in May "the Soviet Union was ready for specific talks on troop cuts without waiting for the security conference."

Committee for European Security "to facilitate the coordination of their activities in the struggle to implement" the government's proposal.⁴¹ By the fall the Committee had established contact with corresponding front organizations in several European countries and was getting ready for "an assembly of European public forces" that had declared themselves in favor of European security and cooperation. But when this assembly met in Brussels in early June 1972 it disappointed Moscow on three counts: it failed to attract any politically significant West European organizations or individuals; even those who came failed to agree among themselves to support unconditionally the Soviet analysis of the situation in Europe and promotion of a security conference; and the impact of the assembly on the West European public and governments was negligible.⁴² On issues of this complexity, it appeared, the day of the front organization was passing and only the road of diplomacy could be relied on.

In President Nixon's view, the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, reached on September 3, 1971, removed the most important obstacle in the way of the European conference. Although it did not restore West Berlin to the status it had enjoyed before the erection of the wall in 1961, it improved its condition considerably. The Soviets, assuming the Berlin agreement had a favorable psychological impact in the West, began almost immediately to intensify their drive for the conference. When Chancellor Brandt visited Brezhnev at Yalta in the wake of the Berlin agreement, he promised to help accelerate the holding of the conference. In Paris Brezhnev secured as complete an endorsement of his plan from a Western power as he could have hoped for. The Franco-Soviet Declaration of October 30, 1971, issued at the conclusion of his visit, pledged France not only to the security and cooperation aspects of the proposed conference but also to the support of its multilateral preparation in Helsinki so that it could be held in 1972.

Conspicuous in this part of the Declaration was its emphasis on "respect for the principles of territorial integrity of states, noninterference in their internal affairs, equality and independence of all states" as a condition of European security and the absence of any reference to MBFR.⁴³ Although the first state-

⁴¹*Pravda*, June 3, 1971, translated in *CDSP*, June 29, 1971, p. 15.

⁴²Sh. Sanakoyev, "Lasting Peace, Effective Security for Europe," *International Affairs* (Moscow), August 1972, pp. 9-13.

⁴³Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, *French-Soviet Declaration, October 30, 1971* (mimeo.), pp. 2-3. See also *Le Monde: Sélection Hebdomadaire*, No. 132, October 1971.

ment smacked of opposition to the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviets may have been inclined to interpret it as a bar to any Western concern for East Germany and to assume that their freedom in Eastern Europe would remain unimpaired. Since they never liked the link between the security conference and the reduction of forces in Europe, they may have tacitly welcomed France's strong reservations on this score and gladly endorsed this issue's exclusion from the Declaration.

This interpretation is reinforced by two subsequent developments. First, at a meeting in Bracciano of foreign ministers from the ten states that would make up the enlarged European Economic Community, French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann argued that the security conference should not deal with the question of MBFR because it would work only to the West's prejudice. Second, although a special NATO meeting chose former Secretary-General Manlio Brosio to represent it in exploratory talks with the Soviet Union on mutual troop withdrawals in Europe as early as October 6, 1971, so that he might report to a NATO ministers' meeting in December, the Soviet government never replied to NATO's request that Brosio be received in Moscow.

It was argued that the refusal of Brosio's mission was due to Moscow's opposition to the discussion of force reductions between the blocs and its desire that countries outside the two military alliances be included in the consideration of this issue. However, at their December 1971 meeting the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers also avoided the MBFR issue, called only for "preliminary consultations of 'all interested parties' to establish the framework of a European security conference," and decided to appoint representatives for "multilateral consultations."⁴⁴ A week later, at the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, Brezhnev reiterated this position. Although he also acknowledged that reductions in armed forces were necessary for an improvement of the political atmosphere in Europe, he did not tie them to his pressure for the conference. Kosygin, during his visit to Denmark and Norway, suggested that the issue of force reductions be handled by a subcommittee of the proposed security conference.

The emerging Soviet strategy of a multilateral approach to the conference and of playing down MBFR was to meet with expected opposition from the majority of the NATO powers led by

⁴⁴*Pravda*, December 3, 1971, translated in *CDSP*, December 28, 1971, p. 21.

the United States. Multilateralism meant fragmentation of the West, while, with the possible exception of Rumania, the Soviet Union could trust the discipline of the members of her bloc. Downgrading the issue of the size and deployment of military forces in Europe removed the only incentive the West might have had for the conference. Therefore, at the NATO Council meeting which followed immediately after the Warsaw Pact session, Secretary of State Rogers put the weight of the United States behind a bloc-to-bloc approach to the conference when he urged his Western allies to prepare a common line, and NATO's Secretary-General, Dr. Joseph M. A. Luns, warned the Soviet Union that without her agreement "to talks on force reductions, either at the conference or at a separate meeting, no East-West discussions would have great significance."⁴⁵

Izvestia naturally objected to these conditions as American and British obstacles to the conference,⁴⁶ but a month later the leaders of the seven Warsaw Pact powers, meeting in Prague, made a concession on one of the two issues. While continuing to object to bloc-to-bloc negotiations, in their Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe they specified for the first time that the agreement to reduce forces on the continent should include national armies as well as foreign troops and, using the Brezhnev-Brandt Yalta formula, also suggested that no reductions should work "to the detriment of the countries taking part" — the Soviet equivalent to NATO's formula of mutual and balanced force reductions.⁴⁷

Soviet pressure supported by a certain degree of accommodation to the stance of the West, and American interest in improved relations with the Soviet Union, finally produced what had so far eluded the conference planners: the seal of American approval. At the end of his visit to Moscow in May 1972, President Nixon endorsed multilateral preparation of the conference and its convocation "without undue delay" as well as separation from the security conference of the issue of reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments.

This separation of the two issues was not a simple concession to the Soviet Union. The Nixon Administration's original linkage between the conference and arms cuts had already served its

⁴⁵*New York Times*, December 4, 1971.

⁴⁶*Izvestia* December 12, 1971.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, January 27, 1972. For the translation of the Prague Declaration, see CDSP, February 23, 1972, pp. 8-10.

purpose by defusing Senator Mansfield's pressure for unilateral reduction of the American military presence in Europe. Moreover, the United States could not ignore that, in the eyes of the NATO allies, even if force reductions could be truly mutual and balanced and not merely symbolic — applied to military bands, as Brandt once remarked caustically — the program carried with it a threat of military and political destabilization. Finally, like all preceding attempts at a multilateral modification of the existing distribution of military power, the more the MBFR plan had to be formulated in terms of specific measures rather than general principles, the more complicated and intractable it appeared.⁴⁸

The NATO Council meeting, immediately following the American President's visit to the Soviet Union, embraced the Brezhnev-Nixon formula unexceptionally. It approved "multilateral conversations concerned with preparations for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" (CSCE) on the one hand, and on the other hand merely appealed to the Soviet Union "that multilateral explorations on mutual and balanced force reductions be undertaken as soon as practicable, either before or in parallel with multilateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe."⁴⁹ But the Council added that the conference should also concern itself with the freedom of movement of people, ideas and information in Europe.

To this demand the Soviets reacted with verbal violence characteristic of their opposition to any relaxation of communist states' control over the lives of individual citizens. *Pravda* labeled it an "impudent and defiant 'list of concessions'" designed "to interfere in the internal affairs of the socialist countries."⁵⁰ In *International Affairs* Sh. Sanakoyev refused it as not connected with international relations, but belonging "to the sphere of ideological struggle in the world arena."⁵¹ The conference was to deal with *interstate* relations, not the problems of individual citizens. The citizens, however, were expected to make their contribution to the conference's success by their massive support.⁵²

⁴⁸*New York Times*, February 20, 1972. See also Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "NATO and European Security: Prospects for the 1970's," *ORBIS*, Spring 1971, pp. 154-177.

⁴⁹*New York Times*, June 1, 1972.

⁵⁰*Pravda*, October 10, 1972.

⁵¹Sanakoyev, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

⁵²A. Gorokhov, "Practical Preparations for an All-European Conference," *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1972, pp. 3-6.

While protecting themselves against a breach in the wall separating the East European peoples from the West — or, as Sanakoyev said, in “the barriers standing in [the] way of imperialism,”⁵³ the Soviets had no consolation for the West: “It is absolutely impossible,” wrote Sanakoyev in a later article, “to offer [the advocates of Atlantic solidarity] guarantees against any social upheavals likely to be caused in the future by the inner workings of capitalist society and by the aggravation of its social and economic contradictions.”⁵⁴ In this manner the Soviet Union reiterated the conception of peaceful coexistence on the European continent she wanted sanctioned by the security conference: guaranteed untouchability of her own sphere in the East and an open field for political penetration in the West.

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These exchanges, however, could no longer close the door to multilateral preparatory consultations opened by the United States' approval of the European security conference and by Moscow's agreement to take part in a separate conference on MBFR. Thus the developments of 1971 and 1972 gave the USSR two significant victories. (1) In order to secure Western endorsement of the conference, the Soviets agreed to include in its agenda consideration of MBFR but in the end succeeded in extricating themselves from this linkage because the Western powers, its original advocates, failed to hold to it. (2) The Western powers accepted multilateral consultations as the approach to the conference — a procedure advocated by the Soviets from the beginning.

The purpose of consultations among the thirty-four participating countries, which commenced in Helsinki on November 22, 1972, was to determine the agenda and decide when and where the conference should be held. The Soviets indicated that they would like it to convene in Helsinki in June 1973. What they offered in the early consultations on the agenda was as limited and general as their final proposals in the diplomatic campaign that led to Helsinki: security guarantees, extension of commercial, scientific, technological, cultural and ecological cooperation, and establishment of a European agency to supervise peace and cooperation on the continent. Nevertheless, in order to secure con-

⁵³Sanakoyev, *op. cit.*

⁵⁴Sh. Sanakoyev, “Peace in Europe and the Confrontation of the Two Systems,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1972, pp. 8-15.

vocation of the conference, they had to make a number of concessions to the West, whose views were most effectively advocated by the united diplomacy of the Common Market countries.

In the section of the agenda relating to security in Europe the Soviet Union agreed that each participating state was to respect and apply a long list of standard principles of international conduct in its relations with all other states, "irrespective of their political, economic, and social systems." During the early stages of the preliminary consultations the Soviet delegation viewed the last clause as completely unnecessary, regarding it as an obvious barrier against the Brezhnev Doctrine, then offered a compromise replacement — "irrespective of the differences between their political, economic, and social systems" — which would have narrowed application of the accepted principles to relations between East and West, but gave way in the end. The West also succeeded in including among the security principles the right of self-determination, which the Soviets had for so long resisted as applicable only in colonial situations.

During these consultations the need for concrete measures that would create mutual confidence and lead to a reduction of tensions was generally recognized, but the Soviet delegation hesitated to be specific about them. However, when an agreement was finally reached on the agenda to be submitted to the conference of foreign ministers, the Soviet Union approved of including in it consideration of such confidence-building measures as the prior notification of, and exchange of military observers for, major military maneuvers and the quite controversial "prior notification of major military movements."⁵⁵

While the section on economic, scientific, technological and ecological cooperation remained relatively noncontroversial, "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields" proved to be the most difficult issue confronted in Helsinki. Restating the Western position developed in the NATO Council, the United States proposed that the agenda should address the removal of "some of the real impediments of free contact" among the peoples of the participating countries and the increased flow of information and ideas.⁵⁶ This proposal became the principal subject of protracted negotiations. After their initial hard-line resistance to such a liberalization of human contacts, because they saw in it an instrument of ideological subversion, the Soviets modified their op-

⁵⁵*New York Times*, June 23, 1973; *The Times* (London), July 2, 1973.

⁵⁶*New York Times*, December 5, 1972.

position and proposed their own version of this point: expansion of cultural cooperation, of contacts among organizations and people, of collective and individual tourism, of youth exchanges, of meetings between professional people, and of dissemination of information, provided that such an expansion contributes to peace and understanding, does not spread an "anticulture" including "pornography, racism, fascism, the cult of violence, hostility among peoples," and the elastic "false slanderous propaganda," and is conducted "on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, laws and customs of each country."⁸⁷

This version, reinforced by Soviet opposition to any reference to the free flow of ideas and free access to information, advanced a principle of selectivity in the area of humanitarian cooperation over which the USSR and her communist partners would have had sovereign control; as Richard Davy wrote in the *London Times*, "it would have allowed them to select and reject as they pleased."⁸⁸ Western rejection of such a shackling of human contacts and of the sanctioning of a revised Iron Curtain induced Soviet negotiators to concede the formula specifying respect to "the sovereignty, laws and customs of each country" and the subjective qualification excluding fascist, pornographic and war-mongering literature from exchanges among the involved states. The final agenda did not, however, contain reference to a freer flow of ideas.

The Soviet proposal for creation of a permanent organ to continue the work of the conference by dealing with questions of European security and cooperation, first put forward in Budapest in 1970, would have bound the West to establishing an institution before any agreement on its specific function had been reached. The West compromised by allowing the coordinating committee to be charged only to consider "such measures as may be required to give further effect to the decisions of the conference and to further the process of improving security and developing cooperation in Europe."⁸⁹

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING

What the Soviet Union had given away in order to bring the preparatory consultations to a close, she tried immediately to reclaim during the first phase of the conference itself when the

⁸⁷*The Times* (London), January 23, 1973 and July 3, 1973.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, July 3, 1973.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*

thirty-five foreign ministers met in Helsinki between July 3 and 6, 1973. In his speech Gromyko brought back the clause, "strict observance of the laws, customs, and traditions in all contacts among the European states and peoples."⁶⁰ Moreover, the Eastern bloc surprised the assembly by presenting it with several detailed draft declarations and projects obviously designed to define the specific terms of the conference's second phase, to be held in Geneva in the fall.

The Soviets' draft of a general declaration on the foundations of European security and the principles governing relations between European states amounted to a request for ratification and regulation of Moscow's concept of coexistence.⁶¹ When a correspondent asked the Soviet spokesman whether the Soviet draft provision concerning "nonintervention in internal affairs of other states" would prevent recurrence of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, he was told that "assistance was granted . . . on the request of the Czech government"; "there was no interference in Czech internal affairs and this should continue to be so in the future."⁶² No wonder a West German delegate found this new Soviet position about the same as it had been at the beginning of the preparatory talks and, therefore, "unacceptable and too general for a final resolution."⁶³ In other Western responses, Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoep insisted that people of every state had the right "to change political, economic, social and cultural systems," and Sir Alec Douglas-Home warned, "If we do not improve the life of ordinary people at this conference, we shall be asked, and with justice, what all our fine words and diplomatic phrases have achieved."⁶⁴

East Germany and Hungary produced an elaborate document on economic, scientific, technological and environmental cooperation. Poland and Bulgaria covered the project of cultural relations and exchange of information. Finally, the Czechoslovakian draft reintroduced the proposal for the establishment of a permanent consultative committee.⁶⁵ Thus the ground already covered during the preparatory consultations was to be retraced and struggled over again in Geneva.

⁶⁰*Izvestia*, July 5, 1973.

⁶¹*Ibid.*

⁶²*New York Times*, July 5, 1973.

⁶³*Ibid.*

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, July 6, 1973.

⁶⁵*Izvestia*, July 7, 1973.

CONCLUSION

Moscow's long and successful campaign to convoke an all-European conference has again cast the Soviet Union as the promoter of international peace and security. While her performance may have tarnished her image on both counts, to a divided Europe the call for cooperation has placed the Soviets in an unassailable position of great moral value. It would be a mistake, however, to think that Moscow has been interested only in scoring propagandistic, symbolic and moral points. If our hypothesis is correct — and the history of the Soviet proposal for a European security conference does not deny it — the Soviets have *already* accomplished most of what could have been their tangible objectives at a peace conference with Germany. What remained, after the first stage in Helsinki, was for Europe, the United States and Canada collectively to ratify these gains: to sanction Soviet acquisition of former Czechoslovak, German and Polish lands in addition to the already approved annexation of Finnish and Rumanian territories; to approve a status for Berlin which, in terms of the Berliners' own interests, is worse than it was before the 1948-1949 blockade; and to guarantee the Soviet Union access to the economic, scientific and technological resources of the Western world. The long-term consequences of the conference — the psychological effect on the East Europeans of the petrification of the status quo, the moral disarmament of Western Europe, and the encouragement of the American propensity toward a reduced commitment on the continent — may be more incalculable but no less real.

The counterproposals made by the West featured three elements that were supposed to compensate it for Soviet gains. One was purely symbolic and had as much practical value as the Yalta Declaration: the commitment to respect sovereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity, and the right of self-determination free of outside constraint. Even in this traditional and legalistic statement of principles supposedly governing relations among nations at least since the days of the League of Nations Covenant, the Soviet Union tried, finally in vain, to replace the last clause, which came from the December 1970 NATO statement, with the weaker and vague "noninterference in internal affairs" to be found originally in the Bucharest Declaration of 1966, and later in the Nixon-Brezhnev communiqué of May 30, 1972. Moreover, the Soviet Union has already concluded treaties with

some East European states — Czechoslovakia, for example — that provide for close cooperation between her and her partner for the purpose of maintaining “the economic and social gains of the two peoples” and that are nothing more than a license for Soviet intervention in the partner’s internal affairs. In the Soviet view, such treaties outrank even the Charter of the United Nations; they will certainly eclipse the provisions of any European security pact, and through their mechanism will safeguard the new security system of the Soviet sphere of control and any extension thereof.

The second Western counterproposal that emerged from the Helsinki consultations demanded the freer movement of people, ideas and information in Europe. This was the only feasible approach toward greater unity and, therefore, toward a new structure of peace and security on the continent. On this issue the West should make no concessions, because the principal source of Europe’s malady lies not in relations between East and West, but in the lack of fundamental freedoms in the East and in the denial of free contact between the Eastern and Western peoples that, as the *Economist* pointed out, “breeds fear, misunderstanding, suspicion and hence insecurity.”⁶⁶ Soviet reaction to this form of rapprochement was ominous. While the Soviet delegation made some concessions in Helsinki, hedging them in ambivalent generalities and flexible qualifications, inside the USSR the position remained categorical: the ideological struggle will grow relentlessly and steadily sharper, and cooperation with the West will be allowed to erode neither its inspiration nor its goals.⁶⁷ A conference that evades this issue will bury Eastern Europe under a twentieth-century version of the Peace of Westphalia’s *cuius regio eius religio*, perpetuate the continent’s unnatural division, and leave the world charged with incessant ideological confrontation generating its own explosive consequences. An editorial in *The Times* of London told the European communist states bluntly that if they were not ready for human contacts, they had “no business to be talking about cooperation and coexistence.”⁶⁸

The third element in the Western negotiating position is MBFR, which the Soviet Union has always tried — and finally managed — to separate from the security conference as an issue to be handled on its own merit. Yet it is the only item in the entire

⁶⁶December 9, 1972, p. 33.

⁶⁷V. Kudinov and V. Pletnikov, “Ideological Confrontation of the Two Systems,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), December 1972, pp. 57-64.

⁶⁸July 3, 1973.

package where a certain degree of reciprocity obtains. Moreover, if in a specified period of time the implementation of this counter-proposal were to lead to a permanent withdrawal of Soviet forces to their own territory, it could reduce, if not eliminate, Moscow's pressure on internal developments in the East European states and allow for their autonomy in harmony with the acknowledged principle of self-determination.

It is unlikely that an agreement on MBFR can be reached to coincide with the outcome of the CSCE. The Western powers have correctly established a link between the political problems of the security conference and the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe, but they have been wrong about the order of business in wishing to settle the arms cuts first. Once they conceded to the Soviets that there was a political issue for the CSCE to handle, they were trapped by the age-old maxim that political accommodation must come before any armaments regulation. Since the security conference is also a conference on cooperation, however, the West may still have a final trump in its hands. It can and should refuse to carry out any political, economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperative arrangements as long as the Soviet Union refuses to pay fairly for her gains and security. More is required of her than a verbal guarantee of the independence and security of all other European states while she waits, hoping that eventually domestic developments in the United States and on the continent will force America out of Europe and make the whole of Europe dependent on Moscow's good will.

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Section III. MBFR: Four Readings

One should not take an isolated view of MBFR for it is only one of several interrelated arms control negotiations currently in progress. The readings which follow describe some of the linkages which MBFR has with CSCE and SALT. (Also see Figure 1 below.) The readings also describe some factors impacting on the East and West European Alliance Systems.

June 1969	North Atlantic Council meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, calls for "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions".
December 1970	The United States informs the North Atlantic Council that it will not conduct unilateral reductions
June 1970	Warsaw Pact indicates it would discuss mutual reductions only as part of a European Security Conference.
May 1971	Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev calls for force reductions in a speech at Tbilisi, Soviet Georgia.
January 1972	Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, meeting in Prague, reaffirms its willingness to participate in separate force reductions.
May 1972	President Nixon in Moscow receives specific Soviet assurances of willingness to begin negotiations.
Fall 1972	West and East lay groundwork for opening negotiations.
November 1972	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opens in Helsinki.
January-June 1973	Multilateral preliminary talks establish the format for MBFR.
October 30, 1973	Formal negotiations open in Vienna, Austria.

Figure 1. MBFR: A Chronology
(Source: Department of Defense, Commanders Digest, Vol 16, No. 20, Nov 74, p. 7)

GIST

—A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations primarily for Government use. Not intended as a comprehensive U.S. policy statement.



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EUROPE: MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

1. Background: The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations began formally on October 30, 1973. Nineteen countries are participating -- 12 on the NATO side; 7 on the Warsaw Pact side. These are divided into two categories:
 - direct participants, those who have forces or territory in Central Europe (Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the West; Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and the USSR for the East); and
 - indirect participants (Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, and Turkey in NATO; Bulgaria and Romania in the Warsaw Pact). Although Hungary is an indirect Pact participant, the Allies have reserved the right to raise the issue of Hungary's direct participation in the negotiations or in any agreement at some future date because of its location.

The fourth round of MBFR ended in Vienna December 12, 1974. While still far apart on the fundamental negotiating issues, both sides have taken initiatives to close the gap.
2. US Role: US forces in Europe, in their current size and composition, perform a vital function in addition to serving as a link to US strategic nuclear forces in the event of nuclear war. They help maintain a strong conventional defense in the event of attack from Pact forces, an essential mission which makes detente possible. They also serve as tangible evidence of America's determination to honor our Alliance commitments.
3. MBFR Rationale: MBFR negotiations cannot be viewed in isolation as merely a redefinition of the balance of power in Europe. Rather, they are part of an overall process of mutual confidence-building in the relationship between East and West known as detente. In Central Europe the Warsaw Pact has an advantage over NATO of approximately 150,000 men in ground forces and a large numerical superiority in tanks of about 9,500 over NATO. Soviet reinforcements are only 650 KM from the East-West frontier, while U.S. reinforcements are 5,000 KM away.
4. Issues: The fundamental issues on which the two sides continue to differ are:
 - the sequence of reductions;
 - the ratio of NATO to Warsaw Pact reductions;
 - the types of forces that should be reduced.

The West seeks approximate parity of ground force manpower, while

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ext. 20736

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the East seeks to maintain the existing unbalanced proportion of forces, but at a lower level.

A. Warsaw Pact position

The Pact proposes proportional, across-the-board reductions in manpower and associated equipment (ground, air, and nuclear) negotiated under a single agreement. Implementation would take place in three successive stages: an aggregate of 20,000 men for each alliance in 1975; 5% reductions of all forces in 1976; and 10% reductions in 1977. The Pact also proposes the establishment of ceilings on national forces which would, in effect, limit the size of force contributions by NATO countries such as West Germany, which now is the largest NATO contributor. Several NATO allies fear that national ceilings would constrain the development of Western European defense cooperation.

B. NATO position

The West continues to call for reductions in two phases:

Phase I to involve only US and Soviet ground forces, with both countries withdrawing a roughly equal percentage of these forces from Central Europe. Reductions by the two superpowers would help create stability and the confidence required for further reductions. A Phase I agreement would also specify, as the goal of the next round, an equal ground manpower common ceiling for each side.

Phase II negotiations would begin after Phase I reductions were completed, and would focus on force reductions of the other participants, to approximate parity on ground force manpower between the two sides.

5. Equitable outcome: Approximate parity for both East and West would be an equitable outcome. To this end, the final goal of the negotiations would be a common ceiling for overall ground force manpower, since such forces actually seize and hold territory. Reductions of ground forces, therefore, would produce an outcome which goes directly to the potential source of conflict in the area. Further, since any conflict in this area would include the risk of escalation to nuclear weapons use, eliminating the ground force imbalance would reduce the overall risk of war, conventional or nuclear.
6. Future prospects: Long-term prospects for balanced force reductions resulting from the MBFR negotiations are positive. But patience and persistence will be required. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies are negotiating seriously, and show an interest in making progress.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SEARCH FOR AN AMERICAN APPROACH

The search for an American approach to the problem of international security is a task of great importance. It is a task which requires a clear understanding of the nature of the problem and a willingness to explore new and innovative solutions. The search for an American approach is a task which requires a clear understanding of the nature of the problem and a willingness to explore new and innovative solutions. The search for an American approach is a task which requires a clear understanding of the nature of the problem and a willingness to explore new and innovative solutions.

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MBFR: THE SEARCH FOR AN AMERICAN APPROACH

by John Yochelson

TALKS on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, having served Washington as a domestic and diplomatic counter for most of the past five years, no longer remain comfortably distant. Until this year, the prospect of reciprocal troop cuts along the Central Front seemed close enough to be tactically useful yet remote enough not to require troubling choices of priorities, objectives and strategies. The self-proclaimed need to preserve a strong bargaining position for MBFR helped both the Johnson and Nixon administrations to fend off domestic demands for unilateral U.S. reductions.

Projected talks served an analogous role for a number of allied governments, promising also to bind the United States into a multilateral process in which West European interests could be taken effectively into account. NATO, with the notable exception of France, used MBFR as a device to parry Warsaw Pact proposals for a European security conference. Western emphasis on force reduction provided a concrete alternative to Eastern agendas emphasizing trade, technological interchange, and non-use of force declarations. Not only did MBFR appear to give substance and practical significance to security negotiations; it also seemed to place the Soviets on the defensive by calling attention to the internal control function of their forces in other Pact countries.¹

The opening of exploratory talks in Vienna in January 1973, however, has marked a new stage by exposing conceptual difficulties and political tensions long recognized but never really faced. How are the diverse military capabilities of participants to be measured? What constitutes balance between which states? How much reduction is to be sought in differing categories of arms? How will nuclear guarantees be affected? How much coordination is possible and desirable within NATO? To what

¹On the tactics and background of MBFR, see Ian Smart, *MBFR Assailed: A Critical View of the Proposed Negotiation on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction in Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Occasional Paper No. 3, 1972), pp. 2-9. Also note Christoph Bertram, *Mutual Force Reduction in Europe: The Political Aspects* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 84, 1972), pp. 2-9.

degree do shared superpower interests transcend alliance commitments?

Although the Nixon Administration presumably has addressed or will address these hard questions, the course being charted remains far from clear to many observers. In 1970, the President's State of the World message scarcely touched upon MBFR; a year later, the American effort was characterized officially as one "to create a more stable military balance at lower levels and lower costs"; in 1972, the White House avoided this definition of objectives and appeared to harden its language by asserting that "undiminished military security for NATO is the only rational criterion for establishing force reduction."²

The absence of a consistently articulated position seems to reflect lack of consensus on the means needed to reach a new arms plateau and the political implications of getting there. White House statements have referred openly to uncertainties and divisions over appropriate analytic techniques, negotiating procedures, and preferred outcomes for MBFR.³ These admissions, in turn, are indicative of broader, unresolved problems that bear directly on the issue: the linkage between force postures and political relationships among allies and adversaries; the impact of détente on American security commitments abroad; the scope and significance of accommodation between Moscow and Washington; the proper distribution of defense contributions within NATO; and the further development of West European defense cooperation. Force reduction thus appears as one of several seemingly narrow items on the East-West agenda which may indeed test the underlying assumptions and direction of American foreign policy.

Without losing sight of the larger perspective, we can identify at least three strategies that seem to have some currency either in Washington or elsewhere in the arms control community: (1) the Quick Fix, designed to secure limited manpower reduction rapidly without sinking into a morass of technical detail; (2) the Ever-Present Balance, intended to maintain a stable security equilibrium through comprehensive negotiations; (3) the Protracted Parley, aimed at engaging in a long-run dialogue to build confidence and gradually ease the hold of the Soviet Union within the Eastern bloc. Each of these approaches envisages MBFR as a

²Richard Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: (I) A New Strategy for Peace* (Washington: GPO, February 18, 1970), p. 36; (II) *Building for Peace* (Washington: GPO, February 25, 1971), p. 40; (III) *The Emerging Structure of Peace* (Washington: GPO, February 9, 1972), p. 179.

³Nixon, *The Emerging Structure of Peace*, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-179.

response to a different primary problem: the first is conceived chiefly to quiet domestic demands for reduction, the second to keep military scales precisely balanced, and the third to forge new political relationships.

In reality, the three strategies reflect differing orders of priority rather than distinct, mutually exclusive choices. All seek to strike some balance between frequently competing domestic, intra-alliance, and interalliance requirements; all deal to a lesser or greater extent with calculations of NATO and Warsaw Pact military capabilities; all are concerned with the maintenance of roughly symmetrical relationships between alliances in Central Europe;⁴ and all are shaded in various nuances. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider the three separately as representative types of policy constructs. A simplified, schematic analysis of the strategies — their projected results, rationales and possible costs — should give some idea of where MBFR may be going or, at least, of the main criteria that ought to be considered by policymakers.

THE QUICK FIX

Repeated Congressional efforts to slice the American military establishment have spurred formulation of the Quick Fix strategy, which seeks to neutralize calls for sharp unilateral reduction while maintaining a high level of American involvement in security arrangements on the European continent. Proponents argue that 10 to 15 per cent cuts in U.S. and Soviet ground forces would suffice for this purpose and could be obtained within the two or three years required to be effective in the domestic arena. Once criticism at home had been quieted, the MBFR exercise probably would be terminated.

Meeting the necessary timetable would require a negotiating framework of greatest simplicity. Complex variables related to the measurement of military capabilities never could be passed over entirely, nor could the principals avoid central issues regarding the definition of zones covered, the disposition of forces taken out

⁴Thus far none of the American approaches to MBFR has put major emphasis upon adjustments on the flanks — either in the Baltic, where the Soviets are presumed to hold significant advantages, or in the Mediterranean, where NATO forces remain numerically superior. The flank issue has been raised in intra-alliance politics to the extent that both northern and southern tier countries have voiced concern over their influence on decisions made with respect to the Central Front. (See *Washington Post*, October 24, 1972, p. 11.) Furthermore, Soviet moves during the preliminary talks of early 1973 indicated an interest in including forces deployed in the Mediterranean on the MBFR agenda. The NATO response to this bid has been noncommittal, but indications are that reductions of land forces in Central Europe remain the key priority. *New York Times*, April 6, 1973, p. 10.

of the theater, the conditions of possible re-entry, and the mechanisms of verification to be employed. Nevertheless, the heart of the accord would be political rather than technical, centering on superpower commitment to redeploy or deactivate agreed numbers of troops. The likely outcome might be a proportionately equal reduction of manpower on each side. Such a formula would lie in the range of compromise between American proposals to offset the natural geopolitical advantages of the Soviets in Europe through disproportionate cutbacks, and Moscow's preferences for one-to-one numerical adjustments.⁵ The arrangement would be only marginally if at all extended to other NATO members in order to allow MBFR to serve as a device for redistributing alliance burdens.

The projected result of the Quick Fix manpower solution would be to strengthen triply the position of the Administration: First, the White House could use the agreement to demonstrate positive movement toward détente and proficiency in dealing with the Soviet Union. Second, the Executive could satisfy in some measure its own as well as Congressional demands for a more equitable division of labor within the NATO alliance. Third, the Defense Department could realize some budgetary and manpower economies, reducing the perennial problem of foreign exchange loss associated with troop stationing in Europe and perhaps relieving a squeeze in the size of the Army which may result from conversion to an all-volunteer force.⁶ At the same time, enough of the U.S. garrison would be left intact to express actually and symbolically the continuity of the American security engagement.

The case for a swift, essentially bilateral manpower arrangement rests first and foremost on an assessment of forces at work in the domestic political arena. Proponents view the intervention of Congress as inevitable if the Administration evades taking pre-emptive action. They point to a strong current of increasing dissatisfaction that has been manifest for half a dozen years, particularly in the Senate. The reduction efforts of Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, which at the outset took the form of a nonbinding sense-of-the-Senate resolution, have escalated into moves to amend U.S. policy through legislation. It is noted that an

⁵A Soviet perspective on MBFR has been sketched by Yu. Kostko, "Mutual Force Reduction in Europe," *Survival*, September-October 1972, pp. 236-238.

⁶For an analysis of budgetary and balance of payments issues, see Edward R. Fried, "The Financial Cost of Alliance," in John Newhouse, *et al.*, *U.S. Troops in Europe: Issues, Costs, and Choices* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 102-144.

initiative in November 1971 to impose unilateral cutbacks fell only twelve votes short of a majority and for the first time received endorsement from the traditionally conservative Senate Appropriations Committee.⁷

Debate in both houses of Congress, moreover, has reflected declining estimates of the Soviet threat, strong resentment over the insufficiency of allied military efforts, and willingness to challenge Presidential prerogatives with respect to deployment of forces abroad.⁸ These indicators, together with the absence of a powerful, vocal domestic constituency for the U.S. garrison outside the government, are said to portend an eventually successful attempt to withhold funds for NATO troop commitments. Advocates of the MBFR short-cut contend that the costs of denying such funds would be dangerously high; it would not only undermine the political and military credibility of Washington in Europe but would set precedents for tying the President's hands internationally. The aim of the White House, therefore, ought to be to do what is necessary to maintain its liberty of action.

The rationale behind the pre-emptive approach is also based on a cluster of estimates regarding the stability of the strategic balance, the incentives of the Soviet Union to reach agreement, and the reactions of allied governments. With respect to military issues, it is implied that the rough parity required to maintain mutual deterrence would not be substantially altered by the troop level changes envisaged. In the first place, the stable global balance is said to be decisive; in the second, any marginal Soviet advantage has been wiped out by the normalization in East-West relations which has enormously reduced the likelihood of conflict. Furthermore, those U.S. troops remaining after MBFR would be locked in by contractual agreement more securely than before, continuing to provide a link to the U.S. nuclear deterrent and to assure a conventional option.⁹ Flexible response would remain operative and the nuclear threshold could be held constant. In sum, the contemplated reductions would preserve the essence of

⁷*New York Times*, November 19, 1971, p. 1.

⁸For discussion of Congressional opposition and references, see John N. Yochelson, "The American Military Presence in Europe: Current Debate in the United States," *ORBIS*, Fall 1971, pp. 796-802.

⁹The type of contractual agreement reached would itself entail a significant choice. On the one hand, a loosely worded accord would seem to maximize White House flexibility in the disposition of forces. On the other, a tightly worded agreement fits the pattern of previous Nixon Administration dealings with the Soviets and would give greater assurance to NATO allies. A truly comprehensive treaty, however, might actually subvert the main objective of the Quick Fix by taking too much time to negotiate.

the security status quo without opening a Pandora's Box of divisive doctrinal issues.

With respect to Soviet incentives, Moscow is seen to have sufficient reason to draw down in Eastern Europe to allow a bargain to be struck. Motives cited are diverse: domestic economic pressures stemming from agricultural difficulties and demands for consumer goods; possible mounting military requirements along the Sino-Soviet frontier; interest in promoting détente to attract additional Western capital investment; and perhaps a desire to avoid a destabilizing unilateral U.S. pull-out which could catalyze unwanted West European defense efforts.¹⁰ Whatever the mix of factors, the Soviet Union is viewed as a state capable of finding a way to exercise its priority control function in the East with a few less divisions. Consequently MBFR could express the common interest of both superpowers to employ their forces in desired political and strategic modes on a somewhat decreased scale.

Lastly, proponents of the pre-emptive strategy gauge that its implementation would not do unacceptable damage to NATO relationships. Although West European governments could be expected to oppose any dealing between Moscow and Washington over their heads, they would nevertheless prefer mutual Soviet and American cuts to the prospect of more drastic one-sided U.S. reduction. Allies could be persuaded to hold the line themselves or to make proportionately smaller reductions than the United States if the White House gave solid assurance that the post-MBFR plateau of U.S. forces would be maintained. Moreover, some alliance partners might be prodded by evidence of superpower collaboration to intensify their own defense cooperation — an objective long supported by many in Washington.

The reasoning underlying the Quick Fix may reflect greater concern for domestic political constraints than sound analysis. A dissection of every point and possibility is unnecessary for our purposes, but it is useful to concentrate on two sets of potential pitfalls; those which could open up if the United States proves unable to reach the accord desired; and those which could be encountered even if an agreement is concluded.

Washington's capacity to gain any MBFR agreement hinges largely on Soviet behavior. What if the political leadership in the Kremlin is not as compliant as hoped? Although Leonid Brezhnev invited the West to taste the wine of mutual force reduction in

¹⁰Soviet motives are examined critically by Melvin Croan in Newhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-23.

May 1971 and restated his commitment to the objective more recently, the Soviets are well aware of the pressures for unilateral reduction on Capitol Hill and are likely to be less vulnerable to internal pressure than the American Administration.¹¹ They may calculate that it makes little sense to vouchsafe more than a token concession if Washington probably has to pull back in any case. In that event, the Soviets could either deny the United States an early MBFR result or could make an offer so skewed that its acceptance would be more damaging politically to the White House than a straightforward unilateral cut justified on the basis of cost effectiveness.

Were Moscow to combine the tactics of stalling with a position of intransigence, Washington could be placed in an awkward situation: breaking off talks would threaten to set back détente sharply; accepting a minuscule mutual reduction would not be of value domestically; concessions in other areas (perhaps tactical nuclear weapons) to sweeten Soviet incentives would precipitate a NATO crisis. In other words, making a domestically driven U.S. strategy contingent upon presumed Soviet self-interest promises to be a risky business. If the dangers of Congressional intervention are as great as claimed, a moderate unilateral withdrawal that created a stronger consensus for subsequent negotiation might prove wiser than a precarious race for results.¹²

Let us grant, however, that Moscow has reason to sign an agreement along the lines already described. Success would also involve important problems. First, a withdrawal of 20,000 or 30,000 troops from West Germany after several years of bargaining could be regarded by the Administration's legislative opposition as wholly inadequate. A pre-emptive strategy seen as too little, too late could subvert its own objectives by generating precisely the pressures it sought to control. For example, Congress could seek to step in by cutting appropriations to fund the U.S. contingent.

Second, the intra-alliance costs of a short-cut agreement stand to be much higher than its advocates suggest. Since West European governments continue to regard U.S. forces as the linchpin of NATO, they remain highly sensitive not merely to changes made

¹¹Soviet perceptions of the U.S. troop level debate are reflected in A. Gromyko, "U.S. Heavyweight in the European Ring," *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1971, pp. 16-23.

¹²The case for a moderate unilateral withdrawal as a means of initiating MBFR has been made most recently by Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal, "America's Move," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973, pp. 380-391. See also Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, *Detente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970's* (Cambridge, Mass.: Dunellen, 1970), pp. 62-67.

but to the way they are gone about. A bald attempt by the United States to reduce its earnest of commitment in conjunction with the Soviet Union would inevitably call into question the value of the commitment itself, perhaps no less so than a unilateral thinning of the presence. West Europeans already fear that Washington's insistence on separate forums for MBFR and the European security conference has set the stage for a ramrod approach. Some are concerned that talks could be used simply as a foil for U.S. reductions; others feel that an entangling web of Soviet-American understanding in security as well as nonsecurity matters could be woven at the expense of Western Europe.¹³

In the name of preserving the security status quo, the Quick Fix could actually entail major change and even reversal of alliance and adversary priorities. A superpower arrangement reached with minimal allied participation could not be said to cast U.S. troops as a dependable military, political and psychological backstop. Such an outcome, particularly if not linked to a follow-up phase of West European reduction, could leave many NATO members contending with powerful pressures to join in scaling down.¹⁴ Decisions to do so, tearing the fabric of the alliance further, might again foster exactly the kind of destabilization that the architects of the short-cut strategy seek to avoid.

A final issue concerns the unwelcome military effects that might result from a U.S.-USSR agreement to reduce troop levels. Some critics contend that these negative implications alone disqualify the Quick Fix. Their objections provide the point of departure for an alternative approach.

THE EVER-PRESENT BALANCE

The strategy of the Ever-Present Balance widens the primary focus of MBFR from manpower considerations to a broader range

¹³Cf. Flora Lewis, "Soviet-American Accord Embitters NATO Officials," *New York Times*, July 26, 1972, p. 1. Fear of bilateralism in MBFR has been accentuated by two parallel developments. First, the ongoing SALT II talks could take up the sensitive subject of the forward-based atomic system in Germany. A combined phase-out of nuclear and conventional forces would seem to maximize doubts over the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee and would leave important unanswered questions with respect to French and British tactical nuclear systems. Second, the accelerated tempo of trade and investment conversations between Washington and Moscow has been regarded as a sign of increasing mutual interest between the superpowers. The prospect of American economic penetration in the East as a counter to West European protectionism has been cited frequently as a source of concern.

¹⁴Insistence on European participation in MBFR is reflected in the West German White Paper 1971/1972, *The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces* (Bonn: Press and Information Office, 1971), p. 10.

of factors governing the military potentials of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Advocates of this enlarged framework of negotiation contend that the Soviet Union enjoys inherently weighty advantages in the European theater. Internal lines of communication and transportation, easy access to supply bases, and ample maneuver area greatly simplify problems of mobilization and reinforcement on short notice. NATO troops, on the other hand, must operate in a comparatively constricted area and must depend in large measure on transatlantic air and sea channels to sustain extended operations. The weaknesses of the Western position, though compensated in part by military technology, are considerable. As a result, it is argued that pure and simple symmetrical troop cuts — whether numerically or proportionately equal — could have an asymmetrical impact on the military balance.¹⁵ A further unfavorable tilt would have the negative consequences of impelling movement toward a less credible security posture (massive retaliation) and inviting and rendering more effective Soviet diplomatic pressures against Western Europe.

Proponents of the Ever-Present Balance thus regard ensuring a stable military relationship between blocs as MBFR's overriding objective. To ensure it requires an approach at once less compromising and more comprehensive than the Quick Fix: less compromising in that negotiating targets have to be conditioned by hard security estimates rather than Congressional demands for reduction; more comprehensive in that the calculus of capabilities and possible adjustments must entail exhaustive study of many variables given relatively light treatment when rapid, visible results are of the essence. Detailed examination would be required of at least the following:

- types of forces
 - air/ground/naval
- origin of forces
 - foreign/indigenous
- readiness of forces
 - standing/reserve/militia
- types of units
 - support/combat
- weapons systems
 - nuclear/conventional

¹⁵A succinct exposition of the military analysis that underlies the Ever-Present Balance can be found in "Fear of Symmetry," *The Economist*, November 25, 1972, pp. 14-16.

- delivery systems
 - theater based/nontheater based
 - nuclear/conventional/dual capable

- zones covered
 - Central Europe/flanks

- collateral constraints
 - movement within theater/movement into theater

- verification procedures
 - unilateral/bilateral/multilateral

Clearly, an MBFR negotiation addressing these factors in depth would raise technical, doctrinal and political questions of unusual complexity. Standards of measurement would have to be worked out for forces trained, armed, equipped, organized and deployed differently. Formulas for reduction specifying contingents affected and zones covered would have to take account of differing tactical and strategic concepts as well as varying values placed on the national contingents involved. The stability of an agreed balance at lower levels would have to be assured not only through detailed verification but through controls over qualitative improvement and the introduction of new weapons systems.¹⁶ In principle, these steps could lead to structural changes of a far more fundamental nature than a one-step troop cut.¹⁷ However, possibilities could not be precisely known at the outset and would only develop during the course of a bargaining process quite different from the short-cut approach.

A central distinction between the Quick Fix and the Ever-Present Balance is that the latter puts much heavier stress on bloc-to-bloc negotiation than superpower understanding. Separate dealing between Moscow and Washington is to be avoided both because of its divisive effects on NATO and because Soviet and American forces are only two constituents of the overall European security structure. The kind of comprehensive agreement

¹⁶Technical issues related to MBFR are discussed in *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction*, Report of the Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., November 1972, pp. 38-47. See also Major F. H. C. Kock, "Problems of Comparing Force Levels," *NATO Letter*, March-April 1971, pp. 19-22.

¹⁷A provocative proposal for achieving structural change while holding to concepts of parity has been advanced by Frederick S. Wyle, "European Security: Beating the Numbers Game," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1973, pp. 41-54. Wyle's suggestion for tacitly or formally agreed conversion from offensive to defensive postures aims at cutting through the technical and procedural complexities inherent in the Ever-Present Balance approach. His arguments point up the distinction between those who regard negotiations on force structure as a means of inducing change and those who view a comprehensive agenda as a means of resisting adjustment.

necessary to assure balance would require the involvement of all Western alliance members stationing troops along the Central Front. Optimally, NATO could confront the Warsaw Pact with a unified position after having thrashed out internal differences. The course of the talks would then hinge on what if anything the Warsaw Pact states were willing to concede.

The appraisals and assumptions underlying the strategy of alliance consolidation and interbloc bargaining are sufficiently evident not to require lengthy elaboration. Domestic pressures are not regarded as serious enough to require softening positions that ought to be governed by the security estimates of the U.S. defense establishment. The President, it is said, should and can confront his critics head-on because he will continue to hold enough trumps to prevail in matters of high politics such as the NATO engagement. In fact, maintenance of an unyielding stance is regarded as the most effective way of dealing with Congressional unrest. The purported lessons of the past indicate that the Chief Executive has virtually never been forced to cede on priority issues of security. Chances that the legislative opposition could not only win in the Senate and House but muster the strength to overcome a potential White House veto are almost nil. Even in that unlikely event, the constitutional authority of Congress to alter U.S. troop deployments is thought to remain doubtful.¹⁸

The military assessments that should shape the U.S. stance in Europe reveal a more tenuous relationship between alliances than wishful-thinking proponents of reduction believe. Partisans of the Ever-Present Balance assume that further deterioration could alter the European environment perceptibly because security depends in the last analysis on mutual estimates of combat capabilities.¹⁹ The Soviets, who remain basically adversaries rather than collaborators, are regarded as ready to exploit any weakening of the Western position diplomatically if not militarily. Past moderation, owing above all to the high risk of pursuing a more aggressive

¹⁸The Executive Branch has never admitted being bound by the 1951 Senate resolution which approved the dispatch of four divisions to Europe and stipulated that Congressional approval would be required for further augmentation.

¹⁹The thesis that the military balance shapes the political-psychological environment has been expounded frequently by the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, General Andrew J. Goodpaster. Goodpaster's remarks to the German Foreign Policy Society at Bonn (NATO News Release 70-70, October 20, 1970) typify the calculus that underlies the Ever-Present Balance: "But it would be illusory to seek detente if it were not founded on a capability of defense and self protection. . . . For if the result of [MBFR] negotiations were to be a weakening on our side, then the whole basis, the whole foundation upon which it has been possible to negotiate the easing of tensions would be modified."

policy, cannot be counted on. Moscow's interest in MBFR has not been demonstrated seriously and should not be taken for granted. Washington must therefore be prepared to approach the negotiating table without illusions and to depart, if necessary, without results.

Allied relationships, according to this view, deserve highest consideration. Only a sharp unilateral cut would be more damaging to West European confidence than a bilateral arrangement that cast doubt upon American steadfastness and weakened the posture of flexible response. Such a move, evoking the twin specters of disengagement and superpower collusion, would greatly increase the vulnerability of NATO allies to Soviet diplomatic maneuvering. Lacking the cohesion and probably the will to develop a collective security alternative to the U.S. guarantee, West European governments might adapt gradually to the situation by lowering their defense profiles and seeking greater accommodation with the East. Since MBFR must not be allowed to start a slide in that direction, it is imperative that NATO be unified on this issue before confronting the Warsaw Pact.

The case for the Ever-Present Balance, no less than that for the Quick Fix, rests on a contestable combination of intellectual preferences, deeply held beliefs and institutional interests. In considering the feasibility of the approach and the costs of implementing it, the main charge to be leveled is that its political and technical requirements are so demanding that they may ensure harmful and unnecessary immobilism. In the first place, the development of a comprehensive position would raise a host of fundamental alliance problems. On the technical level, Western forces differ markedly in armament, logistical organization and manpower composition. On the procedural level, the apparently firm refusal of the French to participate in interbloc negotiations remains a substantial stumbling block. On the political and doctrinal levels, above all, the question of whose forces should be reduced under what circumstances cuts into basic, and still controversial, issues in the alliance: the function and use of U.S. nuclear weapons in the theater; the future status of the U.S. security guarantee; the role of French and British atomic capabilities; and the appropriate strategic and tactical concepts for Europe.³⁰ The assumption that these long-debated matters could be resolved under the pressures of negotiation with the East is

³⁰For an analysis of intra-alliance differences, see Smart, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-22.

dubious, especially at a time during which transatlantic strains in nonsecurity areas are intensifying and the sense of Soviet threat is increasingly remote.²¹ Full exposure of tacitly accepted differences and papered-over disagreements could advance the unwelcome prospect of deadlock or of American efforts to impose alliance discipline — both of which could leave NATO in greater disarray than at present.

Compounding these costs to NATO are others that could be incurred during bloc-to-bloc negotiations. First, this framework would have the undesired corollary of bolstering Moscow's control over its allies; second, the more cohesive Warsaw Pact would find itself well placed to probe Western differences; third, lengthy wrangling over combat equivalencies and equitable schemes for reduction could produce only marginal results, or worse, turn MBFR into an empty platform for propaganda which diverted attention away from more constructive aspects of East-West relations. A rigid negotiating framework oriented toward technical issues also might lack the suppleness to take account readily of improvements in the political atmosphere.

Finally, the initial freezing effect comprehensive talks would have on the size of the U.S. garrison might serve White House interests adversely. On the one hand, pressures during negotiations to refrain from unilateral reduction might tie the Administration down more firmly than it desired — impeding moves to streamline the presence for budgetary or management reasons. On the other hand, deadlock or long delay could lead the Executive Branch to lose control of the troop stationing problem to Congress. Here the costs of not opting for a Quick Fix must be considered; the Administration's position could be seriously weakened if a situation developed in which legislative and public attention became riveted on the apparent anomaly of retaining 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe three decades after the end of World War II. Then the President might be obliged to reduce more abruptly and drastically than if he had achieved some early visible results. If so, the comprehensive bloc-to-bloc approach would have proved maximally self-defeating in that it not only failed to prevent a moderately negative shift in the military balance but speeded a major disruption.

A deficiency of a somewhat different order is pointed up by

²¹A pertinent interpretation of sources of transatlantic economic tension that takes account of security implications is found in Raymond Vernon, "Rogue Elephant in the Forest," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1973, pp. 573-587.

critics who find fault with the political concept of the Ever-Present Balance. Their contention is that MBFR oriented toward questions of military capabilities is an unrealistic throwback to the Cold War which could misdirect the dynamic of détente. In their view, efforts to constrict the diverse national and transnational forces at work into bipolar frameworks are neither sensible nor worthwhile. Security problems derive less from arms themselves than from political relationships among their possessors. By focusing on the wrong issues, the United States is said to be forgoing an opportunity to effect desirable change in the structure of European security. The quest for such change demands a different approach to force reduction.

THE PROTRACTED PARLEY

The strategy of converting MBFR into a prolonged political dialogue, unlike the Quick Fix or the Ever-Present Balance, has not been conceived as a tactical response to maintain the framework of confrontation more cheaply. Rather, the Protracted Parley represents a calculated initiative to alter security relationships, its objective being gradually to loosen the hold of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.²² Advocates of the approach regard Soviet interference in the affairs of socialist neighbors as the main barrier to a more secure European order. Moscow's propensity to intervene in its own camp, they assert, is not merely an internal problem but cause to question whether East-West relations can evolve, as they should, on a more positive basis than that of mutual deterrence. Only Soviet acceptance of greater diversity near the USSR's frontiers can confirm the changes needed to attenuate the political as well as the military threat to the West. Force reduction talks can be used as an instrument to induce the required changes if they are aimed not simply at reducing the physical presence of Soviet divisions but at fostering habits of nonintervention. To be sure, the process would be lengthy and open-ended — yet it would attack the root causes of insecurity in Europe. If successful, the strategy would make formal alliance structures increasingly irrelevant and perhaps one day discardable.

Specifically, proponents of the Protracted Parley envisage MBFR as serving three functions: (1) Talks should be used to increase the margin of maneuver of East European states by un-

²²Bertram, *op. cit.*, explores the case for the Protracted Parley most effectively. My discussion in this section is drawn principally from arguments suggested by Bertram.

derplaying bloc-to-bloc relationships. The United States and its allies would press for institutionalization, emphasizing nation-state representation and seeking to create situations in which Warsaw Pact members could expand their liberty of action (in the formulation of agendas, debate, and implementation of agreements).

(2) Negotiations would be employed to promote interdependencies between Eastern and Western participants, thus fostering a sense of European security that embraced both halves of the continent rather than implying the defense of one half against the other. Some links could be formed merely through informational exchange such as prior notification of military exercises; other ties could result from physical exchanges of observers and joint verification of troop movement; still others could emerge from the definition of agreed principles for arms control in Europe, which some contend ought to be the primary theme of discussion. The cumulative effect of these interdependencies would be to strengthen mutual confidence, increase East European participation, and condition Soviet leadership toward greater tolerance of divergent views. (3) It is said that MBFR ought to provide a barometer of Soviet intentions. Here the key considerations would be the spirit in which Moscow undertook the discussion of principles as well as its willingness to enter into a certain number of agreements on hardware and manpower matters. Although troop level cuts would not be the priority item at the outset, their logic would follow compellingly. The passage from general debate to the negotiation of troop adjustments and other concrete measures therefore would act as a crucial indicator determining U.S. and allied responses.

At the same time, the long-run perspective of the Protracted Parley strategy affords some short-run flexibility. The major requirement from the American standpoint would be to develop a domestic base to support engagement in an extended negotiation unlikely to yield immediate results. Stable expectations regarding the scale of American involvement would be vital not only to retain allied confidence but to lend credibility to the U.S. bargaining position. If necessary, a 10 per cent or 15 per cent unilateral cut in American forces would be a price worth paying for the assurance of continuity in the colloquy. A bilateral Soviet-American accord would also be acceptable provided it were seen as a separate, preliminary step that did not prejudice the content or jeopardize the multilateral form of subsequent talks.

These short-run allowances on the means of U.S. troop adjustment are indicative of the priorities and judgments underlying the strategy of an extended East-West dialogue. The immediate question of the size of the American presence can be de-emphasized to the extent that the East-West balance is sufficiently stable to withstand unilateral reductions of 20,000 or 30,000 men. As long as Washington refrains from massive, uncompensated withdrawals, Soviet intrusion in Eastern Europe must be treated as the likely source of future instability on the continent and the chief impediment to qualitative change in security relationships. Proponents of the Protracted Parley estimate, however, that Soviet behavior can be decisively changed through the medium of external contact. A conservative Soviet leadership, confronted with demands for greater autonomy as socialist economies develop, can be induced to loosen its grip through an arms control process that mutes direct challenges to its hegemony yet undermines the rationale for bloc-to-bloc confrontation. Although the Soviets are to be expected to use MBFR talks to weaken Western cohesion and resolve, it is believed that institutionalization will in the end benefit the positions of the United States and its allies. The talks' divisive potential for NATO can be reduced by pre-discussion, awareness of Soviet objectives, and common agreement that the opening up of Eastern Europe ought to be a primary goal of Western diplomacy. Moreover, the momentum of détente will overcome Soviet advantages in an open-ended, state-to-state negotiation.

Despite its promised advantages, the Protracted Parley raises problems that leave its viability in doubt. In the immediate future, the approach presupposes or exacts the formation of a strong domestic consensus on the United States' NATO policy but glosses over the obstacles involved therein. The ability of the White House to consolidate sufficient backing to enter extended negotiations securely remains uncertain. As we have noted, it is possible that neither moderate unilateral nor reciprocal cuts would satisfy a Congress and public disillusioned by the conduct of American security policy abroad. The absence of backing could prove most damaging if the United States were formally engaged in MBFR yet could not assure the rough military symmetry needed to focus discussion convincingly on principles and procedures of joint reduction. Furthermore, moves taken in the near term could not fail to affect the course of subsequent negotiations. A

Soviet-American arrangement surely would create precedents and establish conditions different from a unilateral cutback or a decision to begin talks while holding the line. Yet the long view seems to provide new insights into the quandaries of the moment and the transition to a future MBFR conference.

Even if a satisfactory bridge were found, a number of other possible drawbacks to the Protracted Parley can be foreseen. First, the bargaining advantage of the Soviet Union may be much understated. It is Moscow, after all, that has pushed persistently in the past for pan-European security arrangements which could both provide Soviet leverage in Western defense councils and cast the United States — directly or indirectly — as a non-European participant.²⁸ Soviet objectives of easing out the American military presence and thwarting West European defense integration remain relatively clear-cut in relation to those of NATO members. The continuing ability of the Kremlin to enforce discipline within its own bloc provides an additional asset. The combination of these factors could weigh against the United States in a loosely structured bargaining context.

Second, NATO countries may not be able to achieve the minimum accord necessary to be effective. Our review of the Ever-Present Balance took note of deep cleavages within the alliance on technical, procedural and doctrinal matters. In addition and perhaps more important, there are divisions regarding the extent to which the West should seek to reduce the USSR's influence and control within its own camp. Although some governments have given strong rhetorical support to a policy of dynamic movement, grave reservations have been expressed in many quarters: some believe that the Soviets are better placed to gain from a Protracted Parley than the West; others feel that acceptance of Moscow's hold in the East helps to deter Soviet adventurism in the West; still others fear that success itself would re-establish unwanted German preponderance in Central Europe; finally, there are those who do not care to see further dilution of West European defense cooperation efforts. In sum, not only the feasibility but the desirability of the approach is held questionable.

A third difficulty concerns the supposition that MBFR can have a real impact on Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe. It is hardly unreasonable to argue that Moscow's posture is governed more by

²⁸Cf. Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 286-287, 293-296, 312-315.

internal factors than outside influences.²⁴ The West simply may not be in a position to have more than tangential effect on matters that depend upon basic socio-economic trends and the dynamic of relations within the Eastern bloc. If the outlook is for a conservative, bureaucratized elite in the Kremlin which may feel threatened by too much diversity, Moscow will not only seek to resist but succeed in resisting the subtle pressures exerted through arms control talks. NATO governments, in contrast, may be a good deal more vulnerable as expectations grow that MBFR can produce major change. Such a development would serve Soviet more than American interests.

THE OUTLOOK

The foregoing breakdown has made a point of sharpening distinctions among various approaches rather than calling attention to the ambiguities and shades of difference that, in reality, blur policy choices. The alternatives described are undoubtedly less clear and less mutually exclusive than they have been made to appear. A short-cut bilateral arrangement, for example, could conceivably open the way to comprehensive multilateral arms reduction which not only treated hardware issues but provided a mechanism for political change. Moreover, it must be recalled that the MBFR debate is taking place within a fairly narrow band along the full spectrum of issues raised by the current American policy in NATO. All three possibilities examined count on the capacity and willingness of the United States to retain substantial numbers of troops in Europe — say, three of the present four and one-third divisions in the Federal Republic — for at least the next five years. A far more profound division exists between proponents of mutual reduction in general and those who favor radical, unilateral adjustments in the U.S. presence. At the same time, some hard-line skeptics question the value of any MBFR negotiations at this juncture.²⁵ Still others stress that higher priority should be placed on the rationalization of the NATO force posture through cost-effectiveness reorganization.²⁶

The attempt to single out strategies and their implications

²⁴For discussion, see Peter Bender, *East Europe in Search of Security* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972), pp. 2-10, 135-144.

²⁵Cf. testimony of John J. McCloy before the Special Subcommittee on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commitments of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, *Hearings* (Washington: GPO, 1972), pp. 13562-13563.

²⁶Cf. Steven Canby, "NATO Muscle: More Shadow than Substance," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1972, pp. 38-49.

nonetheless highlights a core predicament facing American policymakers: how to find a formula that can provide for force reduction without risking serious domestic, intra-alliance, or East-West difficulties. Our analysis suggests that there are no obvious answers but only ambiguous trade-offs among potential gains and costs. On the one hand, approaches that respond to internal pressures for change may have an unwelcome impact on allied and adversary relationships; on the other, policies based for the most part on calculations of international *Realpolitik* may erode domestic support necessary for implementation. No prescription seems wholly satisfactory, each reflecting its own blend of the historical, institutional and purely idiosyncratic factors that shape perceptions of benefits and losses.

The Nixon Administration has thus far reacted to these dilemmas by trying to juggle responses without committing itself to definite priorities. The White House has sought to guard its flank at home both by demanding greater allied contributions to NATO and by promising that MBFR can yield results. At the same time, Washington has reassured its partners in Brussels that no bilateral arrangements to cut troops will be made with the Soviet Union. Even so, the Administration has pursued its private dialogue with Moscow in the aftermath of the Nixon visit there, giving rise to widespread speculation of desire for a superpower agreement.

Further obscuring the pattern, the United States has promoted separate bargaining tracks for MBFR, SALT II and the Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CSCE) without clearly identifying areas of overlap or interrelationship among them. Forward-based nuclear systems, for example, could be dealt with in force reduction or strategic arms talks. Will the White House, mindful of allied anxieties, regard MBFR as the appropriate arena? Will the drive for results lead to a bilateral understanding with differing implications for Soviet and American as well as British and French atomic forces?²⁷ Similarly, confidence-building measures could be taken up both in the pan-European forum or the smaller arms control meeting. Could measures taken in the CSCE, such as observer exchange to increase warning time in case of attack, facilitate progress in MBFR? On

²⁷During the May 1973 visit of West German Chancellor Brandt, the Nixon Administration gave assurances that forward-based systems would not be the object of a bilateral Soviet-American arrangement. See *New York Times*, May 2, 1973, p. 3.

the other hand, could MBFR be used as a *quid pro quo* for forward movement in the security conference? These are the kinds of questions that will have to be resolved in the near future.

The impression left for the time being is one of virtually total concern with tactics. The long-range strategy of Protracted Parley has been dismissed in official circles. Rather, discussion centers on the relative merits of the cautious-comprehensive or short-cut approaches. During 1971 — a year of Mansfield challenges, intra-alliance bickering over costs, progress in SALT I, and preparation of the Moscow summit — the Quick Fix seemed to hold sway within Administration councils. Its principal advocates are said to have included high-ranking civilian defense officials as well as members of the arms control establishment. More recently, however, the Army seems to have mobilized the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which once opposed MBFR altogether, on behalf of the Ever-Present Balance. The uniformed-military coalition draws additional support from civilian policymakers who give first claim to transatlantic security ties, especially during a period of expected economic claims vis-à-vis allies. As of now the outcome remains undecided, though the edge may still be held by those who feel that Washington can and must capitalize on its evolving relationship with the Soviet Union to undercut domestic critics, save funds and shift NATO burdens.²⁸ In any event, we can safely predict that the choice between tactical approaches will be determined by short-run estimates of domestic constraints, allied reactions and Soviet behavior.

The Administration's concern for the immediate future comes as no surprise. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, despite their designation of 1973 as the "Year of Europe," have been preoccupied with the costly U.S. involvement in Asia. The centralized White House foreign policy operation has not been geared to probe European security questions in depth. Furthermore, the ambiguities of the questions encourage the avoidance of choice either by retaining options or partially exploring more than one.

Tactics, however, are not a substitute for broader vision. Two necessary preconditions for selecting a sound course of action seem not to have been met squarely. The first is systematic consideration of the links between MBFR and the host of other prob-

²⁸It should be noted, however, that the 1973 "State of the World" report to Congress does assert the primacy of NATO requirements in any negotiation of MBFR. See Richard M. Nixon, *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace* (Washington: GPO, May 3, 1973), Part III.

lems that must be confronted simultaneously. Despite its complexity, MBFR remains only a single part of an intricate mosaic of domestic and international relationships — one contentious issue among many between the Executive and Congress; one source of tension among many between the United States and Western Europe; and one element in the East-West strategic balance. American decisions on MBFR clearly will not only affect but reflect the larger context, yet neither the statements nor the actions of the Administration have provided any consistent indication of its conception of the interplay.

Second, the White House must come to grips with the process of change in the European security framework. The dynamic forces at work cannot be expected to converge on the status quo indefinitely. Since the situation is likely to be altered whether or not the United States acts, it seems particularly unwise to approach MBFR as a one-step negotiation that can be undertaken and terminated. The mere holding of talks, let alone a satisfactory outcome, will generate new pressures bearing on Atlantic and interbloc relationships. Although new tension and new possibilities cannot be anticipated with great precision, the White House must develop some notion of the structural changes it wants to foster or resist. Is an autonomous West European defense to be encouraged? Is Soviet withdrawal from the East to be a primary objective? Is an American military presence of at least two divisions to be sought as a quasi-permanent fixture? The contours of the Administration's promised structure for peace have to be defined if MBFR is to be fitted into them. This is the unenviable task to be begun if currently gloomy prospects for a constructive policy are to improve.

* * * *

THE SOVIET MILITARY AND FORCE REDUCTIONS

Captain John C. Reppert, United States Army

MORE than a year has passed since representatives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO first sat down together at the conference table in Vienna to discuss the possibility of mutual force reductions in Central Europe.¹ While the first concrete agreement on reductions has yet to be reached, a review of the Soviet military press for the past year suggests a clear lack of enthusiasm by the Soviet military leadership toward the talks. Further, the talks have rekindled a number of sensitive problems for the military leadership. The two areas where this has been most acute are the psychological preparedness of Soviet troops and the apparent questioning by some elements of the military concerning their proper role in deciding the military aspects of détente.

The first and most obvious aspect of the Soviet military's public reaction to

the force reduction talks has been the general lack of enthusiasm toward them. *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, a leading military theoretical journal, published numerous articles in the past year on détente and the improved relations within Europe with only a single mention of the existence of the force reduction negotiations. Even the article which did mention the talks was noticeable in that it was written by a civilian, while approximately 80 percent of the journal's articles are by military personnel.²

Krasnaya Zvezda, the central newspaper of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, also played down the negotiations. Although it did publish a number of the Soviet wire service (Tass) dispatches, not a single analytical article on the negotiations by a military man appeared on the paper's pages throughout the year. This absence of analytical articles was even more no-

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ticeable when compared to the civilian sector of the press which produced a variety of articles explaining the goals and progress of the negotiations.³ *Krasnaya Zvezda* failed to dispatch any of its correspondents to Vienna to cover the talks although correspondents representing *Pravda*, *Izvestiya* and other Soviet publications were in the city.

While it would be foolish to suggest that the lack of enthusiasm toward the talks was universal among the military leadership, it is significant that, during a full year of talks, virtually no Soviet line officer made any favorable comment about them publicly. Recognizing the firm Communist party control over all the mass media assuring that there would be no direct criticism of the negotiations now favored by General Secretary Brezhnev,



Captain John C. Reppert is Executive Officer, US Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, Garmisch, Germany. A June 1974 graduate of the Institute, he has an M.A. in Slavic Area Studies from Kansas University, an M.S. in Journalism from Kansas State University, and has completed the one-year Russian-language program at the Defense Language Institute, West Coast Branch.

the most interesting evidence of the military reaction can be seen in indirect commentary on the issue in the military press.

The focus of this reaction has been on the expressed concern over the maintenance of a high level of psychological preparedness among the Soviet forces.

The basis of this concern by the military leadership is understandable. The Soviet Army fought its last major war nearly 30 years ago, well before the birth of the current draftees. More importantly though must be the memory of the current military leadership which participated in that war. It is highly doubtful that they have forgotten that it was soon after another era of negotiations that Hitler attacked and nearly destroyed a Soviet Army that was neither ready nor willing to fight.

It seems, therefore, more than coincidence that the first armywide conference of party secretaries of military units since 1960 was announced a week after the Soviet agreement to enter into force reduction talks.⁴ Further, the theme of the conference, a call for heightened vigilance in an era of intensified ideological warfare, has an obvious association.

While vigilance has long been a standard theme for military editorials, the frequency of its appearance during the past year was higher than normal. To avoid the suggestion that the appeals for vigilance were in conflict with talks of peace in the new era of détente, the military editorials followed an almost standard pattern. Articles discussing international relations opened with praise of the improved climate and Brezhnev's personal initiatives. They then concluded with a "threat statement" reminding the readers that the imperialists had



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Delegates conversing before the opening session of the MBFR multilateral exploratory talks in Vienna

not forsaken their aggressive aims. Two popular items in support of this conclusion were commentaries on NATO's growing defense budgets and the Western discussion of the creation of a European nuclear force.

Another related theme was developed by the military press in apparent reaction to those in other sectors of the Soviet power structure who might view the force reduction talks as a source of military budget cuts. In order to stake out their position on continued rapid military growth, the following tactic was employed. Initially, the new era of détente was attributed to positive changes in the world's balance of forces, specifically the recent rapid growth of Soviet military might. The argument that the military expansion had been the necessary precondition for détente was then extended to explain that it was only the continued rapid growth of the Soviet military which could assure the maintenance of détente and its related benefits.⁵ This theme, however, was never picked up in the civilian sector of the press.

Agreeing that the conditions for détente had been created by a shift in the balance of forces, they continually emphasized economic and ideological factors as the critical forces involved.

While the statements of the military cited above reflect two areas of considerable concern, perhaps the most meaningful reaction to date is to be found not in what has been said *by* the military leadership, but *to* them. This occurred most patently in a series of philosophical, ideological articles appearing across the bottom third of pages two and three of *Krasnaya Zvezda*.

An evaluation of these articles must be preceded by several remarks. Although the military press is the central forum for the public expression of the military viewpoint, it is far from monolithic in that regard. This specific series of articles is a case in point. Despite the fact that the authors of the articles are nearly all high-ranking military officers, it is notable that none of them are "line officers." They are, instead, leading academic

and political officers within the services. In this series, it is the party's interests, rather than the military, which are being defended. In several instances, the viewpoint of a significant number of military leaders seems more likely represented not in the positions advocated in the articles, but in the "errant" views they criticize. This is not to deny a broad overlap of interests between the two leaderships, but, rather, that there are parochial issues on which there may be disagreement.

The first article in this series appeared a week after East and West first sat down together at Vienna.⁶ Two interrelated themes developed the message of this article. The first was that, as Lenin had observed, only a constantly growing (changing) approach to problems guarantees the viability of the Communist system. Secondly, it is the party which must work out the theoretical problems for the defense of socialism. The first point is a justification of the rapid changes in relations with "mortal" enemies, while the second reminds the military leadership that, even in the military aspects of détente, it is the party which is predominant.

Nearly a month later, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy, General of the Army Epishev, supplemented this argument with an article repeating in several places the necessity of the military's loyalty and subordination to the party.⁷ The significance of this repetition of a standard theme became clear as the series developed.

The two most interesting articles in the series appeared in April and May of last year, following the Army Party Secretary Conference and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) April Plenum. The first⁸

opened with the recognition of the rapid and profound changes taking place in the world and moved immediately to the conclusion that it is the function of military doctrine "to reflect" the stance of the government. The suggestion of the passive act of "reflection," rather than a more active term, such as "correspond with," clearly discourages any military inclination toward initiative in this area.

Having reaffirmed that the party is the origin of all change, a different point is added. The author notes that military doctrines of imperialistic and socialistic states cannot be compared because of the sociopolitical differences of the systems. This argues that not only is it ideologically right for the party leaders to decide the military aspects of détente, but that they are better equipped to do so than the military specialists.

The May article⁹ presents this problem even more acutely, stating directly that there are those within the Soviet Armed Forces who continue to feel that military policy should be determined by solely military considerations. This type of thinking was immediately discredited by associating it with Trotsky. Concern with "arithmetic" considerations, such as numbers of troops or warheads, is also branded as wrong since it ignores the qualitative differences inherent in socialistic and capitalistic armies.

A later section of this article adds another warning to the military leadership by criticizing the overemphasis of technological developments and reminding them that the development of all aspects of society is necessary for the best rounded national defense. These and similar arguments by the author lead to the conclusion that not only is it dangerously incorrect to oppose party decisions on cutback agree-

ments, but that demands from other sectors of the economy may soon have a direct impact on the vast increases in expenditures required to expand Soviet military superiority beyond certain undefined bounds.¹⁰

Later articles in this series have developed no new themes. The predominance of the CPSU in deciding the military aspects of détente is maintained, but no new reference is made to the existence of those within the armed forces who oppose this idea. They have focused attention on the concept that the main area of the further strengthening of the armed forces will be in the field of ideology although hardware certainly will not be ignored.

Based on the interpretation of the themes presented above, a number of conclusions seem justified.

First, the Soviet military leadership is unenthusiastic, if not opposed, to the probable outcome of the negotiations on mutual force reductions in Central Europe. This is most evident in the contrast of the civilian writers who frequently talked optimistically about the negotiations, describing them with "positive" adjectives, and the military writers who were almost uniformly unable to say a single favorable word about them in public.

The second bit of evidence for this conclusion was the party's offensive against those military figures who presumably want a greater voice in the military aspects of détente. The relative directness and strength of this offensive leaves little doubt that the number or influence of those military figures involved in this form of incorrect thinking was not inconsequential.

In this latter regard, some credit should be given to Brezhnev and the CPSU leadership for anticipating this potential threat. As mentioned, the

convening of the first conference of party secretaries of army organizations since 1960 was well-timed to assure that the official line on the "new era" was fully distributed and uniformly understood.

Additionally, it cannot go without mention that, in April of last year, for the second time in the history of the CPSU, a professional military officer was elevated to full membership on the Politburo. While this may or may not greatly increase the influence of the military's view on the negotiations at Vienna, it goes far to preclude at a later date the argument that the military's views were ignored since it is almost inevitable that the nation's number one military leader will publicly support the party position on policy matters.

Secondly, having been effectively prevented from voicing even subtle protest to the negotiations on troop reductions by the series of means mentioned above, the military has channeled its reaction into the twin call of increased vigilance by the armed forces and continued support of the importance of the military as the creator and preserver of the conditions required for détente.

Based on traditional military considerations, the Soviets have little to gain through agreements on force reductions at this time. Prior to their consent to participate in the talks, it seemed likely that a sizable American withdrawal was certain for the near future. Brezhnev's agreement not only suggested that the Soviets would match the American cutbacks, but, in agreeing to negotiations, he most likely postponed the American withdrawal.

Brezhnev apparently sees sizable political and economic gains to be realized through participation in force

reduction talks. It is the concern that these gains are to be purchased at the price of a lower relative defense posture which permeates many of those articles calling for the continued improvement of the Soviet military.

In the same vein, the "businesslike" and "productive" talks on force reduction reported in the civilian press are seen by the military leaders as a real and considerable threat to the psychological battle-readiness of their troops. These officers, who lived through the initial onslaught of World War II and who have been indoctrinated for years concerning the threat of imperialism lurking across the border, understandably are anguished. After years of effort to achieve first parity, then superiority in Central Europe, they are preparing to be told to give up strategic forward dispositions just as their prime enemy seemed on the verge of massive unilateral pullbacks.

The final note of frustration of the Soviet military is the refusal of the Soviet civilian press to pick up the theme that it was the recent rapid growth of their military might which has made détente possible. This, of course, precludes the success of the subsequent appeal that it is only the continuation of this rapid growth which will assure continued stability.

The sum of these frustrations does not, however, suggest that Brezhnev's leadership is in danger from the military. He has gone to considerable lengths to protect his flanks well. The promotion of Grechko and the convening of the Army Party Secretary Conference both served to strengthen his position.

Despite indications of growing military influence in the Soviet leadership,¹¹ the recognition of the extensive party permeation and control of the military suggests that the military

leadership will continue to acquiesce to decisions counter to their own parochial interests. It would only be in the case of a new power struggle with a more conservative element of the party leadership that Brezhnev would discover to what extent he has alienated the military. There is little evidence of the emergence of such a struggle at this time.

NOTES

1 The talks to date have been in two stages. The first, beginning 31 January 1973 and continuing through June, was concerned with determining the status of the various participants in the negotiations and the geographical area concerned. The second stage, which is dealing with the troop and weapon reductions, per se, began in October and is still continuing.

2 V. Levin, "Evropa: ot konfrontatsii—k miru i sotrudnichestvu," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, Number 20, 1973, pp 79-83.

3 For example, Yu. Nikolayev, "Vazhnaya zadacha Evropy," *Novoe Vremya*, Number 4, 1973, pp 4-5; or Yu. Tomilin, "Evropa i problema sokrashcheniya vooruzhennykh sil," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, Number 3, 1973, pp 50-57.

4 The V All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Party Organizations was announced the first week of February in the Soviet press and was held 27-29 March 1973 in Moscow.

5 For example, Colonel I. Sidelnikov, "Mirnoe sotsushchestvovanie i bezopasnost' narodov," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 14 August 1973, pp 2-3.

6 Major General E. Sulimov, "KPSS—Partiya novatorov," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 8 February 1973, pp 2-3.

7 General of the Army A. Epishev, "K novomu pod'emu partiino-politicheskoi raboti v voiskakh," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 2 March 1973, pp 2-3.

8 Lieutenant General I. Zavyalov, "Tvorcheskii kharakter sovetskoi voennoi doktriny," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 19 April 1973, pp 2-3.

9 Major General A. Milovidov, "Filosofskii analiz voennoi mysli," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 17 May 1973, pp 2-3.

10 For a more complete analysis of this particular article, see Peter Vigor, "The Party's Attitude Toward Current Military Pragmatism," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* 176/73, 6 June 1973.

11 Two interesting papers in the last year which looked at aspects of this problem are: G. M. Viktorov, "Vozrastaiushchaya rol' generaliteta vooruzhennykh sil' SSSR," published 3 March 1973, as class material by the US Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, Garmisch, Federal Republic of Germany; and Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Military Influence on Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism*, Number 5, 1973, pp 1-12.



ПЕРЕГОВОРЫ ПРОДОЛЖАЮТСЯ

VIENNA: THE TALKS CONTINUE

Delegations from nineteen countries came together at the Austrian capital in mid-January to continue the talks about the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

The first few days after the new year "recess" have shown that interest in the talks has not slackened either in Europe or on the other side of the Atlantic. On the contrary, leading Western newspapers have begun to publish commentaries and articles devoted to the negotiations in Vienna. This, above all, reflects the significance of the path which has been covered—the preparatory consultations at which a specific area for reductions in forces and armaments was determined, and the first stage of the actual talks, which went on for one and a half months, and during which both sides submitted proposals for examination.

The joint draft of the Soviet Union, the GDR, Poland and the CSSR is clear and distinct. It proposes reductions in both

foreign and national armed forces and in the armaments which the states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact possess in Central Europe. The document envisages a reduction in the aggregate power of the troops—of land and air forces and of units equipped with nuclear weapons. The principle of reductions in terms of equal percentages makes it possible not to infringe on the interests of either side.

The NATO countries participating in the Vienna talks prefer a different approach. As the Western press has reported increasingly frequently, they have aimed the edge of their proposals at trying to achieve a change in the present balance of power in Central Europe. This involves unilateral advantages for the NATO side: it is only being proposed to reduce the land troops (first and foremost at the expense of the Soviet land forces) and to leave the air and nuclear forces of the NATO countries untouched.

Naturally, such unrealistic positions

cannot be conducive to the success of the talks; they only play into the hands of the opponents to international détente and the partisans of the armaments race.

* * *

The problem of a mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments is unusually complicated, but when the vessel of the Vienna talks was rigged for the voyage no-

body expected the sailing to be short and untroubled. As is emphasized in the statements of representatives of the peace-loving peoples of various European countries, Europeans expect that a businesslike, constructive atmosphere must prevail at the talks notwithstanding the difficulties of the problems confronting the representatives of the nineteen countries gathered in Vienna.

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Section IV. SALT: Eight Readings

SALT has received more publicity than either CSCE or MBFR. One reason is that SALT has resulted in a controversial interim agreement limiting numbers of offensive strategic nuclear weapons systems. Critics have bitterly denounced the Nixon Administration for "guaranteeing" Soviet nuclear superiority.

The following readings provide:

- a. Historical documents surrounding the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.
- b. US Government's (Executive Branch) position on the Treaty.
- c. Congressional view of SALT.
- d. Scholarly criticism of SALT I.
- e. Analysis of problems faced by SALT II negotiators in comparing nuclear offensive force levels.
- f. Historical documents and the US Government's (Executive Branch) position on the Vladivostok Agreement.
- g. The Soviet view of SALT as seen by prominent Soviet writers.

U.S.-Soviet Agreements : Complete Texts

Strategic arms limitations will have an effect on every U.S. military commander and the forces under his jurisdiction. Following are verbatim texts of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the Interim Agreement and the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on Strategic Arms Limitation, signed by President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev on May 26.

On June 13, the documents were transmitted to Congress for ratification and approval. The text of the President's letter to the Senate is printed on Page Eight.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. May 26, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:



SIGNING CEREMONY. As President Richard Nixon blots his signature after signing one of several historic agreements reached during the recent Moscow Summit talks, Soviet General Secretary of the Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev, right, and Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexei Kosygin, left, look on. Among the documents signed were three which relate to Strategic Arms Limitation: the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), the Interim Agreement and the Protocol to the Interim Agreement. Verbatim texts of the documents are in the pages that follow, along with a Department of Defense Fact Sheet, summarizing the main points covered by the documents. (Wide World Photo)

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

(Source: Department of Defense, Commander's Digest, Vol 12, No. 4, August 10, 1972, pp. 11-20.)

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) under construction;
- (c) undergoing testing;
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
- (e) mothballed.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phase-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.



Spartan Missile Test (1970)

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use na-

tional technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV


1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.



Soviet "Yankee"-Class Submarine

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS


LEONID I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Interim Agreement Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. May 26, 1972

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,



Poseidon



Minuteman

The U.S. Missiles: Deterrence

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

Article II

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

Article III

The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

Article IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic

missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken.

Article V

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

Article VII

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the

scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

Article VIII

1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies each in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

LEONID I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

PROTOCOL

TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which that Agreement remains in force:

The U.S. may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-mentioned levels, in the U.S.—over 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, and in the U.S.S.R.—over 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines.

The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

LEONID I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU



North American Defense Command (NORAD) Command Post: Remaining on Alert

Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements

1. AGREED INTERPRETATIONS.

(a) Initialed Statements.

The texts of the statements set out below were agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972.

ABM Treaty

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

[C]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.

[D]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding

three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV, and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

[E]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

[F]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. not to provide, to other States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

Interim Agreement

[H]

The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the short-

est distance between the northeastern border of the continental U.S. and the northwestern border of the continental U.S.S.R.

[I]

The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under active construction as of the date of signature of the Interim Agreement may be completed.

[J]

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased.

[K]

The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines will be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, and timely notification thereof, will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

[L]

The Parties understand that during the period of the Interim Agreement there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers, or in the number of such launchers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. The Parties further understand that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training.

(b) Common Understandings.

Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations:

A. Increase in ICBM Silo Dimensions

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "The Parties agree that the term 'significantly increased' means that an increase will not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers."

Minister Semenov replied that this statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

B. Location of ICBM Defenses

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement: 'The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.' In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks [North Dakota] ICBM silo launcher deployment area" (See Initialed Statement [C].)

C. ABM Test Ranges

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972: "Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that 'the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges.' We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at

Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to 'additionally agreed test ranges' to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges."

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

D. Mobile ABM Systems

On January 28, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?"

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter.

E. Standing Consultative Commission

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 23, 1972: "The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement*, agreement establishing the SCC

* See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971.

will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, *ad hoc* arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels."

Minister Semenov replied that, on an *ad referendum* basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

F. Standstill

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement: "In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents."

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval."


The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

2. UNILATERAL STATEMENTS.

(a) The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation:—

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement: "The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation



Artist's concept of the Trident, formerly ULMS (Undersea Long-Range Missile System)

of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The U.S.S.R. Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the U.S.S.R. does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Execu-

tive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement of this statement of the U.S. position."

B. Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "In connection with the important subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest of concluding the Interim Agreement the U.S. Delegation now withdraws its proposal that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent negotiations on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, the U.S. would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that Agreement."

C. Covered Facilities

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "I wish to emphasize the importance that the United States attaches to the provisions of Article V, including in particular their application to fitting out or berthing submarines."

D. "Heavy" ICBMs

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the U.S. Delegation believes it necessary to state the following: The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."

E. Tested in ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Article II of the Joint Draft Text uses the term 'tested in an ABM mode,' in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of 'tested in an ABM mode,' we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be 'tested in an ABM mode' if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempted from application of these criteria."

F. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision



U.S. Polaris Submarine

may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution."

G. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement."

(b) The following noteworthy unilateral statement was made by the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and is shown here with the U.S. reply:—

On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following unilateral "Statement of the Soviet Side": "Taking into account that modern ballistic missile submarines are presently in the possession of not only the U.S., but also of its NATO allies, the Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim 'Freeze' Agreement the U.S. and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers thereon (including 41 U.S. submarines with 656 ballistic missile launch-

ers). However, if during the period of effectiveness of the Agreement U.S. allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the question of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for in the Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Therefore, the Soviet side believes that this whole question, and above all the question of liquidating the American missile submarine bases outside the U.S., will be appropriately resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations."

On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following reply to Minister Semenov: "The United States side has studied the 'statement made by the Soviet side' of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third countries. The United States does not accept the validity of the considerations in that statement."

On May 26 Minister Semenov repeated the unilateral statement made on May 24. Ambassador Smith also repeated the U.S. rejection on May 26.

* * *

On June 13, 1972

President's Letter of Transmittal Sent to Congress

President Richard Nixon sent copies of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the Interim Agreement and the Protocol to the Interim Agreement to the Congress on June 13, urging the legislators to take prompt action toward ratification. Following is Mr. Nixon's letter to the Senate; a similar letter was sent with the documents to the House of Representatives.

THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I transmit herewith certified copies of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies of these agreements are also being forwarded to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. I ask the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expression of support from both Houses of the Congress for the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.

These agreements, the product of a major effort of this administration, are a significant step into a new era of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers.

The provisions of the agreements are explained in detail in the Report of the Secretary of State, which I attach. Their main effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, and at a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. This benefits not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world.

The agreements are an important first step in checking the arms race, but only a first step; they do not close off all avenues of strategic competition. Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the

success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached.

The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today. I am determined that they shall remain so. The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement will permit the United States to take the steps we deem necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security.

Besides enhancing our national security, these agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past.

These accords offer tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nuclear war. They provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can succeed in building a lasting peace.

Because these agreements effectively serve one of this Nation's most cherished purposes—a more secure and peaceful world in which America's security is fully protected—I strongly recommend that the Senate support them, and that its deliberations be conducted without delay.

RICHARD NIXON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 13, 1972

(Source: Department of Defense, Commander's Digest, Vol 12, No. 4, August 10, 1972, p 16.



When the SALT Hit the Fan

Donald G. Brennan



ON FRIDAY, May 26, 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed what will doubtless prove to be the most important arms-control agreements negotiated in the nuclear era—or, it may be, in any area. But their indubitable importance does not, unfortunately, automatically make them a cause for rejoicing; the San Francisco earthquake, for instance, was important too. It remains to be seen whether the agreements of May 26 will prove to be more or less of a disaster than the earthquake. There is some possibility, not as large as we should wish, that the agreements will not be a disaster at all; and a remote chance, which neither the American public nor the Administration bureaucracy deserves, that they will prove a resounding success.

Whatever their chance of success, they are profoundly unwise. And the un wisdom is not confined to the United States alone; it is certainly shared by some of our allies, and may well be shared, though in reduced degree, by the Soviet Union. This is a particular disappointment to

those of us who have been hoping and working for a strategic arms-control agreement that would make a genuine contribution to American security.

The agreements are two: 1) A proposed treaty limiting the deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles, called the Treaty on ABMs, and 2) a proposed "Interim Agreement" limiting certain kinds of strategic offensive forces, namely ICBMs and SLBMs (Intercontinental and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, respectively). The problems of these two are very different.

The Interim Agreement guarantees not merely Soviet parity with, but Soviet strategic superiority over the United States, to a potentially substantial degree. The un wisdom of this agreement lies in the dramatic announcement it makes that the United States has not only become, but apparently is willing to remain, the second nuclear power. This foolishness is, of course, in no way shared by the Soviets; indeed, as one prominent Ameri-

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can strategist put it, the Soviets must be pinching themselves to make sure they are not dreaming.

The ABM Treaty is more symmetric in its immediate effects; in contrast to the Interim Agreement, it does not allow the Soviets four times as much as we are allowed. Apart from a limited (but potentially significant) defense of national capitals, and a limited (and strategically insignificant) defense of missile fields, we and the Soviets have agreed not to defend ourselves—not only against each other, but, interestingly, against anyone else either. On the American side, this agreement stems purely from a sophomoric ideology and fashion, and is pure foolishness; on the Soviet side, the politburo may have accepted the same ideology, in which case they share equally in the foolishness. It is as if we and the Soviets had become seized with a theory that motor vehicles were bad for us, and, proceeding from that theory, both agreed to destroy all the motor vehicles of all kinds we produced in the future. In other words, that we and the Soviets might agree on some completely symmetric arrangement would not of itself prove that the arrangement was in our interest. In my view, the ABM Treaty provides an equally good illustration.

In my initial analysis of the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty, I shall concentrate on their shortcomings. I shall return later to the circumstances and forces that led to these agreements.

The Interim Agreement

The basic provisions of the Interim Agreement are as follows. First, we and the Soviets undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers after July 1, 1972. Second, we both agree not to convert land-based launchers for "light" ICBMs into launchers for "heavy" ICBMs. Third, we agree to limit SLBM launchers and the submarines that carry them to the numbers operational and under construction as of the date of signature (May 26), except that additional launchers (and appropriate numbers of submarines) may be constructed as replacements for an equal number of obsolete ICBM launchers or for launchers on older submarines. In a protocol appended to the Interim Agreement, this is spelled out: The U.S. may have no more than 710 SLBM launchers, and no more than 44 submarines; of those, launchers above 656 and submarines above 41 (the current numbers) must be replacements for equal numbers of obsolete ICBM launchers (in our case, the Titan II). The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 SLBM launchers and no more than 62 "modern" submarines; of those, launchers over 740 (the presumptive current number) must similarly be re-

Donald G. Brennan conducts research studies in military policy and arms control at the Hudson Institute, of which he was president from 1962 to 1964. He has served as a consultant to the Departments of Defense and State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the White House; has lectured before the National, Air and Naval War Colleges and at several universities; and has contributed articles on arms control to several books and journals. He is the editor of *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security* (New York, 1961).

placements for older ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers. Fourth, subject to the foregoing restrictions, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers is permitted. Fifth, compliance with the agreement shall be monitored with "national technical means of verification," meaning such things as reconnaissance satellites, and it is also agreed not to interfere with each other's means of observation or to use deliberate concealment measures that could impede that verification.

The intended immediate purpose of this Agreement is to freeze strategic offensive forces where they now stand, understanding that whatever is under construction at the prescribed date is to be included as if finished. Such an objective is not fundamentally irrational; I have myself urged consideration of a different freeze in other times and circumstances. The difficulties stem largely from the fact that the United States strategic forces have not changed very much in basic capacity for the past eight years, while the Soviet payload capacity—the amount of weight their missile force could deliver on targets, sometimes called the "throw weight"—has increased enormously since 1966, and it now stands around four times the payload capacity of the American force. A secondary problem resides in the extraordinarily generous terms given the Soviets for converting some obsolete missiles into additional modern SLBMs and submarines.

Supporters of the Agreement will point out, and correctly, that, while the Soviet Union has more launchers than the United States, we have—we believe—many more warheads deployed on those launchers. The estimate is based on the belief that the American technology for MIRV (Multiple Individually-targeted Re-entry Vehicles) is much further advanced than the Soviet technology, and that we have deployed MIRV warheads on a substantial fraction of our strategic force while the Soviets have scarcely started (if they have begun at all). However, if the Soviets wish to achieve large numbers of warheads by deploying lighter MIRV warheads within their existing payload capacity, the technology for doing so is within their reach; we, on the other hand, are precluded from achieving the payload capacity of the Soviets by the Interim Agreement.

THE THROW WEIGHT of a strategic force is unquestionably the most important single parameter for characterizing the potential of that force, even though other parameters—notably the number, yield and accuracy of warheads that can be delivered—are of more immediate importance. Some examples of how payload capacity can be used may be instructive. For example, the maximum capacity of a Poseidon launcher is perhaps in the area of three thousand pounds or less. A Poseidon missile, it is said, can accommodate from ten to fourteen MIRV warheads, which must therefore weigh no more than three hundred pounds each. These warheads would be relatively "small" weapons of perhaps fifty kilotons each, but one missile could attack ten separate targets. Some models of the Soviet SS-9 missile have a single large warhead, and some people might think that at least for many purposes, a single Poseidon missile is therefore worth ten SS-9s. In fact, however, that single SS-9 warhead is often estimated to be perhaps 25 megatons, which would suggest that the missile payload capability is around twelve thousand pounds, or at least four

times the payload capacity of a Poseidon missile. Therefore, if a Poseidon booster could launch ten MIRV warheads, an SS-9 could launch forty of the same kind.

The SS-9 probably has from five to ten times the payload capacity of our various Minuteman missiles, and, therefore the Soviet force of approximately three hundred SS-9s by itself probably has two to three times the payload capability of our entire Minuteman force of one thousand. However, the Soviets have perhaps another 1,300 ICBMs in addition to their SS-9s, most of which are also larger than our Minutemen.

Considering both SLBM and ICBM payloads, it is probable that the Interim Agreement will allow the Soviets a throw weight roughly four times ours, with present booster technology. (Either side is at liberty to improve its booster technology; in fact, the Soviets have recently given evidence of a new model of SS-9 with perhaps twice the payload capability of earlier models.)

Some Administration analysts argue that the Soviets do not now have MIRV technology and could not deploy significant numbers of MIRV warheads within the five-year lifetime of the Interim Agreement. In evaluating this position, three points should be borne in mind. First, if no better agreement is negotiated before this one expires, there will be intense pressures to renew it. Second, the estimates that the Soviets could not get substantial MIRV capability come from the same community of intelligence analysts who led former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to announce in the mid-1960s that the Soviets had accepted permanent strategic inferiority, and who were confident in advance of the first Chinese nuclear explosion in October 1964 that that bomb would be a plutonium device. It proved to be a uranium bomb; and it is an easy point that an operating diffusion plant for separating U-235 is very much harder to conceal than a MIRV test.

Most important, we developed MIRV from scratch in about six years, and the system development for the advanced specific systems probably did not take more than three or four years.

Since our own MIRV programs have been noisily advertised to the Soviets since early 1968 (and public mention of the idea can be found as far back as 1963), it would be surprising indeed if the Soviets did not by now have some very advanced ideas on how to do MIRV. Some analysts do, in fact, believe that the Soviets could achieve substantial MIRV capability within the lifetime of the Interim Agreement. Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 15: "... our intelligence specialists believe that by the mid or late 1970s the Soviets could have MIRVed SLBMs in their operational forces."

Published comparisons of Soviet and American missile forces showing a substantial American lead in warheads, as for instance in a chart on the front page of the *New York Times*, May 27, showing 5,700 warheads for the U.S. and 2,500 for the Soviet Union, should be understood as having, in all probability, a highly limited lifetime of validity. Even today, the Soviet warheads are much larger and more destructive than ours.

(The estimates that are given for the Soviet ICBM force, incidentally, such as the number 1,618, are all derived from American intelligence; the Soviets have refused to say how

many missiles they have. Thus, our estimates of the Soviet strategic forces are presumably lower bounds. The limitation in the Interim Agreement is stated as a prohibition on new silo starts, not as an absolute ceiling on numbers. If we later discover a whole field of ICBMs, which I am told has happened in the past, there may be some controversy over just when it was started. There is also room for controversy over what constitutes "light" or "heavy" ICBMs.)

If the Soviets have paid any significant attention to MIRV technology in the past, as is very likely, it would be well within their capability to deploy ten thousand or more MIRV warheads on their allowed booster force within the lifetime of this Agreement. They could do this with sufficient yield in warheads, combined with sufficiently upgraded guidance in their missiles, so that they could wipe out virtually all of our Minuteman force with less than half of their missile force.

This is not to say that launching such an attack would be attractive to the Soviets under ordinary circumstances; the United States has important offensive forces other than Minuteman, and these other forces retain considerable deterrent persuasiveness. Even the Minuteman force by itself would still provide some deterrence; a calculation that it

"That [Soviet] edge includes 40 per cent more intercontinental ballistic missiles (1,408 to 1,000) and missile-launching submarines (62 to 44), one-third more submarine-launched ballistic missiles (950 to 710) and a three-fold Soviet advantage in megatonnage of total missile payload. Much of this appears in writing in the five-year agreement freezing strategic offensive missiles."

—N.Y. Times' summary of SALT agreement,
lead editorial, June 5, 1972.

could be substantially eliminated would be only a calculation and not likely to be appealing to political leaders except under desperate circumstances. But the lopsided nature of the situation will likely have important adverse consequences, as discussed below.

The Administration's justification for not only accepting this embarrassing posture but engraving it in a formal agreement, is that Congress will not in any event provide money for the forces needed to equalize the Soviet strategic force. Indeed, the Administration believes, and sincerely, that if it were not for this Agreement the Soviets would increase their margin of superiority to some even larger extent. For example, the current rate of construction of Soviet ballistic-missile submarines is nine or ten per year; if that rate were continued, in five years the Soviets could have not 62, but perhaps ninety modern missile-launching submarines. Therefore, instead of having the 50 per cent superiority in submarines the Agreement will potentially give them, they could have a 2 to 1 margin (assuming that Congress would not provide the several billion dollars necessary for us to keep pace, an assumption that has not been seriously tested, and may well be false).

Some Administration analysts argue that the degree of strategic superiority given the Soviets by the Interim Agreement, while admittedly large, is nevertheless less than suggested above. The chief arguments they advance are: a) the Agreement does not include bombers, in which we have

substantial superiority; b) the Agreement omits what are called "Forward Based Systems," i.e., our nuclear delivery systems based in Europe; and c) the apparent Soviet superiority in submarines (62 Soviet v. 44 American) is not real, since the Soviets do not or cannot operate their submarines as efficiently as we can with our bases (at Rota and Holy Loch) closer to the Soviet Union. These arguments are more cosmetic than tenable. As for a), it is possible to believe in the superiority of American bomber forces only so long as Soviet medium bombers are not counted; they have some seven hundred of these, which could attack targets in the United States and continue on to airfields in Cuba and Mexico.

As for b), the Soviets have some seven hundred intermediate- or medium-range ballistic missiles that can attack European targets, to which our Forward Based Systems are mainly in response. These Soviet missiles are in no way affected by the Agreement; they can build as many more as they please. As for c), there is nothing to prevent the Soviets from adopting more efficient means of using their submarines. They could, for instance, resupply the sub-


and expectations will be reflected in their peacetime bargaining and will increase their aggressiveness in possible crisis confrontations.

Second, the Agreement and the Soviet lead it establishes will do much to establish an image of American inferiority in American government circles. The effects of this, of course, will be the obverse of those to be expected from the attitudes in the Soviet bureaucracy, though probably less marked in degree.

Third, the new imbalance of power will become firmly established in the minds of our allies, which will ultimately lead them to be more responsive, perhaps unduly responsive, to Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives. To use the current jargon, the Interim Agreement will contribute to "Finlandizing" tendencies in the policies of our allies.

Fourth, enshrining this degree of Soviet superiority as a substantially permanent thing will almost certainly have adverse consequences in any serious crises that may develop. For instance, we could not reasonably expect as favorable an outcome in a replay of the Cuban missile crisis. (The success of that outcome did not reside so much in the immediate outcome in Cuba as that the Soviets were deterred from counter-escalating in Turkey, or, especially, in Berlin, a fact that apostles of parity find convenient to ignore.)

It is in a certain sense true that different degrees of superiority can in the last analysis be translated only into different degrees of "victory" that would in any event be altogether Pyrrhic. However, this often-repeated observation conveniently ignores the fact that most political leaders and many military leaders are not academic strategists: These leaders not only count weapons, they tend to think in terms of who will come out "ahead," and their (perhaps simplistic) attitudes about these matters will influence their expectations, demands and flexibility in a crisis (other things—such as the guts and the political support of the leaders on the scene—being equal). Therefore, a commitment to a position of strategic disadvantage is, at least in some statistical sense, an invitation to be pushed around in the next crisis.



marines and change their crews from ocean-going tenders, so that a larger fraction of the submarines would be on station. Of course, the Soviets *may* not do this, but it would certainly not be difficult to do so and there is nothing in the proposed Agreement to prevent them.

The real Administration argument for the Interim Agreement is that it will limit the extent to which the Soviets will achieve strategic-force lead more reliably than any other approach in sight. But that Soviet advantage, by any reasonable assessment, is already real, and may well become greater as the Soviets deploy MIRVs and otherwise upgrade their permitted force in the coming years. The political consequences of this superiority, or more precisely of the general public recognition of it, are several, and all bad.

First, it will reinforce and confirm previously established Soviet images and expectations of a declining American role in world affairs. Within the past two years, Soviet commentators on the American scene have exhibited increasing contempt for the United States, its power and its role in international affairs. For instance, Soviet analysts often make such remarks as: "The United States must be adjusting itself, in the manner of the United Kingdom at the end of World War II, to its loss of power and influence in the world." The Soviets correspondingly think of themselves as very much in the ascendant. These Soviet attitudes

The ABM Treaty

The key terms of the Treaty on ABMs are as follows:

First, "Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this treaty." The basic philosophy is clear: Apart from the exceptions indicated, we may not defend our homeland against missile attack.

Second, Article III provides for a limited defense by one hundred interceptors of Moscow and Washington, and another defense system, similarly limited to one hundred interceptors, of ICBM silos in some area remote from the national capital.

Third, both we and the Soviets undertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.

Fourth, it is prohibited to transfer ABM systems or their components to other states or to deploy them outside Soviet and American national territory.

Fifth, compliance with the provisions of the Treaty shall be monitored by "national technical means of verification,"

as in the Interim Agreement, and (also similarly) there are obligations not to interfere with such means or to attempt deliberate concealment.

American strategic nuclear policy has been dominated in recent years by the concept of "assured destruction," according to which the chief task of the U.S. strategic forces is to be able to mount a nuclear attack that will be sure to destroy a substantial fraction of Soviet society, even after a major Soviet strike on American forces. (Recent statements by the Nixon Administration have emphasized a doctrine called "strategic sufficiency," but it is clear that something like the concept of "assured destruction" still dominates American strategic policy.)

This domination extends to strategic arms-control matters. It is argued that the most stable, secure, cheap and generally desirable arrangement is one in which we and the Soviets maintain a "mutual assured destruction" posture, in which no serious effort is made by either side to limit the civilian damage that could be inflicted by the other. Most of the opposition in the West to substantial systems of missile de-

ture, we could achieve it effectively, reliably and cheaply. We could have an arms-control agreement to mine each other's cities: We could install very large thermonuclear weapons with secure firing arrangements in, say, Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, etc. while the Soviets could install similar weapons and arrangements in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles, etc. It is technically feasible to make such a system quite secure; with the vulnerabilities mentioned above eliminated, arms-race pressures would be reduced. While such a system would have its own technical problems, analysis indicates they would be far simpler to solve than those of the current system; it could save billions. Yet almost everyone will dismiss it as being merely absurd. If a mined-city system is the best way of realizing a MAD posture, it follows that posture as a goal is itself fundamentally absurd.

There are three fundamental problems here: The first is that, in spite of our best efforts, a major nuclear war could happen. An institutionalized MAD posture is a way of insuring, now and forever, that the outcome of such a war would be nearly unlimited disaster for everybody. While technology and politics may conspire to leave us temporarily in such a posture, we should not welcome it—we should rather look for ways out of it.

The second fundamental difficulty is essentially political: We do not have a Department of Defense for the purpose of deliberately making us all hostages to enemy weapons. The government is supposed, according to the Constitution, to "provide for the common defense," and plainly most Americans would revolt at the idea of a mined-city system as a sensible way to do this. The Defense Department should be more concerned with assuring live Americans than dead Russians.

The third fundamental difficulty is moral: We should not deliberately create a system in which millions of innocent civilians would be exterminated should the system fail. The system is not *that* reliable. Again, if we accept a MAD posture as an interim solution, we should be looking for ways out of it, not ways to enshrine it.



fense for cities, including the opposition embodied in this proposed ABM Treaty, derives from the alleged benefits of such a posture. And much of the opposition to the Safeguard ABM system, which was not intended to provide a substantial defense of cities, stemmed from a concern that it might expand to provide such a defense.

The concept of mutual assured destruction provides one of the few instances in which the obvious acronym for something yields at once the appropriate description; for it, that is, a Mutual Assured Destruction posture as a goal is, almost literally, mad. MAD. If technology and international politics provided absolutely no alternative, one might reluctantly accept a MAD posture. But to think of it as desirable—for instance, as a clearly preferred goal of our arms-control negotiations, as the proposed ABM treaty automatically assumes—is bizarre. Let us consider the simplest and most effective means of realizing it.

At present, we and the Soviets achieve a MAD posture by means of long-range missiles and bombers armed with thermonuclear weapons. There are, however, many problems associated with these forces. Missiles and bombers may be attacked before they are launched; they may fail to perform properly; they may fail to penetrate enemy defenses. Concern about such vulnerabilities helps fuel the arms race. These forces are also expensive; the U.S. alone spends about \$8 billion a year on them.

Now, if it were genuinely desirable to have a MAD pos-

WHY, THEN, do some advocate a MAD posture? The advocates are, in the main, technically oriented people accustomed to theoretical models, and the arguments involve appeals to "stability" of various kinds and reference to other sophisticated jargon—jargon that I understand very well, having helped to articulate it a decade or more ago. For instance, one argument sometimes heard—it is, e.g., reflected in the preamble to the proposed ABM Treaty—is that this posture will best protect against nuclear war altogether, but this proposition is very dubious indeed.

While these MADvocates are undoubtedly sincere, and many of them intelligent, I believe they have been bemused by theoretical models of strategic interactions, models which seem sophisticated and intellectually appealing but which are in fact much oversimplified descriptions of reality. Some few technical people have been so bemused by the models that they seriously advocate deployment of a mined-city system.

If an institutionalized MAD posture is not desirable as a permanent way of life, and it is not, what alternative is available? The answer is to put increasing emphasis on defense, with a corresponding reduction in the effort devoted to strategic offensive forces.

There is much controversy about just how effective any

defense (such as ABM) can be made against existing or further enlarged offensive forces. I cannot discuss this controversy here. However, there is very little controversy over the fact that defense can be made quite effective if the opposing offense is suitably reduced, while allowed defense is built up. This is precisely the direction that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks should have taken, but did not.

Even if it were agreed that currently achievable defense is too ineffective to be useful against even a suitably reduced offensive threat (a position that few informed persons would take), it makes little sense to preclude the possibility of a more effective defense being found in the future. The proposed treaty does exactly that.

It might be possible to achieve similar effects simply by, sharply reducing offensive forces, without any defense, if it were not for two factors: a) there are other countries in the world besides the United States and the Soviet Union, and b) perfect inspection of sharply reduced offensive forces probably cannot be achieved, and defense can provide protection against clandestine weapons.

THE MAD philosophy originally took hold in the American arms-control community about 1960. This might have been ultimately unimportant but for the fact that Robert S. McNamara became a determined believer in the concept, and imposed the "Assured Destruction" philosophy on the civilian staffs in the Pentagon with the full force of his personality. This was in a sense a *tour de force*, because at the time, the Soviets conspicuously did not share this philosophy (although he often asserted that they did). The evidence is overwhelming that, at least up until the late 1960s, the Soviets did not consider a MAD posture desirable. For instance, Premier Kosygin, asked about a moratorium on missile defenses at a press conference in London on February 9, 1967, replied, in part: "I believe that defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people. Some argue like this: What is cheaper, to have offensive weapons which can destroy towns and whole states or to have defensive weapons which can prevent this destruction? At present the theory is current somewhere that the system which is cheaper should be developed. Such so-called theoreticians argue as to the costs of killing a man—\$500,000 or \$100,000. Maybe an antimissile system is more expensive than an offensive system, but it is designed not to kill people but to preserve human lives. I understand that I do not reply to the question I was asked, but you can draw yourselves the appropriate conclusions." This is not the comment of a man who was friendly to a moratorium on missile defense.

Many other Soviet pronouncements, public and private, official and unofficial, left no doubt that the Soviets favored heavy emphasis on active defense, at least up through 1968 and early 1969. But beginning in 1969 or 1970, the Soviet government leaders either began to change their views, or else decided to make us *think* they had changed their views. Thus the overt indications in the SALT negotiations for the past two years have suggested whole-hearted Soviet acceptance, at least at the top of the hierarchy, of the MAD philosophy.

If the Soviets have indeed come to this position, they have had a good deal of American help in getting there.

Almost every American who argued with almost any Russian about arms-control matters in the 1960s tried to make the point that missile defenses were wicked. This stemmed, of course, from the commitment in certain American quarters to the MAD philosophy. Up until 1968, the universal Soviet reaction to this argument was a polite raspberry. But some U.S. spokesmen could not be easily ignored. In particular, McNamara himself did his best to convert the Soviets to his philosophy, both in public statements and in private meetings (notably at the Glassboro Conference in June 1967, when he forcefully presented the case for MAD directly to Kosygin, who did not go for the idea, at least at that time). Another forceful input to the Soviets came from President Lyndon B. Johnson, who, according to his memoirs, sent Premier Kosygin a secret letter in January 1967 warning him that the incipient deployment of Soviet missile defenses had put him under pressure to "increase greatly our capabilities to penetrate any defensive systems which you might establish." Johnson continued: "If we should feel compelled to make such major increases in our strategic weapons capabilities, I have no doubt that you would in turn feel under compulsion to do likewise." It seems likely that this letter was stimulated by Secretary McNamara.

Perhaps the most persuasive pressure on the Soviets was not an argument *per se*; but the American decision of late 1967 and early 1968 to proceed with a major MIRV program for the American strategic offensive force, leading to the deployment of Minuteman III and Poseidon. This program was intended to add something like five thousand additional warheads to the American offensive force. The almost theological, not to say fanatic, faith McNamara had in the MAD philosophy is reflected in the fact that, while he viewed the beginnings of a Soviet system for defense of the homeland as highly provocative, he apparently saw nothing provocative in spending many billion dollars to add several thousand additional warheads to the American force, especially at a time and under circumstances that would have made it impossible for the Soviets to know what accuracy these weapons might achieve.

FOR WHATEVER combinations of reasons, the Soviets have now either accepted the MAD philosophy or are pretending to. It should be noted that, up to the time of writing, one cannot detect many hints of this philosophy in the papers of Soviet colonels writing for each other in *Red Star*; however, this may indicate merely that the message has not yet come down from the top. (Some well-placed Soviet officials have in fact indicated to Americans, very privately, that the ABM Treaty will mean a major doctrinal overhaul in the Soviet military establishment, and may well require a considerable shuffling of senior personnel. It will be interesting to see if this in fact comes to pass.)


Some kinds of ABM systems could be compatible with a MAD posture. The Sentinel ABM system initiated by McNamara in September 1967, and the Safeguard System that the Nixon Administration has been constructing, were both designed to be compatible with a MAD posture. These systems would have provided a "light" or "thin" defense; a large and sophisticated attack, such as the Soviets would be capable of mounting, would easily have overwhelmed the thin over-all defense of our cities. (At McNamara's instruc-

tion, the Sentinel System design also had some specific weaknesses introduced to make the system more easily penetrable by the Soviets.) Such a light area defense was intended, in the case of the Sentinel System, to provide protection of the entire country against possible Chinese attacks.

The Nixon Administration retained the anti-Chinese light-area-defense objective of the Sentinel System and added additional objectives for the Safeguard System, chiefly the provision of added protection of our ICBM and bomber forces. The threefold objectives of the Safeguard program have been stated many times by the present Administration; for instance, as given in the most recent "Posture Statement" issued by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird in February 1972: "Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union; defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which the People's Republic of China is likely to be able to mount within the decade; and protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source." These objectives made sense, even within the framework of a MAD posture, and the program was accordingly supported, especially in its early phases in 1969 and 1970, by many who were willing to accept such a posture.

IT IS INSTRUCTIVE that nothing in either Moscow agreement provides a substitute means for satisfying these objectives of Safeguard. The Interim Agreement does not provide sufficient protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviets (I shall give evidence for this shortly), and of course nothing in either agreement does anything about the possibility of nuclear attack from China or accidental attacks from any source. Therefore, the Administration's previously declared objectives for Safeguard combined with the current proposed agreements constitute a strategic non-sequitur.

The worst aspect of this non-sequitur relates to the protection of our retaliatory forces. The declared Administration objective in linking the negotiation of an ABM agreement to an agreement limiting strategic offensive forces was that it was necessary to limit the threat to Minuteman in order to accept constraints that would limit our ability to protect Minuteman. However, we are far from having achieved that link-up. To quote again from Secretary Laird's most recent Posture Statement: "With significant qualitative improvements in Soviet ICBMs even without increases in the number of Soviet ICBMs [i.e., exactly the situation permitted by the Interim Agreement], the postulated threat to Minuteman in the last half of the 1970s could grow to a level beyond the capabilities of the four-site Safeguard defense of Minuteman. Therefore, we propose [initiating an additional ABM defense program for protecting Minuteman beyond the four-site Safeguard System]." Thus, even the full four-site Safeguard System, which would have entailed many more than one hundred interceptors,



Curves are for numbers of delivery vehicles only, not for payload capacity or "throw weight." Similar curves drawn for throw weight would show the Soviets crossing the American capacity earlier in time, and having a much greater advantage at present.

was judged by Mr. Laird inadequate to protect Minuteman against the threat now permitted the Soviets under the Interim Agreement. We have negotiated away all but a small part of that Safeguard System, to say nothing of the opportunity to add additional active defense.

The gains Mr. Nixon brought back from Moscow are not to be thought of in terms of the often-expressed objectives of the Safeguard program. There are two possible intellectual justifications for accepting this treaty, in the light of the objectives the government has previously expressed. The first is that, while these agreements are inadequate, supplementary agreements to be sought in following negotiations will redress imbalances. However, the Soviets will have very little motivation to degrade the situation they now find themselves in; therefore I do not believe that argument should be given any significant weight. The other justification would say that, while the agreements may in some sense constitute an immediate strategic loss, the various political and economic gains that may develop as a consequence of these agreements will more than compensate for the strategic costs. An argument along this line is in fact indicated in President Nixon's last foreign policy statement. While this argument cannot be dismissed, there is no doubt that such a calculation of gains and losses requires considerable optimism about the consequences of having these agreements and considerable pessimism about the future if the agreements were not in force.

There is probably another sense in which the ABM Treaty is a strategic non-sequitur. It is intended by its American proponents to institutionalize a permanent MAD posture, but it is actually doubtful that, as matters now stand, the United States has an assured destruction capability (measured by standard criteria) against the Soviets, in view of their Civil Defense program. The Soviet government has declared that their CD program could limit Soviet fatalities in an all-out war with the United States to perhaps 6 per cent of their population, which would be substantially less than the fatalities they suffered in World War II. American students of the Soviet CD program agree that this estimate is reasonable. In contrast, current Soviet forces could probably destroy 60 per cent of the American population, with

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high confidence, given our lack of CD preparations. Thus, it appears that the actual current assured destruction capabilities are not exactly mutual.

What Brought Us Here?

The question of what brought us to the point of accepting these agreements can be answered at several different levels, and in terms of several different individuals and groups within the government.

President Nixon genuinely wants peace; he genuinely would like to save money; and he genuinely would like to be re-elected. He obviously knows that these agreements, especially if they are accepted without too much of a battle, will be of substantial domestic political value. I believe it is fair to say that this fact resulted in significant pressure on the American negotiators. However, it would be quite wide of the mark to dismiss the agreements as a cheap electoral trick or to believe that they do not have a substantial base of support in the Washington Establishment.

Many people on the President's own staff place considerable emphasis, in justifying the agreements and especially the Interim Agreement, on the argument that Congress would not provide the wherewithal to close the widening gap in strategic forces. While this argument is probably sincere, it may in fact be less important than a perception that is less frequently articulated, but which is likely held by the President and by some of his key people: that money for military purposes would be very scarce *even if Congress itself were not an obstacle*. Trying to find several billion dollars a year in extra money for the Defense Department would entail very unpleasant alternatives, such as raising taxes, attempting some kind of tax reform, or taking large amounts of money from other programs dear to the Administration. Such alternatives would, of course, seem especially unpleasant in an election year. Congress may make an easy scapegoat, but Congress cannot be reckoned the chief villain of the piece when the President has never once gone to the country to explain that our military posture was in jeopardy and that more money was needed for strategic forces. If the President had chosen to lead on this matter, many of us believe the country might well have followed; but the experiment was never tried.

ONE OF THE more interesting case studies, in relation to these agreements, can be found in the Department of Defense. A decade ago, it would have been absolutely inconceivable that, for instance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have approved either of these agreements, much less both of them. Their approval would have been almost as unthinkable five years ago. Within the past three years however, and especially within the past two, a very noticeable loss of morale has been detectable within the Department. In the face of the buffeting from Congress, from the President's own Bureau of the Budget and from the general public, the military staffs have been looking to SALT to help "save" their situation. Even today, however, it is implausible that the Joint Chiefs could regard these agreements with enthusiasm; more likely, they faced a set of unpleasant alternatives, and judged these agreements to be the least unpleasant.

Some comments in the press have tended to suggest that Henry Kissinger was the chief architect of these agreements. It would probably be much more accurate to think of him as presiding over the national security apparatus as a sort of chairman, and attempting to impose some degree of order and competence on that apparatus, than as a personal mastermind of these agreements. Kissinger's main (and very considerable) strength is in international politics; perhaps because of the technical components involved, he has never been as strong on strategic nuclear issues. Kissinger's personal contribution to events can probably be found much more in the President's determined resistance to cutting American troop levels in Europe, and in the missions to Peking and Moscow, than in these two strategic arms agreements.

Where Next?

These are not the arms-control agreements one would wish to have in an ideal world. I have supported, without serious reservation, every arms-control agreement or treaty that has emerged since World War II. I doubt that one should recommend acceptance of these agreements.

It would be easy to advise rejection, if one had the opportunity to start over again to produce better agreements. But the choice is not there. In view of all the circumstances, both domestic and international, should one accept an American declaration of strategic inferiority, and accept the conspicuous idiocy of a permanent commitment to the MAD posture, and simply hope that the agreements will ultimately contribute to the evolution of a secure peace with freedom? Or should one insist that the President do what is right, Congress do what is right, and the public do what is right, including spending much more money if the Soviets are recalcitrant about establishing more sensible agreements (and, incidentally, almost surely lose the battle)? I do not know, and I can believe that honest and intelligent men, who understand the issues thoroughly, and who are as disappointed as I am with the agreements, could easily differ on the answers.

AT THE VERY least, the debate associated with these agreements, in Congress and out of it, should force attention to a number of important questions. Some of these concern technical details, but ones which may be of sufficient importance to influence the acceptability of the agreements. It may well be that some judicious reservations could be attached to these agreements that would lessen their unfortunate effects.

The United States has suffered something like wounds from a number of sources in recent years—Vietnam, student activism, declining credibility of both the government and the media and, not least, a declining role in world affairs, occasioned largely by declining morale at home. Many of us will feel that Mr. Nixon has now rubbed SALT in our wounds. But we should not forget that there are, in fact, good reasons to slow down the strategic arms race; and if the agreements are accepted, we must, of necessity, share Mr. Nixon's hope that their positive effects will, over the long term, outweigh their immediate strategic costs.

The costs are real. □

* * *

Vladivostok: Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Text of Joint United States-Soviet Statement. November 24, 1974

During their working meeting in the area of Vladivostok on November 23-24, 1974, the President of the USA Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev discussed in detail the question of further limitations of strategic offensive arms.

They reaffirmed the great significance that both the United States and the USSR attach to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. They are convinced that a long-term agreement on this question would be a significant contribution to improving relations between the US and the USSR, to reducing the danger of war and to enhancing world peace. Having noted the value of previous agreements on this question, including the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, they reaffirm the intention to conclude a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, to last through 1985.

As a result of the exchange of views on the substance of such a new agreement the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU concluded that favorable prospects exist for completing the work on this agreement in 1975.

Agreement was reached that further negotiations will be based on the following provisions.

1. The new agreement will incorporate the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977.

2. The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985.

3. Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations:

- a. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles;
- b. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).

4. The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985.

5. Negotiations between the delegations of the U.S. and USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating the foregoing points will resume in Geneva in January 1975.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 2, 1974

THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND THE SOVIET UNION

OPENING STATEMENT

THE PRESIDENT. Good evening.

Perhaps I can anticipate some of your questions by summarizing my recent visits to Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union.

In Japan, we succeeded in establishing a new era of relations between our two countries. We demonstrated our continuing commitment to the independence and to the security of South Korea.

At Vladivostok we put a firm ceiling on the strategic arms race, which heretofore has eluded us since the nuclear age began. I believe this is something for which future generations will thank us.

Finally, Secretary Kissinger's mission maintained the momentum in China with the People's Republic of China.

My meetings at Vladivostok with General Secretary Brezhnev were a valuable opportunity to review Soviet-American relations and chart their future course. Although this was our original purpose, Secretary Brezhnev and I found it possible to go beyond this get-acquainted stage.

Building on the achievements of the past 3 years, we agreed that the prospects were favorable for more substantial and, may I say, very intensive negotiations on the primary issue of a limitation of strategic arms. In the end, we agreed on the general framework for a new agreement that will last through 1985.

We agreed it is realistic to aim at completing this agreement next year. This is possible because we made major breakthroughs on two critical issues:

Number one, we agreed to put a ceiling of 2,400 each on the total number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and heavy bombers.

Two, we agreed to limit the number of missiles that can be armed with multiple warheads—MIRV's. Of each side's total of 2,400, 1,320 can be so armed.

These ceilings are well below the force levels which would otherwise have been expected over the next 10 years and very substantially below the forces which would result from an all-out arms race over that same period.

What we have done is to set firm and equal limits on the strategic forces of each side, thus preventing an arms race with all its terror, instability, war-breeding tension, and economic waste.

We have, in addition, created the solid basis from which future arms reductions can be made and, hopefully, will be negotiated.

It will take more detailed negotiations to convert this agreed framework into a comprehensive accord. But we have made a long step toward peace on a basis of equality, the only basis on which an agreement was possible.

Beyond this, our improved relations with the other nations of Asia developed on this journey will continue to serve the interests of the United States and the cause of peace for months to come. Economy, energy, security, and trade relations were discussed, which will be of mutual benefit to us all.

I would like to repeat publicly my thanks and gratitude for the hospitality extended to me by all of my hosts and, through me, to the American people.

Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International]. I am glad to respond to your question.

QUESTIONS

Q. Mr. President, this pact permits the nuclear buildup to go ahead. Since you want to cut Government spending, how many billions of dollars will this cost the American people over the years, and also, do you think that the Russians stalled last July because they knew that Mr. Nixon was doomed in the Presidency and preferred to deal with his successor?

THE PRESIDENT. I would like to correct, if I might, one impression. This does not permit an agreed buildup. It puts a cap on future buildups, and it actually reduces a part of the buildup at the present time.

It is important, I should say, however, in order for us to maintain equality, which is a keystone of this program, to have an adequate amount of military expenditures. But I can say this without hesitation or qualification: If we

had not had this agreement, it would have required the United States to substantially increase its military expenditures in the strategic areas.

So, we put a cap on the arms race. We actually made some reductions below present programs. It is a good agreement, and I think that the American people will buy it, because it provides for equality and it provides for a negotiated reduction in several years ahead.

Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press].

Q. Mr. President, there are reports that you and Mr. Brezhnev made some progress in maybe fashioning a complementary approach to negotiations in the Middle East. More specifically, perhaps the Soviets would agree to try to persuade the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] to acknowledge that Israel has a right to exist, and we then might try to persuade Israel to talk to the PLO. Is there any truth to this?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Cormier, Mr. Brezhnev and I did discuss at some length our different views on the settlement of the Middle East. There are some differences, but they are not as major as it would appear.

We indicated that, in our judgment, it was important for continuous progress to be made, perhaps with negotiations between Israel and one or more of the other Arab nations.

We also agreed that at a certain point a Geneva conference might be the final answer. So, as we discussed our, what appeared to be different views at the outset, I think we came to an agreement that it was in the interest of the nations in the Middle East, the interest of the world at large, that both parties make a maximum effort to keep negotiations going.

We think our step-by-step approach is the right one for the time being, but we don't preclude the possibility of a Geneva conference.

Yes, sir.

Q. You say that this is going to reduce a part of the buildup. Does that mean, then, that we are going to spend less on defense next year than we are spending this year?

THE PRESIDENT. It does not mean that, because only a part of our total defense program is related to strategic arms research, development, deployment, and operations and maintenance. We do have an obligation within the limits of 2,400 on delivery systems and 1,320 on MIRV's to keep our forces up to that level.

And I think we can, with about the same expenditure level for the next fiscal year, as at the present.

But in the other programs, in our tactical forces and other military programs, there is an inflationary cost. The military has that inflation just like you and I do, so we will probably have to increase our military budget next year just to take care of the costs of inflation.

Yes.

Q. Just to follow up, we are not quite to that ceiling yet, are we? Do you intend to stay below that ceiling, or are you going to try to reach that ceiling?

THE PRESIDENT. I intend to stay below the ceiling. That is the agreement. But we do have an obligation to stay up to that ceiling, and the budget that I will recommend will keep our strategic forces either up to or aimed at that objective.

Q. Mr. President, since it is widely believed the Soviet Union has larger rockets capable of carrying heavier payloads and being MIRVed, to a larger extent carrying more warheads, can you tell us what the relative position would be between the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of warheads if each side goes to the maximum number of 1,320 on the MIRVed limit?

THE PRESIDENT. On delivery systems, we are equal. On the MIRVing, we are equal. I think the question you are asking is throw weight. It is recognized that the Soviet Union has a heavier throw weight, but the agreement does not preclude the United States from increasing its throw weight capability.

A number of years ago, our military decided that we wanted smaller missiles that were more accurate. That has been the decision of our military.

Now, if the military decides at the present time that they want to increase the throw weight, we have that right under the agreement, and I can tell you that we have the capability to do so.

So, if there is an inequality in throw weight, it can be remedied if our military recommended and the Congress appropriates the money.

Q. Mr. President, if you find the Soviet Union leaning, then, toward getting the maximum throw weight or the maximum number of warheads on their MIRV missiles, would you then recommend that the United States accelerate and move from smaller missiles to larger ones?

THE PRESIDENT. The Soviet military guidelines were for heavier missiles, heavier throw weight. Our military took a different point of view some years ago. The Soviet Union is limited as to delivery systems and as to MIRV's within the delivery systems. They cannot go beyond those.

The agreement gives us the flexibility to move up in throw weight if we want to. It does not preclude the Soviets from increasing throw weight, but I think for good reasons they have no justification for doing so.

Yes, Mr. Sperling [Godfrey Sperling, Christian Science Monitor].

Q. Wouldn't your stated accomplishments in Russia have carried more long-range credibility if they had been put initially and then described later on in less sanguine and more modest terms?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, if I understand the question, when I came back a week ago yesterday, we did not have in writing what is called an aid memoir, which was the specific agreement in writing that General Secretary Brezhnev and I had agreed to verbally. That has now been received.

Until that had been received and we had checked it out, we felt it was wise to speak in generalities. I am giving

to you and to the American people tonight the specific figures. They are, I think, constructive. It is a good agreement. It is an agreement—if I might repeat—that puts a cap on the arms race, it makes some reductions, and it gives us an opportunity to negotiate.

So, I don't think a week's delay in the specifics has handicapped our presentation.

Q. More specifically, what percentage of the state of progress in Russia was yours and how much was Mr. Nixon's?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I don't really think I ought to get into an evaluation of that. The United States has been working on a strategic arms limitation agreement for 3 or 4 years. I think we made headway in SALT I. I think we have made a real breakthrough in SALT Two.

Q. Mr. President, I would like to get back to the cost of missiles for one moment, if we may. I understand we are now spending about \$15 billion a year in strategic arms, and there is an enormous amount of missile building to be done under this agreement over the next 10 years, both in MIRV's and in throw weight. Will our costs continue at about the level they are now for the next 10 years or will it be more?

THE PRESIDENT. My best judgment is that our strategic arms cost will hold relatively the same. It will not be substantially expanded other than for any increase resulting from inflation.

Yes.

Q. Mr. President, under the agreement, the United States tactical nuclear weapons at the forward bases in Europe were not included. Do you expect that they will be reduced or eliminated under some future mutual balanced force reduction agreement with the Soviet Union?

THE PRESIDENT. One of the very significant benefits of the agreement from Vladivostok was the fact we didn't have to include in the 2,400 or the 1,320—either the delivery systems or the MIRVs—as far as the forward base systems were concerned.

I am sure you know we are involved in mutual balanced force reductions in Western Europe. When we get closer to an agreement there—and I hope we will—we are presently negotiating in Vienna in this area—it is hopeful that we can make some reductions both in numbers of military personnel between ourselves and the allies on the one side and the Warsaw Pact nations and the Soviet Union on the other, as well as any arms reductions.

Q. Beyond your hope, is that a commitment that you made to the Soviet leaders in Vladivostok?

THE PRESIDENT. No, we made no agreement concerning the mutual balanced force reductions. We did agree to continue negotiations.

Q. Mr. President, are you satisfied that the Soviets are carrying out the spirit and the letter of the 1972 arms limitation agreements?

THE PRESIDENT. We know of no violations, either on the part of the Soviet Union or by ourselves. There have

been some allegations that the Soviet Union has violated the SALT I agreement. We don't think they have.

There are, however, some ambiguities. When the SALT I agreement was agreed to, there was established a standing consultative commission made up of the Soviet Union and the United States. That commission can meet twice a year to analyze any allegations as to violations of SALT I. It is our intention to call for a meeting of that group—I think in January of next year—to analyze any of the ambiguities that have been alleged. We don't think there have been any violations, but I have a responsibility to find out, and we intend to follow through under the agreed procedure of the 1972 agreements.

Q. Mr. President, since there is no limit in this agreement on throw weight and since there is no limit on multiple warheads, and since additional multiple warheads could be put on the bigger missiles, more or less ad infinitum, how can you say that this is a lid or cap on the arms race?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, it certainly, number one, puts a limit on the delivery systems—2,400—and as I indicated at the outset, this does result in a cutback as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

The 1,320 limitation on MIRV's does put a lid on the planned or programmed program for ourselves as well as the Soviet Union.

Now, the throw weight problem is one that we can remedy if we want to. Our military took a different point of view some years ago when they designed our ballistic missiles, but we have that flexibility.

Now, if we decide to go to a heavier throw weight, we can add on a MIRVed missile a greater number of individual warheads. That is a choice of flexibility that we have and I think it is one of the benefits of this agreement.

Q. You wouldn't describe that as an arms race?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, it is an attempt, if our military wanted to achieve an equality in this particular area. We have equality on delivery systems and the right to MIRV from those delivery systems. In the other, if it is our choice, we can go up in throw weight.

Yes, Sarah [Sarah McClendon, McClendon News Service].

Q. Mr. President, I want to ask you, what about conventional weapons? We have heard from Senator Goldwater and we have heard from Admiral Zumwalt that we are very weak on conventional weapons and we need more of those, rather than the kind that you have in your agreement.

THE PRESIDENT. Well of course, this agreement, Sarah, was limited to strategic arms. We hope, as I indicated a moment ago, to continue our negotiations for the mutual balanced force reductions in Europe. That, of course, would have a limit on the conventional weapons.

In the meantime, I think it is of mandatory importance for the United States to maintain its conventional capa-

bility—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines—because the United States, through a responsible military program, can maintain the peace.

If we cut back our defense in conventional weapons, I think we will have weakened our position for the maintenance of peace. I don't intend to propose a budget in that regard.

O. Mr. President, do you think that we can do both of these, then?

THE PRESIDENT. I think so.

Q. To follow up on Frank Cormier's question, did you and Mr. Brezhnev discuss some kind of a trade-off whereby Israel would deal with the PLO and the PLO would recognize Israel's right to exist as a state?

THE PRESIDENT. We didn't get into that detail. Israel has indicated that it would not negotiate with the PLO. We have no way of forcing them to do so.

The discussion between Mr. Brezhnev and myself, as far as the Middle East was concerned, was to state our position and their position, and as we discussed it, I think we came to a higher degree of agreement in that our position was understood by them and the prospects of a Geneva agreement was understood by us.

MR. CORMIER. I understand you would like to devote about half of the news conference to domestic affairs, and I think we are about at the halfway point.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you very much, Mr. Cormier.

* * *

NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS: CONGRESS IS WARY

President Nixon will be in Moscow June 27 for another round of summitry with Soviet leaders. He will be leaving behind him a Congress absorbed by impeachment and increasingly suspicious of detente.

And he will be facing a summit with the major issue of arms limitations still unresolved. By the administration's own admission and according to observers on Capitol Hill, completion of a comprehensive agreement on arms was unlikely.

Prospects for a limited agreement on nuclear weaponry appeared better. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has discussed the possibility of a limited agreement on multiple warheads. There also has been talk of an intensive effort to reach agreement on a partial test ban treaty on underground nuclear explosions.

Any agreement beyond a declaration of principles or a general framework agreement aimed at keeping the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) moving must win the approval of Congress. A provision in the 1961 law (PL 87-297) establishing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency specified that an agreement to limit U.S. forces or armaments must be approved by legislation or treaty. (A resolution of approval would require a majority vote in both the House and Senate, while a treaty would need a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate.)

An agreement with the Soviets can be expected to receive close scrutiny from an increasingly skeptical Congress. Commanding majorities in both the House and Senate thus far have blocked U.S. trade concessions to the Soviets, a central point in the administration's detente policy, because of restrictive Soviet emigration policies. Russian activities in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean have further heightened suspicions on Capitol Hill.

But the overriding issue as the summit approached was the Soviet advancement in nuclear weaponry since conclusion of the 1972 antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty and five-year interim agreement limiting launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Soviet progress in weapons and technology not covered by the agreements—described by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger as “staggering to us in its size and depth, though not its pace”—has caused deep concern. This was evident during House and Senate consideration of the fiscal 1975 defense procurement authorization bill.

SALT II Issues

On Nov. 21, 1972, SALT II teams began negotiating a permanent agreement on offensive strategic weapons. Complicated issues of technological controls and qualitative differences in the asymmetrical strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, along with the question of permanent quantitative limits, had been left for SALT II negotiators to resolve.

Multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), containing several warhead packages capable of separating and destroying different targets, have emerged

Glossary of Terms

Following are excerpts from a glossary of arms control terms published in a book, “SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s,” and reprinted in the *Congressional Record* Jan. 29, 1974.

Antiballistic Missile (ABM): A defensive missile fired to intercept an offensive ballistic missile at both high and low levels.

Ballistic Missile: A missile fired from land or sea sites against surface targets. Such a missile reaches, at the apex of its flight, an altitude outside of the earth's atmosphere before falling back toward its target under the influence of gravity.

Forward-based Systems (FBS): Aircraft and other capabilities that could strike the Soviet Union, at least in one-way missions, although such systems are designed primarily for missions in Western and Central Europe in support of NATO ground forces.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM): A ballistic missile launched from land with an approximate range of 4,000-plus miles.

Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV): A re-entry vehicle containing several warhead packages capable of wide separation and independent targeting.

Multiple Re-entry Vehicle (MRV): A re-entry vehicle containing several warhead packages of limited separation capability.

Payload: The weight that the rockets of a missile are required to lift. This includes both the weight of the booster stage of the missile and the re-entry vehicle with its warhead package.

Re-entry System (RES): Those parts of the missile, including the warhead, intended to fall back into the earth's atmosphere under the influence of gravity and to deliver the warhead to its target.

Re-Entry Vehicle (REV): Each separate package of a multipackage re-entry system, designed to fall back through the atmosphere separately.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM): A ballistic missile launched from an underwater-capable vehicle. The missile is capable of being fired while the vehicle is either on the surface or submerged.

Throw Weight: The weight of the re-entry vehicle with its warhead package. In contrast with payload, the weight of the booster stage of the missile is not included in the calculation of throw weight.

Warhead: The explosive charge, nuclear or conventional, to be delivered by a missile.

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as a major issue in the second round of SALT. Closely related to multiple warheads has been the problem of missile throw weight—the amount of weight that can be delivered by a missile to a target.

Other unresolved issues were mobile ICBMs, missile reductions, strategic bombers and forward-based systems (U.S. tactical aircraft and other capabilities in and around Europe which could strike the Soviet Union).

Symington: "How Many Times Do You Have to Die...?"

"We have this unbelievable capacity for destroying the world"—and no one is really looking at the issue, according to Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.).

"The Hiroshima bomb...was 14 kilotons. One fighter plane out of Frankfurt today—one little fighter plane—could drop 700 kilotons on Moscow," Symington told Congressional Quarterly May 24 in a wide-ranging interview on SALT, nuclear warfare and atomic energy.

Symington, 72, regards nuclear energy as "the most important subject in the world." And, he said, "the sadness in the picture is the lack of knowledge on the part of the people of what they're playing with when they play with nuclear energy."

After nearly 22 years in the Senate, Symington is one of its leading authorities on national security. He is the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, as well as chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Subcommittee on Military Applications. Before his election to the Senate, he served as assistant secretary of the war department from 1946-1947 and secretary of the Air Force from 1947-1950.

Secrecy

"It has never been gotten over to the people—instead it has been hidden for reasons I have never been able to understand—the true importance of the change in all concepts of defense as a result of nuclear weaponry."

Symington said that "one thing that will not be accepted by the hawks who dominate the administration and much of Congress is the logic and the theory of overkill. How many times do you have to die to be dead?"

"The main thing is to get the secrecy out of the picture so people know what we're talking about," he continued. "They've sort of gotten the American people feeling that what we're talking about are firecrackers on the Fourth of July and what we're actually talking about are dynamite sticks that can blow up a dam."

And the senator did not absolve Congress from a share of the blame. In 1953, Symington told the chairman of the Armed

Symington said he repeated his proposal in 1970—and received the same response. "We never wanted to get information on the Armed Services Committee. We've never been interested in the subject.... And I think it's a disgrace, an absolute disgrace."

The Foreign Relations Committee has attempted to get information on nuclear policy—"once in awhile we get a little bit, it's just like pulling teeth with boxing

"We never wanted to get information on the Armed Services Committee. We've never been interested in the subject.... And I think it's a disgrace, an absolute disgrace."

gloves." Requests usually were refused on the grounds that such information could only be given to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. So Symington joined that committee.

The first open hearings on nuclear weapons "in the history of the world," Symington noted, were held April 4 by two Foreign Relations subcommittees. (*Weekly Report* p. 995)

Arms Control

Symington expressed deep concern over India's entry into the nuclear circle and the potential for others to follow.

On the role the United States and Soviet Union could play, he stated: "I can't see why there's all this fighting. If they can knock us off and we knock them off and together both of us could have some influence on (the other nuclear powers), why don't we hurry up and really get to work and work this thing out because pretty soon it won't make much difference."

But he held little hope for success at the current round of SALT talks because "we demanded equality on ICBMs and SLBMs." During consideration of the SALT I interim agreement, Congress approved an amendment, offered by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.) and accepted by the administration, requesting that any permanent treaty on offensive nuclear weapons "not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior" to those of the Soviets. (*Jackson amendment, box p. 1546*)

"The refusal on the part of this government to accept the original Kissinger deal, which embraced strategic bombers and forward-based aircraft, in my opinion has killed any chance of making a meaningful SALT II agreement," Symington stated.

"I think we're demanding superiority and the Soviets will never give it to us again," he asserted.



Sen. Stuart Symington

Services Committee that he thought the whole concept of modern weaponry would be changed by nuclear energy and the committee ought to look into it. But the chairman responded: "It's so secret—I really don't think I want to know anything about it."

Verification, modernization of weapons and the transfer of strategic weapons to third countries were said to be secondary issues by a SALT I participant. Antisubmarine warfare and deferral of a second ABM site were other possible topics at SALT II.

Background—SALT I

The first round of the SALT talks culminated in the signing of two major arms agreements in Moscow on May 26, 1972. The talks had begun Nov. 17, 1969, in Helsinki, Finland.

One agreement was a treaty limiting both the United States and the Soviet Union to two ABM sites: one site for the defense of each nation's capital and one site each for the defense of an ICBM field.

The Soviets constructed a site around Moscow, while the United States opted for one around its ICBM field in Grand Forks, N.D. In the fiscal 1973 defense procurement bill (PL 93-436), Congress prohibited the Defense Department from beginning work on an ABM site requested by the administration to protect Washington, D.C. (1972 *Almanac* p. 404)

The second pact was a five-year interim agreement limiting offensive missile launchers—land-based silos and submarine-launched tubes—to those under construction or deployed at the time of the signing. The United States had a total of 1,710 launchers, including 1,054 ICBM and 656 SLBM.

The Soviet Union was estimated to have a total strategic missile launcher strength of 2,358—1,618 ICBM launchers and 740 SLBM launchers. The Soviets were to be permitted to field about 300 of their new giant SS-9 missiles in silos occupied by older models, but the total number of the larger variety could not be increased. Both sides were given options of replacing ICBM launchers with SLBM launchers up to certain specified levels. (Congress and the Nation Vol. III, p. 895)

In addition to the numerical edge, the Soviets also had the advantage in throw weight, estimated at several times that of the United States. The United States had a technical and numerical advantage in warheads, as well as superiority in strategic bombers (460 at that time, compared to a Soviet total of 140) and forward-based systems.

The administration stressed that the Soviet Union already had a numerical edge which would have continued to grow in the absence of an agreement since the Soviets had an ongoing ICBM development program and the United States did not.

Congressional Action

The ABM treaty won the easy approval of the Senate on an 88-2 vote. But the interim agreement had some rough going on Capitol Hill. (1972 *Almanac* p. 622, 589)

The House approved the interim agreement after about one hour of debate on a lopsided vote of 329-7. But the Senate attached an amendment demanding tough bargaining at SALT II before it approved the agreement on another 88-2 vote. The final version of the amendment was accepted by the administration and the House. (Box, next page)

MIRVs and Throw Weight

Soviet advancements since the SALT I agreement have pushed the issue of multiple warheads and throw weight into the forefront of current discussions. At the time of SALT I, the United States had begun deployment of MIRVs. The Soviet Union had not developed a MIRV

capability, but it was thought to be only a matter of time before they would acquire it. And once they had, the greater throw weight of Soviet ICBMs would permit deployment of a larger number of MIRVs than the United States.

In August 1973 it was announced that the Soviets had successfully flight-tested MIRVs. In his fiscal 1975 defense posture statement, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger told Congress that the Soviets had tested four new ICBMs (SS-X-16, SS-X-17, SS-X-18 and SS-X-19) and had developed their first submarine-launched MRV (a multiple re-entry vehicle containing several warhead packages capable of limited separation) missile. (Graphic on U.S. and Soviet missiles, p. 1548)

Schlesinger said that three of the four new ICBMs had been flown with MIRVs and all four were being designed for increased accuracy. If deployed, according to Schlesinger, three of the missiles would increase Soviet ICBM throw weight from the existing 6-7 million pounds to 10-12 million pounds.

The defense secretary told a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee March 4 that since the signing of the SALT I agreement there had been "a Soviet research and development program of astonishing depth and breadth." He noted that he did not intend to imply that the Soviets had deceived the United States at SALT I. (Weekly Report p. 955)

The United States had programmed about 2,000 re-entry vehicles for its ICBMs, according to Schlesinger. If the United States put MIRVs on its entire Minuteman missile force, it would have about 3,000 re-entry vehicles, compared to a potential Soviet force with 7,000-8,000 one-to-two megaton weapons, he testified.

Schlesinger said the U.S. objective in SALT II was to persuade the Soviets to exercise restraint with regard to the exploitation of their throw weight potential. "In order for them to be persuaded, I think that they must believe that we are prepared either to go up in number if they persist, or to restrain ourselves at present levels or go to a lower level if they will do so," he stated.

Bargaining Chips

On Jan. 10, Secretary Schlesinger announced that the United States had begun retargeting some of its nuclear missiles toward Soviet military installations in addition to cities. The new targeting policy was seen by some critics as a move toward a first-strike capability. (Background, Weekly Report p. 737)

To strengthen the U.S. negotiating position at SALT II, the administration's fiscal 1975 defense budget contained



Henry A. Kissinger



James R. Schlesinger

Henry Jackson: Capitol Hill's Watchdog of Detente . . .

Sen Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.) has become Capitol Hill's watchdog of detente.

The powerful senator thus far has successfully stymied administration plans to extend trade concessions to the Soviet Union.

Commanding majorities in both the House and Senate have called for a relaxation of restrictive Soviet emigration policies in return for the trade concessions. (*Background, Weekly Report p. 1002*)

In an address at the U.S. Naval Academy June 5, President Nixon warned against attempts to interfere in Soviet domestic affairs. Earlier in the day, Secretary of State Kissinger met with Jackson, Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R N.Y.) and Abraham Ribicoff (D Conn.) to discuss the issue. On June 9, Jackson reported there had been "some movement" by the Soviets on the issue. "It's a hopeful sign, but we have a long way to go," he said.

SALT

Jackson was reported to have wielded considerable influence on the SALT I talks up until the final days of the negotiations, when President Nixon personally concluded the final agreements. After the interim agreement was reached, Jackson became its most vocal congressional critic.

He led the move in the Senate to demand a stiff bargaining stance in round two of SALT. An amendment, offered by Jackson to the resolution approving the interim agreement (H J Res 1227—PL 92-448), requested that any future permanent treaty on offensive nuclear arms "not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to" those of the Soviet Union. The amendment, accepted by the administration, also provided that failure to negotiate a permanent treaty limiting offensive arms would be grounds for abrogating the U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty.

The amendment's supporters contended that since technology was not frozen under the interim agreement, Russia conceivably could modernize its weapons to achieve a superior position. The amendment was adopted by a 56-35 vote after several attempts to weaken it were defeated.

SALT II Team


In what some observers saw as a move to appease critics, the administration sent an almost entirely new team of negotiators to Geneva in the early months of SALT II. "The number of new faces in SALT II is too large to be a matter of pure chance.... It is a poorly kept secret in Washington that a mini-purge was conducted by the White House, at Senator Jackson's urging, in a deliberate attempt to start SALT II with a new team of

officials unsullied by association with SALT I," according to SALT I participant Joseph Kruzel.

Gerard Smith, who had served as both the head of the SALT I delegation and director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), resigned in January 1973—according to some reports, because of his "shabby treatment" during the Moscow summit. Career diplomat U. Alexis Johnson was chosen to head the SALT II delegation and Fred C. Ikle subsequently became ACDA director.

Criticism

Sen. Jackson has continued his criticism of the SALT I interim agreement. In an April 22 address, he declared



Sen. Henry M. Jackson

that "the numerical disadvantage into which the United States was frozen by the SALT I interim agreement was held by some to be effectively offset by our technological superiority," but that "today our monopoly in MIRV technology has vanished like last year's snow and the lead in this area that we still possess by virtue of our earlier development of MIRVs can be expected to diminish

rapidly as time goes on."

"In the interim agreement we agreed to inferior numbers, but the Soviets did not agree to inferior technology," Jackson asserted. "We should never have presumed—I, for one, did not—that they would fail to seek the combination of superior numbers and comparable technology that add up to over-all superiority; and this is precisely the direction that they have chosen."

Jackson has differed with the administration on three points regarding a SALT II agreement: (1) the comprehensiveness of an agreement; (2) a definition of equality; and (3) the importance of reductions.

Comprehensiveness

Jackson declared April 22 that the Soviets were insisting on an arrangement that would widen their strategic margin and that "the response of the administration to this situation has been disappointing in the extreme." He went on to charge that "the administration has concentrated on quick-fix, short-term proposals that can be readied for the forthcoming June summit meeting in Moscow."

The senator's charge evoked a strong response. Kissinger told a press conference April 26: "The issues

several strategic research and development programs which Schlesinger described in his posture statement "as hedges against the unknown outcome of SALT II and the uncertain actions of the U.S.S.R."

Bargaining chips included the Trident submarine and B-1 bomber, as well as programs to increase U.S. missile accuracy and destructive capability. In the missile research

and development category were programs for the Trident missile, submarine and air launched cruise missiles (missiles which remain in the earth's atmosphere during flight toward surface targets), a terminally guided maneuvering re-entry vehicle, a mobile ICBM, and programs to improve Minuteman missile yield and accuracy and increase the number of its re-entry vehicles.

... Critical of SALT I, Raising Questions on SALT II

are extremely serious and extremely complicated. And if one uses charged words like 'quick fix' then one really prejudices the answer."

The overriding issue, according to Kissinger, was not the imminence of the summit but "whether in the light of evolving technology one can break out of a comprehensive agreement those items that, if they are not dealt with now or in the very near future, will not be able to be dealt with at all...."

Equality and Equivalence

A definition of equality also has appeared to be a point of dispute. Interpretations of the requirements placed upon U.S. negotiators by the 1972 Jackson amendment have varied.

Jackson has proposed a SALT II agreement in which the United States and the Soviet Union would each be limited to 800 ICBMs, 560 SLBMs (equivalent to 35 missile-firing submarines of the Poseidon type) and 400 long-range strategic bombers. He said that a formula would have to be devised to vary these basic numbers in order to bring the throw weight of the two forces into approximate equality.

"Essential equivalence"—a term used by President Nixon in his 1973 foreign policy message—has become the catch-phrase of the administration.

In a March 4 appearance on Capitol Hill, Secretary Schlesinger explained: "What it means is, first, that we do not plan to have our side a mirror image of their strategic forces. We do not have to have a match for everything in their arsenal. They do not have to have a match for everything in our arsenal. But in the gross characteristics of the forces, in terms of over-all number and over-all throw weight or payload, there should be some degree of equivalency between the two."

Schlesinger said that it would not mean that both sides had to have precisely the same in terms of throw weight. "A discrepancy of 6 to 1 in their favor is not essential equivalence. If it were 3 to 2 it might be quite different," he stated.

When asked if essential equivalence meant that the United States had to have the same numbers with respect to each category of nuclear weapons, Schlesinger replied: "Not for military reasons. Perhaps for political reasons in terms of perceived equality between the two forces, that may be desirable." He said they were concentrating "in the long run on the throw weight issue rather than on the numbers issue."

Reductions

Jackson said that the numbers agreed upon at SALT II need not be precisely the ones he has proposed but that any significant variation should move in the direction of further reductions.

He charged in his April 22 speech that "the view of some in the administration that force reductions are not negotiable is premature, and there are many who do not share this judgement." He added that the administration's refusal "to consider seriously a program for Soviet-American force reductions is as disappointing as the tendency to seek a quick cosmetic agreement in June is dangerous."

Kissinger responded that the administration agreed with Jackson that reductions could and should be one of the objectives of the SALT talks, but that they were not as "time-urgent" as the issue of multiple warheads. "Reductions will be in the hundreds. The growth in warheads will be in the thousands. And there will be a total disparity between the capabilities that develop if reduction becomes our only objective," the secretary insisted in his April 26 press conference.

Other Views

Others on Capitol Hill have joined Jackson in calling for reductions in strategic forces, but have indicated a broader approach to the numbers issue.

"If we move ahead with qualitative controls at SALT II, we must begin to work seriously toward actual reductions of strategic weapons," Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D Minn.) declared in a Nov. 30, 1973, speech. "I don't often agree with my good friend Senator Jackson in matters of arms control and disarmament, but in this respect I certainly do."

Humphrey, however, went on to say: "But let's not fool ourselves. It will do little good to reduce the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons if we do not couple such reductions with across-the-board qualitative restrictions on them as well."

In a Feb. 5, 1974, speech, Sen. William Proxmire (D Wis.) supported Jackson's proposal that ICBMs be reduced to 800 but added that it was extremely unlikely that the Soviets would agree to immediately cut its missile force by 818 while the United States only reduced by 254. "The crucial element in any land-based arms control after SALT I is the balancing of Soviet quantity for U.S. quality," he stated.

A group of 32 senators, led by Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R Md.), has sponsored a resolution (S Res 283) calling on the administration to give "the highest priority" to achieving weapons reduction agreements on a basis of "over-all equality" and to seek restraints on future expenditures for nuclear weapons research, development, testing and deployment. The resolution stated that inequalities should be eliminated and that an agreement on equality of the forces of the two sides would "necessarily involve an over-all balance in their respective forces" that would take into account quantitative factors, qualitative differences and geographical factors.

House

The bargaining chip strategy won a strong endorsement from the House during consideration of the fiscal 1975 military procurement authorization bill (HR 14592). Amendments to limit or delete the Trident, B-1 bomber and missile programs were soundly defeated. (*Weekly Report* p. 1331)

"I think the action the House took...reflects fairly well how the House of Representatives feels" about the SALT talks, Rep. Charles H. Wilson (D Calif.) told CQ. Wilson, chairman of the House Armed Services Special Subcommittee on Arms Control and Disarmament, called the action "a strong indication the House wants to leave our negotiators in as strong a bargaining position as possible."

When asked the House attitude toward SALT, House Armed Services Chairman F. Edward Hebert (D La.) told CQ that he thought House action on HR 14592 best answered the question—"We didn't lose anything."

"We can't negotiate a bargain unless we have strength," Hebert asserted. "The Russians understand one language and one alone and that's strength."

Senate

The bargaining chips also received a strong endorsement in the Senate. In its report on the Senate version of the procurement bill (S 3000), the Armed Services Committee asserted that the new research and development programs "create the most compelling incentive for Soviet restraint in the technological exploitation of its numerically superior strategic forces and for a genuine effort to conclude a stabilizing SALT II agreement." Attempts to limit the bargaining chip programs were rejected during the Senate debate on S 3000. (*Weekly Report* p. 1517)

Status of Talks

But chances for cashing in those chips any time soon looked slim a month before the summit meeting.

The administration had been hoping to sign a SALT agreement at the June summit. At the last summit, in June


1973, President Nixon and Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev had pledged to continue active negotiations toward a permanent agreement on strategic arms limitation "with the objective of signing it in 1974."

They also agreed that limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons could apply both to their quantitative aspects as well as their qualitative improvement, and that limitations must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means (such as satellite reconnaissance and other means of detection).

Proposal Formulation

One of the problems facing both sides has been the complicated process of securing unity back home on a negotiating position. For the United States, this has involved balancing the interests of a sometimes disparate community which included the SALT negotiators, National Security Council, State Department, Pentagon, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and Central Intelligence Agency.

In December 1973, Kissinger, responding to a question about divided opinions, told a press conference that the United States had not thought through all the implications of the problem of qualitative change and there were still "tough questions" to be answered in the area of defining equality between the United States and the Soviet Union.



Indicated above are U.S. estimates of Soviet land-based missile potential. The Soviets had deployed the SS-9, SS-11 and SS-13 with the indicated single or multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) capability or potential capability. The other four missiles are in the research and development stage, with the SS-X-18 the probable replacement for the SS-9; either the SS-X-17 or SS-X-16 the probable replacement for the SS-11 and the SS-X-18 the probable replacement for the SS-13. Three of the new missiles

have been tested with a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV). Although only the Minuteman III missile was included in the chart, the United States has an ICBM force of 54 Titan II missiles and 1,000 Minuteman I, II and III missiles. The United States has deployed 410 MIRV-capable Minuteman IIIs. By mid-1975, all Minuteman I missiles are to be phased out and the United States is to have an ICBM force of 550 Minuteman IIIs with MIRV capability, plus 450 Minuteman IIs and 54 Titan IIs.

He said that "there is not the conceptual basis for the SALT II that existed over a decade of previous work with respect to SALT I. However, I am confident that as far as the U.S. government is concerned this problem will be substantially overcome in the very near future...."



They said it was "remarkable that Watergate has had so little effect on SALT."

—Sen. Charles McC. Mathias (R Md.)

Some reports of a Schlesinger-Kissinger split have circulated. Kissinger told a March 21 press conference: "I think the press corps isn't satisfied when I'm embroiled only with allies. I have to be embroiled with colleagues as well." The secretary voiced support for Schlesinger's new targeting strategy and the acceleration of U.S. weapons programs in reaction to Soviet developments.

Schlesinger has spoken of curbing throw weight as the U.S. objective at SALT, while Kissinger has called MIRVs "the overwhelming issue." When asked about a Schlesinger-Kissinger split, a former National Security Council staffer told CQ that he did not regard it as a major division. As he saw it, Schlesinger viewed U.S. superiority in MIRVs as the basic source of U.S. leverage and would like to wrap up the issue in an agreement covering other strategic weapons. Kissinger reportedly was willing to break out the MIRV issue and viewed U.S. bargaining chips, such as the B-1 bomber, as providing enough leverage if another round of SALT proved necessary.

Negotiating Process

In his March 21 press conference, held several days before his departure for talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow, Kissinger described the three phases of successful disarmament negotiations: exchange of technical information which usually took place during a stalemate, achievement of a conceptual breakthrough in which both sides agreed on what they were trying to accomplish and then a third phase of hard negotiations.

Kissinger said the negotiations at Geneva were at the point where "we should be making, or should be attempting, a conceptual breakthrough." If there were to be a SALT agreement in 1974, he said, "it will have an adequate concreteness and it will not be simply general principles."

No conceptual breakthrough was reached during Kissinger's talks in Moscow in March. After an April 12 meeting with Nixon and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, Kissinger told a press conference that the one outstanding issue in summit preparations was SALT, but he stressed that "this does not mean that detente is in any difficulty, nor does it mean that progress is unreasonably slow."

The secretary said it was unlikely that a comprehensive permanent agreement could be reached by the time of the summit, but "there remains a possibility of a substantial agreement of a more limited sphere." When asked the

area for a possible limited agreement, Kissinger cited multiple warheads and said, "this is the area to which we have paid the greatest attention."

Kissinger and Gromyko met again in Geneva in late April and the two sides were reported to have made progress. Whether progress continued during Kissinger's month-long Middle East peace mission was uncertain, especially since the regular SALT talks in Geneva had recessed March 19 and had not resumed as of early June.

During a June 6 press conference, Kissinger told reporters that the interim agreement would not be renewed "by itself." There have been reports that the administration has been attempting to link renewal of the interim agreement with an agreement limiting missiles with MIRVs. Kissinger said that the administration at that time was not ready to indicate that an agreement was possible.

Test Ban Treaty

During the April meeting in Geneva, Kissinger and Gromyko reportedly discussed the possibility of a limited test ban treaty on underground nuclear tests. Several Capitol Hill sources interviewed by CQ indicated there was a good possibility of a limited agreement banning underground nuclear explosions by the June summit.

One House committee staffer said that he thought negotiators were working "feverishly" on it. And a Senate aide said he had heard "rumors all over town that they're working like mad on it."

One critic attributed the renewed activity on a test ban to the lack of progress on SALT; he said that when it had become obvious there was going to be a "SALT-free summit," negotiators had turned to a test ban in an effort to get something signed in Moscow.

While the urgency surrounding the issue may be new, the question of an underground ban has been a perennial one since 1963 when agreement was reached on a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, space, territorial waters or the high seas. Underground tests—except for explosions which caused radioactive debris outside borders of the country conducting them—were excluded from the 1963 agreement because negotiators had been unable to overcome the stumbling block of verification. The United States wanted on-site inspection, which the Soviets would not accept. (*Background, 1963 Almanac p. 248*)

If an agreement is reached on a test ban, it appeared it would be a threshold rather than a comprehensive treaty. A threshold agreement would set a limit on the size and number of tests that could be conducted.

In a May 22 press release on India's recent underground detonation of a nuclear device, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D Mass.) strongly criticized a threshold ban. Kennedy, leader of the Senate forces pushing for a comprehensive ban, said that a threshold treaty would be seen by many nations as "continued hypocrisy by the superpowers. Once again, they will see the U.S. and the Soviet Union urging others to accept a treaty that enables the superpowers to maintain their own below-threshold development programs."

Kennedy charged: "The dominant voices within the administration on whether we should seek a ban on all nuclear tests do not come from arms controllers at ACDA; rather they emanate from the arms developers at DoD (the Defense Department)."

Kennedy was the chief sponsor of a resolution (S Res 67) urging an immediate U.S.-Soviet suspension of un-

derground nuclear testing and a permanent comprehensive test ban treaty. S Res 67, sponsored by 36 senators, was reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee June 13, 1973 (S Rept 93-214), but no action was taken because of Brezhnev's arrival June 16 for the summit meeting. However, in June 1974, S Res 67 was placed on the Senate whip notice as a possible item for consideration and may come for floor action in the week ending June 22.

Watergate

"The unmeasurable factor at this point" is Watergate, according to one senator's aide. Opinions as to the effect the scandal has had on the negotiating process have varied widely. Questions have been raised as to whether the President might bargain away too much for a headline-making SALT agreement or that the Soviets might have hardened their position because they perceived they were dealing with a weakened or outgoing President.

The administration repeatedly has denied that SALT negotiations in Geneva have been troubled by problems in Washington. Kissinger stated April 26: "I have not noticed that proposals have been made that seem exorbitant and, therefore, perhaps triggered by our domestic difficulties. And we are conducting our foreign policy on the basis, as I have said before, of the national interest—not geared to any deadlines, and not geared to the present domestic difficulties."

Kissinger said that the administration would not rush an agreement in order to complete it by the summit, nor would it fail to complete one because of the domestic debate. He stressed the importance of the issue of nuclear strategy and insisted that "the United States will not play with this or deal with it in an irresponsible manner."

Critics

But Kissinger's reassurances have failed to allay the fears of some on Capitol Hill. One House committee staffer described the mood of the House as "one of caution" because of Watergate, and said he thought any SALT agreement would be looked at very scrupulously by Congress.

Rep. Les Aspin (D Wis.) April 4 introduced several resolutions to curtail President Nixon's foreign policy activities during the period between a House decision to impeach and a Senate vote. One would bar concluding international agreements and another would prohibit official trips abroad. (*Weekly Report* p. 926)

Several senators have called for the President to abandon his plans for the June summit. James L. Buckley (Cons-R N.Y.) April 9 strongly recommended against a presidential trip to Moscow while impeachment proceedings were still underway. He said Secretary of State Kissinger's trip to Moscow in March had "made it clear that the President's political difficulties at home have served to harden Soviet attitudes and positions. This is hardly an atmosphere that is conducive to fruitful negotiations."

In a May 22 speech, Sen. Edward W. Brooke (R Mass.) cautioned against the June summit "unless the substantive articles of a SALT II accord are known prior to the visit and receive widespread approval by a relevant cross-section of the congressional leadership." Brooke, noting that the summit meeting would take place at about the same time the question of impeachment would be coming to a head in the House, warned that "the Kremlin might be tempted to seek undue advantage of a weakened President who desperately

needs a 'dramatic gesture' to counterbalance his political liabilities."

No Linkage

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Hebert told CQ he did not think the Watergate scandal had affected the SALT negotiations. Another committee member, Rep. G. William Whitehurst (R Va.), said he did not relate the two issues together but expected any agreement to receive more scrutiny than it would have before.

In a move to offset linkage of the SALT talks with the Watergate scandal, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D Mont.), Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R Pa.) and Senators Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R Md.) and Walter F. Mondale (D Minn.) sent a letter to Kissinger April 10 expressing their view that "Congress and the American people remain willing to support good faith negotiations leading to strategic arms limitations and reductions."

But, they added "that you should make every effort to advise the Soviet Union that it should not miscalculate the determination of the Congress and the American people to achieve sound and equitable strategic arms limitations and reductions agreements that contribute to our vital national security interests; and that should these important and hopeful negotiations fail to reach such an agreement, the Congress and the people will take whatever steps are necessary to protect our national security."

In a floor statement April 11, Mondale insisted that "it is essential that SALT not fall victim to Watergate and that we not abandon our responsibility to continue to seek further limitations on strategic arms."

Sen. Mathias declared: "The Soviet Union or any other nation should not make the mistake of believing that this clear and unmistakable national goal is in any way affected by any present domestic difficulties."

Mathias told CQ that he had discussed the issue with Kissinger and others who said that it was "remarkable that Watergate has had so little effect on SALT." The senator, however, did say that the "uncertainty of the future" may have led to a limiting of the perspective of an agreement and more emphasis on a short-range agreement of perhaps several years duration. When questioned as to whether he meant uncertainty about the President's future, Mathias said he was speaking about the future in general, which would include that of the President.

Support for Nixon's planned visit to Moscow was voiced May 21 by Sen. George D. Aiken (R Vt.): "It is important to show the Soviet leaders that an open society can still function competently even in the face of bizarre national events and charges."

Kissinger Controversy

A new factor, however, surfaced in early June with the renewal of a controversy over Kissinger's role in the 1969-1971 wiretapping of 13 government officials and four newsmen. Amid allegations that he may have had a more direct role in the wiretapping than he had indicated during his September 1973 confirmation hearings, Kissinger June 11 threatened at a news conference in Salzburg, Austria, to resign unless his name was cleared.

"I do not believe that it is possible to conduct the foreign policy of the United States under these circumstances when the character and credibility of the secretary of state is at issue," Kissinger declared in his June 11 press conference. A Kissinger resignation could have a major impact on negotiations and the summit. (p. 1538)

SALT II AND OFFENSIVE FORCE LEVELS

by Richard Burt

ONE of the most vexing problems facing negotiators at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) is the existence of asymmetries in the U.S. and Soviet offensive strategic nuclear arsenals. A variety of factors — history, bureaucracy, strategy and technology — have caused the two powers to proceed at different rates of force modernization while, at the same time, placing differing emphases on the various components of their strategic forces. In the late 1960's, as the United States curtailed its massive strategic weapons buildup, the Soviet Union launched a huge buildup of its own. As American strategic planners progressively lost confidence in the survivability of the United States' land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and advocated moving larger portions of U.S. forces to sea, the Soviets added to their ICBM arsenal at the rate of 200 a year. As the Soviets designed the behemoth SS-9 ICBM to carry a 15-to-25-megaton warhead, U.S. technicians perfected multiple warhead packages for land- and sea-based missile forces, which enabled launcher vehicles to deliver as many as fourteen separate nuclear charges.

These asymmetries were dealt with at SALT I by agreeing to a temporary ceiling on offensive strategic missiles (the Interim Agreement) that generally ignored U.S.-Soviet differences in strategic force design and composition. The result is that the guidelines for SALT II agreed upon at the June 14-18, 1973 summit in Washington to (1) achieve permanent ceilings on offensive strategic forces, (2) control qualitative aspects of offensive weaponry, and (3) provide for the eventual reduction of forces, pose difficult challenges for negotiators at the second round of the talks — challenges that negotiators were unable to overcome during the June summit in Moscow.

Recognition of these complexities — coupled with the concern for across-the-board numerical parity expressed by the Jackson Amendment and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's concept of "essential equivalence" — has led some analysts to suggest that distinct categories of offensive forces, such as ICBM's, SLBM's and bombers, should not be singled out at SALT II, but that a broad, mutual aggregate ceiling for offensive weapons should be

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negotiated.¹ Such an approach seems attractive, conceptually at least, because it avoids the pitfall of comparing specific categories of strategic capability, while satisfying the wish to replace SALT I's Interim Agreement with a more durable arrangement.

The attempt to place separate categories of offensive forces under a single, aggregate category is not a totally new idea. According to SALT chronicler John Newhouse, a U.S. proposal embracing mutual aggregate ceilings was put forward in the summer of 1970 during the first round of the talks. After being rebuffed by the Soviets in attempts to control the size of offensive missile inventories and multiple warhead deployment, the American delegation offered the "August proposal," a plan by which both sides would be limited to a total of 1,900 missiles and bombers. The proposal failed, Newhouse notes, because the Soviets at the time were "wholly unprepared to talk seriously about limiting offensive weapons on American terms."²

At SALT II, an agreement on mutual aggregate ceilings would entail an expansion of the Interim Agreement's "freedom to mix" sanction, which permits, but does not require, the replacement of older ICBM's with modern SLBM's. A general aggregate ceiling would allow the substitution of forces in one category for those in another, restricted only by a comprehensive mutual ceiling placed on a selected index of offensive power. (Using the measure of launcher numbers, the Interim Agreement permits "one-way" substitution; under an aggregate ceiling scheme, ICBM's, SLBM's and bombers could be freely traded.) Thus, aggregate ceilings would seem to allow each side the opportunity to tailor its strategic inventory to its own technological capability and perceived strategic and geopolitical needs (including third-power threats), while creating an overall situation of offensive parity. In this light, it is worth examining the problem of reaching such an agreement.

WHAT WEAPONS?

In constructing an aggregate ceiling for offensive strategic forces, the weapon systems that comprise this mission must be

¹For a concise, well-argued endorsement of the concept of aggregate ceilings for offensive strategic weapons at SALT, see Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman, "A Proposal for the Second Round of SALT," *Washington Star News*, December 10, 1972. For a succinct view to the contrary, stressing the difficulties of lumping all three elements of the "triad" under an overall ceiling, see George W. Rathjens, "Future Limitations of Strategic Arms," in Mason Willrich and John Rhinelander, editors, *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond* (New York: The Free Press, 1974).

²John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 185-189.

clearly delineated. The long-standing Soviet insistence that some U.S. land- and carrier-based aircraft in the European and East Asian theaters constitute "strategic weapons" makes this a difficult task for negotiators at SALT, as do the corollary Soviet demands that British and French SLBM boats be included in any calculation of the U.S. strategic inventory.³ Even attempting to group "intercontinental" strategic forces is troublesome, for it can plausibly be argued that forward-based SLBM boats do not belong in this category. For purposes of this analysis, however, the U.S. definition (an admittedly artificial one) between "central" and "noncentral" strategic weapons will be utilized, bearing in mind that the resolution of the forward-based system (FBS) problem will be an important determinant of whether aggregate ceilings can be negotiated.

Thus, the U.S. and Soviet "triads" of long-range strategic bombers, land-based ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic missiles will comprise the categories of systems to be aggregated. Specific systems under the three categories are shown in Table I. Weapons to be considered in the aggregate calculus would also include follow-on replacements — in various stages of development — for the weapons listed in Table I. These follow-on weapons are listed in Table II.

It was tentatively agreed during SALT I that medium-range

TABLE I		
SOVIET AND U.S. "CENTRAL" STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS		
<i>Systems</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>Soviet Union</i>
ICBM's	Titan II Minuteman II Minuteman III	SS-7 SS-8 SS-9 SS-11 SS-13
SLBM's	Polaris A3 Poseidon C3	SSN-4 SSN-5 SSN-6
Bombers	B-52 D/F/G/H	Tu-95 (Bear) Mya-4 (Bison)

³According to Michel Tatu's article published in *Le Monde* (January 18, 1974), the Soviets at the second round of SALT have also demanded that Chinese nuclear forces be added to the U.S. offensive weapons total.

TABLE II		
U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FOLLOW-ON SYSTEMS		
<i>Systems</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>Soviet Union</i>
ICBM's	MX	SSX-16 SSX-17 SSX-18 SSX-19
SLBM's	Trident I (C4) Trident II (D5)	SSN-8
Bombers	B-1	_____

bombers — U.S. FB-111's and Soviet Badger and newly procured Backfire bombers — should not be considered to constitute strategic weapons, despite the fact that they are (or potentially could be) configured for an intercontinental strategic mission. This guideline will be employed in my analysis. There are other systems that a ceiling on "central" strategic weapons would not cover: strategic-capable U.S. fighter-bombers stationed in Western Europe and East Asia, as well as naval-strike aircraft on carriers periodically deployed within combat-radius range of the Soviet Union; and Soviet submarine-launched cruise missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles stationed in Eastern Europe. While these systems represent a considerable strategic arsenal of their own, it is assumed that they could best be dealt with in the context of a separate agreement — in conjunction with an agreement on mutual offensive ceilings at SALT II or in MBFR negotiations.

WHAT CEILINGS?

The measures or indexes of offensive capability best suited for an aggregate are those able to reflect accurately the strategic balance over time. Any index (or combination of indexes) finally selected must satisfy the requirement of guaranteeing a situation of rough offensive parity (or at minimum, the political appearance of parity) in terms of a number of different measures of strategic capability. Such an index, as suggested above, is difficult to select and define, owing to existing asymmetries in the force structures of both powers. But it should be emphasized that the function of creating at least the appearance of parity could be the

most important aspect of an agreement on aggregate ceilings;⁴ it would not only serve to protect the talks from criticism from political detractors on both sides, but would also lessen the degree to which either side could exploit perceptions of strategic power for political ends.⁵

While a number of indexes can be elaborated, including those that attempt to describe a number of qualitative attributes of various postures — targeting doctrine, geographical differences, and force structures — a comprehensive and inclusive definition of strategic offensive parity would undoubtedly be too complex and too open to change over time to be negotiable at SALT II. A comprehensive definition of strategic parity would have to take into account not only such elements as targeting requirements, system performance characteristics, and reliability, but other strategic force components such as air defense, ballistic missile defense, and command and control. Perceptions of the utility of strategic weapons — for deterrence, defense and actual combat — would also enter into the calculus, depending upon the task assigned to strategic weapons. While two states might possess similar targeting structures and force levels, parity would not exist in a situation where one assigned its strategic forces the mission of deterring a wide spectrum of military threats, while the other possessed a large conventional force to deal with threats below the nuclear threshold. This suggests that conventional capabilities, under certain circumstances, can figure in the strategic balance, and that the concept of parity cannot be separated from strategic doctrine.⁶

⁴Rathjens notes that there are significant asymmetries that cannot be affected at all by SALT II, including the fact that the American population is more urbanized and that population and industry are more concentrated on or near the seacoasts than in the Soviet Union. He argues "that the most that can be done is to strive for symmetry or at least the appearance of it." Rathjens, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

⁵The means by which strategic weapons and perceptions of strategic power are exploited by the Soviet Union in political situations are explored in Uri Ra'anani's "The Changing American-Soviet Strategic Balance: Some Political Implications," U.S. Senate Sub-Committee for National Security and International Operations, March 10, 1972.

⁶The debate over assured destruction and damage-limiting nuclear strategies has been ongoing since former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara discussed the relative merits and problems of each in his annual military posture statements to Congress in the 1960's. It was considerably enlivened, however, with the signing of the ABM Treaty and the apparent ratification of the assured destruction doctrine. Assured destruction advocates, such as Herbert Scoville, applauded the treaty, while Donald Brennan, a critic of the doctrine, called it "bizarre." See "Strategic Forum: The SALT Agreements," *Survival*, September/October 1972.

The controversy was further stimulated by the Nixon Administration's re-examination of the strategic options in the quest for greater "flexibility," and by the

The debate over doctrine, in the United States as well as the Soviet Union, did not end with the signing of the SALT I accords. The problem of selecting suitable indexes for mutual offensive ceilings is not only a matter of describing the complex nature of the strategic balance, but is intimately connected with the problem of doctrinal choice. The continuing debate over assured destruction and "flexible option" strategies makes it essential that indexes of capability be chosen for their political as well as their operational effect, providing policymakers with the flexibility to adjust strategy within the constraints of a negotiated agreement. The requirement of negotiability demands that the measure selected be capable of expressing operational political and symbolic parity, while not constraining future decisions regarding general strategy. Under these terms, a permanent agreement that, for instance, constrained both powers to an equal level of deliverable megatonnage, while allowing one side three times as many launchers, would be as unacceptable as an agreement that held both powers to an equivalent number of launchers, while allowing one a similar advantage in megatonnage.⁷

Thus, in constructing mutual offensive ceilings of the sort discussed here, an obvious but crucial point must be borne in mind: equality in one measure of offensive capability, such as numbers of launchers, will not necessarily guarantee even rough parity in other measures of capability. Under a situation where

January 10, 1974 announcement by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger that the United States was in the process of modifying war plans to enable U.S. strategic forces to carry out limited, selective strikes against military targets in the Soviet Union. The development of super-accurate warheads and "shoot-look-shoot" capabilities are seen by damage-limiting critics Scoville and George Rathjens as potentially destabilizing because they could be perceived as attempting to achieve a first-strike capability. (See Rathjens, "The SALT Agreements and the Future of the Arms Race," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Research Report Number 6, May 1972.) Administration supporters, including Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Fred Iklé, argued that efforts to build a limited counterforce capability into the U.S. strategic arsenal need not be a major cause for alarm for the Soviet Union. See his article, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973. For a succinct treatment of the earlier debate over U.S. strategy options, see John M. Collins, "Counterforce and Countervalue Options Compared: A Military Analysis Related to Nuclear Deterrence," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, December 7, 1972.

These hypothetical situations assume roughly similar force mixes of bombers and missiles as well as roughly similar performance characteristics. A force possessing a threefold edge in equivalent megatonnage consisting of obsolete bombers would certainly not be significantly superior to a force consisting of hardened ICBM's, defended by SAM's. Despite the asymmetries alluded to earlier, both the United States and the Soviet Union possess roughly similar force structures, and for this reason it is assumed that large advantages in such indexes as numbers and equivalent megatonnage would be an unacceptable outcome in SALT for either side.

each side can be expected to maximize existing advantages in force design, selection of an inappropriate index could exacerbate existing force asymmetries.

A number of potential measures of strategic offensive capability have been suggested for use in an aggregate agreement, ranging from numbers of launchers, the most visible and possibly most politically sensitive measure, to indexes that give a better indication of targeting flexibility and damage-inflicting capability, such as numbers of re-entry vehicles and equivalent megatonnage. An estimate of the strategic capability of the United States and the Soviet Union, as reflected in five measures, is shown in Table III. Only those weapons listed in Table I were considered in the compilation. In some cases, variances are shown to indicate the capability of one or the other side in a given category as made possible by existing technology or as in the case of the proposal to expand the U.S. Minuteman III force (plans that have not yet received the approval of Congress).

An examination of Table III suggests that there exist areas of rough equality in certain indexes of strategic capability. Three indexes apparently lend themselves to mutual ceilings at the present time — numbers of launchers, deliverable payload, and equivalent megatonnage.⁸ Referring to the totals listed in Table III, it would seem that a launcher ceiling set at or about 2,300, a payload ceiling at or about 8,500,000 pounds, or a ceiling on megaton equivalents set at 8,700 would provide for rough parity in offensive strategic capability. Purely in terms of their ability to reflect strategic capability, however, each of these indexes suffers certain drawbacks.

None accurately describes qualitative attributes of the strategic balance. Numbers of launchers, the crudest indicator, gives little indication of performance characteristics of different systems. The same is true of payload and equivalent megatonnage. Thus, these indexes have little utility in gauging such factors as multiple warheads, missile accuracy and reliability, and bomber penetrability — areas where most analysts credit the United States with superior capability.⁹ (A mitigating factor, however, bearing

⁸Equivalent megatonnage is a measurement of the explosive yield of nuclear weapons that takes into account the fact that a weapon's destructive power does not grow proportionately with increases in yield. The megaton equivalent (MTE) of a nuclear weapon is expressed as the two-thirds power of its explosive yield, or $Y^{2/3}$. Thus the megaton equivalent of a 25-MT weapon is 8.5.

⁹For a helpful discussion of such determinants of missile and bomber effectiveness as range and payload, accuracy, reliability and yield, see Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman, *Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, Staff Paper, 1973), pp. 71-74 and 83-90.

TABLE III
INDEXES OF U.S.-SOVIET OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC CAPABILITY*

Strategic Forces	Launcher ^b Vehicles		Re-entry Vehicles		Independently- Targeted RV's		Deliverable ^c Payload (in thousands) of pounds		Equivalent ^d Megatonnage	
	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR
Bombers	390	140 ^e	390- 5,070 ^f	140- 240 ^f	390- 5,070 ^f	140- 240 ^f	6,908	1,465	7,270	1,700
ICBM's	1,054	1,618	3,054	1,618 ^g	2,154- 3,054	1,618 ^g	1,270	6,238	1,698	5,091
SLBM's	656	740	5,400 ^h	740 ^g	5,120 ⁱ	740 ^g	450	625	602	509
Totals	2,100	2,498	8,844-13,524	2,498-2,598	7,664-13,244	2,498-2,598	8,700	8,328	9,570	7,290

*The table reflects offensive strategic capability as permitted by the Interim Agreement; thus, Soviet totals—in any of the five indexes—may presently not be as high as the Interim Agreement permits. It is assumed, however, that the numbers prescribed by the Interim Agreement would constitute the starting point of negotiations concerning aggregate ceilings, making Interim Agreement limits the most valid (and conservative) points of comparison. Where not otherwise stated, estimates derived from *The 1974-1975 Military Balance*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

^bLauncher number figures do not reflect Interim Agreement replacement options.

^cTotal payload derived from Quanbeck and Blechman, see note 1 *supra*.

^dEquivalent megatonnage derived from *The 1972-1973 Military Balance*. Figures reflect maximum MTE loadings for missiles and bombers.

^eDoes not include 50 Bisons configured as tankers.

^fVariance reflects deployment of bomber air-to-surface "standoff" weapons. It is assumed that each B-52 can carry 12 such weapons (SRAM), while the Soviet TU-95 carries one (Kelt).

^gAssumes no Soviet MIRV deployment by end of 1974.

^hAssumes 10 re-entry vehicles aboard each Poseidon C-3.

ⁱVariance reflects possible additional MIRVing of 450 Minutemen requested in FY 1974-1979 FYDP.

on present U.S. qualitative superiority, is that a larger portion of the American force is comprised of long-range bombers whose penetrability is more open to question than that of missiles, given the massive deployment of Soviet air defense systems.) Even numbers of re-entry vehicles — the measure of capability preferred by most American analysts — fails to take into account such factors as warhead size or re-entry CEP (circular error probability).

The indexes of Table III that measure numbers of re-entry vehicles (RV) and separately-targeted RV's reveal a major asymmetry currently favoring the United States, making an aggregate agreement in this area difficult if not impossible to negotiate at the present time. Until the Soviets initiate wide-scale MIRV deployment, perhaps the only means for reaching an agreement embracing numbers of RV's would be for the United States unilaterally to replace MIRV buses on some of its ICBM and SLBM forces with single warhead packages.¹⁰ When and if wide-

¹⁰The Soviet Union has tested MIRV devices for its land-based ICBM force. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has told Congress that, if the Soviets replace the existing SS-11 force (970 missiles) with either the SSX-17 or the SSX-19, and the existing SS-9 force (280-313 missiles) with the SSX-18, the total Soviet ICBM force would be capable of delivering between 7,000 and 8,000 megaton-range re-entry vehicles. (See *US-USSR Strategic Policies, Hearings* before the Subcommittee on Arms Control and International Law and Organization of the

scale Soviet MIRV deployment is initiated, perhaps the two powers could agree to a common ceiling on RV's — either at planned U.S. levels of deployment or at a lower point somewhere between existing U.S. and Soviet RV levels.

Verification, however, is possibly the most acute problem bearing on the negotiability of ceilings on aggregate offensive capability. Given current force structures, the most easily verifiable indexes are those that provide for the crudest measures of capability. Launcher numbers tend to be easily monitored by satellite surveillance and other means of unobtrusive electronic intelligence, although deployment of mobile ICBM systems, such as the SSX-16, could complicate the inspection task. With launcher numbers, and to a lesser extent with the other indexes, the problem of comparing apples with oranges arises. A ceiling on launcher numbers equates an SS-7 with a Poseidon, an SS-9 with a Minuteman II. While equivalent megatonnage, such as numbers of RV's, is a better measure of destructive capability than launcher numbers (assuming roughly parallel force designs and targeting structures), control of this index is nearly impossible to achieve

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 4, 1974, pp. 6-7.) This would give the Soviet Union somewhere in the area of 9,500 separate re-entry vehicles, compared with 8,844 to 13,524 for the United States (see Table III).

because of difficulties in verifying compliance without on-site inspection of warheads. While it is in theory possible to control the development of new multiple warhead devices through surveillance of warhead testing, restrictions on those multiple warheads already deployed would again be impossible without on-site inspection.

Payload capability, a more sophisticated measure than launcher numbers, is easier to verify than either megatonnage or numbers of RV's because it is a measure dependent essentially on launcher numbers and size — information available through "national means" of intelligence. However, given the similarity in composition of U.S. and Soviet forces, it, too, could fail to reflect existing or potential qualitative asymmetries. Based on system size and numbers, a mutual ceiling on total payload capacity would not be sensitive to improved guidance and warhead miniaturization or to attempts to improve propulsion and penetrability. Yet, of the indexes that presently lend themselves to an aggregate ceiling on offensive weapons, deliverable payload capacity seems to be the single most satisfactory measure of strategic capability. It is a verifiable index and, considering the rough parity in launcher vehicles and equivalent megatonnage, it does reflect the potential damage-inflicting capabilities of both sides, if imperfectly.

LIMITS AND MODERNIZATION

In describing potential aggregate agreements on offensive weapons, analysts have asked at what level a mutual ceiling should be set. An understanding to reduce numbers of launchers or other indexes of capability could form a portion of an aggregate ceilings agreement, or could be considered either before or after the negotiation of aggregate ceilings. But attempts to freeze or reduce certain categories of strategic hardware — long-range bombers or heavy ICBM's — to some extent violates the "freedom to mix" principle implicit in the imposition of aggregate ceilings. An agreement to reduce specific categories of weapons numbers, made prior to the setting of aggregate ceilings, could make an aggregate scheme more difficult to negotiate because both sides would eliminate the least effective systems from their inventories, increasing the probability of widening existing asymmetries among the different indexes of strategic capability. An agreement, for instance, to retire the older U.S. bomber force of B-52 D/F's along with the entire Soviet bomber force would decrease U.S. deliverable payload capacity by almost 25 per cent while reducing

the Soviet payload capacity only by 15 per cent. If, as the 1973 Washington and 1974 Moscow summits suggest, both sides desire to negotiate the reduction of offensive levels, it could best be accomplished in the context of an aggregate ceiling — reducing the agreed-upon index to a level acceptable to both rather than reducing systems on a category-by-category basis.

It is probably more realistic to argue that, instead of facilitating offensive force reductions at SALT II, an aggregate ceiling would have to be capable of accommodating the present strategic force acquisition plans of both sides, as permitted by the Interim Agreement: in the case of the United States, the replacement of segments of the Polaris and B-52 forces with the Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber; for the Soviet Union, the modernization of its ICBM force and the continued augmentation of its SLBM capability. With the exception of older strategic force elements, such as Soviet land-based SS-7/8's and land-based Titan II ICBM's, it is doubtful that either side, particularly the Soviets, would be amenable to an arrangement which reduced the level of forces provided for by the Interim Agreement. While attempting to reflect accurately and to maintain offensive parity between the two powers for political and bureaucratic reasons, the aggregate ceiling could not radically upset existing weapons acquisition plans.¹¹

Another factor to be considered in connection with the design of aggregate offensive ceilings is the qualitative attributes of forces. At present, the United States enjoys certain qualitative advantages in force design and performance, particularly in the area of missile accuracy, multiple warhead technology, and command and control, and the Soviets might be unprepared to accept a mutual limitation scheme that had the effect of enhancing the importance of qualitative attributes of existing and planned forces. Generally, an aggregate ceiling placed on any of the essentially quantitative indexes discussed earlier would create pressures to exploit qualitative aspects of weapons performance. In the short run, mutual ceilings placed on all of these indexes would seem to favor

¹¹Manifestly, weapons acquisition policies pose doctrinal as well as bureaucratic constraints. For reasons of strategy, either side may want to change the character of its forces within the boundaries defined by an aggregate ceiling in order to create or augment the "flexibility" of its arsenal. Attempts to build a limited counterforce capability into a force structure by procuring new systems does not rule out reduction of other force elements. Neither side has shown a propensity to phase out what are generally considered obsolete strategic systems. Neither, for instance, has yet chosen to exercise the older ICBM replacement option as provided for in the Interim Agreement. Particularly in the case of the Soviet Union, the weapons acquisition process has historically been one of addition rather than replacement.

the United States, given existing U.S. capabilities in multiple warhead, guidance, and miniaturization technology. Indeed, the upgrading of U.S. offensive forces in these areas (in order to exercise a selective targeting strategy more efficiently) appears to have been the single most important class of changes in strategic weaponry requested in the Nixon Administration's fiscal year 1975 defense budget. (The fact that strategic bombers make up a larger portion of the current U.S. force, leaving the Soviets greater numbers of ICBM's and potentially a larger SLBM force, is a mitigating factor in this regard.)

Ceilings on any of these indexes would undoubtedly reinforce the Interim Agreement's tendency to divert the force planning of both powers into qualitative channels. One placed on launchers would create incentives to achieve breakthroughs in multiple-warhead technology, missile guidance, and bomber penetrability, in order to increase the effectiveness of each delivery vehicle. Another designed to limit numbers of RV's would also stimulate efforts to improve missile accuracy and bomber penetrability, as well as efforts toward warhead miniaturization to enhance the destructive power of each deliverable warhead. And a ceiling placed on megatonnage would have a similar effect: in order to increase the potency of its force available for use under such an agreement, each side would undertake to improve both guidance and miniaturization.

Over a longer time span, mutual ceilings could come to favor the damage-inflicting capability of the Soviets, whose larger missile payload capability could be more effectively used to exploit qualitative advances in warhead design and performance.¹² Eventualities in this regard are dependent on two developments: (1) whether the Soviets move toward massive MIRV deployments, and (2) the nature of a MIRV agreement that might emerge from SALT II. Given a situation in the future where the two powers possessed equal capabilities in the area of multiple warheads and warhead guidance and miniaturization, ceilings on launcher numbers, numbers of RV's, and megatonnage would all work to the advantage of the Soviet Union, because it would be in a position to exploit its advantage in missile payload.

¹²For a discussion of how the Soviets could potentially exploit payload and launcher superiority, see William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements of 1972: Implications for International Security," in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, editors, *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973). Also, see *US-USSR Strategic Policies*, *op.cit.*

Even a ceiling on payload in this situation could be construed to favor the Soviets, owing to the large proportion of U.S. payload capabilities subsumed by bombers, which are considered to be less effective, in both a strategic and a political sense, than missile forces.¹⁸

The preceding discussion suggests that aggregate ceilings placed on particular indexes would stimulate qualitative developments that could upset the condition of rough parity between the two powers. This possibility exists under the Interim Agreement, and pressures for force modernization, given current asymmetries in offensive force structures, threaten any agreement based on quantitative measures of strategic capability. The general problem — that ceilings placed on aggregate indexes could, under certain circumstances, allow either side to gain a significant edge in an index not controlled by the agreement — can be illustrated by a variety of possible outcomes. Under an agreement that set an aggregate ceiling on launchers, the United States could, for instance, further widen the re-entry vehicle gap by over 4,000 additional RV's by replacing portions of the Polaris and B-52 force with the Trident submarine, armed with the Trident II missile, and the B-1, equipped with SRAM. The Soviets, under an agreement that put an aggregate ceiling on deliverable payload, could trade in their 140 bombers for an equivalent payload of 130 heavy ICBM's and, by deploying a MIRV bus able to accommodate twenty separate RV's, could realize a capability to deliver over 8,000 RV's with their heavy ICBM force alone.

These possibilities are by no means the only examples of force asymmetries that could emerge when various ceilings are placed on offensive forces and system replacement or qualitative improvement is undertaken. But they are enough to demonstrate that the asymmetries making a system-by-system agreement difficult to achieve at SALT II could also constrain the more generalized, aggregate approach.

Negotiators at SALT II must also take into account present weapon system deployment plans and existing and anticipated technological capability when determining the kind of imbalances that could stem from ceilings on specific indexes. Many of the possible imbalances that could result from aggregate ceilings are not real possibilities, given current and projected U.S. and Soviet

¹⁸The problems of bomber penetrability could confront U.S. force planners with a difficult choice under an aggregate scheme: either to scrap the existing bomber force for less vulnerable SLBM boats or to procure a less vulnerable but more expensive B-52 follow-on, such as the B-1.

deployment programs. It could also be argued that controlling a certain index, such as launcher numbers or payload, is sufficient insurance for strategic stability since neither power possesses a first-strike capability at the present time. In addition, the case can be made that a mutual ceiling on strategic capability would eliminate the very uncertainties that could lead either side to exploit the agreement in order to achieve large imbalances in indexes not brought under control.

These arguments, however, must be viewed in the context of possible strategic, political and bureaucratic developments. While the potential asymmetries stemming from different ceilings may seem relatively insignificant from the viewpoint of the present assured destruction standoff, a major imbalance in offensive capabilities, coupled with breakthroughs in either ballistic missile defense or anti-submarine warfare would be of crucial concern. Such a development could indicate that one party was trying to achieve a first-strike capability, thus instilling dangerous uncertainty into the strategic relationship of the two powers.

An imbalance that developed in a more symbolic measure of strategic capability, such as launcher vehicles, could also have significant political implications. If an agreement controlling payload, for instance, allowed a large disparity in launcher numbers to develop, the power wielding numerical superiority could exploit its psychological advantage in political tests short of a nuclear exchange. Such a situation could lead not only to political adventurism but to pressures for new arms programs and treaty abrogation within the government of the side possessing the smaller arsenal.

An aggregate ceiling based on a selected index of offensive capability could create other internal political pressures for increased arms acquisition. Any agreement to group offensive weapons together under an aggregate ceiling would need the acquiescence of both powers' military establishments. To some extent, this process was at work when former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird promised to continue the B-1 and Trident programs after the signing of the SALT I accords. Under these conditions, it is doubtful that negotiators would be able to agree to aggregate ceilings below existing force levels. As was suggested previously, the aggregate ceiling would, to some extent, have to be tailored to accommodate planned additions and replacements to the strategic forces on both sides. A ceiling based on numbers, for instance, which allowed the American military to replace Polaris boats and

B-52's with Trident boats and B-1's on a one-by-one basis, would be far more acceptable than a payload ceiling, under which these larger systems could be introduced only when their equivalence in deliverable payload was retired. Even setting ceilings at existing levels could interfere with present deployment plans. On the U.S. side, this can be seen in the area of manned bombers. At the present time Air Force plans call for maintaining the current force of B-52G/H's (255 aircraft) after a force of 244 B-1's is deployed. An agreement that either cut or maintained launcher numbers, payload or equivalent megatonnage would not be compatible with these plans and would undoubtedly meet with resistance in the Pentagon. Thus, negotiators at SALT II might be forced to construct ceilings above existing levels.

COMBINED INDEXES

Perhaps an answer to some, but not all, of the problems connected with negotiating an aggregate ceiling for offensive weapons would be the construction of combined ceilings — in other words, using two or more indexes of strategic capability to limit strategic forces. The Interim Agreement, which combines restrictions on the number of SLBM launch tubes with total number of submarines, is in some ways a precedent for such an approach. With negotiability and verifiability as criteria, the indexes best suited for a combined ceiling would seem to be launcher numbers and deliverable payload. Under an arrangement where both measures were frozen at or near current levels, the potential growth of asymmetries among other indexes of strategic capability would be less likely to occur. Any attempt, for instance, to replace existing forces with heavy ICBM's or more capable bomber aircraft would be felt in the payload measure, while attempts to replace existing delivery systems with greater numbers of smaller weapons would be restricted by the ceiling on launchers.

Undoubtedly pressures would still exist under such an arrangement to improve qualitative aspects of offensive arsenals — size, accuracy and penetrability — but the potential asymmetries that might occur from such modernization efforts could be nowhere as large as those when only one index is controlled. While pressure would be felt to shunt offensive arms competition into qualitative avenues — already a feature of the present strategic environment — it would be reduced by the realization that combined limits on launcher numbers and deliverable

payload would prevent either power from achieving a significant force level edge in either strategic or symbolic terms.

The major advantage of including deliverable payload and launcher numbers in an aggregate ceiling over other possible combinations is verifiability. While numbers of RV's and equivalent megatonnage would constitute a better measure of target coverage and damage-inflicting capability, given the nature of U.S. and Soviet force structures, a combined ceiling on these indexes could not be protected against cheating; nor could such an arrangement be easily negotiated, in view of the disparity between the two sides in RV's. Consequently, it is difficult to visualize how any agreement that places numerical limits on various indexes of offensive capability could stem qualitative force improvement. As analysts have indicated, SALT I's ABM Treaty had a profound strategic effect not only because it blocked a qualitative avenue of arms competition; it also — at least from the standpoint of achieving an assured destruction capability — made quantitative offensive arms competition appear, at least for some observers, less necessary. Since the mid-1960's the United States has emphasized the qualitative modernization of forces over quantitative additions to its force structure. Although it has been argued that a combined aggregate ceiling would provide less opportunity for asymmetries stemming from qualitative developments to occur, the possibility of breakthroughs in defensive areas provides sufficient incentives for continued offensive force modernization.

While aggregate ceilings appear to be negotiable, their primary accomplishment must be seen as consolidating the achievements of the Interim Agreement in a more comprehensive and equitable arrangement. They must also be viewed as a possible result of, and not a prerequisite to, solutions to a number of more knotty problems that have confronted negotiators at SALT II. These more fundamental issues — the question of the long-run desirability of the assured destruction doctrine, the place of FBS in the strategic balance, and the control of multiple warhead deployment — to some extent will determine the negotiability of aggregate offensive ceilings.

If such an agreement does emerge from SALT II, it may well disappoint some segments of the arms control community. It will likely be designed to accommodate existing and planned force structures, and could perhaps accelerate the replacement of forces with their designated follow-ons. This is not to argue that SALT

has become "subverted." Instead it suggests that SALT does not exist apart from the bureaucratic and political interests that contribute to the formation of both Soviet and American defense policies. The experience of SALT I has shown that an agreement on offensive weapons is unlikely to result in overall force reductions. In fact, definitional problems of determining what forces should be included in the agreement will more likely raise ceilings above present levels. Standing alone, an aggregate ceiling on offensive weapons could reinforce pressures for force modernization, and, as previously suggested, the choice of an inappropriate index of offensive capability could exacerbate existing U.S.-Soviet force asymmetries. While an aggregate ceiling, if constructed carefully, would contribute to the continued strategic stability between the two major powers, the implications of such an arrangement for the development of "middle-level" nuclear powers, as well as would-be members of the nuclear club, are by no means clear.

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The following article entitled "The Limitation of Strategic Armaments: Problems and Perspectives," was published in the December 1973 issue of SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA (USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY), pp. 3-12. The authors, Lieutenant-General M. A. Mil'shteyn and Colonel L. S. Semeyko, are strategic specialists affiliated with the Institute of the USA in Moscow. This selection surveys the developments in SALT since 1972 and the nature of the problems faced in SALT II, while it carefully delineates various U.S. opinions and attitudes on these important matters. The article emphasizes the need for the U.S. to place a limitation on its MIRV development and the requirement for rapid progress in SALT in order to prevent an acceleration of the arms race. A more recent article in PRAVDA, April 7, 1974, by another USA Institute specialist, Colonel V. V. Larionov, reiterates the points presented here, thus indicating their continued applicability. As a matter of related interest, Colonel Larionov, a Professor and Doctor of Military Science, was the composing editor of all three editions of the well known Soviet book MILITARY STRATEGY and is a prominent spokesman for Soviet military affairs.

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ОГРАНИЧЕНИЕ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ ВООРУЖЕНИЙ: ПРОБЛЕМЫ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ

М. А. МИЛЬШТЕЙН, Л. С. СЕМЕЙКО

THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES

M. A. MIL'SHTEYN AND L. S. SEMEYKO

The Soviet-U.S. summit meetings in May 1972 and June 1973 made a great contribution to the relaxation of tension in the world and were marked by major steps in the matter of strategic arms limitation. The first stage of the talks on this problem ended, as is known, with the signing of the treaty between the USSR and the United

States on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems and the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. These documents were and continue to be of great significance for lessening the threat of nuclear war and curbing the arms race.

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Let us recall that the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, which came into effect in October last year, was concluded for a five-year term. Proceeding from the principle of equal security, recognition of the inadmissibility of obtaining any one-sided advantages, and the paramount importance of ending the quantitative arms race, it provided for the "freezing" of the number of offensive missiles on both sides.

Thus, the agreement affected only one aspect—quantitative—of the limitation of strategic offensive arms. Was this accidental? Of course not. It should not be forgotten that this was essentially the first agreement of this sort, when the Soviet Union and the United States agreed on the limitation of the arms systems which constitute the basis of the state's military might. And the point is not only that the all-round limitation of strategic offensive arms is an extremely complex and multifaceted problem which cannot be solved at once by some one agreement, but which demands a stage-by-stage approach. During the talks it was necessary to overcome many overgrowths of the "Cold War" in order to arrive at a constructive agreement on questions affecting the vital interests of the sides' security. Only a few years ago even the discussion, let alone the solving, of these questions would have seemed improbable.

The conclusion of the interim agreement was made possible as a result of the positive changes which had occurred in the world and which had been occasioned, above all, by the new alignment of forces which had taken shape as a result of the growth of the economic, political, and military might of the socialist countries. The United States was forced to admit that the relative equality which had evolved—in the evaluation of the U.S. military-political leadership—in the strategic might of the USSR and the United States, requires a new approach to the problem of strategic arms limitation. Under these conditions the former gamble on military force as the chief instrument of foreign policy proved groundless. Moreover, a nuclear war would

be suicidal for the United States. The new approach to the problem insured the possibility of placing certain limits on the further development of the sides' nuclear might.

However, the interim agreement did not block all the channels of the strategic arms race. It limited the number of land-based missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and the number of modern nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles on board but it did not affect at all certain other important components, such as the strategic air force and forward-based nuclear facilities. The agreement did not close such paths for the qualitative improvement of strategic offensive arms as for example, increasing the accuracy of the multiple warheads of missiles, their reliability, penetrability, and so forth, as well as the creation of new systems. It was not by chance, therefore, that the agreement was called an "interim" one and that Paragraph Two of Article VIII stated that it "shall remain in force for a period of 5 years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible."

The document "Basic Principles of Talks on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" signed in Washington in June 1973 is of very great significance in this connection. Continuing and consolidating the line of the Soviet-U.S. agreements concluded in Moscow in May 1972, it defines clearly and distinctly the aims, tasks, and times of the second stage of the talks, that is, the chief parameters of joint work on the further limitation of strategic arms. What are the fundamental directions and significance of this document?

The aims of the second stage, as the "basic principles" point out, consist of the more complete quantitative and qualitative limitation of strategic offensive arms and their subsequent reduction. The task is set of determining definitively and for the long term a mutually agreed number for the two sides' offensive arms, a number which

would take into account the interests of their equal security. This is a difficult task if one takes into account the fact that under conditions of scientific and technical progress the quantitative aspect of strategic arms is linked more closely than ever before with their qualitative aspect. And the fact that the USSR and the United States have now agreed to examine simultaneously also complex questions of qualitative limitations signifies not only the broadening of the range of questions under discussion but also a serious and exceptionally important advance in the talks' group of problems.

In accordance with the agreement reached, measures must also be elaborated for a subsequent reduction in strategic arms. The transition from arms limitation to their reduction would symbolize the beginning of a new stage in solving the problem of general disarmament, which is defined in the "Principles of Relations Between the USSR and the United States" as the ultimate task of the efforts of the USSR and the United States in the matter of arms limitation.

The "basic principles" reaffirm the principles of the sides' identical security and the rejection of attempts to obtain one-sided advantages, which would be incompatible with the strengthening of relations of peace between the USSR and the United States. This created the necessary preconditions for agreeing on the absolute and relative sizes of strategic offensive forces. In the age of nuclear weapons, the principle of identical (or equal) security can be the only acceptable one, since the desire to insure supremacy would make the achievement of long-term and stable agreements impossible and would inevitably engender an arms race which would be senseless, given the existence of the vast nuclear stocks already accumulated.

The time planned for signing a permanent agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic arms is also of great significance. And here the point is not only that this time has been brought as near as possible—the aim is to sign it in 1974, with regard for the fact that the sides will make earnest efforts to elaborate the pro-

visions of the agreement—but the point is also that time is very costly, if one takes into account that the development of new, still more destructive weapons systems proceeds quickly, creating conditions for the acceleration of new spirals in the arms race. In addition, the agreement of the stated time cuts the ground from under the feet of those U.S. "hawks" who, in the period between the two summit meetings, tirelessly shouted about the "danger" concealed in the five-year (to 1977) validity of the interim agreement. Their "arguments" boiled down to alleging that during this time, by using certain provisions of the agreement, the Soviet Union would do everything possible to acquire so-called first-strike capability and would arrive at the 1977 finishing line in better strategic form than the United States. These "arguments" were clearly calculated to undermine confidence in the interim agreement, secure its fundamental revision, and essentially undermine the very foundations of the Soviet-U.S. understanding on the improvement of relations. Now, a serious blow has also been struck at this position of the U.S. right-wing forces by the fact that the sides have registered their readiness to conclude agreements on individual measures to supplement the interim agreement. Such flexibility in the negotiating process is of very great political significance.

Finally, it is also necessary to point to a principle agreed on in the document under consideration—the principle of control over the fulfillment of future agreements. It is known that the question of control has long been a stumbling block since, during the discussion of questions of disarmament, the United States advanced demands unacceptable to the USSR. Many U.S. specialists have pointed out, incidentally, that the forms of inspection proposed by Washington were not even accepted by the United States itself in the final analysis. However, the manipulation of this question enabled mistrust of the USSR to be sown and the solution of problems of limiting the arms race to be dragged out and frustrated. The "basic principles" unambiguously confirm that limitations on

strategic offensive arms must be controlled by national technical facilities. Such control, in many U.S. evaluations, is reliable enough and does not infringe upon the side's state interests.

On the whole, the "Basic Principles of Talks on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" is an exceptionally important and timely document. Speaking of its significance, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his speech at a reception in the USSR Embassy in Washington in honor of the U.S. President: "The understanding reached on the basic principles of further talks on this problem contains everything to give a new boost and clear direction to the joint work on important agreements which are intended not only to curb but also to turn the most dangerous and costly arms race, the nuclear-missile race—and thereby to enable our countries to switch more funds to creative purposes to improving the people's life."

The significance of the "basic principles" increases still further if one considers them not in isolation, but in close connection with the other documents signed in Washington and, above all, with such a one as the permanent agreement on preventing nuclear war. If one analyzes these two documents in depth and comprehensively, it is obvious that even the very readiness of the sides for the further limitation of strategic offensive arms, followed by their reduction, is a very important contribution to a political program aimed at reducing and ultimately eliminating the threat of nuclear war and at asserting the principle of peaceful coexistence. In other words, they reflect the idea that political détente must really be supplemented by military détente.

It must be pointed out that the second stage of the talks on the limitation of strategic offensive arms is proceeding under more favorable conditions in comparison with the first stage, despite all the complexity of the problems which have to be resolved. These conditions are determined by many factors, and above all by the fact that the process of normalizing relations and extending cooperation between the USSR and the United States is continuing

to develop successfully.

Recognition of the interests of the sides' security, based on the principle of equality and rejection of the use or threat of force, constitutes a necessary precondition for the successful holding of the talks. The fact that a definite mechanism has already been elaborated and that considerable experience of holding talks has been accumulated is also of great significance. The sides have advanced along the path of formulating general criteria, evaluations and approaches, which can also be used to a certain extent at the second stage.

Of course all this does not mean that the talks are easy at the second stage. The problems now facing us are considerably more complex than those discussed at the first stage. What, then, is the essence of these problems?

Some of them lie in the political plane and are connected, above all, with the fact that certain circles in the United States oppose, directly or indirectly, any agreements aimed at limiting strategic arms. It is characteristic that they have now sharply boosted their subversive activities, opposing the very process of military détente. This cannot fail to leave its mark on various political aspects connected with determining the nature of future agreements.

Other problems relate to the sphere which may conventionally be called the military-technical sphere. In the opinion of a number of prominent U.S. investigators, one of the chief problems on this plane is the coordination of the contradictions of the existing quantitative-qualitative asymmetry of the strategic offensive arms of the United States and the USSR on the one hand and these countries' "geographic asymmetry" on the other, with the aim of realizing the basic principle of identical security. Indeed, these asymmetries exist and are objective. They were engendered to one extent or another by the conditions of the "Cold War". It is known that these conditions also led to abnormalities, for example, in Soviet-U.S. economic relations. Touching on past Soviet-U.S. economic relations, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at a meeting with representatives of U.S. business circles: "Tension in the political

sphere made the Soviet Union and other countries close in on themselves and provided no opportunity to embark on the broad development of cooperation."

It goes without saying that this tension particularly affected the deployment of strategic arms. During these "Cold War" years, the United States, as is known, stubbornly refused to cooperate in the sphere of arms limitation. As a result, from the time of the creation of nuclear weapons in the forties right up to the beginning of the seventies the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the USSR developed without mutually agreed limitations (the only exception was the treaty banning nuclear tests in the three media). The "action-reaction" principle was virtually implemented under the conditions of the tension which existed. In other words, every "action" by one side (the creation of new strategic weapons systems, the nature and rate of their deployment, and so forth) objectively elicited an immediate active "reaction" from the other. However, because of the sides' different political, strategic and economic factors and scientific and technical solutions, the development of strategic forces could not have identical directions and forms. As a result of this, by the beginning of the seventies the sides possessed strategic offensive forces which naturally could not coincide in their quantitative and qualitative characteristics. As people point out in the United States, this places the solution of the problem of their mutually acceptable limitation under more complex conditions.

"Geographic asymmetry," a number of whose aspects, as already stated, were engendered by the former tension in international relations, is also important. On the one hand, it lies in the different nature of the so-called strike targets (military targets, industrial, populated, and administrative centers, and so forth), their number, size, distribution density, relative importance and so forth. Strategic analysts in the United States believe that this requires the sides' possession of strategic strike facilities differing in their capabilities. But, on the other hand, the USSR and the United States have dissimilar condi-

tions for the basing of their strategic forces. The Soviet Union, as is known, does not have military bases on foreign territories close to U.S. territory, whereas the United States possesses numerous military bases in Europe and Asia. According to a number of U.S. evaluations, this can increase the strategic potential of the United States and enable it to use against the USSR in the event of war, if it has not been successfully averted, not only nuclear facilities with an intercontinental radius of operation but also so-called forward forces—above all, aircraft based at foreign surface airports and on aircraft carriers. The resultant disproportion places the sides under different conditions.

On the whole, the asymmetry problem is exceptionally complex, even if it is examined separately. It is perfectly clear that its solution can be found only with mutual regard for each other's interests, taking the principle of identical security into account.

Another problem is the commensurability of the quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms considered comprehensively. Its essence lies in the selection of the proportions of quantitative limitation which would take comprehensive account of the qualitative characteristics of various types of weapons. The "quantity-quality" problem is linked in U.S. investigations with the need to establish more stable nuclear parity between the United States and the USSR compared with that which had been established, according to U.S. ideas, by the beginning of the seventies.

At present, as the majority of U.S. experts believe, parity is based on the fact that each side has certain quantitative-qualitative advantages over the other—advantages which, on the whole, mutually even out and, at the same time, exclude the sides' ability to, inflict a disarming "first-strike". However, such parity, in their opinion, cannot be stable unless measures are taken for the more complete quantitative limitation of strategic offensive systems, or unless limits are set on their qualitative improvement (above all, on targeting accuracy, power of warheads, their

number in the missiles, and the total number of missiles equipped with several independently targeted warheads).

About quantitative limitations: the 1972 interim agreement succeeded in determining the correlations of the number of land and sea-based missiles of the USSR and the United States, which takes account of the problem of asymmetry proceeding from the principle of the sides' identical security. Now that a broader permanent agreement is being prepared, the task is one of finding more complete forms and methods for the quantitative limitation of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. Among these means one may also include strategic bombers capable of delivering a considerable proportion of the nuclear potential to targets. Such a broadening of the sphere of limitations would be of great significance—they would embrace all components of strategic forces.

At the same time, it is a matter of extreme difficulty to determine criteria for the relative strategic value of various means of delivery—ICBMs, missiles launched from submarines, and bombers. A bomber, for example, can be used repeatedly, whereas a missile can be used only once, and their vulnerability, striking speed and so forth are different. As U.S. specialists in the sphere of arms control (H. York, G. Rathjens, W. Panofsky and others) point out, even the criterion "equal number of missiles" would have serious shortcomings, since strategic missiles can have different numbers of warheads and varying power of the nuclear charges and can differ in their accuracy, reliability, novelty and so forth. Therefore, a unilateral approach to the more complete limitation of the number of strategic offensive arms would, in many U.S. evaluations, hardly be productive because of qualitative differences in the strategic weapons systems.

It would seem hard to disagree with this. A broader approach, comprehensively taking into account both quantitative and qualitative parameters and various aspects of the above-considered asymmetry, and undoubtedly insure the interests of the sides' equal security, can, it must be

thought, contribute effectively to the constructive solution of the problem of quantity.

The qualitative aspect of the limitation of strategic offensive arms—the setting of certain limits on their improvement—is also of great independent significance. The point is, U.S. investigators point out, that, in addition to the novelty of this problem, its importance to the talks lies in the fact that, given the limitation of only the quantitative indicators of strategic arms, in the new rounds of the arms race efforts can be concentrated on the most promising—from the purely technical aspect—sphere of the qualitative improvement of weapons. And it is hard to foresee the consequences of such a race. At a certain moment, the consistently accumulated qualitative advantages or some scientific and technical success may place one of the sides in a position of decisive supremacy, which would radically change the strategic balance. Numerous investigations in the United States point out in this connection that at the present time it is particularly important to concentrate attention on limiting the development of so-called MIRV (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) systems—their accuracy, power, number of warheads on each missile and so forth.

Pentagon leaders assert that MIRV systems are being developed in the United States only as a "second- (retaliatory) strike" weapon. Many objective American experts dispute such assertions. For example A. Enthoven and K. Smith write that the MIRV programs "can be justified only if we are trying for a first-strike capability." And as the testimony of certain Pentagon figures shows, this kind of aspiration still persists. Thus, when speaking about the function of the Minuteman III missile, on which MIRV warheads are installed, former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General J. Ryan stated directly that "this missile with a multiple warhead will be our best weapon to destroy such primary targets as the enemy's long-range weapons." Statements like this cannot fail to alert people. A potential danger of a breakdown in the military relaxation noted in Soviet-

U.S. relations is concealed in the unrestricted development of MIRV systems in the United States.

Another basic reason why many strategic experts in the United States (in particular the Federation of American Scientists), and also a number of prominent members of Congress, consider limitation to be expedient lies in the inseparable link between MIRV and ABM systems. The "MIRVing" of missiles, they note, still had a definite purpose when it was aimed at insuring greater reliability in penetrating an antimissile defense. But now, when systems are limited in the United States and the USSR, this reason is liquidated. The well-known American physicist, W. Panofsky, talks about this in particular: "Before the first stage of the talks it was possible to consider that a surplus of offensive arms were necessary in order to overcome the resistance of possible future ABM systems; taking into account the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems, this argument is now groundless." In the opinion of those who support such a position, favorable conditions are now being created for the next step—the qualitative limitation of strategic offensive arms.

As already noted, one important aim of the talks is the search for ways for a subsequent reduction of strategic arms. A reduction of their level, effected, of course taking into account the principle of the identical security of the sides, would be of great political significance. Strengthening the process of military détente and the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations, it would really reduce the threat of nuclear war and would make a major contribution to a fundamental improvement in the international situation. The economic advantages which both sides would receive here are universally acknowledged. And on this plane the voices of the American "hawks", who as before evaluate Soviet-U.S. relations through the prism of "detering" the USSR and say that the degree of "deterrence" will be reduced given a limitation of strategic arms, sound like an anachronism. The further improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations can be built only on the growth of mutual trust

and the expansion of cooperation in all spheres, and not on the basis of the obsolete dogmas of the Cold War.

Until recently, reducing the level of strategic offensive arms gained relatively less attention in the United States than limiting them at the level achieved. And this is not by chance. The Soviet Union's idea for general and complete disarmament and the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons was received there most skeptically, and certain circles connected with the military-industrial complex are even now trying to stir up disbelief in the possibility of realizing this. Of course, reducing the arms of the USSR and the United States is not general and complete disarmament, but the importance of bilateral steps in this sphere—even if they are only partial steps—is difficult to overestimate.

On the whole, the second stage of the Soviet-U.S. talks which took place in Geneva was connected with the complex interweaving of mutually conditioned political, strategic and scientific and technical questions touching the very base of the national security of the two great powers. Of course, it is not easy to break this interweaving with a single blow and immediately to resolve urgent problems. The Soviet Union advocates serious study and constructive resolution of them, regarding the ending of the arms race in all kinds of weapons as a most important task of its peace program. Here it proceeds from the premise that, as L. I. Brezhnev pointed out in his recent speech in Tashkent, "The principle of 'all or nothing' is in no way suitable in international politics. Here it is essential to strive all the time to move forward, using any possibility available."

From what positions does the United States approach the solution of these problems? These positions were defined to one degree or another during the summer and fall (1972) debate in the U.S. Congress of the documents on limiting strategic arms. At that time, the sharpest discussion turned on the interim agreement which in the final analysis Congress approved, although with a number of amendments to the resolution introduced on the unconditional approval of the agreement. The question of the

equality of the United States' and USSR's strategic offensive arms and the understanding of this equality and the ways to insure it at future talks was basic. During the course of the Senate debate, three main groupings appeared—the right, the moderate and the center.

The representatives of the right wing of the Senate defending the interests of the military-industrial complex and the most aggressive U.S. circles (Senators Jackson, Goldwater, Byrd, Thurmond, Buckley and others), contended that by "equality" should be understood mandatory "numerical equality" in strategic delivery systems. This grouping deliberately oversimplified the entire complexity of the problem of insuring identical security, making parity in the sphere of the USSR's and the United States' strategic forces only numerical equality. Moreover, they made one of the conditions for approving the interim agreement that of fulfilling demands to force through the development of new strategic offensive weapons systems—the Trident submarine system and the B-1 strategic bomber. Thus, their position obviously amounted merely to insuring U.S. nuclear supremacy and achieving a "position of strength" at the second stage of the talks. This was how it was described by Senators Cooper, Fulbright and Kennedy. It was an obvious attempt, if not to frustrate, at least to drag out the process of further Soviet-U.S. talks, and artificially to create an atmosphere of distrust toward the interim agreement—an atmosphere favorable for justifying new rounds in the arms race.

The supporters of a more realistic approach both to evaluating the agreements concluded in Moscow and to future talks (the moderate wing of the Senate—Senators Mansfield, Fulbright, Kennedy, Proxmire, Muskie and others) advanced the thesis, as a counterbalance to the position of the right-wingers, of "asymmetrical equality" of the sides, which would take into account the aggregate of quantitative and qualitative factors rather than just quantitative equality. Regardless of the formulation of this thesis, it was an obvious support for the principle of equal security as proclaimed in the Soviet-U.S.

documents that had been signed, and herein lay its usefulness.

Taking into account the disposition of forces in the Senate (the center occupied a compromise position), the right-wingers introduced a watered-down amendment to the resolution approving the interim agreement. On the whole, it accorded with the position on the center and on September 14, 1972, it was adopted by the Senate and later by the House of Representatives. Congress called on the President to strive to achieve a permanent agreement which "will not restrict the United States to the levels of intercontinental strategic forces which are below those established for the Soviet Union." The watered-down formulation is reflected in the fact that in it there is no categorical demand about numerical equality; it was replaced by the more flexible demand that equal levels are insured, which, as is being noted in the United States, can be interpreted on a broader plane.

With the signing of the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, the Soviet Union has strictly and steadfastly adhered to its articles. Thus, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, W. Fulbright, speaking in the Senate on June 13, 1973, stated that the Soviet Union is fully observing "the spirit and the letter" of agreement already concluded on limiting strategic arms. At the same time he stressed that the Pentagon would like to avoid reducing expenditure on strategic arms.

In fact, as the facts show, certain circles in the United States, and primarily military circles, are trying to sharply accelerate the realization of existing programs for strategic building and the forcing through of the development and entry into service of new strategic weapons systems and the improvement of old systems in order to achieve, within the framework of the concluded agreement, certain one-sided advantages for the United States. Senator Symington, whose information there is no need to doubt, considers, for example, that the Pentagon is trying to use the Trident program as "a trump card for bargaining"

at the second stage of SALT.

However, this kind of approach has no prospects, and this is acknowledged by realistically thinking circles within the United States. The journal *New Republic* wrote: "If the United States really wants to renounce attempts to achieve one-sided advantages, then we must take some kind of one-sided steps to prove our good intention . . . the most important steps we could take are to limit or end experimental design work on the B-1 strategic bomber and the Trident submarine."

Reflecting the viewpoint of many specialists, the eminent expert in the sphere of arms limitation (J. H. Kekhan) said in his speech in the Senate: "The United States should review its own strategic program in order to avoid the threat of an undermining of the stability of the initial agreements and in order not to decide in advance the course of future talks." Other experts—P. Warnke, G. Rathjens, and M. Goldberger—have also spoken of the uselessness of the United States' hopes of insuring a "position of strength" at the talks.

On the whole, the discussion on the question of limiting strategic offensive arms which still continues in the United States testifies that rightist forces have still not laid down their arms there. Defending the doctrine of American supremacy, they will try to exert the maximum restraining influence on the course and results of SALT II. The *New York Times* writes in an editorial: "Rather than Moscow, it will be the supporters of cold war in the U.S. Government who declaim for a tough policy, and the military supporters in the Pentagon who will place obstacles against the conclusion of an agreement."

This circumstance is being taken into account in the Soviet Union. L. I. Brezhnev points out: "We consider it our sacred duty to pursue a policy in such a way that no kind of surprise can catch us unawares, in such a way that any attempt to turn back the world to the times of cold war will immediately receive a worthy rebuff."

It must be noted that rightist forces in the United States, enemies of limiting strategic arms and the relaxation of tension, are encountering considerable resistance

within the United States itself—from those groupings in Congress, business circles, scientists, and political and public figures who realistically take into account the positive shifts which have taken place in the world and who are trying to lay firm foundations for military détente in Soviet-U.S. relations. And in this resistance can be seen the command of the times: realism is unceasingly blazing a trail for itself in the political thinking on Capitol Hill.

* * *

At the present stage, one of the central problems in the development of international relations is how to deepen the process of relaxation and make it irreversible. The addition of military détente to political détente, the ending of the arms race, and the adoption of measures to reduce arms constitute important and constructive steps along the path of solving this problem. This will also be served by SALT II, whose successful outcome will demand a mutual display of good will and a realistic approach. Meanwhile, the quest for doubtful "trumps" for bargaining, a "position of strength" at the talks, and unworthy attempts to obtain one-sided advantages can lead only to the dangerous edge of the main highway onto which both sides have set out for the purpose of ending the arms race, and turn back the entire process of détente. At the Moscow World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces L. I. Brezhnev said: "It is quite obvious that, apart from urging on the arms race, these 'trump cards' bring nothing to the matter, as far as SALT is concerned, for its success it is not military programs which are necessary but a real desire to curb the arms race, backed up by mutual restraint."

The USSR's foreign policy efforts in the sphere of strengthening peace and international security and the positive shifts in the United States' political practice have created the necessary prerequisites for a further broadening of the base of Soviet-U.S. cooperation. This cooperation should be based on objective factors and not on any given conjunctural considerations. This kind of approach can give sufficient grounds for reckoning on a successful solution to the problems of SALT II.

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CHAPTER 6

THE US STRATEGIC DEBATE

Section I. Introduction

The debate over US nuclear strategy stems from Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's announcement of a refined strategy of "flexible response" or as some scholars call it, "strategic adaptability." It must be pointed out that this debate parallels the debate over the SALT negotiations.

The following readings provide:

- a. A comparative analysis of the "dynamic" balance of strategic power.
- b. Secretary Schlesinger's "flexible response" strategy which gives the President a maximum amount of flexibility in responding to a nuclear emergency.
- c. Criticism of "flexible response".
- d. Support for "flexible response".



by
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

the DYNAMIC BALANCE of STRATEGIC POWER

The military posture of the United States can be judged meaningfully only by relating our military forces—both strategic and general purpose—to those of our most powerful potential adversary—the Soviet Union.

In this regard, the negotiation and signing of the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM Treaty) and the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms (Interim Agreement) constituted first steps in our effort to restrain the obvious and destabilizing momentum of the U.S.S.R. strategic force buildup and to establish some control over the deployment of significantly increased strategic forces by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The force levels for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. established by the ABM Treaty are equivalent, but the numerical intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force levels authorized for the Soviet Union by the Interim Agreement are larger than those authorized for the United States. Because of technological and other strategic offensive advantages possessed by the United States, this temporary imbalance was considered acceptable, particularly when weighed against the advantages of reaching some agreement on limiting strategic arms.

In the joint resolution authorizing the acceptance of these agreements, however, you will recall that the Congress specified the President should seek a future agree-

ment which "would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union." Compliance with this Congressional mandate is a primary objective of the current follow-on negotiations to conclude a permanent agreement.

I report to you today that aggressive modernization programs, which could place the United States in a position of strategic inferiority in the foreseeable years ahead, now are being undertaken by the Soviet Union. These programs, although aggressive, are within the terms of the Interim Agreement now in effect. If we are to maintain our relative position, we must continue the development and deployment of the strategic systems requested by the President and must continue to insist upon the equivalence which the Congress so wisely has called for as an ultimate goal in our Strategic Arms Limitations negotiations.

With regard to the balance between the general purpose forces of the Soviet Union and the United States, I have noted with apprehension for the past several years that a major shift in the naval balance is taking place. The U.S. still has the edge with regard to the projection of our naval power as a result of the global reach of our fleets through our carrier and amphibious task forces. The U.S.S.R., however, is building a modern and increasingly powerful naval force capable of interdicting sea lines of communication and obstructing this projec-

(Reproduced from Department of Defense, Commander's Digest, April 11, 1974, pp. 2-16.)

tion of our military power across the oceans to assist our allies. The exact role of the new Soviet carrier force is not clear, but we may be sure that it portends a new era in the projection of sea-power by the U.S.S.R.

The tactical air forces of the Soviet Union are in the midst of a major and significant modernization program. The program appears to be directed at overcoming the long-standing qualitative advantage held by U.S. tactical air forces in the ground attack role. The Soviet tactical air forces hold major quantitative and some qualitative advantages in the air superiority role.

The Soviet weapons and equipment observed in the Middle East, together with other evidence, clearly show that the large U.S.S.R. ground forces also are being modernized with new tanks and new combat vehicles, as well as new and sophisticated combat support weapons and systems. Additionally, there are indications that the Soviet Union is developing air mobile units with ground attack helicopter support which, when combined with its new tanks and combat vehicles, will increase the tactical mobility and firepower of its ground forces.

The strategic programs of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), by contrast, are proceeding somewhat slower than estimated last year. We still expect the People's Republic of China, however, to deploy by the end of this decade a small, but effective, ICBM force which will be capable of striking all of the Continental United States. P.R.C. general purpose forces are being modernized, but also at a relatively slow rate—when compared with those of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, the People's Republic of China is continuing to increase its overall military power.

Events of the past few months in the Middle East once again have proven that the military balance must be assessed on the capabilities of potential adversaries rather than on their announced or estimated intentions. Intentions change much more quickly than capabilities and often change solely on the basis of the opportunities that a lack of opposing capability presents. Therefore, the only sound course of action for our future defense planning is to analyze, as best we can, the military balance between the United States and opposing forces based

on the capabilities of existing forces projected over the next few years.

Before going further, I would like to remind you of the principal caveats.

Five Year Defense Program

First, the U.S. force data are drawn from the currently projected Five Year Defense Program. U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. data are based on the latest intelligence estimates and projections. Both U.S. force data and U.S.S.R. estimates assume that the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement will remain in force for the next five years.

Second, the intelligence organizations can estimate with a fair degree of precision the forces our opponents will have operational in the next year or two. Beyond that point, the estimates become less certain.

Third, while the intelligence organizations cannot predict quantitative deployments very far into the future, they can provide a good indication of the kinds of weapons systems which may be deployed several years from now.

Finally, some degree of personal judgment cannot be avoided in comparing

the military posture of one nation with another. Consequently, some of my colleagues may disagree with me on specific details, but I believe there is a general consensus within the Defense Department on the fundamental aspects of these comparisons. I will give somewhat more attention to the ongoing initiatives of the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. than to those of the U.S.


Strategic Forces

I have emphasized in the past that no task is more important, from a military perspective, than that of developing, maintaining, and protecting a credible strategic deterrent. Detente, offering the opportunity for relaxation of tension, requires that we be strong enough to negotiate with confidence and to insure that our good will is not misconstrued as lack of will, thereby encouraging confrontation. This task presents many challenges because, in making an assessment of the military capabilities of our potential adversaries, we cannot afford to look only at the capabilities of those forces in being today. The long lead time of modern strategic weapon systems demands that we also devote our best efforts

SIGNIFICANT US & USSR INITIATIVES STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS

US		USSR
	ICBM	
MINUTEMAN III SILO MODIFICATION		SS-X-16 SS-X-17 SS-X-18 SS-X-19 NEW SILOS SS-11 MRV SILO MODIFICATION
	SLBM	
POSEIDON CONVERSION TRIDENT C-4		SS-N-8 DELTA SS-N-6 IMPROVEMENTS
	BOMBERS	
B-1 B-52 MODIFICATIONS		BACKFIRE

CHART NO 1



to the evaluation of the relative military balance as it is likely to evolve in the years ahead and as it is likely to be perceived in the eyes of our potential adversaries, our allies, and the rest of the world. If we are to maintain a credible strategic deterrent, actual military strength is essential, but the appearance of military strength cannot be neglected.

Strategic Offensive Systems

Shown on Chart 1 are the ongoing U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic offensive initiatives which will have significant impact on the strategic balance. I will highlight these initiatives so that the dynamic nature of military balance for the foreseeable future can be fully understood.

The Soviet Union clearly has embarked on an unprecedented major commitment to the modernization of its strategic offensive force.

- Four new ICBM designs of varying classes and characteristics currently are being flight tested. These new systems will incorporate improved launch, guidance, and reentry techniques, which will permit the U.S.S.S.R. to introduce accurate multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) into its missile inventory. A corollary of these significant new missile programs is the parallel construction and modification of hardened silos, capable of surviving appreciably higher overpressures and ground shocks. Additionally, a multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) version of the SS-11 is being deployed rapidly in some of these new silos for "light" ICBMs.

- The U.S.S.R. has moved forward rapidly in modernizing its SLBM force. The new 4200 nautical mile (nm)

SS-N-8 has been deployed aboard the first three Delta-class submarines—now in series production. Improvements for the SS-N-6, the SLBM deployed aboard Yankee-class submarines, may be nearing operational status. This new MRV variant of the SS-N-6 is expected to have a slightly longer range and may be deployed in Yankee-class submarines.

- We are uncertain as to the exact military role of the new Backfire variable-geometry wing, supersonic bomber. It is certainly capable of performing intercontinental attack missions, but it is probably best suited for peripheral attack. We anticipate that it will be assigned both roles.

In contrast to the Soviet Union's dramatic program, ongoing U.S. initiatives in the strategic arena are modest and deliberate. The United States does not have any new ICBM systems under engineering development, but it is carrying out advanced development work on improved ICBM technology. Continued improvements also are being made in both Minuteman II and III systems. By the end of FY 1975, all Minuteman I's will be replaced by Minuteman IIIs. Additionally, the hardness of Minuteman II and III missiles and silos is being upgraded, and a Command Data Buffer system is being installed to permit the rapid remote retargeting of Minuteman III missiles. These improvements are designed to increase further the survivability, flexibility and responsiveness of our Minuteman force.

As was noted last year, the last of the Polaris A-2 SLBMs will be phased out of the U.S. force by mid-1974. By mid-1977, the planned Polaris-to-

Two U.S. Navy F-4 Phantom II fighter aircraft from Fighter Squadron 213 (VF-213) fly alongside a Soviet TU-20 Bear bomber. The event took place while the attack aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk was underway in the Pacific Ocean.

Poseidon conversion program will have been completed. At that time, we will have 31 Poseidon submarines and 10 Polaris A-3 submarines. The first Trident submarine, with the new 4000 nm C-4 missile, is expected to enter the force in FY 1979.

The B-1, which is being developed as a replacement for a portion of the B-52 force in the 1980s, will begin flight testing this fall. The results of the flight testing will be examined carefully prior to a production decision being made next year. In the meantime, funds are included in the FY 1975 budget request for modification of 80 B-52D bombers to insure their availability until the B-1 is capable of entering the force in adequate numbers to allow for retirement of the B-52D.

U.S., U.S.S.R. ICBM Forces

Shown on Chart 2 are the principal U.S. and U.S.S.R. ICBMs currently deployed. Before discussing the individual characteristics of these ICBM systems, a brief review of the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms is appropriate so that the operating international legal constraints applicable to the U.S. and U.S.S.R. may be recalled.

At the bottom of Chart 2 are the numbers of ICBM launchers that we associate with the Interim Agreement. The numbers in parentheses indicate the

U.S. estimate of new U.S.S.R. silos under construction on the date the agreement was signed.

The Interim Agreement establishes limitations on the deployment of strategic forces by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Both parties are limited to a relatively large, but unequal, number of fixed land-based and submarine-launched strategic offensive ballistic missile launchers. With but one important exception (i.e., the size of ICBM silos), the Interim Agreement places no significant constraints on the qualitative characteristics of the missiles or the launchers. Moreover, it is also important to recall that the agreement places no limitation on other types of strategic offensive weapons (e.g., long-range bombers, cruise missiles, and air- and sea-based mobile launchers—other than on submarines).

Under the Interim Agreement, ICBM launchers are classified by age and size. The year 1964 divides launchers for modern ICBMs from "older" types deployed prior to that date (e.g., SS-7, SS-8, and Titan II). There is no agreement on a general definition of "heavy," but a unilateral U.S. statement provides that a "heavy" ICBM is an ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest "light" ICBM operational on either side at the time the Interim Agreement was signed. Therefore, under

this definition the SS-11, SS-13, and Minuteman are "light" ICBMs. No additional fixed, land-based ICBM launchers may be constructed by either party after the freeze date of July 1, 1972; but modernization and replacement may be undertaken.

The agreement prohibits converting any of the "older" or "light" launchers into launchers for modern "heavy" ICBMs, but SLBM launchers may be substituted for the "older" launchers, if desired. Under the terms of the agreement, therefore, the U.S. could "modernize" all of its 1,000 Minuteman and its 54 Titan II launchers to Minuteman III or any other modern "light" ICBM; but it could not replace any of the Titan II or Minuteman launchers with modern "heavy" ICBMs. Similarly, the U.S.S.R. could "modernize" all of its ICBMs, but only the 313 SS-9 associated launchers (288 operational SS-9s and 25 new silos under construction in SS-9 complexes at the time the agreement was signed) can be converted to new "heavy" ICBMs.

All of the 1,030 SS-11 and SS-13 launchers, operational at the time the agreement was signed, may be modernized for new "light" ICBMs. New "light" ICBMs also may be installed in the 66 new silos, under construction at the time of the agreement, provided the dimensions of the launcher are not in-

creased by more than 10-15 percent. As I already have mentioned, the 209 "older" SS-7 and SS-8 launchers (and 54 U.S. Titan II launchers) may be replaced by SLBM launchers.


These "older" SS-7s and SS-8s, deployed in both hard and soft sites, are the first Soviet ICBMs shown on Chart 2. We believe that the Soviet Union will substitute SLBM launchers, under the terms of the Interim Agreement, for some or all of these launchers. Before this is done, we consider that we should receive timely notification through the Standing Consultative Commission.

The SS-9 is a very large ICBM with four different versions. The SS-9 MOD 2 has a single reentry vehicle (RV) with the largest yield of any known ICBM and constitutes the bulk of the SS-9 force. The MOD 1 also has a single RV with a slightly smaller yield; however, only a relatively small number has been deployed. These two missiles are the only operational Soviet ICBMs with the combination of yield and accuracy needed to attack hard targets effectively, but there are insufficient numbers of these missiles deployed to constitute a significant threat to our total Minuteman force.

The enigmatic SS-9 MOD 3 has been tested both in a depressed trajectory mode and as a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS). The last test was over two years ago, and there is still substantial question as to its exact capabilities, mission, and extent of operational deployment. We do not believe the MOD 3 has been deployed at any of the regular SS-9 complexes.

The MOD 4 has received more attention in recent years than any other version of the SS-9 because it has provided us with the clearest indication of the Soviet Union's determination to develop MIRVs. Two years ago I reported on the abrupt termination of MOD 4 testing as follows:

"No further flight-tests of the SS-9 MOD 4 have been noted since November 1970. If the Soviets were indeed trying to develop a MIRV system, which I believe is the most plausible explanation for the MOD 4 development program, the project has either been sent back to the drawing boards or abandoned as such."



NEW USSR ICBMs

	SS-X-16	SS-X-17	SS-X-18	SS-X-19
FOLLOW-ON	SS-13	SS-11	SS-9	SS-11
RANGE (NM)	OVER 5000	OVER 5500	OVER 5500	OVER 5500
MIRV WARHEAD	PROBABLE	YES	YES	YES
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MIRVs	?	4	5-8	4-6
DIGITAL COMPUTER	YES	YES	YES	YES
IOC	1975	1975	1975	1975

CHART NO 3

In January of last year, 26 months after testing had stopped, a new MOD 4 test was detected. The three RVs carried were of a much different design and were equipped with parachutes to insure a soft landing and recovery. More R&D tests of the MOD 4 were carried out in 1973, and some improvement in targeting flexibility has been noted. But in view of the progress made on the improved "heavy" ICBM, the SS-X-18, it remains questionable whether the U.S.S.R. will develop the MOD 4 into a MIRV system. It could be deployed, of course, on a very limited basis as an MRV rather than a MIRV.

Soviet military planners probably view the SS-11 as their counterpart to our Minuteman. The SS-11 has a slightly higher yield, but is considerably less accurate, than the Minuteman. Comparable numbers of SS-11s also have been deployed.

Three versions of the SS-11 have been tested, but only the MOD 1 and MOD 3 have been deployed. Our evidence indicates that the MOD 2 program probably has been terminated. Neither the single RV MOD 1 or the MRV MOD 3 has the proper combination of yield and accuracy to threaten Minuteman or to be effective against other hard targets.

The SS-11 MOD 1 has been operational since 1966. In addition to its intercontinental mission, the MOD 1 also has been tested at a reduced range. This supports the belief that the SS-11 also could be used for peripheral attack missions against China and Europe.

Extensive testing of the MRV version of the SS-11 has been conducted since 1969. This test program has been very successful for the U.S.S.R. We believe that probably the MOD 3 initially was developed to facilitate penetration of ABM defenses by multiplying the number of warheads to be dealt with by a defender. Despite the severe restrictions on ABM defenses imposed by the ABM Treaty, the U.S.S.R. is deploying rapidly the SS-11 MOD 3. Therefore, it must see advantages in utilizing the MOD 3 against undefended targets, as well as defended ones—probably because of greater targeting flexibility and accuracy.

The last Soviet missile shown on Chart 2 is the SS-13—the only solid fuel ICBM in the operational inventory. Only 60 SS-13 launchers have been deployed.

US AND USSR ICBM LAUNCHERS (INVENTORY)




CHART NO 4



As I have already indicated, all of our Minuteman Is will have been phased out by mid-1975. At that time, our ICBM force will consist of 550 Minuteman IIIs, 450 Minuteman IIs, and 54 Titan IIs.

We do not have sufficient information, as yet, on the four new U.S.S.R. ICBMs being tested to provide physical comparisons of them, similar to those shown on Chart 2 for currently deployed ICBMs. We do have estimates of some of the important characteristics, as you will note from Chart 3.

The SS-X-18 now being tested at Tyuratam is a large, two-stage, liquid propellant ICBM. It probably is intended as a follow-on to the SS-9. The most significant new characteristic of the SS-X-18 is the addition of a bus-type MIRV system with an on-board digital computer. This new post-boost vehicle (PBV) is similar to the one employed in our Minuteman III and Poseidon. We believe the SS-X-18s probably will have the capability of dispensing five to eight independently targeted warheads. Increased accuracy is a definite goal of the new test program. Finally, we cannot rule out a single RV option for the SS-X-18. Recent tests have employed a single RV, thus indicating a continuing interest in a large warhead with greater accuracy.

As you can see from Chart 3, the SS-X-17 and SS-X-19 are both considered follow-on missiles to the SS-11. Since these are very extensive test programs for expensive systems, they may be competing designs, with only one to be chosen for ultimate deployment as a follow-on to the S-11. We believe that a similar competitive design and flight test program was employed prior to the decision to deploy the SS-9. It would be premature at this time, however, to rule out the possibility that both may become operational. Both systems have on-board computers and have been tested with MIRV warheads. We estimate that one or both of these systems could be deployed in 1975.

The SS-X-16 is the only new solid propellant ICBM being tested by the U.S.S.R. and is a logical successor to replace the 60 SS-13s in silos. The SS-X-16 is about the same size as the SS-13, but has greater range and payload capability. We have no direct evidence that the SS-X-16 will be deployed in a mobile



mode; however, indications suggest that the Soviet Union is developing the SS-X-16 with the option of deploying it as a land-based mobile ICBM.

As you know, the United States unilaterally has stated that it would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the Strategic Arms Limitation objectives, even though the U.S.S.R. would not agree to restricting deployment of mobile ICBMs. Development and testing, however, of a land-mobile ICBM system are not prohibited.

So far, the SS-X-16 has been tested only with a single RV. Nonetheless, there are indications that the U.S.S.R. plans to develop a MIRV payload for the SS-X-16 similar to the other three new ICBMs. Either version could be ready for deployment in 1975, but if a MIRV version is planned for this time frame, a high priority testing program would have to be instituted soon.

Shown on Chart 4 are the latest projections of U.S. and U.S.S.R. ICBM forces, assuming the limitations incorporated in the Interim Agreement remain in effect. This is the first of the quantitative charts that I initially developed for this presentation four years ago. As I repeatedly have noted, there is a degree of personal professional judgment included in these assessments; however, in an effort to provide you with all the information available, it would seem appropriate to note that our estimates of Soviet strategic growth over the past four years have been on the conservative side.

We estimate that the U.S.S.R. at mid-1973, had a total of 1,547 operational ICBM launchers—1,527 at the time of the Interim Agreement in 1972, plus 20 SS-11 MOD 3s now operational in new


small silos. The remaining new silos probably will be operational by mid-1974, giving the U.S.S.R., at that time, a total of 1,587—only 31 short of the estimated SAL ceiling. By mid-1975, the new large silos are estimated to become operational with the SS-X-18 missile system.

Considering all available evidence, it is our best estimate that the Soviet ICBM force over the next five years will be closer to the lower Interim Agreement limit of 1,409 ICBMs than to the upper maximum limit of 1,618. (1,409 ICBMs is the limit if all of the "older" ICBMs are replaced by SLBMs.) This is based on our belief that the U.S.S.R. will exercise its option to replace the older, less effective ICBMs with modern SLBMs. We also believe the remaining ICBMs will be modernized by replacing them with the new systems already described.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. SLBM Forces

Chart 5 provides a comparison of U.S. and U.S.S.R. SLBMs, all of which are operational except the Trident C-4. The C-4 SLBM is included because of its major importance to the military balance in the years ahead. The C-4 will have a range capability approximately double that of the Poseidon. The final design characteristics, of course, cannot be confirmed until the development process is completed and the missile is tested. Nevertheless, it will reflect significant technical and operational advances over the Poseidon. The initial operational capability (IOC) of the new missile will coincide with the completion of the first Trident submarine in late 1978.

The Trident C-4 missile also will be compatible with the Poseidon submarine.



Above is a Soviet Class G-1 ballistic missile submarine.

Backfit of this advanced SLBM can be accomplished during little more than a normal tender (repair ship) availability period for the Poseidon submarine. Plans are made to backfit Trident C-4 missiles in Poseidon submarines with an IOC for the first backfit in FY 1979.

It already has been noted that the current Polaris/Poseidon conversion program of 31 submarines will be completed in FY 1977. This will leave 10 Polaris A-3 submarines with 160 SLBMs and 31 Poseidon submarines with 496 SLBMs, for a total of 41 ballistic missile submarine (SSBNs) with 656 SLBMs in the force. We cannot exceed this number of SLBMs under the Interim Agreement without exercising the option to replace our Titan II with "modern" SLBMs. Under this option, we could have as many as 710 "modern" SLBM launchers on 44 "modern ballistic missile submarines."

Full funding for the first Trident submarine and advanced procurement funding for the second Trident submarine were appropriated last year. Completed funding for the second and third, plus advance funding for four more Trident submarines, in a 10-ship program, is being requested for FY 1975. I will not pursue the matter further, except to say that the Trident submarine, like the C-4 SLBM, will represent major technological and operational advances over our Poseidon submarine.

Turning to the SLBMs of the Soviet Union, the SS-N-8, which I indicated last year was soon to become operational, now has been deployed on at least three Delta-class submarines. It has the long-

est range (4,200 nm) of any operational SLBM. This extra range is significant when compared to the range of the SS-N-6 (1,300 nm), because it greatly enlarges the ocean space available for patrol while remaining within range of the United States. As a result, both our SLBM launch detection and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) search problems are magnified. In addition, there is tenuous evidence indicating that some Delta submarines now under construction are being lengthened. Should this extra length be used to accommodate additional SLBMs, a slightly modified Delta, equipped with more than the standard 12 SLBMs, may be in production.

The Interim Agreement limits the number of SLBM launchers and "modern ballistic missile submarines" to the numbers "operational and under construction" at the time the Agreement was signed. Additional SLBMs may become operational only as replacements for "older" ICBMs (e.g., SS-7s and SS-8s) or for SLBM launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines. By protocol, a negotiated "operational and under construction" baseline for the Soviet Union of 740 "ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered" submarines was accepted. The protocol also provides a ceiling for the U.S.S.R. of 950 modern SLBMs and 62 modern ballistic missile submarines in the event the replacement options are exercised. In any event, we estimate that modern ballistic missile submarines will continue to be produced by the U.S.S.R. at a rate of five to seven units a year for the next few years.

There are indications that the Soviet



Union already has embarked on a program to modernize the Yankee-class submarines—first deployed in 1968. In addition, as already indicated, a new longer-range MRV variant of the SS-N-6 is nearing operational status and may be deployed aboard Yankee-class submarines.

The latest projections of U.S. and U.S.S.R. SLBM launchers are shown on Chart 6. We estimate that the U.S.S.R. by mid-1974, will have a total of 666 SLBM launchers, excluding the 60 on 20 Golf-class submarines. These 60 launchers have been excluded from the U.S.S.R. strategic forces projections after mid-1972 since they are not considered "strategic missile forces" under the terms of the Interim Agreement. Instead, they are included in the Soviet "theater nuclear forces" after that date.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Strategic Bomber Forces

Shown on Chart 7 are the U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic bomber forces projected through mid-1974. In each of my

past three military posture statements, I have reported to you on the progressive development of a new variable-geometry wing, supersonic bomber by the Soviet Union.

Throughout the development of this new Backfire bomber, there has been some uncertainty over its primary mission. The reason for this uncertainty stems from its design and flight characteristics, which place it in between our FB-111 and B-1. In comparison with U.S. intercontinental bombers, it weighs two and one-half times as much as an FB-111 and is about four-fifths as large as the B-1. Its non-refueled maximum combat radius is about 3,100 nm.

We estimate that the Backfire will be deployed operationally in 1974. Un-refueled, Backfire probably is best suited for a peripheral role. Nevertheless, when deployed with a compatible tanker force, Backfire constitutes a potential threat to the Continental United States. It is expected to replace some of both the current medium and heavy bombers, and to be employed on both peripheral and

Expanding Soviet naval forces provide Russia with expanded opportunities for world influence. Here, Soviet sailors march during a port visit to Massawa, Ethiopia.

intercontinental missions.

Although the older medium bombers of the U.S.S.R. probably do not figure prominently in Soviet plans for an attack on North America, some could be used on two-way missions against targets in Canada and Alaska and on one-way missions against other parts of the United States. For this reason, I have projected the total bomber force of the U.S.S.R. on Chart 7.

In terms of just intercontinental bombers, the U.S. now has, and most likely will continue to have, at least into the 1980s, a substantial quantitative lead over the U.S.S.R., even after considering the deployment of a portion of the Backfires in an intercontinental role. As I already have noted, funds are included in this year's budget for additional modification of 80 B-52D bombers to insure

neir continued availability until the B-1 could be capable of entering the force in adequate numbers to allow for B-52D retirement—probably the early 1980s.

The B-1 will begin flight tests late this year. A production decision will be made, after detailed evaluation of the four RDT&E aircraft—probably in late 1976. Under the current planning, the B-1 force could be operational in the early 1980s. The B-1 is the first bomber designed to have both a high pre-launch survivability and a high penetrating capability in a high-threat environment. It also will have a significant stand-off capability for attacking heavily defended targets with the short range attack missile (SRAM). On a comparable mission, it is expected to be able to carry significantly more payload than the B-52 and have a much greater penetration capability. We also believe that it will have important qualitative advantages over the Backfire in range, payload, and penetration capabilities. The B-1 represents a major technological advance over the B-52 and the FB-111, and I strongly recommend your continued support for this extremely important program.

Since the B-1 is not expected to enter the U.S. force until the 1980s, the U.S. intercontinental bomber force will continue to be composed of B-52s and FB-111s through the rest of this decade.

U.S., U.S.S.R. Strategic Offensive Balance

Four general measures have been used to summarize quantitatively the overall strategic offensive balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. These are: numbers of delivery vehicles, megatons, warheads, and throw-weight/payload. It should be understood, of course, that these measures, either singly or collectively, do not provide a complete comparison. There are a number of other factors, primarily qualitative in nature—such as warning, readiness, command and control, pre-launch survivability, accuracy, range, and penetration capability—which also must be borne in mind in assessing the strategic balance. These other factors cannot be reduced to a measurable common denominator suitable for graphic presentation. Some of the more significant factors in regard to individual weapons systems al-


ready have been discussed in the Report of the Secretary of Defense and in this statement. Other factors will be addressed later in this analysis.

The total numbers of operational U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic offensive delivery vehicles, projected through mid-1974, are shown on Chart 8. It should be noted that in this chart, only intercontinental bombers are included and only the operational ICBM launchers and the "operational" ballistic missile submarines are counted.

As can be seen on this chart, the U.S.S.R. has totally eliminated our overwhelming lead in delivery vehicles and now has surpassed us by over 100 operational delivery vehicles. This U.S.S.R. quantitative advantage over the U.S. is not expected to widen much farther over the next five years primarily

as a result of SAL constraints. Moreover, the extensive modernization program of the Soviet Union will keep the exact number of operational ICBM launchers and deployable SLBMs in constant flux, but relatively level, as new construction is completed, old launchers are converted, and submarines are overhauled.

Ten years ago, the U.S. had five times the available megatonnage as the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. has taken over the lead in strategic offensive megatons, and now far surpasses us in this measure of the strategic balance. The sharp drop in U.S. megatons from 1966 to 1970 reflects the reduction in heavy bombers and the substitution of smaller-yield for higher-yield weapons during that period. The decline, thereafter, reflects the substitution of lower-yield MIRVs for



higher-yield single RVs in our strategic missiles.

The U.S. is expected to maintain its substantial and significant lead over the U.S.S.R. in numbers of strategic offensive warheads and bombs. If the U.S.S.R. pursues a rapid modernization effort, this U.S. advantage could be greatly diminished, but not eliminated, over the next five or six years. On the other hand, if a slow modernization effort is pursued by the U.S.S.R., the U.S. lead probably will remain relatively constant and will continue to be very large at least during the next few years.

The U.S.S.R. has a distinct and demonstrable advantage in missile throw-weight, but the U.S. has a major advantage in bomber payload. The throw-weight advantage of the Soviet Union has been reflected in its large megatonnage lead. As the U.S.S.R. develops its new family of ICBMs with their larger throw-weight and MIRVs, this increased throw-weight advantage also will be reflected in the number of warheads as well as in large total megatonnage. Thus, the gross advantage in throw-weight gives the U.S.S.R. the potential eventually to overcome the only remaining quantitative missile lead under these criteria. The U.S., however, should continue to retain a substantial edge in bomber payload.

Strategic Defense Systems

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic defensive initiatives are displayed on Chart 9. These ongoing efforts will have far less impact on the strategic balance in the immediate years ahead than the strategic offensive initiatives. In fact, the significance of this chart is more related to what it doesn't show than to what it does. There are several reasons for this apparent restraint on both sides, but the primary limitation is the constraining influence of the ABM Treaty between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

The ABM Treaty prohibits a nationwide ABM defense and places strict and substantially equivalent controls on ABM launchers, missiles, and associated radars. Under these limitations, the U.S. currently is proceeding with the deployment of Spartan and Sprint ABM missiles at only one location—Grand Forks, North Dakota—and is continuing research and prototype development of the advanced Site Defense System. The U.S.S.R. has

an operational Galosh ABM system around Moscow, with limited capabilities, and is doing research and development work on two new ABM systems.

Turning to air defense, the Soviet Union already has in being an extensive nationwide system employing surveillance, warning, and control systems, a variety of surface-to-air missiles, and a very large interceptor force. The Foxbat, now designated the MIG-25, adds a major capability to the Soviet air defense force. It is a Mach-3 all-weather interceptor and carries a new air-to-air missile. Since the optimum performance of the Foxbat seems to be at high altitudes, we believe that at least one of its primary roles will be against high-altitude, high-speed attackers, such as air-to-surface missiles.

Although the U.S. has no new strategic interceptors, the introduction of the F-14—being developed for fleet air defense—and the F-15—being developed as an advanced air superiority tactical fighter—will improve significantly the overall air superiority capabilities of U.S. general purpose forces. Either or both of these aircraft also could be employed by strategic air defense units. Similarly, the U.S. austere SAM-D program, which is being developed primarily to provide air defense for the Army in the field in the 1980s, could be effective in a strategic defense role, if so assigned.

The U.S. air defense system, even at its peak, was never comparable in size to the one deployed in the Soviet Union. Based on our overall priorities within a constrained budget, primary emphasis in U.S. air defense is now being placed on surveillance, control of air space, and providing warning of a bomber attack. There are clear risks involved in reducing our capability to limit a potential adversary's ability to employ manned bombers and cruise missiles against the U.S. However, improvement of U.S. air defense surveillance and control capabilities should, in the future, reduce those risks somewhat, since the limited air defense force assets and available general purpose augmentation forces then could be employed with greater effectiveness.

In the meantime, U.S. initiatives in strategic defenses are limited to new technology in early warning and command and control. In addition, we are retaining the options, as mentioned, to convert

new general purpose force interceptors and the SAM-D to strategic defense at a later date. Funds for procurement of the first U.S. initiative listed—SLBM Warning Radar—were rejected last year by the Congress because of a belief that "our present warning systems are adequate." A study of these systems has been initiated by the House Appropriations Committee "in order to adequately evaluate future requests of this nature from all the Services." I welcome this study because I have been convinced by several Joint Chiefs of Staff/Department of Defense studies and reviews that our SLBM warning systems are not adequate, particularly in light of the deployment of the Soviet 4,200 nm SS-N-8 SLBM.

The over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radar system is being developed by the U.S. to provide long-range surveillance, detection, and warning of aircraft from the surface to the ionosphere. Although a production decision has not as yet been made, it could be operational by the early 1980s. AWACS, the last U.S. initiative listed, stands for airborne warning and control system. This system consists of a new all-altitude surveillance radar with associated data processing and command and control equipment installed in a Boeing 707 airframe. By mid-1977, it should provide significantly improved surveillance capabilities with respect to radar detection, active and passive tracking of airborne objects, identification of aircraft, and interceptor control for our tactical and strategic defense air forces.

The U.S.S.R. is continuing its research and development of over-the-horizon (OTH) radar. Finally, the U.S.S.R. has a modified transport aircraft, called the Moss, which has been utilized in airborne warning and control since 1968. No new U.S.S.R. AWACS-type development has been noted.

U.S., U.S.S.R. Strategic Defensive Forces

The Galosh ABM system deployed around Moscow consists of four complexes; each with two Try Add engagement radar sites (one large target tracking radar, and two smaller interceptor tracking and guidance radars, per site), plus 16 Galosh missile launchers—for a total of eight Try Add radar sites and 64 operational launchers. (The ABM Treaty

US AND USSR OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE DELIVERY VEHICLES

(ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBERS)




CHART NO 8

SIGNIFICANT US & USSR INITIATIVES STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS




CHART NO 9

authorizes the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to deploy up to 100 ABM missiles on launchers for the defense of the national capital and 100 more for the defense of an ICBM area.)

Target acquisition and tracking are provided by two large, phased-array Dog House regional radars near Moscow. In addition, there are large, high-powered, phased-array Hen House early warning radars deployed around the periphery of the Soviet Union. The deployment of additional early warning radars is not prohibited by the ABM Treaty, provided the radars are deployed along the periphery of the national territory and are oriented outward.

Early in 1971, following a three-year lapse, new construction activity was begun at three previously abandoned ABM complexes near Moscow. Although the ultimate mission for these new facilities is not clear, we still believe the Soviet Union will complete the deployment of the Moscow ABM defenses up to the Treaty limit—six ABM radar complexes and 36 additional ABM launchers. Such deployment is expected to take place during the latter part of this decade. In this regard, Soviet ABM test firings continued during 1973. As already noted, it is postulated that two new systems are under development.

With regard to the U.S. ABM program, we now plan to complete the Grand Forks site with 100 missiles on launchers, a missile site radar, and a perimeter acquisition radar. This site is expected to be operationally ready by mid-1975.

As a hedge against the emergence of new threats which could gravely jeopardize our national safety, we plan to continue the development of the prototype of the Site Defense system through FY 1975 towards the demonstration in 1977 of an improved capability to defend our Minuteman force in the 1980s. Research also will be continued on new technological approaches to even more advanced ABM systems.

The strategic situation is still fraught with many uncertainties, particularly in light of the ICBM-MIRV development of the Soviet Union. It is only prudent, therefore, that we continue our efforts to advance our ABM technology to the full extent permitted by the treaty and retain the option to deploy a more advanced ABM system for the defense of the National Command Authorities or to

deploy a more extensive system should the ABM Treaty be abrogated for any reason.

As previously mentioned, the deployment of the long-range SS-N-8 SLBM has enlarged greatly the ocean areas from which an SLBM attack against the United States can be launched. Some of these areas are beyond the coverage of all of our existing SLBM detection systems. The highly reliable phased-array radar system being requested will provide the long-range detection and tracking capability required to insure adequate warning of an SLBM attack from these remote areas. It also will complement our satellite coverage in other areas. This is required because the satellite is blanked out under certain predictable solar conditions, thus allowing an SLBM to be launched without warning. Additionally, it is essential that the National Command Authorities be provided the highly credible warning data that can be obtained only with detection by more than a single physical phenomenon.

Our current projections of the U.S. air defense force have declined while the U.S.S.R. air defense forces are essentially the same as those I presented here last year. As a result of budget decisions, primary emphasis is being placed on airspace surveillance and peacetime control and warning of a bomber attack. AWACS development funding has been transferred to general purpose forces, although the AWACS still will be required to fulfill strategic, as well as tactical, missions. All existing Continental United States (CONUS) strategic air defense surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) will be phased out of operation by the end of FY 1974, although deactivation will not be completed until FY 1975.

All F-102 interceptors will be phased out by mid-1976, but 242 F-106s and 124 F-101s will be retained at least through mid-1976. Pending a review on the retention of the F-101s, this force could be maintained at about that level through the 1970s. As I indicated earlier, in crisis situations general purpose

A Soviet Navy officer conducts a tour of the Soviet "Kotlin" class destroyer Skritorii for members of the U.S. Navy while both units were in port at Mas-sawa, Ethiopia. The tour was conducted during the annual Ethiopian Navy Days celebration.



fighters and SAMs could augment CONUS defenses; but, of course, these are the same forces that frequently are deployed elsewhere in a crisis. Thus, the Soviet Union's commanding lead over the United States in numbers of air defense radar sites, command and control facilities, surface-to-air missile launchers, and interceptor aircraft is expected to increase.


The first element of the modernized U.S. air defense warning and control system—the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft—will become operational in FY 1977. The second element—the over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radars—could become operational in FY 1980. As I have already noted, the U.S. is retaining the option of utilizing new general purpose force developments, such as the F-14, F-15, and SAM-D, in strategic defense roles, should this become desirable at a later date.

Shown on the right side of Chart 10 are the U.S. and U.S.S.R. home defense interceptor forces projected through mid-1974. The reductions planned in U.S. interceptor forces already have been noted. The Soviet force, although declining slowly in numbers, is being steadily modernized. By mid-1974, the four newest interceptors—Firebar (YAK-28), Fiddler, Flagon-A (SU-15), and Foxbat (MIG-25)—will account for about 50 percent of the force, while the two oldest interceptors—Fresco (MIG-17) and Farmer (MIG-19)—will account for only 25 percent. The Fishpot (SU-9/SU-11), introduced in 1959, accounts for the remaining 25 percent. The Flashlight (YAK-25) was phased out during the past year.


By the late 1970s, the Soviet Union may have interceptors with a look-down/shoot-down/radar/missile system, and may deploy a new AWACS with a look-down capability over land, as well as water. Such an interceptor/AWACS force could pose a formidable threat to our bombers. While we have no direct evidence of the existence of either system, we are hedging against this contingency with the development of a strategic cruise missile and electronic counter-measures, should these threats to our retaliatory forces materialize.

Shown on the left side of Chart 10 are the U.S. and U.S.S.R. home defense surface-to-air missile (SAM) forces.

US AND USSR STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES



SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE LAUNCHERS



INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT

CHART NO 10

The number of operational U.S. strategic SAM launchers will decline to zero at the end of FY 1974.

There was a slight decrease in the Soviet strategic SAM force during the past year; continued deactivation of SA-2 sites exceeded newly activated SA-3 and SA-5 sites. The SA-3 is a low-altitude system while the SA-5 provides long-range, high-altitude defense.

P.R.C. Strategic Forces

The strategic offensive programs of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), when compared with the Soviet Union and the United States, represent a relatively small-scale, but well-conceived, effort. The overall strategic offensive capability of the P.R.C., however, is steadily growing and must be taken seriously even by the superpowers. The deliberate, but unhurried, pace of the P.R.C. strategic offensive programs reflects the comparatively small number of technically qualified personnel working on these programs, the relatively limited resources available, and finally, the influence of long-range goals, rather than short-term objectives.

As indicated last year, a substantial expansion of nuclear production facilities is underway in the P.R.C. For this reason, we estimate that the Chinese stockpile of nuclear weapons will be expanded more rapidly in the years ahead.

Last year, I outlined the four different P.R.C. strategic land-based missile programs and indicated that both a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM)

and an IRBM system may have been deployed. This deployment can now be confirmed. The third system, a limited-range ICBM, is still not believed to be operational; however, it could be deployed later this year. Although capable of reaching deep into the Soviet Union, this missile will not be able to reach the Continental United States (except for the western part of Alaska).

The fourth P.R.C. system, a full-range ICBM, has not progressed as rapidly as we estimated last year. This large missile is in the same class as the U.S. Titan and the Soviet SS-9. It probably will not be operational until 1976 or 1977.

Forecasting the rate of progress of the P.R.C. SLBM program has proven to be a very difficult task. We believe that the P.R.C. is determined to develop a submarine-launched ballistic missile and a modern ballistic missile submarine; however, estimates of the operational dates for an SLBM and a new submarine have been, in the past, overly optimistic.

The P.R.C. has one Soviet-type Golf-class diesel-powered missile-launching submarine, which it built during the early 1960s; but to our knowledge, it has never been equipped with missiles. If the P.R.C. is indeed developing an SLBM, it is reasonable to assume that this submarine will be used as the test platform. No other operational P.R.C. ballistic missile submarines are known to us; however, we cannot preclude the possibility that one or more may be under construction. In any event, we believe that it will be at least 1977 before such a system could become operational.

Turning to the strategic defensive forces, we expect the P.R.C. to develop a modern all-weather interceptor during the next few years. As to the P.R.C. surface-to-air defense system, we believe it is capable of providing only a limited point defense of key urban and industrial areas, military installations, and advanced weapons complexes. Although this system has undergone significant upgrading in the past four years, it still has major weaknesses. The P.R.C. has only one operational SAM system, basically a copy of the U.S.S.R. SA-2 system. We estimate that the P.R.C., by mid-1973, had deployed several hundred SAM launchers and that this deployment will continue to increase during the next few years.



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Overall U.S. and U.S.S.R. Strategic Balance

The overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union is in a state of dynamic equilibrium or in more familiar terms—relative strategic parity. The Soviet Union has, however, generated a momentum in new strategic offensive programs which, in the absence of successful negotiations or increased strategic offensive programs of our own, could easily upset this balance in the future. The U.S.S.R. holds a significant numerical and throw-weight advantage in missiles, but the U.S. today enjoys an equally significant counterbalance in areas of key qualitative importance—e.g., missile accuracy, MIRVs, submarine quietness, and underwater technology. Deployment of the 4,200 nm SS-N-8 has given the U.S.S.R. a temporary qualitative advantage.

The Soviet Union has developed a new supersonic bomber with intercontinental capabilities, but the United States will continue to retain, for a number of years, a significant advantage in the number of intercontinental bombers and in bomber payload. The U.S. main-

tains a significant advantage in ABM technology, but the U.S.S.R. has an operational ABM system and is continuing its research and development on new systems. The Soviet Union has an enormous advantage in air defense, but the U.S. currently maintains the technological and operational capability to penetrate these defenses, should it become necessary to do so.

The advantages in the strategic balance which the United States holds over the Soviet Union are primarily qualitative in nature and are in areas of high technology. For example, our radar technology is still superior to that of the Soviet Union. There are several other areas that could be mentioned, but these technological advantages are transitory at best and are partially offset by the larger warhead yields and missile throw-weight of the U.S.S.R. This Soviet throw-weight advantage is a key element because it facilitates the large-scale MIRV development, already underway at a rapid rate.

These examples are illustrative of the U.S. qualitative technological lead over the Soviet Union in areas impacting on the strategic balance. The Interim Agreement does not constrain either the Soviet Union or the United States from pursuing new technology nor does it limit modernization of strategic systems as long as the quantitative restraints are observed and the size of the ICBM silo launchers are not increased significantly. The relative military strategic balance is

currently in equilibrium, but dynamic and fragile. The essential equivalency necessary to the preservation of peace is, therefore, neither self-perpetuating nor permanent.

It was for this reason that prior to the consideration of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement by the Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enumerated the following three assurances which we regard as essential if the United States is to guard against degradation of its national security posture:

Assurance I—"A Broad Range of Intelligence Capabilities and Operations to Verify Soviet Compliance in a Strategic Arms Limitation Environment."

Assurance II—"Aggressive Improvements and Modernization Programs."

Assurance III—"Vigorous Research and Development Programs."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain firmly committed to these three assurances which are supported in the FY 1975 Defense Budget and the supplemental request for FY 1974. Assurances II and III are particularly pertinent to this discussion. If we fail to maintain weapons systems technological superiority or if we fail to maximize our strategic offensive capabilities within the constraints of our international obligations, we will find that the qualitative advantages we now hold will have evaporated and that the United States will be placed in a position of strategic inferiority, thereby risking both peace and freedom.

An artist's concept of the new Soviet aircraft carrier which is under construction. It is expected to be more than 900 feet long and will have some 45,000-ton displacement. In the background is the 405-foot long "Krivak" class guided missile destroyer.



Section III. - U.S. POLICY

The following article is an extract of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's annual report to Congress for FY 76 and FY 77.

The strategic nuclear forces are the foundation of our military strength. Given our primary objective of deterring attack on ourselves and our allies, it is essential that we remain on equal footing with the Soviet Union in regard to these forces. The Vladivostok understanding not only clearly establishes the principle of equality by setting equal numerical ceilings on the strategic offensive forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, but also provides a point of departure from which we can work toward equitable reductions in the two forces. That is the direction in which we propose to go, once the Vladivostok understanding has been negotiated into treaty form.

Despite its importance, the Vladivostok understanding still does not relieve us of the burden of unilateral planning. Within the ceilings set by the agreement, we must continue to determine what specific objectives we want our strategic forces to serve and what constitutes the most efficient and effective mix of forces for those purposes.

A. THE BASIS FOR THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

It should be clear that deterrence must depend on a capability to respond effectively against the enemy, even after absorbing a first strike. A prospective opponent must, therefore, be aware of that capability, i.e., the ability of our forces to survive his attack and penetrate to their targets. Beyond that, he must be persuaded that in the face of a sufficient provocation, we will actually execute the retaliatory attacks. And we, in turn, must be fully prepared both physically and psychologically to launch those attacks; otherwise the effectiveness of the deterrent will be undermined.

While we tend to talk of deterrence as though it were in continuous operation, it is doubtful that the leaders of the great nuclear powers ask themselves on a daily basis whether they feel deterred. It is only in circumstances of confrontation and crisis that the credibility of the deterrent comes under test; at that point, what may have seemed like a plausible threat under normal conditions may appear grossly inadequate or inappropriate to the situation at hand. For better or for worse, the scientist in the lecture hall who announces that, in response to a Soviet attack on our nuclear forces, we should destroy a hundred Soviet cities and their populations, is unlikely to implement that threat should the situation arise. In addition, theorizing about these matters tends to be too abstract, and does not easily capture the agonizing nature and complex context of these fateful decisions, should they ever arise.

(Reproduced from Department of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report FY 1976 and 1977, February 5, 1975, pp. II-1 through II-11.)

Since we have been fortunate enough never to have undergone such an experience in the thirty years of the nuclear age, the reaction of the policymaker in the face of such an attack cannot be foretold. But he and his advisers will have been exposed to a number of paper wars -- i.e., hypothetical cases in which deterrence has collapsed and our opponent has launched some kind of a nuclear attack. They will know from these exercises that in many circumstances the most suicidal course for the United States -- and hence the least credible course -- would be to strike the population in the opponent's cities. Thus, they quickly come to understand the desirability of being able to retaliate in other ways than by a massive attack against cities.

While the exercises may be hypothetical, the problem is not. The Soviet Union, for example, now deploys a strategic nuclear capability that goes far beyond anything required by the theories of minimum or finite deterrence. Her peripheral attack forces are such as to be able to take under attack every significant target in Western Europe. Her central strategic systems are sufficiently large in number so that she could strike at a substantial number of military targets in the United States, and elsewhere in the world, and still withhold a very large force whose future use we would have to consider in responding.

In addition, the People's Republic of China is slowly but steadily developing a strategic attack force of her own. And, as a result of the Indian nuclear detonation, we are once more aware that the danger of nuclear proliferation is still with us.

Another problem is the difficulty faced by our European and Asian allies. Most of them have no nuclear capabilities; those who do are dwarfed by the immensity of the Soviet strategic and peripheral nuclear attack forces. They still must look to the United States, as they have for thirty years, for some assurance that they cannot be blackmailed into submission by nuclear threats.

The problem is complicated still further by the range of nuclear contingencies that could arise. For planning purposes we have been conditioned to assume as the only contingency a massive surprise attack which comes, usually without motive or warning, as a bolt-out-of-the-blue. The case undoubtedly has its uses, but I would speculate that other contingencies are much more likely. The United States and the Soviet Union have exercised great care in the deployment and control of their nuclear weapons. Other nations may not do as well, and the concern with accidents and unauthorized acts may be with us again. Despite the increasingly stringent measures that we are taking, we cannot totally preclude the seizure or theft of a nuclear weapon and the need for countermeasures. In short, we face a wide range of possible actions involving nuclear weapons, and no single response is appropriate to them all.

There is also the ever present possibility that a conventional conflict might escalate into a tactical or even strategic use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, one of the minor ironies of recent polemics against current defense spending is that the polemicists manage to argue more or less simultaneously that:

- the nuclear threshold must be kept high;
- nuclear options will lower the nuclear threshold;
- long-war conventional capabilities (for antisubmarine warfare, as one example) are unnecessary because conventional conflicts either will be short or will somehow turn nuclear.

I will not attempt to untangle the peculiar logic of this particular position. But it should be evident that the problems on our agenda, both today and in the future, make some of the earlier views of nuclear deterrence totally obsolete. Clearly, our requirements in this realm are for strategic forces capable of providing more than the simple response of a limited or wholesale destruction of cities.

This is not to say that a highly survivable force which can be withheld for substantial periods of time, if need be, and targeted against an enemy's major economic and political assets is irrelevant. Most of us can agree on the need for such a force to serve, at a minimum, as a deterrent to attacks on the cities of the United States and its allies. But to treat such a reserve force as an all-purpose deterrent, as a sovereign remedy for the problems we face, would be the height of folly. To threaten to blow up all of an opponent's cities, short of an attack on our cities, is hardly an acceptable strategy, and in most circumstances the credibility of the threat would be close to zero, especially against a nation which could retaliate against our cities in kind. Granting the need for such a withheld force in order to deter coercive attacks against our cities, we must surely go on to something else if our deterrent is to be credible over a wide range of contingencies.

Last year I pointed out that in addition to such a force, we needed a capability for more limited response options and for rapid retargeting so as to provide the President with the maximum feasible amount of flexibility in a nuclear emergency. In reviewing that requirement, it is worth emphasizing again that:

- Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is capable of a disarming first strike against the other; in fact neither side has a high confidence capability of destroying a large fraction of the other's fixed, hard ICBM silos.
- Neither side, for the foreseeable future, is likely to acquire a disarming first strike capability against the other, even if the fixed, hard ICBM forces become more vulnerable in the 1980s.

-- Because of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, neither side can deploy a combination of counterforce and damage-limiting capabilities that will have any serious prospect of success; barring carelessness, each side should be able to count on large surviving forces that it can use or withhold for substantial periods of time.

In these circumstances, one may ask, has nuclear strategy not reached a dead-end? As far as the massive attacks that preoccupied us in the 1960s are concerned, that may well be the case. Unfortunately, however, there remain a number of more limited contingencies that could arise and that we should be prepared to deter. I have already mentioned the danger of accidents and unauthorized acts. Our allies have good grounds for asking how we would respond to threats against them from intermediate and variable range nuclear systems. And we cannot rule out the possibility that a desperate or reckless enemy might engage in a nuclear "shot-across-the-bow" by firing at one or more of our military installations.

There is, moreover, another contingency about which we must remain concerned. Since both we and the Soviet Union are investing so much of our capability for flexible and controlled responses in our ICBM forces, these forces could become tempting targets, assuming that one or both sides acquire much more substantial hard-target kill capabilities than they currently possess. If one side could remove the other's capability for flexible and controlled responses, he might find ways of exercising coercion and extracting concessions without triggering the final holocaust.

I mention these contingencies -- and no doubt there are others -- for several reasons. First, we have to assume that, despite the appearance of strategic nuclear stalemate, others continue to explore their strategic and tactical possibilities just as they do their technological opportunities. Second, while many of the contingencies may seem bizarre and of extraordinarily low probability, the consequences of their occurrence could prove catastrophic.

Accordingly, I believe that it is our duty to drive the probability of these contingencies even lower by developing and displaying the capability and the doctrine of flexible strategic response. No potential enemy should believe that we are so rigid, so lacking in capability, or so fearful of the consequences that we cannot respond appropriately (according to our best interests) to any nuclear provocation on his part.

The Command Data Buffer System will help ensure this flexibility by substantially improving our capacity for rapid retargeting of the Minuteman force. As national policy, we shall continue to acquire and be prepared to implement a number of more limited response options. No opponent should think that he could fire at some of our Minuteman

or SAC bases without being subjected to, at the very least, a response in kind. No opponent should believe that he could attack other U.S. targets of military or economic value without finding similar or other appropriate targets in his own homeland under attack. No opponent should believe that he could blackmail our allies without risking his very capability for blackmail. Above all, no opponent should entertain the thought that we will permit him to remove our capability for flexible strategic response.

As I pointed out last year, the flexibility that we are developing does not require any major change in the strategic capability that we now deploy. Some modifications in command, control, and communications are necessary and are underway. I believe that our very modest civil defense program should continue; it makes clear to a prospective opponent contemplating a limited strike that, since we can protect our citizens against fallout, we have a credible choice between an all-out response and no response at all.

In addition, I believe that our response options would be enhanced by increased accuracy and a greater flexibility in the yields of the nuclear weapons available to us. In some circumstances, we might wish to retaliate against non-collocated, small soft targets, or facilities near large population centers; high accuracy and a low-yield, air-burst weapon would be the most appropriate combination for those targets. In other cases, we might wish to respond with attacks on a limited number of hard targets such as ICBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs. The desired combination for these latter targets, especially as long as we have to depend on all-inertial guidance systems, is high accuracy and a higher-yield warhead than we now deploy.

Since any discussion of hard-target kill capability inevitably arouses controversy, I must stress that we are not now seeking to develop the capability to destroy the Soviet ICBM force. We have, as I pointed out last year, a limited hard-target kill capability in our missile forces at the present time, as do the Soviets. Our own capability against ICBMs is modest -- partly because our missiles lack the proper combination of warhead yield and accuracy, and partly because of the complications introduced by the phenomenon known as fratricide. I believe that we should improve our hard-target kill capability so as to have higher confidence of executing limited hard-target attacks. To destroy all of the very hard components of the Soviet ICBM force that are now being constructed or upgraded would require not only major qualitative improvements on our part, but also a large number of high-yield and very accurate reentry vehicles. I am not proposing any such deployment programs here.

A number of other and more general concerns about our response options have arisen during the last year, and I believe that they deserve serious consideration. Accordingly, I will try to address the most salient issues.

One of the most serious allegations is that, with limited response options, we are promoting warfighting rather than deterrence. But such a charge stems, in fact, from an erroneous conception of deterrence. This Administration is no less interested in deterrence than its critics; we recognize that the United States has more to lose from a nuclear war than any other country. But we also believe that our conceptions of deterrence must adapt to the large and growing capabilities of our rivals. Our objective remains deterrence, but modern deterrence across the spectrum of the nuclear threat. And that requires us to be prepared with credible responses to a variety of contingencies. Considering all the risks associated with the use of nuclear weapons, this kind of preparation does not in any way imply an effort to substitute limited nuclear response options for other instruments of military power. It is intended to make nuclear war of any kind less, not more, likely. I cannot help but add, in this connection, that nobody suggests that contingency plans, increased accuracy, or the avoidance of attacks on cities makes either non-nuclear or tactical nuclear war more probable. Why, then, should they make strategic nuclear war more probable?

A somewhat related charge is that, however good our intentions, limited response options will result in a lowering of the nuclear threshold. The fact is, as I pointed out last year, that we have had nuclear options for more than twenty years without their having notably affected the probability of nuclear war. Indeed, to believe that the development of contingency plans (which, after all, is what the search for options is all about) will increase the probability of nuclear use is to underestimate seriously the gravity of the decision to go to war, especially nuclear war. What is more, to the extent that concern about the nuclear threshold is more than hypothetical, the most effective way of keeping the threshold high is to increase the effectiveness and readiness of our non-nuclear forces. History, I believe, will show that on those rare occasions when the use of nuclear weapons was seriously considered in the past thirty years, it was because of the impression that adequate conventional forces were not available to achieve the desired objectives.

Another allegation (not quite compatible with the first two) is that limited response options are illusory because any nuclear exchange would rapidly escalate and that its results, even if the war were confined to military targets, would be indistinguishable from attacks on cities. The implication of this argument is that limited response options are worthless and harmful and that we should bow at least to the rhetoric and the force requirements of minimum deterrence.

Certainly it would be foolhardy to preclude the possibility that a nuclear conflict could escalate to cover a wide range of targets, which is one more reason why limited response options are unlikely to lower the nuclear threshold. But I doubt that any responsible

policymaker would deliberately want to ensure escalation, and forego the chance for an early end to a conflict, by refusing to consider and plan for responses other than immediate, large-scale attacks on cities. Surely, even if there is only a small probability that limited response options would deter an attack or bring a nuclear war to a rapid conclusion, without large-scale damage to cities, it is a probability which, for the sake of our citizens, we should not foreclose.

Furthermore, all of the evidence available to us suggests that very limited and quickly terminated nuclear exchanges could result in fatalities and casualties much lower than from some of the traditional conflicts we have experienced. And even if a nuclear exchange were to expand to all strategic nuclear targets in the United States, we would probably suffer at least 100 million fewer fatalities than if our cities were attacked. Approximately similar results would hold true for the Soviet Union as well.

None of this is to argue that a strategy of limited response options is a panacea, or that it solves all the problems that we face in this realm, any more than previous strategies of deterrence have done. However, I believe that the Soviet leaders understand quite clearly why we have adopted this strategy in an era of approximate mutual deterrence, and I see no evidence that they regard as destabilizing these efforts to strengthen our own deterrent. Accordingly, I continue to consider the capability for limited response options as one of the essential requirements of deterrence under current conditions.

An equally essential requirement of deterrence is parity with the Soviet Union in strategic offensive forces, as perceived by friend and foe alike. Not only does Public Law 92-448 (the Jackson Amendment) require us to achieve equality with the USSR in central strategic system but such equality is also important for symbolic purposes, in large part because the strategic offensive forces have come to be seen by many -- however, regrettably -- as important to the status and stature of a major power. Clearly the Soviet Union places a very high value on achieving parity, at the very least, with the United States.

What is perhaps even more important, the lack of equality can become a source of serious diplomatic and military miscalculation. Opponents may feel that they can exploit a favorable imbalance by means of political pressure, as Hitler did so skillfully in the 1930s, particularly with Neville Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden. Friends may believe that a willingness on our part to accept less than equality indicates a lack of resolve to uphold our end of the competition and a certain deficiency in staying power. Our own citizens may doubt our capacity to guard the nation's interests.

Fortunately, the question of perceptions may to a large extent have been resolved by the understanding at Vladivostok, which so firmly establishes the principle of equality between the United States and the Soviet Union in central strategic systems. Assuming that the Soviet leaders exhibit restraint in their application of the agreement's principles, we are prepared to exercise restraint as well. However, until we obtain solid evidence of Soviet restraint, we shall plan for deployment of approximately 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,320 MIRVed missiles. How we proceed on these accounts will depend essentially on the actions of the Soviet Union. They currently have the initiative, and it is up to them to decide how much additional effort the two sides should put into these programs. In making their decision, they should remember that the tortoise won because the hare did not try very hard very often. This hare may be different.

A further requirement of deterrence that I should stress again is what has been called essential equivalence. Let me elaborate on what I mean by that term. Despite the accomplishments of the Vladivostok understanding and the further agreements that might be reached in the future, we will continue to face many uncertainties about the long-term evolution of the strategic forces -- and about which technologies and which components of these forces will be considered most important. Under the circumstances, I believe that it would be a mistake to allow any major asymmetry to develop between the United States and the Soviet Union in the basic technological and other factors that shape force effectiveness.

We must continue to think flexibly about the strategic forces and their deterrent functions. We must be sure to keep pace with the Soviet Union in the design of new offensive and defensive systems, in such areas as accuracy and reliability, and, if necessary, in throw-weight and its management. We may need to maintain an offsetting advantage in some areas to compensate for Soviet advantages in others. For example, the United States should seek to stay ahead in accuracy to offset the large and apparently growing Soviet advantage in throw-weight. I should stress in this latter connection that the Soviet Union has made more rapid strides in accuracy than is generally appreciated and has shown an intense interest in various applications of terminal guidance.

Progress by both sides in this latter area of technology will take time. Meanwhile, we in the United States must accept the fact that while our test-range accuracies with all-inertial guidance systems have shown marked improvement over the years, there remain considerable uncertainties about the extent to which accuracies will degrade on operational trajectories, especially since the world is not a perfect sphere. The Soviets face comparable uncertainties, but can compensate to an important degree for degradations in accuracy by using the high yields that the large throw-weights of

their missiles permit. We are in a less advantageous position in this regard because of the severe constraints on our own missile throw-weights. Accordingly, I believe that we should both increase the yield-to-weight ratio of our warheads and -- regardless of past preferences -- be prepared to expand the throw-weight of our missiles, however we may decide to base them in the future.

Despite these concerns for the future, we continue to deploy a highly effective second-strike strategic force. As matters now stand, we are able to fulfill the four requirements of deterrence that I have articulated in the first section of this Report. We currently possess:

- A powerful and survivable force capable of being withheld for a substantial period of time;
- A capability for limited response options, including some precision damage-avoidance and hard-target kill capability and a modest ability to provide our citizens with protection from radioactive fallout;
- Perceived equality with the Soviet Union, even though our forces differ from hers in certain important respects;
- Momentum in our program of strategic initiatives, to maintain essential long-term equivalence with the USSR and, to the extent necessary, with the PRC.

Since we do not seek a disarming first strike capability against the Soviet Union, there is no reason why she cannot have a capability comparable to ours, thus ensuring the mutual deterrence that is the foundation of equality, respect, and stability.

Despite these hopes and prospects, there remain two major problems on the horizon against which it is particularly important that we carry insurance. The first is that the new generation of Soviet ICBMs, if fully deployed, would carry a throw-weight exceeding that of the MINUTEMAN force by a factor of as much as five or six. The second problem is that this throw-weight, combined with several thousand high-yield MIRVs and accuracies that are well within the reach of the Soviets by the early 1980s, could come to jeopardize the survival of our fixed-based ICBM silos.

While such a development would not give the Soviet Union anything approximating a disarming first strike capability, it would:

- bring into question our ability to deter limited and selective attacks;

- give the Soviets a capability for damage and disruption that we ourselves would lack;
- cause precisely the fears and suspicions that our arms control efforts have been and are designed to dispel.

Here, in fact, is a case where unilateral planning, as I indicated earlier, might have to support and supplement our arms control programs.

We cannot expect, in all candor, that arms control agreements -- any more than domestic laws -- will solve all problems or close all loopholes. Those who hold such high expectations are doomed to disappointment. Where the possibility of loopholes exists, we should not insist on perfection as the price of agreement. Rather we should attempt to close the loopholes, by further negotiation if possible, by unilateral action if necessary.

You will recall in this connection, when I submitted a program of strategic initiatives last year, that I did so on three grounds. First, great uncertainty then existed as to the nature of any successor to the Interim Offensive Agreement that we might achieve. Second, essential equivalence would constitute a fundamental criterion in the future design of our strategic offensive forces. And third, how far we would proceed within these initiatives should depend on the evolution and pace of the ongoing and maturing Soviet strategic programs.

As a result of the understanding at Vladivostok, there now are fewer uncertainties about the shape of a successor to the Interim Offensive Agreement. But the other reasons for continuing with our program of strategic initiatives remain strong.

Until the Soviets decide to make a more stable distribution of their strategic offensive resources, we must take account of the heavy emphasis that they are giving to their ICBM force. Accordingly, we should keep open the option to replace some or all of the force with a larger throw-weight, less vulnerable system. We should continue with our accuracy improvement programs, whether to acquire a more efficient hard-target kill capability or to improve our overall effectiveness against soft point targets. Pending ratification of a threshold nuclear test ban, we should also diversify our warhead prototypes -- particularly with the improvement of yield-to-weight ratios -- so that we can exercise options in the future on how we load our missiles and bombers. It does not follow, for example, that more MIRVs are always better or that we might not want single-warhead replacements for the current POSEIDON missile and its successors. Finally, I believe that we must continue to explore the potentiality of long-range cruise missiles, evaluate the costs and performance of smaller ballistic missile submarines,

and assess the practicality of developing an aircraft that can convert from a transport to a tanker.

With these initiatives, and the other programs that I shall discuss in detail later in this section, I am confident that we can maintain a highly credible, modern, second-strike strategic deterrent within the framework of the Vladivostok understanding and any future SALT agreements. Without them, I can give no such assurance.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE OPTIONS

by G. W. Rathjens

IN joining the debate about strategic arms doctrine that has come into focus with Secretary Schlesinger's defense of the fiscal 1975 defense budget, I do so with two reservations. First, it is questionable whether there is much new to be said about flexible response options and related issues. More fundamentally, I am troubled about joining in a discussion that may be somewhat diversionary. To my mind, the major military threat to our security during the remainder of the century, and particularly in the 1980's, is not likely to be in the United States' or the Soviet Union's use of strategic forces, either politically or militarily, against the other. Rather, it is the probability of war occurring, into which we might be drawn, in which nuclear and possibly other weapons of mass destruction are introduced by third parties. Yet, in discussion of defense issues, nearly all of our attention is focused on the balance between Soviet and American forces and their possible interaction. It is time to recognize that the nuclear proliferation issue may be more serious than Soviet-American differences, and appropriate to remind the reader that any discussion of strategic arms must be carried out with the likelihood of the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities prominently in mind.

THE CASE FOR FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

The questions of counterforce options and flexible response were discussed at length more than a decade ago, and the major arguments, pro and con, have scarcely changed. The renewed interest is in part a reaction to the emphasis during the late 1960's on "assured destruction" as the cornerstone of strategic doctrine. Critics of that concept—former President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger included—believe it would be intolerable for the United States to have no option as a deterrent to a broad range of possible threats other than a massive attack that would destroy Soviet population and industry. The case they, and others, make for greater flexibility in the use of strategic forces is based on three arguments: (1) An assured destruction policy implicitly discounts, to a quite unjustifiable degree, the possibility of an accidental or irrational attack by the

USSR; if such an attack occurs and our response is one of massive retaliation, it will be catastrophic for the people of both nations, and others as well. (2) The threat of such retaliation is of doubtful, and diminishing, credibility as a deterrent to limited Soviet attack, particularly considering that, with the growth in Soviet strategic forces, there would be a virtual certainty of the United States' destruction should it visit such an attack on the USSR. (3) A massive retaliatory attack, whatever the provocation, would be immoral, the more so in that most of those destroyed by it would have had little role in whatever event triggered their destruction.

There is nothing new in the first of these arguments. Nor is there much in the second. Even when the United States had a severalfold advantage in strategic strength by all of the usual measures, it could have been destroyed in any "all-out" nuclear exchange. Yet, the change in relative strength has been a factor in causing an erosion of confidence in the U.S. resolve. There has been increasing doubt that the United States would respond with nuclear or conventional weapons to an attack on its allies or others. Concern has been exacerbated with the realization that the Vietnamese experience has lessened the likelihood that Washington will commit military forces abroad. If there is a stronger case for a broader range of options than could have been made several years ago, it is primarily because of this erosion in confidence, not because growth in Soviet strategic strength would give the USSR an advantage that would make a significant difference once conflict was joined.

To illustrate this last point, consider the scenario Secretary Schlesinger seems to find particularly worrisome—the possibility of conflict developing in which the Soviet Union could use missiles of the kinds it has recently been testing to destroy a large fraction of the U.S. ICBM forces, while the United States lacked similar capabilities. In such a "war fighting" scenario some U.S. missiles would be destroyed as others were launched against Soviet targets, possibly missile silos. At some point, *if we were lucky*, the exchange would stop with a number of U.S. ICBM's destroyed or expended—perhaps nearly all—while the Soviet Union would have expended some of its missiles and probably suffered the destruction of certain other targets. Each side would retain a capability to destroy additional numbers of selected adversary targets or to execute an assured destruction type of attack. However great the degradation in U.S. ICBM strength, the ability of each

power to inflict damage on the other would not have changed much, a consequence of both having had great overkill capabilities to start with.

Turning to the third concern about an assured destruction capability, the morality of threatening what amounts to genocide, there is not much new to be said here either. A number of writers have argued that it is now possible, in the light of technological trends, to maintain deterrence without maintaining a capability to destroy millions of people;¹ and some, notably Donald Brennan, have even seemed to suggest that technology may be moving in such ways that it requires deliberate, and in his view unwise, restraint to prevent evolution in that direction.² To such arguments Wolfgang Panofsky has replied that an assured destruction capability inheres in forces adequate for deterrence—that as long as the United States and the USSR have substantial strategic nuclear forces, each must accept the fact that no matter what doctrine it adopts for the use of its forces, its population will remain at risk because it cannot be sure that its adversary will adopt the same doctrine.³ There is always the question whether maintaining deterrence against the Soviet Union (and for the USSR against the United States) is worthwhile. Most of those who have been writing on strategic arms, including Schlesinger, Iklé and Panofsky, agree that it is, but this is a premise that requires questioning, particularly if, as a price, the likelihood of nuclear proliferation is increased. That question is, however, beyond the scope of this article.

Certainly a case can be made favoring reliance on precisely controllable and limited response capabilities for deterrence over total reliance on the "threat that leaves something to chance," to use Thomas Schelling's phrase⁴—i.e., the threat that at some ill-defined level of hostilities nuclear weapons would be used, at first perhaps in limited numbers, but with a substantial probability of escalation occurring and getting out of control. Three arguments are relevant. First, if the capabilities of the powers are

¹Fred Charles Iklé, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973; Bruce Russett, "A Countercombatant Deterrent? Feasibility, Morality and Arms Control," in Sam C. Sarkesian, editor, *The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment*, Volume II of the Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1972).

²D. G. Brennan, "The Case for Missile Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1969.

³Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, "The Mutual-Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia," *ibid.*, October 1973.

⁴Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 187.

such that at each level on the escalation ladder a threatened nation has available to it a measured, less escalatory response than its adversary, it will presumably have a deterrent that is highly credible. Second, the advantage of a nation's having a broad range of precisely controllable options may be even stronger if it wishes to use them coercively rather than for deterrence, for it is probably less credible to threaten suicide for offensive than for defensive purposes, whereas the measured use of limited nuclear capabilities might be about equally credible in the two contingencies. Third, in comparing alternatives for extending deterrence the possibility of a failure must be considered. If deterrence fails and the rejoinder is a carefully measured response, or even series of responses by each side on an escalating scale, there will be hope of avoiding a total catastrophe; furthermore, the credibility of deterrence with regard to future provocations will probably have been enhanced. With the alternative, i.e., reliance on more or less uncontrollable escalation, which after the fact of provocation would be irrational, catastrophe will result if escalation occurs, and the credibility of deterrence will diminish if it does not—both unattractive outcomes. One has to conclude that a controlled response capability has much to commend it over a threat of a "doomsday" response.

But a "doomsday" response is not the only alternative to moving in the directions suggested by Dr. Schlesinger, and most of his critics are arguing, rather, that we already have enough flexibility in the possible use of our strategic forces. Quite remarkably, many seem to believe that the degree of flexibility we now have is about optimal. They oppose changes that would provide more flexibility, but do not question whether we might have too much. Still others do not dispute that more flexibility would be desirable but object to the suggested direction of movement, especially to improvements in missile accuracy. A few suggest that we have too much flexibility—in particular, they would like to see the President's ability to initiate the United States' use of nuclear weapons limited,⁵ but even they would presumably stop short of arguing for no flexibility at all.

So at issue is whether we should move further in the directions proposed by the Secretary. Clearly, what he wants is a range of options that will enable the United States to respond to any

⁵This has been reflected in proposals, which have gotten nowhere, to require Congressional authorization for *first* use by the United States of nuclear weapons. Under such proposals the President could authorize the use of nuclear weapons in response to use by others without reference to Congress.

provocation with fine tuning, always posing to the USSR the threat of destruction incommensurate with any gains it might hope to realize by its actions; yet our threatened response must not be so great as to be incredible, considering the range of Soviet responses that might be available. Implied is an exceedingly good U.S. command and control system so that escalation does not occur because of miscalculation or unauthorized action by subordinates; ability to deliver weapons of a broad range of yields with high accuracy so that targets can be destroyed with limited collateral damage; and an adequate number of such weapons, so that there will be no point on the escalation scale where the United States could be forced to make a choice between forgoing a response to a plausible Soviet action and initiating an assured destruction type attack.⁶

In considering Schlesinger's proposals for a "flexible options" policy the question is: Can one imagine plausible threats that would be more effectively deterred if we had more flexibility than we now have? We have the possibility of destroying many Soviet military-industrial targets—air bases, naval bases, petroleum refineries and steel mills are examples—with weapons deliverable by missiles with accuracies of half a kilometer or better, and, if with air bursts, with little fallout. This could be done with but a fraction of our strategic force. Moreover, because of the dimensions of such targets, further improvements in accuracy would be of little value in reducing force requirements or, in many cases, in minimizing collateral damage.⁷ Thus, as long as any likely provocations might be deterred by the prospect of the destruction of targets measured in dozens, it is hard to see a need for either quantitative or qualitative improvements in strategic delivery capability.

⁶Schlesinger has emphasized the first two of these requirements. The second is particularly vital if a capability to destroy missile silos and other hardened targets is desired. The Secretary has made it clear that he believes such a capability to be important, and to achieve that purpose he advocates not only improvements in accuracy of delivery but also a higher-yield warhead for the Minuteman III missile. As to whether an increase in force size is required, he is ambiguous. On the one hand, he has said repeatedly that the implementation of his flexible options policy will not require an increase in force size. On the other, he advocates development of a new payload for Minuteman III "with a larger number of smaller RV's . . . to expand the target coverage. . . ." *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, February 26, 1974, Part I, pp. 118-121.*

⁷In the limit, collateral damage could be reduced if accuracies were improved, yield reduced and numbers of warheads increased so that weapons, perhaps even nonnuclear ones, could be used effectively to destroy individual target components—say, individual aircraft on an air base—but the force requirements in such a case could become extremely large, seemingly contradicting Schlesinger's assertion that the changes in targeting he has in mind will not require larger forces.

ties. We could also destroy a number of point targets—missile silos, radars, bridges, power plants, small factories, and so forth. In the case of many of these, collateral damage could be reduced if higher accuracies and lower-yield warheads were used against them, but one has to wonder whether the threat of destroying a large number of such targets with negligible collateral damage would be more credible as a deterrent than destroying larger targets of the kind referred to above (or a smaller number of point targets with some collateral damage).

All the same, it has to be conceded that more fine tuning in response capability may enhance deterrence. A President is more likely to be willing to order a limited nuclear attack if he can be persuaded that in any escalatory scenario the United States will have an advantage. This is the heart of Schlesinger's argument, and it cannot be completely dismissed.

Still another argument for an options policy relates to negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms. Although Schlesinger has declared that the options issue is not to be coupled to SALT and the sizing of strategic forces, this seems to be logically inconsistent. Some of the impetus for a broader range of options is to be found in the growth of Soviet strategic forces. Moreover, whatever advantage one nation may have in strategic strength, as measured by numbers of warheads, deliverable megatons, missiles, and the like—even if it amounts only to political impact on other powers—can be offset, at least in part, by the other's having superiority in the flexibility available to it for the use of nuclear weapons. Such balancing would seem consistent with, or at most a logical extension of, the "essential equivalence" concept Schlesinger has enunciated: the view that we do not require symmetry in strategic forces but that Soviet superiority in some areas can be offset by American strength in others. Thus, despite his efforts to decouple the flexible response question from force-level and SALT issues, one cannot but wonder if one effect of Dr. Schlesinger's remarks (if not one of his motivations) might be to increase American bargaining strength for SALT—directly, by posing the possibility of the United States making changes that would lend more credibility to its limited use of strategic forces than to the Soviet Union's; and indirectly, by building a case, in Congress and elsewhere, for new programs promising increasing strength as measured more conventionally.

In some respects, therefore, the brief for precisely controllable flexible response options may be stronger than it was a decade ago when the subject was last lively. Developments in technology have

made possible better control and more precise delivery of ordnance; there is less confidence in the likelihood of the United States responding to attacks against its allies and to other limited threats; and, in a context where the superpowers are engaged in negotiations to try to limit, and then reduce, strategic arms, there may be bargaining advantage in moving toward a broader range of capabilities. But other changes may cut the other way: some of the arguments against an options policy may also be stronger than a decade ago. There is less concern now than then, probably in both the United States and the Soviet Union, about deliberate adversary attack—although it should be noted that much of the American discussion of strategic force issues continues to be predicated on the assumption of such an attack, with more lip service than analysis being given to the risks of accident or miscalculation. And, clearly, the proliferation prospect ought to weigh more heavily in our thinking today.

PROBLEMS WITH AN OPTIONS POLICY

Broadly speaking, three kinds of criticisms have been leveled at Schlesinger's proposals. It is suggested that the moves he has in mind, particularly the development of capabilities for delivering warheads with improved accuracy, may lead to instability in time of crisis: to reciprocally reinforcing incentives to initiate a disarming first strike against adversary missiles, and, as a result, possibly to the premature launch, based on radar and/or other warning, of such missiles so that they will not be destroyed in their silos. Second, it is argued that emphasis on limited counterforce options will make limited nuclear war more credible and therefore more likely, and that uncontrollable escalation is a quite possible result. Third, it is thought that the quest for increased options will have in it the seeds of an escalating arms competition, and will make it much more difficult to control strategic arms.

The present first-strike debate got off to a rousing start, and probably reached its low point in the United States during the discussion of the proposed deployment of an ABM system, when, with reference to Soviet multiple-warhead programs, former Secretary of Defense Laird made his oft-quoted remark that "the Soviets . . . are going for a first-strike capability. There is no question about that."⁸ Laird's remarks were motivated mainly by

⁸*Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, March 1969 (Washington: GPO, 1969), Part I, p. 196.*

a felt need to defend the Nixon Administration's Safeguard ABM proposal, and there were a number of reasons for discounting them: the difficulty of coordinating a disarming attack, the problem of destroying the whole of a missile-launching submarine force by surprise, and the fact that one side could never have confidence that its adversary would not launch its missiles based on warning of attack. Secretary Schlesinger has alluded to some of these problems: "It is not within the realm of possibility for the United States or the Soviet Union to deny each other the ultimate ability to destroy the urban base of the other's civilization." "It is evident that with forces as large as those possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union, there is no possibility that either can achieve a disarming first strike capability."⁹

Notwithstanding such statements—supported, incidentally, before Schlesinger became Secretary of Defense by Administration arguments in defense of the strategic arms limitation agreements¹⁰—the spirit of Melvin Laird lingers on. Fears continue to be expressed about the Soviet Union developing a disarming first-strike capability, and it is argued that the attainment of high accuracy for U.S. multiple-warhead systems, both MIRV's (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) and MARV's (maneuverable re-entry vehicles), will be seen by the Soviet Union as a U.S. attempt to achieve a first-strike capability against its missiles. If one assumes that Soviet analysts indulge in extremes of "worst case" analysis, like so many of their American counterparts, the latter argument might have had some measure of plausibility a few years ago, before the Soviet Union had deployed a significant SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) force,¹¹ but it has none now.

⁹*Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975 . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 345, 461.

¹⁰*Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, June and July 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 336 *et seq.*, particularly pp. 473-479.

¹¹Schlesinger would possibly dispute even this. He has said, "I think anyone who looks carefully at the numbers knows full well that, even if we disregarded the large numbers of SLBM's that the Soviets have at sea, given the command and control arrangements that the Soviets have and an orderly attack even after absorbing a first strike, they may have enough remaining capability within their ICBM's alone to destroy the urban industrial base of the United States." *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975 . . . , op. cit.*, p. 347.

"There is just no possibility that a high confidence disarming first strike is attainable for either side, even against the ICBM components of the strategic forces on both sides and certainly not against both sets of forces, SLBM's and ICBM's." *U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 1974* (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 38.

Need we be concerned, then, that the development of limited counterforce capabilities by the United States might have an adverse effect on stability in a time of crisis? I think yes, but not because it might induce the Soviet Union to launch a massive attack against us, either pre-emptively or based on warning that a U.S. attack was under way. Rather, the concern must be about a possible increase in the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used in a limited way by the United States—or by the Soviet Union if it emulates us with an increased emphasis on flexible options—and a corresponding prospect that a sequence of escalatory responses will follow. It is the nuclear war-fighting issue that demands our attention, and there are two problems with it.

The first question concerns the interaction between U.S. and Soviet decisions as regards force postures. It seems unlikely that if the United States moves toward more options, including improved accuracy, the Soviet Union will stand still. Schlesinger makes his case for our moving in these directions by arguing that it is necessary because the Soviet Union seems certain to decide for improved accuracy and deployment of MIRV's on its new missiles. If we go further, further Soviet increases in force levels and qualitative developments seem more likely than not. Thus, one has the prescription for a virtually unlimited arms race.¹²

Some elaboration is in order here. One of the foundations on which much of the arms control effort of the 1960's rested was the concept of "sufficiency," to use a phrase coined apparently by Donald Quarles in the late 1950's but then appropriated and corrupted by the last Administration: the idea, of which the assured destruction concept is a variant, that nuclear forces in excess of those required to inflict some high level of damage on an adversary's population and industry could serve little useful purpose. Acceptance of the sufficiency idea implies that if developments that might jeopardize the effectiveness of offensive forces in an assured destruction role could be prevented or limited, the impetus for enlarging or improving those forces would be largely eliminated. There would, then, be little need for explicit controls on them.

The experience since the conclusion of the ABM treaty, which

¹²It is not only the desire to avoid being caught in an "options gap" that will provide motivation for an arms race. Notwithstanding the unlikelihood of either nation acquiring a disarming first-strike capability, that possibility will be exploited, just as it was by former Secretary Laird, to generate support for a variety of weapons programs such as mobile ICBM's, new bombers, new sea-launched missile systems, and possibly proliferation of ICBM's and/or hardening or active defense of them so that more might survive a first strike.

was, at least in part, a product of such beliefs, has cast doubt on this model of the strategic interaction. The model would be rendered totally inoperative by a rejection of the sufficiency concept, i.e., by an acceptance of the pursuit-of-options idea—of a policy based on having a nuclear war-fighting capability. Containing the strategic arms competition would then require imposition of constraints across the board: on defensive systems, on offensive force levels, on weapons systems' performance parameters, and even, if possible, on command and control capabilities.

The other major objection to a policy of increased options is the claim that its acceptance implies a greater likelihood of nuclear war. Some of the critics argue that by making nuclear war more "thinkable," it is made more likely; and commonly they go on to argue that once nuclear weapons are used, escalation will be almost inevitable. Neither contention can be demonstrated to be correct. Certainly the underlying premise of the flexible options policy is to make a nuclear response credible, but this need *not* imply an increased likelihood of nuclear war, for *if* the credibility is sufficient, the likelihood of a whole range of provocations may be reduced, and the compound probability of a provocation followed by a nuclear response may be less than in the case of continued reliance on "the threat that leaves something to chance." Similarly, the effect of greater emphasis on flexible options on the probability of an all-out nuclear exchange must be indeterminate: the probability could be greater or less than if no change in emphasis were made.

But, while unambiguous assertions cannot be justified with respect to these points, the suggestion that a policy of flexible options will result in an increase in the likelihood of nuclear war of some kind occurring seems plausible. In making this statement I have in mind not so much the possibility that decision-makers in the United States or the USSR would initiate the use of nuclear weapons against the other power in the expectation that they could do so without provoking a response in kind or worse, although that possibility may be of some importance, but rather the fact that the inhibitions on the use of nuclear weapons against other powers will almost certainly be much relaxed. Consider the last two wars in which the United States has been engaged and hypothesize that the President in each case had been presented with arguments that nuclear weapons could be used effectively against military targets with little or no collateral damage and with savings in American lives. Would the temptation to use them have been resisted?

Possibly. But to the extent that such weapons could be characterized as an extension of conventional capabilities—and it seems clear that this is the direction toward which the flexible options policy leads—it seems doubtful. Or, consider the Cuban missile crisis. Suppose the Air Force had been able to argue convincingly that “surgical” missile strikes with “clean” nuclear warheads could ensure the destruction of Soviet facilities in Cuba with little or no collateral damage and no loss of American lives, instead of conceding, as it did, that such an outcome could not be guaranteed.¹³ Would their use have been resisted?¹⁴

Such use of nuclear weapons under a flexible options policy is doubly troublesome. It could lead to a nuclear response by an adversary power with a stake in the conflict in question. Even more worrisome may be the fact that any increase in the credibility of nuclear weapons being used by those that now have them against those that do not is bound to provide an impetus to the latter to acquire them for deterrence, and perhaps for coercion of other states.¹⁵ Thus, the great powers’ pursuit of flexible options, and the consequent erosion of the most prominent firebreak we have on the escalation scale—that between use and nonuse of nuclear weapons—are likely to stimulate nuclear proliferation. And proliferation can well increase the likelihood of nuclear war simply by virtue of there being more, and in some cases probably less responsible, fingers on nuclear triggers.

CONCLUSION

In summary, it seems plausible that our hand will be strengthened in our dealings with the USSR if we have more options for the flexible use of nuclear weapons, particularly against military targets. But the advantages to either power in having somewhat greater flexibility than its adversary are likely to be small, particularly with the overkill capabilities each now has. Any relative advantage must be weighed against the absolute disadvantage of fueling the bilateral arms competition that will almost inevitably

¹³Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 684.

¹⁴The rebuttal to this line of argument goes as follows: It is conceivable (although I think unlikely) that the possession by the United States of the hypothesized capabilities would have served to deter the Soviet Union from placing missiles in Cuba in the first place.

¹⁵If the emergent nuclear power is concerned about deterrence of one of the great powers it will likely be forced by economic and technical circumstances to rely on a “threat that leaves something to chance,” i.e., on deterrence based on irrationality in response; but if it wishes to deter, or particularly if it wishes to coerce, other weaker states, a flexible options policy would presumably be preferred.

result, and against the increase in difficulty in controlling strategic arms. To my mind, these disadvantages alone tilt the scale. When one recognizes that greater emphasis on flexible options almost certainly implies an increase in the likelihood of use of nuclear weapons against other powers, a related increase in the impetus to nuclear proliferation, and a consequent increase in the likelihood of nuclear war, the case against the Schlesinger proposals appears to be overwhelming.

His case would seem to be a good one only if one assumes that (1) the Soviet Union will not respond to the United States' efforts to broaden its range of options; (2) the United States will not be more likely to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states—or if we should, we can discount heavily the possibility of the Soviet Union or China responding with nuclear weapons; and (3) we need not be much concerned about nuclear proliferation. At least the first and third, and probably the second, of these assumptions are doubtful.

STRATEGIC ADAPTABILITY*

by William R. Van Cleave and Roger W. Barnett

THE advent of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems altered and bifurcated the concept of war. Superimposed upon the traditional image was one of a long-range nuclear duel between "superpowers," which came to dominate modern discussions of strategy. In *this* image, when the possibility of massive civilian destruction was considered, the notion of "winning" seemed to become obsolescent: victors and vanquished would be indistinguishable; there could be no winners, only losers.

Deterrence of war between nuclear powers thus came to be considered the only appropriate objective. As if to make this image of war a self-fulfilling prophecy, a "strategy" of deterrence developed that had as its aim, not winning, but assuring that all would be losers. No longer could a chief of armed forces approach his political leadership and proclaim palindromically, "Now, Sir, a war is won!"

If it is allowed, on the other hand, that "winning" may mean "not losing," or alternatively "securing an objective," pursuing relative advantage, or improving the outcome of a war, the term does not seem intrinsically evil or necessarily obsolescent—assuming that one cares who wins. "Winning" in this sense lies at the core of strategic policymaking and planning for national defense.

Participation in a strategic nuclear exchange, the "success" of which is measured in devastated cities and tens of millions of deaths, must be excluded entirely from all definitions of "winning." Preventing such an exchange must also unequivocally be classified as "not losing," or winning. But ensuring that nuclear war takes the form of such an exchange does not qualify as strategy; strategy does not seek to guarantee that both sides lose, that there will be no winners.

Deterrence of a strategic nuclear attack on the United States must certainly comprise the cornerstone of U.S. strategic policy. On this untarnished principle there is no debate. But the matter clearly does not end there. Deterrence is not static, either in what must be deterred or in the way deterrence is to be ac-

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complished. Nor is deterrence alone the sum total of strategy. In brief, the key to strategy is *adaptability*, and adaptability is the key to recent changes in U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine.

Strategic adaptability presumes, in agreement with Professor Donald Zoll, that "strategy reduces itself to the arts of war designed to achieve objectives short of the vital interests of states—for whose protection, presumably, the full national power of the state must be unleashed—coupled with those plans necessary to deal with the contingency of a nuclear strike of irrevocable dimensions."¹ This harkens back to the dual nature of winning—that if one wants to win, more is required than the ability simply to assure massive destruction in the name of forestalling a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

A NEW DEBATE?

A new great debate over strategy, expected from Defense Secretary Schlesinger's espousal of what we are here calling strategic adaptability, and from Secretary of State Kissinger's later appeal for a national debate on strategy, has yet to bloom despite a smattering of journalistic articles largely denouncing or decrying the "Schlesinger strategy," and a lesser number of more scholarly treatments.² The principal reason for this is that there appears to be little latitude for such a dramatic debate if the issues and alternatives are accurately defined; and when the issues are dramatically but erroneously posed, and strawman alternatives are drawn, only a false and futile debate can result. Yet even if no great debate takes place, one notes intellectual ferment and a rethinking of established strategic and arms control precepts, a new skeptical look at what has been for a long time orthodox wisdom, accompanied by substantial — though hardly mass — apostasy. As two scholars writing on this renaissance of thought correctly pointed out, a "widespread and deep-seated dissatisfaction today with many of the fundamental premises underlying American strategic weapons policy" has been brought about by disillusionment with SALT and Soviet intransigence therein, by the vigor of Soviet strategic weapons programs, and by other

¹Donald A. Zoll, "New Aspects of Strategy," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1973, p. 43.

²Examples of the latter include Colin S. Gray, "Rethinking Nuclear Strategy," *ORBIT*, Winter 1974, and the relevant parts of Albert Wohlstetter's article in the same issue, "Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era." Also, Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," *World Politics*, January 1974; Ted Greenwood and Michael L. Nacht, "The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1974; and Bruce M. Russett, "Short of Nuclear Madness," *Worldview*, April 1973.

manifestations of Soviet strategic doctrine and policy that have combined to produce a "general skepticism of Russian intentions."⁸

It is ironic that counterforce was eschewed as a major U.S. objective in order to exercise a self-restraint that, it was assumed, would induce similar self-restraint on the part of the Soviets; but it must now be seriously reconsidered because the lack of Kremlin restraint has produced a Soviet strategic capability rendering "assured destruction"—or any massive strike option—questionable as a planned response. In other words, the reconsideration has been necessitated not so much by our own volition or acumen as by the determination of our major adversary. The doctrine of assured destruction and the concept of "mutual assured destruction" might have remained the dual cynosure of U.S. strategic and arms control thought had not steady growth of Soviet strategic offensive capabilities and steadfast Soviet rejection of those notions forced a rethinking of our doctrine and concepts.

There still remain more or less ritual recitations of mutual assured destruction dogma, and the statements of the Secretary of Defense earlier this year were met with the usual rhetorical overkill of that school of thought. Increasingly, however, a new thoughtfulness is evident, even where disagreement remains. It is this thoughtfulness that should be encouraged in any national debate, where too often (as in the Safeguard case) the objective is to win points rather than to clarify and promote judicious choice.

A debate on matters of national strategy, subject to strong emotions in such areas as strategic force planning and targeting, may by its very nature muddle issues rather than clarify them. Alternatives become dramatically, if not apocalyptically, cast in spurious either-or terms, which themselves are seldom descriptive or analytic but polemic. Carrying normative or pejorative connotations, these often imprecise terms are employed as missile words to be launched against one's opponents: arms control, stability, arms race, overkill, first strike.

In actuality the choices—and the modifications represented by Schlesinger's announcements—are matters of degree, not of either-or. In many cases they merely involve clearer thinking, and tun-

⁸Greenwood and Nacht, *op. cit.* For a description of these factors, see the testimony of Defense Secretary Schlesinger, *U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, Hearing* before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 1974, made public on April 4, 1974.

ing declaratory policy more closely to actual policies for acquisition, deployment and employment of forces. Some would have the choices defined sharply as being between "counterforce" and "assured destruction," between "war-fighting capability" and "deterrence," even though these can never be contrasted, have never been either-or choices, and never will be. Any modern strategic force has *some* inherent counterforce capability, whether against soft, hard or hardest military targets.⁴ Any plan for the use of such forces will necessarily include some military targets: for example, defenses may have to be suppressed before other attacks take place. Any force, to deter, must be capable of being used. Does anyone seriously suggest that a military force have *no* war-fighting capability?

It may be useful to emphasize here that counterforce is not synonymous with hard-target kill. Some counterforce targets have been hardened to nuclear and blast effects, some have not, and some cannot be. To use counterforce to describe only missile silo destruction is an impoverishment of the term; using it solely in that sense is a distortion. Counterforce targets may be soft, hard, harder and hardest, from an ability to withstand only a few pounds per square inch additional overpressure to perhaps 1,000 psi, with only silos and some command facilities in the last category. Moreover, even for hard-target capability, its significance resides in the degree to which it exists. Statistically, there is some hard-target counterforce capability in all ICBM forces. The measurement of accuracy (CEP) is a statistical expression of where we may expect 50 per cent of the weapons to detonate relative to the target, and hard-target kill probability is a function of the number of weapons one is willing to dedicate to a single target, as well as of the accuracy and yields of those weapons. If one is willing to dedicate a large number to a single target, high or significant kill probabilities may be achieved; but this may not be an efficient use of that number of weapons, it may not result in anything close to a favorable exchange ratio, and it may be far from a first-strike capability.

The differences in the hard-target potentials of different warheads, or MIRV's, must also be understood. Here accuracy is the most important single factor. An improvement in accuracy by a factor of two has the same effect against a hardened target as increasing yield by a factor of eight; or, 100 KT at .25 nautical miles (nm) gives about the same psi overpressure and single-shot kill probability as 800 KT at .5 nm. (Neither is very good against hard targets: about .10 probability against a 1,000 psi target and about .16 against a 500 psi target, which demonstrates the difficulty of attaining even high single-shot kill probabilities against such targets.) However, yield, too, is important, particularly where there are large differences. The following chart gives some examples of variable combinations of accuracy, yield and numbers of (reliably arriving) RV's in terms of kill probability against a target hardened to 500 psi, and also demonstrates clearly the differences in hard-target counterforce capability between U.S.-type MIRV's and Soviet-type MIRV's:

Yield No. of RV's:	.04 MT		.15 MT		2 MT	
	1	3	1	3	1	3
.4 nm	.04	.11	.09	.25	.42	.8
.3 nm	.07	.20	.15	.39	.62	.95
.2 nm	.15	.38	.32	.68	.89	.999

First-strike or significant hard targeting of even fixed land-based forces is much more complicated than this simplified chart would suggest, since there are major problems of timing and coordination, degradations to be expected in accuracy and system performance, and possibly detrimental effects of the nuclear detonations of some warheads on other arriving warheads (i.e., "fratricide").

Whether U.S. strategic offensive forces have had and have now the ability to attack enemy military targets—even hardened ICBM silos—is no real issue. They have had and do have *some* such capability. The question is whether that capability is sufficient. Our present capability, even if improved to a great extent by major force programs not now planned, would not provide a first-strike disarming capability against Soviet land-based strategic forces, much less a preclusive disarming capability, as the Secretary of Defense has explained.⁵ Thus, there is no real issue concerning possibly unsettling effects of a first-strike capability.

Indeed, it is difficult to make an issue of "flexibility," per se. As Schlesinger observed, "when you get down to the hard rock of selectivity and flexibility in targeting plans, there really is very little criticism of that."⁶ (However, as Professor Wohlstetter points out, there is a strong tendency among those who accept flexibility in principle to argue that "fortuitously, we have just the right amount of flexibility that we need and, it seems by good luck, exactly the right degree of accuracy."⁷)

Hence, the issues are not either-or as frequently suggested, but more or less: more or less enhanced flexibility; more or less selectivity; more or fewer options; more or less emphasis in planning on limited strikes, on restraint, on precision, on military targets.

The questions related to those issues are simple ones that need not be confounded by resort to polemical jargon or dramatic descriptions of alternatives and consequences. Will the adjustments proposed mean that we will be more or less able to deter various threats and to negate the effectiveness of threats to the United States and its allies? Are the adjustments more likely to increase or decrease our chances for controlling escalation in the event of war? Does deterrence, if it fails initially, also have to fail totally? Do we wish to be more or less able to discriminate between military targets and civilian ones, to attack militarily relevant targets selectively without the necessity of widespread urban and population destruction? To what extent do we want

⁵*U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, op. cit., and Report of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 1974. See page citations from the latter below, referred to as FY 75 DOD Report.*

⁶*U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, op. cit., p. 10.*

⁷Wohlstetter, *op. cit.*, p. 1135. Greenwood and Nacht, *op. cit.*, take essentially this approach, as does Wolfgang Panofsky in "The Mutual-Hostage Relationship between America and Russia," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1973, though Panofsky seems to reverse himself, from first arguing that high levels of population destruction are inherent in any strategic strike to suggesting that we have sufficient flexibility and options other than civilian destruction.

that capability? Do we wish to improve it principally by changes in targeting plans, or to improve it still further by changes in the physical capabilities of our forces?

Answers to such questions, because they signify decisions on strategies and on force programs, must be derived on balance since considerations on both sides must be weighed. But the choices are unlikely to be as stark as they are editorially presented. The issues are more a matter of the general direction to take in strategic policy, the direction that will guide research and development, force acquisition and deployment, the planning of options for employment, and, finally, declaratory policy, since it is clearly a purpose of the Defense Secretary to have declaratory policy somewhat more consistent with actual policies than it may have been in the past.

Even in the matter of direction, however, there has been some confusion. Many accounts, in the guise of arguing against a putative movement away from assured destruction toward counterforce, actually would have U.S. planning move toward a more rigid and pure adherence to urban assured destruction. An inflexible Catonic strategy of city destruction, which would in all likelihood be mutual, would be substituted for continuing force improvements and plans enhancing the ability to use forces selectively in a manner that might induce restraint in an adversary—i.e., to hit and to confine damage essentially to point targets other than population concentrations.

It is always necessary to ask first what we want our strategic forces to *do*. Some would answer simply, to deter. But to deter what? How? Until those answers are determined, the capabilities we wish our forces to have and the strategies to be followed cannot be established. The tendency has been to try to isolate "deterrence" from usefulness of nuclear forces, from flexibility, "war-fighting," denial of an adversary's objectives, and damage limitation. Concurrently, deterrence, undifferentiated by considerations of varied threats and tailored ways of countering those threats, has been seen by many as exclusively associated with the infliction of retaliatory punishment. In this view, the greater or more "assured" the destructiveness, the surer the deterrent; the more "usable" the forces, the more likely they were to be used, thereby presumably weakening deterrence. Destructive capability was emphasized over credibility. In the nuclear sphere at least, this was a direct reversal of the criticisms of "massive retaliation" that grew and became widely accepted in the late 1950's.

Presumably, in such thinking, the overriding objective is not deterrence, *per se*, much less defense, but avoidance at all costs of the use of nuclear weapons: our use to be deterred as much as enemy use. But if that is one's primary value, one should be candid about it and not disguise it under the rubric of deterrence. Such a posture evokes questions: Should deterrence be based upon *unusable* weapons? Can it be?

Inherently high levels of destructiveness do not constitute an optimum deterrent or even a satisfactory policy against some kinds of threats—at the tactical nuclear weapons level, for example, and where deterrence might best be accomplished by the credible ability to defend or to respond with restraint rather than to threaten mass destruction reflexively. Now, for military or political coercion, there are varieties of strategic nuclear threat possible, against which assured destruction or massive retaliation is not as credible as *measured* retaliation. Since deterrence is some product of capability and credibility, the capability to use nuclear forces in a rational and nonapocalyptic fashion, when compared with the credibility of massive strikes in response to nonmassive attacks, and when the adversary has his own massive capabilities in reserve, may become a better—and infinitely safer—deterrent. Contrary to what many seem to believe, increasing the credibility of use does not promote a breakdown of deterrence and the ultimate use of nuclear weapons. The objective is deterrence, and if both capability and credibility of the use of strategic weapons are sufficient, deterrence will be strengthened.

But deterrence may fail in any case, and the weapons may have to be used. The ability to conduct selective and limited nuclear strikes for express and restricted purposes while holding major retaliatory forces in reserve (where they are of more value for coercion than if used for urban-industrial destruction) provides an important hedge against the inability to predict deterrence thresholds for a range of situations, promotes the possibility of escalation control, and increases opportunities for war termination without major urban damage. Flexibility in the application of strategic weapons thus supports the requirement of adaptability in strategic policy.

Hence, while it is true that strategic flexibility has been considered and debated in the past, it is timely to consider it again. Despite the similarity of some points in Secretary McNamara's June 1962 Ann Arbor speech and Schlesinger's current proposals, there are issues and considerations about limited strategic

options and flexibility that are unique to the 1970's: for example, both technology and the strategic balance have changed in ways that prompt a re-examination of the utility of flexible and limited options.

GENESIS OF ASSURED DESTRUCTION

Through the 1960's "assured destruction" grew from an analytical tool to the principal criterion for gauging U.S. retaliatory force sufficiency, to the dominant strategic concept among the intellectual defense community and even among official planners, to a philosophy for arms control and mutual deterrence. After early flirtations with strategic flexibility, counterforce and damage limitation, "assured destruction" became the "badly needed" theory of requirements, the "conceptual framework for measuring the need and adequacy of our strategic forces."⁸

Strategically, assured destruction came to be measured in terms of destroying arbitrarily determined percentages of population and civil industry: (a) because of a lingering association of "strategic" bombing with city bombing; (b) because during the formative years of the concept the combination of yield and inaccuracy then characteristic of strategic forces failed to lend itself to discriminate attacks avoiding major collateral damage, at least on targets in or near urban areas; (c) because many regarded, and continue to regard, such destruction as inevitable (Panofsky asserts it to be "a physical fact" insensitive to policy) or at least easily accomplished, so that—if both sides designed their strategic forces on this premise—costs of strategic forces could be decreased, mutual deterrence would increase, and arms limitation agreements could be brought about; and (d) because population fatalities and gross urban-industrial destruction, given a few assumptions, seemed readily calculable and thus a fine accounting or measuring device.

However, the linkage of strategic bombing to city bombing need not be so rigid. Accuracies have been achieved that allow discriminate attacks without the accompaniment of widespread civilian collateral damage. There is nothing inevitable in massive population destruction or escalation. Likewise, there is a significant distinction among numbers killed, even at high levels. Strategic forces, even in the heyday of assured destruction, have been designed for capabilities and missions other than city bust-

⁸Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 170. This process is described in Chapters 5 and 6.

ing.⁹ Furthermore, there is ample evidence that the Soviets reject the concept outright. It has neither reduced arms competition nor produced meaningful arms control; to the contrary, it may have contributed to Soviet incentives for a strategic buildup to the extent that it provided them first with an opportunity to gain strategic parity, and then with an opportunity for measurable superiority.

The term assured destruction connotes a misleading simplicity and certainty: it reduces strategic calculations to the easily grasped tenets of a Catoic strategy and implies that this destruction is not only calculable but easy. Neither is the case. Nothing is "assured"; certainly not that the United States would so respond, not even that the planned or assumed destruction would take place if the United States did so respond.¹⁰ In a situation where such use of U.S. forces would in all probability bring about condign destruction of U.S. cities—and thus amount to an act of self-destruction—it is hardly "assured" that U.S. forces would be put to that use.

In view of the rhetoric of assured destruction, the dominant role the concept has assumed in strategic intellectualizing, and its importance in guiding strategic force decisions and evaluating strategic arms limitation packages, it is essential to keep repeating that it is basically an analytical test, and not necessarily strategy. At least, if it is the "cornerstone of U.S. deterrence strategy," it exists in variations other than deliberate and methodical destruction of urban population. Ultimate reliance on assured destruction, however defined, does not preclude other options or prohibit all other strategies of employment. Even so primary an advocate as Alain Enthoven acknowledged: "The assured-destruction test did not, of course, indicate how these forces would actually be used in a nuclear war."¹¹

For the most part, the arms control community in the United States has been the driving force for converting what was originally one analytical tool to aid evaluation of strategic retaliatory sufficiency into unidimensional strategic policy. The success of that endeavor has been largely in the realm of academic theorizing and declaratory policy (and even that has usually been

⁹"United States strategic offensive forces have been designed with the additional system characteristics . . . needed to perform missions other than assured destruction, such as limited and controlled retaliation." *Ibid.*, p. 195.

¹⁰See the article on "Population Vulnerability," by Conrad V. Chester and Eugene P. Wigner, in this issue of *ORBIT*, pp. 763-769.

¹¹Enthoven and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

hedged to include other possibilities)—although assured destruction calculations *did* become the predominant test of strategic forces and of various arms limitation packages considered for SALT from 1968 to 1972.¹² The staggering notion that the United States would actually wage a war, should that become necessary, according to criteria the analysts found useful and the academics beguiling—however monstrous in execution—was allowed to grow and harden into conviction without adequate objection. Pursuit of “stable deterrence” and arms control could not be interrupted by distinctions regarding what was to be deterred, or by questions about what should happen if deterrence failed. Stripped of its trimmings, the response was simply: It *won't* fail.

Even an argument that large-scale destruction is a by-product of large strategic attacks¹³ is much different from judging the adequacy of strategic forces by population destruction, and the latter is a far cry from basing force employment strategy on deliberate attempts to achieve such results. As Albert Wohlstetter wrote:

... a policy of unrestrained, indiscriminate attack on Russian civilians, executed without reserve, with no attempt to induce restraint in the Soviet leadership, can serve no purpose of state under any circumstances. If “Mutual Assured Destruction” means a policy of using strategic force only as a reflex to kill population, it calls for a course of action under every circumstance of attack that makes sense in none.¹⁴

Thus, we are conscious of persistent questions: Is threatening massive urban and population destruction necessary to deter Soviet attacks on the United States? Is it an effective deterrent against limited threats? Even against the most extreme threats to the United States, is it a better deterrent than the threat of large-scale attacks on the enemy's military capability, natural resources or basic industries?

¹²As one of the present authors has pointed out in Congressional testimony, assured destruction calculations were almost exclusively the test of various SALT limitations packages. Statement of William R. Van Cleave, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, July 1972, pp. 569-592.

¹³Panofsky's “physical fact” levels are much lower than those used by McNamara for hypothetical city targeting, and limited strikes—depending on the limitations and civil defense effectiveness—may reduce casualties further yet. Improvements in accuracy and Soviet civil defense plans combine to make possible discriminate attacks not accompanied by the high levels of population fatalities commonly postulated.

¹⁴Wohlstetter, *op. cit.*, p. 1133.

EXODUS OF ASSURED DESTRUCTION

Strategic doctrine in the interim between the McNamara era and the present was officially based on assured destruction, but the so-called sufficiency principle neither expressed the assured destruction criterion explicitly in terms of population fatalities nor made assured destruction equivalent to sufficiency. Resulting from an interagency study in 1969, the four criteria for strategic sufficiency insofar as a direct threat to the United States was concerned were:

Maintaining an adequate second-strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.

Providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis.

Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war.

Defending against damage from small attacks or accidental launches.¹⁵

Overall, these criteria—which have not been repealed publicly—clearly announced that assured destruction is not enough and that “how much is enough?” in strategic forces must be judged by additional considerations. However, certain changes in wording in the current (FY 75) Department of Defense Report seem to imply a new set of sufficiency criteria.

In March 1974 the Secretary of Defense described the “principal features that we propose to maintain and improve in our strategic posture” as, *inter alia*:

... a capability sufficiently large, diversified, and survivable so that it will provide us at all times with high confidence of riding out even a massive surprise attack and of penetrating enemy defenses, and *with the ability to withhold an assured destruction reserve for an extended period of time.*

... command-control capabilities required by our National Command Authorities to direct the employment of the strategic forces in a *controlled, selective, and restrained* fashion.

... the forces to execute a *wide range of options* in response to potential actions by an enemy, including a *capability for precise attacks on both soft and hard targets, while at the same time minimizing collateral damage.*

... an offensive capability of such size and composition that all will

¹⁵Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1972-1976 Defense Program and the FY 1972 Defense Budget, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, March 9, 1971.

perceive it as in overall balance with the strategic forces of any potential opponent.¹⁶

This formula calls for:

(1) Not only an assured destruction capability, but the ability to withhold it in reserve for an extended period of time. The assured destruction force becomes a last-ditch deterrent threat, its primary value resting in its influence on an enemy's restraint while it is not used, rather than in the principal employment option.

(2) A wide range of employment options enabling controlled, selective, restrained and precise attacks against both urban and nonurban targets, soft and hard, in a manner to limit collateral damage.

(3) "Essential equivalence" with the strategic forces of any enemy, both actually and perceptually. This equivalence refers not only to observables such as the relative size of strategic forces, but also to counterforce capabilities. It does not, however, require force symmetry or the matching of all opponent capabilities. Rather, it requires "overall balance" wherein enemy advantages may be canceled by U.S. advantages in other areas.

The problem then is not so much assured destruction. As an analytical tool, it may be useful if not overdone. As a force capability, it is necessary—but insufficient. Nor is the change proposed a move entirely away from it. There are two differences:

(1) Instead of relying on assured destruction as our primary response capability and allowing it to dominate all other options, we now want more planned limited-strike options, some of which would be quite discriminate, while the assured destruction capability would be held in reserve with the objective of dampening escalation. Such a reserve would serve to make even clearer the limited nature of the other options. (2) In view of President Nixon's charge that measuring population fatalities is inconsistent with American values, and similar comments by Secretary Schlesinger, we may now prefer to judge the adequacy of the assured destruction capability with regard not so much to population fatalities and urban destruction as to objectives of greater political-military relevance to a war and its aftermath—such as (a) reduction of the enemy's military capability, both to prosecute the war and to exert postwar power beyond his borders (or, for that matter, to maintain domestic control and protect his own borders), (b) destruction of elements critical to his post-

¹⁶FY 75 DOD Report, pp. 44-45. (Emphasis added.)

attack recovery capability, and (c) disruption of political control mechanisms.

To conduct a reasonable discussion of what changes are suggested for U.S. strategic doctrine and what are not, and of the reasons for the changes, it is best to understand exactly what the Secretary of Defense has said.

ADAPTABILITY: MEASURED DETERRENCE

On January 10, 1974, Secretary Schlesinger first announced that there has taken place "a change in the strategies of the United States with regard to the hypothetical employment of central strategic forces. A change in targeting strategy as it were."¹⁷ (He did not say it was a thorough change.) He went on:

To a large extent the American doctrinal position has been wrapped around something called "assured destruction" which implies a tendency to target Soviet cities initially and massively and that this is the principal option that the President would have. It is our intention that this not be the only option and possibly not the principal option.

Because of the growth of Soviet force capabilities, "the range of circumstances in which an all-out strike against an opponent's cities can be contemplated has narrowed considerably and one wishes to have alternatives for the employment of strategic forces other than what would be a suicidal strike against the cities of the other side."

That a broadening of the options available in U.S. targeting plans (the SIOP—Single Integrated Operational Plan) was in the wind should have come as no surprise. Concern had been expressed about overly restricted options and changes had been suggested in each of President Nixon's four previous annual messages on U.S. foreign policy.

In a news conference on January 24, Schlesinger explained his earlier remarks. In the first place, he said, the key to understanding the modifications—rather than focusing on counterforce versus assured destruction—is to recognize that the "emphasis is upon selectivity and flexibility; that does not necessarily involve what is referred to as major counterforce capabilities. . . . The emphasis is on the selection of targets." Nor does this selectivity necessarily require new force programs. More important, the Secretary emphasized, is a change in attitude and planning. "In order to have a strategy of selectivity and flexibility one must

¹⁷Remarks by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Overseas Writers Association Luncheon, International Club, Washington, D.C., January 10, 1974. Mimeo. transcript, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD/PA).

consciously adopt that and adjust plans to doctrine. That is a considerable change."¹⁸

In his annual report to Congress in March, Schlesinger elaborated on the changes and the reasons for them.¹⁹ U.S. thinking about strategic deterrence, he said, has not kept pace with the evolution of the threat. "The scope of the Soviet program as it has now emerged is far more comprehensive than estimated even a year ago . . . a truly massive effort." It has developed "ahead of rather than in reaction to what the United States has done," and it will pose a much broader range of real threats to the United States and its allies than in the past.

To counter the more extreme views of assured destruction advocates, the Secretary reiterated that the United States has had targeting options in the past:

Although several targeting options, including military only and military plus urban/industrial variations, have been part of U.S. strategic doctrine for quite some time, the concept that has dominated our rhetoric for most of the era since World War II has been massive retaliation against cities, or what is called assured destruction.²⁰

Concurrently he explained to the Muskie Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

Of course, all our delivery vehicles are targeted against specific targets. The point that is different about the targeting doctrine that I have outlined to you is the emphasis on selectivity and flexibility. In the past we have had massive preplanned strikes in which one would be dumping literally thousands of weapons on the Soviet Union. Some of those strikes could to some extent be withheld from going directly against cities, but that was limited even then.

With massive strikes of that sort, it would be impossible to ascertain whether the purpose of a strategic strike was limited or not. It was virtually indistinguishable from an attack on cities.²¹

We have, then, had options. However, they have (a) required the release of a very large number of weapons and therefore involved high levels of destruction; (b) been too few in number and insufficiently selective or limited to suit future requirements—we have made no real effort to develop adequate limited options either in planning or in force capabilities;²² and (c) not

¹⁸News Conference by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger at the Pentagon, January 24, 1974. Mimeo. transcript, OASD/PA.

¹⁹FY 75 DOD Report, especially pp. 32-45.

²⁰Ibid., p. 33.

²¹U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

²²Whatever has been said about options before, "nobody at the political level from 1961 to 1971 has put the energy behind developing the doctrine and the plans. . . . Now we are consciously basing our deterrent strategy upon the achievement of flexibility and selectivity." Ibid., p. 26.

been precise enough against military targets or, as Schlesinger later testified, particularly efficient against harder military targets.

We still plan to have an assured destruction capability, but today that is neither sufficient nor reassuring:

Such reassurances may bring solace to those who enjoy the simple but arcane calculations of assured destruction. But they are of no great comfort to policymakers who must face the actual decisions about the design and possible use of the strategic nuclear forces. Not only must those in power consider the morality of threatening such terrible retribution on the Soviet people for some ill-defined transgression by their leaders; in the most practical terms, they must also question the prudence and plausibility of such a response when the enemy is able, even after some sort of first strike, to maintain the capability of destroying our cities.

Since we ourselves find it difficult to believe that we would actually implement the threat of assured destruction in response to a limited attack on military targets that caused relatively few civilian casualties, there can be no certainty that, in a crisis, prospective opponents would be deterred from testing our resolve.

Today, such a massive retaliation against cities, in response to anything less than an all-out attack on the U.S. and its cities, appears less and less credible.²³

Yet, deterrence may fail in many ways; the problem, therefore, is a lack of sufficient options between no response and large-scale responses. The requirement stipulated is for a series of measured responses as more credible deterrents to a range of threats, and more rational responses to limited failures in deterrence, responses that

bear some relation to the provocation, have prospects of terminating hostilities before general nuclear war breaks out, and leave some possibility for restoring deterrence.

Flexibility of response is also essential because, despite our best efforts, we cannot guarantee that deterrence will never fail; nor can we forecast the situations that would cause it to fail. . . . To the extent that we have selected response options—smaller and more precisely focused than in the past—we should be able to deter such challenges. But if deterrence fails, we may be able to bring all but the largest nuclear conflicts to a more rapid conclusion before cities are struck. Damage may thus be limited and further escalation avoided.²⁴

It is important to note that, in contrast to ideas of damage limiting that would seek to deprive the enemy of his strategic capabilities through major counterforce operations and active defenses, the emphasis here is on *targeting restraint*. Restraint is

²³FY 75 DOD Report, pp. 35, 37-38.

²⁴Ibid., p. 38.

characteristic of limiting and terminating conflict once deterrence has failed.

In discussing limited-strike options, Schlesinger indicated that targets for nuclear weapons may include not only cities and silos, but also airfields, many other types of military installations, and a variety of other important assets that are not necessarily collocated with urban populations. We already have a long list of such possible targets; now we are grouping them into operation plans. . . . To the extent necessary, we are retargeting our forces accordingly.

The choice of options would depend on the nature of an enemy's attack and his objectives. In addition, he acknowledged that "we may also want a more efficient hard-target-kill capability than we now possess" in order to enhance deterrence. "The real issue is how much hard-target-kill capability we need."²⁵ The latter must be determined not only by our own assessment of the requirements of flexibility and selectivity, but also in light of the continued development of Soviet strategic force capabilities.

The Secretary stated candidly that we want to improve our counterforce capability somewhat, particularly through better accuracies. Although he requested research and development funding for a follow-on Minuteman warhead with larger yield, as well as improved accuracy, it is clear that the fundamental vehicle will be the removal of past restrictions on accuracy and other improvements to make selective targeting and retargeting possible. These improvements do not constitute expensive or major programs. In the Senate hearings in March, he pointed out that "retargeting . . . does not require any change in our force structure," and that "the long-term costs of improvements which can be related to the new targeting doctrine are about \$300 million, including \$186.7 which has already been obligated. The FY 1975 Defense budget includes \$33 million to complete development and to continue procurement of the Command Data Buffer," which has been an approved and ongoing effort, and \$65 million for development (not procurement), mostly of data acquisition, processing and communication capability.²⁶

In separating targeting changes and new programs, the Secretary went even further:

The change in targeting doctrine does not require new capabilities. There are some aspects for which we are asking the Congress this year for additional funding, but the change in doctrine is not dependent upon the additional funding. We are asking money in this budget for improved

²⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 39-41.

²⁶*U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, op. cit.*, pp. 7, 29.

command and control, and for some improvement in accuracy, but the change in targeting doctrine does not depend for its efficacy upon our getting this money.²⁷

While the door may be left open for future requests for program funding, these will be determined in view of developments in SALT and in the Soviet Union, as well as from continued assessments of our own requirements. In any case, that issue would be one of more-or-less, over which—including requests for funding—Congress and the public will have a say.

ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE

There are, of course, new program requirements established for other reasons; e.g., to replace aging systems, to maintain necessary survivability and penetrability, and to prevent the United States from slipping into a position of actual or perceptible strategic inferiority to the Soviet Union. The last has been referred to as the requirement for "essential equivalence," which should be considered separately from the targeting issue, although it is somewhat related. Retargeting and improvement of strategic flexibility are desirable goals regardless of the size and throw-weight of our strategic missile forces and their comparison with those of the USSR. A policy of strategic adaptability requires enhanced flexibility in whatever strategic force we have. Whether this force may be reduced or must be increased depends upon SALT, Soviet activities, and the principle of essential equivalence, which insists that our forces not be significantly inferior to the strategic forces of the Soviet Union in numbers, throw-weight or counterforce capability.

Since equivalence includes counterforce capability as well as size, improved targeting flexibility is related to it to the extent that it also involves counterforce improvements. In fact, if essential equivalence is to guide U.S. force decisions it will demand greater hard-target counterforce capability than will the more flexible targeting, simply because of the enormous hard-target counterforce potential inherent in the Soviet ICBM force now being developed.

Essential equivalence thus has to do with the sizing of forces and depends upon Soviet force developments;²⁸ targeting im-

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁸This does not mean to imply that essential equivalence is not promoted through advanced capabilities and the quality of technology, which is obvious in its counterforce criterion. Nor is it to suggest that technological advantages may not make up in important respects for quantitative disadvantages. Technological advance is probably the most fruitful route for the United States to take if it is pushed vigorously enough to offset Soviet quantitative advantages.

provement has to do with neither. Similarly, improving targeting flexibility has nothing to do with SALT or with any attempt to coerce or influence the Soviet Union. Essential equivalence is directly related to SALT—we hope to establish it by agreement to hold forces down equally—and may also be an attempt to gain leverage in the negotiations and to induce the Soviets to exercise greater restraint in their programs.

To be realistic, however, it must be acknowledged that essential equivalence may go the way of many other labeled policies and become little more than flummery. While it is an admirable goal, it is not an exact one and may become more elastic over time, as it grows clearer that equivalence in the three properties so far defined will be most difficult to attain if limited to those central strategic offensive forces contained in strategic arms limitation agreements. Taken literally, the term looks a bit strange when juxtaposed with projections of ten to twelve million pounds of ICBM throw-weight and 7,000 to 15,000 ICBM MIRV's for the Soviet Union, against two million pounds' throw-weight and 2,000 to 3,000 MIRV's, respectively, for the United States.²⁹ Even if applied to the launcher limits established by the SALT I agreement, equivalence requires that we go up or they come down.

To attain essential equivalence, the forces to be included may have to be so defined as to render the concept sterile: by including more U.S. systems (bombers, noncentral systems) while excluding comparable Soviet systems, by comparing noncomparables such as bomber payload (carefully restricted to "heavy bomber" payload) and missile throw-weight, and by weighing (exaggerating?) alleged advantages in U.S. technology and in nonlimited systems.³⁰

The conclusion is ineluctable that we can achieve improved targeting flexibility, selectivity and discrimination more easily than essential equivalence (in any meaningful sense of the term) and without any necessary association of the two. Enhanced flexibility of U.S. strategic forces may promote equivalence in targeting capability, but it does not depend upon "essential equivalence," however defined. It is an objective in and of itself, unrelated to the sizing of forces.

²⁹U.S.-U.S.S.R. *Strategic Policies*, op. cit., pp. 5-7.

³⁰One is reminded here of Dr. Edward Teller's comment, in Congressional testimony eleven years ago, on intelligence concerning capabilities easily seen and those not so easily assessed. "I am disturbed by the fact that in the region which is easily observed, we admit the Russians are ahead. Whereas in those regions where observation is more difficult we still claim superiority." *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearings* before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress 1st Session August 1963

This is important to understand in view of expressed concerns that increasing our ability to plan more flexible and selective attacks and to strike targets more discriminately will somehow provoke a Soviet reaction, thereby fueling an "arms race," and/or destabilizing the strategic balance.

But how could this be? As the Secretary of Defense has pointed out, critics of options cannot have it both ways:

If the nuclear balance is no longer delicate and if substantial force asymmetries are quite tolerable, then the kinds of changes I have been discussing here will neither perturb the balance nor stimulate an arms race. If, on the other hand, asymmetries do matter (despite the existence of some highly survivable forces), then the critics themselves should consider seriously what responses we should make to the major programs that the Soviets currently have underway to exploit their advantages in numbers of missiles and payload.²¹

There has been a tendency on the part of many advocates of mutual assured destruction and critics of counterforce, limited strategic options, and arms modernization, to argue at the same time that strategic deterrence is inherently stable (because of the impossibility of disarming first strikes and the inevitability of great civil devastation from even a small number of strikes in retaliation), but that improvements in counterforce, damage limiting, or flexibility would be destabilizing and increase the risk of nuclear war. They also argue that the inevitability of great population destruction—essentially, assured destruction—is insensitive to policy (Panofsky), but that a change in policy away from reliance on that principal option toward more limited and selective options would, again, be destabilizing. If deterrence is so stable and population devastation so certain, if counterforce and damage-limiting measures are so meaningless, how can qualitative improvements in weaponry and adjustments of targeting policy be so destabilizing?

On the one hand, it seems, we have reached a plateau from which there is no escape; on the other hand, the merest hint of escape is bad. Man has devised a situation where, in the event of strategic nuclear warfare, excessively high levels of destruction are unavoidable; yet any attempt to relieve or to escape from this inflexible situation is both bad and a priori doomed to failure. We are eternal captives of what we ourselves have devised, according to the advocates of the inflexible mutual hostage strategy. (One might ask why, if such a condition is inevitable,

²¹FY 75 DOD Report, p. 39.

it is necessary to advocate it.) Yet, they fear that changes will be upsetting. Of what?

At the same time it is argued that the proposed changes will be destabilizing in another sense: they will provoke major Soviet reactions and produce, or propel, an arms race. This concern seems to trouble even some who reject the mutual hostage theory or the notion that deterrence will be destabilized by the proposed changes, and who may on balance favor the changes. But (leaving aside for the moment that an "arms race"—or more accurately some increased arms competition—may be preferable to continuation of the existing situation and of recent trends in strategic arms relations) this reservation, as remarked by the Secretary of Defense, in reality is as baseless as the first concern, for the reasons cited in the next section.

ARMS PACING

In the first place, it is not proposed that the United States increase its forces, but that the flexibility and capability of the forces we have be improved; and for the most part the changes necessary do not now seem to involve major programs. Ensuring viable and adequately survivable forces in the future probably *will* involve major programs, and the test of essential equivalence *may* do so, but these requirements depend upon what the Soviets do. In the second place, while the Soviets have been arms racing, the United States has been arms walking or crawling;³² with SALT's failure to meet our expectations, the problem is now one of pacing, and the less pacing we do immediately, the sooner we will be placed in the position of having to catch up.

Moreover, war winning and counterforce capability have been consistent keynotes of Soviet strategic doctrine and strategic force development for some time, and it is abundantly clear that American pedagogy and restraint have not succeeded in steering Moscow away from such objectives. As two writers recently observed, "the Soviet Union has or will have great targeting flexibility and counterforce capability in its own strategic forces. . . . Soviet writers have consistently advocated a capability to engage in and to win a strategic nuclear war."³³ That the brightness of MAD truths must surely penetrate even the murkiness of primitive Soviet military thought to close the intellectual gap between the

³²See the two-part article by Albert Wohlstetter, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?," *Foreign Policy*, Spring and Fall 1974; also Gray, "The Urge to Compete . . .," *op. cit.*

³³Greenwood and Nacht, *op. cit.*

strategic doctrines of the two countries can no longer appear convincing even to the most credulous.³⁴

Critics of increased flexibility, which they interpret to signify increased counterforce capability on the part of the United States, include among their arguments the assertion that the USSR would be seriously concerned about any indication of increased hard-target-kill capability in U.S. strategic forces. At the same time they assert that the United States, by dint of its triad of mutually supporting strategic forces, need not fear a Soviet disarming first strike, since attack timing problems, the fratricide factor, and the assured survival of a large number of U.S. weapons would deter it. In view of the prevailing strategic balance (the significantly larger numbers of Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's and the potentially great number of RV's), the mix of strategic forces on both sides, and the natures of the two different political systems involved, this alleged concern over U.S. intentions and Soviet reactions becomes "curiouser and curiouser."

Even if improvements in U.S. targeting capability were to mean substantial improvements in counterforce capability, one must ask: What more can the Soviets do to develop *their* counterforce capability? It is most difficult to see what they could do beyond what they are already doing. And if there is a reaction, *to the extent that* the Soviets become concerned with U.S. hard-target counterforce capability, their reaction must be in the direction of improving the survivability of their own forces. Is that bad for the United States? Efforts and resources the Soviets must put into survivability measures are efforts and resources unavailable for a quest for strategic superiority, for their own menacing counterforce capabilities, or for other purposes more detrimental to U.S. interests.

DOWN THE UP ESCALATOR

In conclusion, this article expresses the conviction that the enhanced targeting flexibility proposed by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger is a step in the right strategic direction. By promoting strategic adaptability and credibility with restraint, it will strengthen deterrence and promote U.S. interests in the event of war without increasing the risk of long-term detriments about which many are concerned. It is not a proper goal of strategy to increase war's destructiveness, particularly so meaninglessly; the

³⁴An exception is John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).

object is, rather, to avoid losing; to preserve and to pursue U.S. interests; to control escalation, and to promote a more satisfactory war termination than that implied by assured destruction. An attempt to limit war damage, while maintaining or improving prewar and intrawar deterrence, is laudable and an essential objective of both national military strategy and arms control. To insist that deterrence depends upon maximizing—or inflicting very high levels of—civil destruction as a necessary consequence of retaliation is execrable.

The programs suggested to improve current targeting capabilities are not costly and hardly constitute a “first-strike” threat. The degree of further improvement through future programs will be a matter of Congressional (and thereby public) approval. No increase in force levels is contemplated, but that, too, is an option for future consideration, depending upon the need to adapt to Soviet capabilities and upon the outcome of SALT.

In essence, advocates of strategic adaptability merely call for a return to more traditional, sensible, time-tested and proven strategic thinking—a return from a bizarre detour to a path with origins as far back as Sun Tzu:

What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. . . .

Next best is to disrupt his alliances. . . .

The next best is to attack his army. . . .

The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.³⁵

³⁵Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated and with an Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press Paperback, 1971), pp. 77-78.

