

~~RESTRICTED~~
Security Information

ST 33-20-1


PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SCHOOL SPECIAL TEXT

PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE
FIELD OPERATIONS



PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SCHOOL -- February 1953

~~RESTRICTED~~
Security Information



RESTRICTED
Security Information

SPECIAL TEXT

ST 33-20-1

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
FIELD OPERATIONS

This Special Text reflects the current thought of The Psychological Warfare School and conforms to printed Department of the Army doctrine as closely as possible.

RESTRICTED. DISSEMINATION OF RESTRICTED MATTER. No person is entitled solely by virtue of his grade or position to knowledge or possession of classified matter. Such matter is entrusted only to those individuals whose official duties require such knowledge or possession. (See also AR 380-5.)

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SCHOOL

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

February 1953

RESTRICTED
Security Information

RESTRICTED
Security Information

SPECIAL TEXT

ST 33-20-1

This text is published as interim training literature pending publication of FM 33-20, Psychological Warfare Operations in Occupied and Liberated Areas. The text is keyed to the revised final draft of the Field Manual manuscript.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
FIELD OPERATIONS

RESTRICTED. DISSEMINATION OF RESTRICTED MATTER. No person is entitled solely by virtue of his grade or position to knowledge or possession of classified matter. Such matter is entrusted only to those individuals whose official duties require such knowledge or possession. (See also AR 380-5.)

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SCHOOL

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

February 1953

2

RESTRICTED
Security Information

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SCHOOL

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

February 1953

This Special Text reflects the current thought of the Psychological Warfare School and conforms to printed Department of the Army doctrine as closely as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDANT:

OFFICIAL:

Joe V. Morey

JOE V. MOREY
Major, Infantry
Secretary

Gordon Singles

GORDON SINGLES
Colonel, Infantry
Assistant Commandant

FOREWORD

This is one of a series of Special Texts to be published on psychological warfare. Upon completion of this series of Special Texts FM 33-5, Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations, will be rescinded or revised to eliminate all obsolete or superseded material. Other Special Texts of this series are:

- ST 33-10-1, Military Propaganda
- ST 33-25-1, Psychological Warfare Field Operational Units
- ST 33-30-1, Intelligence for Psychological Warfare

CONTENTS

	Paragraph	Page
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL	1-5	6
CHAPTER 2. PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS		
Section I. General	6-13	9
II. Employment of Leaflets	14-16	13
III. Leaflet Targets	17-19	15
CHAPTER 3. TYPES OF LEAFLETS		
Section I. General	20-22	20
II. News Leaflets	23-28	21
III. Propaganda Newspapers	29-33	24
IV. Safe Conduct Pass	34-39	28
CHAPTER 4. PREPARATION OF LEAFLETS		
Section I. Special Situation Leaflets	40-45	32
II. Standard Leaflets	46-53	34
CHAPTER 5. LEAFLET CAMPAIGNS	54-58	39
CHAPTER 6. DISSEMINATION OF LEAFLETS		
Section I. Artillery	59-63	43
II. Air	64-71	47
III. Other means	72-75	51
CHAPTER 7. RADIO BROADCASTING		
Section I. Introduction	76-80	52
II. Strategic Radio	81-83	55
III. Tactical Radio	84-86	60
IV. Clandestine Radio	87-88	63
CHAPTER 8. MONITORING	89-90	65
CHAPTER 9. FIELD RECORDINGS	91-93	68
CHAPTER 10. LOUDSPEAKERS		
Section I. Introduction	94-100	70
II. Employment of Loudspeakers	101-105	74
APPENDIX I. REFERENCES		85
II. SERIAL NUMBERING SYSTEM - LEAFLETS		86
III. LEAFLET FIRING TABLES		87
IV. LEAFLET DRIFT TABLE		89

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

1. **PURPOSE AND SCOPE.** This Special Text sets forth the detailed procedures for the conduct of psychological warfare operations in a theater of war. It contains discussion of media, propaganda tactics and techniques, and other aspects of psychological warfare operations.

2. **MISSION.** The mission of psychological warfare operations is to support combat operations and to assist military and governmental agencies in the administration and control of liberated and occupied territories. This is accomplished by the use of propaganda and related measures to effect changes in the opinions, attitudes, emotions, and behavior of enemy, friendly and neutral populations in such a way as to reduce enemy will to resist and to increase their cooperation with United States forces.

3. **CAPABILITIES.** a. Communication. Psychological warfare operations provide direct communication with the enemy and with occupied friendly nations through such media as leaflets, radio, and loudspeakers and through patrols, agents and underground organizations. Written or oral messages may be transmitted to groups or individuals by overt or covert means to effect desired changes in their attitude and ultimately in their behavior.

b. Depress enemy morale. Sustained employment of psychological warfare operations can produce a cumulative depressing effect upon the morale of enemy units and civilian populations.

c. Reduce combat efficiency. Consistent psychological attacks upon morale, when integrated with other military operations, can lower the combat efficiency of enemy soldiers.

d. Induce defection. Employment of psychological warfare operations over extended periods can induce enemy soldiers to malingering, surrender or desert.

e. Deception. Psychological warfare operations can be employed in support of the deception plans of the commander.

f. Direct dissident elements. Psychological warfare operations can sustain the morale of dissident elements in enemy territory and may be used to direct activities of such elements against the enemy war effort.

g. Encourage friendly populations. Propaganda measures can be used to gain the confidence of friendly populations under enemy control; to sustain their morale; and to direct their activities against the enemy war effort.

h. Promote good will. Informative and good will programs can be directed toward neutral nations within a theater of operations to win active or passive support for the United States and her allies.

i. Assist Civil Affairs/Military Government. Psychological warfare operations can assist Civil Affairs/Military Government in the administration and control of liberated and occupied territories.

4. LIMITATIONS. a. Communications restrictions. The channels through which psychological warfare operations may reach populations in enemy territory are currently limited to leaflets, radio and loudspeakers, supplemented by behind-the-lines activity of patrols, agents and underground organizations. Limitations of each channel will be discussed separately. When other channels, such as television or other means of disseminating propaganda, become available and are practical to employ they will undoubtedly be utilized.

b. Enemy countermeasures. The effectiveness of psychological warfare operations is limited by the nature of enemy countermeasures.

c. Incomplete information. Accurate knowledge of all factors in the enemy situation is normally not avail-

able to intelligence agencies. Lack of knowledge of these factors may restrict the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations.

d. Difficulty of evaluation. Enemy restrictions on exchange of information, public discussion, and travel limit the information available to psychological warfare operations for the evaluation of propaganda effectiveness.

e. Timely coordination. Complete coordination among all military and civilian propaganda agencies is necessary to insure common direction to all propaganda output. Failure to effect such coordination may provide the enemy with opportunities for effective counterpropaganda and may limit effectiveness of a measure or campaign.

f. Critical personnel. Psychological warfare operations requires personnel with an intimate knowledge of the language, customs and way of life of the target audience and of the political, economic and social problems of its society. Such personnel are often difficult to obtain because of the requirements of other military and civilian agencies.

5. MEDIA OF DISSEMINATION. a. Leaflets. Leaflets, newsheets, newspapers and other printed matter are disseminated by artillery, aircraft, infantry patrols, agents and underground elements in enemy territory are major medium.

b. Loudspeakers. Loudspeakers mounted on vehicles tanks and or aircraft are standard media in close support missions.

c. Radio broadcasts. Radio broadcasts beamed toward enemy areas within the effective range of the transmitter form an effective medium to reach both civilian and military targets. The audience is limited, however, to those who are in possession of receiving sets of appropriate wave length and those who are inclined to listen.

CHAPTER 2

PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS

Section I. GENERAL

6. **DEFINITION.** For the purpose of military psychological warfare operations a leaflet is a written or pictorial message, from an agency of the armed forces to the individual soldier or civilian of another nation for a specific purpose.

7. **ADVANTAGES.** a. Flexibility. Leaflets may employ an appeal which is either primarily textual or primarily pictorial, depending upon the characted of the target audience and the purpose of the leaflet.

b. Permanency. A leaflet is a permanent record of the propaganda message, to which the reader may refer until it has become impressed upon his mind. It may be transmitted to other readers without alteration or distortion.

c. Versatility. Leaflets can be disseminated to forward areas or to areas far behind the lines, and are capable of reaching a wide variety of individuals, individuals, including those who are out of range of the loudspeaker and those who are unable to receive radio messages.

d. Additional meaning. A leaflet may carry a meaning beyond its textual or pictorial content by the use of significant color, typography or shape which has suggestive connotations in the minds of the target audience.

e. Adaptability. The text of the message may be adapted to the intelligence and literacy of the target audience. It may be employed effectively to mould the opinions of those who customarily attach a high value to the credibility of the written word.

8. **DISADVANTAGES.** a. Time-consuming. Effective psychological warfare operations often depend upon the rapid exploitation of fleeting situations. The time required for the preparation, reproduction, and dissem-

ination of a leaflet may reduce its effectiveness in such situations.

b. Illiteracy. Leaflets employing a textual appeal may be ineffective against an illiterate audience or against those with limited ability to understand them. This handicap is overcome in part by the use of illustrations.

c. Countermeasures. Enemy countermeasures include rapid collection and destruction of leaflets, prohibitions against reading with severe penalties for violations, rebuttals through official channels and similar steps.

d. Weather. Wind, rain, snow, and other weather extremes contribute to excessive losses of leaflets, impose restrictions on their dissemination by aircraft, and disturb effective dispersion patterns.

e. Troop education. Troops must be instructed in the identification of surrender leaflets and safe conduct passes to insure compliance with their provisions. Failure to abide by the provisions of such leaflets limits the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations.

9. CLASSIFICATION OF LEAFLETS. Leaflets may be classified in many ways. Normally, the purpose for which leaflets are classified determines the method of classification. Leaflets may be classified -

a. By employment. Leaflets may be classified as tactical, strategic, consolidation, or combination, depending upon the situations in which they are employed.

b. By target. The categories may be determined by the groups to which leaflets are addressed; enemy military, enemy civilian, friendly or neutral civilian.

c. By theme. Leaflets may be classified by the nature of the theme which is employed. Many themes, for example, seek to instill fear in the minds of the target audience; others employ nostalgia; others, the promise of good treatment.

d. By purpose. Psychological warfare operations may use leaflets which are primarily persuasive, informative or directive. These purposes may form the basis of

the classification system.

e. By preparing agency. Circumstances may require that leaflets be classified by the preparing agency: specific Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Groups or Loud-speaker and Leaflet Companies.

10. RECORDS. a. General. Operating units are required to maintain adequate records of leaflets and leaflet operations. Such records are necessary for reference, for historical purposes, as the basis of reports to higher headquarters and for evaluation of the effectiveness of specific leaflets and of leaflet operations in general.

b. Individual leaflet record. A record is maintained for each leaflet reproduced for dissemination. A copy of the leaflet will be affixed to the record, which should contain the following information -

- (1) Originating unit.
- (2) Type of leaflet.
- (3) Language employed.
- (4) Designation or serial number.
- (5) Remarks, to include any special circumstances pertinent to the understanding of the leaflet.
- (6) Target group, whether general or specific.
- (7) Explanation of art work and its significance.
- (8) English translation of the text and captions of all illustrations.

c. Leaflet operations record. Leaflet operations records show, in tabular form, the employment of leaflets in a specific operation or over a given period of time. From such a record, information may be digested to show the employment of a given leaflet during a given period of time, the types and numbers of leaflets used against any particular enemy unit or the total number of leaflets disseminated within a period of time. Example of a typical entry in a leaflet operations record is shown below -

LEAFLET OPERATION RECORD

Date	Target Unit	Target Des.	Leaflet No.	Quantity
30 Apr	150 Div, 50 CCF	C159-F816*	4652	400,000

*Designates location by coordinates on situation map.

11. **REPORTS.** Leaflet reports are prepared by psychological warfare operations units and staff officers for submission to higher, lower and adjacent headquarters. They are of two types, routine and special -

a. Routine. Periodic reports are submitted as prescribed by higher headquarters. Such reports are generally of a statistical nature and include daily progress reports and weekly summaries. They are normally submitted as a part of a consolidated report covering all psychological warfare operations of the unit in the period covered.

b. Special. Special reports cover unusual conditions or irregular events. They may be requested by higher headquarters or may be initiated by a subordinate headquarters. An operations report normally will follow an unusual, experimental or emergency operation. It will include the following: the tactical or strategic situation involved; propaganda methods employed and reasons therefore; quantity reproduced and disseminated; specific targets; and other factors affecting the operation. Whenever practicable, supplementary reports stating the effectiveness of the leaflet operation, as determined from prisoner of war interrogation, captured documents or propaganda analysis, should follow and be incorporated into the special report.

12. **SERIAL NUMBERS.** The system of serial numbering of leaflets in a theater of operations will be designated by proper authority. Some system will be employed to facilitate identification, ordering, stockpiling, filing, and recording. An adequate system will also serve as an index to all leaflets on a particular theme. Appendix II contains a sample serial numbering system.

13. **TRANSLATIONS.** English translations will be produced in quantity for each foreign language leaflet employed by psychological warfare operations. English

translations are prepared for reference and historical purposes and for the following reasons -

a. Troop orientations. English translations are used to orient front line troops concerning the provisions of leaflets disseminated to enemy soldiers facing their positions. The success or failure of a leaflet mission may depend upon troop compliance with the leaflet promises made to the enemy, especially those which deal with the treatment of surrendering soldiers. Translations distributed to front line troops prior to dissemination of the of the leaflet facilitate such cooperation.

b. Briefing. Translations are also distributed to artillerymen, air crews, and infantry patrols engaged in leaflet dissemination to the target audience. Such advance knowledge of the nature of the dissemination mission will emphasize its importance and insure better cooperation.

c. Policy coordination. Psychological warfare operations units and staff officers in a theater of operations and policy-making agencies in the zone of the interior will be supplied with English translations of all leaflets. Translations will serve as a basis for their evaluation of the leaflet and for the development of new leaflet types.

Section II. EMPLOYMENT OF LEAFLETS

14. STRATEGIC SITUATIONS. a. Nature. Leaflets employed strategically are long-range in scope and are designed to orient the opinions, attitudes, emotions, and ultimately the behavior of the target audience toward the broad objectives of American policy. Strategic leaflets may be employed against any individual or group under enemy control and for the information and guidance of friendly and neutral populations wherever they may be located within a theater of operations.

b. Purpose. Such leaflets usually further the the broad political and military objectives of the United States by creating new or modifying old attitudes among the target populace. They are employed to reduce the en-

emy's will to resist; to sustain the morale of and to direct the activities of dissident and friendly elements in enemy territory; and to prepare for United States post-war military and political policies and control. The propagandist attempts to increase internal tensions within the enemy nation and to decrease productive capacity for war.

c. Dissemination. Strategic leaflets are normally disseminated by aircraft. This permits extensive area coverage at minimum expense and with maximum speed.

15. TACTICAL SITUATIONS. a. Nature and purpose.

Leaflets employed in tactical situations are designed to have an effect upon the immediate attitude and behavior of the enemy soldier and consequently the battle situation. Essentially, the tactical leaflet is a message from one soldier to another across the battle line. As such, it is simple and direct in language, limited in scope and timely in employment.

b. Types. Tactical leaflets are either general or local in nature, depending upon the target against which they are employed -

(1) General. These leaflets are intended for dissemination on a wide front covering several enemy units. They apply to all enemy soldiers in an area and are usually intended to modify attitude rather than to affect immediate behavior.

(2) Local. Local tactical leaflets are addressed to specific enemy units or specific locations. They are more personal in appeal and may cite names of enemy personnel, their circumstances, and courses of action open to them. They may generally be considered more immediately effective than general leaflets because of their emphasis on behavior response and their application to a specific tactical situation.

16. CONSOLIDATION SITUATIONS. a. Nature. The consolidation phase begins in liberated or occupied territory when the first friendly or hostile civilians come under control of Allied forces. Consolidation propaganda deals with the establishment of orderly control and with

the orientation and re-education of the populace toward philosophies of government and ways of life in accord with United States political and military policy. Initially, emphasis is placed upon securing lines of communication and restoring order. As the consolidation phase progresses, psychological warfare operations begin the task of rehabilitating civilian media of mass communication. These media will be operated by psychological warfare operations in the early phases of consolidation. Operational and subsequent policy control of these media will be turned over to selected indigenous personnel as the consolidation period advances.

b. Media. Media employed during this period include normal civilian means of mass communication: newspapers, radio, theaters, motion pictures, magazines, books, and pamphlets, supplemented by handbills and posters in the initial stage.

Section III. LEAFLET TARGETS.

17. STRATEGIC TARGETS. The entire population of a theater of operations, military or civilian, constitutes the target for strategic leaflet operations. It is neither possible nor desirable to attack all segments and strata at one time. However, during the course of a military campaign, psychological operations will address strategic leaflets to all of the following segments of the population -

a. Enemy military. Strategic leaflets play upon the morale and the will to resist of all members of the enemy military establishment. They supplement the more localized and more immediate appeals of tactical propaganda. Strategic leaflets employ nostalgic, divisive, informative, and political themes among others to achieve a long-range effect upon enemy morale. Such leaflets seek to build future acceptance of a United States victory and of eventual U. S. control. They also have an indirect effect upon military morale through the changes which they achieve in the opinions, attitudes, emotions and behavior of the

civilian population which provides strategic support.

b. Civilians. Strategic propaganda leaflets are directed to civilian populations throughout the period of hostilities. Civilian targets may be hostile, friendly or neutral.

(1) Enemy civilians. Strategic leaflets attack diverse psychological vulnerabilities within the enemy nation to weaken the willingness of the civilian to continue war sacrifices, to undermine his faith in his government and its leaders, to reduce his productive capacity and to create frictions and dissension within the enemy state.

(2) Friendly civilians. The populations of occupied friendly nations, as well as dissident elements within the enemy nation look to the United States for liberation. Such groups present a distinct problem to the strategic propagandist. Strategic leaflets are employed to sustain the morale of such groups, and to obtain their cooperation. Strategic leaflets are also addressed to active underground elements to direct their activities to coincide with the strategic plans of U. S. military forces.

(3) Neutral civilians. Neutral civilians are treated in a manner similar to that of friendly civilians. Strategic leaflets attempt to gain their sympathy and support for U. S. war aims and to convince them of the certainty of U. S. victory.

18. **TACTICAL TARGETS.** Tactical targets are limited to military and civilian personnel who are in a position to affect the immediate combat situation by changes in their attitudes, opinions, emotions and behavior. Leaflets used in such a situation are based upon current intelligence and are normally more intense in their impact upon the target audience than other leaflets dealing with more general themes. Tactical targets include the following -

a. Enemy military. Members of the enemy military establishment in the combat zone are the principal target of tactical leaflets. The aim of such leaflets is to re-

duce the fighting efficiency of the enemy by changing morale and behavior patterns. Prime military targets are the following -

(1) Combat units. Enemy personnel in contact with allied forces are particularly susceptible to propaganda. Such personnel are subject to the pressure of allied arms which furnishes conviction to tactical leaflet appeals. Enemy information services often fail to provide news to the front lines, and the enemy soldier, in the absence of news reports from his own side, is more prone to accept propaganda.

(2) Supply Points. Military personnel from various enemy units gather at supply points daily. Discussion of the military situation and of factors affecting the individual soldier arises regularly. Leaflets directed against such points spread rapidly.

(3) Assembly areas. Places where troops congregate or installations through which they must pass in the combat area constitute good leaflet targets. Enemy hospitals, however, are major exceptions. Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention, they may not be subjected to attack of any kind.

b. Civilians. Tactical leaflets may be addressed to civilians in a position to affect the immediate battle situation. Such targets include civilians serving with enemy forces, labor groups impressed for work on military fortifications and installations, and citizens of towns located within the battle area. Leaflets in these circumstances are used to influence civilians to hinder and block enemy action, to surrender a community more readily, or to collect tactical information for use by allied forces.

19. SPECIAL TARGETS. a. Special publics. Psychological warfare operations may normally expect to find in enemy territory groups which present special possibilities for propaganda exploitation. For psychological warfare operations purposes, those groups which differ from the enemy public in a significant manner are termed special publics. Special publics, however, do not auto-

matically constitute special targets.

b. Criteria of special target. To be a special target, friction must exist between the special public and the rest of the nation to such a degree as to permit propaganda exploitation. The special public must also be in a position to take such action as the propaganda indicates. The existence of a special public is indicated by the presence of both of the following factors -

(1) Significant difference. Groups or individuals must possess some physical characteristic, some mode of living or some belief that makes them significantly different from the rest of the population.

(2) Resistance to change. Those who differ significantly from the rest of the population must be unable or unwilling to lose their salient characteristics.

c. Examples of special publics. The following are typical minority groups which may be considered special publics -

(1) Racial. Members of a minority race within the enemy nation often constitute a special public.

(2) Ethnic. Many nations embrace large minorities which have cultural backgrounds and traditions which differ significantly from that of the majority.

(3) Religious. Members of religious organizations may resist laws and edicts of their government because of the conflict with their basic religious beliefs.

(4) Economic. Workers who have been impressed by the enemy or displaced against their will, oppressed peasants, financially distressed persons, and others may constitute special publics.

(5) Foreigners. Foreigners who have been impressed into enemy labor or military service represent cultural backgrounds differing from those of the enemy nation. Such persons may be particularly discontented with enemy policies and authority.

(6) Political. In totalitarian nations, there exist numerous minor political factions working covertly for their own betterment. These, combined with occasional splits within the majority party, may form

special publics.

(7) Regional. Inhabitants of a particular locality or region often possess regional loyalties which transcend nationalistic interests.

CHAPTER 3

TYPES OF LEAFLETS

Section I. GENERAL

20. **PERSUASIVE.** Persuasive leaflets attempt to gain their objectives through the processes of reason. Facts are arranged and presented in such a way that the target audience is convinced that conclusions reached by the propagandist are valid. The reader is given the impression that he is thinking the problem through for himself. In this way, the morale effect is increased.

21. **INFORMATIVE.** The informative leaflet is employed in all phases of a propaganda campaign. This type, allowing facts to speak for themselves, is used to attract a reading public within the target audience. It establishes the credibility upon which all propaganda activities depend. Information leaflets also play a persuasive role indirectly when our military situation is favorable by emphasizing the futility of the enemy effort. Material is presented in the form of news leaflets, air drop newspapers, and similar matter.

22. **DIRECTIVE.** The directive leaflet is fundamentally a special purpose leaflet, effective only in limited circumstances. It is used in the following phases -

a. **Tactical.** The directive leaflet must be employed with care in tactical situations. The propagandist normally does not direct the enemy soldier to surrender or take other actions favorable to our cause unless three factors are present -

(1) The enemy soldier is in a desperate situation.

(2) The enemy soldier realizes the hopelessness of his situation.

(3) Available intelligence clearly indicates that the enemy is psychologically prepared for directive propaganda.

b. Strategic. Directive propaganda is employed strategically to direct and control activities of underground forces in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. It may also be used to disrupt enemy production by giving advance warning of bombing attacks and directing enemy workers to protect themselves by remaining away from their work.

c. Consolidation. During the consolidation phase, directive leaflets are employed to aid Civil Affairs/Military Government in securing lines of communications and restoring order and discipline. Such leaflets may direct civilians to remain in their homes at certain hours, to stay off certain roads, and to obey other instructions of the occupying forces.

Section II. NEWS LEAFLETS

23. NATURE. News, properly presented, is an effective form of propaganda. News leaflets present news in any printed format other than that of the newspaper. Newspapers, because of their different problems of typography and content, are treated separately in the next section.

24. PURPOSE. The news leaflet serves three propaganda purposes -

a. Provides information. It informs the target audience of the true situation, thus acting as counter-propaganda to any false information disseminated by enemy sources.

b. Promotes credibility. Factual news, presented with apparent impartiality, and subsequently proven accurate, commands the confidence of the targeted audience.

c. Attracts an audience. When credibility is established, news leaflets disseminated at regular intervals attract an audience. This is especially true in nations where domestic censorship leaves U. S. propaganda output the only source of dependable news. An audience thus attracted to news leaflets is predisposed to favorable consideration of other forms of propaganda.

25. EMPLOYMENT. a. Strategic. The news leaf-

let is a vital element of strategic psychological warfare operations. In addition to gaining an audience and promoting credibility, news leaflets are ideal for presentation of military or political developments of widespread importance to the target audience.

b. Tactical. News is vital to the combat soldier. His view of the progress of the war is largely limited to his immediate front. If news from his own official sources does not correspond to the facts as he sees them, or if propaganda news leaflets can provide him with more timely service, he may come to depend upon psychological warfare operations for his supply of news.

c. Consolidation. The news leaflet, as such has little application in the consolidation phase. However, news leaflets in the form of handbills are used in the initial stage of consolidation propaganda and to cover remote areas where other media are not readily available.

26. NEWS SOURCES. a. Military. News normally is obtained from both military and civilian sources. Military agencies supplying information of news value include -

(1) G2, Intelligence.

(a) Data on enemy deployment, strength, unit identification, supply, and morale.

(b) Information concerning the enemy homefront, with emphasis on political dissension, tensions, and unrest.

(c) Photographs taken by clandestine agents in enemy territory.

(d) Information concerning the combat situation.

(2) Signal Corps. Photographs of prisoner of war camps, U. S. or captured enemy war materiel and other subjects of interest to the target audience.

(3) Radio intercept. Monitoring sets organic to psychological operations units gather information of news value from broadcasts of enemy, friendly, and neutral radio stations.

(4) Other. Contacts with military personnel

at all levels provide psychological warfare operations with information for use in news leaflets. News correspondents in the combat area are an additional source.

b. Civilian. (1) News services. U. S. and allied news gathering agencies provide news of interest to the target audience.

(2) Governmental information agencies. Civilian governmental information agencies provide news files for employment in psychological warfare operations. The State Department currently provides such a news service.

27. EDITORIAL PRINCIPLES. a. Adherence to facts.

Since one mission of the news leaflet is to establish credibility, care is taken to insure the accuracy of news disseminated to the target audience.

b. Objectivity. The propagandist does not editorialize in the news leaflet. He allows selected facts to speak for themselves.

a. Selection. The choice of material for dissemination by news leaflets depends upon these factors -

(1) Type of presentation. Illiteracy among the target audience restricts extensive and detailed presentation of news. When this situation exists, written text is reduced in favor of photographs sketches or maps to facilitate understanding.

(2) Censorship conditioning. Target audiences accustomed to strict news censorship are often skeptical of objective news coverage. The news leaflet is most effective when it presents facts which may be verified by the individual reader. Items relating to such remote facts as production figures, damage and casualty claims are apt to be received with skepticism by the target audience.

d. Speed. Speedy dissemination of news by psychological warfare operations can force the enemy into the position of confirming U. S. propaganda output. If the enemy has already received the news of a certain event from us by the time this same event is reported to him by his own side, then the enemy unwittingly lends credibility to our propaganda. Furthermore, news must be recent to in-

sure the target's maximum attention. It is essential, therefore, that news be handled with the speed due a perishable commodity.

e. Brevity. The reader may not have time to read long news items, especially when active anti-leaflet measures are enforced by the enemy. Short items, tersely written, convey essential facts quickly and simply. Brevity also allows maximum use of limited leaflet space.

f. Conformance to policy. Psychological warfare operations field units operate within the framework of policy formulated by higher authority. This policy guidance specifies those themes and vulnerabilities which may or may not be exploited.

28. APPEARANCE. a. General. News leaflets are flexible as to size, shape and typography. These may be altered to fit the productive facilities available and the habits of the reader.

b. Style. Items are presented in the news leaflet in the manner which intelligence indicates is best suited to customs and habits of the target audience. They may be brief bulletins, paragraph descriptions of events, or entire leaflet reports on a single outstanding event.

c. Color. Color may be used effectively in the news leaflet to emphasize important items, simplify illustrations or improve the over-all appearance.

Section III. PROPAGANDA NEWSPAPERS

29. NATURE. A distinguishing feature of newspapers used as propaganda media is the deliberate attempt to make them conform to typographical standards of the area where they are employed. Although normally of large leaflet size, they are more detailed in content than news leaflets. The newspaper normally is disseminated on a regular schedule: daily, semi-weekly or weekly.

30. PURPOSE. Like the news leaflet, the propaganda newspaper is aimed at building an audience and es-

establishing credibility through factual presentation of selected news items. However, the propaganda newspaper often is more effective because of its refined format and style, and greater detail in content.

31. EMPLOYMENT. a. Strategic. The strategic propaganda newspaper is usually an elaborate production. Disseminated by air, it may be addressed to enemy soldiers and civilians, to friendly civilians under enemy control or to specialized groups such as displaced persons within the enemy nation. Size and quality of the newspaper depends upon the facilities, personnel, and time available for its production.

b. Tactical. The propaganda newspaper is employed tactically against enemy troops in the combat area. It is often identical in form and content to the strategic newspaper. In such cases, it is normally printed by the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group and forwarded to the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company for dissemination. Other newspapers pertaining to local situations may be produced by the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in the field. Dissemination is by air or artillery. If disseminated by artillery, the tactical newspaper is of approximately standard leaflet dimensions, 5 by 8 inches.

c. Consolidation. Propaganda newspapers are vital to the success of the consolidation phase. In the initial stage, they normally take the form of leaflet-sized handbills, but as soon as facilities permit these are replaced by conventional newspapers whose format and style are closely tailored to the reading habits of the civilian population.

32. CONTENT. The problems involved in publication of propaganda newspapers are comparable to those faced by all newspapers. The propagandist must produce a newspaper which will gain the acceptance of his audience, or his propaganda message is wasted. Thus, proper content is essential to success of the propaganda newspaper. Content is limited by available space, but a well-balanced pub-

lication contains several, or all, of these elements -

a. War news. News about the war is localized to the maximum extent, but some information about action on other and distant fronts also is essential.

b. World news. Accounts of the world at large are of great interest to readers. This is especially true when the news concerns activities of vital consequence to the enemy nation on the international scene. Readers also are interested in news concerning their nation's place in the world after the war.

c. Homefront news. News items concerning morale on the homefront, inequalities of life at home, effects of bombing raids and similar items are valuable in promoting disaffection among enemy soldiers and civilians.

d. Other news. (1) Sports. Brief news of sports events may be employed as an audience-gaining device. Such news occasionally has propaganda value.

(2) Weather. Weather comments or predictions as they affect the target audience may be employed effectively provided security is not violated.

(3) New Weapons. Latest developments in the weapons field are of interest to both the civilian and the combat soldier.

e. Columns. Through the signed column, the propagandist may comment upon the war, conditions at home, supply problems, food or the weather without the restrictions of more formalized writing style. However, the personal column normally is not used in areas where it is an unfamiliar means of expression.

f. Illustrative material. Pictorial presentation emphasizes propaganda points and attracts readership. Proper illustrations improve the appearance of a newspaper and clarify the content. Illustrative devices include -

(1) Photographs. News and feature pictures emphasize a point, draw attention to a particular item, and provide variety in content and make-up.

(2) Cartoons. Cartoons, when employed, should be similar to the type of drawing the target audience is accustomed to seeing in its own publications.

(3) Comic strips. Where this is a familiar medium to the target audience, the comic strip can capitalize upon humor to great psychological advantage.

(4) Maps. Maps clarify tactical situations for the reader, and their documentary appearance lends to the impression of objectivity in the newspaper.

(5) Sketches. Line drawings are employed to emphasize important points in a news story and to improve the appearance of the newspaper.

33. TECHNIQUES. a. Objective approach. The propagandist uses an objective approach in the propaganda newspaper, just as he does in other news output. This is generally easy when the battle situation is favorable to U. S. troops; it is more difficult when the tactical situation becomes unfavorable. Persuasive aspects of a propaganda newspaper should not be so prominent as to be obvious to the target audience.

b. Familiarity. The propaganda newspaper conforms closely to standards with which the target audience is familiar. These standards fall into three categories -

(1) Writing style. The style of news items should correspond to customary usage in the area concerned, wherever practicable.

(2) Makeup. The physical makeup of the newspaper should conform to accepted civilian custom, including such details as placement of major stories, selection of type faces, and use of various illustrative and break-up devices.

(3) Content. The content must be consistent with the purpose of the propagandist and the reading habits of the audience.

c. Balance. The propaganda newspaper must provide a proper balance between the serious and the light, the good and the bad news. Over-emphasis on bad news has a tiring effect upon the reader. It causes him to ignore the newspaper. An excessively light approach also fails in its propaganda mission. Balance is determined to some extent by the psychological makeup of the target audience.

d. Timing. There is a close relationship between the military situation and the nature and timing of propaganda newspapers. Those published in mobile situations differ radically from those produced in static periods in both content and purpose.

(1) Mobile situations. The newspaper is timely as well as accurate. Thus, where the combat situation is changing constantly, psychological warfare operations concentrates on reporting the action quickly, capitalizing upon the psychological impact of fresh news.

(2) Static situations. When the combat situation is stable, the tone of propaganda newspapers changes. The propagandist uses static periods to build credibility by shifting emphasis to material which the enemy can readily accept, by wider use of non-local news and by the inclusion of occasional items which favor the enemy. In this way, psychological warfare operations facilitates acceptance of its offensive arguments when the need arises.

Section IV. SAFE CONDUCT PASS

34. NATURE. The safe conduct pass is the most official in appearance of all psychological warfare operations products. It is designed to be carried by the enemy soldier as he crosses the lines in surrender, it is employed both strategically and tactically. The safe conduct pass is unique within a theater of operations, standardized in all elements, and authenticated with the signature of the theater commander.

35. PURPOSE. Basically, the purpose of the safe conduct pass is to reassure the enemy soldier that he can surrender safely. Further, the safe conduct pass is so designed that it may be carried covertly by the enemy soldier over long periods of time until he is motivated to surrender by an unfavorable tactical situation or the cumulative effect of propaganda.

36. EMPLOYMENT. a. Strategic. The safe conduct pass may be employed where there is no likelihood of

substantial numbers of enemy soldiers. It is of normal leaflet size, or smaller, and the enemy soldier may tuck it away in the lining of his clothes, in his shoes, or in other inaccessible spots. Constant possession of the leaflet, even joking about it among enemy soldiers during favorable times, advertises the ultimate usefulness of the document. Thus, it keeps the surrender idea uppermost in the mind of the enemy soldier.

b. Tactical. The safe conduct pass finds its maximum usefulness in the tactical situation. It is aimed primarily at removing the enemy soldier from combat through surrender, but it also has important anti-morale effects. Possession of the safe conduct pass gives the soldier a way out, thus discouraging last-ditch resistance.

c. Combination. The safe conduct pass often is both tactical and strategic in effect. The leaflet may be dropped upon civilian population centers for the strategic purpose of depressing civilian morale or arousing controversy about the outcome of the war.

37. ESSENTIAL STANDARDIZED ELEMENTS. The chief characteristics of the safe conduct pass are an authoritative appearance and ease of recognition. It should be standard in each of the following elements -

a. Distinctive form. The typographical arrangement of the safe conduct pass should not be repeated in other leaflets of any nature in the theater. The typography must permit easy recognition by friendly forces.

b. Unique color. Within a theater of operations, a safe conduct pass should make use of a single color, or color combination, which is not duplicated in any other leaflet.

c. Official appearance. The safe conduct pass must convey the impression of a serious and official document, prepared by competent authority. This official appearance is fostered by use of appropriate governmental seals, the selection of type faces, scroll work, and other characteristics of official papers.

d. Proper direction. Essentially, the safe con-

duct pass is addressed to the capturing soldier from the enemy who is surrendering. For this reason, the pass features the captor's language in large type and subordinates the enemy translation. The enemy has studied the safe conduct pass before making his move to surrender; he wants assurance that the man with a gun trained on him can easily read what it says.

e. Authenticating signature. The safe conduct pass should be authenticated by the signature of the supreme commander of the theater of operations involved. Normally, this signature appears below the English language message, and again below the translation in the enemy language.

f. Convenient size. In drafting a safe conduct pass, the propagandist must remember that the enemy soldier may have to carry the pass with him for a considerable time. In many cases, discovery of the pass on his person may be grounds for execution. Unless it is of a size convenient for safe-keeping, the enemy soldier will ignore it and much of its effectiveness may be lost.

g. Statement of treatment of prisoners of war. The safe conduct pass should emphasize those provisions of the Geneva Conventions which relate to the treatment of prisoners of war. The pass is the final leaflet the enemy soldier sees before captivity. A restatement of those provisions which relate to his future status as a prisoner of war serves to reassure him at a time when he may need such reassurance.

38. UNIT PASS. Although standardization is carried to great lengths in the safe conduct pass, there is enough latitude to permit psychological warfare operations units to devise special purpose unit passes at their discretion. Such a pass might be addressed to a specific enemy company, battalion or isolated pocket. Employment of unit passes is sometimes effective in obtaining the surrender of the enemy unit. It may also have an adverse effect upon the morale of the individual soldier. Extreme care must be exercised in the use of the unit pass, to

insure that the standard form safe conduct pass is not compromised.

39. ORIENTATION OF OWN TROOPS. The success of the safe conduct pass rests upon the degree of reliability which enemy soldiers attribute to it. If surrendering soldiers are fired upon as they attempt to use the pass, they and their comrades will regard the pass as a trick. Every friendly combat soldier must be oriented to recognize the pass, and understand its value and objectives. However, he must also be informed that the enemy may use surrender and safe conduct passes as ruses. Capturing troops must be alert for enemy tricks which might cost lives.

CHAPTER 4

PREPARATION OF LEAFLETS

Section I. SPECIAL SITUATION LEAFLETS

40. NATURE. Special situation leaflets are planned, created, reproduced, and disseminated for a particular, immediate purpose. They are developed on the basis of intelligence which indicates the existence of specific, exploitable vulnerabilities within the target audience. They are prepared to meet specific situations as they develop in the course of a military campaign.

41. PURPOSE. Special situation leaflets are prepared on the spot to exploit current psychological weakness within the target audience. Such leaflets often achieve great propaganda impact by imparting a sense of familiarity with the enemy situation. Special situation leaflets are intended for one time use only, since the exact circumstances which governed their preparation are rarely duplicated in the future. Because they greatly enhance the propaganda effect of the message, they are normally employed in all psychological warfare operations except those where standard leaflets may be effectively used (par. 46).

42. EMPLOYMENT. Special situation leaflets may be employed in all situations and against all targets. They are particularly effective when directed against specific enemy units, population groups or locations, but they may also be effectively employed against widely divergent groups over a large area. Tactical propaganda achieves its maximum results when enemy soldiers and civilians in the combat area receive leaflets which relate to their situations at the moment and which outline the attitudes and courses of action which are open to them. Similarly, strategic propaganda is made more effective by use of special situation leaflets which deal with specific problems and discuss them in terms of the facts as they

exist at the precise moment. Consolidation propaganda, likewise, employs special situation leaflets for maximum results. They enable the propagandist to transmit decisions and directives of Civil Affairs/Military Government to the individual community. They are also used to localize re-education propaganda in terms of the particular target group.

43. SELECTION OF THEME. The immediate situation governs the theme employed in the special situation leaflet. Since the situation is appraised upon the basis of intelligence indicating the existence of an exploitable vulnerability, the theme will, in a sense, be determined by the available intelligence.

44. ADVANTAGES. a. Special situation leaflets enable the propagandist to exploit enemy vulnerabilities as they develop.

b. They impart a sense of familiarity with the enemy situation.

c. They permit psychological warfare operations to tailor leaflets to fit the particular target.

d. Since timeliness is inherent in special situation leaflets, they lend themselves particularly to those operations in which proper timing is vital.

45. DISADVANTAGES. a. Since the effectiveness of special situation leaflets often depends upon the speed with which they are disseminated, delays in preparation and reproduction may render them useless.

b. They require high-speed reproduction equipment capable of adequate production in minimum time. Such equipment must be geared to production at peak periods and may thus remain relatively idle at other than peak periods. Where high-speed equipment is not available, quantity production of special situation leaflets within a short space of time is rendered difficult or impossible.

c. More personnel are required for the planning, writing, and layout of special situation leaflets.

Section II. STANDARD LEAFLETS

46. NATURE. Standard leaflets are planned, created, and reproduced for anticipated requirements in advance of the circumstances which govern their employment. They are disseminated to the target audience when the circumstances fit the scope and content of the leaflet. As such, they are general in nature and are intended for repeated employment in a theater of operations. They constitute the stockpile of printed material on which psychological warfare operations may call in emergencies or in other clearly defined situations.

47. PURPOSE. Standard leaflets serve four basic purposes in psychological warfare operations -

a. Contingency. Leaflets are frequently prepared in advance of their need to fit emergency situations which recur along a front.

b. Standardization. Certain leaflets, such as the safe conduct pass, are rigidly standardized. They are normally prepared and stockpiled in advance of need.

c. A theater of operations or army may find it necessary to emphasize certain themes and to place repeated stress upon certain leaflets.

d. Complicated art work. Leaflet illustrations which require complicated art work or extensive color-printing may be mass-produced for reasons of economy of operation.

48. FORM. a. Completed. Standard leaflets in completed form are employed in the following situations -

(1) When the situation which dictates employment of a leaflet is of such a fleeting nature that there is not sufficient time available for the preparation and reproduction of a special situation leaflet. In such cases, a leaflet which has been prepared in advance to fit the general circumstances is employed.

(2) When standardization of the leaflet is essential for quick identification by U. S. and enemy troops, e.g., the safe conduct pass.

b. Semi-completed. Partially printed leaflets are prepared for employment in the following situations -

(1) When standardization of certain elements is required. The surrender leaflet, for example, must contain a standard recognition feature within a theater of operations. The text of the leaflet should, however, fit the immediate circumstances. Therefore, the recognition feature is advance printed for standardization and the remainder of the message is added by the tactical operating unit.

(2) When complicated art work or extensive color-printing is required. The art work and color-printing may be accomplished in advance during slack periods, for completion of the printing process when required. Certain news leaflets, for example, contain standard color panels. These panels are printed ahead of need and the news bulletins overprinted later, as the need arises.

(3) When limited time is available in emergency situations. The contingency leaflet may be printed in advance to cover general and recurring situations, with only a unit designation or place name left vacant. Little preparation and makeup time is required to complete the leaflet.

c. Reverse-side. Leaflets may be pre-printed on one side only for the following reasons -

(1) To emphasize certain powerful themes in a combat area or in a theater of operations:

(2) To speed up the leafletting process.

49. EMPLOYMENT. a. Strategic. Standard leaflets may be employed in strategic propaganda to provide a stockpile of readily available leaflets. Semi-completed leaflets may also be employed at the strategic level to simplify the printing process and reduce reproduction time when a special situation develops.

b. Tactical. Standard leaflets are particularly important in tactical operations. In mobile warfare, situations may develop so rapidly that operating units are unable to prepare leaflets to fit the case. In such cases,

standard leaflets provide a continuation of the propaganda effort. Also, in tactical situations, equipment failures are more likely to occur because of greater stress upon the equipment and because of the scarcity of factory-trained technicians. Standard leaflets in such instances permit continuation of leaflet operations over short periods when equipment is deadlined.

c. Consolidation. Standard leaflets, particularly completed forms, are employed effectively during the initial phase of consolidation operations. Directives which are common to all liberated or occupied territories may be transmitted by this means. Their use in such situations frees reproduction equipment for the continuing tactical mission.

50. PREPARATION. Standard leaflets are prepared by both the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group and the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. The work load placed upon the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company by the combat situation determines the extent of its standard leaflet efforts. Where time is available, all types of standard forms, with the exception of the safe conduct pass, are reproduced by the company so that they may be geared more fully to the tactical situation. Where the work load is heavy and time is not available, responsibility shifts back to the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. Due to greater flexibility in equipment and the availability of commercial facilities, the Group is normally responsible for production of complicated standard leaflets.

51. STOCKPILING. a. Criteria. Standard leaflets must be stockpiled between the time they are prepared and the moment they are employed. There are a number of factors which govern the size of leaflet stockpiles, whether they are maintained at theater or army level -

(1) Size of the enemy force. Stocks vary in approximate proportion to the size of the opposing enemy forces.

(2) Composition of the enemy force. The com-

position and size of different language groups within the enemy forces is a factor in leaflet stockpiling.

(3) Nature of combat. During static periods, use of stockpile leaflets is held to a minimum. Thus, such a lull might be an advantageous time to build up the standard leaflet stockpile for future use.

(4) Anticipation of need. An intelligent estimate of future needs is a vital factor. A Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company facing long open stretches of farm land, for example, would have little use for large stocks of leaflets calling upon villages to surrender, but it might well need a sizeable supply of "You Are Surrounded" leaflets.

(5) Available storage space. Availability of storage space is a limiting factor at both theater and army level.

b. Procurement. Normally, the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company maintains a stockpile of standard leaflets sufficient to cover its anticipated needs. This it does by reproducing leaflets or by drawing them from the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, as appropriate. Supplies held by forward units must be augmented as the distance to theater headquarters increases.

52. ADVANTAGES OF STANDARD LEAFLETS. a. They permit immediate dissemination of leaflets when speed is a primary factor.

b. They provide for complete standardization of certain leaflets and for important features of semi-completed leaflets.

c. They insure continuity of psychological warfare operations on a given front even though equipment may be out of action temporarily.

d. They are particularly suited to highly mobile situations in which preparation of specific leaflets is impractical.

e. They make efficient use of larger high-speed presses at theater level for pre-printing and provide for the employment of Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company printing

facilities during slack periods.

53. DISADVANTAGES OF STANDARD LEAFLETS. a. Standard leaflets are usually less effective than leaflets designed for a specific situation.

b. They require the use of substantial storage space for the stockpiling of leaflets.

c. They add a complicating factor to the problem of supplying the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company.

d. In the case of semi-completed and reverse-side leaflets, further printing is required to complete the leaflet and the advantage of speed may be lost.

CHAPTER 5

LEAFLET CAMPAIGNS

54. **NATURE.** A leaflet campaign is a planned, progressive presentation of ideas in printed form to the target audience in order to achieve a specific propaganda goal.

55. **PURPOSE.** Military propaganda has two broad objectives: one aimed at changing the attitudes of the target audience, and the other aimed at influencing the behavior of the target audience. Normally, the propagandist seeks to influence behavior in a desired direction by first changing the attitudes of his target audience. To accomplish his objective, the propagandist must overcome or bypass the natural hostility, suspicion or misunderstanding of the target audience. One leaflet or propaganda theme, even when repeated constantly, is rarely sufficient. Thus, a step-by-step leaflet campaign becomes necessary to bridge this psychological gap.

56. **FRAME OF REFERENCE.** Just as a person's behavior is determined by his attitudes, so are his attitudes largely a result of his own experience. This reservoir of experience against which the individual reviews each new situation is called his frame of reference. To change an enemy soldier's attitudes and influence his behavior, the propagandist must plan a campaign to modify the enemy's frame of reference. Otherwise, the propaganda effort is doomed to failure.

57. **PLANNING THE LEAFLET CAMPAIGN.** a. General. Leaflet campaigns generally are part of a larger propaganda campaign utilizing all effective media. Leaflet campaigns are employed in strategic, tactical, and consolidation phases of psychological warfare operations. Planning is almost identical in each of the phases.

b. Intelligence. The propagandist planning a

leaflet campaign must have accurate intelligence concerning the target audience. From area studies, supplemented by prisoner of war interrogation, propaganda analysis, captured documents, and other intelligence sources, he must draw an accurate picture of the attitudes of the target audience on a given subject. He uncovers vulnerabilities in the enemy camp which may be exploited to effect changes in these attitudes. With these facts at hand, the psychological warfare officer is ready to plan a step-by-step leaflet campaign.

c. Selection of themes. Although a leaflet campaign might conceivably consist of variations of one effective theme, such a campaign generally makes use of multiple themes carefully selected for their contribution to the propaganda objectives. In seeking to change the target audience's attitudes, the propagandist first chooses a theme easy for the target audience to accept. Any number of leaflets may be used to exploit one theme. This theme, when accepted lays the groundwork for the presentation of the next theme, and so on until the target audience's attitudes have changed enough for its behavior to be affected or directed. Evaluation of effectiveness of each leaflet will provide guidance in selecting successive leaflets.

d. Continuity. Generally, each leaflet in a leaflet campaign bears a definite relationship to every other. Methods by which separate elements of a campaign are tied together include the following -

(1) Continuity of subject matter. Leaflet subject matter must be coordinated in a propaganda campaign. If the campaign is based upon the theme of "good treatment of prisoners of war," for example, one leaflet may deal with food, another with medical treatment, and still another with postal privileges.

(2) Slogan or catch phrase. A single slogan or catch phrase may run through an entire leaflet campaign and serve to tie the various elements together.

(3) Similarity of art work. Often, the character of the art work serves as a coordinating device between different leaflets of a campaign.

(4) Format. Leaflets which comprise a campaign may employ a similar format to aid in identification.

(5) Other methods. The propagandist may employ many other methods to provide continuity to his leaflet campaign. The color or texture of the paper as well as the size or shape of the leaflet may form connecting links between one leaflet and the next, depending upon the situation and what the series is designed to accomplish.

e. Composition. The psychological warfare operations officer may use any type of leaflet that helps him achieve the objective of his leaflet campaign. Air drop newspapers, safe conduct passes, surrender leaflets, and straight propaganda leaflets may be employed.

58. PHASING. a. General. Those leaflet campaigns devised to supplement a military campaign are phased directly into the military operation. They may complement either conventional military warfare or unconventional warfare. Psychological warfare operations achieves its maximum effectiveness as a support weapon when it is timed to hit the target audience at the right psychological moment. This requires accurate, up-to-date intelligence and close coordination with the combat arms. The enemy soldier or civilian is likely to be in a more receptive frame of mind following severe artillery or bombing attacks, during sieges of uncomfortable weather, or after news of military or diplomatic reverses.

b. Operation order. The psychological warfare plan for a given element of a leaflet campaign, including leaflet themes to be developed and the time schedule on which leaflets will be disseminated, is evolved by psychological warfare operations staff officers at the appropriate level of command. The plan, when approved, becomes an annex to the operations order in cases where the leaflet campaign is a direct part of the operation. It is the task of psychological warfare operations to make certain that proper leaflets are ready at specified ammunition points at specified times.

c. Informal phasing. Although many leaflet oper-

ations are phased into regular military operations, others are handled more independently. In this case, close coordination must be effected by psychological warfare operations staffs and operating units with disseminating agencies concerned.

CHAPTER 6 DISSEMINATION OF LEAFLETS

Section I. ARTILLERY

59. **GENERAL.** a. General. Artillery is a standard method for tactical dissemination of propaganda leaflets. Although experimentation indicates that further satisfactory methods of distribution may be developed for tactical psychological warfare operations, the 105-mm howitzer is used almost exclusively at the present time.

b. Capabilities. (1) Accuracy. Artillery can pinpoint targets with reasonable accuracy. This means that small objectives, such as platoon or company positions holding up an advance, may be bombarded with leaflets.

(2) Weather. Artillery is an effective means of disseminating leaflets in almost all weather conditions.

(3) Coordination. By close liaison with intelligence and operations officers, an artillery leaflet-firing mission may be geared to the enemy situation and to our own plans.

c. Limitations. (1) Limited range. Artillery has a limited range. It cannot penetrate deeply into enemy positions.

(2) Visibility. Leaflets frequently are fired at dusk or at dawn to protect enemy soldiers from reprisals when they leave their positions to pick up leaflets. However, excessive fog, wind, rain or darkness reduce accuracy of artillery-fired leaflets.

(3) Limited capacity. Each artillery round has a limited carrying capacity. For maximum effectiveness, certain saturation effects must be achieved. A desired saturation may require an excessive number of guns and shells.

(4) Lack of penetration. Artillery leaflet shells cannot penetrate fixed defenses. The armor-piercing shell cannot be adapted to leaflet dissemination, and the BE smoke shell is not capable of such penetration.

60. ROLLING AND CONVERSION OF SHELLS. a. Conversion of 105-mm BE smoke shell. The 105-mm BE smoke shell is used for leaflet dissemination, after conversion. Each shell, including fuze and propellant charge, is packed and issued in a separate carton. In preparing the shell for the leaflet operations, the base plate is unscrewed and the smoke canisters removed. The empty shells are stored until used, at which time leaflet rolls are placed in the shell in place of the smoke canisters.

b. Rolling the leaflet. The cavity of the 105-mm BE smoke shell is 11 7/16 inches long by three inches in diameter. This provides room for two rolls of 5 or 5½ inch leaflets, rolled on the short axis. Cardboard washers are inserted ahead of, between, and behind the rolls if space remains. The load must be snug inside the shell without crinkling or tearing the leaflets. A three-inch roll contains upwards of 150 leaflets, depending upon the paper stock and the skill of the leaflet-roller. All leaflet rolls are marked for easy identification, preferably with a symbol that can be chalked or painted on the shell itself. Also, an English language copy of the leaflet should be attached to the roll for later insertion in the shell box. This makes it certain that the proper leaflets are distributed to the firing battery, and helps orient firing personnel with the text and general purpose of the leaflet.

c. Packing the shell. In order to diminish the danger of flash burns on the leaflets, it is advisable to plug the hole in the powderbag baffle in the nose of the shell with a small wooden splinter. This splinter tends to absorb the flash so that the leaflets are left unmarred. After insertion of leaflet rolls, the loading and reassembling of the leaflet shell may be completed with addition of any necessary cardboard washers, replacement of the base plate and stenciling of the shell with the proper identification symbol.

61. ROLLING AND CONVERSION, OTHER WEAPONS. The process of rolling and conversion is similar for shells

of other artillery pieces, when used for dissemination of propaganda leaflets. In each case, a base ejection shell must be employed.

62. DELIVERY OF SHELL. a. General. The method by which loaded leaflet shells are delivered to the artillery vary with the circumstances.

b. Normal procedure. Shells normally are transported to the ammunition supply point (ASP) for pick-up by the firing units. In pre-planned missions, the procedure for getting the shells to the firing batteries on a wide front is the responsibility of the army artillery officer. However, once the basic firing plan has been agreed upon, the commander of the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company incorporates the details of where and when the leaflet shells will be available, and where and when they are to be fired, in an operations memorandum for the signature of the army psychological warfare officer. The memorandum is endorsed by the army artillery officer before action by the corps and division artillery officers involved. Their standard firing orders incorporate the required information for the guidance of the firing batteries.

c. Special circumstances. Under special circumstances, the artillery liaison section of the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company delivers the loaded leaflet shells directly to the designated firing batteries. This may be necessary under conditions requiring maximum speed. Such operating procedure is not normally followed because the psychological warfare operations unit lacks sufficient transportation for such activities.

63. FIRING THE MISSION. a. Types of weapons.

(1) 105-mm howitzer. The basic artillery weapon for leaflet dissemination at present is the 105-mm howitzer, M2 or M2A1. Shell used is the M84, base, ejection type smoke-filled, weighing 27.4 pounds. It is detonated by the 25-second M54 or 75-second M67 fuze and powered by either a No. 5 charge for ranges up to 5,000 yards, or a

No. 7 charge for greater ranges.

(2) British 25-pounder. The British 25-pounder is the counterpart of the U.S. 105-mm howitzer, but the shell weighs only 17.8 pounds and carries a somewhat shorter smoke canister. Its range with charge No. 2 is approximately 6,000 yards; with charge No. 3, it is slightly over 10,000 yards.

(3) U. S. 155-mm howitzer. Experimentation has been performed with the U. S. 155-mm howitzer for longer range leaflet dissemination. This weapon proved impractical because observation of the target area was extremely difficult, and because the leaflets were damaged by the more powerful charge. Ballistics of the leaflet shell also make it erratic at ranges greater than 8,000 yards.

b. Advantages of 105-mm howitzer. This weapon and its shell are considered the best at present for various reasons -

(1) Light artillery. It is light artillery, carried in sufficient quantity and yet mobile enough in any artillery battalion to handle most psychological warfare operations missions.

(2) Dispersion. The shell is designed to disperse its contents over a reasonable area once the base plate has been ejected.

(3) Simplicity. The shell is loaded with smoke canisters which can easily be removed and replaced with leaflet rolls.

(4) Dimensions. Dimensions of the shell are such that they provide generally satisfactory leaflet coverage per shell.

(5) Visible fire. The pieces may be used at maximum ranges and still provide observable targets; longer range guns carry leaflets out of normal visible range.

(6) Supply. Supplies of ammunition are assured, because of the general utility of the piece in military operations.

c. Ballistics. Original firing tables for the BE smoke shell were found during World War II to be unfit for leaflet-firing. New firing tables were devised for

both the U. S. 105-mm BE shell and the British 25-pounder BE smoke shell (Appendix III).

(1) Fuze for 105-mm howitzer. The M54 fuze, with either the No. 5 or the No. 7 charge, has been found to be the most practical for leaflet firing. However, a TM 67 fuze may be used, where the required range is greater than 8,000 yards and observed fire is not required. This fuze, with a maximum time of 75 seconds, carries a No. 7-charged shell 12,000 yards.

(2) Saturation. Saturation of the target area is a vital factor in leaflet dissemination. It has been found that an area 500 yards long by 500 yards wide can be adequately covered by firing 25 shells, each loaded with two rolls of leaflets. Where the enemy is in defilade or camouflaged by overhanging trees, a graze burst is preferred in order to bring the leaflets within reach of enemy personnel.

(3) Terrain and weather factors. The range tables are for computing fuze settings for time burst. In sighting the gun, the factor of trajectory angle must be taken into account. Recommended height of burst is 100 yards, except where the enemy is covered by heavy foliage. Graze burst is preferable, in such cases, to prevent the leaflets from clinging to foliage, out of reach of enemy personnel. The terrain factor must also be weighed. Flat, slightly wooded country is best for leaflet operations. Mountain targets are extremely difficult to reach. On the open plains, a small breeze will blow the leaflets out of reach. As with smoke, use of leaflets require a study of wind conditions over the target area. A wind of 10 to 15 miles per hour may cause leaflets to drift as much as 500 yards when they are ejected at a height of 100 yards.

(4) Observation. Observation of a leaflet mission target is limited by the position of the enemy, by the terrain, and by visibility conditions.

Section II AIR

64. GENERAL. Air dissemination is a dependable

method of delivery for large quantities of leaflets. Both long-range strategic aircraft and light liaison planes are available as carriers. The target area extends from the front lines to deep in the enemy's homeland.

65. ADVANTAGES OF AERIAL DISSEMINATION. a.

Range. Long-range aircraft can carry strategic leaflets deep into the interior of the enemy nation. Tactically, air drops made by fighter planes or light liaison craft can drop leaflets on isolated enemy troop positions which may be out of artillery range. Troops in reserve, marshaling areas and concentrations of civilians also fall into this target category.

b. Flexibility. Leaflet drops on more than one target per mission are possible by releasing portions of the bomb load over several target areas. In addition, loudspeaker operations can be conducted from the same planes used for leaflet drops.

c. Bomb capacity. One M105 KM16A1) leaflet bomb carries a load capacity of approximately 22,500 leaflets. Therefore, a modern strategic bomber is capable of extensive target saturation.

d. Overcomes terrain barriers. Terrain barriers to artillery fire or movement of artillery pieces, such as primitive jungle trails, rugged mountains or isolated island positions, can be overcome with leaflet-carrying aircraft.

66. DISADVANTAGES OF AERIAL DISSEMINATION. a.

Weather. Strategic and tactical air leaflet bombing missions are subject to the same weather restrictions as other aerial operations.

b. Enemy defenses. Enemy defenses can adversely affect a leaflet bomb run. This limitation is somewhat minimized by the fact that leaflet bombs may be dropped from high altitudes, since the objective on strategic missions is to saturate an area rather than pinpoint a target. However, enemy air superiority can make the operation extremely difficult and hazardous.

c. Accuracy. On tactical air drops, it is often more difficult to get complete saturation of small areas than it would be by using artillery.

67. ROLLING OF AIR DROP LEAFLETS. The leaflet roll for the M105 (M16A1) bomb, currently standard for leaflet bombing, contains approximately 4,000 5 by 8 inch leaflets. The roll is made within a metal template 13 1/4 inches in diameter and four inches high. When the roll is completed, a string is tied around the top to hold it together.

68. DELIVERY OF BOMBS. The processing sections of the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group and the Loud-speaker and Leaflet Company are responsible for rolling and loading of bombs, and for their delivery to Air Force personnel at the appropriate air base. Fuzing is accomplished by Air Force personnel. Sometimes more efficient operations will result if the leaflets are rolled by the processing section and then transported to the air base for loading at that point.

69. BOMB, M105 (M16A1). This, the standard leaflet bomb at present, is a metal casing which originally was designed for delivery of butterfly bombs. The rear of the bomb casing consists of a fin assembly for the purpose of keeping the bomb in a free glide pattern trajectory. The fin assembly also prevents tumbling, which would have an adverse effect upon the bomb's accuracy. The threaded receiving cup for attachment of the fuze is in the nose of the bomb. The lugs protrude from the side of the casing for the purpose of mounting the bomb in the bombrack. The bomb breaks open down the center of the long axis. The detonation of the fuze in the nose exerts a pressure which flares the bomb open, exposing the leaflet rolls inside. The rolls disintegrate in the wind stream, allowing the leaflets to flutter to the ground.

70. DRIFT AND DISPERSION. a. Leaflet bomb drop.

Since the advent of the present leaflet bomb and the timed fuze, many of the uncertainties of area coverage caused by drift and dispersion of free falling leaflets have been eliminated. For accurate saturation, a bomb-burst altitude of 1,000 feet is considered most efficient. When the fuze is timed to burst at this altitude, the free falling leaflets are still subject to wind dispersion and drift, and it is necessary to select a point of detonation some distance to windward of the target area. Appendix IV indicates approximate drift of leaflets according to wind velocity where 1,000 feet is the height of the bomb burst.

b. Leaflet hand drop. The hand-drop method is commonly used in tactical dissemination of leaflets. An arbitrary number of leaflets, usually about 500 per bundle, are tied with an off-center tie as close to the end as possible. The bundles, so prepared and thrown free of the plane either one package at a time or in a connected series, open when the air blast hits the untied end. To insure proper opening of the bundles, a trip wire or cord should be attached to the leaflet bundle tie and run to the plane, to be secured there or held in a crew member's hand. The wrapping tie thus is pulled off and the leaflets fall free. The drift and dispersion factors affecting area saturation must be clearly understood and followed in this type of air drop mission. The pilot should come in over the target at a low altitude. To take full advantage of wind velocity and direction, the drop must take place to windward of the target area. At an altitude of about 1,000 feet, the drift table in Appendix IV should give maximum coverage of the target area.

71. COORDINATION. Coordination between the Air Force and psychological warfare operations units is essential to the success of air dissemination operations. The Air Force may designate one squadron or elements of several squadrons to handle all leaflet missions. In the planning phase, both psychological warfare operations staff officers and liaison officers of the various operating units must maintain constant contact with the assigned

Air Force units. In this manner, air drop leaflet campaigns may be kept geared with ground operations, and the drop schedule can be sufficiently flexible to account for circumstances of weather and target defenses.

Section III. OTHER MEANS

72. SURFACE DISSEMINATION. a. Patrols. Posters and leaflets can be placed or scattered by infantry and reconnaissance patrols, usually in conjunction with their regular missions.

b. Guided missiles. The chief advantage of artillery dissemination is its accuracy. A small guided missile would extend this accuracy over a much greater range. A large guided missile might eventually replace the air-drop, when development is sufficiently advanced.

c. Balloons. Unmanned free balloons are not orthodox carriers, but their use in propaganda has received much publicity and support. It has proved somewhat effective, although thermal currents and sudden wind shifts render it highly inaccurate.

73. AIR DISSEMINATION. a. Tactical aircraft. Ground support planes can be utilized for leaflet distribution, achieving a considerable degree of accuracy.

b. Consolidation aircraft. Two types of aircraft may be employed in dissemination of consolidation leaflets: liaison planes and helicopters. Both may be employed in air-drop operations. Because they can fly at low altitudes and disseminate leaflets with a high degree of accuracy, they are especially useful in propagandizing a sparsely populated area.

74. RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS. Leaflets can be left behind in retrograde movements. They may be tacked on trees, pasted on buildings or left lying on the ground.

75. INFILTRATORS. Infiltrators, line crossers, partisans, and special agents may be employed for disseminating overt or covert leaflets behind the enemy lines.

CHAPTER 7

RADIO BROADCASTING

Section I. INTRODUCTION

76. In many respects, radio is an ideal medium for psychological warfare operations. Radio's value to psychological warfare operations lies largely in its basic quality as a true medium of mass communication. In areas where possession of radio receivers is widespread, radio can reach more people quicker than any other medium. Radio may be employed in the tactical, strategic or consolidation phases of operations.

77. CAPABILITIES OF RADIO. a. Speed. Radio is timely. It capitalizes upon the latest information available because of the speed with which material may be processed and disseminated to the target audience. This makes radio ideal for news dissemination.

b. Wide coverage. Radio can provide wide coverage of the target area.

c. Ease of perception. Radio-listening requires little or no effort on the part of the target audience, compared with the effort required to read and comprehend the written word. Illiteracy is no bar to understanding.

d. Versatility. Radio is a versatile medium. Since it is easily adaptable to drama, music, news, education, and other types of programs, radio can transmit the propaganda message in a less obvious manner than other media.

e. Familiarity. Where possession of radio sets is common, listening to the radio is a habit. Thus, audience familiarity is greater than in the case of leaflets.

f. Emotive power. Radio has all the emotive power of the spoken word. A skilled radio propagandist can exert tremendous influence on the emotions of the listener simply by variations of tempo and emotional pitch of delivery.

78. LIMITATIONS OF RADIO. a. Jamming. Enemy jam-

ming may prevent the target audience from receiving radio broadcasts.

b. Preventive measures. In areas under enemy control, the target audience may be subject to severe anti-listening laws, thereby reducing effectiveness of radio propaganda.

c. Technical. Radio signals may be rendered inaudible by fading or static due to unfavorable weather and atmospheric conditions. Also, mountainous or mineral-laden terrain often limits range.

d. Lack of receivers. In some areas, so few receivers are available that radio is not an effective medium. In addition, the enemy may have distributed receivers incapable of receiving foreign broadcasts.

e. Power shortage. Bombing or other military action may destroy power plants, thus rendering inoperative all receivers depending upon an external power source.

f. Competition with enemy output. Enemy radio broadcasts compete with psychological warfare operations' radio output for the attention of the audience. Long enemy indoctrination may have made the target audience unreceptive to our propaganda output.

g. Fleeting impression. Oral media do not possess the permanency of written media. The propaganda message may be forgotten or distorted with the passage of time.

79. PROGRAMMING. a. Definition. For purpose of this text, radio programming consists of planning the schedule, content, and production of radio programs during a given period.

b. Objectives. The broad objectives of programming for psychological warfare operations include.--

(1) Building and maintaining a listening audience among those whom the propagandist wishes to influence.

(2) Accomplishing propaganda objectives in coordination with other media.

c. Principles. (1) Regularity. The radio propagandist must create habitual listening patterns, in order to build a regular audience. Thus, regularity is an essential element of programming. The broadcast day, once established, remains rela-

tively unchanged. Specific programs are transmitted at the same hour each day. Content style, and format of programs should not vary once the proper pattern is established.

(2) Repetition. Incessant repetition is essential to oral learning. Key themes, phrases or slogans must be repeated until accepted (or definitely rejected) by the target audience.

(3) Suitability for target audience. The radio propagandist must prepare programs to suit the tastes and needs of his intended audience. Program content and style of presentation should, as far as practicable, follow the patterns to which the intended audience is accustomed.

(4) High standards. Programs offered by psychological warfare operations must be better than those offered by the enemy if a large audience is to be gained.

(5) Credibility. Factual and credible material is utilized.

(6) Exploitation of enemy censorship. Discussion or presentation of books, plays, music, and political topics banned by the enemy often finds a ready reception among the target audience. The same holds true of news withheld by enemy censors.

(7) Reinforcement. Radio propaganda supplements or reinforces U. S. or friendly propaganda disseminated through other media.

d. The voice. Selection or training of announcers with proper voice qualities is essential to successful radio propaganda operations.

(1) Emotive power. The emotional tone conveyed by the voice often influences the listener more than the logic of arguments presented. The power of a propaganda message may be greatly affected by the pitch, resonance, inflection or articulation of the announcer.

(2) Proper accent. (a) Generally, only those announcers should be used whose voices do not sound "foreign" to the intended audience.

(b) Care must be taken to avoid use of announcers whose accents are similar to those of unpopular groups within the target audience.

(3) Female announcers. Use of female announcers generally is limited.

(a) Because of the pitch of female voices, they generally are not as suitable for radio transmission as lower-registered male voices.

(b) The status of women, legally and extralegally, is distinctly inferior to that of men in most parts of the world. The audience may resent directions or suggestions from a woman.

(c) Female voices may be employed effectively in certain cases, however. A female voice may lend effectiveness, for example, in propaganda exploiting nostalgia and sex frustration. In addition, female announcers may be used in consolidation radio programs directed to female audiences.

80. PROGRAM ORIGIN. Radio programs beamed to the target audience originate in four ways--

a. Direct. Programs may be transmitted directly to the target audience simultaneously with their origin in the studio.

b. Relay. This is a broadcast originating in a regular studio and transmitted to one or more other broadcasting stations for instantaneous relay transmission to the target audience.

c. Remote. In a remote broadcast, the broadcast originates somewhere other than the regular studio. The signals are transmitted to the studio (usually by wire), and are simultaneously beamed to the target audience. An example would be a remote broadcast of a political demonstration.

d. Rebroadcast. Programs may be recorded and transmitted at a later time. Such programs may originate in the studio, or be relay or remote broadcasts.

Section II. STRATEGIC RADIO

81. EMPLOYMENT. a. General. Radio is an extremely effective medium for dissemination of strategic propaganda. The Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group is responsible for strategic radio operations within a military theater, under plans and policies laid down by Psychological Warfare Division, Special

Staff, Theater. This section is concerned only with overt operations. Clandestine radio operations are discussed in paragraphs 87 and 88.

b. Role in propaganda campaign. Radio broadcasting is employed in close coordination with strategic leaflet operations. Both operations are phased with orthodox military operations for maximum effect. Radio propaganda campaigns are planned and executed in the same way as leaflet campaigns.

c. Support to underground elements. This type of strategic radio operation requires separate consideration. Radio may be used to transmit instructions, directions, and other information to underground elements in enemy-held territory. Such messages may be sent either as straight announcements or in a pre-arranged code.

(1) Non-coded messages are aimed at--

(a) Providing underground supporting elements with instructions, directions or information which require immediate action.

(b) Taxing the effectiveness of the internal security forces by giving information calculated to mislead or confuse such security forces.

(c) Creating general distrust among the enemy population by promoting the idea that "your co-worker or next-door neighbor may be a spy." Such distrust leads to inefficiency in production and loss of faith in victory.

(2) Encoded messages are employed when the instructions, directions or information are of such a critical nature that they must be unintelligible to the enemy. Generally, coded messages are contained within the text of normal broadcasts. Selected words or phrases form a master code. When these words or phrases are interspersed in announcements or newscasts, underground elements receive the coded information.

82. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS. The following capabilities and limitations are specifically applicable in strategic radio--

a. Capabilities. (1) Safety. Radio propaganda operations may be executed without the risk to personnel and equip-

ment involved in aerial leaflet drops.

(2) Wide coverage. Radio provides an economical and effective means of reaching a target audience spread over a wide area.

b. Limitations. (1) Intelligence. Effective strategic radio operations are dependent upon adequate intelligence. Such intelligence may be difficult to obtain.

(2) Personnel. Announcer-linguist personnel must be highly skilled and may be difficult to obtain.

83. PROGRAM CONTENT. a. News. News is the backbone of psychological warfare radio operations, particularly in wartime. News is an ideal vehicle for propaganda.

(1) Types of news broadcasts. There are two general classifications of news programs: the straight newscast which avoids any obvious personal comment, and the news commentary in which personal comment supplements straight news.

(2) Preparation. (a) News sources. News sources for radio news programs are the same as those outlined in paragraph 26 for news leaflets. News is selected for broadcast according to its listener interest and its effectiveness in accomplishing the propaganda objectives.

(b) The script. Press services provide the bulk of the news material used in strategic radio operations. Since this news material is not written exclusively for radio, it must be rewritten before broadcasting by personnel well versed in the language of the target audience. As in newspaper preparations, selection and placement can be used to emphasize a particular news item.

(3) Presentation. (a) Timing. The radio propagandist must schedule news programs for those times when they can reach a maximum number of listeners. For example, if intelligence reports show that the most popular listening hours are from 0600 to 0800 and from 1900 to 2200, programming for those hours should emphasize news.

(b) Presentation techniques. Propaganda can be blended into news with relative ease, if the scriptwriter is careful to maintain the appearance of objectivity. Or, since news

Section III. TACTICAL RADIO

84. **EMPLOYMENT.** a. General. Tactical radio is used in conjunction with combat operations by mobile units of the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. Planning for their employment is accomplished by the army to which attached. Tactical radio operations are based directly upon combat intelligence, interpreted against the background of strategic intelligence obtained through normal intelligence channels.

b. Objectives. Broad objectives of tactical radio operations are:

- (1) To increase disaffection among enemy soldiers.
- (2) To deceive the enemy as to U. S. and friendly intentions.
- (3) To influence civilians in territory under enemy control to take actions favorable to U. S. and friendly forces.

c. Station location. Tactical radio stations are usually located forward of the army rear boundary. Proximity to the combat area increases the effective range of the radio operations and results in availability of more recent intelligence with which the propagandist can work. Exceptions could be the tactical use of radio against guerrilla forces, or by-passed and isolated garrisons.

d. Static situation. When employed in a static combat situation, tactical radio may be used to--

- (1) Build an audience for our later broadcasts when fighting resumes.
- (2) Establish credibility in the minds of enemy listeners through strict objectivity in newscasts.
- (3) Support, expand, and clarify themes used in other media.
- (4) Disseminate information which may help deceive the enemy as to operational plans for the immediate future.

e. Mobile situation. (1) Advance. When U. S. and friendly forces are advancing, tactical radio is directed primarily to civilians in the enemy rear. Broadcasts emphasize the futility of resistance and seek to cause the collapse of civilian aid to the enemy military effort. In addition, such tactical broad-

casts prepare civilians psychologically for occupation by U. S. and friendly forces.

(2) Retrograde movements. Tactical propaganda has limited value in retrograde movements. The radio propagandist may increase credibility by broadcasting selected truths about the combat situation, when such facts do not jeopardize the security of combat units and the success of their missions.

85. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS. Tactical radio is subject to the general capabilities and limitations of radio outlined in paragraphs 77 and 78. The following aspects are specifically applicable to tactical radio--

a. Capabilities. (1) Mobility. Tactical radio stations are mobile and may be deployed where they are most needed. Thus, maximum utility is obtained from critical personnel and equipment.

(2) Speed. The speed with which combat intelligence can be processed into tactical radio output enables the propagandist to get his message to the target audience before the combat situation changes. Speed also makes tactical radio an effective medium for counterpropaganda.

(3) Authenticity. Proximity to the combat area lends authenticity to tactical radio. People normally tend to accept a report originating locally than rather from a distant place.

(4) Area programming. Tactical radio can cater to the tastes of limited, specific target audiences.

b. Limitations. (1) Receivers. An adequate number of radio receivers may not be available to the target audience, especially combat troops. This shortage of receivers often is so severe that tactical radio is ineffective. However, this limitation may be offset by two factors--

(a) When even a few individuals receive tactical radio broadcasts, the message may be passed along by word of mouth.

(b) Listening groups often form to take advantage of those receivers which are available.

(2) Audience attention. In the combat area, the target audience may not have time for listening to the radio.

(3) Power. Our own combat operations may destroy or damage electrical power facilities, thus rendering inoperative those receivers depending upon external power sources.

86. PROGRAM CONTENT. a. General. Program content of tactical radio normally is less varied than that of strategic radio. Production facilities are not as elaborate. Fewer types of programs are needed to satisfy the tastes of the target audience.

b. News. News is the essential element in tactical radio programming. News source, preparation and presentation of tactical news programs are basically the same as for strategic radio. However, tactical news programs should be planned and produced with these factors in mind--

(1) The listener has an abnormally high interest in what is occurring in the immediate combat area. It means life or death to him.

(2) Newscasts must be factual. The listener is often in a position to check personally on the accuracy of news reports.

(3) Local news should predominate as it is of much greater interest to the target audience. However, enough world news and news from other fronts should be included to give meaning to the local military news.

c. Prisoner of war lists. Where it is in accordance with policy, broadcasting names of prisoners of war is an excellent method of gaining and holding an audience.

d. Testimonials. Prisoners of war may volunteer to broadcast short propaganda messages to their ex-comrades, especially those in their own units. The highest ranking prisoners available should be employed in such broadcasts. For security reasons, broadcasts by enemy personnel are by censored recordings.

e. Music. Music is employed extensively in tactical radio programs, for the same purposes as outlined in paragraph 83. It is especially useful in programs aimed at increasing nostalgia of enemy troops for pre-war peace and home life.

f. Special broadcasts. Documentary broadcasts are employed in tactical radio to bring events of special signifi-

cance to the attention of the target audience. These broadcasts, normally originating outside the studio, may include --

(1) Relays or rebroadcasts of significant speeches by high military or civilian officials.

(2) Broadcasts of important political or diplomatic events.

(3) Talks by former prisoners of war, enemy civilians, and other persons whose opinions are significant to the target audience.

(4) Recordings made in the immediate combat zone.

Section IV. CLANDESTINE RADIO

87. BLACK RADIO. a. Definition. "Black" radio is that form of radio propaganda which appears to originate from sources other than the actual one. It is designed to give the impression that it comes from dissident elements in the enemy country or in territory occupied by the enemy. Normally, it involves utterances or acts which are unlawful under the domestic law of the enemy-controlled area.

b. Advantages. (1) Black radio can use themes and tactics not permitted on overt or "white" radio because of policy considerations.

(2) It can operate on either side of the battlefield. When operated by clandestine agents in enemy-held territory, it can broadcast first-hand accounts of events and situations embarrassing to the enemy.

(3) It can operate with a minimum of personnel and equipment.

(4) Black radio can cause the enemy populace to worry about apparent enemies within the ranks. With every man suspecting his neighbor, inefficiency grows and the capacities of the internal security forces are strained.

c. Disadvantages. (1) When operating behind enemy lines, black radio stations are easily located. Therefore, they must constantly be moved.

(2) Programming must be extremely skillful to avoid revealing the station as an obviously black operation.

(3) Black radio is difficult to coordinate with white operations.

(4) When found out, black stations which purport to represent underground movements in an enemy country may discredit valid underground movements which have arisen independently.

(5) Since black operations must echo the enemy viewpoint in many respects in order to convince the target audience of its legitimacy, there is the danger that black radio actually may help maintain enemy morale.

88. GRAY RADIO. a. Definition. "Gray" radio is that form of radio propaganda operation in which the propagandist avoids specific identification as being either friendly or enemy.

b. Advantages. (1) Gray radio can be more forthright than black radio in its programming because it does not attempt to falsify the source.

(2) Gray propaganda operations can be coordinated more directly with military action than black radio.

(3) When the true identity of a gray station is discovered and made public by the enemy, valid underground groups are not necessarily discredited.

c. Disadvantages. (1) The audience often realizes that gray broadcasts originate from enemy sources, thereby decreasing effectiveness of both gray and overt operations.

(2) Gray radio, having no recognized voice of authority, cannot have the power of authoritative tone of white or black operations.

CHAPTER 8

MONITORING

89. GENERAL. a. Purpose. The purpose of radio monitoring by psychological warfare operations units is interception of enemy, friendly, and neutral radio broadcasts which, when analyzed, provide information of value to psychological warfare operations. Discussion of the intelligence aspects of monitoring is contained in St 33-30-1. Specifically, monitoring has these specific aims --

(1) To ascertain the nature, direction, and purpose of the enemy's propaganda output to domestic or foreign audiences and to his own military forces in the field.

(2) To insure, through monitoring of friendly radio broadcasts, that the propaganda output of U. S. and allied nations is in consonance.

(3) To provide news supplementary to that obtained from regular sources.

(4) To provide information required for evaluating the effectiveness of U. S. psychological warfare operations.

b. Responsibility. (1) Strategic monitoring. Strategic monitoring within a theater of operations is the responsibility of the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. Such monitoring is performed within the monitoring section of the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, and within the Group S2 section. In practice, these sections normally combine to operate radio interception equipment.

(2) Tactical monitoring. Tactical monitoring is a responsibility of the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company within a particular army area. Such monitoring is performed by a monitoring sub-section of the Operations and Intelligence Section of the Propaganda Platoon.

90. OPERATIONS. a. Coordination. Strategic and tactical monitoring facilities are not adequate for monitoring all enemy, friendly, and neutral radio output. A process of selection is therefore required if those responsible for planning and ex-

ecuting propaganda operations are to be adequately informed. Monitoring personnel are provided with monitoring schedules setting forth which programs are to be monitored.

b. Monitor qualifications. (1) Language skill. Monitoring personnel must be skilled in the language used in monitored broadcasts. Their vocabulary must be wide, and they must be trained to recognize subtle vocal inflections which add meaning to the message being broadcast.

(2) Shorthand or speed-writing. Monitors must be able to record information as rapidly as it is broadcast, by means of some shorthand or speed-writing system. This is not necessary when recording apparatus is used in monitoring.

(3) Familiarity with equipment. All monitoring personnel must be thoroughly familiar with operation of monitoring equipment.

c. Recordings. Broadcasts may be monitored by means of recording equipment. This insures accuracy and allows maximum utilization of available personnel. However, much material is recorded in this manner which is of no interest. Therefore, the recorded broadcast is useless until edited by personnel capable of recognizing material of propaganda import.

d. Scanning. In addition to scheduled monitoring of specific broadcasts, provision is made for scanning the dial for other broadcasts of significant interest to U. S. and allied forces.

e. Operational rules. Monitoring personnel must—

(1) Be accurate. They must not allow personal opinion to influence their monitoring reports, in cases where such reports are not verbatim accounts of broadcasts.

(2) Be familiar with names of persons and places likely to appear in monitored broadcasts.

(3) Monitor only the station to which assigned, unless specifically directed to scan for other broadcasts.

(4) Record the identity of the monitored station, the date and hour of the monitored broadcasts, and other such pertinent information.

(5) Write phonetically when in doubt as to correct spelling.

(6) Follow standard procedure in notifying superior or significant information obtained in monitoring.

f. Communications and reports. All communications and reports are handled in accordance with established procedure. Monitoring sections compile and disseminate special reports as required by authorized requesting agencies. Periodic reports are forwarded to those agencies by Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff, Theater.

CHAPTER 9

FIELD RECORDINGS

91. GENERAL. a. Definition. Field recordings are those recordings made at the actual scene of the event. These recordings are later broadcast by radio, by loudspeaker.

92. EMPLOYMENT. Field recordings are of great value to psychological warfare operations. They lend balance to radio programming by making available various material originating outside the studio. Ways in which field recordings are utilized include--

a. Discussion among cooperative prisoners of war concerning their treatment since capture may be recorded and broadcast by tactical or strategic radio.

b. A touch of realism can be added to newscasts by interspersing news items with recordings calculated to heighten the impact of the news. Documentary recordings may be made of the arrival of news bombers for use against the enemy, capture of an enemy-held city by U. S. or allied forces, and other such significant events.

c. Recordings may be made for later special events broadcasts, covering such events as speeches by high military or civilian officials and round-table discussions among persons known and respected by the target audience.

d. Excerpts from enemy broadcasts which are inconsistent with enemy output to his domestic audience may be recorded and broadcast, thus discrediting the enemy propagandist with his own people.

93. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES. a. Advantages. (1) Field recordings have the touch of realism and drama which make them of great interest to the listener.

(2) They lend variety to programming.

(3) They facilitate security measures. The recording may be censored or edited before being broadcast.

(4) The recording is a permanent record and may be reused.

(5) New announcers, especially indigenous personnel, as well as program ideas, can be auditioned in advance by enemy prisoners of war, and their reactions noted.

(6) Use of recordings insures accuracy in broadcast material.

b. Disadvantages. (1) External noises at the scene of the recording may interfere with satisfactory reproduction.

(2) Some events to be recorded cannot be rehearsed or staged purely for purposes of recording.

CHAPTER 10

LOUDSPEAKERS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

94. **DEFINITION.** A loudspeaker, for the purposes of this Special Text, is an instrument designed to increase the volume of sound so that it can be heard beyond its normal radius by the unaided human ear. Essentially, combat loudspeakers are elaborate, mobile adaptations of public address systems.

95. **CAPABILITIES.** a. Hastening the enemy's decision to surrender, facilitating the surrender, and thereby reducing casualties which would occur if the enemy fought to the last man.

b. Inducing individual surrenders in static situations from dissident enemy elements, thereby reducing the necessity for patrols to capture enemy personnel for intelligence purposes.

c. Facilitating the reorganization of civilian elements for obedience to authority of friendly forces.

d. Supporting any offensive action of the ground forces by deceiving or confusing portions of the enemy forces.

e. Inducing attitude modification and/or behavior activation in the target audience.

96. **LIMITATIONS.** a. Wind-flow, terrain-induced acoustical effects, and other technical difficulties often make a loudspeaker broadcast inaudible.

b. Since its operating area is so localized, there is often an excessive time lag between a request for the unit and its arrival.

c. The effectiveness of a loudspeaker unit depends heavily upon the ingenuity and intelligence of the announcer. The announcer must necessarily operate without close supervisory control.

97. **INTELLIGENCE AND COORDINATION.** The loud-

speaker broadcast is an intensely specific operation in terms of its audience. Intimate intelligence concerning the enemy unit and its personalities is essential. If the enemy soldier hears his unit addressed properly, his own platoon officer called by name and his casualty figures given accurately, he will react more favorably to a loudspeaker message. Before every mission, the announcer must carefully study all intelligence about the specific enemy force to be addressed. Closest coordination with orthodox military weapons must be achieved. For example, a loudspeaker surrender appeal may be ineffective until orthodox weapons have physically battered the enemy unit into a receptive stage. The loudspeaker message may be an ultimatum prefaced by a medium or heavy artillery barrage and concluding with a threat of redoubled barrage if the ultimatum is not obeyed. Such threats must be kept, on schedule. If such action is called for, there must be the highest degree of coordination maintained through military channels.

98. BASIC PRINCIPLES. Certain standard principles of loudspeaker appeal may be set forth.

a. Direct. Combat loudspeakers are a tactical support weapon. Accordingly, the appeal should be free from any strategic, long-range propaganda. It should refrain from argument. In most combat situations when loudspeakers can be employed, brief and pertinent appeals are most effective.

b. Simple. The appeal should be made in simple, easily understood language.

c. Firm and authoritative. The text should have a firm note, and should be official in tone.

d. Repeated. Important phrases should be repeated throughout the appeal for emphasis and clarification.

e. Personalized. The appeal should be personalized

f. Well-planned. The appeal should be prefaced with an explanation in English as to the purpose of the broadcast. American troops must be cautioned not to shoot enemy soldiers coming forward to surrender.

g. Specific. Detailed, specific instructions on how to surrender should always be included in a surrender appeal.

h. Brief. The normal loudspeaker appeal from a stationary position should be as brief as possible, consistent with the situation and the intent of the message.

i. Current. The appeal must be based on the latest and most accurate intelligence of the enemy forces. Such intelligence, especially order of battle data and details on enemy morale, must be thoroughly absorbed before the loudspeaker broadcast is initiated.

99. TEXTS AND SITUATIONS. The text of a loudspeaker appeal is tailored for a specific situation and should be prepared in advance. Such texts fall into many categories. The following are examples of situations in which loudspeakers may be effectively employed. Each reflects the individual situation in which it is employed.

a. Static situation. Where the situation is such that the enemy cannot possibly surrender, the loudspeaker is handicapped to that extent, but there are occasions when a broadcast still may be advantageous. The text should--

(1) Stress late news indicating the worsening of the enemy's position.

(2) Concentrate on building up an attitude favorable to future loudspeaker broadcasts rather than insisting upon surrenders.

(3) Be short and precise, with important points repeated to insure understanding.

(4) Be specifically directed against the enemy force by name.

b. Small scale operations. Usually, this is an operation against an isolated pocket of enemy forces. The text should--

(1) Present a concise, detailed report of the enemy's tactical situation.

(2) Avoid premature surrender instructions. Probably nothing increases a man's determination to fight more than being told how to surrender before he is psychologically ready.

(3) Avoid using emotion-laden words like "surrender." Emphasis should be on the voicing of specific action instructions.

c. Friendly advance. In a situation in which the enemy is disorganized, the loudspeaker is capable of providing retreating enemy soldiers with a source of direction. In this situation, the text should--

(1) Be more powerful and authoritative than in any other situation.

(2) Come immediately to the point that further resistance is hopeless. Instruction should be given to the enemy soldier on how to surrender or quit the fight.

d. Consolidation. Loudspeaker units move quickly into a liberated or occupied city and pass along news and instructions to the civilian populace. Texts in this situation should--

(1) Be slower-paced and more carefully developed than in any other loudspeaker situation. The text should present as many details as possible since the time element is comparatively unimportant.

(2) Be calm in tone and avoid any inciting words or phrases. The emphasis should be on an authoritative, factual presentation of news and instructions.

100. LOUDSPEAKER EQUIPMENT. a. Proposed equipment. Proposed loudspeaker equipment possesses the following military characteristics--

(1) The equipment should be light-weight and capable of operation from aircraft, vehicles or ground positions.

(2) The equipment should be sufficiently high-powered to project an intelligible voice propaganda message approximately two miles under optimum conditions, or for at least 15 seconds from an aircraft flying in excess of 3,000 feet.

(3) The equipment should be capable of speedy installation and removal from vehicles or aircraft.

(4) Weight and size of the equipment should not overload or interfere with normal operation of vehicles or aircraft.

(5) Lip microphones should be used for elimination of local noises such as loud engines and gunfire.

b. AN/UIQ-1 Public Address Set. This loudspeaker

set has been widely used, although not designed specifically for psychological warfare operations. It is a portable electro-acoustic system consisting of two amplifiers, two power units a horn-type speaker with mounting stand, lip microphones and other equipment such as cables and switches. The AN/UIQ-1 has a rated peak output of 350 watts. Under ideal conditions, it has a range of up to two miles. This range is limited, however, by such factors as battle noises, intervening terrain and adverse winds. The complete set weighs 1,100 pounds, but weight of the speaker horn with attached driver unit is only 84.5 pounds.

c. AN/TIP-2 Public Address Set. This set is a portable system for the distant projection of sound. Rated output of the set is 500 watts. Under optimum conditions, range of the system is some 10,000 feet. It performs satisfactorily under all weather conditions. The speaker, weighing 106 pounds, consists of eight banked horns and a tripod employed in ground operations.

d. Reels. Reels carrying extra cable lengths are not standard equipment with the AN/UIQ-1 or AN/TIP-2 sets, but may be used as a field expedient to increase the distance between the announcer and the horn. This is done to protect the announcer from enemy fire directed at the loudspeaker broadcast and to permit locating the speaker as close to the enemy as possible.

Section II. EMPLOYMENT OF LOUDSPEAKERS

101. WHEELED VEHICLES. a. Operation from vehicular mount. For psychological warfare operations, a vehicular mounted loudspeaker is considered one which is mounted on a wheeled vehicle. Various types of vehicular mountings are listed, with their outstanding advantages and disadvantages.

(1) 1½-ton personnel carrier. (a) Advantages. The primary advantage of this vehicle is the abundance of room available for the loading of equipment.

(b) Disadvantages. The vehicle has low acceleration and is not maneuverable, particularly in rough terrain.

(2) ¾-ton panel type. (a) Advantages. It offers

protection against weather and can transport recording equipment along with the loudspeaker.

(b) Disadvantages. The vehicle's enclosed body makes it difficult for personnel to withdraw from the vehicle and take cover quickly in the event of air attack. It is an easy target due to its high silhouette.

(3) 1/4-ton truck and trailer. (a) Advantages. It has a low silhouette and is easily camouflaged.

(b) Disadvantages. The truck and trailer combination affords poor traction in mud and has poor maneuverability, especially when backing.

(4) 3/4-ton weapons carrier. (a) Advantages. The vehicle offers good protection against weather. It has good maneuverability and provides enough room for the unit's personal equipment. It makes the unit self-contained.

(b) Disadvantages. A high silhouette is the most serious disadvantage. This may be partially overcome by removing the crossbows and tarpaulin over the cargo bed, and carrying along the folded-up tarpaulin as a throw-over cover in bad weather.

(5) Half-track. (a) Advantages. It has good traction and maneuverability, and affords good protection against weather.

(b) Disadvantages. The half-track requires considerable maintenance. In combat conditions, being an armored vehicle, it attracts enemy fire.

b. Terrain and weather factors. Terrain and weather factors bearing upon the success of the mission and the security of personnel and equipment must be considered by the responsible loudspeaker unit leader. These considerations involve--

(1) Placing the loudspeaker horn in a position to gain the maximum range and coverage. The most desirable positions are the forward slope of a hill near the crest, topmost stories of houses, or any other location that combines height and safety.

(2) Placing the vehicle and crew in a defiladed area during the actual broadcast.

(3) Avoiding, where possible, broadcasts on flat terrain where protective cover is lacking.

(4) Taking cognizance of the manner in which inclement weather conditions affect the audibility and range of a loudspeaker broadcast.

c. Deployment. The loudspeaker unit, when working with the infantry: follows a basic tenet of the infantry: to deploy in combat. When the speaker is being used in close support of ground troops, it is essential to have a reel containing some 300 feet of extra cable mounted on the vehicle. This is used as an extension for the loudspeaker horn and allows the truck and crew to remain in a comparatively safe area during the broadcast.

d. Duties of personnel. (1) Announcer. The announcer is in charge of the loudspeaker team. His duties are--

(a) To acquaint himself with all available intelligence data on the nature of the target audience.

(b) After receiving available intelligence, to direct the driver to the locale of the broadcast.

(c) To prepare the script on notes on what he is to say in the loudspeaker broadcast.

(d) To broadcast to the target audience.

(3) To assist the driver and technician in dismantling and removing the equipment to a place of safety.

(2) Technician. The duties of the technician are--

(a) To work under the direction of the announcer.

(b) To maintain and operate loudspeaker equipment.

(3) Driver. The duties of the driver are to drive and maintain the vehicle in which the loudspeaker is mounted, and to assist the announcer and the technician under the direction of the announcer. In many cases, a two-man loudspeaker crew is used, in which case it consists of an announcer and a driver-technician.

e. Security of personnel and equipment. Loudspeaker operations often entail considerable personal risk. Since much of the unit's equipment may be within range of enemy small

arms fire, maintenance of the equipment at top-level efficiency is an important problem. These considerations emphasize the need for careful personnel and equipment security measures.

(1) Information. Upon arrival in an unfamiliar area for a broadcast, unit personnel collect all possible information as to location of mined areas, enemy strong points, and potential danger areas. If possible, an escort should be obtained before moving down to the actual front.

(2) Defilade. The vehicle and crew should remain in defilade during the broadcast.

(3) Brief message. The broadcast itself should be brief so as not to subject personnel and equipment to unnecessary enemy fire.

(4) Withdrawal. Care should be taken that a good route of withdrawal is available to permit rapid extrication of personnel and equipment.

(5) Equipment care. Regular maintenance of loudspeaker equipment will contribute to its effectiveness and long life.

(6) Deployment. Proper deployment and use of cover in movements must be standard practice with loudspeaker operations personnel.

102. TANK-MOUNTED. a. Mission and capabilities. The basic mission of the tank-mounted loudspeaker is to keep up with armored spearheads on the break-through and exploit situations as rapidly as they develop. The tank loudspeaker may also be used in certain static situations, but since this weapon has a unique shock value, it is most properly used when it exploits the speed, violence, and jarring surprise inherent in the well-executed armored attack.

b. Moving situation. (1) Besieged towns. In an assault on a besieged town, the "talking tank" may be extremely effective. A column of tanks leading a break-through deploys before the town and holds fire. The tank-mounted loudspeaker then broadcasts the appropriate message or instructions. If air coordination can be effected or if artillery units are not too far behind the advance, leaflet bombs or shells may be dropped over

the town. Then the tanks move forward without firing while the loudspeaker calls for the inhabitants to capitulate. Instructions on the use of white flags, the surrender of weapons, and similar matters are broadcast.

(2) Pockets of resistance. Tank mounted loudspeakers are effective in cleaning up road blocks and stubborn pockets. For example, an infantry platoon or company may be pinned down by enemy fire. The call goes back for a "talking tank," since other loudspeaker vehicle-mountings are not sufficiently armored for this type of broadcast. While the infantry holds its fire, the tank moves around the flanks, broadcasting a summary of the tactical situation which emphasizes the futility of the enemy position.

c. Static situation. Except in unusual circumstances, use of a tank-mounted loudspeaker in static situations is an inefficient way of utilizing this weapon. Not only is it wasteful but also an unnecessary risk of valuable equipment.

d. Deployment. Deployment of the tank-mounted loudspeaker varies with the nature of the individual situation. However, the following basic considerations are always applicable--

(1) Utilize mobility. The main purpose of mounting a loudspeaker on a tank is to gain mobility. Any deployment that does not utilize this mobility factor is improper.

(2) Column position. Usually, the "talking tank" takes up a No. 2 or No. 3 position in a moving tank column. It is important that it be close to the head of the column.

e. Placement of equipment and personnel. The AN/UIQ-1 loudspeaker system, powered by a PE-75 generator, is mounted on both light and medium tanks. Although different equipment may be used in future operations, a knowledge of this mounting will be beneficial.

(1) Light tank. In the light tank, the loudspeaker is mounted on the gun rack outside the tank and the generator behind the turret. Both are protected by armor plate welded to the tank. The amplifiers are mounted on both sides of the gun inside the tank. The announcer replaces the bow gunner; usually he occupies the bow gunner's position.

(2) Medium tank. On medium tanks, the loudspeakers

er is welded to the front of the turret and the generator to its rear. Both are protected by armor plate. The amplifiers are mounted inside. The announcer sits in the position of the bow gunner while the combat loudspeaker technician operates (the tank radio and) the loudspeaker system in the gunner's position. He reloads the guns if necessary.

f. Security factors. (1) Training. Since loudspeaker tanks accompany other tanks in the column and operate as part of a team, tank loudspeaker personnel must be as well-trained in tank tactics as other personnel in the column.

(2) Discipline. Loudspeaker personnel must obey implicitly all orders of the unit commander. The tank commander's advice on such matters as bridge load maximums, avoidance of bad terrain, and tank tactics should generally be heeded.

(3) Security. When making a loudspeaker appeal even to an apparently weak position, the "talking tank" personnel should take proper security precautions.

(4) Equipment. Care of equipment is of the utmost importance to tank loudspeaker personnel. Superior maintenance procedures must be uniformly followed.

103. AIRBORNE. a. Equipment. At the present time airborne loudspeaker equipment is mounted in the floor of C-47 transport planes and is capable of broadcasting audible propaganda messages from an altitude of 5,000 feet for as long as 30 seconds under normal operating conditions.

b. Operations. Airborne loudspeaker operations are of three general types --

(1) Combat. In a combat situation, the loudspeaker plane is called up for a broadcast over an area in which the enemy is still a potent fighting force. The broadcast may be part of a coordinated attack involving infantry, artillery, and armor, as well as other air units. The sole purpose of the loudspeaker plane's participation is to support the over-all operation. Broadcasts may be surrender appeals or anti-morale messages.

(2) Semi-combat. In this situation, the loudspeaker plane broadcasts over an area where the enemy forces are already militarily defeated. Surrender appeals and instructions

constitute the major portion of the loudspeaker activity in this type of situation.

(3) Consolidation. In this situation, the airborne loudspeaker is merely another vehicle for conveying to civilian populations in liberated or occupied areas any news, information or directives which will facilitate their cooperation with U. S. aims.

c. Capabilities. (1) Mobility. Airborne loudspeakers are capable of broadcasting on short notice to sectors ranging several hundreds of miles from the base of operations.

(2) Self-contained units. The airborne loudspeaker is a self-contained unit and is capable of delivering a broadcast without any laborious technical preliminaries.

(3) Wide coverage. Air loudspeakers can cover a wider target area with a single broadcast than ground loudspeakers. Elevated terrain barriers are not a handicap to airborne loudspeakers.

(4) Psychological impact. Psychologically, the airborne speaker has an authoritative effect upon the target audience. Strong words cascading down from the sky may be especially effective when employed against primitive and backward peoples.

d. Limitations. (1) Security. Loudspeaker planes afford an inviting target for enemy fire. The problem cannot be solved simply by increasing altitude or flight speed. These factors bear upon the problem.

(a) Altitude. Loudspeaker planes have to descend to an altitude of 5,000 feet or less to obtain worthwhile ground audibility. At this altitude, the plane is highly vulnerable to ground fire and is still inaudible over cities and active battle areas.

(b) Weight. It is estimated that every increment of 1,000 feet written into altitude requirements doubles the weight of the loudspeaker equipment. Thus, if the power output is stepped up to maintain audibility from a higher altitude, the weight of the amplifying equipment increases disproportionately.

(c) Plane size. As the weight of the equipment is increased, the size of the carrying plane must be similarly

greater. Larger planes provide larger targets. The greater engine noise of larger planes increases the difficulty of achieving satisfactory audibility.

(2) Audibility. Poor audibility of airborne loudspeakers arises from the following factors --

(a) Engine Noise. The higher the engine noise, the poorer the audibility of broadcast.

(b) Air turbulence. Mounting of the airborne speaker often subjects the loudspeaker broadcast to the air turbulence caused by the revolutions of the propellers. Such interference greatly reduces ground audibility of the message.

(c) Banking. Banking of the plane changes the sound focus of the loudspeakers. Thus, the loudspeaker plane must travel in a straight line, limiting its audibility to a small target area, unless the message is extremely short.

(d) Atmosphere. Atmospheric conditions often adversely affect the audibility of airborne loudspeakers.

(3) Duration of appeal. The length of the loudspeaker appeal must be sharply limited because of the speed at which aircraft must fly.

104. MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONS. a. Mop-up operations. In the final stages of combat, employment of loudspeakers can save both time and lives in mop-up operations.

(1) Primary mission. The basic objective of mop-up operations is to induce the enemy soldier to leave his strongpoint and surrender to our forces. It may be assumed that the imminence of capture or surrender already is in the enemy's mind. The problem for the loudspeaker team, then, is to project this thinking into the act of surrendering.

(2) Capabilities. Broadly speaking, mop-up operations are valuable in the following situations --

(a) Pockets. Often, the enemy force has been surrounded or bypassed, but it still can muster up some effective defensive strength. Generally, tactics consist of a ceaseless attrition campaign on the perimeter, emphasizing the hopelessness of the enemy situation, coupled with specific surrender directives.

(b) Abandoned towns. In this situation, the enemy has pulled back, but stragglers are hiding out individually or in small groups. Usually, the stragglers have no clear-cut plan. The loudspeaker unit should cover the town broadcasting specific instructions as to where the enemy stragglers must assemble. The tone of these broadcasts is firm and authoritative. Often, the enemy straggler tries to disguise himself as a civilian. For these people, the broadcasts should point out the violations of international law involved in abandoning of military status, and the severe punishment for doing so. The aid of bona fide civilians should be sought by pointing out how the existence of these stragglers jeopardize the civilians' position, and that they should offer information on such stragglers.

(3) Limitations. The effectiveness of a mop-up operation by loudspeaker is limited by--

(a) A good morale situation within the enemy forces.

(b) Possibility of reinforcements arriving to relieve the pocket.

(c) The fact that loudspeaker mop-up operations cannot be carried on indefinitely. Sooner or later, a decision must be made as to whether the number of prisoners taken by loudspeaker operations is worth the tie-up of equipment and personnel. When the decision is negative and the presence of the enemy soldiers is considered dangerous, conventional methods of concluding the mop-up operation may be employed.

b. Consolidation operations. Loudspeakers are employed primarily in the initial stage of consolidation operations to inform and direct the civilian population. This is especially true where war damage has rendered newspaper plants and radio stations inoperative. With its own source of power, the loudspeaker unit often provides the only direct method of appealing to the occupied or liberated civilian.

c. Ultimatums. In general, the ultimatum as such is a device of limited utility. Even when the enemy is surrounded and in an obviously hopeless position, the ultimatum often serves only to strengthen his will to resist. The ultimatum should be employed in psychological warfare operations only in

clearly defined situations, such as the following--

(1) Combat in towns. Rather than risk destruction of their communities for a hopeless cause, officials may obtain the cooperation of military units in the area and turn the town over to allied troops without a struggle.

(2) Against isolated enemy pockets. The ultimatum may be employed effectively here, but only when intelligence shows conclusively that the enemy is psychologically ready for such an approach.

(3) Deception. The ultimatum may be used for purposes other than obtaining the surrender of the enemy force. It may be employed against an enemy strong-point merely to induce the enemy to bring up reinforcements and commit them to battle.

(4) Rule for employment. Under no circumstances, except for purposes of deception, should the ultimatum be used unless the enemy force against which it is directed is in hopeless straits and knows it.

105. TECHNICAL AND LOGISTICAL FACTORS. a. Pre-operation maintenance. The aim of pre-operation maintenance is to shorten by as much as possible the time spent in checking loudspeaker equipment in the broadcasting area. Failure to check and test equipment in rear areas may result in technical breakdowns in the field, thus causing failure of the mission. It is the task of the PA system mechanic to see that all parts are ready to function properly.

(1) Regular check-ups. Equipment of all kinds must be given periodic maintenance check-ups.

(2) Spare parts. The mechanic should insure that he has on hand a sufficient supply of such spare parts as switches, plugs, tubes, fuses, and condensers.

(3) Inspection. Before an operation, the mechanic (or technician) should examine all cables, the microphone, speaker horn(s), prongs on all plugs, amplifiers and generators, to make sure they are in working order.

(4) Pre-operation testing. Frequent testing in rear areas is highly desirable, especially before an operation. Often, the mechanic will have no time for thorough testing. In such

case, he must be satisfied with a quick visual check of his equipment as enumerated in subparagraph (3).

b. Operational maintenance. Maintenance in the broadcasting area is brief. Pre-operation check-ups and repairs must be carried out thoroughly.

c. Preparation of equipment before operation. The aim of preliminary preparation is to reduce the time spent in setting up the equipment in the broadcasting area. The following procedure applies specifically to the AN/UIQ-1 set. It may be adapted to other equipment.

(1) Amplifiers and generators. The two amplifiers are mounted firmly in the utility truck (1/4-ton) and are joined in parallel. The microphone cable may be plugged in beforehand as well. The two generators are set in the trailer.

(2) Speaker horn and driver unit. This equipment is carried in the trailer. Much time can be gained if the horn can be attached to the driver unit prior to the operation. However, care must be taken in rainy weather, since in order to attach the horn to the driver unit the unit's waterproof covering must be removed.

d. Reconnaissance of area. The broadcasting area should be selected with the utmost care. This involves as thorough a reconnaissance of the area as time will permit.

(1) General reconnaissance. The loudspeaker team should be provided with a guide by regiment, battalion or company. This guide should know the terrain, position of mine fields, enemy unit locations, as well as nearby friendly units.

(2) Position of loudspeaker. As the loudspeaker team makes its reconnaissance, specific positions advantageous for broadcasts to the enemy target will be considered. The best of these will be chosen, with one or two alternative sites noted.

(3) Entering and leaving. During its reconnaissance, the team also chooses routes of arrival and departure. Natural cover is used for concealment, but no time should be wasted in elaborate preparations for this purpose during the actual operation. The loudspeaker team's main protection is speed. The whole undertaking should be finished in a few minutes: equipment emplaced, broadcast delivered, and equipment assembled for departure by a previously chosen route.

APPENDIX I

REFERENCES

- FM 21-5 Military Training
FM 21-8 Military Training Aids
FM 21-30 Military Symbols
FM 25-10 Motor Transport
FM 30-5 Combat Intelligence
FM 33-5 Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations
FM 100-5 FSR, Operations
FM 100-10 FSR, Administration
FM 101-5 Staff Officers Field Manual, Staff Organization and Procedure
TM 12-406 Officer Classification, Commissioned and Warrant
T/O&E 20-77 Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Army
T/D 250-1201 Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Company
T/D 250-1202 Reproduction Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group
T/D 250-1203 Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group
T/A 250-21 Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Company
AR 380-5 Safeguarding Military Information
SR 110-1-1 Index of Army Motion Pictures and Film Strips
SR 310-20-3 Index of Army Training Publications
SR 310-20-4 Index of Technical Manuals, etc.
SR 320-5-1 Dictionary of United States Army Terms
SR 320-50-1 Authorized Abbreviations
SR 615-25-15 Military Occupational Specialties - Enlisted Personnel
Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, JCS, June 1950

APPENDIX II

SERIAL NUMBERING SYSTEM - LEAFLETS

The serial numbering system employed by any particular headquarters will depend largely upon which method of leaflet classification the headquarters wishes to use. Classification by theme is generally considered best. In the serial numbering system recommended here, each general theme is allotted a block of 1,000 numbers. Each leaflet exploiting a given theme is given a number within that block, preceded by symbols or letters indicating the originating headquarters. The sample allotment of numbers that follows is not necessarily complete. As a new theme is employed, a new block of numbers is allotted.

<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Theme</u>
0-999	Fear
1,000-1,999	Materiel Superiority
2,000-2,999	Informative (News)
3,000-3,999	Good Treatment
4,000-4,999	Divisive (Split)
5,000-5,999	Nostalgia
6,000-6,999	Suffering at Home
7,000-7,999	Inevitability of Defeat
8,000-8,999	War Aims
9,000-9,999	War Guilt

APPENDIX III
LEAFLET FIRING TABLES

1. **GENERAL.** To obtain the desired leaflet range in the tables below, the corresponding HE range setting in Column 2 should be used. Procedure is normal from this point. Ballistics computations and corrections should be made on the basis of the HE range setting.

2. **COMPUTATION OF DATA.** To obtain the required data -

- a. Plot map reference of center of area.
- b. Measure off correction for wind (30 yards upwind for each foot-second shown for 5 f.s. time of flight).
- c. Measure line of range and r.s. to the point found in b.
- d. Apply correction of the moment for line and range.
- e. From data found in d and using appropriate table below, find fuse setting and HE range.
- f. Apply fuze correction of the moment, using chemical shell range table for prediction.

3. **FIRING TABLE, 105-mm HOWITZER, BE SMOKE SHELL.**

<u>Desired Leaflet Range (yds)</u>	<u>HE Range Setting (yds)</u>	<u>Elevation (mils)</u>	<u>Fuze Setting (secs)</u>
CHARGE 5			
2000	1880	94.3	6.4
2500	2375	121.6	8.0
3000	2870	150.1	9.7
3500	3365	179.8	11.5
4000	3865	211.2	13.3
4500	4370	244.6	15.2
5000	4875	280.2	17.1

<u>Desired Leaflet Range (yds)</u>	<u>HE Range Setting (yds)</u>	<u>Elevation (mils)</u>	<u>Fuze Setting (secs)</u>
5000	4955	155.1	13.1
5500	5465	177.6	14.7
6000	5975	201.4	16.3
6500	6485	226.4	18.1
7000	7000	253.0	20.0
7500	7525	281.4	21.9
8000	8090	313.8	23.8

4. FIRING TABLE, BRITISH 25 POUNDER, BE SMOKE SHELL.

<u>Desired Leaflet Range (yds)</u>	<u>HE Range Setting (yds)</u>	<u>Fuze Setting (secs)</u>
--	---------------------------------------	------------------------------------

CHARGE II

2000	1475	2.7
2500	1975	3.5
3000	2475	4.3
3500	3000	5.1
4000	3575	6.0
4500	4050	6.8
5000	4600	7.6
5500	5200	8.4
6000	5825	9.2

CHARGE III

5000	4350	6.2
5500	4950	6.9
6000	5550	7.6
6500	6150	8.3
7000	6750	9.0
7500	7350	9.8
8000	7950	10.6
8500	8550	11.4
9000	9150	12.3
9500	9750	13.2
	10350	14.2

APPENDIX IV

LEAFLET DRIFT TABLE

<u>Wind Velocity</u>	<u>Drift in Miles</u>	<u>Drift in Yards</u>
5		720
10		1440
15	1.02	1760
20	1.18	2020
25	1.32	2280
30	1.44	2480
35	1.56	2700
40	1.67	2880
45	1.77	3030
50	1.88	3200

Based on bomb burst altitude of 1,000 feet.

INDEX

	Paragraph	Page
Adaptability, leaflets	7	9
Agents	75	51
Air Dissemination, Leaflets:		
Advantages	65	48
Coordination	71	50
Delivery of bombs	68	49
Disadvantages	66	48
Drift and dispersion	70	49
Hand drop	70	50
Leaflet bomb	65, 69	48, 49
Rolling of leaflets	67	49
Airborne loudspeaker:		
Capabilities	103	80
Equipment	103	79
Limitations	103	80
Operations	103	79
Artillery dissemination, leaflets:		
Capabilities	59	43
Conversion of shells	60	44
Delivery of shells	62	45
Drift table	App. IV	89
Firing tables	App. III	87, 88
Limitations	59	43
Observation	63	47
Rolling of leaflets	60	44
Saturation	63	47
Terrain and weather	63	47
Types of artillery	63	45
Artillery liaison section	62	45
Assembly areas	18	17
Black radio	87	63
Bomb leaflet	65, 69	48, 49
British 25 pounder	63, App. III	46,
Cartoons	32	26
Civil Affairs/Military Government.	3, 22, 42	7, 21, 32
Clandestine radio:		
Black	87	63, 64
Gray	88	64
Comic strips	32	27
Consolidation operations:		
Airborne loudspeaker	103	79

	Paragraph	Page
Aircraft	73	51
Directive leaflets in	22	20
Loudspeakers in	99, 104	72, 81
Media used in	16	15
Nature of	16	14
News leaflets in	25	21
Propaganda newspapers in	31	25
Special situation leaflets in	42	32
Standard leaflets in	49	35
Black radio	87	63
Field recordings	92	68
Loudspeaker appeal	98, 99	71, 72, 73
News leaflet	28	24
Propaganda newspaper	32	25, 26, 27
Radio broadcast	79	53, 54, 55
Safe conduct pass	37	30
Strategic radio	83	57, 58, 59
Tactical radio	86	62, 63
Coordination:		
Leaflet operations	58	41
Loudspeaker operations	97	70
Monitoring	90	66
Policy	13	13
Psychological Warfare		
Operations	4	7, 8
Countermeasures, enemy:		
Air drop leaflets	66	48, 49
Censorship	27	23
Leaflets	8	10
Radio	78	53
Deception	3	7
Defection, enemy	3	7
Definitions:		
Black radio	87	63
Field recordings	91	68
Frame of reference	56	39
Gray radio	88	64
Leaflets	6	9
Leaflet campaign	54	39
Loudspeaker	94	70
Programming (radio)	79	53
Special publics	19	17
Special Targets	19	18

	Paragraph	Page
Dissemination, leaflets:		
Air	64, 65, 66 67, 68, 69 70, 71, 73	47, 48, 49, 50, 51
Artillery	59, 60, 61 62, 63	43, 44, 45 46, 47
Balloons	72	51
Guided missiles	72	51
Infiltrators	75	51
Patrols	72	51
Evaluation, difficulty of	4	8
Field recordings:		
Advantages	93	68
Definition	91	68
Disadvantages	93	69
Employment	92	68
Firing tables, leaflet	App. III	87, 88
Flexibility, leaflets	7	9
Frame of reference	56	39
Gray radio	88	64
Howitzer, 105mm	63	45
Howitzer, 155mm	63	46
Intelligence:		
Loudspeaker operations	97	70, 71
Monitoring	89	65
News sources for	26	22, 23
Strategic radio	82	57
Leaflets:		
Advantages	7	9
Campaigns	54, 55, 56 57, 58	39, 40, 41
Classification	9	10, 11
Disadvantages of	8	9, 10
Individual records	10	11
News	23, 24, 25 26, 27, 28	21, 22, 23 24
Operations record	10	11
Routine reports	11	12
Serial numbering of	12, App. III	12
Special reports	11	12
Special situation	40, 41, 42 43, 44, 45	32, 33
Standard	46, 47, 48 49, 50, 51 52, 53	34, 35, 36 37, 38


	Paragraph	Page
Strategic	14	13, 14
Tactical	15	14
Targets of	17, 18, 19	15, 16, 17 18, 19
Translations of	13	12, 13
Types	20, 21, 22	20, 21
Leaflet campaigns:		
Nature	54	39
Phasing	58	41, 42
Planning	57	39, 40, 41
Purpose	55	39
Linecrossers	75	51
Loudspeakers:		
Airborne	103	79, 80, 81
Announcer qualifications	101	76
Capabilities	95	70
Coordination	97	70, 71
Definition	94	70
Equipment	100	73, 74
Intelligence for	97	70, 71
Limitations	96	70
Miscellaneous operations	104	81, 82, 83
Pre-operation maintenance	105	83, 84
Principles on operations	98	71, 72
Situations where used	99	72, 73
Tank mounted	102	77, 78, 79
Texts for	99	72, 73
Vehicular mountings	101	74, 75, 76 77
Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company	31, 50, 62 89, App. I	25, 36, 45 65
Deployment in	101	76
Terrain and weather factors	101	75, 76
Maps	32	27
Media:		
Leaflets	5	8
Loudspeakers	5	8
Radio broadcasts	5	8
Mission:		
Loudspeaker mop-up operations	104	81
Psychological Warfare		
Operations	2	6
Tank-mounted loudspeaker	102	77
Morale, enemy	3, 36	6, 7, 28 29

	Paragraph	Page
News leaflets:		
Appearance of	28	24
Consolidation use of	25	22
Editorial principles used in	27	23, 24
Nature	23	21
News sources for	26	22, 23
Purpose	24	21
Strategic employment	25	21, 22
Tactical employment	25	22
News Sources	26	22, 23
Objective, military propaganda	55	39
Operations orders	58	41
Orientation, own troops	13, 39	13, 31
Partisans	75	51
Permanency, leaflets	7	9
Personnel, limitations on	4, 82, 83	8, 57, 59
Phasing, propaganda operations	58	41, 42
Photographs	32	26
Policy guidance	27	24
Propaganda newspapers:		
Consolidation use	31	25
Content of	32	25, 26, 27
Nature of	29	24
Purpose	30	24, 25
Strategic employment	31	25
Tactical employment	31	25
Techniques	33	27, 28
Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff, Theater	90	67
Psychological Warfare Operations:		
Capabilities	3	6, 7
Limitations	4	7, 8
Media used	5	8
Mission of	2	6
Radio in	76	52
Radio Broadcasting:		
Capabilities	77	52
Clandestine	87, 88	63, 64
Discussion of	76	52
Limitations	78	52, 53
Programming	79	53, 54, 55
Program origin	80	55
Strategic	81, 82, 83	55, 56, 57 58, 59

	Paragraph	Page
Tactical	84, 85, 86	60, 61, 62 63
Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group	31, 50, 51 81, 84 App. I	25, 36, 37 55, 60, 85
Radio Messages:		
Encoded	81	56
Non-coded	81	56
Radio monitoring:		
Operations	90	65, 66, 67
Personnel qualifications for .	90	66
Purpose of	89	65
Recordings	90	66
Responsibility for	89	65
Strategic	89	65
Tactical	89	65
Range, loudspeaker	100	73, 74
References	App. I	85
Safe conduct pass:		
Employment of	36	28, 29
Nature of	34	28
Purpose	35	28
Sketches	32	27
Smoke shell, 105 mm BE	60, App. III	44, 87, 88
Special publics	19	17, 18, 19
Special situation leaflets:		
Advantages	44	33
Disadvantages	45	33
Employment	42	32, 33
Nature	40	32
Purpose	41	32
Themes of	43	33
Standard leaflets:		
Advantages	52	37
Disadvantages	53	38
Employment	49	35, 36
Form	48	34, 35
Nature	46	34
Preparation	50	36
Purpose	47	34
Stockpiling	51	36, 37
Strategic operations:		
Directive propaganda in . . .	22	20, 21

	Paragraph	Page
Leaflet targets of	17	15, 16
Leaflet use in	14	13, 14
News leaflets	25	21, 22
Propaganda newspaper	31	25
Safe conduct pass	36	28, 29
Special situation leaflets	42	32, 33
Standard leaflets	49	35
Strategic radio	81	55
Strategic radio:		
Capabilities	82	56, 57
Employment	81	55, 56
Limitations	82	57
Monitoring for	89	65
Program content	83	57, 58, 59
Supply points	18	17
Tactical operations:		
Airborne loudspeaker in	103	79, 80, 81
Directive propaganda in	22	20
Leaflet targets	18	16, 17
Leaflet use in	15	14
Loudspeakers	99	72, 73
News leaflets in	25	22
Propaganda newspapers in	31	25
Safe conduct pass in	36	29
Special situation leaflet in	42	32, 33
Standard leaflets in	49	35, 36
Tactical radio in	84, 85, 86	60, 61, 62
	87	63
Tank-mounted loudspeaker in	102	77, 78, 79
Tactical radio:		
Capabilities	85	61
Employment	84	60, 61
Limitations	85	61
Monitoring	89	65
Program content	86	62, 63
Tank-mounted loudspeaker:		
Capabilities	102	77, 78
Light tank	102	78
Medium tank	102	78, 79
Mission of	102	77
Targets:		
Leaflet	17, 18, 19	15, 16, 17 18, 19
Special	19	17, 18, 19

	Paragraph	Page
Special situation leaflet . . .	40	32, 33
Tactical leaflet	18	16, 17
Underground elements as	81	56
Themes:		
Black radio	87	63
General	43	33
Leaflet	57	40
Ultimatums	104	82
Underground	3, 75, 81	7, 51, 56
Unit pass	38	30
Versatility, leaflets	7	9





RESTRICTED
Security Information

WARNING NOTICES

Authority for release of this document to a foreign government must be secured from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army.

When this document is released to a foreign government, it is released subject to the following conditions: This information is furnished with the understanding that it will not be released to another nation without specific approval of the United States of America, Department of the Army; that it will not be used for other than military purposes; that individual or corporation rights originating in the information whether patented or not will be respected; and that the information will be afforded substantially the same degree of security as afforded by the United States of America, Department of the Army.

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

RESTRICTED
Security Information