

P. KATZ

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

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
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
FUNDAMENTALS

Section I. GENERAL

1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual provides basic information with regard to the capabilities and limitations of psychological warfare, its organization and procedures, and in the methods and techniques of psychological warfare as conducted by the Army in time of war or declared emergency.

b. This field manual further describes the procurement and use of intelligence for psychological warfare, the nature of propaganda and the means of communication utilized in its dissemination, and the operational employment of psychological warfare in support of military operations.

2. Definitions

a. Psychological Warfare. Psychological warfare is the planned use of propaganda and other actions that have the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of the enemy, neutral, or friendly groups in such a

way as to support the accomplishment of national aims and objectives.

(1) For the purpose of technical definition, psychological warfare may be divided into three types—

(a) Strategic psychological warfare is employed as an integral and coordinated element of strategy.

(b) Tactical psychological warfare is directed against enemy military and civilian personnel located generally within the combat zone of a military theater of operations in direct support of combat operations.

(c) Consolidation psychological warfare is directed toward populations in friendly rear areas or in territory occupied by friendly military forces with the objective of facilitating military operations and promoting maximum cooperation among the civil populace.

(2) From the viewpoint of operational method, the definition may be further amplified and divided into two types—

(a) Overt psychological warfare is acknowledged by a stated and identified source.

(b) Covert psychological warfare is so planned and conducted that, if uncovered, the nation of origin can plausibly disclaim any responsibility.

b. Propaganda. Propaganda is any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or be-

havior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly. Having reference to its source, propaganda may be divided into three types—

- (1) White propaganda is propaganda that is disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof.
- (2) Grey propaganda is propaganda that does not specifically identify any source.
- (3) Black propaganda is propaganda that purports to emanate from a source other than the true one.

3. Objectives

The overall objective of psychological warfare is to support the accomplishment of national policy and aims, or a military mission. Psychological warfare activity, carefully integrated with combat operations, contributes to the achievement of this ultimate objective by using psychological warfare operations—

a. To reduce the combat efficiency of the enemy. Such action consists of exploitation of all political, economic, social, and morale vulnerabilities.

b. To facilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated areas in conjunction with civil affairs/military government operations.

c. To produce cumulative effects upon the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of the target audiences that will assist in the defeat of the enemy.

4. Tasks

A psychological warfare task encompasses a particular project that will contribute to the accomplish-

ment of a psychological warfare objective. Psychological warfare operations seek to control the beliefs or actions of the target audience by manipulating the content, presentation, and medium of communication. Therefore, tasks are the key points around which all psychological warfare operations must be organized. According to the situation and the responsibilities assigned to the military commander, these tasks may be designed—

a. To induce malingering, desertion, mutiny, and surrender among enemy troops.

b. To foment distrust in the existing enemy leadership, arms, and equipment.

c. To create confusion as to the righteousness of enemy war aims.

d. To instill a lack of faith in the enemy's ultimate victory.

e. To develop resistance to the political ideologies of the enemy government.

f. To drive a wedge between the enemy's government and people.

g. To create dissension within specific enemy groups.

h. To encourage resistance movements within enemy areas.

i. To gain cooperation of foreign groups within occupied areas.

j. To deny to the enemy the cooperation of foreign groups within areas occupied by him.

k. To increase the friendship and cooperation among the allies.

l. To split the enemy and his satellites.

m. To build goodwill and friendship with neutral groups.

n. To deny to the enemy the economic or political collaboration of neutral groups.

5. Themes

A theme is a line of persuasion. It is a subject, topic, or other statement designed to support the accomplishment of or to interpret a psychological warfare task.

a. Themes are selected on the basis of policy, intelligence, and estimation of the target toward which the themes are to be directed. Good themes are—

- (1) Consistent. Themes must be consistent with basic doctrine, with political and military policy, with psychological warfare activities of the other services, and with the intent of the campaign.
- (2) Timely. To achieve success, a theme must exploit the current situation. In order to achieve this timing, it must be coordinated with current intelligence from all agencies charged with producing intelligence. The theme of a food shortage may be used to increase the enemy's feeling of futile resistance resulting from the current tactical situation. However, if this supporting theme is to be effective, an actual food shortage must exist.
- (3) Credible. Truth alone does not always make feasible propaganda because truth is not always believed. Themes must be un-

derstandable and convincing to the target audience.

b. ~~As soon as a task has been selected, the propagandist determines what themes may be exploited to support the task.~~ He keeps in mind the three characteristics of good themes listed above. Strong themes may be used alone, while weaker single themes may be used in combination. If the propagandist thinks that his exploitation of a task may require a long and arduous campaign, he may keep some themes in reserve to be used at the optimum psychological moment, thus obtaining the added strength for a psychological victory.

Section II. ORGANIZATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

6. Coordination

a. The employment of psychological warfare is a command responsibility. Its role as a military supporting weapon is limited only by the imagination of the commander. A psychological warfare campaign foments a progression of psychological impacts that produce ultimate, intangible results. One misstep in the progression may nullify the total campaign. It is not enough that coordination in the conduct of the campaign be effected at the national level, because consistency is impossible unless this coordination is complete and continuous down to and including the actual operating agencies. Close and harmonious liaison must be maintained among operating agencies in the field to avoid misdirection and eventual loss of the goals involved.

b. At the national level the Department of Defense, Department of State, United States Information Agency, and other executive agencies concerned with the national psychological warfare effort effect coordination of their planning and implementing activities to insure adherence to national aims and policies. Policy guidance in the information field is furnished oversea branches of national agencies and theater commanders to prevent conflicts and inconsistencies that might weaken or entirely discredit the national program.

c. Within the Army itself, psychological warfare activities must be fully coordinated with public information and with troop information and education. Complete and careful coordination of coverage is necessary so that the enemy will find no basis for discrediting the campaign by pointing out that factual portions of propaganda to him do not agree with information released to the general public. Coordination with troop information and education is essential to insure that friendly troops are aware of the form, nature, and objectives of enemy propaganda and are provided with information that will destroy or at least minimize its effectiveness.

7. Department of the Army

Within the Department of the Army, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, a special staff section, is the organization charged with the responsibility of formulating and developing psychological warfare plans for the Army in consonance with established policy. It further recommends policies for and supervises the execution of Army

programs in this field. The Chief of Psychological Warfare has direct access to the Chief of Staff, and works closely with the General Staff and other staff agencies. Within the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, provision has been made for the planning for and conduct of world-wide military psychological warfare operations and matters pertaining to intelligence, organization, personnel, training, logistical, and research requirements for psychological warfare activities.

8. Psychological Warfare Staff Organization (FM 101-5)

To assist commanders, psychological warfare staff officers are provided at theater, army, corps, and division echelons to plan, coordinate and supervise operations. The psychological warfare staff officer performs the following staff functions:

a. Advises the commander and staff on psychological warfare matters.

b. Exercises operational control over all psychological warfare units or personnel not assigned or attached to subordinate units.

c. Coordinates psychological warfare activities in subordinate units.

d. Prepares and supervises training programs for psychological warfare units under his operational control, and exercises technical supervision over psychological warfare training throughout the command.

e. Plans and supervises psychological warfare support operations, including those that communicate

ideas and information intended to affect the minds, emotions, and actions of the enemy, and those that a military command conducts for the purpose of reducing the enemy's combat efficiency. These activities involve—

- (1) Preparation of psychological warfare materials in accordance with policies and guidance from higher headquarters.
- (2) Dissemination of psychological warfare materials in coordination with appropriate staff officers.
- (3) Formulation of intelligence requirements for psychological warfare operations and the submission of such requirements to G2.
- (4) Coordination of psychological warfare operations directed toward civil populations under supervision of civil affairs/military government in friendly rear areas or in occupied territory. Psychological warfare teams for the conduct of consolidation psychological warfare operations may be attached to a civil affairs/military government unit for operational control.

f. Provides an evaluation of enemy psychological warfare to the troop information and education officer for use in preparation and dissemination of materials which counteract that warfare.

g. Effects coordination with representatives of any national information services that may be operating or planning to operate within the area.

9. Organization for Strategic Employment of Psychological Warfare

a. Within military theaters of operations, commanders must employ psychological warfare in such a way as to support the accomplishment of their mission and the national policy and aims of the United States. Approved psychological warfare plans, policies, and guidance will be transmitted to commanders by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If, at any time during the execution of psychological warfare operations, a theater commander finds it necessary to deviate from these plans, policies, and guidance, he must immediately notify the Joint Chiefs of Staff of his action and the reasons therefor. Psychological warfare plans and policies other than in military theaters of operations are formed at government level where the National Security Council is the responsible agency.

b. The radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion conducts strategic psychological warfare in a military theater of operations. Targets include enemy soldiers and civilians outside the combat area; hostile, friendly, and neutral populations under enemy control; and neutral nations within the theater of operations. The theater psychological warfare special staff section plans for and supervises the operations of the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion. This special staff section is under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, or, in joint and combined staffs, under the Assistant Chief of Staff, J3. It plans, coordinates, directs, supervises, evaluates, and prepares requirements for all military psychological warfare activities within the theater. In addition, it advises

the theater commander on matters pertaining to psychological warfare. See FM 101-5.

10. Organization for Tactical Employment of Psychological Warfare

a. Tactical employment of psychological warfare units assigned to field armies is a responsibility of the army commander. Psychological warfare planning, advisory, and supervisory functions at field army, corps, and division headquarters are a responsibility of G3 of the army, corps, or division to which the unit is assigned. Duties of field army, corps, and division psychological warfare staff officers must be within the framework of plans and directives laid down by the theater commander.

b. The loudspeaker and leaflet company conducts tactical psychological warfare operations in direct support of the combat units. The targets of psychological warfare in tactical operations are the enemy forces and all other persons in the immediate combat area, exclusive of friendly military forces.

11. Organization for Employment of Consolidation Psychological Warfare

a. In liberated or occupied areas, propaganda, education, and information activities are intertwined with every day civil administration and contribute vitally to the consolidation effort. Civil affairs/military government operations represent combined operations, utilizing techniques and personnel from every branch of service. Psychological warfare vigorously assists and supports the CA/MG organiza-

tion, particularly in the fields of public information and education.

b. The psychological warfare consolidation company provides organization, personnel, and equipment to operate within the CA/MG structure to facilitate psychological warfare operations in liberated and occupied areas. However, spheres of responsibility and activity must be indicated by planners to avoid confusion and duplication of effort and to phase psychological warfare support properly to the planned CA/MG operation.

CHAPTER 2

TYPES AND EMPLOYMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Section I. TYPES

12. Overt Psychological Warfare Operations

Overt psychological warfare operations are activities conducted in such a manner that they may be attributable to or acknowledged by the sponsoring government. A principal means employed in overt psychological warfare operations is white propaganda.

13. White Propaganda

a. Capabilities.

- (1) White propaganda is capable of acting as the official voice of the user. Through its employment a belligerent nation may formally pose its war aims and objectives for historical record.
- (2) It carries the full weight and authority of the nation employing it. It therefore may be employed to capitalize on the prestige and position of that nation.
- (3) It can create issues in the enemy camp by bringing up questions which the enemy wishes to ignore.

- (4) It may act as a foil to enemy propaganda by countering false claims, allegations, and assertions.

Limitations.

- (1) As it is obviously the "voice of the enemy," white propaganda is resisted to some extent by the target audience.
- (2) As the official voice of a responsible state, it is limited in the subject matter it may employ.
- (3) Lacking free access to enemy dissemination channels, it may be outweighed by the enemy's own propaganda efforts.
- (4) As it emanates from outside the enemy country, it may be restricted in its range. Radio and long-range air leaflet drops compensate somewhat for this limitation.
- (5) It is vulnerable to counterpropaganda by the receiving nation.

14. Covert Psychological Warfare Operations

Covert psychological warfare operations are activities planned and conducted in such a manner that the government responsible for them is not evident and for which, if uncovered, the sponsoring government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility. The principal means employed in covert psychological warfare operations are black and grey propaganda.

15. Black Propaganda

a. Capabilities.

- (1) Operating under cover, black propaganda can be active within the enemy homeland

and provide immediate, on-the-spot propaganda messages.

- (2) Since it emanates from an unknown or falsified source, it can demoralize the enemy by suggesting to him that there are dissident and disloyal elements within his ranks.
- (3) Because it appears to be completely divorced from official or white propaganda, it can employ themes and techniques not appropriate for that type.
- (4) Because of its covert nature, enemy counterpropaganda is less effective against it.

b. Limitations.

- (1) Black propaganda requires an unusual amount of care to avoid identification with overt efforts.
- (2) It is difficult to coordinate with overt efforts.
- (3) It seldom can use established media of communication.
- (4) It may be difficult to control because disseminating agencies are not under central control.
- (5) It is limited by the stringent security requirements.
- (6) It is vulnerable to discovery and destruction when operating in enemy territory.

16. Grey Propaganda

a. Capabilities.

- (1) With skillful employment, grey propaganda can gain acceptance by avoiding the stigma of being "enemy" propaganda.

- (2) It can use sensational themes without reflecting on the prestige of the originator.
- (3) By the skillful use of terminology and themes, it can be made to appear as an enemy propaganda effort. The enemy thus is placed in a position where he seems to contradict himself, with a resultant loss of effectiveness in his white propaganda.
- (4) It may be used to introduce certain themes without identifying the real source. In this manner it may be used for "trial balloon" purposes.

b. Limitations.

- (1) Grey propaganda is somewhat restricted by the difficulty of keeping its origin mysterious, yet authoritative.
- (2) It is vulnerable to analyses of its content and intent. Thus, it loses effectiveness and may be more readily susceptible to effective counterpropaganda than other types.

17. Counterpropaganda

Counterpropaganda is propaganda directed at enemy or other foreign groups and designed to counteract or capitalize on enemy or other foreign propaganda. Counterpropaganda is not necessarily a defensive weapon. It may form part of a well-planned, aggressive propaganda offensive. In determining when to use counterpropaganda, the criterion must always be the ultimate success of the venture and its contribution to the success of the overall campaign. The approach to be taken by the propagandist in conducting a counterpropagan-

da campaign will be that which will most successfully accomplish his purpose of counteracting or capitalizing on the enemy or foreign propaganda subject.

a. Forestalling. This is the process of counteracting or capitalizing on a subject susceptible of use in foreign propaganda before this subject actually is used by the enemy propagandist.

b. Direct Counterpropaganda. Direct counterpropaganda is a point-for-point answer in rebuttal of enemy propaganda charges. Care must be taken to counter the enemy charge so completely and effectively that the charge itself is not reinforced by counterpropaganda and the publicity it will bring. A disadvantage is giving credibility to enemy propaganda by repeating it.

c. Indirect Counterpropaganda. Indirect counterpropaganda involves the introduction of a new set of relevant themes which serve to refute the original enemy contention by implication or insinuation.

d. Diversionary Counterpropaganda. Diversionary counterpropaganda is an attempt at diverting the attention of the target audience from the original enemy propaganda subject by "creating" a new theme or intensifying efforts on some theme which has already proved effective.

e. Silence. If the enemy theme does not lend itself to successful exploitation or if the subject is not important enough to warrant rebuttal or countering, it may be best to ignore it and remain silent.

f. Minimizing the Subject. If none of the previous techniques can be used successfully in the

counterpropaganda effort, the propagandist will seek to minimize the subject. This may be done in one of three ways—

- (1) Emphasize the aspects of the case favorable to us.
- (2) Insinuate that the whole story cannot be told.
- (3) Give brief mention to maintain reliability in reporting, and then drop the matter completely.

Section II. EMPLOYMENT

18. Strategic Employment

Strategic psychological warfare operations are designed, generally, to further broad or long-term aims in coordination with general strategic planning. They usually are directed at forces, peoples, or areas in their entirety.

a. Objectives.

- (1) To support and explain a nation's wartime political policies, aims, and objectives.
- (2) To support economic and other nonviolent forms of sanctions against the enemy.
- (3) To lower the morale and efficiency of enemy soldiers and civilians.
- (4) To encourage in the enemy nation disaffection on the part of religious, ethnic, social, political, economic, and other elements which have grievances against the government or against each other.
- (5) To elicit the support, morally or actively, of neutral nations.

- (6) To give moral support to friendly elements in the enemy area.
- (7) To lend support to tactical propaganda operations.

b. Limitations.

- (1) Strategic psychological warfare operations are difficult to evaluate as they usually extend over a long period of time. The results, though effective, are not always tangible and adequate intelligence is not always available.
- (2) They may be countered in the enemy homeland. Severe penalties may be imposed on enemy civilians and military personnel for listening to the opponent's radio broadcasts or reading his printed material. Therefore, the target audience may not be able to see or hear the output if enemy counter-measures are effective.

c. Media. Media are the means or channels of communication to the enemy. The principal media employed in strategic psychological warfare operations are—

- (1) Radio and television broadcasting systems.
- (2) Air disseminated printed matter.
- (3) Infiltrated novelties or useful items.
- (4) Planned rumor campaigns.

d. Aids to Success. Some conditions which aid the successful attainment of strategic psychological warfare objectives are—

- (1) Military defeats suffered by the enemy.
- (2) Shortages of food, housing, clothing, and other necessities on the enemy home front.

- (3) Shortages in the enemy's military establishment.
- (4) Enemy monetary inflation.
- (5) Enemy racial and religious intolerance.
- (6) Enemy political disunity and lack of confidence in leaders.
- (7) Labor-management strife in the enemy camp.
- (8) Lack of raw materials to support the enemy economy and war programs.
- (9) Undue hardships under totalitarian control.

19. Tactical Employment

Psychological warfare operations are prepared and executed in forward areas in direct support of tactical operations.

a. Objectives.

- (1) To lower the enemy's morale and combat efficiency.
- (2) To facilitate the occupation of enemy towns by delivering ultimatums and giving surrender directions.
- (3) To support strategic psychological warfare operations by furnishing more detailed and timely knowledge of local vulnerabilities which may be woven into the overall strategic pattern.
- (4) To give information and directions to friendly elements operating in the enemy combat zone as appropriate to the psychological warfare mission.
- (5) To give specific and direct support to tactical commanders on short notice.

- (6) To "humanize" our soldiers and leaders in the eyes of the enemy soldier.
- (7) To persuade the enemy to associate his reasons for fighting with our own, thus weakening his incentive to destroy us.

b. Limitations.

- (1) Specific intelligence may be difficult to obtain upon short notice so that propaganda of maximum effectiveness may be disseminated.
- (2) In fluid battle situations, a favorable psychological warfare situation may change before the message can be brought to the enemy.
- (3) Static situations are the most difficult to exploit.

c. Media. The principal tactical psychological warfare media are—

- (1) Leaflets disseminated by artillery, aircraft, patrol, or agents.
- (2) Loudspeakers.
- (3) Radio.
- (4) Miniature newspapers, pamphlets, and novelties dropped by airplane.

d. Aids to Success. Some conditions which aid in the successful attainment of tactical psychological warfare objectives are—

- (1) Numerous enemy defeats and high casualties.
- (2) Precarious enemy military situations.
- (3) Insufficient or inferior enemy supplies and equipment.
- (4) Inexperienced or unqualified enemy officers.
- (5) Bad news from the enemy home front.

- (6) Excessive periods of combat for enemy troops.
- (7) Ethnic or political minorities forced into combat.
- (8) Over-age, inexperienced, or untrained troops.
- (9) Enemy troops not well indoctrinated in their nation's ideology.
- (10) Sicknesses and lack of adequate medical services.

20. Consolidation Employment

Consolidation psychological warfare operations are employed to consolidate the results of preoccupational psychological warfare operations and to support compliance with laws, orders, and decrees issued by the military commander.

a. Objectives.

- (1) To support combat operations by helping to protect lines of communication in occupied areas, thus relieving combat troops for regular duties.
- (2) To aid civil affairs/military government in restoring law and order in occupied or liberated territories.
- (3) To obtain the effective cooperation of civilians.
- (4) To counter rumors and false reports.
- (5) To help prepare the people for postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation.
- (6) To aid in the reestablishment of local governments.

- (7) To aid in eradicating any traces of aggressive militarism and in building a friendly attitude toward the United States.
- (8) To evaluate public reaction to the occupation.
- (9) To formulate requirements for intelligence pertaining to consolidation psychological warfare operations.
- (10) To aid in the restoration of media communication facilities such as newspaper plants, publishing houses, and radio and television stations.

b. Limitations.

- (1) Effectiveness often is handicapped by destroyed, damaged, or sabotaged communication facilities in the occupied areas.
- (2) Effectiveness sometimes is hampered by lack of materiel which must be utilized in combat.
- (3) Prejudice, resentment, and hostility usually are found in occupied areas and sometimes in friendly liberated areas.
- (4) Underground movements refusing to accept military defeat may harass consolidation efforts in an attempt to break them up or destroy them.

c. Media. In general, psychological warfare units supporting consolidation operations utilize both organic equipment and that taken from the enemy. Principal outlets are—

- (1) Radio and television broadcasting.
- (2) Newspapers.

- (3) Loudspeakers.
- (4) Pamphlets, posters, bulletins, books, magazines, and other publications.
- (5) Motion pictures and the theater.

d. Aids to Success.

- (1) In defeat, people often develop a psychological inferiority which makes them less resistant to propaganda.
- (2) An otherwise hostile populace may see the end of the war in sight and decide that compliance with occupation directives is the only sensible course.
- (3) Civilians are accustomed to receiving their information through certain media such as their daily or weekly newspapers and local radio stations. The sooner these media start functioning the more acceptable the consolidation propaganda will tend to be.
- (4) Civilians caught in the onrush of war often suffer from shock. Their mental condition may be such that they are incapable of committing any acts of sabotage or otherwise obstructing the occupation.

21. General Procedures of Psychological Warfare

The broad objective of psychological warfare is to get the enemy to think and act in a manner that will be detrimental to his war effort. To support this broad objective, certain procedures must be set up.

a. Create Audience Confidence. The creation of confidence in the reliability and authenticity of the

sources of propaganda is a long-range objective of vital importance.

- (1) Truth is the most important builder of audience confidence. All information disseminated must be objective, factual, and accurate. One patently false bit of information may destroy an audience confidence which required months to create. If the enemy propaganda machinery habitually disseminates false or distorted information to the people it dominates, they are more likely to turn to a source of information on which they can rely.
- (2) The propagandist must know his audience and be certain that what he tells them is credible to them as well as true.
- (3) If the propagandist tries to go against solid enemy opinion, he will fail to gain or hold their confidence. To avoid this mistake, accurate intelligence as to what the enemy believes or thinks is required.

b. Gain and Hold an Audience. One of the most difficult psychological warfare problems is to gain and hold an audience. Some of the tested methods for this purpose are—

- (1) Truthful, accurate, and complete news coverage.
- (2) Entertainment planned to gain and hold audience attention.
- (3) Broadcasting names of prisoners of war.
- (4) Skillful radio and journalistic devices.
- (5) Use of enemy vernacular in radio and press.
- (6) Discussion of subjects vital to the enemy.

c. Avoid Antagonizing an Audience. A good propagandist avoids saying or writing anything that will arouse his audience's antagonism. The propagandist should avoid—

- (1) Boasting about victories when reporting or writing news. The enemy's losses should not be made to appear either shameful or more significant than they actually are.
- (2) Ridiculing, caricaturing, or insulting the enemy. This will result only in stiffened resistance.
- (3) Making defection seem dishonorable. Psychological warfare operations bring about individual and collective changes in state of mind to the point that defection appears to be the only logical behavior. The enemy should be made to believe, through the cumulative effects of planned psychological warfare, that it is his duty to shorten the war by malingering, sabotage, desertion, or even surrender.

d. Persuade the Audience. The use of persuasion, as opposed to direct order, is implicit in psychological warfare techniques. Commands are effective only when the enemy is demoralized. The aim of psychological warfare techniques should be to employ reason, logic, emotional appeals, and all attitude-forming devices to persuade the target audience to adopt a course of action rather than to order it to take such a course of action.

PART TWO

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE TROOP UNITS

CHAPTER 3

**RADIO BROADCASTING AND LEAFLET
BATTALION—GENERAL**

22. Mission

The mission of the radio broadcasting and leaflet (RB&L) battalion is to conduct psychological warfare operations in a theater of operations.

23. Assignment and Organization

One radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion normally is assigned to each theater of operations. However, a greater number may be authorized if required. The battalion normally consists of a headquarters and headquarters company (TOE 33-56), and attached radio broadcasting company (TOE 33-58), reproduction company (TOE 33-57), and consolidation company (TOE 33-67). For detailed organization, see current tables of organization.

24. Employment

a. The radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion is semicellular in structure in order to facilitate employment of its components over a wide area. Dur-

ing operational periods the headquarters and headquarters company normally will be located near theater headquarters. To assure efficient operations, close coordination between the theater psychological warfare special staff section and battalion headquarters is essential. Since headquarters and headquarters company has administrative, supply, communications, and maintenance functions, it normally remains with battalion headquarters.

b. When planning the location of the reproduction company, first consideration should be given to existence of indigenous printing plants whose facilities might be employed to support printing operations. The availability of buildings to house the printing equipment as well as storage for supplies and finished publications are important considerations.

c. The radio broadcasting company contains teams designed to operate fixed and mobile radio broadcasting stations. The capabilities of units organized under TOE 33-58 vary with the size and groupings of the necessary teams. Individual team capabilities are indicated in chapter 5.

d. Operational teams from the consolidation company may be attached to a civil affairs/military government unit for operational control. Functions and responsibilities of these teams are described in chapter 7.

CHAPTER 4

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, RADIO BROADCASTING AND LEAFLET BATTALION (TOE 33-56)

25. Battalion Headquarters

The mission of battalion headquarters is to perform command and staff functions necessary for proper operation of the battalion. Officers of battalion headquarters have normal staff duties as prescribed in FM 101-5.

26. Headquarter Company

a. The mission of headquarters company is to assist in the operation of battalion headquarters by conducting administrative and service functions and by exercising command supervision of all enlisted personnel.

b. Headquarters company is organized in five major components: company headquarters; intelligence and operations section; administration, supply, and maintenance section; propaganda platoon; and communications section. Each activity has a basic assigned responsibility and may be further subdivided into teams of "special functions" units as directed by the battalion commander (fig. 1).

27. Company Headquarters

Normal command and administrative personnel are assigned to company headquarters. They include




Figure 1. Organization of headquarters and headquarters company, radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion.

the company commander, first sergeant, supply sergeant, company clerk, armorer, utility repairman, and mess personnel.

28. Intelligence and Operations Section

Assigned to this section are the enlisted personnel who perform duties in the battalion S2 section and the battalion S3 section. These personnel are under the operational control of the respective staff officers but are under the administrative control of the headquarters company commander.

29. Administration, Supply, and Maintenance Section

Assigned to this section are the enlisted personnel who perform duties in the battalion S1 section and the battalion S4 section. These personnel are under the operational control of the respective staff officers but are under the administrative control of the headquarters company commander.

30. Propaganda Platoon

The majority of the company's personnel is assigned to the propaganda platoon. For information about the production of propaganda, which is the mission of the propaganda platoon, see chapters 12, 15, 16, 17, and 22. In addition to a platoon headquarters, the platoon contains seven sections, including—

a. Analysis and Evaluation Section. This section is responsible for the preparation and maintenance of the intelligence worksheet. It analyzes and evaluates enemy propaganda obtained in coordination with all agencies with propaganda intercept capa-

bilities, and makes continual studies with regard to specific areas of interest to the battalion. The section analyzes and evaluates information to assist in determining psychological strengths and vulnerabilities of the target audience (chs. 12-13).

b. Interrogation Section. This section plans and conducts special interrogations, in close coordination with G2, of prisoners of war, line crossers, and refugees, either by intensive interviews or group polling. It prepares interrogation reports and the indications to be derived therefrom. The interrogation section may be divided into operational teams of one or two men each. The information gained in this manner plays a vital part in determining exploitable psychological vulnerabilities of the target audience.

c. Monitor Terminal Section. In coordination with other agencies with propaganda intercept capabilities, this section is responsible for the planning and scheduling of the programs to be monitored, and the translation, editing, recording, and dissemination of the monitored material. It is further responsible for reviewing the translations of the monitored material and preparing résumés or digests for dissemination within the section as well as to other interested agencies.

d. Language Section. The linguists of this section work primarily with the broadcast media section, assisting in the preparation of radio scripts, acting as announcers, and playing roles in dramatic presentations. The translators work primarily with the printed media section by assisting in the preparation of copy for printed propaganda material. Inasmuch as the language specialty is critical in psychological

warfare operations, it is necessary to use those qualified in as many positions as possible. By pooling specialists, a man qualified in two or three languages may be used for translation work in one language and as an announcer in another. In addition, when all language specialists are under one control, they may be used to assist area study specialists, interrogators, and monitors.

e. Broadcast Media Section. This section is responsible for the planning, preparation, and production of radio programs. The script writers plan and write the scripts for radio programs and assist in the production of the programs. The script writers work with the propaganda officers, linguist personnel, and radio broadcasting specialists in the preparation of scripts.

- (1) Production personnel produce both live and transcribed radio programs. They work in conjunction with the studio engineers, control room operators, tape recording specialists, script writers, and propaganda officers in the planning and production of radio broadcasts. They procure the properties, sound effects, and recordings needed for each individual broadcast, and determine the timing and techniques to be employed.
- (2) Control-records personnel plan and produce the program schedules, indicating both starting time and running time. They maintain records of all broadcast material and arrange for the use of studios.

f. Printed Media Section. This section is responsible for the production of copy, layout, art work,

and photographs, and for the preparation of all material prior to forwarding to the reproduction company.

(1) Copy personnel plan and write the texts for printed propaganda material such as leaflets, posters, and newspapers. They work in cooperation with the propaganda officers, translators, artists, and photographers.

(2) The artists plan and execute the illustrations, hand-lettering, and layouts necessary for all printed matter. They also prepare charts, visual aids, and graphs as required. The photographic laboratory specialist develops the negatives of photographs. Production personnel, by means of composing machines, set text materials into desired formats. They assemble the component parts of the layout for processing by the reproduction company.

g. News Section. This section receives news copy from established press agencies for both printing and broadcasting purposes.

31. Communications Section

This section, under supervision of the battalion communications officer, controls telephone, teletype, and telegraph communications, as well as message center, monitor listening post, and program relay transmitter operations.

CHAPTER 5

RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANY, RADIO BROADCASTING AND LEAFLET BATTALION (TOE 33-58)

32. Mission and Organization

a. The mission of the radio broadcasting company is to conduct psychological warfare operations by radio broadcasting in a theater of operations.

b. The Radio Broadcasting Company is composed of the teams, indicated in TOE 33-58, as required to perform the specific mission assigned to the company. One or more separate detachments or companies may be attached to the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion.

33. Team AA—Company Headquarters

This team is responsible for the administration and control of six or more operational teams totaling not less than 48 individuals.

34. Team FA—Radio Broadcasting Station Operations

This team supervises a mobile radio broadcasting station using its own personnel and mobile equipment. It may also supervise a fixed radio broadcasting station utilizing indigenous or military equipment and personnel, when augmented by team FB. Necessary indigenous personnel will be

used to increase the capability of this team. It is allocated on the basis of operational requirements, normally four teams per radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion.

35. Team FB—Fixed Station Operations Augmentation

This team, when combined with team FA, supervises operation of a fixed radio broadcasting station using indigenous or military equipment and military personnel. It is allocated normally one per four teams FA.

36. Team GA—Program Operations

This team provides the program operations personnel for a mobile radio broadcasting station. It also can provide the basic military program operations personnel for a fixed radio broadcasting station to be augmented by indigenous personnel or team GB. This team may be replaced by indigenous personnel in the operation of a fixed radio broadcasting station. It is allocated one per two teams FA.

37. Team GB—Fixed Station Program Operations Augmentation

This team, when combined with team FA, provides the necessary military program operations personnel for a fixed radio broadcasting station. Team GB is allocated one per two teams GA.

38. Team HA—Technical Operations

This team provides the military technical operations personnel for a fixed radio broadcasting sta-

tion when combined with team HC or indigenous personnel. It can also provide the military technical operations personnel for a mobile radio broadcasting station when combined with team HB. This team may be replaced by indigenous personnel in the operation of a fixed radio broadcasting station. It is allocated normally one per two teams FA.

39. Team HB—Mobile Station Technical Operations Augmentation

This team, when combined with team HA, provides the military technical operations personnel for a mobile radio broadcasting station. It is allocated normally one per two teams HA.

40. Team HC—Fixed Station Technical Operations Augmentation

This team, when combined with team HA, provides the military technical operations personnel for a fixed radio broadcasting station. It may be replaced by indigenous personnel in the operation of a fixed radio broadcasting station. Normally, one per two teams HA is the basis of allocation.

CHAPTER 6

REPRODUCTION COMPANY, RADIO BROADCASTING AND LEAFLET BATTALION (TOE 33-57)

41. Mission and Organization

a. The mission of the reproduction company is to reproduce leaflets and other printed matter in support of psychological warfare operations in a theater of operations.

b. The reproduction company consists of company headquarters, camera and plate platoon, press platoon, and processing platoon (fig. 2).

42. Company Headquarters

Company headquarters performs supply, administrative, and command functions necessary to the company. Company headquarters includes the company commander and enlisted personnel required to fulfill the mission of the headquarters. The company commander is responsible for supervising the administration and the functioning of the unit. He is classified as a psychological warfare officer, and he should be familiar with printing, logistical, and technical procedures.

43. Camera and Plate Platoon

This platoon produces the photolithographic plates used by the offset presses in printing leaflets and other




Figure 2. Organization of reproduction company, radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion.

propaganda material. Its organization consists of a platoon leader and the enlisted technicians required to accomplish the platoon's mission. These include the platoon leader, who has a thorough knowledge of photolithographic requirements and operations, a photolithographic supervisor, process photographer, plate makers, grainers, and retouchers. Equipment required by the platoon includes darkroom cameras, arc lamps, safe lights, photolithographic sinks, printing frames, layout and opaquing tables, whirlers, and an air-conditioning unit.

44. Press Platoon

This platoon operates the presses required to produce printed propaganda material from the plates prepared by the camera and plate platoon. This press platoon is headed by a platoon leader, who has a thorough knowledge of photolithographic printing, and enlisted specialists experienced in the operations of photo-offset, multi-color printing presses.

45. Processing Platoon

This platoon prepares finished propaganda material for dissemination. The processing platoon consists of an officer and enlisted men who cut, pack, and load the printed product.

CHAPTER 7

CONSOLIDATION COMPANY, RADIO BROADCASTING AND LEAFLET BATTALION (TOE 33-67)

Section I. GENERAL

46. Mission

The mission of the consolidation company is to conduct consolidation psychological warfare operations in support of the CA/MG activity in liberated and occupied areas.

47. Assignment

The consolidation company is attached to the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion. Teams of the company normally will be attached to CA/MG units for operational control.

48. Capabilities

The consolidation company is capable of supervising and conducting consolidation psychological warfare operations in liberated and occupied areas in coordination with appropriate CA/MG agencies by the use of still and motion pictures, newspapers, periodicals, loudspeakers, radio, and other appropriate media of communication. The capabilities of units organized under TOE 33-67 will vary with the size and grouping of the teams.

49. Organization

a. The consolidation company is composed of teams from the cellular consolidation organization (TOE 33-67) assembled to perform a specific psychological warfare function.

b. The company is composed of administrative service and operational teams. Each team, with personnel and equipment applicable thereto, is listed according to specialty (i. e., news and press team).

50. Employment

A study of the area to be occupied is made in depth, and from this study the requirements for media of communication become apparent. The composition of the company is organized on the basis of these requirements. For example, if a survey of the area reveals the presence of the most meager type of information media, the company would be formed of mobile sound and film teams, and other mobile teams that could operate on their own power sources without recourse to any local materials or facilities. On the other hand, if the area is characterized by the presence of a large, specialized system of information media, cellular units such as the news and press teams, radio teams, publications teams, and motion picture and theater teams will be utilized to supervise the operations of these media under the control of CA/MG public information and public education teams. This type of organizational concept permits maximum flexibility and economy of personnel because the organization, capabilities, and operations of the unit can be adjusted

to take into account the peculiarities of the military mission in the given area.

Section II. ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE TEAMS.

51. TEAM AC—Company Headquarters

This team is responsible for the supervision, administration, and control of three or more consolidation platoons. The team provides the personnel necessary to command the unit and for usual administrative duties connected with a unit of this type. Administrative functions not provided for in TOE 33-67 are the responsibility of the commander to whose unit the consolidation organization is attached or assigned. Mess teams and automotive maintenance teams will be drawn from TOE 29-500, Composite Service Organization. Basis for computation of teams required will be the number of personnel to be messed, and the number of vehicle equivalents requiring organizational maintenance.

52. Team AA—Platoon Headquarters

Although the number of teams and platoons is not fixed, the platoons are organized as the situation dictates. There must be 40 or more personnel assigned or eight or more operational teams in the field before a platoon headquarters is authorized, and the platoon operates as a separate unit. When three platoon headquarters have been established a company headquarters (team AC) may be authorized. The number of teams in the platoon depends upon the mission to be performed and the situation in which the teams are operating.

Section III. OPERATIONAL TEAMS

53. General

Seven specialized types of teams carry out the assigned consolidation psychological warfare missions. The military government service organization (TOE 41-500A) also is cellular. So close is the expected association between the two organizations that the consolidation company TOE team designations follow in alphabetical series the CA/MG TOE team designations. Thus, the last team listed in TOE 41-500A is an "E" series team, and the first specialist team listed in TOE 33-67 begins an "F" series (par. 54). Consolidation psychological warfare units normally will function under the supervision of the CA/MG public information and public education teams.

54. Team FA—Motion Picture and Theater

a. This team provides personnel capable of reestablishing, operating, and directing the operation of motion picture installations for psychological warfare operations. Augmented by civilian personnel, it can operate one or more theaters within a large area.

b. The team consists of an officer, who is the theater manager, and two enlisted men—a chief projectionist and a sound projector repairman.

c. This team is provided with the requisite projection equipment for operation of a motion picture installation. However, any local equipment found in good working condition also may be used for the consolidation operation. The team equipment is utilized

until such time as the indigenous theaters can be opened.

55. Team GA—News and Press

a. This team provides personnel to supervise the reestablishment and operation of newspapers. The news and press team, augmented by civilian personnel, can supervise the operation of one newspaper plant. The newspaper published by this team prints news, proclamations, and official directives from higher headquarters and from the local CA/MG organization.

b. This team consists of three officers and two enlisted men—newspaper editor, newspaper manager, propaganda officer, printing supervisor, and translator.

c. Team GA will supervise the supply of newsprint, news-pictures, special features, and news articles as well as the distribution of newspapers over the circulation area.

- (1) The team surveys the efficiency of the printing equipment in the area and plans its employment. If printing equipment is not immediately available, copy may be written and edited locally, published by the reproduction company of the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion, and delivered to the team for distribution. This is an interim measure until the team arranges through the CA/MG organization for the repair and operation of indigenous equipment. Necessary logistical support for the team's activi-

ties is required for supply, transportation, and repair.

- (2) In later phases the team establishes news and picture agencies for local newspapers and arranges for the circulation of printed materials for the use of other consolidation organizations.
- (3) Monitoring activities of the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion may be a source of external news until local teletype circuits are restored.

56. Team HA—Mobile Sound and Film

a. This team operates a mobile sound and film truck in areas where immediate information outlets are required. It travels to villages that have no theaters, to towns where the theaters have been destroyed, and to areas where electric power is not available.

b. The team is composed of a propaganda officer and two enlisted men, one an announcer-linguist and the other a projectionist.

c. Because of its mobility, the team may move into an area where captive or voluntary audiences are present. The team's capabilities include—

- (1) Conduct of mobile and community loud-speaker operations, both live and recorded.
- (2) Display and dissemination of printed and visual media.
- (3) Projection of motion pictures and slides.
- (4) Utilization of the mobile stage for skits and similar theatricals.

57. Team IA—Radio

a. This team provides personnel to plan and supervise the operation of a fixed radio broadcasting station selected for psychological warfare operations. The radio team provides only the nucleus of required administrative and technical personnel to operate the station and utilizes civilians to the maximum extent practicable. The team plans and produces psychological warfare programs of a consolidation nature addressed to civilians within range of the station. However, the majority of programs may be relayed from or transcribed by the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion, United States stations, and allied stations.

b. This team consists of four officers and four enlisted men. A program director commands the team that includes these personnel—audio engineer, propaganda officer, radio engineer, radio broadcast supervisor, senior radio announcer, translator, and radio repairman.

c. The team is provided with testing and maintenance equipment used in the supervision and operation of fixed radio broadcasting stations.

58. Team KA—Publications

a. This team provides personnel to supervise the reestablishment and operation of publication facilities, except newspapers. The team requires large quantities of prepared material with which to conduct information services until facilities for publishing magazines and books are available. It operates in conjunction with, and utilizes the publications pre-

pared by, United States national overseas information programs administered through governmental channels until indigenous publications can be prepared. Later, publications prepared in the zone of interior will be used to supplement or expand the local production.

b. The team consists of three officers and two enlisted men—publications officer, assistant publications officer, propaganda officer, printing supervisor, and translator.

c. This team may be located at company headquarters to act as a central publications supply agency.

59. Team LA—Distribution

a. This team provides personnel for supervising the distribution of newspapers, periodicals, and other printed materials. It normally will take over the existing distribution facilities in a liberated or occupied country. When facilities are limited or unavailable, military channels will be used to accomplish the mission. The distribution team must be augmented by local personnel.

b. This team consists of one distribution officer and three enlisted publication distribution specialists.

c. This team also may be located at company headquarters to act as a central distributing agency for consolidation propaganda materials produced by team KA or other agencies.

60. Team MA—Display

a. This team prepares and conducts pictorial photographic, art, poster, and instructional two- and

three-dimensional displays, exhibitions, and backgrounds for indoor and outdoor audiences. In addition, it supervises the improvised construction of stage settings and supporting graphic materials for theater and television use, as required.

b. The team consists of a display officer and two enlisted men, a senior information specialist and a photographer.

c. This team, allocated on the basis of operational requirements, operates in a manner similar to the mobile sound and film team (par. 56).

61. Augmentation Teams

Augmentation teams are provided in TOE 33-87 to strengthen the basic administrative and operational teams when necessary.

CHAPTER 8

COMMAND COORDINATION, RADIO BROADCASTING AND LEAFLET BATTALION

62. Administration

a. Personnel. The personnel requirements of the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion are varied. In addition to normal service and administrative personnel, the battalion employs personnel skilled in languages, art, propaganda, writing, intelligence, printing, radio broadcasting, and kindred specialties. Under certain circumstances, the organic military personnel may not be sufficient to accomplish the mission of the battalion. In such cases, civilian specialists must be procured.

- (1) *United States civilians.* Such civilians are hired under Department of the Army policies and assigned to the battalion by proper authority.
- (2) *Allied civilians.* Local prevailing laws, customs, and practices are followed in the employment of foreign nationals and indigenous personnel. Adequate records and accounting are maintained on personnel procured under any lend-lease, counterpart fund, or other approved government fiscal arrangement.
- (3) *Enemy civilians.* Enemy and ex-enemy civilians may be employed by the battalion,

based upon decisions and policies laid down by the theater commander.

b. Movement Procedures. The radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion is transportable. The degree of mobility of the consolidation company and the radio broadcasting company must be computed for each specific combination of cellular teams of which the companies are composed. The S4 advises the battalion commander on matters pertaining to movement procedures.

63. Security

Security requirements of the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion fall into two general categories—

a. Intelligence Security.

- (1) *Frequencies.* Broadcast channels for battalion operations are assigned by the theater signal officer, with due consideration of possible enemy jamming activity and prevention of interference with essential communications.
- (2) *Unit communications.* In communications between the battalion and higher or lower units, standing operating procedure, as laid down by the theater signal officer and the intelligence officer, will be followed.
- (3) *Intelligence clearance.* All material disseminated by psychological warfare operational units is subject to scrutiny for security reasons by G2.

b. Local Security. Protection of personnel and equipment against hostile action or observation is a

responsibility of the battalion commander. Normally, it is a function of headquarters and headquarters company.

- (1) *Interior guard.* The headquarters company commander, in coordination with the S2, provides and supervises interior guard details for security of personnel, equipment, and information. See FM 26-5.
- (2) *March security.* March security will be observed when elements of the battalion move from one location to another. See FM 25-10 and FM 100-5.
- (3) *Camouflage.* Camouflage measures and discipline will be exercised when the battalion or any of its elements is in areas where camouflage is considered necessary or desirable. See FM 5-20.

64. Operations

a. Coordination. Psychological warfare operations performed by the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion require close coordination between the commander and his staff, and between individual members of the staff. Staff officers are advisors, planners, coordinators, supervisors and, at times, operators. They must not allow themselves to become engrossed with administrative details to the detriment of their primary responsibilities.

b. Relationship to Theater Staff. The radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion is the strategic psychological warfare operating agency within a theater of operations. General planning is accomplished by the theater psychological warfare special staff sec-

tion. Successful psychological warfare operations can be expected only if strict adherence to this clear-cut division of activities is scrupulously maintained: *planning* by the theater staff may include suggestions as to the choice of specific themes, but *implementation* of these themes is the sole and exclusive responsibility of the battalion commander.

65. Training

a. General. Planning and supervision of all training within the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion are functions of the S3. He is assisted by other staff and command elements of the battalion.

b. Training Methods. Procedures used in the training of battalion personnel are described in FM 21-5.

66. Supply

Planning and supervision of all matters pertaining to supply in the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion are functions of the S4, in coordination with other staff and command elements of the battalion. See current tables of organization and equipment and tables of allowances.

CHAPTER 9

LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET COMPANY (TOE 33-77)

Section I. GENERAL

67. Mission

The mission of the loudspeaker and leaflet (L&L) company is to conduct psychological warfare operations in support of a field army.

68. Assignment and Organization

The loudspeaker and leaflet company normally is assigned one to a field army.

a. The company consists of company headquarters, publication platoon, operations platoon, and loudspeaker platoon (fig. 3). For details, see current TOE 33-77.

b. A mobile radio detachment may be attached to the company by the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion for specific operations in which radio is essential.

69. Employment

As presently organized, different units of the loudspeaker and leaflet company may be employed in various sectors of the army area at the same time. When not in operation, units will be located in or




Figure 3. Organization of loudspeaker and leaflet company.

near army headquarters to facilitate coordination with the psychological warfare staff officer (G3). Sections of the loudspeaker platoon may be temporarily attached to corps, division, or regiment.

70. Company Headquarters

Company headquarters is the command element of the company and performs administrative functions such as personnel records, mess, and supply common to company headquarters in general. Its organization includes the company commander and enlisted specialists required to accomplish the mission.

a. Company Commander. The company commander must be an officer with some experience as a composite unit commander and must possess the qualifications of a psychological warfare officer. He must be capable of planning, directing, and supervising the preparation of psychological warfare material, analyzing enemy morale, and evaluating enemy psychological warfare operations. The task of the company commander is twofold—

- (1) He must supervise the administration of the company to a greater degree than commanders of other units because the loudspeaker and leaflet company has no executive officer.
- (2) He must supervise the functioning of the company. He must be certain that the several components are working efficiently and harmoniously. He is responsible for seeing that the missions assigned to the company are carried out as thoroughly as possible.

b. First Sergeant. Many routine supervisory and administrative duties ordinarily handled by an executive officer are charged to the first sergeant.

c. Administrative Personnel. A company administrative clerk and a personnel administrative clerk maintain company records.

71. Publication Platoon

a. The mission of the publication platoon is to print leaflets, newspapers, and other printed material prepared by the operations platoon. The organization of the publication platoon is similar to that of the reproduction company. It includes platoon headquarters, camera and plate section, press section, and processing section. The reproduction officer and his enlisted men, with the exception of those assigned to the processing section, are technical specialists in printing.

b. Like the reproduction company, the publication platoon of the loudspeaker and leaflet company utilizes the photo-offset method of printing. Equipment is similar, although certain differences exist.

(1) *Mobility.* The publication platoon is 90 percent mobile. It prints propaganda material to support tactical operations and must have equipment that can be moved on short notice.

(2) *Speed.* Propaganda material produced by the publication platoon need not be as elaborate or complicated as that produced by the reproduction company. Thus, the emphasis in the loudspeaker and leaflet company is on smaller, simpler presses capable of fast production in one or two colors.

72. Operations Platoon

The mission of the operations platoon is to coordinate the integration of evaluated intelligence and propaganda into a psychological warfare operations product (chs. 12, 15, 16, 17, and 18). It is the tactical counterpart of the propaganda platoon of headquarters and headquarters company, radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion (par. 30). In addition to a platoon headquarters, the platoon contains an intelligence section and a propaganda section.

a. Platoon Headquarters. The operations platoon leader is directly responsible for integrating intelligence and propaganda to support and fulfill assigned operational missions. He is assisted by an air liaison officer and enlisted specialists, including a platoon sergeant and an artillery liaison sergeant.

b. Intelligence Section. This section formulates requirements for, assembles, and processes intelligence, for the use of the propaganda section and the loudspeaker platoon.

- (1) The section consists of an officer and his enlisted assistants, all of whom should have linguistic ability so that they may act as monitors, translators, or interrogators.
- (2) The intelligence officer supervises the preparation of collection requirements, levies these requirements on intelligence agencies, and evaluates and interprets the intelligence received. He makes certain that the intelligence files are properly maintained, that the voice interceptors are performing effectively, and that the interrogators are gain-

ing the most useful information (chs. 10-12).

c. Propaganda Section. This section plans and conducts tactical leaflet operations (ch. 16). Planning for loudspeaker operations normally is accomplished within the loudspeaker platoon (par. 73). The section is headed by a foreign language propaganda officer. He is assisted by enlisted specialists, including a section chief who is an information supervisor, information specialists, illustrators, and vari-typists.

- (1) The propaganda officer should be a fluent writer and speaker of the target audience's language. In addition, he must be familiar with the effective use of words, pictures, headlines, color, and white space (ch. 16).
 - (a) He supervises and coordinates the work of the script writers and the layout artists in order to produce effective materials.
 - (b) He acts as a coordinator between his section and the intelligence section. His requests for information must be clear.
 - (c) He works closely with the reproduction officer. He must be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the equipment and personnel of the publication platoon, otherwise the platoon's capabilities might not be used to the utmost, or valuable time might be lost in revising leaflet layouts to conform to mechanical limitations.
 - (d) He makes certain that policy directives are rigidly followed. If the propaganda

officer allows a taboo word or theme to appear in a leaflet, time and effort will be lost in revising it. Should the error escape scrutiny, serious damage to a propaganda campaign may result. He must make certain, to whatever extent possible, that the script writer and artist have exploited fully an enemy vulnerability. A well-made plan at army level can be thwarted in the company by unimaginative work.

- (2) Information specialists in the section collect, prepare, and disseminate propaganda material. They keep themselves fully informed on policy directives and guidance.
- (3) Illustrators and vari-typists in the section are responsible for the layout, design, and type composition required in the reproduction of leaflets.

73. Loudspeaker Platoon

This platoon is responsible for tactical psychological warfare operations by means of loudspeaker systems (ch. 18). Its organization consists of platoon headquarters and three loudspeaker sections.

a. Platoon Headquarters. Platoon headquarters is the command and administrative element of the loudspeaker platoon. Its personnel includes an officer who is the platoon leader, a platoon sergeant, a radio repair supervisor, and an interpreter.

- (1) *Platoon leader.* The platoon leader commands the overall operations of the platoon

and coordinates intelligence, script writing, and employment of personnel and equipment during a preplanned loudspeaker operation.

- (2) *Platoon sergeant.* The platoon sergeant reads and logs reports received from collecting agencies, studies and makes the preliminary analysis of reports, and compares them with other related information to estimate importance, significance, and reliability. He systematizes, simplifies, and adapts information to the needs of the unit. The platoon sergeant also should be familiar with the operation and maintenance of loudspeakers and the submission of routine and special reports on platoon operations.

b. Loudspeaker Section (Three). Each loudspeaker section is divided into a maximum of four teams, making a total of twelve tactical loudspeaker units. Each team has at least two members, including a team chief, who is an intelligence analyst, and a mechanic.

- (1) *Section leader.* The section leader is a foreign language propaganda officer. In addition to possessing the linguistic skill called for in this specialty, he must have enough technical knowledge of loudspeaker equipment to supervise its proper maintenance.
- (2) *Senior intelligence analyst.* The senior intelligence analyst is the chief intelligence analyst in the section. He assists the section leader. He should have technical knowledge

of the equipment and the analytical skills required in his specialty.

(3) *Public address announcer supervisor.* Each public address announcer supervisor should be fluent in the language of the target. If no qualified linguists are available, indigenous personnel may be employed, provided they remain under the operational control of a team leader at all times.

(a) The announcer prepares his own script either by writing it or by making notes from which he will speak extemporaneously.

(b) The announcer obtains the necessary local intelligence from the intelligence section of the operations platoon or as arranged by the loudspeaker platoon leader.

(c) The announcer must know and observe carefully the policy directives which forbid mention of certain words or subjects and emphasize the effectiveness of others.

(d) The announcer should have some technical knowledge of the loudspeaker equipment. He may be called upon, in an emergency, to make repairs.

(4) *PA system mechanic.* Another member of the loudspeaker team is PA system mechanic. He has two functions—

(a) He sets up the loudspeaker equipment and makes certain it is in proper operating condition. He also must be able to make emergency repairs in the field.

- (b) He drives the vehicle in which the equipment is transported.

Section II. COMMAND COORDINATION

74. Administration

a. Personnel. Personnel problems and procedures of the loudspeaker and leaflet company are very similar to those of the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion, but are on smaller scales. The loudspeaker and leaflet company has neither adjutant nor executive officer to perform personnel functions for the company commander.

b. Movement Procedure. The commander, aided by subordinate officers, must plan and supervise all movements of the company. Movements of elements of the company are the responsibility of the officer in charge (FM 25-10 and FM 100-5).

75. Security

Elements of the loudspeaker and leaflet company frequently are exposed to hostile air and ground action. This is especially true of the loudspeaker teams. The company commander is responsible for security measures required to protect personnel and equipment from hostile action, as well as security measures aimed at safeguarding vital military information.

a. Intelligence Security. Safeguarding of military information is closely identified with communications security measures observed in the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion (par. 63). However, loudspeaker broadcasts made by teams in the front lines must be composed on the basis of local intelligence and, frequently, normal security clear-

ance procedures cannot be followed. Loudspeaker teams must be provided with sufficient operating directives on which they can base decisions regarding security in selecting information for loudspeaker broadcasts. This necessitates highly trained loudspeaker team members who can exercise judgment in selecting information for use in loudspeaker broadcasts and, at the same time, avoid premature disclosure of valuable intelligence.

b. Local Security. Security measures for protection of personnel and equipment include—

- (1) *Interior guard.* The company commander is responsible for proper interior guard measures except where elements of the company are detached to other units (FM 26-5).
- (2) *March security.* March security measures will be employed when the company or any of its elements move from one location to another (FM 25-10 and FM 100-5).
- (3) *Camouflage.* Camouflage measures and discipline will be exercised by the company and its elements when enemy action or observation is considered likely (FM 5-20).

76. Operations

a. Coordination. Psychological warfare operations performed by the loudspeaker and leaflet company require a high degree of coordination between the commander and subordinate officers. Although independent operation of loudspeaker elements to a certain extent is unavoidable, maximum coordination must be exercised so that the mission of the company is accomplished. In planning for any loud-

speaker or leaflet operation, coordination should be effected through the fire support coordination center (FSCC).

b. Relationship to Staff. Tactical psychological warfare planning is accomplished by the psychological warfare staff officers (G3) in coordination with the company commander. Broad planning for tactical operations also is accomplished by the theater psychological warfare special staff when such operations are part of a large-scale military effort. Unity of action will be achieved by appropriate psychological warfare representation at the fire support coordination center.

77. Training

Training methods, phases, and objectives are virtually identical in the loudspeaker and leaflet company and the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion. For training procedure, see FM 21-5.

78. Supply

Planning and supervision for all matters pertaining to supply in the loudspeaker and leaflet company are the responsibility of the company commander. For further details about unit and psychological warfare supply, see current table of organization and equipment and tables of allowances.

PART THREE
INTELLIGENCE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE

CHAPTER 10
INTRODUCTION TO INTELLIGENCE FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Section I. GENERAL

79. Purpose

Part Three provides basic information for the operation of intelligence sections at all levels of command in the use of intelligence in psychological warfare operations. It presents the organization and functioning of psychological warfare unit intelligence sections, collecting and processing information for psychological warfare operations, and various intelligence techniques and operations peculiar to psychological warfare.

80. Relationships

(FM 101-5)

a. Unless the propagandist knows what his target is doing and thinking, he is operating by guesswork alone. Area specialist personnel are provided in staff and operational sections of psychological warfare units primarily to select and analyze items of in-

formation obtained through normal G2 channels and to prepare them as bases for effective propaganda. The psychological warfare intelligence officer formulates the requirements for the information and intelligence to be provided by the regular intelligence sources, but may augment them with basic background and specialized information on such items as the politics, economics, social structure, and ethnic, cultural, and religious factors of his target. He must seek to determine target audience attitudes toward both its domestic environment and its reactions to external factors, including propaganda directed at it. He is constantly seeking enemy psychological vulnerabilities to be exploited. Only by a continuing process of collating current intelligence and information from all sources with a thorough background knowledge of his target can the psychological warfare intelligence officer effectively support his own propaganda program.

b. The primary objectives of psychological warfare intelligence activities are—

- (1) To formulate timely requirements through established military intelligence channels for intelligence and information from all sources to discover exploitable vulnerabilities.
- (2) To assist in and coordinate the collection of such intelligence and information by all sources and agencies when authorized. Close and continuing coordination and liaison with higher and lower echelons of psychological warfare and with higher, adjacent, and lower echelons of G2 are essential.

- (3) To guide the operators and planners by evaluating the probable effectiveness of planned or possible psychological warfare operations.
- (4) To evaluate the after-action effectiveness of special psychological warfare operations and the impact of other actions having a psychological effect.

Section II. SOURCES AND AGENCIES EXTERNAL TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

81. General

a. The major source of intelligence external to psychological warfare is the military intelligence channel (FM 30-5). In a theater of active operations, G2 is responsible for the production of intelligence needed by all arms and services, including psychological warfare, but G2 in turn must rely on all arms and services to supply it with much of the raw information from which this intelligence is derived. (At the theater level, this function may be under a Navy or Air Force or Joint intelligence section. At lower levels, the Army psychological warfare intelligence officer will normally deal with an Army G2 section at his command level.) In addition to close liaison with G2, the psychological warfare intelligence officer will maintain liaison and working arrangements with other sources of information for spot reports of new developments having a bearing on his target's attitudes. FM 30-5 lists commonly useful sources.

b. As G2 is responsible for the intelligence needed by all arms and services, it is the latter's responsibility

to submit all items of information gained elsewhere to G2 as rapidly as possible. Frequently, however, G2 and psychological warfare will gain the same information simultaneously and working arrangements at each echelon will facilitate this. An example is in the interrogation of prisoners. The psychological warfare intelligence officer should be a frequent visitor to prisoner of war cages and may assist and guide G2 interrogators in those subjects pertaining particularly to psychological warfare (app. II). The G2 interrogator is interested in the state of the enemy units' morale; the psychological warfare intelligence officer wants to determine the "why" of that state of morale. G2 wants to determine the level of food, clothing, pay, recreation, etc., of the enemy troops; psychological warfare in addition wants to determine whether or not appeals directed at some point of resentment would sow the seeds of doubt in the enemy soldiers' minds and cause disaffection, or even surrenders and desertions. G2 needs to know the combat effectiveness of minority groups (religious, ethnic, etc.) within enemy forces; psychological warfare further wants to find how these groups might be persuaded to disaffect and even defect. In these examples, psychological warfare may need more information than the G2 would normally produce. It is to obtain this additional factor that psychological warfare works closely with and often assists the normal collecting process.

c. It cannot be emphasized too much that the psychological warfare intelligence officer must fully understand the G2 functions and must keep current with G2 intelligence. Strength, morale, effectiveness of enemy troops; numbers, condition and capability

of enemy weapons, material, and personnel equipment; conditions on the homefront, such as extent of bomb damage, food shortages, delay in mail delivery, etc.—all these facts and many more are essential to the psychological warfare intelligence officer. G2 reports often are not sufficiently detailed for psychological warfare purposes. In addition to interrogating prisoners of war or assisting at G2 interrogations, the psychological warfare intelligence section needs, and must obtain from G2, the use of other raw information such as captured letters, diaries (both official and personal), newspapers, and periodicals.

82. Military Sources

It is most desirable that the psychological warfare intelligence officer have a thorough background knowledge of his enemy target, either through actual residence or extensive travel in the area. The higher the echelon with consequent broader scope of operations, the more necessary such a background becomes. This must be augmented by intensive study of the geography, people, politics, economics, social structure, culture, language (to include *current* idiom and slang), etc., of the area. Study of the area can be accomplished by various means. Independent reading and periodic consultation with area specialists both in universities and in research institutions and in various government agencies are two of the most readily available means for increasing and renewing knowledge of an area. Refugees and defectors should be interviewed whenever possible. It must be remembered, in addition to the problem of planted enemy agents among the defectors, that these

escapees are people with a grievance of some sort and that their information is almost invariably colored, perhaps unconsciously, by their personal likes and dislikes, fears and hopes, etc.

83. Basic Background Studies

Basic background studies on foreign areas, produced jointly by United States intelligence agencies, are a valuable source of information for psychological warfare. These studies cover the sociological, political, military, economic, geographic, and other aspects of specific areas and are published as "National Intelligence Surveys." These studies are produced for and used by all agencies of the U. S. Government and thus they represent a source of coordinated information for psychological warfare. In addition, individual agencies of the Government produce basic area studies which provide further detailed background material.

Section III. SOURCES AND AGENCIES INTERNAL TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

84. Supplementary Studies

Basic intelligence provided by the intelligence agencies is augmented by supplementary studies produced internally when normal intelligence production cannot satisfy psychological warfare's special requirements. These studies may be produced within the intelligence sections of psychological warfare staffs and units by organic personnel. Basic intelligence may also be significantly supplemented through external research, sponsored by psychological war-

fare and coordinated with all intelligence agencies, when needed information is not available through these agencies. Such detailed studies are important sources of background information against which to project current intelligence and arrive at exploitable vulnerabilities. These studies, for example, may be directed at one or more of the following elements of an area:

a. Sociological.

- (1) Ethnic divisions and characteristics of the people.
- (2) Cultural development.
- (3) Education.
- (4) Social stratification.
- (5) Religion.
- (6) Taboos, prejudices, and sensitivities.
- (7) Geographic influence.
- (8) Conditions of rural life.
- (9) Conditions of urban life.
- (10) Forced labor.
- (11) Attitudes toward foreign nations and peoples.
- (12) Public welfare and health.
- (13) Bibliography of references.

b. Political.

- (1) Structure of government.
- (2) Origins of real power.
- (3) Foreign policies.
- (4) Relationship of military hierarchy with civil powers.
- (5) Law enforcement agencies and procedures.
- (6) Intelligence and security.
- (7) Propaganda.

- (8) Subversive potentialities.
- (9) Biographies of key personalities.
- (10) Bibliography of references.

c. Economic.

- (1) Industrial potential.
- (2) Agricultural potential.
- (3) Trade unions.
- (4) Taxation.
- (5) Trade.
- (6) Finance.
- (7) Availability of consumer goods.
- (8) Bibliography of references.

d. Armed Forces.

- (1) Organization.
- (2) Strategic mission.
- (3) Tactical doctrine.
- (4) Political control and indoctrination.
- (5) Counterintelligence.
- (6) Discipline.
- (7) Characteristics, training, loyalties, and morale of enlisted personnel.
- (8) Characteristics, training, loyalties, and morale of officers.
- (9) Equipment, weapons, and logistic capabilities.
- (10) Biographies of general officers.
- (11) Paramilitary organizations.
- (12) Bibliography of references.

e. Communications and Transportation.

- (1) Type and distribution of radio receiving sets.
- (2) Radio listening practices and counter-measures.

- (3) Newspapers, magazines, and other printed media.
- (4) Clandestine publications.
- (5) Public travel and rumor dissemination.
- (6) Bibliography of references.

85. Special Psychological Warfare Studies

Various special studies may be undertaken within the intelligence sections of the psychological warfare staffs and units in addition to special studies by civilian experts or agencies under contract to the U. S. Government. These studies may include the effectiveness of various media and planning and operational problems. Command reports also fall into the special studies category.

86. Propaganda Analysis

Propaganda analyses pertain to systematic studies of enemy, friendly, or one's own propaganda. For further details, see chapter 13 and appendix V.

a. Enemy Propaganda. Enemy propaganda must be analyzed in order to obtain important supplemental intelligence. Much may be learned from enemy propaganda by analyzing it carefully in the light of known and probable facts.

b. United States Propaganda. Propaganda analysis should be used to determine how United States propaganda is affecting the enemy. This intelligence is derived from information supplied by opinion polls and prisoner of war interrogations.

- (1) Propaganda may be regarded as having an initial impact effect and a delayed reaction effect. The initial impact effect consists of

those immediate changes in enemy attitudes and behavior that occur early, perhaps within the first 24 hours after the enemy has received our propaganda. The delayed reaction effect is that which occurs some time after propaganda reception. As the effects of propaganda are mainly cumulative, most are of the delayed reaction type.

- (2) In the employment of both tactical and strategic propaganda the reaction may be considerably delayed. A surrender pass may be carried for many weeks or months before it is used, but the fact that it is still in the possession of the enemy soldier is an indication of its effectiveness. An anti-regime theme beamed at the target may take months to develop any appreciable change in attitude in the enemy population.

87. Opinion Analysis

Measurement of opinion may be achieved by use of polling techniques, and the results may be analyzed. For further details regarding this complex source of intelligence for psychological warfare, see chapter 13 and appendix VI.

88. Interrogation for Psychological Warfare

The interrogation of prisoners of war is a principal means of obtaining information for propaganda purposes. Interrogation of prisoners of war will always be effected in close coordination with G2. Early interrogation in forward areas is done principally by G2 (S2) personnel. The psychological war-

fare intelligence officer assists in this interrogation whenever possible. In rear areas, G2 will often make prisoners available to psychological warfare for more intensive questioning. FM 30-15 gives general information on techniques of interrogation with which the psychological warfare interrogator should be thoroughly familiar.

a. Detailed Interrogation. This method pertains to the detailed interrogation of individual prisoners of war. In using it, the subjects should be as representative of the enemy military forces or civil population as possible. Identical or similar questions should be asked over an extended period of time. Further, the interrogator must be thoroughly trained in order to secure truthful, nonevasive, and factual information. For an example of prisoner of war interrogation for psychological warfare, see appendix II.

(1) *Advantages.* The detailed interrogation can be used when only one or a small number of prisoners is available. It may be conducted without advance planning at higher echelons. The interrogator has a better chance to evaluate the information obtained because of the length of time he has the prisoner under observation and the variety and scope of questions he can ask.

(2) *Disadvantages.* Lengthy periods of time may be required for detailed interrogations. Difficulty may be encountered in obtaining and training sufficient numbers of qualified interrogators.

b. Prisoner of War Surveys. This method is based upon written "Yes" or "No" answers of brief expressions of opinion, and is given to a substantial number of prisoners at one time. A written form of poll questionnaire is used.

(1) *Advantages.* The prisoner of war survey can be conducted speedily and a large number of answers to uniform questions can be obtained.

(2) *Disadvantages.* Due to inherent problems of sampling (app. VI), prisoner of war polls may not reflect accurate opinions. Reliability of prisoners cannot be evaluated as closely as in a detailed interrogation. The fact that many prisoners may be illiterate will restrict such a survey to those who are better educated.

CHAPTER 11

ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE

89. Psychological Warfare Special Staff Section, Theater of Operations

Intelligence functions of the psychological warfare special staff section, theater of operations, may be performed by an appropriate intelligence unit in coordination with G2 (FM 101-5). The intelligence unit—

a. Formulates theater psychological warfare intelligence requirements for psychological warfare plans and policy.

b. Effects close coordination in procurement of information with G2.

c. Processes intelligence received for psychological warfare plans and policy.

d. Arranges for surveys, opinion polls, or other operations to measure the current status of enemy, neutral, and allied public opinion.

e. Maintains a current intelligence estimate of the psychological warfare situation.

f. Prepares estimates of the probable effectiveness of proposed psychological warfare plans.

g. Recommends targets for psychological warfare operations.

h. Analyzes enemy propaganda and psychological

warfare with a view toward obtaining trends and indications of enemy capabilities.

i. Maintains psychological warfare intelligence records.

j. Provides intelligence useful for counterpropaganda activities.

90. Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Battalion

The radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion includes an intelligence activity in its headquarters company (ch. 4). This activity—

a. Formulates battalion requirements for and processes intelligence received to support the psychological warfare plans and operations.

b. In coordination with theater psychological warfare special staff section, arranges with G2 for and conducts interrogations of prisoners of war by psychological warfare specialists.

c. In coordination with theater psychological warfare special staff section, arranges with G2 for examination of captured enemy documents and materiel by psychological warfare specialists.

d. Disseminates battalion psychological warfare intelligence reports to appropriate units and agencies.

e. Provides the battalion commander with a psychological warfare estimate of the situation, and coordinates with staff elements of the battalion in planning operations.

f. Advises the battalion S3 regarding security of battalion operations.

g. Analyzes strategic area studies for psychological warfare purposes.

h. Provides daily supplementary monitoring reports of enemy, allied, and neutral broadcasts not provided by other intelligence activities.

i. Analyzes samples of enemy, allied, and neutral newspapers, magazines, and other publications received from higher and lower echelons.

j. Receives and processes psychological warfare intelligence estimates, results of surveys, propaganda analyses, and similar reports from the theater psychological warfare special staff section for use in battalion operations.

91. Psychological Warfare Officer—Army (FM 101-5)

The psychological warfare officer (G3) at field army headquarters has certain intelligence functions. The psychological warfare officer—

a. Estimates effectiveness of psychological warfare operations.

b. Receives and disseminates psychological warfare reports and analyses from higher and lower echelons and from army G2.

c. Obtains pertinent psychological warfare information from G2 sources and, in coordination with G2, supplements the G2 effort.

d. Determines security measures relating to intelligence for psychological warfare.

92. Psychological Warfare Officer—Corps (FM 101-5)

In many respects the intelligence functions of the psychological warfare officer (G3) at corps head-

quarters parallel those of the army psychological warfare officer. Specifically, he is concerned with aiding loudspeaker teams in obtaining specific intelligence for operations and planning subsequent operations for the teams (par. 73).

93. Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company

The loudspeaker and leaflet company includes an intelligence section in the operations platoon. This section—

a. In coordination with the army psychological warfare officer, initiates intelligence requirements through G2.

b. Processes intelligence from all sources.

c. Monitors and analyzes enemy loudspeaker and, if necessary, local radio propaganda broadcasts.

d. Arranges with G2 for prisoner of war interrogations for psychological warfare purposes.

CHAPTER 12

OBTAINING INTELLIGENCE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Section I. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

94. General

(FM 30-5)

Obtaining intelligence for psychological warfare is a continuous process to supply a constant demand. It involves clearly defined steps to obtain maximum results. These steps are—

- a. Formulation of essential elements of information (EEI).
- b. Preparation of a collection plan.
- c. Presentation of requests for information to G2 for collecting agency action.
- d. Collection and submission of information through G2 to the psychological warfare requesting agency.
- e. Processing of information in the psychological warfare journal and worksheet.
- f. Preparation of psychological warfare intelligence estimate on the basis of the information received to include exploitable psychological strengths and vulnerabilities.

95. Psychological Warfare EEI

The psychological warfare EEI comprise the specific information that the commander must know so

that he may develop a plan and conduct psychological warfare operations. EEI are the guides for the direction of the collection plan.

a. Originating Authority for EEI. Assisted by his staff, the psychological warfare officer at each echelon is responsible for the preparation of the EEI in order to maintain a constant flow of operational intelligence for use in implementing plans. These EEI must be coordinated in such a way that they do not overlap or conflict (par. 64, FM 30-5). Such coordination is the responsibility of the theater commander. The EEI will supplement the basic intelligence requirement and cover any specific plans, targets, or vulnerabilities that should be exploited.

b. Dissemination of EEI.

- (1) Psychological warfare EEI normally are stated in question form.
- (2) EEI are disseminated to the appropriate agencies by means of a psychological warfare EEI form. See appendix III.
- (3) EEI are not fixed. Should policy directives governing propaganda themes change or the requirements for information about the targets change, corresponding changes in the EEI are necessary.

96. Documents Considered in the Preparation of the EEI

In preparing the EEI, intelligence officers should consider information and documents already on hand. Various documents to be considered are—

a. Psychological warfare policy guidances and directives.

- b.* Strategic area studies.
- c.* Interrogation reports.
- d.* Propaganda analyses.
- e.* Intelligence estimates.

Section II. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COLLECTION PLAN

97. Definition of Collection Plan

(FM 30-5)

The psychological warfare collection plan is the psychological warfare intelligence officer's program for securing the answers to the EEI. Definite and precise requirements must be presented to the psychological warfare agencies and to G2.

98. Indications

a. Psychological warfare indications are those evidences or manifestations of attitudes, either positive or negative, which may point to the existence of psychological strengths and vulnerabilities capable of being exploited by propaganda.

b. Indications may be vague clues or definite signs of information pointing to the existence of psychological strengths and vulnerabilities. Examples might be hunger (or lack of hunger) in recently captured personnel; obvious resentment against (or respect for) their officers among prisoners; worry (or lack of worry) among prisoners about events at the front or conditions on the homefront, etc. In the collection plan they are arrived at by a detailed analysis of the EEI.

99. Form for the Collection Plan

(FM 30-5)

The standard format for the collection plan is used.

100. Intelligence Annex

(FM 101-5 and FM 30-5)

When time permits, orders and requests for information may be included in the intelligence annex to the operation order. This annex is prepared by G2. The paragraphs in which psychological warfare will insert its intelligence interests are as follows:

a. Paragraph 1. Information in summary form regarding the current morale status of the enemy. This information is of value to combat commanders in planning their operations.

b. Paragraph 2. Psychological warfare **EEL**.

c. Paragraph 3. Specific directives and requests to all intelligence agencies assigned to collect information.

d. Paragraph 4. Any differences peculiar to the collection or handling of intelligence for psychological warfare.

e. Paragraph 7. Instructions relating to the time and place for the submission of reports.

Section III. INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING

101. Intelligence Journal

(FM 30-5)

The psychological warfare intelligence journal is a daybook type of permanent record in which entries are made immediately upon receipt or dispatch of a

report. Original entries should not be altered but may be supplemented by subsequent entries. The journal is closed daily or at the end of a phase or period.

102. Intelligence Worksheet

The psychological warfare worksheet is a device to provide for the systematic recording of psychological warfare information, so that items bearing on a particular topic will be grouped together for reference or comparison. It is not a permanent record. The principles and techniques given in FM 30-5 are applicable, but entries will be items of psychological warfare interest (app. IV).

103. Evaluation

Evaluation of psychological warfare information is accomplished in accordance with the standard systems described in FM 30-5.

104. Interpretation

a. Interpretation involves the analysis of evaluated information to determine its significance with respect to information and intelligence already at hand.

b. As in any other case, interpretation of psychological warfare information requires proper organization of the material to be interpreted. If the worksheet has been set up in the approved manner and the various items have been entered in appropriate categories, the work of interpretation is made much easier.

105. Psychological Warfare Intelligence Estimate

The psychological warfare intelligence estimate is the presentation in summary form of evaluated and interpreted information upon which the commander can make sound and timely decisions in regard to psychological warfare. The estimate is the end product of the intelligence process. The estimate provides the commander and the operating propagandist with a current picture of enemy morale and possible psychological strengths and vulnerabilities. The principles and techniques covering G2 estimates are applicable (FM 30-5).

106. Enemy Vulnerabilities

a. Psychological vulnerabilities are those points of weakness, stress, or tension in the enemy character, position, or situation which are susceptible of exploitation by propaganda or by other activities designed for psychological impact in furtherance of the total military effort to destroy the enemy's will to fight. Enemy vulnerabilities embrace three main aspects—

- (1) *Potential vulnerabilities.* These are points of stress and tension, not previously exploited, which offer possibilities for psychological attack. They are exploited only after careful consideration of all available intelligence.
- (2) *Actual vulnerabilities.* These are existing enemy vulnerabilities that represent definite opportunity for exploitation.
- (3) *Nonexploitable vulnerabilities.* These are possible psychological vulnerabilities that

cannot be attacked successfully either because of higher policy directives or because they are beyond friendly capability for attack, or vulnerabilities which, when called to the attention of the enemy, could be relatively easy to eliminate and thereby strengthen the enemy position.

b. Determination of exploitable vulnerabilities, actual and potential, is accomplished through the production of intelligence for psychological warfare as outlined in this chapter.

- (1) The vulnerability must exist at the time of exploitation. Some vulnerabilities may be of such fleeting nature that they are useless for exploitation. Examples would be a temporary shortage of food, or lack of warm clothing in a sudden cold weather wave, etc.
- (2) The vulnerability must be deep-seated rather than trivial in nature. For example, soldier complaints must not be interpreted as evidence of low morale until they pass a reasonable point.
- (3) The target audience must recognize the the situation from which the vulnerability was developed. For example, propaganda exploiting the existence of concentration camps would not be successful unless the target audience knew of the concentration camps, or could be brought to believe in their existence.
- (4) The vulnerability must be one whose exploitation would not violate propaganda policy and directives.

- (5) The vulnerability must be one which, if successfully exploited, will show results commensurate with the required expenditure of effort.
- (6) The vulnerability should not be one which, if exploited, invites effective counterpropaganda.
- (7) The vulnerability, if exploitable, must be assigned a priority. This is necessary because the maximum effectiveness of any propaganda campaign depends upon selection of a few important themes that will have the cumulative effect desired. Selection of the most powerful themes depends, of course, on prior selection of the most exploitable vulnerabilities. Normally, priority is determined by how closely each vulnerability considered meets the standards outlined above.

CHAPTER 13

PROPAGANDA AND OPINION ANALYSIS

107. Introduction to Propaganda Analysis

Analysis of enemy propaganda is a supplementary source of intelligence for psychological warfare. It is a recognized method of examining propaganda for the purpose of determining and evaluating the source, content, audience, media and techniques, and effect.

a. In scope, propaganda analysis attempts to answer the model questions: *Who says what to whom, how, and with what effect?* The information from this analysis, accurately carried out and objectively evaluated, often will reveal or suggest psychological strengths and vulnerabilities that are exploitable.

b. Propaganda analysis in itself does not furnish intelligence adequate to support plans for a psychological warfare campaign except in the extreme instances where all other sources of information are unavailable. For the techniques of propaganda analysis, see appendix V.

108. Opinion Analysis

a. An additional and somewhat complex source of intelligence for psychological warfare is the opinion analysis. For the techniques of opinion analysis (see appendix VI).

b. Opinion analysis may be based on carefully prepared and executed interrogations and interviews with—

- (1) Prisoners of war.
- (2) Civilians in occupied and liberated areas.
- (3) Refugees.

109. Selecting a Public

a. *Definition of a Public.* For psychological warfare purposes, a *public* is a group of people distinguished on the basis of a common interest. Differing from a mere audience, mob, or crowd, a public is formed with respect to an issue recognized by its members and concerning which its members may take sides and act. For example, the United States has within it numerous separate publics: those of voting age, those who are Democrats, those who are Republicans, those who are students, railroad workers, or veterans, and many others. A public is not a random collection of individuals.

b. *Prisoners of War as Publics.* Prisoners of war constitute a limited homogeneous group in that they are all captured enemy soldiers. They have all participated in aggressive or defensive operations against the United States or friendly forces. They have all received similar training and indoctrination. They have all been taught that the objective of their nation is to defeat the United States in battle. It is true, however, that any large group of enemy prisoners can be broken down into numerous sub-groups, or publics. For instance, many modern armies are composed of soldiers drawn from vastly different racial groups, soldiers who cannot even

speaking one another's language, or whose racial habits or characteristics conflict. In another instance, there may be two basic publics among enemy prisoners: one smaller group composed of fanatic soldiers who are wholly convinced of the righteousness of the ideology for which they are fighting; and a second, much larger group composed of relatively unindoctrinated individuals who are in the army only because they could not avoid military service.

c. Publics and Social Organization. An individual's opinion is greatly influenced by his relation to other people and his position in society. The kinds of homogeneity that make a number of individuals into a significant public, either for measurement or manipulation of their opinion, are those which result from the organization of society. For this reason, publics must be defined in terms of such characteristics as the occupation, income, age, sex, education, religion, marital status, etc., of the individuals in the society. The degree of success of the analyst depends heavily on the professional knowledge provided by research in the social sciences.

110. Opinion Polls

The most reliable opinion poll can only measure what the opinions of those questioned were at the time they were polled. Opinion may change significantly and rapidly. The only reasonably sure way to determine if it has changed is to take another reliable poll. Where polls are used to obtain information for propaganda campaigns, the temptation to think of them as infallible indications of future opinion should be avoided.

111. Panels

When a small group of people is interviewed on two or more occasions, that group usually is referred to as a *panel*. The number of interviews varies with the purpose. The chief use of the panel technique is in the study of changes in opinions, attitudes, or behavior. The panel is an especially useful device for identifying the persons who have or have not changed their views, for locating the stimuli responsible for such changes, and for testing the effectiveness of information materials. When used for such purposes, a small core of identical questions is asked in succeeding interviews so that differences in the responses may be observed and analyzed.

a. Prisoner of War Panels. Pretesting of propaganda campaigns often can be accomplished through the use of small groups of prisoners of war who are deliberately picked to approximate certain characteristics prevalent in the enemy audience.

- (1) Such panels should be used with wisdom and caution. One danger is that the panel personnel may become indoctrinated in the ideas of the propagandist, so that the panel answers may start reflecting what the prisoners believe is desired by the questioners. This danger may be countered by organizing two separate panels for cross-checking answers and by periodically replacing panel members with new arrivals.
- (2) Such panels also present an administrative problem, since making a prisoner of war a member of a panel is in effect putting him to work for the United States. The Geneva

Conventions put many limiting conditions on such employment. The analyst is advised to examine the Conventions thoroughly before deciding to use panels.

b. *Civilian Panels.* In occupied and liberated areas the use of civilian panels can provide valuable material with which to guide and gauge the conduct of consolidation psychological warfare operations in support of civil affairs/military government activities. For example, such panels may be used to test the effectiveness of a series of posters, a book, a motion picture, or similar item. Bearing in mind what kind of information the item is designed to impart, the interviewer may ask questions to determine the extent of the panel's knowledge or attitudes. After viewing the item, the same panel members are re-interviewed with similar questions. The *before* and *after* answers then are compared.

PART FOUR

CONDUCT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 14

INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONS

112. Purpose

Part Four describes the procedures for the conduct of psychological warfare operations in a theater of operations. It presents information concerning communication techniques and devices as well as information concerning the employment of psychological warfare through the media of leaflets and other printed materials, radio, and loudspeakers.

113. Mission

The mission of psychological warfare operations is to support combat operations and to assist military and governmental agencies in the administration and control of liberated or occupied areas.

114. Capabilities

a. Communication. Psychological warfare operations provide direct communication with the enemy and with occupied friendly nations through such media as leaflets, radio, and loudspeakers and through patrols, agents, and underground organiza-

tions. Written or oral messages may be transmitted to groups or individuals by overt or covert means to effect desired changes in their attitudes and ultimately in their behavior.

b. Depress Enemy Morale. Sustained employment of psychological warfare operations can produce a cumulative depressing effect upon the morale of enemy units and civilian populations.

c. Reduce Combat Efficiency. Consistent psychological attacks upon morale, when integrated with other military operations, can lower the combat efficiency of enemy soldiers.

d. Induce Defection. Employment of psychological warfare operations over extended periods can induce enemy soldiers to malingering, surrender, or desert.

e. Deception. Psychological warfare operations can be employed in support of the deception plans of the commander.

f. Direct Dissident Elements. Psychological warfare operations can sustain the morale of dissident elements in enemy territory and may be used to direct activities of such elements against the enemy war effort.

g. Encourage Friendly Populations. Propaganda measures can be used to gain the confidence of friendly populations under enemy control, to sustain their morale, and to direct their activities against the enemy war effort.

h. Promote Good Will. Informative and good will programs can be directed toward neutral nations within a theater of operations to win active or passive support for the United States and her allies.

i. Assist Civil Affairs/Military Government. Psychological warfare operations can assist civil affairs/military government agencies in the administration and control of liberated or occupied areas (chs. 19-22).

115. Limitations

The channels through which psychological warfare operations may reach populations in enemy territory are currently limited to leaflets, radio, and loudspeakers, supplemented by behind-the-lines activity of patrols, agents, and underground organizations. Limitations of each channel will be discussed separately.

a. Enemy Countermeasures. The effectiveness of psychological warfare operations is limited by the nature of enemy countermeasures.

b. Incomplete Information. Accurate knowledge of *all* factors in the enemy situation may not be available to intelligence agencies. Lack of knowledge of these factors may restrict the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations.

c. Difficulty of Evaluation. Enemy restrictions on exchange of information, public discussion, and travel limit the information available to psychological warfare operations for the evaluation of effectiveness.

d. Timely Coordination. Complete coordination among all military and civilian psychological warfare agencies is necessary to insure common direction to all psychological warfare operations. Failure to produce such coordination may provide the enemy with opportunities for effective counterpropaganda

and may limit effectiveness of a measure or campaign.

e. Critical Personnel. Psychological warfare operations require personnel with an intimate knowledge of the language of the target audience and of the political, economic, and social problems of its society. These personnel often are difficult to obtain because of the requirements of other military and civilian agencies.

116. Media of Dissemination

a. Leaflets, newsheets, newspapers, and other printed materials are disseminated by artillery, aircraft, infantry patrols, agents, and underground elements in enemy territory. Rumor may be circulated covertly by agents.

b. Loudspeaker sets mounted on vehicles, tanks, or aircraft as well as light weight public address equipment that can be handcarried are standard media in close support missions.

c. Radio broadcasts beamed toward areas within the effective range of the transmitter form an effective medium to reach both civilian and military targets. The audience is limited, however, to those who have access to receiving sets of appropriate wave length and who will listen if they can.

117. Fire Support Coordination Center

Psychological warfare at the tactical level is coordinated at the fire support coordination center (FSCC). The FSCC coordinates the employment of artillery, navy, air, psychological warfare, and any other supporting weapons.

CHAPTER 15

COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES AND DEVICES

118. Symbols

A symbol is something that has a commonly shared meaning. It is usually an object that represents something abstract such as an idea, quality, or condition. This representation normally is accomplished through suggestion or association in thought.

a. Essential Characteristics. All good symbols possess two characteristics—

- (1) *Suggestiveness.* A symbol must transmit the active idea it represents and the emotional basis upon which it depends (menace, compassion, love, pride, hate). The power of the Christian cross is highly effective as a symbol because it graphically presents the great climax of the Christian life—Christ's sufferings for the sins of man.
- (2) *Simplicity.* A symbol should be so simple that it can be reproduced with ease by the amateur or illiterate. Simple symbols have the advantage of being immediately recognizable and not liable to misrepresentation.

b. Types of Symbols.

- (1) *Visual.* Visual symbols are those which can be seen. One of the oldest and best known visual symbols is the cross.
- (2) *Auditory.* This type of symbol depends expressly on the use of sound to suggest its meaning. A drum roll, for instance, through constant usage has become a symbol of anticipation in many areas of the world.
- (3) *Action.* This type requires some sort of physical action, usually on the part of a person, to represent an idea. The everyday handshake exemplifies an action symbol.

c. Combination Symbol. This type is not classified as one of the basic types of symbols because it is a composite. It employs at least two of the basic characteristics enumerated above. The "V for Victory" of World War II employed all the basic characteristics since it employed visual, auditory, and action characteristics.

d. Use of Symbols. Symbols should be carefully chosen because orientation of a psychological warfare campaign around a suitable symbol can mobilize the target audience into support of the objective. They may be put into use by word of mouth, through printed materials, by radio, or any other technique commonly employed in propaganda. Some good symbols spring up spontaneously. The propagandist should be constantly on the lookout for spontaneously created symbols and repeat them as often as possible in his communication media. Once a

symbol has gained momentum the people will help to increase and maintain that momentum.

119. Slogans

A slogan is a short phrase or expression designed to stir up emotions, such as anger, hatred, or courage, that will result in a specific mass action or response. The French "Ils Ne Passeront Pas! (They shall not Pass!)" and the American "Remember Pearl Harbor!" are examples of slogans which rallied the people to the support of a cause. Slogans should be selected and exploited in the same manner as symbols.

120. Music

Musical instruments have always been used to influence the emotions and behavior of mankind. The drums of the jungle are used to whip natives into a fighting frenzy. Conversely, the strains of the symphony orchestra may transport men into a mood of complete serenity. Music also has its place in the psychological attack upon the enemy.

a. Most propaganda broadcasts feature excellent recordings of popular music. Soldiers away from home, especially those in a combat area, usually will listen at every opportunity to music of their native lands. Radio propagandists can use music popular with enemy military and civilian personnel to gain and hold their attention.

b. Music may be used in combination with other techniques, such as—

- (1) Names of prisoners may be read at irregular intervals along with short messages while a musical program is in progress.

(2) News items may be given from time to time in conjunction with radio music.

c. Other uses for music are—

(1) As background for radio skits and dramas.

(2) As direct propaganda weapons. During lulls in front line fighting, both sides may use loudspeakers to broadcast enemy tunes to each other. This is an attempt on the part of each side to instill nostalgia which will lessen the enemy's desire to fight.

121. Gifts

Small gifts and novelties may be dropped upon the enemy, especially items of which the enemy is in short supply. This is purely a psychological move and is not in any way designed to ease the lot of the enemy. The purpose is to accentuate the enemy's feeling of suffering and privation by demonstrating that while he has to do without certain articles, his enemy has them to give freely. These gifts should be wrapped in paper containing propaganda messages. Gifts are used—

a. Strategically. Soap, salt, needles, matches, chocolate, and similar articles are air-dropped to civilians to demonstrate the wealth and benevolence of the giver.

b. Tactically. Gifts air-dropped or infiltrated to enemy soldiers tend to create a favorable impression and lower the enemy's will to resist.

122. Nostalgia

a. Objectives. The technique of inducing nostalgia in the minds of the enemy does much to decrease morale and subsequent fighting efficiency.

b. Strategic Application. Strategically, propaganda uses nostalgia—

- (1) To accentuate the desire of civilians to end the war and return to the prewar days of peace and normal home and family life.
- (2) To induce displaced persons and alien forced laborers to malingering and commit acts of sabotage, thus speeding the end of the war and their repatriation.

c. Tactical Application. Tactically, nostalgia is directed primarily at the enemy combat soldier. Military propaganda uses nostalgia—

- (1) To portray the comforts and pleasures of home that he is foregoing by continuing resistance.
- (2) To accentuate the discomforts of combat duty and the risk of death.
- (3) To convince the individual enemy soldier that he is needed for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of his homeland after the war.

123. Rumor

Rumor is one of the most effective weapons of psychological warfare. A soldier in combat is so harried by the many pressures which surround him that rumors can do much to weaken his fighting effectiveness. Rumors can weaken cooperation between army units and between allied nations. They can cause demoralizing hysteria and panic to a civilian population.

a. Definition of Rumor. A rumor is a report whose authenticity is questionable and whose origin is

unverifiable. In spite of this uncertain atmosphere, rumors develop and spread because—

- (1) They are concerned with subjects of intense interest.
- (2) There is either no information available concerning the subject, or the existing information is unsatisfactory.

b. Classification of Rumors. Three basic emotional drives underlie most rumors. These are *fear*, *hope*, and *hate*. Consequently, most rumors may be classified under one of the three emotional drives which they tend to satisfy.

- (1) *Fear rumors.* A fear rumor is based on one's fearful anticipation of certain events. It capitalizes on the readiness of many people to believe the worst.
- (2) *Hope (or wish) rumors.* A hope rumor is one which is based on one's desire or is the product of wishful thinking. It is given credence because one "wants" to believe it.
- (3) *Hate rumors.* A hate rumor is one which is based upon one's dislike for others. It capitalizes on prejudice.

c. Origin of Rumors. Two general conditions must be present for rumors to start—the subject matter must be important to the people, and little or no information must be available concerning the subject. Rumors originate in two ways—

- (1) They are deliberately started by clandestine agents or by people hostile to the success of the war effort.
- (2) They start spontaneously from small pieces of information, usually just a fraction of

the full statement or truth intended. That bit of information is often twisted into a story which reinforces people's hates, desires, or fears.

d. Why Rumors Spread. Rumors are usually passed on by word of mouth or in letters. They mushroom with amazing rapidity once they are started. The principal reasons for this rapid spread are—

- (1) They answer important questions when factual information answering those questions is not available.
- (2) They offer excuses for one's own actions. When a person does something he knows is wrong, he will rationalize by using a rumor as an excuse for his actions.
- (3) They relieve one's emotions. When a person feels hatred toward a group, he finds an emotional outlet in spreading rumors that will discredit that particular group.
- (4) They make the teller feel important. In times of doubt and confusion, a person's prestige is greatly enhanced when he is able to supply "information" which will relieve emotions, excuse actions, and answer important questions.

e. Why Rumors Change. By the time a rumor is a few days old, its details may be completely changed. This happens for the following reasons:

- (1) It is impossible for most people to retain all the facts of a particular story. Those which appear most important will be remembered

and often exaggerated. Those which appear irrelevant will be forgotten or changed to fit the pattern of the more important facts.

- (2) People add their own interpretations. This often is done to make either the rumor or the teller seem more important.

f. How to Control Rumor. The three primary methods of controlling rumor are—

- (1) Supply satisfactory answers to important questions which perplex the people.
- (2) Educate the people in an attempt to control their hates, fears, and prejudices concerning events and people likely to be exploited by enemy-inspired rumors.
- (3) Hunt down rumors and discredit them at once by supplying factual information.

124. Glittering Generalities

Glittering generalities are words or phrases so closely associated with commonly accepted ideas or beliefs that they carry conviction in themselves, without benefit of reason or supporting information. They appeal to such emotions as love of home, a sense of honor, generosity, desire for freedom, etc. They are composed of "virtue" words such as *peace, honor, right, and freedom*. They ask for approval without looking into the reason.

a. Employment. By means of glittering generality, the propagandist identifies his program with the sense of virtue. The words and phrases which he employs are vague and may suggest different things to different people. Their connotations, however,

are always favorable. Glittering generalities may be employed in the following ways:

- (1) *Transfer*. Glittering generalities evoke an emotional response which stimulates the reader to identify himself and his opinions with recognized authorities (par. 125).
- (2) *Vagueness*. Glittering generalities are deliberately made vague so that the target audience may provide its own interpretation. The intent is to so move the audience by the use of undefined phrases that it will not seek detailed explanations.
- (3) *Rationalization*. Individuals or groups may employ glittering generalities to rationalize questionable actions or beliefs. The use of vague and pleasant phrases serves to justify such actions and beliefs.
- (4) *Simplification*. Glittering generalities provide simple answers for complex social or political problems (par. 126).

b. Changes in Effect. Glittering generalities may gain or lose effectiveness with changes in the social, political, or economic conditions. Overuse may create cliches that are not valuable in propaganda. Phrases which called up pleasant associations at one time may evoke unfavorable connotations after the frame of reference has been substantially altered.

125. Transfer or Testimonial

The transfer or testimonial device is an attempt to place the official sanction of a respected authority on a propaganda message. This is done in an effort to lead the target audience to identify itself with

the authority or to accept the authority's opinions and beliefs as its own. This device is commonly employed in commercial advertising where a famous personality endorses the product of the advertiser.

a. Official Sanction. The testimonial authority must have officially given the endorsement attributed to him or he must be clearly on the record as having approved of the object, idea, or belief attributed to him.

b. Respected Authority. The authority must be respected by the target audience. Four factors bear upon this problem—

- (1) *Accomplishment.* People place confidence in an authority who has demonstrated outstanding ability and proficiency in his field. This accomplishment, however, must be related to the subject of the testimonial.
- (2) *Identity with target.* People have greater confidence in an authority with whom they have a common bond. The soldier, for example, will more readily trust another soldier who, presumably, has undergone similar experiences.
- (3) *Position of authority.* The official position of the authority may instill confidence in the testimonial. The propagandist will frequently employ statements by high enemy officials where those statements support the purposes of the propagandist.
- (4) *Attributes of the authority.* Inanimate objects may be used in the testimonial device. In such cases, the propagandist seeks to transfer their physical attributes to the mes-

sage. The Rock of Gibraltar, for example, is associated with strength and this association may be employed in a propaganda message.

c. Source of Authority. Five principal sources of testimonial authorities are—

- (1) *Enemy leaders.* The enemy is more likely to believe the statements of his own leaders as a source of information.
- (2) *Fellow-soldiers.* Because of their common experience, soldiers form an intimate bond of friendship. As a result, men in the service are inclined to listen carefully to what their comrades-in-arms have to say.
- (3) *Friendly leaders.* The enemy has a tendency to believe the statements and testimonials of the leaders of the opposing nation. This will to believe can be strengthened if such statements and testimonials offer some measure of hope of bettering the present situation. Such testimonials are of particular value in messages that outline war aims and objectives or plans for administering the enemy nation after it capitulates.
- (4) *Famous scholars, writers, and other personalities.* Frequently, statements of non-belligerents and nonmilitary persons known to the target can be effectively employed in propaganda messages.
- (5) *Nonpersonal authorities.* Institutions, ideologies, national flags, religions, and other nonpersonal sources are often used. Their

creeds, beliefs, principles, or dogmas may make effective propaganda testimonials to transfer persuasion.

d. Plausibility. The testimonial itself must be plausible to the target audience. The esteem in which the authority is held by the target audience will not transform an implausible testimonial into effective propaganda messages.

e. Fabricated Testimonials. Falsified testimonials are never employed. They may be highly selective but not fabricated. Fabricated testimonials are ineffective for the following reasons:

- (1) *Unreality.* It is difficult to imitate the style and mannerisms of an authority and at the same time make the false testimonial seem authentic.
- (2) *Vulnerability.* Often a fabricated testimonial is vulnerable to exposure and verification. When detected as false, it may be strongly resented by the target audience.
- (3) *Lack of necessity.* It is unnecessary to falsify testimonials since adequate numbers of potential authorities are available to a propagandist.

126. Simplification

Simplification is a device whereby the subject matter of propaganda is reduced to clear, concise, dogmatic statements that are credible to the target audience. It is used to make complex subjects appear uncomplicated and easy to understand. It offers simplified interpretations of events, ideas, or personalities which appear wholly right and virtuous.

Qualifying words such as *almost* and *more or less* are never used in connection with the simplification device. Statements must be firm and positive. Most people are specialists in one field but because of limitations of time and energy are forced to turn to simplifications in order to understand other areas of human activity. The following are characteristics of simplification which enable it to perform this function:

a. It Thinks for Others. Some people accept information which they cannot verify personally as long as the source is acceptable to them. The authority is considered an expert. Others absorb whatever they read or hear with little discrimination. In addition, some people are too lazy or too unconcerned to think problems through for themselves. Therefore, they accept convenient substitutes.

b. It Is Concise. Simplification gives the impression of going to the heart of the matter in a few words. The propagandist employs this characteristic to make his simple, concise statement appear authentic. It is the intention that the average member of the target audience will not even consider that there may be another answer to the problem or another side to the story.

c. It Builds Ego. Some people are reluctant to believe that any field of endeavor, except possibly their own, is difficult to understand. A layman, for example, is pleased to hear that "law is just common sense dressed up on fancy language," or that "modern art is really a hodgepodge of aimless experiment." This reinforces his ego. It is what he would like to believe because he is inwardly afraid that law and

modern art are in reality beyond his comprehension. He is eager for easy explanations of complicated problems and subjects.

127. Plain Folks

The plain folks device is designed to win the confidence of an audience by talking or writing in the manner or style used by that audience. The propagandist employs ordinary language when he wants to show his audience that he is one of them and when he wants to identify his point of view with the average man. With the plain folks device, the propagandist can win the confidence of persons who resent or distrust "foreign-sounding" or "formal" talk.

a. Self Identification. The propagandist attempts to make the audience identify its interest with his points of view. By speaking or writing in the manner of the target audience, he tries to establish a common bond that will help transfer the sympathies of that audience to his side.

b. Presenting Soldiers as Plain Folks. The propagandist wants to make the enemy feel that he is fighting against soldiers who are "decent, everyday folks," much like himself. With the plain folks device, he can do much to counter enemy propaganda themes that the opponents are "bloodthirsty killers."

c. Presenting Civilians as Plain Folks. The same principle above applies to civilians. The plain folks device can help convince the enemy that the opposing nation is not composed of "arrogant," "immoral," or "deceitful" people.

d. Humanizing Leaders. Plain folks can provide human touch to our military or civilian leaders to

counteract their defamation by the enemy. A statesman whose hobby is hoeing a garden or raising hogs and whose manner of speech is closer to the farm than the bank vault cannot be summed up as a "plutocratic viper."

e. Categories of Plain Folks Device.

- (1) *Vernacular.* Vernacular is the language of a specific area or country as it is popularly spoken or written. It includes slang, idioms, and jokes. The propagandist must be sure to use accurate and up-to-date vernacular for a given group. If the vernacular is to be used, it must be consistent with the speech of the area in which it is used and with the type of audience to which it is directed.
- (2) *Dialect.* Dialect is a variation in pronunciation and accent from the norm of a region or nation. In propaganda, dialect is almost entirely spoken. Over the radio, dialect can be avoided if the speaker does not exaggerate his pronunciation. Spoken dialect must be flawless, however, because the audience will be quick to detect inaccuracies.
- (3) *Speech errors.* Perfect pronunciation, enunciation, and delivery suggest that what the speaker has to say has been carefully planned. To give the impression of spontaneity, some speakers deliberately hesitate between phrases, stammer, or mispronounce words. When not overdone, the effect is one of deep sincerity in what the speaker has to say. Errors in written material may be used only when they are commonly com-

mitted by the members of the reading audience.

- (4) *Homey words.* Homey words are forms of virtue words used in the everyday life of the average man. These words are common, familiar ones such as *home, family, children, farm,* and *neighbors.* They evoke an emotionally favorable response from the listener or reader and help transfer his sympathies to the propagandist's message. Homey words are widely used in evoking nostalgia on the part of the enemy.

f. Dangers in Use of Plain Folks.

- (1) *Recognition.* The propagandist must take extreme care to conceal the use of this device. If the audience recognizes that it is a device, resentment is certain to follow.
- (2) *Unsuitable subject.* If the plain folks technique is to be effective, it must have a subject that will serve as a credible basis. There must be some factor in a man's personality, his background, or his experience that can be used as a logical basis for the foundation of this idea. Without such a logical basis, the device loses its authentic aspect.
- (3) *Misjudging the audience.* The opinions and ideas of the audience concerning our leaders must be taken into account. It would be useless to try this stratagem against an enemy which cannot conceive of its leaders as ordinary people. However, where possible, the propagandist should at-

tribute to our leaders those qualities the enemy admires in a leader.

128. Card Stacking

The card stacking device is one that selects and presents those facts that most effectively strengthen and authenticate the desired point of view. It involves the collection of all the material available which is pertinent to the problem, and the selection from this material of the portion with which the propagandist can most effectively support his case. The propagandist's success or failure in gaining a favorable audience reaction will depend on how successful he has been in selecting his facts or "cards" and presenting or "stacking" them in his favor. The primary uses of card stacking are to place the allied effort in a favorable light, to place the enemy effort in an unfavorable light, and to contrast the two as "white" and "black."

a. *Employment.*

- (1) *Substantiating point of view.* The propagandist may use card stacking to present United States war aims in the best possible light and to show how the war is going for the enemy in the worst possible light. In the rare cases when the enemy's propaganda must be directly countered, the propagandist uses this device to refute his statements.
- (2) *Increasing prestige.* In time of war, leading figures, economic systems, institutions, and other components of a nation are constantly subjected to propaganda attacks by the enemy. Card stacking is used to counter

these attacks by presenting the propagandist's side.

- (3) *Other uses.* Like most propaganda methods, card stacking is used to supplement other methods. Thus, card stacking may be used to simplify propaganda tasks, to portray tasks in black and white, and to provide simple answers to complicated subjects.

b. Selecting Facts. The intelligent propagandist makes his case with selected facts and does not mix falsehood with truth. His opponents can challenge his conclusions and his opinions, but they cannot refute his facts. It is upon this bedrock of facts that the card stacker operates. In an operational sense his work is divided into two main phases. In the first, the propagandist selects facts and presents these facts to the target audience in such a manner as to elicit a favorable mental reaction with reference to his objectives. In the second, the propagandist uses these facts as a basis for his conclusions, thus attempting to lead his audience into acceptance of his conclusions through acceptance of his facts.

c. Presenting the Other Side. Some persons in a target audience realize that neither belligerent is entirely virtuous. To them, propaganda that deals solely in terms of right and wrong may not be credible. Thus, if a propagandist is producing a newspaper to be dropped on enemy troops, he should report obvious defeats suffered by his side.

129. Bandwagon

Bandwagon is often a successful device because it reinforces people's natural desire to aline them-

selves with some group, preferably one which is accepted and recognized by a majority of people. The propagandist generally will use it in an effort to convince his audience that his program is an expression of an irresistible mass movement. Consequently, his implications are aimed at motivating the individual's tendency to follow mass public opinion. Thus, in his attempt to persuade the mass to act together, the propagandist also tries to condense the target. The bandwagon device is used for—

a. Securing New Adherents. Those not already on the bandwagon are induced to climb aboard.

b. Consolidating. Those already on or partially on the bandwagon are reassured that climbing and staying aboard is the proper thing to do.

c. Securing Disapproval. The propagandist uses the device to get his audience to disapprove of ideas as well as to approve of them. He may declare that an idea is popular with groups which are hated or feared by the target audience. Thus, if individuals who supported a certain piece of legislation were led to believe that subversive elements also approve it, they might decide to change their position.

130. Insinuation

Insinuation is a device used to create or stir up suspicions of the target audience against ideas, groups, or individuals. The propagandist attempts to divide the enemy. He tries to divert the enemy people's hatred from us by making them fall out among themselves. He suggests, hints, and implies. He allows them to draw their own conclusions. He irritates latent suspicions within the enemy camp and tries to

build them into active expressions of disunity which weaken the enemy's war effort.

a. Exploitable Vulnerabilities. Possible cleavages in the enemy camp which may be exploited by the use of insinuation or other techniques include—

- (1) Enemy nation against its allies or satellites.
- (2) One region against another where ethnic differences are pronounced.
- (3) Religious, political, or ethnic minorities against majorities.
- (4) Combat soldiers against civilians.
- (5) Combat soldiers against rear echelon soldiers.
- (6) People against civilian and military leaders.

b. Insinuation Techniques. In exploiting the above listed vulnerabilities, the following are the most commonly used techniques:

- (1) *Leading questions.* The propagandist may ask questions which point to predetermined answers. Thus the question, "What is there left to do, now that your commanding officer has surrendered and you are completely cut off?" clearly insinuates that desertion or surrender is the logical alternative to annihilation.
- (2) *Humor.* Humor is one of the most effective forms of the insinuation technique. Jokes and cartoons about the enemy may be accepted by persons who would reject straightforward accusations. In satellite nations especially, jokes about totalitarian leaders spread with great rapidity. Appreciation of humor differs among target groups. Care

should be exercised to prevent a breach or, on occasion, great mistakes.

- (3) *Purity of motive.* The propagandist may assert that his side is acting in the best interest of the target audience, thereby insinuating that his opponent is acting in his own worst interest. As an example, a satellite force fighting with the common enemy would be insuring the continued subjugation of its country by helping the common enemy win the war.
- (4) *Guilt by association.* When fixing guilt by association, the propagandist links a person, group, or idea with other persons, groups, or ideas which are repugnant to the target audience. He insinuates that the connection is not accidental or superficial although he does not plainly say so.
- (5) *Rumor* (par. 123). Malicious rumors are one of the most effective forms of insinuation.
- (6) *Pictorial and photographic insinuation.* A picture or cartoon can often insinuate more effectively than words. Selected and composite photographs can be highly degrading.
- (7) *Vocal insinuation.* Radio propagandists can insinuate not only by the selection of words they use, but also by the way in which they deliver them. Significant pauses, inflections of the voice, sarcastic pronunciation, and other means can be more subtle than written insinuation.

131. Name Calling

Name calling is the device by which the propagandist seeks to arouse the prejudice in his target audience for or against ideas, persons, or institutions. He tries to make people hate, mistrust, and reject opinions, persons, or groups which are in opposition to his cause. He may be forced to use only insinuation if he feels that his audience would be antagonized by a direct attack. But if he believes the audience is in sympathy with him or is neutral, he may employ the techniques of denunciation, defamation, and sarcasm. The propagandist will label the object of his assault as something which the audience hates or fears.

a. Types of Name Calling.

- (1) Direct name calling is used when the audience is sympathetic, and sometimes when it is neutral. It is a simple, straightforward attack on an avowed opponent.
- (2) *Indirect.* Indirect name calling is used when direct name calling would antagonize the audience. It is simply a convenient label for the various degrees of attack that are between pure name calling and insinuation. The techniques of sarcasm and ridicule frequently are used, as is the technique of inserting innocuous words or phrases in otherwise straightforward messages.

b. Pictorial and Photographic Name Calling. Cartoons, illustrations, and photographs frequently are used in name calling.

c. Vulnerabilities. Name calling may be indicative of the fact that the propagandist has lost a de-

gree of equilibrium. The good propagandist remains calm at all times. In deciding whether name calling should be employed, he must weigh the beneficial results it may obtain against the possible harm it may cause, and then proceed accordingly. Even if the audience may appear receptive, the propagandist may commit grave errors. Enemy soldiers, for example, may hate a division commander and may criticize him openly, but when they hear the enemy call him names they may resent it simply because the name calling came from the enemy. Also, when name calling is employed, the propagandist must use the words and phrases of the kind of name calling to which the audience is accustomed. As a general rule, in the field of psychological warfare it is best to leave name calling to black or grey propaganda.

132. Stalling

Stalling is the device used by the propagandist to gloss over, hide, or distract attention from subjects that are embarrassing.

133. Combination of Devices

Propaganda devices are overlapping and difficult to isolate. For maximum effect, devices are planned and used in combinations when conditions warrant it.

CHAPTER 16

LEAFLETS

Section I. GENERAL

134. Definition

For the purpose of psychological warfare operations, a leaflet is a written or pictorial message from an agency of the armed forces to the individual soldier or civilian of another nation for a specific purpose.

135. Printed Propaganda

Printed propaganda includes all propaganda disseminated in printed form, such as leaflets, posters, and newspapers. The most widely used medium for printed propaganda is the leaflet which can be distributed in bulk by artillery fire and air drops. Because printed material can be preserved, passed on to others, and carefully examined for inaccuracies, it is highly important as a tool of psychological warfare. This section deals chiefly with the basic principles of leaflet preparation, format and writing techniques, and methods of distribution, all of which may be modified for use in preparation of other printed propaganda.

136. Leaflet Principles

Separate Section
a. *Destructible Leaflet* Writer Qualifications. A single writer with all the qualifications listed below is rarely obtainable.

- (1) A good, practical knowledge of the enemy language, including current idioms and slang, will enable the writer to translate effectively the ideas to be incorporated into the leaflet.
- (2) Recent residence in the enemy nation and familiarity with current happenings in that area will aid the writer. Politics, cultural patterns, and even language vernacular often change rapidly. The skillful leaflet writer must be abreast of all these changes.
- (3) The writer should be familiar with the structure of the enemy's forces, leadership, equipment, and arms. He should know the average enemy soldier's emotional and sociological background, including his ambitions, prejudices, likes, and dislikes.
- (4) Preferably, the writer should have experience in one or more of the following fields: advertising copy writing, journalism, public relations, and any other field allied to persuasive or interpretative writing.

b. Writing for Maximum Effectiveness. The text of the message is limited by space and other considerations. Consequently, in a few words the writer must hit the enemy so hard with the logic or emotional content of his theme that readers of the leaflet will be motivated either to pass it on to others or to relay the message by word of mouth. Results which aid the military effort, whether they be immediate or long-range, are the only criteria of successful leaflets.

c. Writing for Objectivity. Objectivity is the keynote of effective leaflet writing. Although it is sometimes difficult to do, the efficient leaflet writer puts aside all personal prejudices and biases when writing for enemy consumption. Statements or arguments based on prejudice or bias of the writer have no place in leaflet writing. The leaflet writer depends upon intelligence agencies for information upon which to base his leaflet attacks. This information must not be adapted to fit the writer's own personal opinions.

d. Writing From the Positive Viewpoint. Assertions, not negations, are the stock in trade of the leaflet writer. The psychological warfare writer has, without doubt, the toughest selling job in the world. Every facility at the disposal of the enemy, from domestic propaganda to military strength, is aimed at discrediting or refuting his statements. A negative attitude, therefore, is interpreted by the enemy as a sign of weakness. Only positive attacks can tear down the psychological barrier the enemy has erected against him. Furthermore, enemy propaganda may be designed to get the opponent to deny something. If the propagandist retaliates by categorically denying enemy accusations, he may be supplying data for which the enemy has been probing.

137 Leaflet Format

a. Shape. No standard shape for leaflets is indicated, although most leaflets are rectangular. They may be square, triangular, round, representative (i. e., shaped like tree leaves), or any other shape.

Leaflet shape is determined by the message, by proportion and number of photographs or drawings used, and by the reproduction equipment available.

b. Size. Leaflet size is not standardized, although the method of dissemination and size of presses available will often determine the size. A 5 x 8 inch leaflet has been found to fit well in both the 105-mm artillery shell and the leaflet bomb.

c. Typography. The type must be of sufficient size to be perfectly legible. While the heading and subheading may vary in size, body type should not be smaller than 8 point, preferably 10 point. If the Roman alphabet is not used in the enemy nation, provision must be made to secure the proper type fonts.

d. Color. A judicious use of color is highly important to the appearance of the leaflet. The number of colors available will be limited by the type of printing equipment available. When two or more colors are available, the following factors should be considered:

- (1) Color in a leaflet should be planned to contrast sharply with the predominant color of the terrain over which it is to be disseminated. With such a contrast in color, a leaflet attracts attention. On occasion, however, color in a leaflet may be planned to blend with the terrain in areas where punitive or other restrictive measures against picking up leaflets have been imposed. Blended colors give an individual a greater opportunity to pick up, handle, or retain a leaflet.

- (2) Colors that are favorites of the enemy target may be used. For example, canary yellow is favored in the Orient, and green in Ireland.
- (3) Colors may be employed to harmonize with the moods of the illustrations. In some countries red may be used to connote violence, blue or green for peaceful scenes, and black for death.
- (4) The elementary principles of color harmony will be employed when two or more colors are used.

e. Photographs. Photographs often are used as documentary proof. Pictures of bombed-out cities showing recognizable landmarks are proof to enemy soldiers that their homeland is receiving devastating bombing raids. Pictures of healthy prisoners eating hearty meals tend to break down the enemy's fears that he will be maltreated if he becomes a prisoner. Whatever their use, photographic plates should be used only when the resultant impression is clear.

f. Cartoons and Drawings. Cartoons and drawings, if well done, are invaluable assets in supporting the theme of a leaflet.

- (1) They catch the eye.
- (2) They help to present a more attractive format.
- (3) They may interpret the message for illiterates who cannot read the accompanying message.
- (4) They may be used with a slogan or without any printed matter at all.
- (5) They tend to leave lasting impressions.

g. Format Symmetry. Headlines, subheadings, photos, cartoons and drawings, and body of text should be so arranged as to present an attractive and symmetrical appearance. Variety in format is important in a leaflet campaign except in the use of surrender or safe conduct passes. These should be standardized for recognition purposes.

138. Leaflet Creative Techniques

a. Heading. The leaflet heading is normally the most important part of the leaflet because it is the part that first catches the eye.

(1) *Be brief.* One to four words make ideal headings. As space is at a premium in leaflets, fewer words in a heading permit larger letters.

(2) *Summarize the theme.* If possible, the content of the leaflet message should be summarized in the heading.

(3) *Use short, forceful words.* Where the language lends itself conveniently to brevity, use one-, two-, but no more than three-syllable words. Use words packed full of meaning.

b. Subheading. Leaflet subheadings are used when it is impossible to summarize the text in the main heading and further explanation is needed to point out the significance of the message. They may be used to introduce separate paragraphs in the body of the text.

c. Text.

(1) The first sentence or two of the text should contain the substance of the message fol-

lowed by the facts and details. This is done because it is necessary to secure the interest of a hostile audience with the first few words.

- (2) Facts are the backbone of the leaflet message. The enemy soldier often risks being shot or severely punished for reading leaflets. Thus, the information must be of vital importance to him if he continues to read leaflets. Facts, whether favorable or adverse, will command his attention.
- (3) The message must be brief and to the point. If it is too verbose the reader will lose interest. Furthermore, the leaflet message is decidedly limited by the amount of space available.
- (4) Simplicity of words and of ideas is of extreme importance. A leaflet is no place to demonstrate erudition. The writer's purpose is to put ideas across to the enemy. The more simple the ideas and the more clearly they are stated, the more likely they are to find acceptance.
- (5) The leaflet normally presents only one theme. A leaflet which presents two or more unrelated or vaguely related subjects tends to confuse the audience and detracts from the persuasive strength of each subject. If more than one theme is used, they should be closely related to a single task.

139. Advantages

a. *Flexibility.* Leaflets may employ an appeal that is either primarily textual or primarily pic-

torial, depending upon the character of the target audience and the purpose of the leaflet.

b. Permanency. A leaflet is a permanent record of the message to which the reader may refer until it has become impressed upon his mind. It may be transmitted to other readers without alteration or distortion.

c. Versatility. Leaflets are capable of reaching a wide variety of individuals, including those who are out of range of the loudspeaker and those who are unable to receive radio messages.

d. Additional Meaning. A leaflet may carry a meaning beyond its textual or pictorial content by the use of significant color, typography, or shape that has suggestive connotations in the minds of the target audience.

e. Adaptability. The text of the message is fitted to the intelligence and literacy of the target audience. It may be employed effectively to mold the opinions of those who customarily attach a high value to the credibility of the written word.

140. Disadvantages

a. Time-Consuming. Effective psychological warfare operations often depend upon the rapid exploitation of fleeting situations. The time required for the preparation, reproduction, and dissemination of a leaflet may reduce its effectiveness in such situations.

b. Illiteracy. Leaflets employing a textual appeal may be ineffective against an illiterate audience or against those with limited ability to understand them. This handicap is overcome in part by the use of illustrations.

c. Countermeasures. Enemy countermeasures include rapid collection and destruction of leaflets, prohibitions against reading with severe penalties for violations, rebuttals through official channels, and similar steps.

d. Weather. Wind, rain, snow, and other weather extremes contribute to excessive losses of leaflets, impose restrictions on their dissemination by aircraft, and disturb effective dispersion patterns.

e. Troop Education. Troops must be instructed in the identification of surrender leaflets and safe conduct passes to insure compliance with their provisions. Failure to abide by the provisions of such leaflets limits the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations.

Section II. RECORDS AND REPORTS

141. General

Operating units are required to maintain adequate records of leaflets and leaflet operations. Such records are necessary for reference, historical purposes, reports to higher headquarters, and evaluation of the effectiveness of specific leaflets and of leaflet operations in general.

142. Individual Leaflet Record

A record is maintained for each leaflet reproduced for dissemination. A copy of the leaflet will be attached to the record that should contain the following information:

- a.* Originating unit.
- b.* Type of leaflet.

- c. Language employed.
- d. Designation or serial number.
- e. Remarks, to include any special circumstances pertinent to the understanding of the leaflet.
- f. Target group, whether general or specific.
- g. Explanation of art work and its significance.
- h. English translation of the text and captions of all illustrations.

143. Leaflet Operation Record

Leaflet operation records show, in tabular form, the employment of leaflets in a specific operation or over a given period of time. From such a record, information may be digested to show the employment of a given leaflet during a given period of time, the types and numbers of leaflets used against any particular enemy unit, or the total number of leaflets disseminated within a period of time. Example of a typical entry in a leaflet operation record is shown below.

LEAFLET OPERATION RECORD

<i>Date</i>	<i>Target Unit</i>	<i>Target Location</i>	<i>Leaflet No.</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
30 Apr 52	150 Div.....	O159-F816*.....	4652	400,000

* Designates location by coordinates on situation map.

144. Serial Numbers

The system of serial numbering of leaflets in a theater of operations will be designated by proper authority. Some system will be employed to facilitate identification, ordering, stock-piling, filing, and recording. An adequate system will also serve as an index to all leaflets on a particular theme. Appendix XI contains a sample serial numbering system.

145. Translations

English translations will be produced in quantity for each foreign language leaflet. English translations, in addition to having historical value, are prepared for the following reasons:

a. Troop Orientations. English translations are used to orient front line troops concerning the provisions of leaflets disseminated to enemy soldiers facing their positions. The success or failure of a leaflet mission may depend upon troop compliance with the leaflet promises, especially those regarding the treatment of surrendering soldiers. Translations distributed to front line troops prior to dissemination of the leaflet facilitate such cooperation.

b. Briefing. Translations may be distributed to firing batteries, air crews, and infantry patrols engaged in leaflet dissemination to the target audience. Such advance knowledge of the nature of the dissemination mission will emphasize its importance and insure cooperation.

c. Policy Coordination. Psychological warfare units and staff officers in a theater of operations and policy-making agencies in the zone of the interior will be supplied with English translations of all leaflets. Translations will serve as a basis for evaluation of the leaflet and for the development of new leaflet types.

146. Reports

Leaflet reports are prepared by psychological warfare operations units and staff officers for submission to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. They are of two types, periodic and special—

a. Periodic reports are submitted as prescribed by

higher headquarters. Such reports are generally of a statistical nature and include daily progress reports and weekly summaries. They normally are submitted as a part of a consolidated report covering all psychological warfare operations of the unit in the period covered.

b. Special reports cover unusual conditions or irregular events. They may be requested by higher headquarters or may be initiated by a subordinate headquarters. An operation report normally will follow an unusual, experimental, or emergency leaflet operation and will cover the tactical or strategic situation involved, propaganda methods employed and reasons therefor, quantity of leaflets reproduced and disseminated, specific targets, and other factors affecting the operation. Whenever practicable, supplementary reports stating the effectiveness of the leaflet operation, as determined from prisoner of war interrogation, captured documents, or propaganda analysis, should follow and be incorporated into the special report.

Section III. EMPLOYMENT OF LEAFLETS

147. Strategic Situations

a. *Nature.* Leaflets employed strategically are long-range in scope and are designed to orient the opinions, attitudes, emotions, and ultimately the behavior of the target audience toward the broad objectives of United States policy. They are employed to reduce the enemy's will to resist, to sustain the morale of and to direct the activities of dissident and friendly elements in enemy territory, and to prepare for United States postwar military and political

policies and control. The propagandist attempts to increase internal tensions within the enemy nation and to decrease productive capacity for war.

b. Dissemination. Strategic leaflets normally are disseminated by aircraft. This permits extensive area coverage with maximum speed.

148. Tactical Situations

a. Nature and Purpose. Leaflets employed in tactical situations are designed to have an effect upon the immediate attitude and behavior of the enemy soldier and consequently the battle situation. Essentially, the tactical leaflet is a message from one soldier to another across the battle line. As such, it is simple and direct in language, limited in scope, and timely in employment.

b. Types. Tactical leaflets are either general or local in nature, depending upon the target against which they are employed. General tactical leaflets are intended for dissemination on a wide front covering several enemy units. They apply to all enemy soldiers in an area and are usually intended to modify attitude rather than to produce immediate behavior. Local tactical leaflets are addressed to specific enemy units or specific locations. They are more personal in appeal and may cite names of enemy personnel, their circumstances, and courses of action open to them. They generally may be considered more immediately effective than general leaflets because of their emphasis on behavior response and their application to a specific tactical situation.

149. Consolidation Situations

For details concerning the employment of leaflets in consolidation situations, see chapter 22.

Section IV. LEAFLET TARGETS

150. Strategic Targets ✓

a. Military Targets. Strategic leaflets play upon the morale and the will to resist of all members of the enemy military establishment. They supplement the more localized and more immediate appeals of tactical leaflets. Strategic leaflets employ nostalgic, divisive, informative, and political themes, among others, to achieve a long-range effect upon enemy morale. Such leaflets seek to build future acceptance of a United States victory and of eventual United States control. They also have an indirect effect upon military morale through the changes which they achieve in the opinions, attitudes, emotions, and behavior of the civilian population.

b. Civilian Targets. Strategic propaganda leaflets are directed to civilian populations throughout the period of hostilities. Civilian targets may be hostile, friendly, or neutral. Strategic leaflets attack diverse psychological vulnerabilities within the enemy nation to weaken the willingness of the civilian to continue war sacrifices, to undermine his faith in his government and its leaders, to reduce his productive capacity, and to create frictions and dissension within the enemy state. The populations of occupied friendly nations, as well as dissident elements within the enemy nation, look to the United States for liberation. Strategic leaflets are employed

to sustain the morale of such groups and to obtain their cooperation. Strategic leaflets are also addressed to active underground elements so as to direct their activities to coincide with the strategic plans of United States military forces. Neutral civilians receive strategic leaflets that attempt to gain their sympathy and support for United States war aims and to convince them of the certainty of United States victory.

151. Tactical Targets

Tactical targets are limited to military and civilian personnel who are in a position to influence the immediate combat situation by changes in their attitudes, opinions, emotions, and behavior. Leaflets used in such a situation are based upon current intelligence.

a. Military Targets. Members of the enemy military establishment in the combat zone are the principal target of tactical leaflets. The aim of such leaflets is to reduce the fighting efficiency of the enemy by changing morale and behavior patterns. Enemy personnel are particularly susceptible to propaganda when subjected to the pressure of arms. Enemy information services often fail to provide news to the front lines, and the enemy soldier, in the absence of news reports from his own side, is more prone to accept United States printed information. Military personnel from various enemy units gather at supply points where discussion of the military situation and of factors affecting the individual soldier arises regularly. Leaflets directed against such points spread rapidly. Places where troops congregate or instal-

lations through which they must pass in the combat area constitute good leaflet targets. Enemy hospitals, however, are major exceptions. Under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, they may not be subjected to attack of any kind.

b. Civilian Targets. Tactical leaflets may be addressed to civilians in a position to effect the immediate battle situation. Such targets include civilians serving with enemy forces, labor groups impressed for work on military fortifications and installations, and citizens of towns located within the battle area. Leaflets in these circumstances are used to influence civilians to hinder or block enemy action, or to surrender a community more readily.

152. Special Targets

Psychological warfare operations normally may expect to find targets that present special opportunities for exploitation. For psychological warfare purposes, any group that differs from the target public in a significant manner is termed a *special public* and may be a special target. Friction must exist between the special public and the rest of the target to such a degree as to permit exploitation. The public must possess some physical characteristic, some mode of living, or some belief that makes it significantly different from the rest of the population, and its members must be unable or unwilling to lose their distinguishing characteristics. The following are typical minority groups which may be considered special publics.

a. Racial. Members of a minority race often constitute a special public.

b. Ethnic. Many nations embrace large minorities that have cultural backgrounds and traditions differing significantly from those of the majority.

c. Religious. Members of religious organizations may resist laws and edicts of their government because of a conflict with their basic religious beliefs.

d. Economic. Workers who have been impressed or displaced against their will, oppressed farmers, and financially distressed persons may constitute special publics.

e. Political. In totalitarian nations, numerous minor political factions work covertly for their own betterment. These, combined with occasional splits within the majority party, may form special publics.

f. Regional. Inhabitants of a particular locality or region often possess regional loyalties which transcend nationalistic interests.

Section V. GENERAL TYPES OF LEAFLETS

153. Persuasive Leaflets

The persuasive leaflet attempts to gain its objectives through the processes of reason. Facts are arranged and presented in such a way that the target audience is convinced that conclusions reached by the propagandist are valid. The reader is given the impression that he is thinking the problem through for himself.

154. Informative Leaflets

The informative leaflet is employed in all phases of a propaganda campaign. This type, allowing facts to speak for themselves, is used to attract a reading

public within the target audience. It establishes the credibility upon which all propaganda activities depend.

155. Directive Leaflets

The directive leaflet is fundamentally a special purpose leaflet.

a. Tactical. The directive leaflet must be employed with care in tactical situations. The propagandist normally does not direct the enemy soldier to take action unless—

- (1) The enemy soldier is in a desperate situation.
- (2) The enemy soldier realizes the hopelessness of his situation.
- (3) Available intelligence clearly indicates that the enemy is psychologically prepared for directive communication.

b. Strategic. The directive leaflet is employed strategically to direct and control activities of underground forces in enemy or enemy-occupied territory. It also may be used to disrupt enemy production by giving advance warning of bombing attacks and directing enemy workers to protect themselves by remaining away from their work.

c. Consolidation. During consolidation operations, directive leaflets are employed to support civil affairs/military government units in securing lines of communications and restoring order and discipline. Such leaflets may direct civilians to remain in their homes at certain hours, to stay off certain roads, and to obey other instructions of the occupying forces (ch. 22).

Section VI. NEWS LEAFLETS

156. Nature

News, properly presented, is an effective form of propaganda. News leaflets present news in any printed format other than that of the newspaper. Newspapers, because of their different problems of typography and content, are treated separately in section VII. The news leaflet serves three propaganda purposes.

a. Provides Information. It informs the target audience of the true situation, thus acting as counter-propaganda to any false information disseminated by enemy sources.

b. Promotes Credibility. Factual news, presented with apparent impartiality and subsequently proven accurate, commands the confidence of the target audience.

c. Attracts an Audience. When credibility is established, news leaflets disseminated at regular intervals attract an audience. This is especially true in nations where domestic censorship leaves the United States as the only source of dependable news. An audience attracted to news leaflets is predisposed to favorable consideration of other forms of psychological warfare communication.

157. Employment

a. Tactical. News is vital to the combat soldier. His view of the progress of the war is largely limited to his immediate front. If news from his own official sources does not correspond to the facts as he sees them, or if news leaflets can provide him with more

timely service, he may come to depend upon psychological warfare operations for his supply of news.

b. Strategic. The news leaflet is a vital element of strategic psychological warfare operations. In addition to gaining an audience and promoting credibility, news leaflets are ideal for presentation of military or political developments of widespread importance to the target audience.

c. Consolidation. News leaflets are used in consolidation psychological warfare operations when other media are not readily available (ch. 22).

158. News Sources

News normally is obtained from both military and civilian agencies.

a. Military Sources.

- (1) Combat intelligence agencies furnish information on enemy deployment, strength, unit identification, supply, and morale; information concerning the enemy homefront, with emphasis on political dissension, tensions, and unrest; photographs taken by clandestine agents in enemy territory; information concerning the combat situation.
- (2) Signal corps pictorial agencies furnish photographs of prisoner of war camps, United States or captured enemy war materiel, and other subjects of interest to the target audience.
- (3) Monitors organic to psychological warfare troop units gather information of news value from broadcasts of enemy, friendly, and neutral radio stations.

(4) Contacts with military personnel at all levels provide psychological warfare operations with information for use in news leaflets.

b. Civilian Sources.

(1) United States and allied news gathering agencies provide news of interest to the target audience.

(2) Civilian governmental information agencies provide news files for employment in psychological warfare operations.

159. Editorial Principles

a. Adherence to Facts. Since a principal mission of the news leaflet is to establish credibility, care must be taken to insure the accuracy of news disseminated to the target audience:

b. Objectivity. The propagandist does not editorialize in the news leaflet. He allows selected facts to speak for themselves.

c. Selection of Content. When illiteracy exists among the target audience, written text is reduced in favor of photographs, sketches, or maps to facilitate understanding. To a target audience accustomed to strict news censorship, the news leaflet is more effective when it presents facts that may be verified by the reader. Items relating to such remote facts as production figures, damage, and casualty claims are apt to be received with skepticism.

d. Speed. News must be handled with the speed due a perishable commodity.

e. Brevity. The reader may not have time to read long news items, especially when active antileaflet

measures are enforced. Short items, tersely written, convey essential facts quickly and simply. Brevity also allows maximum use of limited leaflet space.

f. Conformance to Policy. Psychological warfare operations adhere to policy formulated by higher authority. Selected news for leaflets must conform to such policy.

160. Appearance

a. General. News leaflets are flexible as to size, shape, and typography. These may be altered, when desirable, to fit the productive facilities available and the habits of the reader.

b. Style. Items are presented in the news leaflet in the manner which intelligence and policy indicate is best suited to the target audience. They may be brief bulletins, paragraph descriptions of events, or entire leaflet reports on a single outstanding event.

c. Color. Color may be used effectively in the news leaflet to emphasize important items, simplify illustrations, or improve the general appearance.

Section VII. NEWSPAPERS

161. Nature

A distinguishing feature of a newspaper used as a propaganda medium is the deliberate attempt to make it conform to typographical standards of the area where it is employed. Although normally of large leaflet size, it is more detailed in content than a news leaflet. The newspaper normally is disseminated on a regular schedule: daily, semiweekly, or weekly.

162. Purpose

Like the news leaflet, the newspaper is aimed at building an audience and establishing credibility through factual presentation of selected news items. However, the newspaper often is more effective because of its refined format and style, and because of its greater detail in content.

163. Employment

a. Strategic. The strategic newspaper is usually an elaborate production. Disseminated by air, it may be addressed to enemy soldiers and civilians, to friendly civilians under enemy control, or to special targets such as displaced persons within the enemy nation. Size and quality of the newspaper depends upon the facilities, personnel, and time available for its production.

b. Tactical. The newspaper is employed tactically against enemy troops in the combat area. It is often identical in form and content to the strategic newspaper. In such cases, it is normally printed by the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion and forwarded to the loudspeaker and leaflet company for dissemination. Other newspapers pertaining to local situations may be produced by the loudspeaker and leaflet company in the field. Dissemination is by air or artillery. If disseminated by artillery, the tactical newspaper is of leaflet dimensions.

c. Consolidation. Newspapers are vital to the success of consolidation psychological warfare operations. They first may take the form of leaflet-sized handbills, but as soon as indigenous facilities permit

they are replaced by conventional newspapers (ch. 22).

164. Newspaper Content

The propagandist must produce a newspaper that will gain the acceptance of his audience. Thus, proper content is essential to success of the newspaper. Content is limited by available space, but a well-balanced publication contains several, or all, of these elements—

a. War News. News about the war is localized to the maximum extent, but some information about action on other and distant fronts also is essential.

b. World News. Accounts of events in the world at large are of great interest to readers. This is especially true when the news concerns international developments of vital consequence to the target audience. Readers also are interested in news concerning their nation's position in the world after the war.

c. Homefront News. News items concerning morale on the homefront, inequalities of life at home, effects of bombing raids, and similar items are valuable in promoting disaffection among soldiers and civilians.

d. Other News. Brief news of sports events may be employed as an audience-gaining device. Such news occasionally has propaganda value. Weather comments or predictions as they affect the target audience may be employed effectively provided security is not violated. Latest developments in the weapons field are of interest to both the civilian and the soldier.

e. Illustrative Material. Pictorial contents attract

readership. Proper illustration improves the appearance of a newspaper and clarifies the content. News and feature pictures emphasize a point, draw attention to a particular item, and provide variety in content and make-up. The cartoon and the comic strip may be used to great psychological advantage. Maps clarify tactical situations for the reader, and their documentary appearance lends to the impression of objectivity in the newspaper. Line drawings are employed to emphasize important points in a news story and to improve the appearance of the newspaper.

165. Techniques

a. Objective Approach. ✓ The propagandist uses an objective approach in the newspaper, just as he does in other news media. This is generally simple when the battle situation is favorable to United States troops, but it is more difficult when the tactical situation becomes unfavorable. Persuasive aspects of a newspaper should not be so prominent as to be obvious to the target audience.

b. Familiarity. Unless policy objectives otherwise dictate, the newspaper conforms closely to standards with which the target audience is familiar. The content should be consistent both with the purpose of the propagandist and with the reading habits of the audience.

c. Balance. The newspaper must provide a proper balance between the serious and the light, the good and the bad news. Overemphasis on bad news has a tiring effect upon the reader. It causes him to ignore the newspaper. An excessively light approach also fails in its propaganda mission. Balance is

determined to some extent by the psychological make-up of the target audience.

d. Timing. A close relationship exists between the military situation and the nature and timing of newspapers. Those published in fluid situations differ radically from those produced in static periods in both content and purpose. The newspaper is timely as well as accurate. Thus, where the combat situation is changing constantly, psychological warfare operations concentrate on reporting the action quickly, capitalizing upon the psychological impact of fresh news. When the combat situation is stable, the tone of newspapers changes. The propagandist uses static periods to build credibility by shifting emphases to material which the enemy can readily accept, by wider use of nonlocal news, and by the inclusion of occasional items which favor the enemy.

Section VIII. SAFE CONDUCT PASSES

166. Nature

The safe conduct pass is the most official in appearance of all psychological warfare operational products. It is designed to be carried by the enemy soldier as he crosses the lines in surrender. The safe conduct pass is unique within a theater of operations, standardized in all elements, and authenticated with the signature of the theater commander.

167. Purpose

Basically, the purpose of the safe conduct pass is to reassure the enemy soldier that he can surrender safely. Further, the safe conduct pass is so designed

that it may be carried covertly by the enemy soldier over long periods of time until he is motivated to surrender by an unfavorable tactical situation and the cumulative effect of the psychological warfare campaign.

168. Employment

The safe conduct pass finds its maximum usefulness in the tactical situation. It is aimed at removing the soldier from combat through surrender, but it also has important antimorale effects. Constant possession of the leaflet, even joking about it among soldiers during favorable times, advertises the ultimate usefulness of the document. Thus, it keeps the idea of possible defection uppermost in the mind of the soldier. Possession of the safe conduct pass discourages the soldier from offering last-ditch resistance.

169. Essential Standardized Elements

The chief characteristics of the safe conduct pass are an authoritative appearance and ease of recognition. It should be standard in each of the following elements:

a. Distinctive Form. The typographical arrangement of the safe conduct pass should not be repeated in other leaflets of any nature in the theater. The typography must permit easy recognition by friendly forces.

b. Unique Color. Within a theater of operations, a safe conduct pass should make use of a single color or color combination that is not duplicated in any other leaflet.

c. Official Appearance. The safe conduct pass must convey the impression of a serious and official document, prepared by competent authority. This official appearance is fostered by use of appropriate governmental seals, the selection of type faces, scroll work, and other characteristics of official papers.

d. Proper Direction. Essentially, the safe conduct pass is addressed to the capturing soldier from the man who is surrendering. For this reason, the pass features the captor's language in large type and subordinates the enemy translation. The man has studied the safe conduct pass before making his move to surrender, and he wants assurance that the capturing soldier with a gun aimed at him can easily read what it says.

e. Authenticating Signature. The safe conduct pass should be authenticated by the signature of the supreme commander. Normally, this signature appears below the English language message, and again below the translation in the enemy language.

f. Convenient Size. In drafting a safe conduct pass, the propagandist must remember that the soldier may have to carry the pass with him for a considerable time. In many cases, discovery of the pass on his person may be grounds for execution. Unless the pass is of a size convenient for safekeeping, the enemy soldier may ignore it.

g. Statement of Treatment of Prisoners of War. The safe conduct pass should emphasize those provisions of the Geneva Conventions which relate to the treatment of prisoners of war. The pass is the final leaflet the soldier sees before captivity. A restatement of those provisions which relate to his

future status as a prisoner of war serves to reassure him at a time when he may need such reassurance.

170. Unit Passes

Although standardization is carried to great lengths in the safe conduct pass, there is enough latitude to permit psychological warfare units to devise special purpose unit passes at their discretion. Extreme care must be exercised in the use of the unit pass to insure that the standard form safe conduct pass is not compromised. Such a pass may be addressed to a specific company, battalion, or isolated pocket. A unit pass, in addition to stimulating possible mass defection, also creates an adverse effect on the morale of the individual soldier. The success of the unit pass rests upon the degree of reliability which the target attributes to it. If surrendering soldiers are fired upon as they attempt to use the pass, they and their comrades will regard the pass as a trick. Every friendly combat soldier must be oriented to recognize the pass, and to understand its value and objectives. However, capturing troops must be alert for ruses that might cost lives.

Section IX. SPECIAL SITUATION LEAFLETS

171. Nature

Special situation leaflets are planned, created, reproduced, and disseminated for a particular, immediate purpose. They are developed on the basis of intelligence which indicates the existence of specific exploitable vulnerabilities within the target audience. They are prepared to meet specific situations as they develop in the course of a military operation.

172. Purpose

Special situation leaflets are prepared on the spot to exploit current psychological weakness within the target audience. Such leaflets often achieve great psychological impact by imparting a sense of familiarity with the target's situation. Special situation leaflets are intended for one time use only, because the exact circumstances which governed their preparation are rarely duplicated in the future. They are normally employed in all psychological warfare operations except those where standard leaflets may be effectively used (par. 177).

173. Employment

Special situation leaflets may be employed in all situations and against all targets. They are particularly effective when directed against specific units, population groups, or locations, but they may also be effectively employed against widely divergent groups over a large area. Tactical psychological warfare operations achieve maximum results when soldiers and civilians in the combat area receive leaflets which relate to their situations at the moment and which outline the attitudes and courses of action that are open to them. Similarly, strategic psychological warfare operations are made more effective by use of special situation leaflets that deal with specific problems and discuss them in terms of the facts as they exist at the precise moment. Consolidation psychological warfare operations likewise employ special situation leaflets for maximum results. They enable the propagandist to transmit decisions and directives of civil affairs/military government.

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agencies to the individual community. They are also used to localize reeducation materials in terms of the particular target.

174. Selection of Theme

The immediate situation governs the theme employed in the special situation leaflet. Since the situation is appraised upon the basis of intelligence indicating the existence of an exploitable vulnerability, the theme, in a sense, will be determined by the available intelligence.

175. Advantages

Special situation leaflets enable the propagandist to exploit enemy vulnerabilities as they develop. They impart a sense of familiarity with the enemy situation. They permit psychological warfare operations to tailor leaflets to fit the particular target. Since timeliness is inherent in special situation leaflets, they lend themselves particularly to all those operations where proper timing is vital.

176. Disadvantages

Since the effectiveness of special situation leaflets often depends upon the speed with which they are disseminated, delays in preparation and reproduction may render them useless. They require reproduction equipment capable of adequate production in minimum time. Such equipment must be geared to production at peak periods and may thus remain relatively idle at other than peak periods. Where high-speed equipment is not available, quantity production of special situation leaflets within a short space

of time is rendered difficult or impossible. More personnel are required for the planning, writing, and layout of special situation leaflets. The requirement for agent-type intelligence in order to evaluate effects is an additional disadvantage.

Section X. STANDARD LEAFLETS

177. Nature

Standard leaflets are planned, created, and reproduced for anticipated requirements in advance of the circumstances which govern their employment. They are disseminated to the target audience when the circumstances fit the scope and content of the leaflet. As such, they are general in nature and are intended for repeated employment in a theater of operations. They constitute the stockpile of printed material on which psychological warfare operations may call in emergencies or in other clearly defined situations.

178. Purpose

Standard leaflets serve three basic purposes in psychological warfare operations.

a. Contingency. Leaflets frequently are prepared in advance of their need to fit emergency situations which recur along a front.

b. Standardization. Certain leaflets, such as the safe conduct pass, are rigidly standardized. They normally are prepared and stockpiled in advance of need.

c. Emphasis. A theater of operations or army may find it necessary to emphasize certain themes and to place repeated stress upon certain leaflets.

179. Form

a. Completed. Standard leaflets in completed form are employed in the following situations:

- (1) When the situation which dictates employment of a leaflet is of such a fleeting nature that there is not sufficient time available for the preparation and reproduction of a special situation leaflet. In such a case, a leaflet which has been prepared in advance to fit the general circumstances is employed.
- (2) When standardization of the leaflet is essential for quick identification, such as the safe conduct pass.

b. Semicompleted. Partially printed leaflets are prepared for employment in the following situations:

- (1) When standardization of certain elements is required. The surrender leaflet, for example, must contain a standard recognition feature within a theater of operations. The text of the leaflet, however, should fit the immediate circumstances. Therefore, the recognition feature is printed in advance for standardization and the remainder of the message is added by the tactical psychological warfare unit when suitable press equipment is available.

- (2) When complicated art work or extensive color printing is required. The art work and color printing may be accomplished in advance during slack periods. ~~Certain news leaflets, for example, contain standard color panels. These panels are printed~~

ahead of need and the news bulletins overprinted later, as required.

- (3) When limited time is available in emergency situations. The contingency leaflet may be printed in advance to cover general and recurring situations, with only a unit designation or place name left blank. Little preparation and makeup time is required to complete the leaflet.

c. Reverse-Side. Leaflets may be preprinted on one side only to emphasize certain powerful themes in a combat zone or in a theater of operations, or to speed up the leaflet operation.

180. Employment

a. Strategic. Standard leaflets may be employed in strategic psychological warfare operations to provide a stockpile of readily available leaflets. Semi-completed leaflets also may be employed at the strategic level to simplify the printing process and reduce reproduction time when a special situation develops.

b. Tactical. Standard leaflets are particularly important in tactical operations. In mobile warfare, operating units are unable to prepare leaflets to fit rapidly changing situations. In such cases, standard leaflets provide for a continuation of the psychological warfare support effort. In tactical situations, equipment failures are more likely to occur because of greater stress upon the equipment and because of the scarcity of factory-trained technicians. Standard leaflets in such instances permit continua-

tion of leaflet operations over short periods when equipment is deadlined.

c. Consolidation. Standard leaflets, particularly directives, are employed effectively during the early stages of consolidation psychological warfare operations. Their use in such situations frees reproduction equipment for the continuing tactical support mission.

181. Preparation

Standard leaflets are prepared by both the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion and the loudspeaker and leaflet company. Where time is available, all types of standard leaflets, with the exception of the safe conduct pass, are produced by the loudspeaker and leaflet company. Where time is not available, production responsibility may shift to the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion. Due to greater flexibility in equipment and the availability of commercial facilities, the battalion normally is responsible for production of complicated standard leaflets.

182. Stockpiling

a. Standard leaflets must be stockpiled between the time when they are prepared and the moment they are employed.

- (1) Stocks vary in direct proportion to the estimated size, disposition, and composition of the opposing force. An estimate of future needs must take into consideration, for example, the various language groups within the opposing force.

- (2) During a static period, use of stockpile leaflets is slight. Such a lull offers an advantageous time to build up the standard leaflet stockpile for future use.
- (3) Availability of storage space may be a limiting factor in planning and maintaining leaflet stockpiles.

b. The loudspeaker and leaflet company maintains a stockpile of standard leaflets sufficient to cover the anticipated needs of tactical psychological warfare support. The company reproduces standard leaflets or obtains them from the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion, as appropriate. Supplies held by loudspeaker and leaflet companies must be augmented as the distance to theater headquarters increases.

183. Advantages of Standard Leaflets

a. Standard leaflets permit immediate dissemination when speed is a primary factor.

b. They provide for complete standardization of certain leaflets and for important features of semi-completed leaflets.

c. They insure continuity of psychological warfare operations on a given front even though reproduction equipment may be out of action temporarily.

d. They are particularly suited to highly mobile situations in which preparation of specific leaflets is impractical.

e. They make efficient use of larger high-speed presses at theater level for preprinting and provide for the employment of loudspeaker and leaflet company printing facilities during static periods.

184. Disadvantages of Standard Leaflets

a. Standard leaflets are usually less effective than leaflets designed for a specific situation.

b. They require the use of storage space for the stockpiling of leaflets.

c. They add a complicating factor to the problem of supplying the loudspeaker and leaflet company.

d. In the case of semicompleted and reverse-side leaflets, further printing is required to complete the leaflet and the advantage of speed may be lost.

Section XI. LEAFLET CAMPAIGNS

185. General

A leaflet campaign is a planned, progressive presentation of ideas in printed form to the target audience in order to achieve a specific psychological warfare goal.

186. Planning the Leaflet Campaign

a. *General.* Leaflet campaigns generally are part of a larger campaign utilizing all effective media. Leaflet campaigns are employed in support of strategic, tactical, and consolidation psychological warfare operations. Planning is almost identical in each type of support operation.

b. *Intelligence.* The propagandist planning a leaflet campaign must have accurate intelligence concerning the target audience. From area studies, supplemented by prisoner of war interrogation, propaganda analysis, captured documents, and other current information, he must draw an accurate picture of the attitudes of the target audience on a

given subject. He exploits vulnerabilities that may produce changes in these attitudes. With these facts at hand, the psychological warfare officer is ready to plan a step-by-step leaflet campaign.

c. Selection of Themes. Although a leaflet campaign might conceivably consist of variations of one effective theme, such a campaign generally makes use of several themes carefully selected for their contribution to the psychological warfare objectives. In seeking to change the target audience's attitudes, the propagandist first chooses a theme easy for the target audience to accept. Any number of leaflets may be used to exploit one theme. This theme, when accepted, lays the groundwork for the presentation of the next theme, and so on until the target audience's attitudes have changed enough for its behavior to be affected or directed. Evaluation of effectiveness of each leaflet will provide guidance in selecting successive leaflets.

d. Continuity. Generally, each leaflet in a leaflet campaign bears a definite relationship to every other. Methods by which separate elements of a campaign are tied together include the following:

- (1) *Continuity of subject matter.* Leaflet subject matter must be coordinated in a psychological warfare campaign. If the campaign is based upon the theme of "good treatment of prisoners of war," for example, one leaflet may deal with food, another with medical treatment, and still another with postal privileges.
- (2) *Slogan or catch phrase.* A single slogan or catch phrase may run through an entire

leaflet campaign and serve to tie the various elements together.

- (3) *Similarity of art work.* Often, the character of the art work serves as a coordinating device between different leaflets of a campaign.
- (4) *Format.* Leaflets that comprise a campaign may employ a similar format as an identification aid.
- (5) *Other methods.* The propagandist may employ many other methods to provide continuity to his leaflet campaign: The color or texture of the paper as well as the size or shape of the leaflet may form connecting links between one leaflet and the next, depending upon the situation and what the series is designed to accomplish.

187. Phasing

A leaflet campaign achieves its maximum effectiveness as a support operation when it is timed to hit the target audience at the right psychological moment. This requires accurate intelligence and close coordination with the combat arms. The soldier or civilian is likely to be in a more receptive frame of mind following severe combat pressure, during sieges of uncomfortable weather, or after news of military or diplomatic reverses.

Section XII. DISSEMINATION BY ARTILLERY

188. General

Artillery is a standard method for tactical dissemination of leaflets. Although experimentation indi-

cates that further satisfactory methods of tactical distribution may be developed, the 105-mm howitzer is the standard artillery weapon for leaflet dissemination at the present time.

a. Capabilities.

- (1) Artillery can pinpoint targets with reasonable accuracy. This means that small objectives, such as platoon or company positions, may be bombarded with leaflets.
- (2) *Coordination.* By close liaison with the intelligence officer, operations officer, and fire support coordinator, an artillery leaflet-firing mission may be geared to the enemy situation and to our own plans.

b. Limitations.

- (1) Artillery has a limited range.
- (2) Artillery observation is not important provided previous registration has taken place. However, it is extremely difficult to observe a leaflet burst for registration purposes. This problem is heightened by the presence of fog, wind, rain, or darkness.
- (3) Each artillery round has a limited carrying capacity. The leaflet load of a 105-mm shell varies from 300 to 600 leaflets, depending on the weight and size of the paper stock. For maximum effectiveness, certain saturation effects must be achieved. A desired saturation may require an excessive number of guns and shells.

189. Types of Weapons

a. 105-MM Howitzer. The basic artillery weapon for leaflet dissemination at present is the 105-

mm howitzer, M2 or M2A1. Shells used are either the M-84 BE smoke or the T-107 propaganda shell. They are detonated by a standard artillery time fuze.

b. Leaflet Rocket. The T-229 115-mm leaflet rocket has been developed to provide a standard dissemination device capable of being employed by psychological warfare personnel in close support of tactical operations. This rocket is equipped with its own launcher which readily may be employed under field conditions. It has a range of 1,000-2,500 yards and contains approximately 700 leaflets per round.

c. Ballistics. Conversion of the BE smoke shell to a leaflet round requires modification of the standard firing tables to maintain accuracy. The T-107 shell will eliminate this difficulty and current firing tables may be used with normal corrections to allow for the slight difference in weight.

190. Leaflet Shells

a. The 105-mm BE smoke shell is currently used for leaflet dissemination. Recent development of the T-107 propaganda shell will result in an improved round that will replace the smoke shell for leaflet purposes. In converting the smoke shell for leaflet dissemination, the base plate of the round is uncrewed and the smoke cannisters and packing washers removed. Specifically prepared leaflet rolls are then placed in the body of the round. The T-107 round is supplied with split-sleeve leaflet roll containers that reduce crimping of the leaflets and assist in discharging the base plate.

b. The body of the 105-mm BE smoke shell provides room for two rolls of 5 by 8 inch leaflets rolled

on the short axis. The T-107 round contains approximately the same amount of room as a result of design features. In both cases, washers are inserted ahead of, between, or behind the rolls if space remains after the leaflet rolls are inserted. The leaflet load must fit snugly against the base plate if crinkling and tearing of the leaflets on discharge are to be avoided. Leaflet rolls should be marked for easy identification of content, preferably with a symbol or number that can be easily chalked or stenciled on the propaganda shell. An English translation of the leaflet should be available for insertion in the shell box as this translation makes certain that the proper leaflet is being distributed and helps to orient firing personnel with the text and general purpose of the leaflet.

c. Plugging the hole in the powder bag baffle in the nose of the BE smoke shell with a small wooden splinter is advisable in order to diminish the danger of flash burns on the leaflets. This splinter will tend to absorb the flash of the fuze so that the leaflets are left unmarred.

191. Rolling and Conversion, Other Shells

The process of rolling and conversion is similar for other shells when used for dissemination of leaflets. In each case, with the exception of the T-229 leaflet rocket, a base ejection shell must be employed.

192. Delivery of Shell

a. General. The method by which loaded leaflet shells are delivered varies with the circumstances.

b. Normal Procedure. Leaflet shells normally are

delivered to the ammunition supply point (ASP) where the firing units obtain them.

c. Special Procedure. Under exceptional circumstances, the loudspeaker and leaflet company delivers the loaded leaflet shells directly to the designated firing batteries. This may be necessary under conditions requiring maximum speed. Such operating procedure is not normally followed because the psychological warfare unit lacks sufficient organic transportation for such activities.

Section XIII. DISSEMINATION BY AIR

193. General

Air dissemination is a dependable method of delivery for large quantities of leaflets. Strategic, tactical, and Army aircraft are available as carriers. The target area extends from the front lines to deep in the enemy's homeland.

194. Advantages of Air Dissemination

a. Long-range aircraft can carry strategic leaflets deep into the interior of the enemy nation. Tactically, light bombers or Army aircraft can drop leaflets on targets out of artillery range. Troops in reserve, isolated troop positions, marshalling areas, and concentrations of civilians are included in the tactical target category.

b. Leaflets disseminated on more than one target per mission is possible by releasing portions of the leaflet load over several target areas. In addition, loudspeaker operations may be conducted from the same planes used for leaflet drops.

c. One M105 (M16A1) leaflet bomb contains an average of 30,000 leaflets while the recently developed T-58 leaflet bomb is designed to hold 50,000 leaflets. A heavy bomber with a full load of leaflet bombs is capable of saturating an extensive area with leaflets.

d. Terrain barriers to artillery fire or movement of artillery pieces, such as jungle trails, rugged mountains, or isolated island positions, can be overcome with leaflet-carrying aircraft.

195. Disadvantages of Air Dissemination

a. Strategic and tactical leaflet bombing missions are subject to the same weather restrictions as other air reconnaissance and bombing operations.

b. Defenses can adversely affect a leaflet bomb run. This limitation is somewhat minimized by the fact that leaflet bombs may be dropped from high altitudes. However, lack of air superiority can make the operation extremely difficult and hazardous.

c. On tactical air drops, complete saturation of small areas is more difficult to achieve than by the use of artillery.

196. Rolling Leaflets

Leaflet bomb M105 is capable of holding five leaflet rolls with each roll containing approximately 6,000 5- by 8-inch leaflets. When hand-rolled, the roll is formed by carefully stacking leaflets within a metal template 13½ inches in diameter by 4 inches high. For handling purposes, the roll is tied together with strong twine. The rolls formed by the leaflet rolling machine are held together by a wrapping of heavy paper. The leaflet roll for the T-58 bomb is 16 inches

in diameter and contains approximately 10,000 5- by 8-inch leaflets.

197. Delivery

The processing components of the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion and the loudspeaker and leaflet company are responsible for rolling the leaflets, loading the bombs, and delivering the bombs to the designated air base. More efficient operations may result if the leaflets are rolled and loaded in the bombs at the air base.

198. Leaflet Bombs

Three types of bombs have been employed to disseminate leaflets: the M104 100-pound bomb, the M105 500-pound bomb, and the recently developed T-58 bomb. The M104 bomb is seldom used.

a. The M105 leaflet bomb is a metal casing that originally was designed for delivering butterfly bombs. The rear of the bomb casing consists of a fin assembly for the purpose of keeping the bomb in a free glide pattern trajectory. The fin assembly also prevents tumbling which would have an adverse effect upon accuracy. The threaded receiving cup for attachment of the fuze is in the nose of the bomb. Lugs protrude from the side of the casing for the purpose of mounting the bomb in the bombrack. The detonation of the fuze in the nose exerts a pressure that splits the bomb down the center of its long axis, spilling the leaflet rolls. The rolls disintegrate in the windstream, allowing the leaflets to flutter to the ground.

b. The T-58 leaflet bomb is appreciably larger than the M105 and unlike the M105 has been de-

signed for high-speed, high-altitude delivery. The T-58 bomb is formed of three fibre glass sections. As presently designed, a barometric fuze ignites primacord pressed into the body of the bomb. The igniting cord bursts the body of the bomb to release the leaflets.

199. Drift and Dispersion

a. Leaflet Bomb Drop. Since the advent of the present leaflet bombs and the time fuze, many of the uncertainties of area coverage caused by drift and dispersion of free falling leaflets have been eliminated. For accurate saturation, a bomb-burst altitude of 1,000 feet is considered most efficient. When the fuze is timed to burst at this altitude, the free falling leaflets are still subject to wind dispersion and drift, and it is necessary to select a point of detonation some distance to windward of the target area.

b. Bundle Drop. The bundle drop method of leaflet dissemination is often used from cargo or Army aircraft. The leaflet bundle generally consists of approximately 20 pounds of stacked leaflets bound in place by a strong paper cover and held together by suitable twine. Normal technique of discharge is to burst the twine and open the paper package by the burst of a blasting cap. Burst altitude is determined by properly cutting a section of time delay fuze R7EHC to ignite blasting cap R7LJA at approximately 500 feet elevation. The time delay fuze cord is ignited by lighter fuze R7KCA when the bundle is discharged from the aircraft. Smaller, loosely packed bundles have been employed in cer-

tain cases without fuzing, depending upon the slip stream, trip wire, or impact on the ground to burst the bundle. Wind drift and leaflet dispersion characteristics must be clearly understood when employing these techniques so that necessary correction factors may be made.

200. Coordination

Coordination with the Air Force is essential to the success of air dissemination operations. The Air Force may designate one squadron or elements of several squadrons to handle all leaflet missions. In the planning phase, both psychological warfare staff officers and liaison officers of the various operating units must maintain constant contact with the assigned Air Force units. In this manner, air drop leaflet campaigns may be coordinated with ground operations, and the drop schedule may be made sufficiently flexible to account for circumstances of weather and target defenses.

Section XIV. DISSEMINATION BY OTHER MEANS

201. Patrols

Posters and leaflets may be placed or scattered by infantry and reconnaissance patrols, usually in conjunction with their regular missions.

202. Balloons

Under certain circumstances, free flight meteorological or pillow balloons are considered practical and inexpensive means to disseminate leaflets over large target areas. A simple technique is to tie a

leaflet bundle to the balloon and then to release the leaflet bundle by burning the tie cord with a suitable slow burning fuze. A comprehensive study is being conducted to improve this capability of leaflet delivery at both short and long ranges. Short range dissemination is subject to effects by thermal wind currents and sudden wind shifts. However, such effects may be minimized by careful choice of the launching site and release of an adequate number of balloons.

203. Retrograde Movements

Leaflets can be left behind in retrograde movements. They may be tacked on trees, pasted on buildings, or placed on the ground.

204. Infiltrators

Infiltrators, line crossers, guerillas, and special agents may be employed for disseminating leaflets behind the enemy lines.

CHAPTER 17

RADIO BROADCASTING

Section I. GENERAL

205. Radio

In many respects, radio is an ideal medium for psychological warfare operations. Radio's value to psychological warfare operations is largely in its basic quality as a true medium of mass communication. In areas where possession of radio receivers is widespread, radio can reach more people faster than any other medium.

206. Capabilities of Radio

a. Speed. Radio is timely. It capitalizes upon the speed with which the latest information may be processed and disseminated to the target audience.

b. Wide Coverage. Radio can provide wide coverage of the target area.

c. Ease of Perception. Radio-listening requires little or no effort on the part of the target audience. Illiteracy is no bar to understanding.

d. Versatility. Radio is a versatile medium. Since it is easily adaptable to drama, music, news, and other types of programs, radio can transmit the propaganda message in a less obvious manner than other media.

e. Familiarity. Where possession of radio receivers is common, listening to the radio is a habit. Thus, audience familiarity is greater than in the case of leaflets.

f. Emotive Power. Radio has all the emotive power of the spoken word. A skilled radio propagandist can exert tremendous influence on the emotions of the listener simply by pitch, resonance, inflection, or articulation.

207. Limitations of Radio

a. Jamming. Deliberate jamming may prevent the target audience from receiving radio broadcasts.

b. Preventive Measures. The target audience may be subjected to severe anti-listening laws, thereby reducing effectiveness of radio broadcasts.

c. Technical. Radio signals may be rendered inaudible by fading or static due to unfavorable atmospheric conditions. Mountainous or mineral-laden terrain often limits the range of the transmitter.

d. Lack of Receivers. In some areas, so few receivers are available that radio is not an effective medium. In addition, the target may possess receivers incapable of receiving foreign broadcasts.

e. Power Shortage. Bombing or other military action may destroy power plants, thus rendering inoperative all receivers depending upon an external power source.

f. Competition with Other Output. Other radio broadcasts compete with United States radio output for the attention of the audience. Long indoctrination may have made the target audience unreceptive.

g. Fleeting Impression. Oral media do not pos-

sess the permanency of written media. The propaganda message may be forgotten or distorted with the passage of time.

208. Programming

a. Definition. Radio programming consists of planning the schedule, content, and production of radio programs during a given period.

b. Objectives. The broad objectives of programming for psychological warfare operations include building and maintaining a listening audience among those whom the propagandist wishes to influence, and accomplishing psychological warfare objectives in coordination with other media.

c. Principles.

(1) *Regularity.* The radio propagandist must create habitual listening patterns in order to build a regular audience. Thus, regularity is an essential element of programming. The broadcast day, once established, remains relatively unchanged. Specific programs are transmitted at the same hour each day. Content, style, and format of programs should not vary once the proper pattern is established.

(2) *Repetition.* Incessant repetition is essential to oral learning. Key themes, phrases, or slogans must be repeated until accepted (or definitely rejected) by the target audience.

(3) *Suitability for target audience.* The radio propagandist prepares programs to suit the tastes and needs of his intended audience.

Program content and style of presentation, as far as policy objectives permit, should follow the patterns to which the intended audience is accustomed. Programs must be better than those offered by the enemy if a large audience is to be gained.

- (4) *Credibility.* Factual and credible material is utilized.
- (5) *Exploitation of censorship.* Discussion or presentation of banned books, plays, music, and political topics often finds a ready reception by the target audience. The same holds true of news withheld by censors.

d. The Voice. Selection or training of announcers with proper voice qualities is essential to successful radio psychological warfare operations.

- (1) The emotional tone conveyed by the voice often influences the listener more than the logic of arguments presented.
- (2) Care must be taken to avoid use of announcers whose accents are similar to those of unpopular groups within the target audience.
- (3) In some areas the use of female announcers is limited. Women announcers may be used to overcome jamming or other interference on weak signals. In many parts of the world women's voices may be resented, but in China, for example, they are used extensively. Female voices may be employed effectively in propaganda exploiting nostalgia or sex frustration, or in programs addressed to female audiences.

209. Program Origin

Radio programs beamed to the target audience originate in four ways.

a. Direct. Programs may be transmitted directly to the target audience simultaneously with their origin in the studio.

b. Relay. A relay broadcast originates in a regular studio and transmitted to one or more other broadcasting stations for instantaneous relay transmission to the target audience.

c. Remote. In a remote broadcast, the broadcast originates somewhere other than the regular studio. The signals are transmitted to the studio (usually by wire), and are simultaneously beamed to the target audience. An example would be a remote broadcast of a political demonstration.

d. Rebroadcast. Programs may be recorded and transmitted at a later time. Such programs may originate in the studio, or may be relay or remote broadcasts.

Section II. RADIO SCRIPTS

210. Writing News

a. Conversational Style. News should be written the way it would be told in the presence of an informal group of people. The listener should not be conscious of the fact the news is being read to him. In brief, the rules of radio or loudspeaker news-writing are simply the rules of good conversation.

b. Simplicity. The writer uses simple everyday words and simple sentence structure. He avoids modifying clauses. He may make two short sen-

tences out of one long sentence. He does not make every sentence approximately the same length, however, as this will produce a "sing-song" effect.

c. Initial Attention. As the listener may be risking reprisals for tuning in, the announcer must command attention from the start. The first sentence of the script must convince the listener that he is listening to something worth while. Essential facts regarding the subject must be contained in the first few sentences, not only to gain initial interest, but to insure that if the script has to be cut, nothing of major importance will be lost from the end of the script.

d. Rate of Speech. The normal rate of speech will vary among different announcers. The script writer should time the rate of speech of each announcer in the language used and write for him accordingly so as to end the program at the right time.

e. Tongue Twisters and Alliteration. The writer avoids words that successively begin with the same sound, such as: "Purpose proper provision procedures . . ." He also avoids as much as possible words ending *ch*, *sh*, *th*. These sounds, when occurring at the end of words, produce a hissing effect through the microphone.

f. Numbers. Round numbers are substituted for tedious, exact figures unless the specific number is important. For instance, "20 thousands" may be used in place of "20,128." Numbers should be written in the manner easiest to read, such as "one-billion-200 million-50 thousand," in place of "1,200,050,000."

g. Unfamiliar Names. A news item should not be

started with an unfamiliar name. The writer does not say, "John Jones announced this morning that . . ." Rather, he says, "The Australian Minister of Education, John Jones, announced this morning that . . ."

h. Quotation Marks. The listener cannot see quotation marks. By voice inflection the announcer can make it clear when a quotation begins and ends. Other methods may be used to indicate a quotation:

- (1) In Smith's own words . . . The council is sure to reject the proposal.
- (2) To quote Smith . . . The council is sure to reject the proposal.
- (3) As Smith states . . . The council is sure to reject the proposal.

i. Punctuation Marks. Ordinary marks of punctuation are ignored in script writing. They are used solely as a guide to the announcer. For example, parentheses () may be used to set off a phrase. Key words may be capitalized for emphasis. Phonetic spelling may be used to help the announcer with the pronunciation of difficult words.

j. Profanity and Horror. The propagandist, as a representative of his government, will not use outright profanity. He will not make it a policy to employ horror, although the description of battles, bombings, ship sinkings, and human suffering often find a legitimate place in radio and loudspeaker operations.

k. Abbreviations. Conventional abbreviations are seldom used. For example, "Mister" is used in place of "Mr." and "Doctor" in place of "Dr." In case an

abbreviation is as well or better known than the full title, the abbreviation may be used. "C.I.O." and "F.B.I." fall into this category.

211. Writing Drama

Radio drama, with its ability to stir the imagination of the listener, can be a powerful psychological technique if used correctly. Abstract ideas become a living, breathing part of everyday life when skillfully expressed through the medium of drama. Its production, however, is no job for the amateur. Dramatic writing requires a much more delicate touch than news writing. Better and more ample facilities and more personnel are necessary for successful production. If the script is to produce the desired effect on the audience, the writer must know his audience, its tastes, its likes and dislikes, and its psychology. He must know what makes them laugh or cry, to what emotions he should appeal: Pride? Hate? Love of country? Love of family? Ambition? Jealousy? In preparing his drama script, the writer works with three dramatic ingredients: speech, music, and sound effects. The writer must know the capabilities of each.

a. Speech. Narration and dialogue are the two types of speech employed by the drama script writer.

- (1) *Narration.* Narration is employed to establish the drama and to provide the continuity. The narrator is a middleman between the play and the audience. American mystery plays make wide use of this technique. Over-long narrations should be avoided.

(2) *Dialogue.* Dialogue is the technique chiefly used by the dramatist to advance the play and makes up the bulk of most drama scripts. All characters must be made to speak occasionally, or the audience will forget they are in the cast. This is the reason that a small cast is to be desired. Characters should have simple names that are easy to remember.

b. Music. Music can be used to help set atmosphere and mood in a radio drama. Music is used—

- (1) To set the mood of the play when used at the opening.
- (2) To reset the mood from one scene to another.
- (3) To heighten or lower emotions when used as a background.

c. Sound Effects. Sound effects are either self-identifying or of the type that must be supported for identification. Footsteps, creaking doors, and gunshots usually are self-identifying. On the other hand, the crackling of cellophane and the rumble of a kettledrum may be used to simulate either fire or thunder, and must be made clear in the dialogue which one of the phenomena the sounds are supposed to represent. Sound effects may be recorded or they may be conveyed by mechanical, electrical, manual, vocal, or acoustical devices. They may be used as background (gunfire in battle) or they may be used to shift scenes (footsteps, door closing).

d. Other Guides.

- (1) Radio drama exists only in the minds of

the listeners. The entire play is nothing but a series of well-planned sounds.

- (2) Radio's audience is generally not a crowd audience, so crowd psychology is not needed. The script should be written for the individual listener whose interest must be maintained continually.
- (3) The cast must be kept at a minimum. The listener becomes confused if confronted with too many voices.
- (4) Paint scenery by suggestion. Radio characters can go anywhere in the world and do almost anything through the power of suggestion. A scene should not be overly described. Instead of describing an army camp, for example, the producer may use background sounds of marching feet and bugles.

Section III. STRATEGIC RADIO

212. Employment

a. General. The radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion is responsible for strategic radio operations within a theater of operations.

- (1) Paragraphs 213 through 218 are concerned only with overt radio operations.
- (2) Paragraph 219 discusses covert radio operations.

b. Role in Psychological Warfare Campaign. Radio broadcasting is employed in close coordination with strategic leaflet operations. Both operations

are phased with military operations for maximum effect. Radio campaigns are planned and executed in a manner similar to leaflet campaigns.

c. Support to Underground Elements. This type of strategic radio support requires close coordination with all agencies concerned with unconventional operations. Radio may be used to transmit instructions, directions, and other information to underground elements in enemy-held territory. Such messages may be sent either as straight announcements or in a prearranged code.

- (1) Noncoded messages provide underground supporting elements with instructions, directions, or information which require immediate action. They tax the effectiveness of the internal security forces by giving information calculated to mislead or confuse such security forces. They create general distrust among the enemy population by promoting the idea that "your co-worker or next-door neighbor may be a spy." Such distrust leads to inefficiency in production and loss of faith in victory.
- (2) Coded messages are employed when the instructions, directions, or information are of such a critical nature that they must be unintelligible to the enemy. Generally, coded messages are contained within the text of normal broadcasts. Selected words or phrases form a master code. When these words or phrases are interspersed in announcements or newscasts, underground elements receive the coded information.

213. Capabilities

Strategic radio psychological warfare operations may be executed without the risk to personnel and equipment involved in leaflet dissemination by air. Radio provides an economical and effective means of reaching a target audience spread over a wide area.

214. Limitations

Effective strategic radio operations are dependent upon adequate intelligence. Such intelligence may be difficult to obtain. Announcer-linguist personnel must be highly skilled and such personnel may be difficult to obtain.

215. Program Content

a. News. News is the backbone of radio psychological warfare operations. The two general classifications of news programs include the straight newscast which avoids any obvious personal comment, and the news commentary in which personal comment supplements straight news. Sources for radio news programs are the same as those outlined in paragraph 158 for news leaflets. News is selected for broadcast according to its listener interest and its effectiveness in accomplishing psychological warfare objectives.

- (1) *Presentation.* The radio propagandist must schedule news programs for those times when they can reach a maximum number of listeners. For example, if intelligence reports show that the most popular listening hours are from 0600 to 0800 and from 1900

to 2200, programming for those hours should emphasize news.

- (2) The announcer is a language specialist who normally has no part in preparation of the script. His sole task is to voice the finished script. However, he can increase the impact of the written message through vocal inflections.
- (3) The news commentator writes, edits, and voices a policy-controlled interpretation of the news. The commentator selects straight news material, analyzes and interprets it in the light of related information, and weaves his completed evaluation into a meaningful pattern for the listening audience. The commentator may be a person well known to the target audience, or may be a fictional character with audience acceptability.

b. Music. Music is employed to make the radio audience friendly and receptive. Fundamentally, musical programs are designed to gain an audience, to hold it, and to make the audience want to listen again. More specific purposes of music in programming include—

- (1) *To set mood.* The propagandist must know the musical tastes of his audience. Then he can employ music to set the audience mood for reception of specific messages.
- (2) *To maintain program balance.* Musical programs are used to provide contrast between similar programs, such as two news

programs or two drama skits. Music may also be used as a bridge between two portions of a program.

- (3) *To provide entertainment.* Music is employed to make programs more entertaining, thus more interesting and acceptable to the target audience. Music should be selected for broadcasts according to the tastes of the audience.
- (4) *To exploit well-known artists.* Musicians and singers known and liked by the target audience may be employed in strategic radio broadcasts. Such musical presentations often have an intrinsic propaganda value, especially when the music or musicians have been banned.

c. Drama. Where personnel and facilities are available, dramatic skits may be employed in strategic radio broadcasts. Drama has these advantages and disadvantages:

- (1) *Advantages.* Dramatic appeal makes deep and lasting impressions. Variety of subject matter available for dramatic treatment is almost inexhaustible.
- (2) *Disadvantages.* Drama is difficult to write and requires extensive facilities for presentation. Competent acting personnel normally are scarce. Quality of production must be high, or such drama presentations may do more harm than good.

d. Special Broadcasts. Special broadcasts normally originate outside the studio and are of a documentary nature. They include—

- (1) Speeches by high civil or military officials, such as the President of the United States or the theater commander, that are of significance to the target audience.
- (2) On-the-spot broadcasts of important political or diplomatic events significant to the target audience.
- (3) Talks by former prisoners of war and other persons whose opinions are significant to the target audience.

e. Culture. Some cultural programs may be employed in the strategic phase as an audience-gaining technique. However, such programs normally are not employed where antilisting laws make listening to broadcasts hazardous to the target audience. In these cases, the target audience normally prefers news or other critical programs in which they are more vitally interested.

f. Directives. Directive messages may be employed where the audience has developed attitudes sympathetic to the viewpoint of the propagandist.

Section IV. TACTICAL RADIO

216. Employment

Tactical radio is used in conjunction with combat operations by mobile units of the radio broadcasting organization (ch. 5) or as an adjunct to tactical loud-speaker operations employing radio communication equipment and techniques. Planning for their employment is accomplished by the army to which they

are attached. Tactical radio stations are located forward of the army rear boundary.

a. Objectives. Tactical radio operations strive to increase disaffection among soldiers, to deceive the enemy as to United States and friendly intentions, and to influence civilians to take actions favorable to the United States and friendly forces.

b. Static Situation. When employed in a static combat situation, tactical radio may be used in the following ways:

- (1) Build an audience for broadcasts when later fighting resumes.
- (2) Establish credibility in the minds of listeners through strict objectivity in newscasts.
- (3) Support, expand, and clarify themes used in other media.
- (4) Disseminate information which may help deceive the enemy as to operational plans for the immediate future.

c. Mobile Situation.

(1) When United States and friendly forces are advancing, radio is directed primarily to civilians in the tactical target area. Broadcasts emphasize the futility of resistance and seek to cause the collapse of civilian aid to the military effort. In addition, such tactical broadcasts prepare civilians psychologically for occupation by United States and friendly forces.

(2) Tactical propaganda has limited value in retrograde movements. The radio propa-

gandist may increase credibility by broadcasting selected truths about the combat situation when such facts do not jeopardize the security of combat units and the success of their missions.

217. Capabilities and Limitations

Tactical radio is subject to the general capabilities and limitations of radio outlined in paragraphs 206-207. The following aspects are specifically applicable to tactical radio:

a. Capabilities.

- (1) Tactical radio stations are mobile and may be deployed where they are most needed. Thus, maximum utility is obtained from critical personnel and equipment.
- (2) The speed with which combat intelligence can be utilized in tactical radio output enables the propagandist to get his message to the target audience before the combat situation changes. Speed also makes tactical radio an effective medium for counter-propaganda.
- (3) Proximity to the combat area lends authenticity to tactical radio. People normally tend to accept a report originating locally rather than from a distant place.
- (4) Tactical radio can cater to the tastes of limited, specific target audiences.

b. Limitations.

- (1) An adequate number of radio receivers may not be available to the target audience,

especially combat troops. This shortage of receivers often is so severe that tactical radio is ineffective. However, this limitation may be offset by two factors: the message may be passed along by word of mouth; and listening groups often form to take advantage of those receivers which are available. A battery-operated radio receiver has been developed for psychological warfare as Radio Set AN/PRR-5. This long-life receiver may be employed to augment existing receiver equipment.

- (2) In the combat area, the target audience may not have time for listening to the radio.

218. Program Content

a. General. Program content of tactical radio is less varied than that of strategic radio. Production facilities are not as elaborate. Fewer types of programs are needed to satisfy the tastes of the target audience.

b. News. News is the essential element in tactical radio programming. News sources, preparation, and presentation of tactical news programs are basically the same as for strategic radio. However, tactical news programs should be planned and produced with these factors in mind:

- (1) The listener has an intense interest in what is occurring in the immediate combat area. It means life or death to him.
- (2) Newscasts must be factual. The listener is often in a position to check personally on the accuracy of news reports.

(3) Local military news should predominate as it is of the greatest interest to the target audience. However, enough world news from other fronts should be included to give meaning to the local news.

c. Prisoner of War Lists. Where it is in accordance with policy, broadcasting names of prisoners of war is an excellent method of gaining and holding an audience.

d. Testimonials. Prisoners of war may volunteer to broadcast short propaganda messages to their ex-comrades, especially those in their own units. The highest ranking prisoners available should be employed in such broadcasts. For security reasons, censored recordings are used as the bases for broadcasts by enemy personnel.

e. Music. Music is employed extensively in tactical radio programs for the same purposes as outlined in paragraph 215*b*. It is useful in programs aimed at increasing nostalgia.

f. Special Broadcasts. Documentary broadcasts are employed in tactical radio to bring events of special significance to the attention of the target audience. These broadcasts, normally originating outside the studio, may include—

- (1) Relays or rebroadcasts of significant speeches by high military or civilian officials.
- (2) Broadcasts of important political or diplomatic events.

- (3) Talks by former prisoners of war, enemy civilians, and other persons whose opinions are significant to the target audience.
- (4) Recordings made in the immediate combat zone.

Section V. CLANDESTINE RADIO

219. Black Radio

a. Definition. A black radio broadcast appears to originate from sources other than the actual one. It is designed to give the impression that it comes from dissident elements in the target area. Normally, it involves utterances or acts which are unlawful under the domestic law of the target nation.

b. Advantages.

- (1) Black radio can use themes and tactics not otherwise permitted because of policy consideration.
- (2) It can operate on either side of the battle-front. When operated by clandestine agents, it can broadcast first-hand accounts of events and situations embarrassing to the enemy.
- (3) It can operate with a minimum of personnel and equipment.
- (4) It can cause the populace to worry about apparent enemies within the ranks. With every man suspecting his neighbor, inefficiency grows and the capacity of the internal security force is strained.

c. Disadvantages.

- (1) When operating behind the enemy lines, black radio stations are easily located. Therefore, they must be constantly moved.
- (2) Programming must be extremely skillful to avoid revealing the station as an obviously covert operation.
- (3) Black radio is difficult to coordinate with overt operations.
- (4) Since covert operations must echo the enemy viewpoint in many respects in order to convince the target audience of its legitimacy, there is the danger that black radio may actually help maintain rather than destroy morale.

220. Grey Radio

a. Definition. In a grey radio broadcast, the propagandist avoids specific identification as being either friendly or enemy.

b. Advantages.

- (1) Grey radio can be more forthright than black radio in its programming because it does not attempt to falsify the source.
- (2) Grey radio operations can be coordinated more directly with military action than black radio.
- (3) When the true identity of a grey station is discovered and made public, valid underground groups are not necessarily discredited.

c. Disadvantage. Grey radio, having no recognized voice of authority, cannot have the power of authoritative tone.

Section VI. MONITORING

221. General

a. Purpose. One purpose of radio monitoring by agencies charged with this task is to intercept enemy, friendly, and neutral radio broadcasts which, when analyzed, provide information of value to psychological warfare operations. Monitoring has these specific aims:

- (1) To provide information concerning the enemy's psychological warfare operations to domestic or foreign audiences and to his own military forces in the field.
- (2) To provide information for evaluating the effectiveness and consonance of United States and allied psychological warfare operations.
- (3) To provide news supplementary to that obtained from regular sources.

b. Responsibility.

- (1) Primary responsibility for monitoring in foreign areas is assigned to Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS) and full advantage must be taken of such facilities. Psychological warfare monitoring in close support of strategic psychological warfare operations of the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion is the responsibility of the battalion.

- (2) Psychological warfare monitoring in close support of tactical psychological warfare operations is the responsibility of the loud-speaker and leaflet company.

222. Monitoring Operations

Strategic and tactical monitoring facilities are not adequate for monitoring all enemy, friendly, and neutral radio broadcasts. A planned basis for selection is therefore required. Monitoring personnel are provided with schedules setting forth which programs are to be monitored.

a. Recordings. Broadcasts may be monitored by means of recording equipment. This insures accuracy and allows maximum utilization of available personnel. Broadcasts recorded in this manner may be of no interest until edited by personnel capable of recognizing material of propaganda import.

b. Scanning. In addition to scheduled monitoring of specific broadcasts, provision is made for scanning the dial for other broadcasts of significant interest to United States and allied forces.

c. Operational Rules. Monitoring personnel—

- (1) Must not allow personal opinion to influence their monitoring reports in those instances where such reports are not verbatim accounts of broadcasts.
- (2) Are familiar with names of persons and places likely to appear in monitored broadcasts.
- (3) Monitor only the station to which assigned, unless specifically directed to scan for other broadcasts.

- (4) Record the identity of the monitored station, the date and hour of the monitored broadcasts, and other such pertinent information.
- (5) Write phonetically when in doubt as to correct spelling.
- (6) Follow standard procedure in notifying superiors of a significant information obtained in monitoring.

d. Communications and Reports. All communications and reports are handled in accordance with established procedure.

Section VII. FIELD RECORDINGS

223. General

Field recordings are those recordings made at the actual scene of the event. These recordings are later rebroadcast.

224. Employment

Field recordings are of great value to psychological warfare operations. They lend balance to radio programming by making available various program material originating outside the studio.

a. Discussion among cooperative prisoners of war concerning their treatment since capture may be recorded and broadcast by tactical or strategic radio.

b. A touch of realism can be added to newscasts by interspersing news items with recordings calculated to heighten the impact of the news. Documentary recordings may be made of the arrival of

new bombers, capture of a city by United States or allied forces, and other such significant events.

c. Recordings may be made for later special events broadcasts, covering such events as speeches by high military or civilian officials and round-table discussions among persons known and respected by the target audience.

d. Excerpts from enemy broadcasts which are inconsistent with enemy output to his domestic audience may be recorded and broadcast, thus discrediting the enemy propagandist with his own people.

225. Advantages and Disadvantages

a. Advantages.

- (1) Field recordings have the touch of realism and drama which make them of great interest to the listener.
- (2) They lend variety to programming.
- (3) They facilitate security measures. The recording may be censored or edited before being broadcast.
- (4) The recording is a permanent record and may be reused.
- (5) New announcers, especially indigenous personnel, as well as program ideas, can be auditioned in advance by enemy prisoners of war. The reactions of the prisoners can then be noted.
- (6) Use of recordings insures accuracy in broadcast material.

b. Disadvantages.

- (1) External noises at the scene of the recording may interfere with satisfactory reproduction.
- (2) Some events to be recorded cannot be rehearsed or staged purely for purposes of recording.

CHAPTER 18

LOUDSPEAKERS

Section I. GENERAL

226. Loudspeaker

A loudspeaker is an instrument designed to increase the volume of a given sound so that it can be heard beyond its normal radius by the unaided human ear. Combat loudspeakers are elaborate, mobile adaptations of public address systems.

227. Capabilities

The loudspeaker is capable of supporting military operations by—

a. Hastening the enemy's decision to defect, facilitating the defection, and thereby reducing the number of casualties that would result from stubborn resistance.

b. Inducing individual disaffections in static situations from dissident enemy elements.

c. Facilitating the reorganization of civilian groups for obedience to the authority of friendly forces.

d. Supporting any offensive action by confusing portions of the enemy forces.

228. Limitations

The loudspeaker is limited in its ability to support military operations because—

a. Wind-flow, terrain-induced acoustical effects, in addition to technical difficulties, often make a loudspeaker broadcast inaudible.

b. Its operating area is localized, with the result that an excessive time lag may develop between the time that a loudspeaker team is requested and the time that the team actually goes into action.

c. The effectiveness of a loudspeaker team depends heavily upon the ingenuity and intelligence of the announcer who must necessarily operate without close supervisory control.

229. Intelligence and Coordination

The loudspeaker broadcast is an intensely specific operation in terms of its audience. Intimate intelligence concerning the target and its personalities is essential. If the soldier hears his unit addressed properly, his own platoon officer called by name, and his casualty figures given accurately, he will react more favorably to a loudspeaker message. Before every mission, the announcer must carefully study all intelligence about the specific target to be addressed. Closest coordination with supported elements must be maintained. For example, a loudspeaker message may be an ultimatum prefaced by an artillery barrage and concluding with a threat of redoubled barrage if the ultimatum is not obeyed. Such threats must be kept, and on schedule.

230. Loudspeaker Appeals

Loudspeaker appeals must be based on sound creative principles. Like the leaflet writer and the radio script writer, the propagandist using this medium must meet such standards as those of doctrinal consistency and relevance of themes to task.

- a. The appeal should be brief and pertinent.
- b. The appeal should be made in simple, easily understood language.
- c. The text should have a firm note and should be official in tone.
- d. Important phrases should be repeated throughout the appeal for emphasis and clarification.
- e. The appeal should be personalized.
- f. Any surrender appeal should be prefaced with an explanation in English as to the purpose of the broadcast. United States troops must be cautioned not to fire on enemy soldiers coming forward to surrender.
- g. Detailed, specific instructions on how to surrender should always be included in a surrender appeal.
- h. The appeal must be based on the latest and most accurate intelligence.

231. Texts and Situations

Scripts for loudspeaker appeals should be prepared in advance for exploiting specific situations. Such scripts fall into many categories. The following are examples of situations in which loudspeakers may be employed effectively.

a. *Static Situation.* The script should—

- (1) Stress late news indicating the weakness of the target's position.

- (2) Concentrate on building up an attitude favorable to future loudspeaker broadcasts rather than insisting upon surrender.
- (3) Be short and precise, with important points repeated to insure understanding.
- (4) Be specifically directed against the target by name.

b. Small Scale Operations. Usually, this is an operation against an isolated pocket. The script should—

- (1) Present a concise, detailed report of the target's tactical situation.
- (2) Avoid premature surrender instructions. Probably nothing increases a man's determination to fight more than being told how to surrender before he is psychologically ready.
- (3) Avoid using emotion-laden words like "surrender." Emphasis should be on the voicing of specific action instructions.

c. Friendly Advance. In a situation in which the target is disorganized, the loudspeaker is capable of providing retreating soldiers with a source of direction. In this situation, the script should—

- (1) Be more powerful and authoritative than in any other situation.
- (2) Come immediately to the point that further resistance is hopeless. Instructions should be given to the soldier on how to surrender or quit the fight.

d. Consolidation. Loudspeaker teams move quickly into a liberated or occupied city and pass along news and instructions to the civilian popula-

tion. Scripts in this situation should be slower-paced and more carefully developed than in any other loudspeaker situation. The script should present as many details as possible since the time element is comparatively unimportant.

232. Contingency Scripts

The loudspeaker team announcer possesses a stock of scripts prepared for use in a variety of situations. Such scripts may serve as bases for personalized appeals to exploit targets of opportunity. Contingency scripts are especially valuable to indigenous announcers or to the team announcers who have difficulty phrasing the appeals.

Section II. EMPLOYMENT OF LOUDSPEAKERS

233. Vehicular Mounted Loudspeakers

a. Operation From Vehicular Mount. For psychological warfare operations, a vehicular mounted loudspeaker is one that is mounted on a wheeled vehicle. Various types of vehicular mountings have certain advantages as well as disadvantages.

(1) *1½-ton personnel carrier.* The primary advantage of this vehicle is the abundance of room available for the loading of equipment. However, the vehicle has low acceleration and is not very maneuverable, particularly in rough terrain.

(2) *¾-ton panel truck.* This vehicle offers protection against weather and can transport recording equipment along with the loudspeaker. On the other hand, the vehicle's

inclosed body makes it difficult for personnel to withdraw from the vehicle and take cover quickly in the event of air attack. It offers a target due to its high silhouette.

- (3) *1/4-ton truck and trailer.* It has a low silhouette and is easily camouflaged. But when operating in mud, the truck and trailer combination has poor traction. In addition, it has poor maneuverability, especially when backing.
- (4) *3/4-ton weapons carrier.* The vehicle offers good protection against weather. It has good maneuverability and provides enough room for the unit's personnel and equipment. A high silhouette is the most serious disadvantage. This may be partially overcome by removing the crossbows and tarpaulin over the cargo bed, and carrying a folded tarpaulin as an emergency throw-over cover in bad weather.
- (5) *Half-track.* It has good traction and maneuverability, and affords good protection against weather. Under combat conditions, however, the vehicle is prone to attract fire.

b. Terrain and Weather Factors. Terrain and weather factors bearing upon the success of a mission and the security of personnel and equipment must be considered. These considerations involve—

- (1) Placing the speaker in a position to gain the maximum range and coverage. The most desirable positions are the forward slope of a hill near the crest, topmost floors

of houses, or any other location that combines height and safety.

- (2) Placing the vehicle and crew in a defiladed area during the actual broadcast.
- (3) Avoiding, where possible, broadcasts on flat terrain where protective cover is lacking.
- (4) Taking cognizance of the manner in which inclement weather conditions affect the audibility and range of a loudspeaker broadcast.

c. Deployment. Proper deployment, including use of cover, must be standard practice. When the speaker is being used in close support of ground troops, it is essential to have a reel containing extra cable to be used as an extension to the speaker.

d. Announcer. The duties of the announcer are—

- (1) To acquaint himself with all available intelligence data on the nature of the target audience.
- (2) After receiving available intelligence, to direct the driver to the site of the broadcast.
- (3) To prepare the script for the loudspeaker broadcast.
- (4) To broadcast to the target audience.
- (5) To assist the PA system mechanic in dismantling and removing the equipment.

e. PA System Mechanic. The duties of the PA system mechanic are—

- (1) To work under the direction of the announcer.
- (2) To maintain and operate loudspeaker equipment.

- (3) To drive and maintain the vehicle in which the loudspeaker is mounted.

f. Security of Personnel and Equipment. Upon arrival in an unfamiliar area for a broadcast, team personnel collect all possible information as to location of mined areas and other potential danger areas. If possible, an escort should be obtained.

234. Tank Mounted Loudspeakers

a. Mission and Capabilities. The basic mission of the tank mounted loudspeaker in armored spearheads is to exploit situations as rapidly as they develop. The tank loudspeaker has unique shock value. It is most properly used when it exploits the speed, violence, and surprise inherent in the well-executed armored attack.

b. Moving Situation.

- (1) *Besieged towns.* In an assault on a besieged town, the "talking tank" may be extremely effective. A column of tanks leading a break-through deploys before the town and withholds fire. The tank mounted loudspeaker then broadcasts the appropriate message or instructions. If air and artillery coordination can be effected, leaflets may be disseminated over the town. Then the loudspeaker calls for the inhabitants to capitulate by broadcasting instructions on the use of white flags, the surrender of weapons, and similar matters.
- (2) *Pockets of resistance.* Tank mounted loudspeakers are effective in cleaning up road

blocks and stubborn pockets. For example, an infantry unit may encounter heavy fire. A request is made for a "talking tank" because other loudspeaker mobile mountings are not sufficiently armored for this type of broadcast. While the infantry withholds its fire, the tank moves around the flanks and broadcasts a summary of the tactical situation which emphasizes the futility of holding the isolated enemy position.

c. Static Situation. Except in unusual circumstances, use of a tank mounted loudspeaker in static situations is an unnecessary risk of valuable equipment.

d. Deployment. Deployment of the tank mounted loudspeaker varies with the nature of the individual situation. However, the following basic considerations are always applicable:

- (1) *Utilize mobility.* The main purpose of mounting a loudspeaker on a tank is to gain mobility. Any deployment that does not utilize this mobility factor is improper.
- (2) *Column position.* Usually, the "talking tank" takes up a No. 2 or No. 3 position in a moving tank column. It is important that it be near the head of the column.

c. Placement of Equipment and Personnel. The loudspeaker system may be mounted on both light and medium tanks.

- (1) *Light tank.* In the light tank, the loudspeaker is mounted on the gun rack outside the tank and the generator behind the turret. Both are protected by armor plate welded

to the tank. The amplifiers are mounted on both sides of the gun inside the tank. The announcer replaces the bow gunner and usually occupies the bow gunner's position.

- (2) *Medium tank.* On medium tanks, the loudspeaker is welded or otherwise mounted on the front of the turret and the generator on its rear. Both are protected by armor plate. The amplifiers are mounted inside. The announcer sits in the position of the bow gunner while the PA system mechanic operates the tank radio and the loudspeaker system in the gunner's position. He reloads the guns if necessary.

f. Security Factors.

- (1) *Training.* Since loudspeaker tanks accompany other tanks in the column and operate as part of a team, tank loudspeaker personnel must be as well trained in tank tactics as other personnel in the column.
- (2) *Discipline.* Loudspeaker personnel must obey implicitly all orders of the tank commander.

235. Airborne Loudspeakers

a. Equipment. Airborne loudspeaker equipment may be mounted in Army, light bomber, and cargo aircraft and is capable of broadcasting audible messages from an altitude of 5,000 feet for as long as 30 seconds under normal operating conditions.

b. Operations. Airborne loudspeaker operations are of three general types:

- (1) *Combat.* In a combat situation, the loud-

speaker plane is requested for a broadcast over an area in which the target is a potent fighting force. The broadcast may be part of a coordinated ground and air assault. The sole purpose of the loudspeaker plane's participation is to support the overall operation. Broadcasts may be directive appeals or antimorale messages.

- (2) *Semi-combat.* In this situation, the loudspeaker plane broadcasts over an area where the target is a hopelessly defeated group. Surrender appeals and instructions constitute the major portion of loudspeaker activity.
- (3) *Consolidation.* In this situation, the airborne loudspeaker is merely another vehicle for conveying to civilian populations in liberated or occupied areas any information or directives that will facilitate their cooperation with United States aims.

c. Capabilities.

- (1) Airborne loudspeakers are capable of broadcasting on short notice to sectors ranging several hundred miles from the base of operations.
- (2) The airborne loudspeaker is a self-contained unit and is capable of delivering a broadcast without any laborious technical preliminaries.
- (3) Airborne loudspeakers can cover a wider target area with a single broadcast than ground loudspeakers. Elevated terrain barriers are not a handicap to airborne loudspeakers.

- (4) The employment of the airborne loudspeaker has a strong psychological impact. Words cascading from the sky may be especially effective when employed against primitive and backward peoples.

d. Limitations.

- (1) Loudspeaker planes are inviting targets. Loudspeaker planes must descend to an altitude of 5,000 feet or less to obtain worthwhile ground audibility. At this altitude, the plane is highly vulnerable to ground fire and is still inaudible over cities and active battle areas. It is estimated that every additional increment of 1,000 feet written into altitude requirements doubles the weight of the loudspeaker equipment. Thus, if the power output is stepped up to maintain audibility from a higher altitude, the weight of the amplifying equipment increases. As the weight of the equipment is increased, the size of the carrying plane must be similarly greater. Larger planes provide larger targets.
- (2) The loudspeaker broadcast is subjected to the air turbulence caused by the revolutions of the propellers. Such interference greatly reduces ground audibility of the message. Banking of the plane changes the sound focus of the loudspeakers. Thus, the loudspeaker plane must travel in a straight line which limits audibility to a small target area unless the message is extremely short.
- (3) Atmospheric conditions often adversely af-

- fect the audibility of airborne loudspeakers.
- (4) The length of the loudspeaker appeal must be sharply limited because of the speed at which aircraft must fly.

236. Miscellaneous Operations

a. Mop-Up Operations. In the final stages of a combat operation, employment of loudspeakers can save both time and lives. The basic objective of psychological warfare mop-up operations is to induce the soldier to leave his position and surrender. The likelihood of capture or surrender already is in the soldier's mind. The problem for the loudspeaker team is to stimulate this attitude to an extent that the desired action follows.

b. Consolidation Operations. Loudspeakers are employed primarily in the early stages of consolidation psychological warfare operations to inform and direct the civilian population. This is especially true where war damage has rendered newspaper plants and radio stations inoperative. With its own source of power, the loudspeaker unit often provides the only direct method of appealing to the civilians of occupied or liberated areas (ch. 22).

c. Ultimatums. In general, the ultimatum as such is a device of limited utility. Even when the enemy is surrounded and in an obviously hopeless position, the ultimatum often serves only to strengthen his will to resist. The ultimatum should be employed in psychological warfare operations only in clearly defined situations, such as the following:

- (1) *Combat in towns.* Rather than risk destruction of their communities for a hopeless

cause, officials may obtain the cooperation of military units in the area and turn the town over to allied troops without a struggle.

(2) *Isolated pockets.* The ultimatum may be used against isolated pockets, but only if intelligence shows conclusively that the target is psychologically ready for such an approach.

(3) *Deception.* The ultimatum may be used for purposes other than obtaining surrender. It may be employed deceptively to induce premature commitment of reinforcements to battle.

237. Technical Maintenance

The aim of preoperation maintenance is to shorten by as much as possible the time spent in inspecting loudspeaker equipment in the broadcasting area. Failure to inspect and test equipment in rear areas will result in technical breakdowns in the field, thus causing failure of the mission. It is the task of the PA system mechanic to see that all parts are ready to function properly.

a. Loudspeaker equipment of all kinds must be given periodic maintenance inspections.

b. A sufficient supply of such spare parts as switches, plugs, tubes, fuzes, and condensers must be maintained.

c. Before an operation, all cables, microphones, speakers, plugs, amplifiers, and generators must be inspected and tested to make certain they are in working order.

PART FIVE

CONSOLIDATION PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

CHAPTER 19

INTRODUCTION TO CONSOLIDATION PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

238. Purpose

Part five is a guide for the conduct of consolidation psychological warfare activities. It serves to familiarize all military personnel with the nature and capabilities of consolidation psychological warfare and its relationship to other military activities. It covers the nature, objectives, organization, capabilities, and limitations of consolidated psychological warfare and outlines the principles relative to its conduct in the field in support of civil affairs/military government (CA/MG) operations. See FM 101-5.

239. Definitions

a. Consolidation Psychological Warfare. Consolidation psychological warfare is directed toward populations in friendly rear areas or in territory occupied by friendly military forces. Its overall objectives are to support military operations as well as to promote maximum cooperation among the civil population.

b. Civil Affairs/Military Government. Civil affairs/military government encompasses all powers exercised and responsibilities assumed by the military commander in an occupied or liberated area with respect to the lands, properties, and inhabitants thereof, whether such administration be in enemy, allied, or domestic territory. Military government is defined as the supreme authority exercised by an occupying armed force. Civil affairs is defined as the assumption by the responsible commander of an armed occupying force of a degree of authority less than the supreme authority assumed under military government. See FM 27-5.

240. Objectives

a. Consolidation psychological warfare has two over-all objectives:

- (1) Support of military operations.* The immediate objective of consolidation psychological warfare is to support combat forces in the accomplishment of their military missions. The area through which an army fights usually is left in a state of chaos. Unless this area is reorganized and controlled, it may threaten the success of subsequent military operations. Consolidation psychological warfare, through its ability to organize and control by persuasion and psychological direction, can assist the CA/MG activities of the command and thus render valuable aid to the combat forces. See FM 27-5.

(2) *Education of civilian populations.* Acceptance of United States national objectives by liberated or occupied peoples may be hampered because of their ignorance of the objectives. Consolidation psychological warfare has a major role to play in getting the peoples to accept the United States national objectives as ultimately desirable and good and as being in consonance with their own objectives.

b. The overall objectives of consolidation psychological warfare, while generally pertinent to all areas and all times, do not require identical processes, methods, or means. Objectives may vary directly with the character of the area in which employed and the particular stage of consolidation operations.

(1) *Liberated areas.* Liberated peoples who hold beliefs similar to those of their liberators may be more cooperative and require less orientation toward basic war aims than people in occupied territories. Emphasis is therefore placed on those objectives which seek to utilize their talents and labors immediately, rather than on those which seek to discipline and educate them. This does not mean that control is unnecessary. On the contrary, liberated peoples sometimes permit their enthusiasm to obscure their understanding of the need for discipline. They sometimes feel that liberation automatically ends all restrictions on their behavior and thus they may require a high degree of control. It does mean, however,

that control objectives in liberated areas are not emphasized as heavily as those designed to secure active cooperation and immediate participation in the war effort or in the post-combat missions of the military forces.

- (2) *Occupied areas.* In occupied areas, the civil populations are understandably hostile to the wishes of their conquerors. Thus, emphasis on objectives leading toward their control and discipline later tending toward their acceptance of the occupier's war aims takes precedence over all others.

c. In any area, whether liberated or occupied, an attempt is made to draw upon its human, economic, and social resources to further the combat mission and, through reeducation, to build a fund of good will for post-war diplomacy to draw on. The task of developing an understanding of purpose and objectives will be greater or less according to the attitude and cultural development of the people.

241. Aids to the Attainment of Objectives

a. *Intimidation.* Under normal circumstances a civilian may be stubborn, proud, and unreceptive to the authority of military commanders. However, intimidation stemming from the presence of strong military forces in the area may temper his hostility and make him more responsive to consolidation operations.

b. *Feelings of Inferiority.* People who, by reason of standard of living, color, race, religion, or educational level, have humbled themselves for a long pe-

riod of time often exhibit little resistance to propaganda and are much easier to lead or direct. The presence of such groups in a liberated or occupied area may facilitate the attainment of desired objectives.

c. Battle Shock. In an area recently subjected to total war, surviving civilians frequently are in a state of shock, weary and apathetic of the consequences of their obedience to direction. This often renders them incapable of any premeditated resistance to authority and facilitates their control by psychological warfare operations.

d. Dependence on Occupying Power. The civilian in a newly liberated or occupied area soon learns that some cooperation with the occupying power is unavoidable if he is to survive. Supply and distribution of goods, conditions of employment, power and heat, news and information—all these come from the occupier and may be withheld by the occupying powers for failure to comply with directives. Thus, the self-interest of the audience may aid the propagandist in his task.

e. Knowledge of the Military Situation. Knowledge of the military situation when it is favorable to the occupier tends to make people cooperate more readily with the occupation forces.

f. Credibility. An important factor in the success of consolidation operations is the civilians' confidence in the source and the factual basis of the propaganda itself. This credibility should have been established in the strategic and tactical operations which preceded the consolidation of the area. If propaganda is credible and the civilian is convinced that truth is

its basis, the task of the propagandist may be lightened immeasurably and the attainment of his objectives facilitated.

g. Control of Familiar Media. Civilians are accustomed to receiving news and information through certain well-known and established media. They are inclined to believe and follow more readily dictates which come to them through these sources than from elsewhere. The consolidation propagandist, by utilizing these familiar and trusted media, capitalizes on an existing habit and materially increases the likelihood of attaining his objectives.

242. Obstacles to Attainment of Objectives

a. Resentment Against Occupying Forces. Occupied peoples have a natural antipathy toward the forces which have occupied them. Their innate patriotism may cause them to resist the occupation forces and stimulate them to make the occupation as difficult as possible. At times they may lead to positive acts of disruptive behavior and even to open rebellion. This natural resentment is an obstacle and a challenge to consolidation psychological warfare operations.

b. Ideological Differences. Whether he comes as a conqueror or liberator, the consolidation propagandist may find himself dealing with adherents to ideologies hostile to his own. In conquered territory such a difference may lead to the creation of resistance groups. In liberated territories, dissident elements may attempt to sabotage the occupation for selfish and opportunistic purposes. In any case,

followers of a hostile ideology will make the task of the consolidation propagandist more difficult.

c. Military Misconduct. Not all the obstacles to the attainment of consolidation psychological warfare objectives originate among the indigenous populations. Occupation forces may lack a sense of responsibility and engage in acts of misconduct that discourage cooperative spirit.

d. Devastation and Disrupted Communications. Consolidation psychological warfare operations are dependent upon communications. When these are destroyed or impaired, the task of informing and controlling civilian populations is made more difficult.

e. Disease and Injury. The devastation attendant upon combat with its destruction of sanitary facilities may lead to the outbreak of disease and sickness. When this happens, personnel who might normally aid in rehabilitation are unable to work, and successful consolidation of the area is delayed.

f. Enemy Propaganda. Although evicted from the area, the enemy can be expected to continue his propaganda efforts among the remaining people by radio, leaflets, and rumor-mongering. Some persons will be affected by this propaganda and any success so gained will militate against the achievement of consolidation objectives.

243. Planning

a. General. The basic principles for the planning of military operations as outlined in FM 100-5 and FM 101-5 apply to consolidation psychological warfare operations.

b. Information. The information required for proper planning of consolidation psychological warfare operations is generally the same as for other psychological warfare planning, namely, the mission, intelligence of the area, friendly situation, and effectiveness of prior psychological warfare efforts.

- (1) *Mission.* Knowledge of the elements of the mission is required since the planner must achieve specific objectives. These objectives usually include informing the populations of military control requirements, publication of civil affairs/military government directives, and education of the people toward attitudes that will insure maintenance of post-war aims during the peace to follow.
- (2) *Intelligence of the area.* From current intelligence consolidation psychological warfare planners specifically need to know: factors determining the general attitudes and morale of people in the area; extent of destruction to information media and the requirements for the rehabilitation or replacement; and availability of qualified technical and professional personnel who may be employed in rehabilitation and information activities.
- (3) *Friendly situation.* The information needed is the same as is required for normal operational planning.
- (4) *Evaluation.* Consolidation psychological warfare planners must evaluate the effectiveness of past operations and CA/MG

activities in producing desired results. Such evaluation is a continuing requirement.

c. Principles of Consolidation Planning.

- (1) *Continuity.* Psychological warfare in liberated and occupied areas is carried out as a single, continuous, and evolving operation from the time the area is uncovered to the time when the military occupation ceases.
- (2) *Consistency.* Consolidation planning must be consistent with post-war aims. The psychological warfare planner must avoid making commitments for short-term gains that are impossible to fulfill without disruption of long-range policies. Broken promises not only may delay the attainment of short-range objectives, but also may compromise foreign policy for years to come.
- (3) *Inter-relation to the U. S. national program.* Consolidation psychological warfare operations must be correlated with the United States national information program and must follow directives governing that program. After consolidation operations, the post-war relationship between the United States and the area in question is developed by diplomacy and governmental information activities drawing on good will created by orientation and reeducation activities.
- (4) *Inter-relation to strategic and tactical operations.* Consolidation psychological warfare operations are intimately related to

strategic operations. The relationship is one of reinforcement. The dissemination of identical themes and the exploitation of identical tasks results in mutual support. Consolidation operations differ only in that the audience is restricted to a target area held by friendly forces.

- (5) *Inter-relation to friendly underground.* Every effort should be made to obtain the cooperation of governments-in-exile and friendly guerilla and resistance organizations in order to achieve coordination of psychological warfare programs toward common objectives.

244. Psychological Warfare Units

The responsibility of the CA/MG organization for the civil administration of newly occupied or liberated areas makes the vigorous and whole-hearted cooperation of the psychological warfare consolidation company vitally important. The CA/MG organization will control the deployment of the consolidation psychological warfare units which will furnish personnel and equipment to assist in the propaganda, education, and information activities of the CA/MG (ch. 7).

CHAPTER 20

CONSOLIDATION SITUATIONS

245. General

As many situations for consolidation psychological warfare exist as there are different countries, peoples, attitudes, and customs. Such a consolidation situation is a complex of varying circumstances, a framework wherein certain aims or objectives are implemented. The situation may be described from the viewpoint of condition of the area and people, prevalence of local custom, and objectives to be attained. The situation, a continuing one, is modified by the objectives that are desired as well as by the receptivity of the populace to occupation policies. It moves from post-combat emergency to long-term political orientation as rapidly as possible. Although World War II experience indicates there is no "one" or "ideal" situation, certain common conditions are present.

246. Condition of Area and People

a. General. Consolidation psychological warfare teams (ch. 7) move into an area as soon as the combat forces have driven out the enemy. In some areas, destruction will have been severe and the people will be destitute, without food, shelter, or essential services. These conditions present serious problems relating to control and restoration of order. Other areas

may have been overrun so quickly and against such light resistance that only slight physical damage is the result.

b. The Area. The initial condition of any area in which combat has just taken place is characterized by the degree of physical destruction which has occurred. The retreating enemy usually destroys ports, buildings, homes, public utilities, means of transport, and any other item of value to his opponents. The service forces behind an army assume responsibility for the repair or rehabilitation of those facilities in which they have primary interest. Communications media are rarely, if ever, found intact or operative.

In order to provide an interim means of disseminating his messages, the consolidation propagandist brings mobile printing presses, radio stations, and motion picture equipment into the area. Physical facilities of all types are in process of rehabilitation. Replacement of mobile and emergency information facilities by those that are permanent and indigenous is initiated as soon as practicable and to such extent as is compatible with the demands of other military services for such facilities. With the return of the community to normalcy, consolidation psychological warfare operations of a long-range nature are continued by psychological warfare units. Orientation and reeducation measures once begun are continued by indigenous civilians under the general supervision of occupying authorities.

c. The People

- (1) Aside from the extent of physical damage to the area, the mental state of occupied or liberated people is an important consideration.

ation. Such people are often characterized by their extreme mental confusion and inability to act in an orderly manner. Often their sources of information have broken down and they are totally ignorant of what is happening or what they are supposed to do. Rumors run rampant. Families are scattered. Technical and professional personnel lose their identity in the mass and their services are therefore unavailable. Civilians may wander aimlessly about the area, clogging the roads and hindering the movement of troops and supplies.

(2) One of the first consolidation psychological warfare tasks is to assist in dispelling this confusion by disseminating information and civil affairs/military government directives in order to help reorient the thinking of the civilian population so that movement can be more easily controlled, order restored, and military operations continued without hindrance.

(3) Later, dangerous or hostile elements in the population are brought under control. The confusion and near-shock characteristic of the early days are dissipated, and the population becomes mentally prepared to begin the task of rebuilding. Acceptable indigenous personnel are employed in the restoration and operation of requisitioned information facilities required for psychological warfare purposes. Initially, consolidation psychological warfare personnel

attached to CA/MG public information teams may fill policy positions and maintain direct supervisory control over indigenous workers in all media. Training and integration of indigenous personnel in actual operations are increased, the ultimate objective being complete operational control by indigenous personnel and return of requisitioned facilities to their owner.

247. Conditions of Psychological Importance

The initial consolidation psychological warfare effort is perhaps the most difficult of all from a psychological point of view because the attitudes of the populace are as yet relatively unknown. A thorough understanding of these attitudes shapes the course of consolidation psychological warfare operations and gives it effectiveness. Many of these attitudes stem directly from the condition of the area and the people, but there are other attitudes that have deeper psychological bases.

a. Attitudes Toward Occupying Forces. While it may be taken for granted that liberated populations normally have more friendly attitudes toward occupying forces while occupied peoples have more hostile ones, the propagandist must know the intensity of these attitudes in order to deal effectively with them.

b. Attitudes Toward Accepting Discipline or Control. People differ greatly in the way they react to discipline or attempts to control their behavior. Those accustomed to totalitarian methods may respond favorably to dogmatic authority, but these

familiar with democratic methods may require gentler handling.

c. Attitudes Shaped by Proximity of the Enemy. When the enemy's forces are relatively near the occupied or liberated area, the possibility that he may return haunts the population. Otherwise friendly individuals may withhold their full cooperation because of possible enemy retaliation, whereas intransigent individuals will be led to resist in the hope that they may be rewarded at a later date. Conversely, if the enemy has been driven far away and there is little likelihood of return, both friendly and hostile persons may tend to cooperate.

d. Attitudes Based on Enemy Propaganda. In both liberated and occupied areas, the enemy has had opportunity to advance his own ideology through intense propaganda effort. The consolidation propagandist must analyze and determine the residual strength of the enemy propaganda effort, because the effectiveness of his own propaganda will depend upon a correct analysis.

e. Attitudes Created by Organized Resistance Groups. When organized resistance groups exist in liberated or occupied areas, they exert a forceful influence on the population. Not only do they engage in active psychological warfare operations against the occupying forces, but the fact that they exist is an attitude forming element in itself. Failure to control them may suggest weakness on the part of the occupying force and may lead to the development of unfavorable attitudes among the population.

CHAPTER 21

CONSOLIDATION METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

Section I. SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

248. General

In attaining the overall objectives of consolidation psychological warfare discussed in paragraph 240, many secondary objectives contribute to the realization of the two primary objectives. In addition to expediency, the situation, international law, and international agreements between the United States, allies, and liberated areas are important influences on objectives of the consolidation operation and on the methods and techniques used to attain the objectives. The consolidation methods and techniques discussed in this chapter by no means are exhaustive.

249. Support of Military Operations

Under this general objective are several secondary objectives, each of which contributes to the support of the combat forces in a specialized way. Initially, consolidation psychological warfare objectives are related strongly to combat situations. Support of military operations is paramount. Orientation and reeducation are given attention only when they further the basic support mission and only as they form the basis for later exploitation. Normally, consoli-

dation psychological warfare in liberated areas is persuasive and suggestive while in occupied areas it tends to be arbitrary and directive. However, the demands of combat and the requirement for absolute control may be so urgent and overriding that all people are treated alike.

a. Establishment of Order and Discipline. No army is secure as long as its rear area is disorganized. Consolidation psychological warfare agencies, by the judicious use of propaganda, assist CA/MG efforts to calm the fears of the people, prevent their aimless movement about the area, and direct their activities into useful and orderly channels. This not only permits military operations to be unhindered, but also eliminates the need for diverting large numbers of combat troops for control purposes.

b. Security of Lines of Communication. An army's fighting effectiveness depends upon the uninterrupted flow of supplies and material. Refugees fleeing from the combat zone frequently clog highways and routes of supply. Consolidation psychological warfare agencies by assisting in the dissemination of CA/MG instructions contribute in preventing refugee massing at critical points, and in directing their movement from supply routes.

c. Support of Antiguerrilla Action. Psychological warfare operations can be of assistance in controlling guerrilla groups. To operate, any guerrilla force requires the support of the population. By discrediting a guerrilla force or leader with the populace, the propagandist may reduce support to guerrilla activities.

d. Marshalling Labor. Modern armies require civilian laborers in addition to organic service troops to help unload supply ships and vehicles, create and maintain equipment centers, repair docks and roads, and other similar tasks. Consolidation psychological warfare agencies publicize these labor requirements to the civilian population and direct potential workers to appropriate labor offices.

e. Collection of Information. Psychological warfare personnel are frequently able to obtain data of intelligence value. Through close contact with the enemy and friendly civilians, they often are informed of such information as location of enemy dumps, headquarters, and gun emplacements. It is an important function of the psychological warfare agencies to report information of this type to G2 without delay.

f. Control of Rumors. Inhabitants of a combat zone are extremely vulnerable to rumors, some of which may stimulate them to action that interferes with combat operations. It is a continuing objective of consolidation psychological warfare agencies to counter dangerous rumors by the dissemination of accurate information.

g. Prevention of Disease and Epidemics. Consolidation psychological warfare units are extremely valuable in disease and epidemic control and prevention by publicizing CA/MG public health activities, the presence of contaminated areas, and other emergency precautionary measures required to be taken.

Section II. ORIENTATION AND RE-EDUCATION

250. General

Orientation and reeducation of the people begin as soon as practicable and run concurrently with those actions designed to support the combat forces.

a. The mission of consolidation operations in liberated areas is to create good will for the United States. Much can be accomplished by tactful cooperation with officials of the liberated area, and by explaining the United States and its aims to the liberated population. On the other hand, blundering or patronizing measures will cause those unfavorable qualities to be associated with the United States long after the consolidation operation has ended.

b. The mission of consolidation operations in occupied areas is to implement the orientation and reeducation of the civilian population. This process of eradicating unacceptable doctrines and of eliminating the influence of persons or groups identified with such doctrines will continue throughout the occupation. The groundwork for orientation of the population to United States post-war aims is laid at this time.

c. Education and reorientation include many secondary objectives, not all of which involve the actual dissemination of propaganda.

- (1) *Reconnaissance.* One objective is to locate all information media and accessory equipment and to identify and keep on file the names of all technical and professional communications persons in the area. While these may not be put to immediate use or

employment, they are screened for later requisition when needed.

- (2) *News dissemination.* A major objective is to keep people informed. Thus, the dissemination of news has prominence from the very beginning of operations. Prior to the orientation or reeducation of occupied or liberated peoples along more complex political lines, steps must be taken to demonstrate democracy in action to them. The experience of being served by an objective press is a natural initiation to any political indoctrination that follows.
- (3) *Rumor control.* The orientation and reeducation of civilians cannot proceed as long as their minds are at the mercy of wild and conflicting rumors. Control of rumors assumes importance in consolidation operations as a prerequisite to the establishment of sound education programs later.
- (4) *Collection of information.* Just as certain information obtained from civilians by psychological warfare personnel is valuable to the military intelligence officer, so also is much of it necessary in evaluating the temper of the people. This information may largely determine the nature and content of educational propaganda employed later. Its collection begins immediately.

251. Restoration of Media

Repair and reconstruction of local information facilities begin as soon as possible. Manpower for

restoration of media normally will be civilian. Thus, restoration serves a dual function—not only are media restored to use, but the jobs thus created aid in returning the area to a stable economy and society.

252. Utilization of Civilian Personnel

a. General. Like the restoration of media, utilization of civilian personnel in the operation of information facilities is one of the objectives in the orientation and reeducation of the populace. People learn by doing. Proper integration of civilian personnel is an essential step in the transfer of information media to civilian control. Utilization of civilian personnel is required for reasons of personnel economy. In addition, local personnel often are needed to overcome the language barrier and to provide a closer understanding of the local situation.

b. Basis for Transfer of Control. Civilians in occupied territories are hired for non-policy making jobs and work under the direct supervision of consolidation psychological warfare agencies such as CA/MG public information teams and attached psychological warfare teams. With the transfer of control, these civilians will operate more independently. They will receive only policy guidance from consolidation psychological warfare agencies.

253. Integration and Training of Civilian Personnel

a. General. Local personnel with professional or technical skills needed in operation of information facilities are screened carefully for integration into the consolidation effort. This integration is one of the most vital and difficult steps in consolidation op-

erations. Extreme care must be exercised in the selection of civilian personnel as the success or failure of the consolidation program depends heavily upon the choice of suitable personnel. The requirements for such local help may be submitted in the form of a requisition to the local labor office which maintains records of the quantity and type of civilian skills available. The labor office in turn will allocate individuals as they become available. This action does not preclude the necessity for seeking out persons who by virtue of their skills or position would not register with the local labor office (par. 249d). Applicants for positions in consolidation activities are screened for technical competence by the using agency, and hiring is accomplished through the labor office.

b. Standards of Selection. Consolidation psychological warfare personnel must overcome any temptation to allow expedience to determine the acceptability of civilian personnel for positions in information media. Skill is a prerequisite, but acceptable ideological views are even more important. Since civilians are hired for manual labor on the one extreme to skilled technical, editorial, and advisory positions on the other, the criteria for screening vary accordingly. Persons considered dangerous to the consolidation mission will not be hired in any capacity. Past experience indicates that certain groups are more likely to meet the standards of acceptability:

- (1) Older editors, staff members, and technicians who are more likely to be friendly to the new regime than younger persons who

may have undergone more intense enemy indoctrination.

- (2) Qualified citizens who fled the old regime.
- (3) Qualified and acceptable prisoners of war.
- (4) Foreigners who are not objectionable to the population.

c. Clearance. All civilian personnel screened for employment in consolidation operations must be given clearance by the Counter Intelligence Corps.

d. Employment. When suitable civilians have been selected and cleared for employment, they are hired under existing policies set by the supreme commander as implemented by the CA/MG structure.

e. Training of Civilian Personnel. Consolidation psychological warfare units may find that personnel who pass the screening process lack sufficient professional competence or familiarity with United States objectives. Such personnel must be properly trained. This training may be accomplished on-the-job under supervision, supplemented by classroom instruction if necessary.

254. Consolidation Propaganda

a. Directives and Announcements. Although consolidation psychological warfare units continue to publicize civil affairs/military government directives and announcements, such directives and announcements begin to emphasize matters of long-range importance to the occupation. In liberated areas, these normally will be held to a minimum, but announcements by military commanders are still of intense interest to liberated civilians. In occupied areas, directives or instructions may be issued on such mat-

ters as curfew hours, blacklists, commerce restrictions, area restrictions, monetary rates of exchange, and similar subjects.

b. News. News plays a vital role. It normally will be divided into three classes:

- (1) Much local news originates with civil affairs/military government agencies in the form of directives, announcements, or instructions as discussed above.
- (2) The civilian has a great interest in progress of the war, because he has a great personal stake in its outcome.
- (3) Civilians normally become more interested in political, scientific, religious, and educational news from other parts of the world. Many also may turn with renewed interest to news dealing with music, literature, and art as a diversion from the hard realities of everyday existence.

c. Propaganda Selection. Propaganda may be embodied in both news and official directives and announcements.

- (1) In liberated areas, units emphasize news explaining United States aims and stressing the unity of the coalition facing the enemy. Efforts to build good will for the United States among the people and leaders of the liberated nation reach fruition as consolidation progresses. Ill-advised action to suppress unfavorable news can boomerang by creating resentment against the military forces and the Government of the United States. Consolidation agencies act prima-

rily in an advisory capacity and as a source of news and propaganda materials. Once again the presence of international agreements will shape the role of consolidation psychological warfare units in this situation.

- (2) In occupied areas, consolidation operations stress that the old order has been superseded, and that the people must cooperate with the occupying forces for their own good in order to make a better future materialize. Enemy rumors and propaganda also must be controlled. Consolidation psychological warfare operations should contribute to the overall mission of building good will for the United States. These operations must be skillful. The people are told of the progress of rehabilitation. Outstanding examples of initiative and cooperation with the occupation program are publicized. The enemy ideology must be eliminated not only by suppression, but by motivating the creation of a new and better system.

255. Transfer of Control

Transfer of control of information facilities to qualified indigenous personnel is a prime objective. Although essentially nonpropagandistic in nature, this action has important psychological implications.

a. Liberated Areas. The earliest possible return of requisitioned information facilities to civilian con-

trol is essential to support the political mission of building good will for the United States. Therefore, media are turned back to civilian owners or directors as soon as military security permits. Transfer of operational and policy control is generally simultaneous. However, consolidation agencies may maintain control over external news sources as well as over supplies and equipment of all kinds. If necessary, such news and material can be distributed in a manner most calculated to encourage cooperation.

b. Occupied Areas. Reeducation of an enemy population along ideological lines is a lengthy process. People accustomed to totalitarian rule do not learn the privileges and responsibilities of freedom quickly. Final success in the reeducation program is impossible until indigenous personnel progressively are given the opportunity to exercise responsibility. Transfer of control must be accomplished with caution. Operational control may be transferred to licensees and registrants. Then, as the licensees and registrants prove their reliability, policy control is transferred to them,

256. Control in Occupied Areas

Control over information facilities in occupied areas after transition to civilian operation is much more direct than in liberated areas. One form of control may be accomplished by a formal licensing and registration procedure:

a. Licensing. A license may be required of all persons exercising financial or executive control over creation of an information product (newspapers, books, motion pictures, radio programs, or maga-

zines). Licenses are issued by appropriate authorities under the policies of the theater command and are of two general types:

- (1) Conditional license requires that the licensee submit all material he produces to authorities for scrutiny *before* the material can be disseminated. After the licensee demonstrates his ideological reliability, the conditional license may be replaced by a standard one.
- (2) Standard license requires that the licensee submit all material he produces for scrutiny *after* dissemination.

b. Registration. Certain types of information activities not requiring licenses must be registered in order to operate. In general, these required to register are distributors, exhibitors, or sellers of information products created by licensees or consolidation psychological warfare units.

257. Supervision and Control of Licensees and Registrants

a. Objective. In occupied areas, consolidation psychological warfare agencies may be assigned to the task of supervising civilian licensees and registrants to insure achievement of objectives. Specifically, control and supervision measures are aimed at—

- (1) Uncovering operation of media by unlicensed or unregistered persons.
- (2) Checking and evaluating performance of licensees and registrants.
- (3) Uncovering "weak spots" in the people's at-

titudes, thus indicating need for intensified orientation on certain subjects.

b. Methods.

- (1) Consolidation psychological warfare units cooperate with the CA/MG public safety officers in uncovering instances of illegal information activities.
- (2) Licensed and registered information activity is scrutinized from time to time by personal inspection or, more commonly, by an editorial check of informational material either before or after dissemination.

c. Punishment for Violations. When violations of information control directives are uncovered, those responsible must be punished. Punishment in such cases can be of several types:

- (1) Warnings and reprimands may be sufficient in cases where the violations are minor and unintentional.
- (2) License or registration of civilians may be suspended when violations are uncovered. Such suspension is of a temporary nature, and may be employed where it is believed that the erring licensee or registrant is a justifiable future risk.
- (3) License or registration may be permanently revoked in cases where appropriate authorities do not believe the persons involved should be allowed to resume operation.
- (4) Revocation of license or registration may be accompanied by criminal prosecution if the offense warrants such action.

CHAPTER 22

MEDIA FOR CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

Section I. LOUDSPEAKERS

258. General

Loudspeakers are major instruments of mass communication in the early stages of consolidation operations. Loudspeakers employed usually differ from combat types in size, power, and methods of mounting. Since external noise levels are low and great range is not a requirement, they normally are of relatively low power, similar to the public address systems used for commercial advertising. Consolidation loudspeakers may be vehicular mounted, airborne, hand carried, or fixed.

259. Employment

a. The first consolidation operations are conducted by the tactical loudspeaker teams of the loudspeaker and leaflet company attached to the attacking unit. These teams are primarily concerned with the enemy military personnel and give their attention to civilians only to direct them away from military objectives or communication arteries. While this activity is related to certain aspects of consolidation operations, it is primarily concerned with tactical psychological warfare operations.

b. In the wake of the tactical loudspeaker teams, consolidation units such as division CA/MG teams and consolidation company teams enter an area. Teams, either vehicular mounted or airborne, cover the area and address messages to groups of people wherever found. Other vehicular teams may locate themselves in an open area, such as a public square, and assemble a crowd in order to issue information.

c. As the operation develops, definite operating sites are selected and precise schedules for broadcasts arranged. In addition, loudspeaker teams cover the area on scheduled routes. Normally, civilians soon learn about these broadcasts and assemble without additional direction or urging.

d. In addition to broadcasting routine programs, teams must always be alert and available for emergencies. These include operations to quell riots, break up dangerous mass meetings, clear highways, and evacuate hazardous areas. Because of their greater mobility, airborne loudspeakers are particularly suited for emergency missions.

e. Consolidation loudspeakers have numerous advantages:

(1) Vehicular mounted or airborne loudspeakers can move rapidly and deliver their messages when and where required. Mobility also reduces requirements for equipment and effects an economy in the number of loudspeakers required to cover an area.

(2) Loudspeaker units are self-contained systems and can operate anywhere in an area regardless of the amount of damage done to normal communications facilities.

- (3) Because the announcer's voice over the loudspeaker system has superhuman volume, loudspeakers possess a dramatic and mystic quality that commands attention. They also have a shock power that is extremely effective for impressing ideas in the minds of confused audiences.
- (4) Loudspeaker broadcasts penetrate into buildings and cellars where individuals may be hiding, thus enforcing reception of the message.
- (5) Unlike printed material that requires an effort on the part of the audience to comprehend, loudspeakers reach their audience without demanding effort from the audience.
- (6) Loudspeaker messages capitalize on the power of the human voice. They can lend emphasis and emotional appeal to messages at will. In addition, they are capable of communicating with illiterates who otherwise would not be able to comprehend the message.

f. Consolidation loudspeakers have certain disadvantages that may limit their use:

- (1) Even under ideal conditions loudspeakers have a limited range. This limitation is accentuated in a city where sound waves are impeded by buildings. Relatively few people can be reached at one time and it requires movement to cover an area.
- (2) Loudspeaker broadcasts are fleeting in nature. Important portions of an address may be lost because of distractions. Broad-

casts, unlike printed messages, cannot be reread to clarify a point or studied in detail. The initial impact must carry the full burden of the message.

- (3) Like all oral messages, loudspeaker broadcasts may be misunderstood or misinterpreted.
- (4) Loudspeakers are subject to many technical limitations. Equipment is delicate and may fail to function at a critical moment.

Section II. PRINTED MATERIALS

260. General

Printed propaganda rivals that disseminated by loudspeakers both in quantity and importance during the initial stages of consolidation operations. Because of technical problems of production and distribution, the use of printed materials usually lags behind loudspeaker operations. However, as the area becomes better organized, dissemination of printed materials increases as the need for loudspeaker operations decreases.

a. Production of printed propaganda poses many problems. These problems stem mainly from lack of publication facilities and organized methods of distribution. Three solutions, used singly or in combination, may solve the production problem:

- (1) *Preprinting*. Much printed material is prepared in zone of the interior or at secure rear area bases and is brought to a target area ready for distribution. This material usually consists of general interest propaganda

such as posters depicting war aims and general admonitions for cooperation. It is valuable as supplementary material but lacks the authority and pertinence of locally produced materials.

- (2) *Local facilities.* When local printing plants are undamaged, they are put to use as soon as possible and become the major producers of printed propaganda. However, such facilities are usually either damaged or inoperative because of lack of electric power. The consolidation propagandist should rarely plan production from these facilities in the early part of a consolidation period.
- (3) *Psychological warfare printing units.* Psychological warfare loudspeaker and leaflet companies are provided with complete printing units mounted in vans. This equipment may be available for production of printed materials. Presses are of the offset type and are limited as to quantity and type of produced material, but they are capable of meeting nearly all emergency requirements. The reproduction company of the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion also will support consolidation operations with more versatile, higher quality printing than is available in the loudspeaker and leaflet company (ch. 6 and 9).

b. Printed propaganda enjoys all the advantages of the printed word over the spoken word. Specifically, these advantages include—

- (1) Printed propaganda is relatively perma-

ment. It may be studied in detail and kept for future reference.

- (2) Lengthy material may be presented in print more effectively than in broadcasts.
- (3) Printed narrative may be supported by illustrations such as photographs and cartoons.
- (4) Printed material may be passed from person to person without distortion, thereby increasing the size of the audience.

c. Printed propaganda has the following disadvantages:

- (1) Printed material requires elaborate equipment and critical technicians that are not always available initially.
- (2) Once produced, printed material must be placed in the hands of a reader before it is effective. This requires provision for distribution facilities, sometimes difficult to arrange in newly occupied territory.
- (3) Because production and distribution are time consuming, a time lag develops before news of an event or a theme can be presented to an audience. In certain situations, this can limit its effectiveness.
- (4) Printed material is less effective when disseminated in areas of low literacy.

261. Leaflets and Handbills

These printed forms are small, single sheet items resembling tactical and strategic leaflets in format. They are extremely flexible both as to content and methods of distribution.

a. Content. News summaries, CA/MG directives, control regulations, and warnings are printed on leaflets and handbills.

b. Distribution. Prior to military entry into an area, leaflets are disseminated by air drop. This method is also employed to reach isolated regions or in emergencies when other means are not available. Handbills, which usually replace leaflets once an area is occupied, are distributed by hand. They are left in bundles at strategic gathering places such as churches, market places, and factory entrances. They are attached to walls and billboards where they serve as miniature posters. Frequently, they are carried by loudspeaker teams and handed to assembled audiences at the close of broadcasts.

262. Posters

a. General. Wall posters vary from typewriter page size to bed sheet size. Often the enemy has made prolific use of posters and his efforts may be found posted in prominent locations throughout the area. These posters are torn down as quickly as possible and replaced by those of the occupying power. Because of their size and complexity, wall posters usually are produced in rear areas and brought to the target area with consolidation psychological warfare units for posting.

b. Content. Posters usually carry announcements, warnings, or instructions of a control nature, or general propaganda designed to lift the morale of liberated people or impress occupied populations with the strength and policies of the CA/MG authorities.

c. Distribution. Immediately upon entry into an area, consolidation psychological warfare teams set out to affix wall posters at all prominent locations, tearing down enemy posters in the process. The teams also carry supplies of posters to leave with authorities in towns and outlying villages with directions for posting.

d. Advantages of Posters.

- (1) Posters with their color and sometimes spectacular illustrations have a unique ability to gain and hold attention.
- (2) Posters are simple to put up and their handling does not require large numbers of personnel.
- (3) Posters appear in areas where people congregate and are viewed by more than a single person at once. This tends to stimulate discussion which may further insure an understanding of their purpose.
- (4) Posters present ideas pictorially and thus are capable of affecting illiterates.

e. Disadvantages of Posters.

- (1) Due to problems of production, posters cannot be prepared locally and therefore must be general in content.
- (2) Posters may be destroyed in inclement weather.
- (3) Posters are favorite targets for subversive elements. They may be removed or defaced in an effort to ridicule the occupying power.

263. Newspapers

a. General. When their publication and distribution are possible, newspapers play a major role in consolidation operations. Both in liberated and occupied areas, news is always at a premium and early newspapers satisfy this need more completely than any other medium. In size and format, newspapers vary according to the type of presses and paper stocks available. When press facilities are not available, however, the production of newspapers is not possible and newssheets take their place. These are single sheet, two-page publications varying in dimension from leaflet to tabloid size. Their makeup and content should resemble standard indigenous newspapers.

b. Production. When local facilities are not available, newspapers and newssheets may be produced by psychological warfare printing units. Production may be limited because of lack of press capacity and because they must compete with priority tactical and strategic printed materials. Newspapers and newssheets also may be printed in rear areas. In occupied areas, newspapers are published by psychological warfare agencies attached to the CA/MG headquarters in the area. The period of direct operation normally is longer in occupied enemy areas since the beginnings of responsible journalism are likely to be slow in nations accustomed to a controlled press. Later, operation of newspapers is transferred to screened and licensed civilians.

c. Content. In addition to disseminating local and worldwide news with emphasis on the progress of the war and consolidation activities, newspapers are

important outlets for CA/MG directives, announcements, and instructions. Later, military and occupation news is deemphasized in favor of news and features of a political, diplomatic, religious, and cultural nature. Direct control over the licensed press is maintained until the transfer of policy control later in the occupation. Censorship over licensed newspapers is exercised by scrutiny of editorial content either before or after publication.

d. Major News Sources.

- (1) *Press agencies.* Early in the consolidation period, the news is disseminated by psychological warfare units on the basis of dispatches from commercial news agencies and monitoring activities. This operation should set the precedent for objective handling of news by domestic press agencies after the transition to civilian control. Domestic news agencies are screened and their teletype equipment and land lines restored, when necessary, after which they may resume operations in accordance with CA/MG policy directives.
- (2) *Licensed indigenous news services.* Licensing of press associations or news services normally occurs after the licensing of newspapers. Licensed local news services may be organized along cooperative lines, so that they are dependent upon member newspapers for supply of regional and national news. Foreign news may be obtained from United States or allied press associations

until such time as foreign correspondents are permitted to go abroad.

- (3) *United States or allied news services.* Later in the consolidation period, United States or allied news services supply news in instances where they are allowed to contract directly with licensed newspapers. Higher levels of command decide whether such news services shall be allowed to compete directly with local news services, or whether they must simply sell their news files to the local news services. The former policy often is preferred because it allows editors to choose material from more sources.
- (4) *Other news sources.* In addition to press associations, other sources of nonlocal news include the monitoring of friendly or enemy radio broadcasts and reprints of news or feature items appearing in United States or allied publications.

264. Publications

a. General. As stability returns to a liberated or occupied area, books, periodicals, and pamphlets assume increasing importance. These materials generally are among the last to reappear in a consolidation operation because of production and distribution difficulties, but they are invaluable in accomplishing long range psychological warfare objectives.

b. Books. The consolidation propagandist makes maximum use of books in his orientation and reedu-

cation program. Books must be provided to fill the literary vacuum with works of an educational, religious, or cultural nature given priority over those of a purely popular or escapist character. The most enduring of all media, books are ideal for employment in later stages of consolidation operations. Volumes published during the consolidation period will exercise influence for many years thereafter. In liberated areas, activity of psychological warfare units normally is limited to distribution of books imported from the United States or friendly countries, and encouragement and assistance to private publishers in resuming their activities. In occupied areas, book publishing will be resumed under the direct supervision of consolidation agencies until procedures as indicated in chapter 21 permit a final transfer of control to licensed civilian publishers.

(1) *Production.* Since a paper shortage is likely to exist, authorities first license only those publishers concentrating on priority reeducation subjects. In this medium, pre-publication censorship is more practical than post-publication scrutiny. Consolidation psychological warfare agencies should take note of the book manuscripts offered for publication because they may give an indication of public feeling on the outcome of the war, conduct of the occupation, and similar subjects.

(2) *Distribution.* Books reach the reading public of occupied areas through registered distributors, booksellers, and information centers.

c. Periodicals. As in the case of books, psychological warfare units generally are not concerned with publication or distribution of periodicals in liberated countries except for furnishing a supply of periodicals imported from the United States or friendly nations. In occupied areas, production and distribution of periodicals are conducted by licensed civilians. Periodicals or magazines offer problems and opportunities similar to those of books. Acceptable periodicals are imported, and nonobjectionable local periodicals are released for distribution. In addition, however, consolidation psychological warfare agencies may begin publication of new periodicals under their direct control. These periodicals, which may be either specialized or general in content, have a dual function: they are an effective medium for orientation and reeducation of the populace and, as forerunners of periodicals to be licensed to civilians, they set a standard for such publications to follow.

d. Pamphlets. The pamphlet is an excellent medium in both liberated and occupied areas. Consolidation psychological warfare agencies produce and disseminate pamphlets of various types. Pamphlets may be used in liberated countries to publicize the aims of the United States and allied powers and to emphasize the friendship between the liberated nation and the United States. Pamphlets are also used in the reeducation process in occupied areas where they are most valuable in presenting a single theme or topic. They may contain reprints and translations of magazine articles or important speeches as well as essays by responsible civilians.

Section III. RADIO AND TELEVISION

265. Radio

a. General. Radio may not be a major propaganda medium in the early stages of consolidation operations because the enemy usually destroys local stations when he evacuates an area and because electrical power is seldom available for receivers. In the rare instances when both radio stations and electric power plants are intact, radio should be employed to the utmost. If the number of receivers is scarce or unavailable, sufficient radio sets may be distributed to guarantee a listening audience.

b. Employment. When local radio stations are not available and radio broadcasting operations are considered necessary, consolidation units may employ the mobile units of the radio broadcasting company (ch. 5). These units are requested from the radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion. Electric power plants and permanent radio facilities are repaired and returned to operation. This makes possible the release of mobile broadcasting units for employment in more critical areas. The physical expansion of radio facilities generally is accompanied by an increase in the number of broadcasting hours per day per station and in a refinement of program content. In liberated areas, psychological warfare agencies merely assist and advise the liberated government and operators of radio stations. In occupied areas, radio licensees and their employees determine program content to a large degree, but their actions are subject to review.

c. Advantages of Radio.

- (1) Radio capitalizes on the latest information available because of the speed with which material may be processed and disseminated.
- (2) Wherever a radio receiver is to be found, radio broadcasts can flood the region with its message.
- (3) Radio, being versatile, lends itself readily to drama, music, comedy, education, ideological discussions, and news.
- (4) An inherent advantage of radio is the ease of reception. A worker who returns to his home may not want to bother with reading, but he can listen to his radio while relaxing.
- (5) Radio does not require a literate audience.

d. Disadvantages of Radio.

- (1) Radio broadcasts are fleeting in nature. They may be misunderstood because the audience cannot reread the message or refer to it.
- (2) The enemy's tactical or strategic propagandists compete with the consolidation propagandist for the attention of the target audience.

e. Programming.

- (1) News reports and news commentaries account for a large portion of the broadcast day. News is selected for broadcast according to its value to consolidation operations. News should be analyzed as well as reported so that it will be more meaningful to the audience.

- (2) Broadcasts of CA/MG announcements and directives are of continued interest to the audience.
- (3) Consolidation radio operations are balanced by the use of music and entertainment. Music may be used as a form of propaganda in itself in the event certain musical compositions have acquired political or ideological significance.
- (4) In most parts of the world, religion is a vital force in the life of a community. Therefore, radio facilities are made available to appropriate church groups.
- (5) Special broadcasts, used increasingly as the occupation progresses, may include round-table discussions among civilian political leaders, occupation authorities or ordinary citizens, on-the-spot broadcasts of press conferences, political rallies, and sports events.
- (6) Educational programs of wide scope may be inaugurated.

f. Diffusion Exchanges. In some areas many residents subscribe to diffusion exchanges which transmit programs over a wire network. Diffusion exchanges are ideal for propaganda control because the audience can hear only those programs that the propagandist wants it to hear.

266. Television

In areas where television facilities exist, these facilities are restored to operating condition. Television has the same general characteristics of radio with two important exceptions: unless relay facilities

are available, television has an effective range of no more than 50 miles; however, it has the added advantage of realism paralleled only by motion pictures.

Section IV. OTHER MEDIA

267. Films

a. General. Films, when their employment is feasible, constitute one of the most effective media available to the consolidation propagandist. The extent to which films are utilized depends upon the familiarity of the population with the medium and the speed with which motion picture projection facilities are restored. Psychological warfare mobile sound and film set AS-4 provides rear screen projection equipment for daytime use as well as transportable 16-mm film projection systems. If restrictions on public gathering are in effect, psychological warfare agencies largely confine their activities to restoration of facilities until the bans are lifted.

b. Advantages of Films.

- (1) Motion pictures, along with television, are the most inherently credible of all propaganda media. For most people, seeing is believing.
- (2) Motion pictures are dramatic. Propaganda content is absorbed almost automatically when skillfully presented in a fast-moving and interesting film.
- (3) Attendance at motion picture theaters provides an outlet to the "crowd" instinct of

people, lessening the tendency for them to gather clandestinely.

- (4) Motion pictures reach illiterate as well as literate audiences.

c. Disadvantages of Films.

- (1) *Shortage of facilities.* A shortage of motion picture facilities, including films, may prevent effective utilization of the medium.
- (2) *Prohibitions.* Prohibitions on large gatherings may prevent effective utilization of motion pictures.

d. Film Sources. A film shortage may still exist due to seizure of objectionable films and halting of film production. This shortage may be overcome in three ways:

- (1) *Importation.* Suitable films may be imported from the United States or friendly countries. Imported films normally must have the dialogue dubbed into the indigenous language or must be provided with subtitles.
- (2) *Local films.* In occupied enemy areas, all enemy films are screened thoroughly to eliminate all traces of the enemy ideology. Films found acceptable are distributed for exhibition.
- (3) *Projection of telecasts.* Where television is available, telecasts may be projected in motion picture theaters to help overcome a film shortage.

268. Music, Art, and the Theater

The production or presentation of plays, operettas, operas, musical comedies, ballets, dance recitals, carnivals, and circuses, as well as the publication or distribution of all types of printed music or sound recordings, are resumed as rehabilitation and re-orientation continue. Other important cultural activities, such as the reopening of museums and art galleries, are encouraged. Art treasures, formerly safeguarded by CA/MG arts, monuments, and archives teams, are returned to public display.

269. Public Gatherings

Public gatherings or mass meetings, banned in occupied enemy areas, may be resumed as soon as the situation in the area and attitudes of the population permit. Such meetings may be effective in shaping public opinion in the desired direction. This is especially true in areas where oral agitation was used by the enemy regime.

270. Information Centers

a. General. Psychological warfare agencies, such as display teams attached to CA/MG public information teams, may operate information centers in both liberated and occupied areas. These centers combine the functions of libraries, art museums, lecture halls, theaters, and music halls. They are excellent means of making available much of the information or activities suppressed by the enemy.

b. Contents.

- (1) *Printed Material.* Printed material is selected for sale or free distribution in infor-

mation centers according to its contribution to consolidation objectives.

- (2) *Exhibitions.* A widespread hunger for culture often grows in the aftermath of war. Information centers may sponsor exhibitions of books, works of art, photographs, and similar materials.
- (3) *Lecture programs.* Information centers may be used as headquarters for lecture programs as well as discussion and study groups. Consolidation psychological warfare agencies should encourage such activities since free discussion is a most direct means of reeducation.
- (4) *Visual aids.* Special showings of motion pictures may be sponsored by information centers.
- (5) *Musical programs.* Programs of selected classical, popular, or folk music have a cultural value and may be especially important in areas where the enemy has suppressed certain musical forms.

c. Service to Rural Areas. Information centers are especially valuable in smaller towns and rural areas where libraries, theaters, concert halls, and museums are not available. Mobile sound and film teams and display teams should be used wherever possible to visit rural communities and extend the work of the information centers to them.

APPENDIX I

REFERENCES

- FM 5-20 Camouflage, Basic Principles.
- FM 6-135 Adjustment of Field Artillery Fire by the Combat Soldier.
- FM 11-35 (Title classified).
- FM 21-5 Military Training.
- FM 21-8 Military Training Aids.
- FM 21-30 Military Symbols.
- FM 21-75 Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling.
- FM 24-5 Signal Communications.
- FM 25-10 Motor Transportation, Operations.
- FM 26-5 Interior Guard Duty.
- FM 27-5 United States Army and Navy Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government.
- FM 27-10 Rules of Land Warfare.
- FM 30-5 (Title classified).
- FM 30-15 Examination of Personnel and Documents.
- FM 30-19 (Title classified).
- FM 30-102 Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces.
- FM 30-103 Aggressor Order of Battle.
- FM 31-21 (Title classified).
- FM 41-15 Civil Affairs/Military Government Units.
- FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations, Operations.

- FM 101-5 Staff Officers Field Manual, Staff Organization and Procedure.
- TOE 29-500A Composite Service Organization.
- TOE 33-56 Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Battalion.
- TOE 33-57 Reproduction Company.
- TOE 33-58 Radio Broadcasting Organization.
- TOE 33-67 Consolidation Organization.
- TOE 33-77 Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Army.
- TOE 41-500A Military Government Service Organization.
- AR 220-60 Battalions—General Provisions.
- AR 220-70 Companies—General Provisions.
- AR 380-5 Safeguarding Defense Information.
- DA Pam Index of Army Motion Pictures, Television, Recordings and Filmstrips.
108-1
- DA Pam Index of Training Publications.
310-3
- DA Pam Index of Technical Manuals, Technical Regulations, Technical Bulletins, Supply Bulletins, Lubrication Orders and Modification Work Orders.
310-4
- SR 320-5-1 Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
- SR 320-5-5 Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.
- SR 320-50-1 Authorized Abbreviations.
- SR 615-25-15 Military Occupational Specialties.

APPENDIX II

SUGGESTED FORM, PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

NAME Englehard von Nathusius
RANK Colonel
UNIT 40 Tk Div
JOB IN ARMED FORCES CO 71 Tk Regt (M)
FORMER OCCUPATION Social Worker
REGION OF ORIGIN Berlin
PLACE OF RESIDENCE Madrid
AGE 52
EDUCATION Dr. Philosophy, University of
Breslau

PERSONAL HISTORY:

Interrogator's estimate of POW's reliability
Fair

Military career and experience Cadet Corps,
Potsdam, as 2d Lt.

Circumstances of capture During retreat in
North Carolina, Surrendered with his unit.

UNITED STATES PROPAGANDA:

Leaflets Nuisance but not effective except sta-
tistical reports of bombing of home front.

Radio Very little effect. Had his signal personnel keep radio sets on frequencies of home stations.

AGGRESSOR PROPAGANDA Good but not enough indoctrination of troops in adjustment to adverse conditions during last months of war.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS "LAST DITCH" WARFARE From a military point of view, thinks it is useless.

OUTCOME OF WAR:

Aggressor wins Doubts it now.

Stalemate or compromise Stalemate due to leader's promise of "last ditch" warfare.

Doubt N/A

Aggressor defeat If happens, only temporarily. Believes country will rise again at our side against new enemy.

No opinion N/A

ATTITUDE TOWARDS U. S. OCCUPATION Knows about unconditional surrender. Hopes United States rather than other nations will occupy homeland.

SPECIFIC CONCERNS:

Revenge against civilian Yes

population No X

Looting, destruction of Yes

property, rape No X

Unemployment	Yes	<u>X</u>
	No	<u> </u>
Lack of food	Yes	<u>X</u>
	No	<u> </u>

POST-WAR EXPECTATIONS:

Aggressor destroyed as state No, just destruction of political machine.

Resurgence of party Possibly, country needs strong hand.

Reasonable democratic regime. Yes, if country is helped from outside.

Communist state No

No opinion N/A

Personal fate? Anxious to return home and forget war and politics.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS AGGRESSOR SOCIALISM:

Complete faith N/A

Belief with reservations Yes. States country needs discipline.

Doubt N/A

Rejection N/A

Unpolitical N/A

No opinion N/A

ATTITUDE TO OTHER LEADERS, INCLUDING LOWER PARTY FUNCTIONARIES

States leader was not responsible for defeat.

The leader was badly advised from top down to small functionaries.

WAR GUILT:

Leaders, not Aggressor people Yes

Leaders and people No

Allies guilty Partly. Feels strongly against
Aggressor leaders' prewar attitude.

Other (specify in comments) Does not wish
to elaborate.

No opinion N/A

FEELING OF POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY:

Politics should be left to those on top N/A

Feels own responsibility but Aggressor people
not capable N/A

Feels own responsibility, and also Aggressor
people capable N/A

No personal responsibility, favors Aggressor de-
mocracy Yes, along pre-dictatorship style.

Other (specify in comments) N/A

No opinion N/A

Not covered in interview Favors military-civil
combination of power.

FEAR OF ILL TREATMENT AS POW:

Fear N/A

Uncertain Has heard of reprisals on other
fronts. Believes U. S. will treat POW
better than the other allies.

No fear N/A

No opinion N/A

ATTITUDE TO SENIOR LEADERS:

Trust N/A

Doubt N/A

Mistrust Of immediate superior. Admits leaflets instrumental in destroying belief in senior leaders, especially during recent retreats.

No opinion N/A

ATTITUDE TO IMMEDIATE OFFICERS:

Devotion, trust N/A

Acceptance of authority N/A

Doubt N/A

Mistrust, contempt As above. Refuses to elaborate but mentioned one political leader, Hans Dehmel, as an immediate superior whom he would like to see in jail.

No opinion N/A

REACTION TO ALLIED WEAPONS Admits our artillery and air superiority, although calls it waste of ammunition. Admits its effectiveness in creating fear and disaffection among his troops.

SERVICE CONDITIONS (food, health of unit, mail, types of reserves encountered, etc.) Generally good, except after last Aggressor offensive.

RIVALRIES IN AGGRESSOR ARMY Personal disapproval of promotion of younger officers above him without consideration for rank, age, and civilian background.

HOME FRONT (underground opposition, foreign workers, family life, morale effects of air raids) Lost home in bombing, not seen family in 1 1/2 years, lost son in war, does not know if wife is alive, afraid of occupation by Eastern allies. Claims to have been against slave labor and concentration camps.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS, COMMENTS, AND SUGGESTIONS POW undoubtedly comes from good circles. Fact remains he joined party early. Tried to blame political leaders for defeat. Hopes for fair treatment by allies and safe return to Aggressor homeland.

SIGNATURE OF INTERROGATOR /s/ John M. Smith, Capt., Inf.

DATE OF INTERVIEW 14 June 195—

PLACE OF INTERVIEW Third Army PWE

APPENDIX III

EXAMPLE, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) FORM

52D LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET
COMPANY

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) FORM

DATE: 16 June 195—.

REQUESTED BY: Intel Sec, 52d L&L Co.

DATE INFORMATION NEEDED: 221300 June
195—.

TO: See Distribution

EEI REQUIRED:

1. What do enemy soldiers of the 26th Tank Regiment of the 17th Mechanized Division think of their commanding officer, Comdt Buenarroti?
2. What do enemy soldiers think of their country's war aims?
3. What do the soldiers of the 15th Airborne Division dislike most about being at the front?
4. What do the enemy troops fear most and dislike about the Americans in general and the United States Army in particular?

REMARKS:

Any conclusions or suggestions as to enemy vulnerabilities and how to exploit these vulnerabilities

should be submitted by collecting agencies along with above specified information. Any general statement, such as "Morale in this enemy division seems to be quite low," must be accompanied by specific evidence attesting to any conclusion before it will possess any value as a basis on which to conduct psychological warfare operations. As a part of such evidence, the number and background of enemy prisoners making the statement (this holds true for all answers to questions in the EEI) will be submitted so that the psychological warfare intelligence analyst may judge the validity of the evidence on which he must base his recommended action for exploiting the vulnerabilities.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

/s/ John R. Smith
/t/ **JOHN R. SMITH**
1st Lt, Inf
Intelligence Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

G2, Fifth Army
Intel Sec, 52d L&L Co

APPENDIX IV

EXAMPLE, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE WORKSHEET

<p style="text-align: center;">PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE WORKSHEET</p> <p>From <u>1200</u> <u>4 Feb 195—</u></p> <hr/> <p>To <u>1200</u> <u>11 Feb 195—</u></p> <p>Headquarters <u>31st RB&L Bn</u></p> <p>Location <u>Fort Bragg, N. C.</u></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enemy strength.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Frictions among enemy elements.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Inefficiency and/or corruption.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Discipline.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Worries about home front.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Political and war aims.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Enemy counter-measures.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Morale, general.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. Anti-war feelings.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 10. POW treatment.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Comforts (food, clothing, mail, etc.)
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 12. Artillery.
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 13. Air power
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 14. New weapons.

APPENDIX V

TECHNIQUES OF PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS

1. Source Analysis

The "who" aspect of propaganda analysis process determines the sponsoring government, agency, or organization. It further obtains and analyzes data concerning the propaganda agency or structure itself and its personalities. It seeks the relationship of the propaganda organization to the governmental structure and the degree of coordination that exists with other governmental agencies as well as the personal history of the individual propagandist.

2. Content Analysis

The "what" aspect of propaganda analysis process may receive the most attention from analysts because it usually can be adapted to statistical or quantitative handling. In establishing a statistical base for computing the content of propaganda, analysts make arbitrary assumptions, however, that may subject the analysis to varying degrees of validity and reliability.

a. The uses to which content analysis may be put are numerous and varied. Content analysis, with its statistical objectivity and precision, may be used to—

- (1) Describe trends in propaganda content.

- (2) Disclose likenesses and differences in communication content.
- (3) Expose propaganda techniques.
- (4) Provide indications of future actions.
- (5) Obtain political and military intelligence.

b. Content categories, or systems of classification arbitrarily assumed by the analyst, may be any of several kinds, including—

- (1) Subject topics or objectives *discussed* in the communication.
- (2) Subject topics or objectives *implied* in the communication.
- (3) Direction (favorable or unfavorable) of the treatment of the communication.

c. Units of measurement arbitrarily assumed by the analyst likewise are numerous kinds:

- (1) The word is the smallest unit applied in content analysis. Its application results in the compilation of a list of relative frequencies of selected words.
- (2) The theme in its most compact form lends itself readily as the unit of measurement.
- (3) The item is frequently used as an acceptable unit of measurement. It may be a book, article, fiction story, speech, radio program, letter, news story, editorial, or any other self-contained expression.
- (4) In instances where propaganda is woven around individuals, personalities may be catalogued and used as a basis for measurement.
- (5) Some analysts examine content by such physical measurements as the column inch,

page, line, paragraph, minute, or foot, thus allowing for more precise computations than are possible with the item unit.

3. Audience and Media Analysis

The "whom" and "how" aspects of propaganda analysis process are extremely difficult to separate for study because they are intertwined. Audience research provides data on the characteristics of the audience to which the propaganda is being directed, while analysis of media techniques is an examination of the methods used in distributing the propaganda message to that audience.

a. Audience Table. In conjunction with content analysis of enemy propaganda, the analyst may classify the target audience according to component groups over a given period of time. This analysis may be a further aid to inferring the intentions and aims of the enemy. Various schemes of classification can be used to divide the intended audience into identifiable groups separated by income bracket, geographic region, and ethnic, political, religious, or social class. The classification system selected may be used as a basis for preparing an audience table, an example of which is contained in appendix VII. Such an analysis gives no clue to the actual size of the audience, nor to possible reactions. It depicts only the intended audience.

b. Media Selection. The propaganda analyst is unable to analyze *all* media adequately. Therefore he selects those media most representative of the propaganda effort, provided they are available. In a theater of operations, radio, loudspeaker, and leaflet

are the principal media on which the analyst usually relies. The analyst must guard against collecting too little or too much information over an insufficient operating period. If the analyst selects his basic data from brief operating periods, such as one day in each week, he may confuse transient themes with basic ones. As the example illustrates in appendix VIII, the suggested correct assembly of data for analysis places emphasis on consistency, objectivity, and precision of selection.

4. Effects Analysis

Effects analysis is the final aspect of the propaganda process where an evaluation is made to determine the effects of propaganda on the target audience.

a. Analyzing Morale. The status of enemy morale may often be discovered through analysis of the enemy's domestic propaganda before it can be reported by other agencies. Good morale normally is shown by a quiet tone in domestic propaganda. Poor morale is shown by extremes in domestic propaganda, either in complete silence or in blistering vehemence. A tone of extreme defiance, of unwillingness to cooperate in international affairs, often springs from the mission of the propagandist to divert a restless domestic front from its real worries at home to imaginary worries about the opponent. A propagandist's attack on another nation more technically advanced may indicate an inferiority complex on the part of the government and people represented by the propagandists. Claims of "first

inventions" made for domestic consumption may serve to lessen feelings of national inferiority.

b. Analyzing Involuntary Information. Enemy propaganda contains news, opinions, and entertainment as a means of attracting an audience. Careful analysis of the content and makeup of this propaganda may provide valuable intelligence.

(1) Shortages of materiel and personnel are often indicated.

(a) A lack of qualified language specialists is apparent when enemy propaganda contains incorrect phraseology in the language of the target area.

(b) A lack of qualified artists and engravers is indicated when crude or inaccurate illustrations are a part of the enemy's pictorial propaganda.

(c) Shortages of supply may be indicated by poor grades of ink and paper used in the enemy's printed propaganda.

(d) The weakness of enemy radio signals, interrupted programs, poor production of programs, or the scarcity of stations on the air may indicate a lack of materiel and personnel.

(2) Biographical information is secured when the enemy mentions names of personalities.

(a) The space of time given to personalities by the enemy, especially those in the political or military limelight, is an accurate measurement of their prominence, or the prominence of their positions, at the time.

- (b) An abrupt omission of a popular personality from a propaganda news source may indicate a realignment of political or military forces, or it may conceal an event which would reflect discredit on the enemy authorities.
- (c) Movements and visits of key personnel may indicate political or military action in the areas visited.
- (3) Topographical information may be secured when the enemy boasts of field victories and gives his version of places and names.
- (4) Economic information may be obtained from statistics given via propaganda channels. Even if the statistics are falsified or slanted, comparisons with previous data given may indicate economic trends.

c. Analyzing Voluntary Information. The bulk of enemy propaganda contains information about his personnel, his opinion of himself, his opinion of the United States and of nations friendly to the United States, his state of mind, his order of battle, his economic strength, and other items. Much of this information, although recognized by the enemy as being of intelligence value, is disseminated in order to gain attention and capture an audience. The astute analyst will classify this information for ready reference and evaluate it in accordance with its source and the circumstances.

d. Revealing Enemy Strategy. Analysis of enemy propaganda may offer clues as to his strategy.

- (1) Enemy realization of an impending defeat may be preceded by propaganda telling the

home audience of the overwhelming strength which enemy forces face.

- (2) When the enemy is security minded, specific action may some times be anticipated from his complete propaganda silence on something about which he would normally talk.
- (3) Deceptive propaganda may be used to conceal the real intentions of an enemy nation.
 - (a) A nation preparing to launch an aggressive war without warning may carry out a propaganda campaign alleging aggression on the part of the nation to be attacked. It will try to make the world in general believe that the real responsibility for a new war belongs to the victim.
 - (b) An aggressor nation preparing to break the peace may indulge in peace propaganda in order to deceive the intended victim as well as other nations.

e. Using the Emphasis Chart. The emphasis chart, an example of which is in appendix IX, shows diagrammatically the quantitative emphasis placed by the enemy on various important themes in his propaganda output. A particular medium, or several media, may be involved. Either a line or a bar graph may be adapted for use. The hypothetical example shown in appendix IX reveals that a relatively close correlation exists between the amount of emphasis placed on the "Peace Campaign" by Aggressor and the amount of emphasis placed on "Western Aggression." This analysis makes clear one of the basic elements in Aggressor strategy—to blame the Western Powers for the threat of war, and then

to picture Aggressor as representing the party of peace. On the other hand, it can be seen that there has been a downward, long term trend in the period covered in the emphasis placed on the Caribbean War. One conclusion is that Aggressor has already decided that this war is of little importance in the overall struggle. This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that at no time, in the period of survey, did the theme of the Caribbean War approach the amount of emphasis given the other two themes.

f. Evaluating Enemy Techniques. An analysis of enemy propaganda may reveal propaganda techniques which, because of their effectiveness, may be adopted by the United States in whole or in part if they do not violate overall propaganda policy. This imitation of enemy propaganda techniques is analogous to imitation of any military weapon used by the enemy when its superiority has been demonstrated.

5. Assessment of United States Propaganda Effects (FM 30-15)

a. General. Various techniques are employed in order to analyze relative effectiveness of United States propaganda campaigns. Answers to questions regarding which themes are most effective, which themes should be dropped, or what audiences are receiving our propaganda are necessary in planning subsequent campaigns.

b. Public Opinion Polls. Polls, if properly used, present a fairly reliable index of propaganda effectiveness (ch. 13).

c. Prisoner of War Interrogations and Surveys. Prisoners of war can furnish valuable data regarding United States propaganda effectiveness. Written or oral questions should be specific rather than general.

d. Prisoner of War Panels. Prisoner of war panels are valuable in determining propaganda effectiveness. A mock-up of a planned leaflet or other medium is presented to the prisoner of war panel. It should be asked, for example, what part of a leaflet it believes or disbelieves, what it thinks of certain statements, and other specific questions. The panel then gives its reaction. Faulty propaganda may be detected before it is used against the enemy. The panel may point out specific parts of the proposed propaganda message that will not have the calculated effect because of a difference in the enemy psychology, intensive indoctrination, religion, or other beliefs (ch. 13).

e. Other Sampling Techniques. Other supplemental sampling techniques, some unorthodox, may be employed:

- (1) One technique involves the sampling of opinion leaders, i. e., those persons whose position enables them to exert wide influence upon public opinion. This device is particularly applicable in the case of newly occupied areas where local leaders can be questioned regarding their reaction to propaganda lines.
- (2) Analysis of personal letters and other captured documents is often a remunerative sampling technique because the writers

usually express their true sentiments regarding propaganda lines.

- (3) Analysis of items in enemy newspapers may reveal current thinking regarding United States propaganda efforts.

f. Enemy Group Disintegration. Certain signs of enemy group disintegration indicates a low state of morale and may provide clues to the effectiveness of propaganda operations. Analysts, however, must interpret such clues with utmost caution since the motivation of such group actions is often difficult to determine. In any case, the number of enemy soldiers who surrender is never an accurate measure of propaganda effectiveness.

g. Enemy Morale Reports. After detailed analysis, data on the current enemy morale situation should be entered periodically on a situation map overlay. Colors may be used to portray the various levels of enemy morale. For example, blue color may symbolize very high morale; green, high; yellow, low; and orange, very low. Once the nature and level of morale have been determined, the analysis is reported through intelligence channels. In addition to the morale situation map, a standardized form for reporting enemy morale may be adopted. For an example of a convenient morale report form, see appendix X.

APPENDIX VI

TECHNIQUES OF OPINION ANALYSIS

1. The Opinion Poll

a. Types of Measurement. Since collecting the opinions of each member of a large public usually is not feasible, the opinions of a sample of the public are taken and counted. From this sample, inferences are drawn about the distribution of opinion in the whole public. This method is known as the opinion poll. If the analyst seeks to ascertain how strongly individual members of a public held opinions about a particular issue he may employ either the quantitative or qualitative methods of analysis.

- (1) Questions requiring short answers are normally employed in the quantitative method of analysis. This method is well suited to measurement of opinion intensity in large groups.
- (2) Intensity of opinion may also be measured by qualitative observations. The basic method employed in such observations is the open-end or intensive interview, normally used with smaller groups or even individuals.
- (3) Those who study public opinion prefer to use quantitative methods whenever possible for measuring both extent and intensity of opinion. Not only are quantitative methods more precise, but the results of analysis

can be expressed in relatively brief statistical form. This is an important advantage in the preparation of intelligence reports involving analysis of a large public and the resultant mass of opinion data.

b. Conduct of Opinion Polls. Five steps in conducting a public opinion poll include:

- (1) Establishing a public in terms of certain characteristics common to its members (ch. 13).
- (2) Selecting a sample that is representative of that public (par. 2 below).
- (3) Framing the questionnaire (par. 3 below).
- (4) Taking the poll (par. 4 below).
- (5) Interpreting the results (par. 5 below).

2. Samples

a. Random Sample. A random sampling of public opinion is taken by lot or by chance. While it may be representative, it often fails to produce a true indication of what the public is thinking or doing. However, assuming that the composition of a random sample is truly random, the next source of error is in the size of the sample. Generally, the larger the random sample, the more dependable are the results.

b. Constructed Sample. Although a random sample can be representative, there are so many chances to commit an error that will bias the sample that modern opinion polls do not rely upon it to any great extent. Instead, a sample of representative persons is set up. These persons are calculated to have opinions on a question that are quite similar to

the general public opinion on that question. Although the principle of the constructed sample is simple, its application is often quite difficult. The technique of the constructed sample is based upon the theory that an individual's opinion is greatly influenced by his position in the structure of his society. Construction of a representative sample requires an extensive knowledge of the society in which the public to be polled lives. Certain characteristics have been suggested as frequently significant. Among them are age, sex, marital status, education, income, occupation, race, religion, political affiliation, and rural or urban residence. Not all of these characteristics have equal significance. Often other characteristics stemming from the social organization are significant for particular questions.

c. Stratified Random Sample. This type of sample may be regarded as being intermediary to the other two types in that it partakes of some of the characteristics of each. It is constructed in the same sense that the poll taker makes a conscious effort to see that the various groups in the general population are represented in his sample in the same proportion as that in which they occur in the general population. It is random in that once the number of each subgroup to be polled has been decided upon, the selection of any given person in this group to be polled is purely a matter of chance.

d. Weighting a Random Sample. To guard against working with a sample that is not truly representative, the poll taker constructs a weighted sample. The poll taker asks questions about the respondent—his age, occupation, or other such data

that he believes significant in determining opinion on the question. Then he weights the answers of a certain group in his sample to bring them up to the same proportion as that in his total public.

3. Framing the Questionnaire

A carefully selected sample may be wasted because of the quality of the questions that are asked. Additional wastage may be caused by the fact that the meaning of even the simplest word in the questionnaire may be elusive to groups of people widely separated in background, experience, education, and terminologies peculiar to interest or occupational groups.

a. The following points should be considered in framing questions:

- (1) Are questions too vague to permit precise answers?
- (2) Are questions too obscure in meaning?
- (3) Are questions making use of some stereotype or overtone implicit in the questions rather than the meanings actually intended?
- (4) Are questions misunderstood because they involve technical or unfamiliar words?
- (5) Are questions presenting issues not sufficiently circumscribed?
- (6) Are alternatives provided for answers not exhaustive?
- (7) Are alternatives too many or too long?
- (8) Are there questions whose implications are not seen?
- (9) Are questions concerned with only a portion of the population and therefore meaningless to many people?

- (10) Are questions getting only surface rationalizations?
- (11) Are questions getting only stereotyped answers?

b. Three types of information can be obtained from the use of a questionnaire :

- (1) *Objective facts about behavior.* Factual information usually include details of the individual respondent's own personal history or his behavior. The respondent may be asked for similar information about persons he is in a position to know about—family, friends, employees. Or he may be asked about events or conditions witnessed by him, such as occurrences at political meetings or conditions in forced labor camps.
- (2) *Opinions and feelings.* Opinions and feelings may be ascertained by such questions as: "Which radio program do you like best?" "Do you trust the news you read in the papers?" Inquiry may go still further and seek to learn from the individual his reasons for his behavior and attitudes insofar as he can reveal them. Questions may be phrased so as to search out the influences that have acted upon the respondent—the relative importance of other persons, events, or media—and the person's own internal motivations, desires, and values.
- (3) *Combination types of information.* As a rule, questionnaires consist of a judicious mixture of "factual" and "opinion" ques-

tions. Where the interest is largely in opinion, a certain amount of factual information is always needed if for no other reason than to establish the representative character of the sample questioned. Even when the purpose of an inquiry is largely "statistical," questions on opinions usually make factual material more meaningful.

c. When the questionnaire has reached what appears to be its final form, it is ready for a rehearsal or pretest.

- (1) Were there questions that caused embarrassment to the extent that the respondents appeared reluctant to answer?
- (2) Were any questions not easily understood?
- (3) Did respondents appear to become bored or impatient at some points?

d. For details on the panel system that may be used as a pre-test board for contemplated psychological warfare campaigns, see paragraphs 5*d* of appendix V and 111*a*.

4. Taking the Poll

The majority of people may be hesitant about replying to a stranger who starts asking questions. The interviewer's first task is establishing a feeling of confidence in his prospective respondent's mind. Particularly in interrogating prisoners of war, the questioner must face the situation of fear, hostility, and distrust on the part of the prisoners. Many circumstances that work against good interview conditions may be eliminated by careful planning. Forethought should be given to construction of the

questionnaire, the interviewer's background characteristics, and the circumstances of the interview such as its timing, place, and sponsorship.

a. The Questionnaire and Rapport. Both the questionnaire and the accompanying interviewer's instructions must be based upon and reflect a clear conception of what information is being sought. The opening questions should be easy to answer, should arouse the respondent's interest, but should stir up no objectionable emotional state. When questions are asked that may interfere with rapport—demanding an effort of memory, or touching on personal or embarrassing subjects—such questions may be interspersed among others more readily answered, or may be held until the end of the interview. Rapport is usually stronger at the end of an interview than earlier and if it is not, the disturbing effect of these questions will not influence unfavorably the replies to other questions.

b. Interviewer's Background. If the respondent and interviewer are dissimilar in too many respects, confidence in the interviewer cannot be readily established. With regard to religion, language, nationality, social and economic position, and education, the interviewer must be not too unlike those he is to question. As far as possible, the interviewer should be familiar enough with the respondent's culture so that he can be flexible in his approach. Without fluency in the respondent's language, for example, effective interviewing may not be possible because the respondent is reminded with every question that the man in front of him is different.

c. Circumstances of the Interview. The time and

place of interviewing have definite effects on the results obtained. Although the type of surroundings may aid rapport, it may be less important than the mental comfort of the respondent. This means that, wherever possible, privacy should be assured.

5. Interpreting the Results

In a sense, all poll results can be taken as past history. Since questions are asked about various things at a certain time, it may be assumed that the answers are valid only for that particular time and are not necessarily valid a week or month later. However, if attitudes are being measured, it is possible to make predictions of future behavior based on poll results.

a. In any poll there will be some "no opinion" answers, sometimes there are many. What does a "no opinion" answer mean? Can such answers be safely ignored? If not, what should be done with them? How should they be interpreted? When the respondent says that he does not have an opinion on the question, the interviewer should know when to "force" an opinion on the question and when to accept the "no opinion" reaction. Following are some of the reasons why persons say they do not know.

- (1) They may be thinking aloud. They may not have thought about the question before but will reach a decision if given time.
- (2) Lack of information on the subject.
- (3) Lack of understanding of words or phrasing of the question. Sometimes if the question is repeated, an answer will be forthcoming.

- (4) No conception of what the subject is, or what type of answer is expected. If repetition of the question fails to bring a response, this is usually the reason.
- (5) Inability to decide between alternatives. Such cases may merely require time.
- (6) Fear of possible consequence should the respondent's opinions come to the attention of persons in power over him. A guarantee of confidential treatment of responses may help in such cases.
- (7) Belief that his facts are inadequate for him to make a decision.
- (8) Belief that it is not his province to hold an opinion on the subject—that those "in authority" should handle the issue.
- (9) Hesitance at expressing an unpopular or minority view. The "everybody has a right to his own opinion" line may be useful for such cases.
- (10) Fear of being wrong. The interviewer may obtain an explicit answer by remarks such as "there aren't any right or wrong answers." When all other efforts have failed, the interviewer may solicit an explanation by a comment such as "would you mind telling me why you feel you can't answer?"

b. The analyst can determine what he wants to do about the "no opinion" or "don't know" answers by delving into the circumstances and concluding whether it is safe to disregard those answers or whether further investigation is in order.

APPENDIX VII

EXAMPLE, AUDIENCE TABLE

AGGRESSOR PROPAGANDA TO U. S.—MONTH OF
MAY 195—

Audience	Media used			Average
	Radio	News- papers	Maga- zines	
Farmers.....	10	25	10	15
Landowners.....	0	0	0	
Tenants.....	10	25	10	
Workers.....	35	30	40	35
Organized.....	25	20	25	
Unskilled and semi- skilled.....	20	15	20	
Skilled.....	5	5	5	
Unorganized.....	10	10	15	
White collar workers.....	0	0	0	
Manual workers.....	10	10	15	
Businessmen.....	5	0	10	5
Very small.....	5	0	10	
Small.....	0	0	0	
Medium.....	0	0	0	
Large.....	0	0	0	
Professions.....	20	15	10	15
Lawyers.....	0	0	0	
Physicians.....	0	0	0	
Clergy.....	5	0	0	
Teachers.....	15	15	10	
Military.....	0	0	0	
Others.....	0	0	0	

**AGGRESSOR PROPAGANDA TO U.S.—MONTH OF
MAY 195— (Continued)**

Audience	Media used			Average
	Radio	News- papers	Maga- zines	
Students.....	25	20	30	25
High school.....	10	5	10	
College.....	15	15	20	
Housewives.....	0	0	0	
Unemployed.....	5	10	0	5
Retired.....	0	0	0	
Miscellaneous.....	0	0	0	
Total.....	100	100	100	100

APPENDIX VIII

EXAMPLE, CORRECT ASSEMBLY OF RAW MATERIAL FOR ANALYSIS

Week beginning	Leaflets	Books	TV	Newspapers	Magazines	Movies	Radio	Other media
Jan 1....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
8....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
15....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
22....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
29....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
Feb 5....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
12....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
19....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
26....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
Mar 5....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
12....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
19....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----
26....	X	-----	-----	X	X	-----	X	-----

Week beginning	Leaflets	Books	TV	Newspapers	Magazines	Movies	Radio	Other media
Apr 2	X			X	X		X	
9	X			X	X		X	
16	X			X	X		X	
23	X			X	X		X	
30	X			X	X		X	
May 7	X			X	X		X	
14	X			X	X		X	
21	X			X	X		X	
28	X			X	X		X	
Jun 4	X			X	X		X	
11	X			X	X		X	
18	X			X	X		X	
25	X			X	X		X	

APPENDIX X

EXAMPLE, MORALE REPORT

1. The following, in order of importance, are the principal indications of ~~(high morale)~~
(low morale)
among (enemy military forces)
~~(enemy civilians behind enemy lines)~~
~~(enemy civilians behind our lines)~~
obtained by means of Fifth Army G2 agencies on
3-10 March 195—:

- a. Interrogation of 100 enemy soldiers.
- b. Study of captured enemy newspapers.
- c. Analysis of monitored enemy propaganda.

2. The following, in order of importance, are the principal indications of (low) morale in the group
(high)
mentioned above:

- a. Prisoners report that most new recruits are poorly trained and equipped.
 - b. Enemy newspapers report glorious victories will ensue but minimize present fighting.
 - c. Enemy radio calls for greater sacrifices and reports numerous executions of saboteurs of the war effort.
 - d. Many replacements are deserting to U. S. lines.
3. The following noteworthy changes in the morale

in this group have occurred in comparison with the period 24 Feb—Mar 195—:

Continuing downward trend in enemy morale.

4. On the basis of the above and other evidence, the following directives are recommended for our propaganda:

- a. In our leaflet propaganda, split new recruits and enemy veterans by pointing out inadequate training and equipment of recruits.
- b. Include a series of battle maps in our leaflets showing ground lost by the enemy.
- c. In our radio propaganda, point out in news commentaries the growing hysteria of the enemy regime which is finally recognizing the inevitability of defeat.

5. The following future propaganda moves by the enemy seem probable:

- a. Increasing calls for "last ditch" resistance.
- b. Increasing threats of punishment against those who call for an end to the war.

6. Evidence for the above predictions (is)

(is not)

appended.

APPENDIX XI

SUGGESTED SERIAL NUMBERING SYSTEM FOR LEAFLETS

The serial numbering system employed by any particular headquarters will depend largely upon which method of leaflet classification the headquarters wishes to use. Classification by theme is generally considered best. In the serial numbering system recommended here, each general theme is allotted a block of 1,000 numbers. Each leaflet exploiting a given theme is given a number within that block, preceded by symbols or letters indicating the originating headquarters. The sample allotment of numbers that follows is not necessarily complete. As a new theme is employed, a new block of numbers is allotted.

<i>Numbers</i>	<i>Theme</i>
0-999 -----	Fear
1,000-1,999 -----	Material Superiority
2,000-2,999 -----	Informative (News)
3,000-3,999 -----	Good Treatment
4,000-4,999 -----	Divisive (Split)
5,000-5,999 -----	Nostalgia
6,000-6,999 -----	Suffering at Home
7,000-7,999 -----	Inevitability of Defeat
8,000-8,999 -----	War Aims
9,000-9,999 -----	War Guilt

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