






**South Vietnam
Initial failure of the
U. S. "limited war"**

MAJOR BATTLES IN 1966

LEGEND

-  L.A.F.'s big-operation zone
-  Annihilation of one U.S. battalion and upward
-  Annihilation of one puppet battalion
-  Attacks on U.S.-puppet bases

0 25 50 75 100 km



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**MARCH FORWARD TO WIN BIG VICTORIES
IN ALL FIELDS AND ALL OVER SOUTH VIETNAM**

*Communique issued on December 5,
1966 by the Presidium, Central Com-
mittee, South Vietnam National Front
for Liberation*

An enlarged meeting of the Central Committee Presidium of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation was held on December 4 and 5, 1966, under the chairmanship of Dr Nguyen Huu Tho. The meeting was attended by all the members of the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Front, representatives of political parties, mass organizations, religious communities, nationalities and the Command of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces. Vo Oanh, a patriotic personality in Saigon, who had just left the enemy-occupied area for the liberated zone to take

part in the national salvation resistance to the American aggressors, also attended.

The meeting made an all-round review of the South Vietnam situation since early this year and laid down the tasks for the Front in the near future.

1. The meeting unanimously noted that since the beginning of this year, the American imperialists had exerted great efforts in many fields, and stepped up the dispatch of U.S. and satellite troops to South Vietnam to intensify their war of aggression. But they did not attain the goals they had set for themselves, and continue to suffer bitter setbacks, both military and political. Sustaining heavy defeats in their 1965-1966 dry season strategic counter-offensive, they dug in during the recent rainy season to preserve their forces and prepare for a new counter-offensive.

For their part, the South Vietnamese people and Liberation Armed Forces firmly held the initiative, steadily developed the efficacy of the strategy of people's war, made deep thrusts into the enemy's rear areas to wipe him out. Guerilla warfare developed in scope and intensify. Opening the Winter 1966-1967 Spring campaign, the Liberation Armed Forces again won big victories on all theatres.

The American-puppet "rural pacification plan" has in the main been foiled. The liberated zones under the control of the Front have not only been firmly preserved but also broadened in some areas such as Quangtri and Thuathien, and on the whole, production of foodstuffs has been firmly maintained. The people in the areas with a still weak movement and

in the enemy-occupied zones continued rising up to eliminate cruel agents of the Americans and break the enemy's grip. The political, economic and social situation in the enemy's rear areas remained confused. The patriotic movement of all strata of the people in towns and cities has steadily developed. The farce of the so-called "constituent assembly election" was laid bare and boycotted by our entire people. The scramble for power among the puppet rulers continued unabated. The puppet army went on disintegrating. Reality in South Vietnam has shown that the more the American aggressors increase their troops, weapons and war means, the greater their defeats and the more serious their predicament.

The meeting assessed that since the American imperialists dispatched en masse U.S. and satellite troops to take a direct part in the aggression against South Vietnam, the antagonism between our entire people on the one hand, and the American imperialist aggressors and their henchmen on the other, had become more and more acute. Extremely brutal means of war, repression, persecution, plunder, exploitation, pressganging and drafting of people for forced labour, monetary devaluation, repression of religious communities, and abolition of all democratic freedoms have been used by the enemy. All this has exasperated the hatred for the American aggressors and their lackeys, of our entire people irrespective of social strata, religious communities and political tendencies. Except for a handful of traitors working on American orders who sell out the southern part of our fatherland to the U.S. aggressors, inviting them to trample on

its soil, all the Vietnamese people, including the personnel of the puppet administration and army in South Vietnam, have seen more and more clearly the traitorous nature of the Thieu-Ky clique and joined their efforts to oppose the invaders.

The meeting reviewed the implementation of the policy of consolidating and enlarging the National United Front against American aggression for national salvation, and the policy of united actions with truly patriotic forces and individuals. It was glad to note that while the army and people had won great successes in all fields, since the beginning of this year the National United Front against the American aggressors to save our fatherland had been further consolidated and broadened. Common action has been satisfactorily developing between all patriotic forces and individuals.

2. The meeting examined the enemy's schemes at this stage and worked out concrete policies and measures to mobilize the entire people and army to fulfil at all costs the immediate political task, namely to take the initiative, actively and relentlessly attack the enemy both in the military and political fields throughout the three strategic theatres — the highlands, the countryside and the towns — in order to wipe out an important part of the American and satellite forces, knock down and disintegrate large numbers of puppet troops, disturb and narrow down the enemy's rear, shatter the enemy's plan of military counter-offensive, political stabilization and "pacification of the countryside", consolidate and expand our

liberated zone, uphold and promote our strategic initiative, and create conditions to achieve greater victories.

The meeting also laid down several policies and measures to further strengthen and broaden the National United Front against American aggression to save the country, and the Front of United Action between all patriotic forces and individuals in South Vietnam.

The meeting called on the entire people and Liberation Armed Forces to heighten their determination to fight and defeat the American aggressors, and exert utmost effort to achieve greater victories in every field and every place.

3. The meeting decided to solemnly celebrate the sixth founding anniversary of the Front (December 20) throughout South Vietnam and, on this occasion, to commend all units, localities, branches, organizations at all levels and individuals with outstanding achievements in order to develop the successes already scored and further boost the emulation drive "determined to fight and defeat the American aggressors".

The meeting unanimously admitted Vo Oanh into the Front Central Committee and appointed Nguyen Van Tien, one of its members, as head of the Front's Permanent Representation in North Vietnam.

**CRUSH THE FORTHCOMING ENEMY COUNTER-
OFFENSIVE, SCORE BIG VICTORIES IN THE
WINTER 1966 - SPRING 1967 CAMPAIGN**

*Appeal made on October 27, 1966 by
the Presidium, Central Committee, South
Vietnam National Front for Liberation*

Compatriots!

Cadres and fighters!

The American aggressors have sustained heavy defeats.

In the past dry season, they sent a big expeditionary force to South Vietnam in view of a "counter-offensive", but our people and armed forces dealt them heavy blows.

In the recent rainy season, they dug in in their strongholds hoping to preserve their forces and prepare for a new counter-offensive, but our armed forces

and people made deep thrusts into their base areas, giving them no respite. The American aggressors have also suffered bitter setbacks in their air war of destruction in North Vietnam.

In South Vietnam alone, in the first nine months of this year, our people and armed forces killed and wounded over 200,000 enemy troops, including nearly 90,000 men of the American and satellite forces, completely wiped out 27 infantry battalions and 9 motorized units, shot down or destroyed 1,651 aircraft.

The enemy's plan of "pacifying" the countryside also met with failure. The liberated zones have not only been firmly defended but also broadened in several areas such as QuangTri and ThuaThien provinces.

Generally speaking, production in the liberated zones has been maintained.

Our forces are hurled at, have infiltrated deep into and held on to places with a weak movement to help the people rise up, annihilate wicked thugs, and break the grip of the enemy.

The political and social situation in the cities and towns of South Vietnam is still in a mess. The "constituent assembly" hoax has been boycotted and denounced by the entire people. Contradictions are rife among the quislings. The puppet administration continues to disintegrate. The American warmongers are being condemned by the whole of progressive mankind.

It is obvious that the more troops the American aggressors send to South Vietnam, the deeper they are bogged down and the greater their difficulties. B

they and their stooges still have not reconciled to their failure. They are whipping up a noisy campaign of faked peace and slanders against North Vietnam, branding her as an aggressor, at the same time as they dispatch more reinforcements, weapons and war material to South Vietnam. The aggressors and their satellites and puppets are preparing to launch a new "counter-offensive" in the coming dry season, aimed at "pacification" and at creating a position of strength from which to compel our people to negotiate on capitulation terms.

Compatriots, cadres and fighters!

The American imperialists are very reactionary, stupid and boastful. They have not yet understood the invincible strength of such a heroic and indomitable people as ours, endowed with iron-like determination and rich fighting experiences.

All right! They may not understand it now, but they will in five, ten, twenty or more years.

In the immediate future, in the coming Winter-Spring, our armed forces and people will give them a taste of the whip.

Let's translate our deep hatred into thundering blows at the American aggressors and their henchmen. Let's translate the glorious tradition of South Vietnam, the brass wall of the fatherland, into bright exploits.

We will shrink from no sacrifices and hardships. We are crushing the biggest aggression in the history of our people and defeating the most bellicose imperialist

chieftains in the world. We are fighting for the survival of our people, for the future of our younger generations, and for freedom-loving people all over the world. We ardently cherish peace, peace in genuine independence and democracy, not peace under the yoke of the American aggressors.

The American aggressors are doing their best to bring our country under their rule, and their flunkys to sell it out. Both of them are committing monstrous crimes.

We must avenge our families and our fatherland. Compatriots in the enemy-occupied zones, rise up to annihilate wicked thugs, and break the enemy's grip. Armymen, march forward to wipe out as many enemy forces as possible. We will fight them all, be they American, puppet or satellite troops.

Male and female guerillas and militia-members! Cling to the enemy wherever he is to strike him, bring your initiative into full play and using all weapons available, cut all communication lines, infiltrate deep into the enemy's rear and hit hard at his stores and airfields, tighten the noose on Americans' posts, garrisons and military bases, snipe at him day and night, giving him no respite. We will resolutely inflict upon the American expeditionary force — the most modern armed forces of the cruellest imperialist power — a bitter and ignominious defeat in the flaming sea of guerilla warfare in South Vietnam.

Regional armymen! Make deep thrusts, hold on then fan out to fight and carry out other activities in the enemy-occupied areas, giving most effectual help

to our compatriots in towns and countryside in their struggle, in annihilating wicked thugs, in rising up to break the enemy's grip and win back the right to be masters of their land.

Regular army units! Deal deadly blows at American and puppet mobile troops, don't let them raise their heads!

Compatriots in the liberated zones! A plough in one hand and a rifle in the other, take an active part in armed and political struggle and persuasion work among enemy soldiers, stick to your fields and villages, increase production, actively serve the front and give efficient support to the struggle of our compatriots still under the enemy's grip!

Officers and men of the puppet army, officials of the puppet administration! Check the American aggressors' acts of cruelty, arrogance and insolence, which are of daily occurrence. How can you remain indifferent to the danger being faced by the nation? How can you choose the path of ignominious death with the aggressors and traitors instead of finding a way to come over to the side of the people and struggle together with them against the enemy in order to serve the fatherland?

Interpreters in the service of the American imperialists! Actively help in persuasion work to stir up anti-war feelings among the G.I.'s so that they demand peace and repatriation. Find all opportunities to help our compatriots in their struggle against shelling, rape, plunder and massacre by the enemy.

Compatriots, cadres and fighters!

Bear deeply in mind and carry out well the following watchwords :

Exert every effort, be resolute to crush the forthcoming counter-offensive plan of the American and puppet clique, score big victories in the Winter 1966-Spring 1967 campaign!

Follow up our victories, overcome all difficulties, fight the enemy in all the three zones *, attack them in all directions, fight continuously and ceaselessly develop the strength of the revolution!

With our great strength and firm position, be resolute to wipe out all the more American troops as they are brought in, and to win ever-greater victories.

Be united, increase production, annihilate the enemy to record exploits and avenge our families and fatherland!

Be resolute to fight and win, however long and hard the struggle may be, for nothing is more precious than independence and freedom!

Compatriots, cadres and fighters, valiantly march forward!

* Urban centres, plains, and highlands and forests.

**A YEAR OF GRIM TRIAL OF STRENGTH,
A YEAR OF SPLENDID VICTORIES**

L.A.F. commentator

I. A GRIM TRIAL OF STRENGTH

— We won three brilliant victories.

— The enemy suffered three shameful defeats.

1966 which witnessed a grim trial of strength in South Vietnam between the people and the Liberation Armed Forces on the one hand, and the big U.S. expeditionary force, the puppet and satellite troops on the other, came to a close with glorious victories for us, and heavy all-round and repeated setbacks for the enemy...

... Nothing can testify to the most desperate situation of the American aggressors and their henchmen more eloquently than the hard facts, which took place on the theatre of operations in over a year, a very

striking one among them was this: in a single year they had to pour in reinforcements three times and each time they failed.

Those three occasions were:

- the 1965-66 dry-season strategic counter-offensive.
- the 1966 monsoon stage of passive contention, and
- the present 1966-67 dry-season counter-offensive.

First, the 1965-66 dry-season strategic counter-offensive. Facing collapse by mid-1965 the Americans abandoned their "special warfare" strategy and, in a desperate attempt to make good their failure, started a "limited war", sharply raising the number of U.S. expeditionary troops to 200,000 within a short time (almost the double of the French Expeditionary Force at the height of the Indochina war). They had initially earmarked 6 billion dollars for war expenditure in South Vietnam, which was boosted to 12 billion in early 1966 for the same year, i.e., twice as much as what they had spent annually in the Korean war. They substantially built up and had available 2,000 aircraft including strategic bombers B.52 and nearly 1,000 pieces of artillery of various calibres, among them ultra-rapid 175mm and 203mm guns (approximately the fire-power used in Korea). With such a force the American aggressors and their lackeys trumpeted about an all-round dry-season strategic counter-offensive on all battlefields. They boasted they would

wipe out a division of "Vietcong" regulars, concentrate one million inhabitants, establish 1,000 "strategic hamlets" within the framework of the "pacification" plan, increase the ratio of strength between U.S. forces and L.A.F. to 4 to 1 in their favour, bring the war to an early victory, etc.

Relying on their troop strength and the quantity of their war means, the U.S. aggressors and their valets launched successive large-scale raids sensationally described as "search and destroy" campaigns...

... The Americans who thought of winning a military victory sustained bitter losses in the first round on the battlefield. The one who got his backbone broken in the 1965-66 dry season was not the Vietcong but the U.S. aggressors themselves. And the all-round strategic counter-offensive brought them and their stooges only frustration and disappointment.

... *When the 1966 monsoon came*, they lost all of their initial truculence and faced an utter political confusion due first and foremost to the powerful struggle of our compatriots in urban centres. They were kept in the constant fear of an imminent large-scale "Vietcong" offensive. The invaders and their henchmen were thus compelled hastily to switch over to a defensive strategy during the rainy season. Lyndon B. Johnson ordered them to exert every effort to attain the following aims :

1. To maintain at any cost the situation as it was at the end of the 1965 dry season, prevent any further deterioration.

2. To stabilize the rear areas by all means — terror, repression, bribery, splitting tricks, use of force of arms and money to crush all opposition and preserve the Thieu - Ky clique from collapse.

3. To impel forward still more powerfully the "pacification" plan in view of immediate and long-range objectives.

4. To continue increasing the effective of armed forces and means of war in preparation for a major counter-offensive after the rainy season.

Aware of the weak points of the enemy, the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces had devised very original and flexible fighting methods, bringing into play the surprise factor. So that in spite of his "defensive plans in store", he could not know where and when we struck our blows in order to cope with them effectively. Unable to bring to fruition the four points of his defensive strategy, and thereby firmly maintain his position during monsoon, he met with four surprises, that is, four major defeats in the below-mentioned battlefronts.

First surprise: While the adversary dreaded a big L.A.F. action in the Western High Plateaux and Eastern Nambo, our L.A.F. and people in Quangtri and Thuathien unexpectedly, valiantly, relentlessly and extensively attacked him. The operation had a great bearing on the whole military situation and on the widespread political movement in urban centres at that time. So much so that to stave off the "imminent fall of Hue", he hurriedly brought in nearly two divisions (both of them American and Pak Jung Hi

troops). This upset his whole military plan, frittered the disposition of his forces, scattered combat operations and deprived him of the initiative of action during the rainy season. Meanwhile, the L.A.F. and population in Quangtri and Thuathien steadily continued to take the offensive and killed hundreds of adverse troops, extended the liberated areas to hundreds of villages and hamlets, and freed many thousands of people from the enemy's grip.

Second surprise: The relentless struggle waged by the townsfolk scored progress on both the political and the military fields. Their political struggle attained an extremely extensive development: better organized and led, the masses put forth everywhere, particularly at Dalat, Hue and Saigon, such exacting political slogans as "Thieu, Ky: quit", "Yankee go home". Their armed struggle also made very important headway.

Third surprise: Our successes on the communication front. Most remarkable were the engagements on waterways, such as on the Longtau River, in which the Liberation fighters sent to the bottom more than ten warships, including one of 10,000 tons, and on land communications resulting in the destruction of armoured vehicles, such as on Highway 13 in Eastern Nambo. Strategic arteries like the Mangthit and Dongnai Rivers, Highways 1, 15, 20 and 4, and the North-South Railway remained interdicted, so that the enemy had to mobilize entire regiments to guarantee security to military convoys which, however, could not escape the L.A.F.'s ambushes. To such a point

that U.S. troops were detailed to mount guard, and even then the adversary proved unable to avoid our blows as at Candam and Canle on Highway 13 for instance.

Fourth surprise : During the rainy-season campaign the plain theatre witnessed an even and powerful development of our forces from Quangtri and Thua-thien up north to Camau down south, from Quangnam, Quangngai and Binhthuan to Longan, Bentre, Cantho and Soctrang.

Our successes in this theatre stemmed from our efforts *to make guerilla warfare take a new step forward*, from the valiant spirit shown by our fighters who clung to the people, to the places where they had to operate, to production, and from their determination to frustrate enemy raids. They were also due *to the guiding principle according to which the L.A.F. had to make deep thrusts into weak areas*, hold on and from there fan out with a view to crushing adverse garrisons and posts, suppressing wicked thugs, destroying "strategic hamlets" and smashing the "pacification" plan. This line was so effectively applied that the enemy bitterly complained that in certain places, in a single night, all the people impounded in "strategic hamlets" had left for the Vietcong-controlled areas. Those initial results were very inspiring.

When the 1966-67 dry season set in, with 400,000 U.S. troops (twice as many as at the same period in 1965), nearly 2,000 military vehicles (three times as many), some 3,000 aircraft of various types (one and a half times more) and 24 billion dollars (the double

of what had been earmarked early in 1966), like a gambler incensed by his losses, the American aggressors and their lackeys made feverish preparations for a new counter-offensive. If they had more forces and war means at their disposal than in the previous dry season, they had not forgotten the bitter lessons drawn from it. Therefore, although they recklessly embarked on the same strategic schemes, and continued to strike at us on two fronts by means of a military offensive and "pacification" work, they were aware that the forte of the South Vietnamese people was also the foible of the U.S. troops. Consequently, they showed less recklessness and more cautiousness than in the last dry season, and used more machiavelian methods to reach their strategic aims.

But diamond cut diamond. Confronted with the enemy's new schemes and designs we have armed ourselves with an iron-like determination to foil them and so prepared our forces as to enable them to achieve greater victories than in the past dry season.

Thus, for the second time a grim dry-season trial of strength has unfolded on the battlefield, and though still in its initial stage, it has gone through the following important developments :

First, we have been holding the initiative of action, attacking and driving the enemy into a defensive position since the very beginning. The shelling of the site — right in the heart of Saigon — of the celebrations of the day when native puppets cut one another's throat in a bid for the monopoly of serving U.S. imperialism, heralded the winter offensive campaign of the

Liberation Armed Forces. Before the enemy counteracted, the next day the Eastern Nambo L.A.F. launched an attack on American and puppet units in Tayninh province where they were making feverish preparations for a big raid in the area, and dealt them a telling blow before they started deploying. Immediately, Westmoreland gathered all U.S. mobile forces in Nambo — Infantry Divisions 1 and 25, Paratroop Brigade 173, Light Infantry Brigade 196 and Armoured Regiment 11, 30,000 men in all — and dispatched them to the Duongminhchau zone in an attempt to knock out a powerful regular unit of the L.A.F. in Eastern Nambo allegedly stationed here. But it turned out that nearly three American divisions were pinned down by the L.A.F. at a point in a wild forest of the Duongminhchau zone. The G.I.'s were wiped out when fanning out or surprise attacked and repeatedly and very accurately shelled by artillery when digging in. An entire brigade was practically put out of action in the first few days. The adversary used most varied tactics: decoys to lure the L.A.F. into their traps, helicopter and armoured transport, airpower provided even by B.52's, ultra-rapid artillery, round-the-clock shelling, highly concentrated noxious chemicals sprayed wantonly. All that did not help the most famous U.S. units make any gain. They just roamed about round a corner of the Tayninh forest, driven to bay and into an utter passive state.

Second, in the meantime the L.A.F. in the Western High Plateaux managed *to entice American and puppet troops to the eastern and western sides of the*

Sathay River where they knocked down several of their units in magnificent engagements. They also mounted annihilating assaults on many enemy battalions in Quangnam, Quangngai, Binhdin, Quangtri and Thuathien provinces. In the Saigon area our armed forces and people, coordinating their action with those in Tayninh and the Western High Plateaux, launched fierce attacks — twice on Tansonnhat airfield and three times on the big Longbinh ammunition depot — causing very heavy losses.

Meanwhile, in the Central and Western Nambo provinces such as Longan, Bentre, Rachgia, Cantho, in the course of successive strikes, we smashed many garrisons and posts, promoted guerilla warfare, repressed spies and wicked notables and thugs, thereby expanding the liberated zones, and delivering rather hard blows at the enemy's "pacification" plan.

Third, the above developments turned the biggest U.S. combat operation to date into U.S. most bitter setback, and *the first round of the 1966-67 dry-season into a bloody and tragic curtain-raiser for the Americans and puppets.*

Although in 1966 we met with a number of difficulties caused by the adversary, we scored far-reaching victories and the situation was basically favourable to us. *Because we possessed an invincible revolutionary line and people's war line, a correct leadership, a very high combativeness, which have enabled and will enable us to overcome all difficulties and achieve still greater victories.*

II. OUR STRATEGIC POSITION IS AN OFFENSIVE, STRONG AND WINNING POSITION. THE ENEMY'S IS A DEFENSIVE, WEAK AND LOSING ONE.

Our direct confrontation with three strategic plans of the American aggressors and their henchmen over more than a year — plans which have been successively frustrated — has helped us to make a clearer appraisal of our and the enemy's positions. We can unequivocally assert that *our strategic position is an offensive, strong and winning position whereas the enemy's is a defensive, weak and losing one.*

The extremely reactionary nature and the extremely unjust character of the policy pursued by the American imperialists in their war of aggression constitute the root-cause of all their blunders and failures in the military and political fields, in tactics and technique, in thinking and morale. Moreover, they have been dealing with a people possessed of an excellent revolutionary line and people's war line, long-standing traditions of valiant resistance to foreign invasion, strong national unity and unshakable determination to fight and die for their freedom rather than be enslaved. This has driven the U.S. aggressors and their valets into an impasse which grows more and more critical, in strategy and tactics, in thinking and morale. Their defensive strategic stalemate has compelled them to act counter to all the traditional methods of imperialism as is shown in the following points.

1. The Americans wanted to defeat us with the power of their air and naval forces which they boastfully described as the most up-to-date, the strongest in the world. But they also wanted to win through the agency of their puppets in order not to show their hands as neo-colonialists always do. By mid-1965, in face of the imminent collapse of the Saigon army and administration, they hurriedly threw masses of U.S. troops into the battle, disregarding the lesson of the French Expeditionary Force in Vietnam, and their own experience in Korea where they had learned that committing their ground forces to the mainland of Asia boiled down to grappling with sharks in the high seas.

2. The Americans thought that with the presence of U.S. forces they could boost the morale of the puppet troops and use them for strategic purposes, on the battlefield. Unfortunately, the more G.I.'s came in, the sharper the contradictions between them and the Saigon army became, and the more extensive and quicker the latter's disintegration. According to the Western press, the number of deserters reached at least ten thousand per month.

3. The Americans thought that with a sizable expeditionary force and a huge war apparatus like theirs, they could easily overwhelm our people and fight a blitz war to snatch a quick victory. The warmongers often trumpeted that the war was nearing its end and that the G.I.'s would soon be sent home, etc.. But after their 1966-67 dry-season setback Johnson, McNamara, Dean Rusk and Westmoreland spoke another language ringing with distress. The United States, they

said, should display patience; faithful to the commitments by three American presidents, it will not abandon the "Republic of Vietnam"; many difficulties still lie ahead, and so on.

4. The policy of the American aggressors was to defeat us on two fronts by means of a military offensive and "pacification" work. But chiefly they wanted to win a final military victory in the 1965-66 dry season, or at least a strong position which would help the implementation of the said policy. Their "great" counter-offensive plan was unhappily frustrated too soon and too costly.

Unable to win on the military front the Americans shifted hastily to the other front — "pacification" work. "Pacifying" this heroic land, however, was no easy job for them! Besides, once they had lost militarily what could they achieve on the "pacification" plane? For the prerequisites of a successful "pacification" lay in a military victory, and after a military defeat any hope on this score was indeed a pitiful illusion.

5. The Americans did their best to stabilize the political situation, settle the internal strife among their valets, repress the opposition by force of arms, stage the election farce in Saigon and convene the Manila Conference — in fact a "war council" used by Johnson as a forum to deceive the American and world peoples. In spite of all the pronouncements uttered by the U.S. president, the bloody quarrel in Tactical Zone I, the repression of buddhists in Saigon and Hue, the assassination of Tran Van Van, the

dismissal of General Dang Van Quang from the 4th Tactical Zone Command, and the defeat of Johnson's Democratic Party in the last November elections, clearly spelled out the increasing deterioration of the American aggressors' political situation beset with so many irreconcilable contradictions. In addition, more and more political and armed actions by the masses of the people in the South Vietnamese urban centres had broken out with much bitterness. The political struggles at Dalat, Hue, Saigon and other towns, just as the recent blows at Longbinh, Tansonnhat, Vungtau, Chulai, Danang, Binhduong, Cantho, etc., aggravated the crisis facing the aggressors and accelerated their ultimate failure.

Thus, things evolved against the will of the Americans. They wanted to carry out aggression after a neo-colonialist pattern but had to bring in expeditionary troops. They wanted to fight a blitz war, but had to sustain a protracted one and parry blows for the puppet army, which in practice added to their deterioration. They hoped for political stabilization while their agents proved to be incapable, corrupt and greedy creatures involved in endless internal wrangles. They who reckoned with the annihilation of our regular forces, suffered heavy casualties at the latter's hands. An obstacle to their "pacify-the-countryside" plan, guerilla warfare grew powerfully at the same time as the people's movement in towns and cities kept on developing. The mighty people's war upset their designs and schemes and brought about results contrary to their expectation. Furthermore, it was the intention of the aggressors to wreck North Vietnam

and thus damage our big rear. But North Vietnam remained unruffled and more united, more powerful than ever, wholeheartedly assisting South Vietnam. Never have North and South Vietnam been so close to each other as at present.

And now what is the strategic position of the American imperialists and their lackeys? It may be summarily said that they find themselves in a blind alley on the following scores:

1. They are at a loss how to cut down U.S.-puppet casualties and slow down the tempo of the Saigon army's disintegration.

2. They do not know how many more U.S. expeditionary troops will do (with 200,000 then with 300,000 and even with 400,000 they have got trounced) and what will result from the introduction of more forces in the political, economic and military fields.

3. Unable to cope with the South Liberation Armed Forces and people, with over one million officers and men under their command, they do not know how to fight off — let alone wipe out — the L.A.F. and subdue the Vietnamese people.

4. They do not know how to turn the puppet administration notoriously greedy, thievish, corrupt and full of lust of power and privileges, and the puppet army now disintegrated to the point of virtual paralysis, into an "effectual" tool.

5. They do not know how to bomb North Vietnam into reducing — let alone giving up or ending — its aid to its kith-and-kin South Vietnam.

6. They do not know how to make their unsavoury "will for peace" trick palatable to everyone, etc.

When Johnson, McNamara, Dean Rusk and company, with the assistance of a tremendous war machine, including many scores of generals, show signs of disappointment in the face of a series of unsolvable problems, one wonders where lies their path to victory, if not through the graveyard.

We won in three successive strategic bouts by foiling the Staley plan, the McNamara plan and the plan for "escalating" the war to North Vietnam, thereby bringing the U.S. strategy of "special warfare" to total bankruptcy. Since late 1965 we have won two other contests with the frustration of the 1965-66 dry-season counter-offensive and the monsoon defensive plan. In the third, a fiercer test of strength now going on, we have got the upper hand in the first round. The agresors may recklessly challenge us for a fourth and a fifth duel in future. Fighting for a just cause, guided by a clear-cut strategic line and enjoying the superiority of people's war, determined as they are to achieve independence, freedom and national reunification, our army and people in South Vietnam will surely thwart all of the enemy's perfidious schemes.

Our military and political successes in 1966 were of a very important significance. They have not only demonstrated that *we have foiled in its first stage the U.S. "limited war" waged by some 400,000 American troops, struck hard at the will of aggression of the American imperialists, and driven them into confusion and perplexity. Their successes have also created material and moral conditions for still greater victories at the later stages of the war. They have consolidated and enhanced the confidence of the armed*

forces and people throughout our country, the confidence of our friends and all men of conscience the world over. They have exposed the wickedness and cowardice of the American aggressors as well as the weakness of the "clay-footed colosses".

III. BRIGHT PROSPECTS FOR 1967

How will evolve the situation? With their disposal of more than one million U.S.-puppet and satellite troops, and of a huge volume of steel and iron, which they clamour will substantially increase, what will the Americans undertake in 1967?

Of course they still are strong, still are obdurate and cannot bring themselves to bow to the inevitable, to quit South Vietnam. Clearly, therefore, they will continue their efforts to achieve the strategic designs and objectives they failed to realize in 1966. They will certainly play these trump cards:

— Continuation of the military counter-offensive during the dry season.

— Execution of the "pacification" plan on a wide scale.

That is a two-point program to which both the Americans and the puppets attach great importance, and which they strive to realize with every possible means, fair or foul.

As regards the dry-season military counter-offensive, they will surely go on striking strongly at our liberated zones and our bases in an effort to wipe out

part of our regular forces, destroy our stores and seal off communication-lines, carry on the concentration of the population into "strategic hamlets", encroach upon the territory under our control, and ensure the security of their rear bases. Though they no longer entertain the hope of defeating us militarily, they will do their best to reduce the L.A.F.'s actions to the minimum, thus making an easy "pacification" possible.

Concerning the "pacification" of the countryside, which is none other than an offensive against the population, the "second war" as they put it, nearly all the puppet forces (more or less than 90 per cent) and part of the U.S. and satellite forces (around 10 per cent) are being assigned this job. 60 billion — Saigon currency units — as compared to 15 in 1966, have already been earmarked for this purpose.

Apart from that, in 1967 the Americans will be compelled to introduce combat troops into the Mekong delta for occupation task with a view to providing a prop — not so strong — to the puppet troops in this area.

Though it is a perfidious plan, its very existence already betrays their failure in their attempt to wipe out our armed forces. They wanted to defeat us militarily and having failed to snatch a military victory as well as in the use of puppet troops to confront the L.A.F., they resign themselves to dividing their forces to guard their rear areas, "pacify" the territory, concentrate the population. In so doing they aim at achieving a relative military and political equilibrium in order to deceive our people, and also a position of

strength in view of "peace negotiations". What difficulties will await the American imperialists in this manoeuvre ?

First drawback: This is the same difficulty that beset the execution of the "pacification" plan. Throughout 1966, despite strenuous efforts, they could only fulfil — theoretically — 20 per cent of the plan. Will they be in a position to achieve better results in 1967 ? Their new, larger plan will surely score bigger negative ones. For our people have acquired more experiences and resolutely oppose "pacification"; the puppet troops, badly mauled on the battlefield, will incur still more blows from the population and disintegrate more quickly and on a wider scale ; as to the puppet administration at the grass-root level, it will be simply smashed.

Second drawback: it lies in the fact the G.I.'s will have to occupy the plains. They will be a fat target for the crack shots of the regional troops, guerillas and militiamen. They themselves perfectly know that the plains are our stronghold, our resistance bases over the past twenty years, the cradle of the insurrection movement, especially the Nambo delta — the graveyard of the U.S. "heliborne tactics" and "armoured vehicle tactics"; on this score, typical among other places are Apbac and Chala.

Third drawback: The American and puppet forces will have to split and scatter more extremely than before. This is one of the difficulties plaguing the enemy's strategy for a long time. Concentration provides strong mobile forces but hinders occupation of

territory and control over the population. Dispersal generates weak points, exposes the occupants to the blows of the L.A.F. and people everywhere, in all the three zones (urban centres, plains, and mountains and forests, *Ed.*) and leads to quicker and heavier defeats.

Fourth drawback : The increasingly deteriorating morale of the U.S. and puppet forces, the growing contradictions between the Americans and their lackeys, contradiction that cannot be overcome unless the Yankees go home.

In spite of numerous difficulties, the adversary will display greater recklessness, indulge in more wicked cruelty. The test of strength between him and us will become many times tougher and fiercer.

But, resolute to pursue an invincible revolutionary line and people's war line, armed with very abundant experiences drawn from our confrontation with the U.S. aggressors, and firmly determined to fight until final victory, we shall be perfectly capable of crushing all their designs in 1967. We shall completely foil their military offensive plan as well as their large-scale "pacification" plan.

The movement for the annihilation of American and puppet troops will soon seethingly develop; tens of thousands of them will be knocked down. Guerilla warfare and the anti-"pacification" movement with the whole people taking part will powerfully forge ahead.

If the enemy makes thrusts into our zones, we shall hit at his own; if he massacres our compatriots and damages our bases, we shall strike forcefully at his

rear bases and airfields. If he establishes one "strategic hamlet", our people will destroy two or three. We shall beat him without let-up. The number of puppet troops annihilated and disintegrated will grow in proportion to the number of "pacification" raids that will be undertaken by them. Political actions from urban centres to rural areas will contribute to shaking further the already shaky political foundations of the enemy's regime. That is the inevitable trend of development of our people's war.

We shall never allow ourselves to drift into subjectivism and self-complacency, we shall never shrink from any sacrifice or bitter fighting and do not harbour any illusion about peace as the U.S. imperialists wishfully think. For we very clearly realize that only by means of resolute offensives and by defeating the enemy on the battlefield can we win a complete victory.

We inflicted defeats on 200,000 U.S. troops in 1965, on 400,000 in 1966, and shall surely inflict defeats on them and the puppet and satellite troops in 1967, even if, in response to the appeal made by President Ho Chi Minh and the Presidium of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, we have to deal with 500,000, 600,000 or more American troops and to prolong the resistance war for another ten, fifteen or twenty years. We are determined to fight on and shall certainly win.

BALANCE-SHEET OF VICTORIES

In 1966, the South Vietnam army and people won great victories in all fields, and bolstered their position and strength.

They kept firm and developed their initiative in all theatres of operations, and repeatedly struck at the enemy everywhere :

- Put out of action 370,000 enemy troops (among them 108,000 Americans and nearly 10,000 satellites)
- Annihilated 47 battalions (including 17 infantry battalions and seven armoured squadrons of the American forces) ;
306 companies (among which 79 American and 10 satellite) ;
454 platoons (including 62 American) ;

— Downed and destroyed 2,130 planes, destroyed 3,300 military vehicles :

— Sunk 97 warships and motor launches, wrecked 43 locomotives and 217 carriages ;

— Razed or compelled the enemy to withdraw from 4 military subsectors, 314 posts and watch-towers ;


(Excerpt from the Communique of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces Command on the military achievements of the South Vietnam army and people in 1966).

ANNEXES

TAYNINH BATTLE

According to still incomplete data, from October 28 to November 25, 1966 the armed forces and people of Tayninh, killed, wounded and captured over 2,500 enemy troops, mostly American. Five U.S. field officers lost their lives. If account is taken of enemy losses in Boiloi, Banha, Tabang and Baugon areas (Duong-minhchau district from October 15 to October 28, 1966, the total casualties inflicted on the enemy are as follows: 3,200 troops wiped out; one U.S. battalion, three U.S. companies and six puppet companies neatly annihilated, two U.S. battalions and several U.S. and puppet companies heavily decimated. The U.S. 196th Infantry Brigade completely lost its fighting capacity, 52 U.S. planes were shot down or destroyed, 55 military vehicles of various types (including 20 armoured personnel carriers M.113) and eight artillery pieces put out of action, and hundreds of weapons of various types captured.

These simple figures yet constitute an expression of the marvelous strength of the "Be determined to win" call by the N.F.L.



Presidium, and of the seething mettle of the armed forces and people of Tayninh emulating among themselves in combat actions against the enemy.

The Representative of the South Vietnam Eastern Nambo Command of the L.A.F. stated that in launching their second "dry-season counter-offensive" in 1966, the American aggressors strove to attain three following major objectives :

"Bitterly defeated in last year's dry season, the enemy had, one month before it came to a close, to revert to a defensive position throughout the past six-month rainy season. For two or three months, he had made active preparations for a counter-offensive in the current dry season. At first glance, his operational plans seemed imposing indeed : attacking our rear areas and stores, putting out of action part of our hard-core units, hindering our offensive actions and creating favourable conditions for the puppet troops to carry out the 'pacification' plan. In substance, however, these plans were nothing but strenuous attempts to prevent our tempestuous offensive drive. In other words, these were attacks aimed at ensuring a better defence. One no longer sees the aggressive and daring spirit which characterized American troops when they first landed in South Vietnam at the beginning of the past dry season. This year, General Westmoreland's truculence has also deflated. Besides, realities have developed quite differently from their operational plans. During last year's dry season their objective was to wipe out part of our main forces. Yet, they could not even maim a single platoon of the L.A.F., and instead lost one battalion after another. Since the beginning of this year's dry season, in the Nambo plains alone, that is, not to mention the heavy setbacks sustained by the aggressors in Rachgia and Quangtri provinces, in the Western High Plateaux, the Trungbo plains, Longan and Bentre provinces, all the enemy units thrown into the Tayninh battlefield, viz., the entire 196th Brigade, the 173rd Paratroop Brigade, the 25th Division and the First Infantry Division of the American expeditionary force were badly mauled by Liberation troops. In particular, as lamented one American journalist, the 196th Brigade had "gone back to the drawing board", which means that this unit had been almost entirely put out of action. Obviously, the more reckless

the Americans' 'offensive actions', the greater their passivity. Having put their heads into the noose of our people's war, the more they wriggle the tighter the hold around their neck will become."

To illustrate this point, the Representative of the Eastern Nambo Command gave an account of the combat developments during the last one month or so, dividing them into two specific periods :

"Beginning from October 15, American mobile forces were deployed in three directions in Baria, Bienhoa, Giadinh and Tayninh provinces. They set about attacking our base areas in Tanhlinh, Zone D., Boiloi, Trangbang, Duongminhchau, Godau, Cuchi areas, etc. Everywhere they were fiercely countered by regional troops and guerillas. In Baria province, for example, the guerillas of Ngaigiao, operating along highways, destroyed eight armoured vehicles and a military train. Guerillas of Thudaumot launched a sudden attack on puppet troops at Godau. In particular the armed forces and people of Bienhoa province blew up an artillery dump of 125,000 shells at Longbinh. In an encounter with the enemy, the armed forces and people of Longan killed 144 G.I.'s. In Tayninh province, the guerillas of Boiloi, Banha, Tubang attacked enemy units while on the march and wiped out over 200 American and puppet troops ; on October 28, they again knocked down 100 G.I.'s at Camxe ; on October 3 regional forces in Duongminhchau district wiped out 70 G.I.'s while the guerillas of Banha in a four-day engagement put out of action another 140.

Thereafter, on November 3, combining military actions, political struggle and agitation among enemy troops, the armed forces and people of Tayninh simultaneously attacked and broke the grip of a series of enemy posts and 'strategic hamlets' at Batuoi, and fiercely shelled the rear base of the 196th Infantry Brigade, and the military sub-sectors of Phuocninh, Trangbang, Godau, Baudon. These actions resulted in further confusion among, and disintegration of, the local puppet troops. To alleviate the latter's plight, the 196th Brigade and two battalions of the American Special Forces were thrown into action. The L.A.F. went on attacking on November 4 and 5. The 196th Brigade which the Americans have boastfully described as the "most recent invention" of

the Pentagon, the "most mobile" infantry formation, the "most effective" in anti-guerilla action, received heavy blows at the hands of the L.A.F. in Tay Ninh. Of the two American battalions fielded one was completely wiped out and several companies badly mauled. The entire brigade subsequently lost its combat capacity and had to be sent back to the rear for reorganization. Two puppet Civil Guard battalions acting as probing elements for the American forces, were heavily struck, while one of their companies was completely annihilated.

This dangerous situation drove the aggressors into utter passivity. As a result, they had to stop short all military operations in other provinces, and hastily dispatch their 25th Division, First Infantry Division and 173rd Paratroop Brigade to Tay Ninh. With over 30,000 American and puppet troops, 40 military vehicles, 130 artillery pieces of various calibres, and air support from several hundred planes including B.52's, the aggressors hoped that by making deep thrusts into our base areas they would be able to compel our troops to rush back and thus succeed in decimating part of our hard-core units, and also hinder our offensive drive. But holding firmly the initiative, the L.A.F. continued to attack the enemy both head-on and on their rear. Hardly had the 'Tropical Lightning' 25th Division stepped into the battle when it was readily met by the Liberation forces. Two of its battalions sustained heavy losses at a point north of Baugon while one company was neatly knocked down at Khedu. In addition, units of this division were intercepted in various places by the guerillas of Baugon, Giengchi, Catum, Baucan, etc., who inflicted losses upon both infantry and armoured elements. Soon after it went into action, the First Infantry Division lost one company at Chado, and had two other companies badly mauled, while the 173rd Brigade was bitterly battered during its withdrawal. Far from making effective use of the high mobility afforded them by their air force, of the 'leap-frog' tactics in order to launch lightning attacks and wipe out the L.A.F., the aggressors were instead taken by surprise by the latter, and lost entire companies and battalions. Baugon was an example. To no avail did they resort to the

method of airdropping puppet troops first with a view to lessening their own casualties: both they and their lackeys incurred heavy losses... the 'leap-frog' tactics involving the landing of artillery and M. 113 armoured carriers could in no way compensate for the deteriorating morale of the American and puppet forces. The infantrymen were in effect reluctant to leave carriers or venture beyond artillery range, always wandering in and around a few points. This made them easy targets for the L.A.F.

While the aggressors were being dogged at every step, continuously decimated and wiped out in Tayninh, our armed forces and people in the contested zones, the cities and the enemy's base areas stepped up ever more enthusiastically their attacks on all theatres of operations. From November 12 to 18, at Longan they annihilated four regular and civil guard companies. Numerous engagements took place in Giadinh province, causing the destruction of several bridges on the approaches to Saigon, and particularly noteworthy were the attacks on Phuthohoa and Phulam police stations in the outskirts of Saigon. On November 15, 1966 an American company was wiped out at eight kilometres from Bienhoa city. In the night of November 16, the car park and temporary cantonment of the 11th U.S. autonomous armoured regiment at Suoiram was subjected to intense artillery shelling. On November 21, the same regiment fell into an ambush and lost another eleven M.41 cars and six lorries fully loaded with troops. A second raid was launched on the Longbinh ammunition dump, Thudaumot province, and the regrouping base of thousands of American troops at Dautieng was attacked on seven occasions, resulting in about one hundred men killed and seven aircraft destroyed. Another enemy ranger company was subsequently wiped out on the very approaches to Tayninh provincial capital, while the Liberation forces continued to threaten communication-lines and break the enemy's grip over the "strategic hamlets". On November 11, Dautieng was again shelled with more than hundred American troops killed and tens of aircraft destroyed; were also shelled the rear areas of the 196th Brigade and, later on, the enemy positions in Dongpan, Baucan, Suoida... These shellings hit accurately at the Command posts of U.S. army brigades and divisions, and took a heavy toll of the aggressors. Thus, the

deeper the enemy's thrusts into our base areas to secure initiative of action and save their face, the more bitter losses they suffered. In the meantime, their own rear base areas were ever more seriously threatened, and their 'pacification' plan confronted with the danger of going bankrupt. At last, they had to withdraw quietly, alleging that 'the Vietcong were nowhere to be found'. And in doing so the 173rd Brigade and 25th Division met hard blows, and on the night of November 25/26, the U.S. Operational Command located at Dautieng was again subjected to fierce shelling, resulting in more than 300 troops killed or injured."

The Representative of the Eastern Nambo Command then pointed out the great significance of the recent successes in the area.

"1. At the very start of the Winter-Spring period, the armed forces and people of Tayninh province have dealt a strong blow at all American mobile forces in Eastern Nambo, wiping out an important part of their effective. In particular the 196th Brigade, which constituted the main striking force in Tayninh province, lost much of its fighting capacity and the U.S. Special Forces, many companies. This heavily affected the enemy's over-all counter-offensive plan in the current dry season in Eastern Nambo.

2. Holding the initiative in counter-attacking and wiping out American crack troops thrown against the liberated areas, our armed forces in Tayninh penetrated deeply into the enemy's rear, razing to the ground many of their garrisons and posts, putting out of action a large number of his troops, thus effectively helping our countrymen to break the enemy's grip over the 'strategic hamlets'. The resounding victories in the liberated areas coupled with the successful attacks on the American and puppet strongholds and the break-up of the enemy's grip in his own rear, have resulted in a further disintegration of the puppet troops, and ever-greater enthusiasm on our side. This is a serious blow dealt at the 'pacification' plan to which both the Americans and their henchmen attach paramount importance.

Along with the above victories, the armed forces and people of Tayninh succeeded in attracting over 30,000 American troops into a small battlefield, and in compelling the enemy to abandon

the military operations in other areas. This situation was duly exploited by the armed forces and people of other provinces to inflict significant losses on the adversary and liberate more territory.

3. The armed forces and people of Tayninh province made great progress in ensuring a harmonious co-ordination between the various theatres of operations, and the three categories of armed forces, as well as a good combination of military actions, political struggle and persuasion work among enemy troops. Regular forces, regional troops and district and village guerillas in our base areas had the opportunity to test their fighting capacity. They attacked the enemy wherever he was, whether he advanced, pitched his camps or withdrew. Everywhere, the guerillas could manage to take a substantial toll of enemy troops, armoured vehicles and aircraft, thereby creating favourable conditions for the regulars to neatly wipe out many American and puppet units. After their confrontation with 30,000 G.I.'s our army and people have come to realize better the enemy's weaknesses, and assess more accurately our own capacity and superiority, something which has further enhanced their own confidence and determination to fight and defeat the U.S. aggressors. This is a highly important factor which heralds many more feats of arms in the days to come."

In conclusion, the Representative of the Eastern Nambo Command, stated :

"At the beginning of the current dry season, the armed forces and people in Tayninh as well as throughout Eastern Nambo scored major victories. The American aggressors sustained heavy losses in Operation *Attleboro*; their 'pacification' plan was crippled, and a significant number of American and puppet troops wiped out. These of their reverses will certainly lead to further dislocations in their overall scheme for a second 'dry-season counter-offensive' in Eastern Nambo. Our victories have enhanced the revolutionary enthusiasm of our army and people, debunked the enemy's prestige and drove him into greater passivity. Important as they are, these successes are but initial ones and a small contribution to the brilliant and far-reaching victories scored by our army and people throughout South Vietnam. With


the impetus generated by those victories bright prospects lie ahead of us. Responding with seething enthusiasm to the 'Be determined to win' call of the N.F.L. Presidium, the armed forces and people in Tayninh as well as throughout Eastern Nambo are resolute to surge forward more vigorously, and stand prepared to smash all enemy new counter-offensive schemes against the liberated zones, while continuing to launch attacks deep in the contested zones, the cities and enemy rear base areas, to frustrate their 'pacification' plan, and liberate more territory. We will certainly achieve still more brilliant victories and, together with the army and people throughout South Vietnam, make a worthy contribution to foiling the American aggressors' second 'dry-season counter-offensive' plan."

PLEIJRANG BATTLE

Pleijrang, a strategically important region on the Western High Plateau

Pleijrang is a narrow valley near the Cambodian border, about 40 km west-northwest of Pleiku provincial capital. The American aggressors set up there an "enclave" defended by a puppet ranger unit. An outpost defending the western flank of Pleiku town and sheltering three brigades of U.S. Infantry Divisions № 4 and № 25, it is regarded as a very important position. It was at Pleijrang that one battalion of Division № 25 (*Tropical Lightning*) was neatly wiped out by the Djrai Liberation Armed Forces on May 28, 1966.

The area west-northwest of Pleijrang, which belongs to Kontum province bordering on Cambodia, is covered with thick forest and watered by the Krongpoco River. Between this river and the Cambodian border flows the Sathay River where from October 26 to November 19, 1966, in close co-ordination with the Djrai troops and population, the Kontum L.A.F. and guerillas, known for their traditional indomitable spirit, intercepted the enemy in several mopping-up operations, dealt telling blows at American and puppet troops, and won resounding victories.



Initial hard blows for U.S. Infantry Division № 4

Since mid-October 1966, the Pleijrang garrison had been frequently invested and threatened by the guerillas. Fearing annihilation, the puppet rangers cabled for help every day.

This was a ticklish problem for the American commanders, as they have made it a rule "not to let the Vietcong apply their classical tactics of attacking the post in order to lure in and knock down reinforcements". But without reinforcements, Pleijrang would fall, the western gates of Pleiku would be forced open and the rear base of the three brigades of Divisions № 4 and № 25 directly threatened. Now sending to the rescue a puppet army unit whose morale was sagging would not help, while dispatching American troops would amount to falling into the "Vietcong troops". But not to bring in G.I.'s would give substance to the puppet troops' charge of cowardice and to blemish the "prestige" of the U.S. Ground Forces.

The Americans were finally compelled to send a rescuing party by air-drop so as to secure a foothold, and from there strike at the rear of the L.A.F.

On October 20, 1966, they ordered puppet rangers to make a deep thrust west of Pleijrang in an attempt to use them as a decoy to allure the L.A.F.. Their artillery and aircraft, including B.52 strategic bombers, repeatedly struck at areas suspected to be the refuge of the people's armed forces, in the hope of crushing partially the strength of their adversary and thus creating conditions for their units to arrive "safety" at destination.

After a heavy bombing and shelling, on the morning of October 26, Brigade № 2, Infantry Division № 4, led by a battalion of puppet troops, was heliborne to a locality about 13km west-northwest of Pleijrang, east of the Sathay River.

No sooner had the Yankees landed that they built a defence line with many *points d'appui* defended each by a company capable of rescuing another. The whole day, their artillery and aircraft struck at the areas surrounding their encampment, confident as they were that in its first operation far from its base, Infantry Division № 4 would be able to make a "safe" landing in the dense jungle of the Western High Plateau. However, just

on the same night, in a skilful movement, the Kontum L.A.F. delivered a first blow at the enemy, killing over 40 G.I.'s and puppet troops.

On the night of October 28, the L.A.F. unremittingly attacked three encampments, at the same time wiping out two American companies and badly mauling another. The Liberation fighters displayed admirable courage and resourcefulness. The enemy had to call for airplanes to drop flares and profusely pounded our lines with heavy guns without being able to save his footmen. *U.P.I.* admitted that in this battle, Infantry Division № 4 landed in Vietnam just two months before and having no experiences as yet, had been delivered a bitter blow by seasoned "Vietcong" troops.

On October 29, enemy aircraft frenziedly bombed and strafed the jungle area west of Pleijrang. As no major activity was reported on the part of the L.A.F., on the same night American field commanders cabled to Saigon that "the communists had been repelled", while the American brasshats here boastfully stated that the "communists had apparently withdrawn to the jungle".

Meanwhile, the L.A.F. were closely watching the least activities of the enemy. After a relatively quiet week, at 9 a.m. on November 5, an enemy company venturing west of its base was wiped out and another badly mauled in an ambush mounted by the L.A.F.. The attack came as a surprise for the Yankees, all the more so as they had just submitted the area to a heavy bombing and shelling.

Panic-stricken, the remnants of the American troops stationed east of the Sathay River flocked together to dig in.

But this was only a foretaste for Infantry Division № 4.

Six heavy blows in eleven days

After these blows, the Yankees tried to explain their failure as due to an erroneous landing and argued that they should "hop in further" if they wanted to free themselves from the pressure of the L.A.F. at Pleijrang.

On November 9, after a reinforcement of American troops at Pleiku, three puppet ranger companies were heliborne west of

the Sathay River, about 23km west-northwest of Pleijrang and 10 km from the American encampment east of that river.

Accurately guessing the direction of the enemy, on November 10 the L.A.F. neatly wiped out two puppet companies clearing the way for the Yankees. Believing that the L.A.F. had been caught in the snare set with the puppet troops as decoy, the Yankees immediately landed two battalions, Infantry Division № 4 — supported by artillery, M. 113 amphibious cars and two companies of puppet rangers — near the battlefield in an attempt to encircle the L.A.F..

Instead of deploying company-size strength this time they made two *points d'appui* defended each by one American infantry battalion, one artillery company and one 106.7-mm mortar platoon. In order to prevent the L.A.F.'s surprise attacks, they placed obstacles and built fortifications, including prefab blockhouses and planted puppet rangers in the outer line. Part of Infantry Division № 25 was landed south of the encampments of Division № 4 to take the L.A.F. in a tight pincer west of the Sathay River.

Despite a round-the-clock bombing and shelling around the American harracks, on November 10 the L.A.F. stormed the enemy artillery positions east of the Sathay River, annihilating an artillery company and destroying six 105-mm guns. Beaten on two flanks, on November 11 the Americans sent out a puppet commando company which was immediately wiped out at 3 km from its base.

While the enemy was at a loss for a way out, one of his battalions stationed in the north fell under the attack of the L.A.F. : on November 12, at 5 p.m. the battalion was pounded by guns of various descriptions ; the first shellings hit its C.P. and signal centre and silenced its gun emplacements. At the thick of the engagement C.47 planes dropped over 200 flares for other aircraft to homb all around the battlefield. Our shock troops swiftly split the American formations into small groups and wipe them out one after another. In this attack which lasted some twenty minutes, the L.A.F. completely knocked down a battalion, an artillery company with six 105-mm guns and a platoon with three 106.7-mm mortars, all of them belonging to Infantry Division № 4. The puppet ranger battalion defending the outer perimeter was

also annihilated. The battalion stationed in the south did not dare go to the rescue of their mates badly battered in the north. Only the next morning, when the L.A.F. had withdrawn and B.52 planes had wantonly bombed the battlefield, did it deploy company-size units to prevent an eventual attack by the L.A.F..

By 1.p.m. a company of about 180 men from Brigade № 3, Infantry Division № 25, went south of the battlefield in search of the L.A.F. but was annihilated not far from its starting point. *U.P.I.*, November 14, bitterly remarked that it was an unfortunate company.

The same afternoon, the remnants of Infantry Division № 4 stationed west of the Sathay River was ordered to fall back immediately to its base, but to cover up this bitter defeat, the same day, the American brasshats in Saigon trumpeted that their artillery and air force had repelled the communists west of Pleijrang.

After four days of relative calmness, the Yankees believed that the "communists" had withdrawn and on November 10, at noon, two companies of Brigade № 3, Infantry Division № 25, propped up by artillery and aircraft, made a deep thrust west of the Sathay River. Taking the situation in hands, the L.A.F. intercepted this rescuing party on a battlefield prepared at 28 km west-northwest of Pleijrang and annihilated it wholesale. After this thundering blow, the enemy ran higgledy piggledy, leaving behind 50 deaths and a quantity of weapons and military equipment. Thus, in eleven days from November 9 to 19, U.S. Infantry Division № 4 and № 25 and the puppet rangers at Pleijrang received six stinging blows from the L.A.F..

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
All told, in 31 days (from October 16 to November 19, 1966), the Kontum armed forces and people won brilliant victories. They wiped out one battalion and six companies of U.S. infantry, two companies and one platoon of U.S. artillery, destroyed seventeen 105-mm guns and 106.7-mm mortars, wiped out four companies of puppet rangers, wore down many other American and puppet units, shot down twelve aircraft of various types and seized a big haul of arms and military equipment.

Thus, the Kontum armed forces and people have inflicted great defeats on U.S. Infantry Division № 4, known to be the "veteran" of the U.S. Ground Forces and boasted to achieve the "most outstanding deeds" and to be capable of doing everything, while Infantry Division № 25 dubbed "Tropical Lightning", "thoroughly broken to jungle warfare", had to parry hard blows and suffer hundreds of casualties in the jungle of Kontum.

THE BATTLE OF NORTH QUANGTRI

At the beginning of 1966, in co-ordination with the army and people throughout South Vietnam, who were smashing the first American "dry-season counter-offensive", the armed forces and people of Quangtri, Thuathien and Hue staged repeated attacks combined with political struggle and persuasion work on puppet troops, disintegrating by big chunks several puppet security, militia and even regular units. As a result, the puppet First Division had no more fighting capacity and could not cope with the Liberation troops, for many among them refused to go on raiding and reinforcement missions but instead sympathized with, and supported, the people's struggle against the American aggressors and the Thieu-Ky clique.

The concerted uprising of the people in the province of Quangtri and Thuathien swept like storms, and guerilla warfare developed vigorously. Western press admitted that the "Vietcong"-controlled areas lay at the gates of Hue city and that no G.I. dared to go there for he knew that the guerillas would interdict him.



To save the puppets in the First Tactical Zone from annihilation the Americans had to go in and fight the guerillas.

On July 15, 1966, more than ten thousand American and puppet troops rushed to the approaches of Highway 9 (Quangtri) in what was called Operation *Hastings*.

However, ten days later, under the continual attacks of the Liberation forces, over 15 battalions, including seven American marine had to withdraw to their bases, with 1,600 killed and wounded.

The American scheme to occupy Quangtri had failed since the day the G.I.'s were landed there, but a number of marine battalions had nevertheless to encamp on Highway 9 to prop the puppet forces. Said *A.F.P.* on October 11 : the presence of G.I.'s here is completely unexpected and unforeseen in such a dense jungle.

Therefore, they hastily consolidated their encampments and unceasingly raided their environs to prevent untoward blows by the Liberation fighters. However, all their operations were strongly rebuffed. On August 17, one U.S. company was annihilated near Camlo while attempting to retake Daumau lost on June 27. In the small hours of August 18, nearly 100 Americans were knocked down as soon as they alighted from choppers on Hien village (five kilometres northwest of Daumau). In the night of August 25, the artillery emplacement of U.S. marines two kilometres west of Camlo was razed, two artillery companies and one guard company knocked down and six 105-mm and 155-mm guns along with seven tanks destroyed.

After many days of wanton bombing on the area west of Giolinh and blatant use of B.52's on the demilitarized zone to massacre and terrorize people, on September 15 the Americans raked five marine battalions at Chulai - Danang, and launched them together with the puppet troops against Gioan - Gioson (west of Giolinh). This was a big operation involving all the three kinds of arms : naval, air and ground forces.

The enemy concentrated many warships along the coast, including the helicopter-carrier Iujima, to land troops and provide artillery support to the operation.

However, the detachments at Tanloc, Hathuong and Kemon were grimly counter-attacked. Those alighted from choppers had to fight their way back to Hathuong while others were pinned down on the spot.

On September 16 and 17, the Americans put in more motorized units to help the marines break the encirclement and storm Longson, Tanan, Lacson and Andinh (about seven kilometres from their landing places on September 15). The regionals and guerrillas then closed in on the enemy, killed many of them and delayed their movement, thus enabling the armed forces and people to consolidate their defence works. As a result, the first adverse column which reached Longson fell under heavy fire and suffered many casualties. According to an *A.P.* correspondent, two companies were invested, ran short of food and were almost completely wiped out. A *U.P.I.* despatch also disclosed that for thirty-six hours running some hundred leathernecks were under mortar and machinegun fire from all sides, while the survivors wailed that it was hell broken loose.

In the night of September 15 and 17, a detachment of Liberation fighters launched surprise attacks on the enemy artillery emplacements at Thienchanh (northwest of Dongha) and Hoathanh (three kilometres west-southwest of Camlo), putting out of action 542 aggressors. In the raid against Hoathanh alone two American artillery companies got heavy losses: ten 105-mm and 155-mm guns along with one 106.7-mm mortar were destroyed, and 342 men captured.

Throughout the operation the enemy mustered many aircraft from armed helicopters up to F.4 and F.105 jet fighters to support their infantry, but they lost their sting in face of people's war (*U.P.I.*, September 21).

Closely co-ordinating the three categories of armed forces* and acting up to the motto "everybody is a fighter", the army men

* regulars, regionals and militia members.

and people of Quangtri organized fighting very skilfully, combated in a most flexible, resourceful and energetic manner, now fiercely attacking, now rapidly falling back to wrest the initiative and counter-attack powerfully. Thus, after only six days (September 15 to 21) the enemy operations ended in a flop. The army men and people of Quangtri decimated nearly 1,000 aggressors, downed five aircraft, destroyed and damaged thirteen heavy guns, mortars and three armoured carriers.

Having sustained severe losses the Americans had to move their Second Paratroop Battalion at Giabinh (seven kilometres from Dongha) to their rear bases for re-establishment.

Together with their activities west of Giolinh, the Liberation fighters also wiped out many of the enemy troops north of Daumau and Tanlam in several engagements at Heights 300 and 216, Hien and Tre villages. In an attack on Height 400 (six kilometres north-northwest of Daumau) one group of Liberation troops checked a whole U.S. marine battalion during three days (September 26 to 28), putting out of action more than one hundred men. American correspondent Borgrove wrote in the *Newsweek* of October 10, 1966 that while slogging through the jungle he saw several bones and pieces of leatherneck uniform stained with dry blood, and was said that one marine company had lost 60 per cent of its effective in killed and wounded there.

According to Borgrove, the company had fallen under the fire of the group of Liberation fighters from Height 400, run short of food for twenty-four hours and had been unable to carry away their dead and injured. For the Americans involved in this engagement, he said, it was hell on earth.

For over three months of fighting against the American expeditionary force, an enemy superior in number and armament, the armed forces and people of Quangtri won success after success. According to still incomplete figures from *Liberation Press Agency*, from the day Operation *Hastings* began (July 15 and 16) followed by the *Prairie* up to now the Quangtri Liberation armed forces wiped out about 3,000 of the enemy, among them 2,200

Americans, destroyed nearly 20 heavy guns of 105-mm and 155-mm, downed nearly 40 aircraft of various kinds including jet fighters and B.57 bombers.

Through the above glorious victories the Quangtri Liberation armed forces have grown up rapidly in all fields : organization, command, technique and tactics. The enemy is being driven to a defensive position and compelled to give battle in a terrain unfavourable to them. They are thus caught in a dilemma whether to stay or to withdraw, and will be all the more beaten as they try to wriggle out of the quagmire.

U.S. «ESCALATION»

<i>American troops in South Vietnam</i>	<i>December 31,65</i>	<i>December 31,66</i>
	190,000	380,000
<i>War material</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1966</i>
	2,000 aircraft	3,900 aircraft
	1,500 tanks and armoured cars	3,000 tanks and armoured cars
<i>War expenditures</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1966</i>
	12 billion	24 billion
<i>Bombs and shells used</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>1966</i>
	480,000 tons	1,137,000 tons

In comparaisn with the Korean war

<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>Korea</i>	<i>Vietnam</i>
	1,083 from 1950 to 1953	3,900 in 1966
<i>Bombs and shells</i>	448,366 tons from 1950 to 1953	1,137,000 tons in 1966

American units in South Vietnam as compared with U.S. ground forces available

<i>In South Vietnam until December 1966</i>	<i>U.S. infantry</i>
7 divisions	21 divisions
4 brigades	
1 armoured regiment	

U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN 1966

<i>1) American and Pak Jung Hi troops put out of action</i>	
<i>1965</i>	<i>1966</i>
19,200 G.I.'s	108,000 G.I.'s and over
	10,000 Pak Jung Hi troops

2) *American and Pak Jung Hi units annihilated*

1965		1966
— 6 U.S. infantry battalions	-- 20 U.S. infantry and artillery battalions	
— 4 U.S. armoured squadrons	— 7 U.S. armoured squadrons	
— 12 U.S. companies	— 79 U.S. companies	
	— 10 Pak Jung Hi companies	

3) *American aircraft downed and damaged*

1962	1965	1966
200	1,337	2,130

4) *Puppet troops deserted*

1962	1965	1966
27,200	113,000	180,000

MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1966

I — QUANGTRI-THUATHIEN THEATRE

March 9 : Asau, Thuathien province : five puppet companies annihilated.

March 27-28 : Trieuphong, Quangtri province : 300 puppet troops wiped out and 4 M.113 armoured cars destroyed.

June 30 : Caunhi, Thuathien province : 2nd battalion of the puppet 2nd Marine Regiment annihilated (including 1 American colonel), 50 weapons captured, 1 aircraft downed, and 25 military vehicles destroyed.

July 14-26 : Road No 9, North Quangtri : *Operation Hastings* : 1,688 enemy troops (including 1,250 U.S. marines) wiped out and 30 aircraft downed.

December 10 : Anlo, Thuathien province : 1 puppet battalion, 1 puppet company and 4 puppet platoons knocked out, and five 105-mm guns destroyed.

II — SOUTH CENTRAL VIETNAM THEATRE

A) Quangnam province

January 10-17 : North Quangnam : 400 troops put out of action (including 300 G.I.'s) and 4 aircraft downed.

April 15 : Dailoc : 374 G.I.'s and puppets wiped out (including 1 U.S. marine company), and 9 aircraft downed or destroyed on the ground.

August 6-13 : Queson-Tamky : 1,500 troops wiped out (including 750 U.S. marines), 25 helicopters downed, 1 G.M.C. truck and 13 M.113 armoured cars destroyed.

B) Quangngai province

January 28 - February 16 : Moduc - Ducpho : Operation *Double Eagle* : 1 puppet battalion, 4 puppet companies and 1 U.S. marine company or 2,039 troops (including 1,266 G.I.s) put out of action.

March 4-5 : Donggiap-Hill 62 : Operation *Texas* : 2 battalions and 4 companies of the U.S. 3rd Marine Division annihilated, 20 aircraft downed and 12 M. 113 armoured cars destroyed.

June 12 : Gocam - Quanthom : 1 puppet battalion and 1 puppet company wiped out, 2 puppet battalions heavily decimated, and 5 M.113 armoured cars destroyed.

June 22 : Moduc : 2nd battalion of the puppet 4th Regiment and one puppet ranger platoon annihilated, 2 battalions of the puppet 5th Regiment heavily decimated, and 13 G.M.C. trucks and 2 jeeps destroyed.

July 15 : Gosoi, Binhson district : 1 U.S. marine battalion and 2 puppet platoons annihilated.

C) Binhdinh province

January 27 - March 7 : North Binhdinh : Operations *Masher* and *White Wing* : 9,166 troops put out of action (including 5,160 G.I.'s or 2 battalions and 4 companies of the U.S. First Airmobile Cavalry Division, and 1,255 Pak Jung Hi mercenaries).

March 25 - 29 : Tuyphuoc - Phucat - Annhon : 857 troops (mainly Pak Jung Hi mercenaries) wiped out and 2 helicopters downed.

September 22 : Mot Mountain, Phucat district : Attack on the logistic base of the U.S. First Airmobile Cavalry Division : 1,000 G.I.'s wiped out, 60 aircraft and 140 G.M.C. trucks destroyed.

December 27 : Xuanson : 2 battalions and 1 sapper platoon of the U.S. First Airmobile Cavalry Division (600 G.I.'s) annihilated in 13 minutes, 4 aircraft, 11 105-mm and 155-mm guns and 2 81-mm mortars destroyed.

D) Phuyen province

January 19 - February 19 : Sonhoa - Tuyhoa : Operation *Vanburen* : 2,649 troops (including 1,079 G.I.'s and 1,288 Pak Jung Hi mercenaries) wiped out, including 1 U.S. and 2 Pak Jung Hi companies completely annihilated, and 12 aircraft downed.

June 18 - 25 : Dongxuan - Tuyhoa : 1,509 troops (including 1,402 G.I.'s) put out of action, 1 aircraft and 38 helicopters of U.S. 101st Parachute Brigade and U.S. First Airmobile Cavalry Division shot down.

III — WESTERN HIGH PLATEAU THEATRE

February 15-20 : Iadrang, north of Banmethuot : 600 troops wiped out and 15 military vehicles destroyed.

March 30 : Pleime, Gialai province : 2 companies of the U.S. First Airmobile Cavalry Division annihilated, 9 aircraft (including 2 B.57's) downed.

May 21 - June 10 : Pleijrang and north of Kontum : 2,500 troops (including 1,380 G.I.'s) wiped out : 1 U.S. battalion, 4 U.S. companies, 6 U.S. infantry platoons, 3 U.S. artillery platoons and 4 puppet companies completely annihilated and 2 puppet battalions heavily decimated ; 5 M.113 armoured cars destroyed.

July 24 - August 8 : Pleime, Gialai province : 700 G.I.'s or 1 company and 3 platoons of U.S. First Airmobile Cavalry Division put out of action, and 7 military vehicles destroyed.

October 28 - November 24 : Pleijrang : 1 battalion, 6 companies, and 4 platoons of U.S. infantry, 2 companies and 1 platoon of U.S. artillery and 4 puppet companies annihilated, 14 aircraft downed, 17 105-mm guns and 106.7-mm mortars destroyed.

November 29 : Road № 20, Lamdong : 1 armoured squadron wiped out, 2 companies wiped out, 1 company heavily decimated, 14 military vehicles and 3 guns destroyed.

IV — EASTERN NAMBO THEATRE

- February 24* : Nhado - Bongtrang, Bienhoa province : Operation *Rolling Stone* : 2 battalions of First Brigade, U.S. First Infantry Division wiped out, 1 Australian battalion heavily decimated, and 2 squadrons of 48 tanks and armoured cars destroyed.
- April 3 - 11* : Lamxuan - Tambo, Baria province : 1,200 G.I.'s wiped out (1 battalion annihilated, another heavily decimated, both belonging to U.S. First Infantry Division), 21 aircraft downed or damaged, 19 military vehicles destroyed.
- June 8* : Road № 13, Candam, Thudaumot province : 1 tactical group of 3 squadrons of tanks and armoured cars annihilated, 57 vehicles destroyed, 300 G.I.'s and 200 puppet troops put out of action, and 8 aircraft downed.
- June 30* : Road № 13, Canle, Thudaumot province : 1 tactical group of 43 tanks and armoured cars destroyed, 300 G.I.'s wiped out and 5 aircraft shot down.
- July 9* : Xacat - Minhthanh, Thudaumot province : 1 tactical group of 35 tanks and armoured cars annihilated, 400 G.I.s put out of action, and 8 aircraft downed.
- November 2 - 21* : Tayninh : Operation *Attleboro* : 3,200 troops (mostly G.I.'s), including 1 U.S. battalion and 3 U.S. companies, 6 puppet companies wiped out and 2 U.S. battalions heavily decimated, 52 military vehicles destroyed and 52 aircraft downed or damaged.

V — SAIGON-CHOLON-CUCHI THEATRE

- January 1 - 7* : Duchoa - Duchue, Cholon : Operation *Marauder* : 900 troops (including 729 G.I.'s and satellites) wiped out, 11 aircraft downed, and 11 M. 113 armoured cars destroyed.
- January 8 - 19* : North Cuchi, Giadinh province : Operation *Crimp* : 1,438 G.I.'s killed and 208 G.I.'s and Pak Jung Hi mercenaries wounded.
- May 16 - 25* : Cuchi : 618 troops wiped out (including 609 G.I.'s of First Brigade, U.S. First Infantry Division, and Second Brigade, U.S. 25th Infantry Division), 26 aircraft downed, 29 armoured cars destroyed and 10 military vehicles damaged.

July 11 : Hunglong, Nhabe district, Saigon - Giadinh : 220 G.I.'s and puppet troops killed and 150 others wounded.

July 19 : Cuchi : 2 companies of U.S. 25th Infantry Division annihilated.

Longtau River

August 23 : the 10,000-ton cargo Baton Rouge Victory sunk.

August 28-29 : 3 U.S. minesweepers sunk.

October 7 : 1 L.C.T. sunk, another heavily damaged.

VI — NAMBO THEATRE

February 8 - 12 : Giongrieng - Tanhop, Rachgia province : 1,130 troops wiped out, 8 M.113 armoured cars destroyed, and 7 aircraft shot down or heavily damaged.

May 25 : Myho, Myan district, Mytho province : 3rd puppet battalion, 15th Regiment, Ninth Division and 1 platoon annihilated.

October 6 - 13 : Mocay, Bentre province : 600 troops put out of action, and 9 posts razed to the ground.

October 18 : Goquao, Rachgia province : 1,000 puppet troops, 31st Regiment, 21th Division, wiped out.

October 27 : Chauthanh district, Soctrang province : 300 troops (including 1 American colonel killed and another wounded) put out of action.

October 28 : Coco, Soctrang province : 3 warships sunk, 3 others damaged and 1 aircraft downed.

ATTACKS ON U.S. AIRFIELDS IN 1966

January 24 : Nuocman (Danang) : 130 G.I.'s put out of action, 34 aircraft destroyed.

January 30 : Phuloi, Thudaumot province : 300 G.I.'s wiped out, 72 aircraft, 3 armoured cars, 7 guns and many barracks destroyed.

February 2 : Phucat, Binhdin province : 110 G.I.'s put out of action, 30 aircraft and 5 military vehicles destroyed.

February 19 : Ankhe strategic and air base, Gialai province : 497 G.I.'s wiped out, 97 aircraft destroyed.

February 20 : Tranoc, Cantho province : 295 G.I.'s put out of action, 65 aircraft destroyed or heavily damaged.

February 24 : Phuloi, Thudaumot province : 100 G.I.'s wiped out, 15 aircraft destroyed.

February 28 : Tamky, Quangnam province : 100 G.I.'s put out of action, 3 tents destroyed.

March 12 : Vungtau strategic sea base, Baria province : 200 G.I.'s (including 1 colonel) and 200 puppets wiped out, 30 aircraft destroyed.

March 21 : Phanthiet, Binhthuan province : 1 350,000-litre petrol depot burnt, 2 helicopters, 5 military vehicles and 4 machine-guns destroyed.

March 22 : Camly, Dalat province : 1 petrol dump burnt, many aircraft destroyed.

March 23 : Chulai, Quangnam province : 200 G.I.'s put out of action, 1 petrol depot burnt, 52 jets, 2 M.113's and 8 U.S. barracks destroyed or heavily damaged.

March 27 : Xuanloc, Bienhoa province : 239 troops (including 106 G.I.'s) wiped out, 25 aircraft destroyed.

March 30 : Travinh : 3 aircraft, 2 military vehicles and 1 barrack destroyed.

April 13 : Tansonnhat strategic air base, Saigon : 300 U.S. airmen and technicians put out of action, 1 petrol depot burnt, 67 aircraft (F. 100's, F.105's, B.57's, transport planes and helicopters) destroyed.

April 22 : Pleiku strategic base, Gialai province : 500 troops (including 450 G.I.'s) wiped out, 58 aircraft downed or destroyed on the ground.

May 17 : Soctrang : 130 troops (including 26 G.I.'s) put out of action, 30 helicopters destroyed.

May 25 : Phuloi, Thudaumot province : 32 G.I.'s wiped out, 2 helicopters, 1 24-ton tank and 2 barracks destroyed.
Vinhlong : 146 troops (including 100 G.I.'s) put out of action, 26 aircraft and many barracks destroyed.

- June 4* : Locninh airfield and military sub-sector, Thudaumot province : 200 troops (including 100 G.I.'s) wiped out, 27 helicopters destroyed.
- June 5* : Ankhe strategic base, Gialai province : 70 G.I.'s, U.S. First Airmobile Cavalry Division, put out of action, 12 helicopters destroyed.
- June 13* : C.P. of the U.S. First Infantry Division at Laikhe, Thudaumot province : 48 G.I.'s wiped out, 11 helicopters destroyed.
- June 22* : Soctrang : 10 G.I.'s put out of action, 27 aircraft and 7 magazines destroyed.
- July 8* : Cantho provincial capital : 180 G.I.'s and puppets wiped out, 54 aircraft and 3 military vehicles destroyed.
- July 21* : Quangngai provincial capital : 131 troops (including 96 G.I.'s) put out of action, 4 guns, 2 helicopters and 1 military vehicle destroyed.
- July 24* : Nuocman (Danang) : 150 U.S. airmen and technicians wiped out, 70 aircraft destroyed.
- July 26* : Soctrang airfield and paratroop training camp : 430 troops put out of action, 1 petrol depot and 11 helicopters destroyed.
- August 15* : C.P. of Third Brigade, U.S. First Infantry Division at Laikhe, Thudaumot province : 165 G.I.'s wiped out (including 12 pilots), 12 helicopters, 10 barracks and tents of the Third Brigade Command and logistic service of the First Infantry Division, destroyed.
- August 28* : Vinhlong : 100 troops (mostly Americans) put out of action, 16 aircraft and 2 military vehicles destroyed.
- September 3* : Ankhe strategic base, Gialai province : 40 aircraft destroyed, many others damaged. Many G.I.'s put out of action.
- September 26* : Phanthiet provincial capital, Binhthuan province : 6 aircraft and 2 guns destroyed.
- October 13* : Soctrang provincial capital : 140 troops (including 40 G.I.'s) wiped out, 16 aircraft destroyed.

November 1 : Soctrang provincial capital : 73 troops (including 30 G.I.'s) put out of action, 7 helicopters destroyed.

November 7-11 : Dautieng, Thudaumot province : 160 troops wiped out, 7 aircraft destroyed.

November 10 : Xuanloc, Bienhoa province : 1 125,000-litre petrol depot and 1 helicopter burnt.

November 21 : Tayninh, Thudaumot province : 100 G.I.'s U.S. First Infantry Division, put out of action, 1 helicopter and 2 M.41 tanks and many tents destroyed.

November 25 : Dautieng, Thudaumot province : 300 G.I.'s and many puppets wiped out, 10 helicopters, 2 guns and many military vehicles destroyed.

December 4 : Tansonhat strategic air base, Saigon : 600 troops (including 400 G.I.'s) put out of action, 260 aircraft, 2 bomb stores (200 tons) and 13 military vehicles destroyed.

December 7-9 : Dautieng, Thudaumot province : 50 G.I.'s wiped out, 7 helicopters destroyed.

December 11 : Duchoa and Haunghia sub-sector, Cholon : 300 troops put out of action, 6 aircraft destroyed, 24 weapons captured.

December 23 : Tranoc, Cantho province : 16 aircraft and 1 radar station destroyed, many G.I.'s wiped out.

MAJOR ATTACKS ON U.S. REAR BASES IN 1966

April 1 : Victoria billet, Saigon : 215 G.I.'s, mostly officers, put out of action (94 killed, 121 wounded).

April 17 : Danang artillery position : 180 U.S. marines wiped out (including 1 artillery company), 7 guns, 4 machineguns and 4 armoured cars destroyed, 1 petrol dump burnt.

June 19 : Chulai artillery position, Quangnam province : 400 G.I.'s and Pak Jung Hi troops put out of action, 6 guns, 1 mortar, 6 M.113's and M.118's, 9 blockhouses and 32 barracks destroyed.

- June 19* : Phuxuan military sub-sector, Hue : 85 troops wiped out, stores of arms and munitions destroyed, many weapons and wireless sets captured.
- June 22* : Banmethuot artillery and tank position, Darlac province : 1 company put out of action, 2 rows of barracks burnt, 2 blockhouses and 10 military vehicles destroyed
- July 26* : Dongdu base, Cuchi, Giadinh province : 423 G.I.'s knocked down, 200 G.I.'s of U.S. 25th Infantry Division wounded, 60 tanks and armoured cars, 5 guns, 6 aircraft and 2 electric generating sets destroyed, 177 tents burnt and 432 others demolished.
- August 17* : C.P. at Cambinh, Danang : 500 G.I.'s (1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 1 captain) wiped out, 1 munition depot and 110 military vehicles destroyed, 4,000,000 litres of petrol burnt.
- August 25* : Camlo, Quangtri province : 2 artillery companies and 1 infantry company annihilated, 7 tanks destroyed.
- October 8* : Thudaumot : 2 petrol dumps (2,000,000 litres and 8,500 litres) burnt.
- October 28* : Longbinh, Bienhoa province : 3 stores (125,000 bombs and 105-mm and 203-mm shells) destroyed.
- November 1* : Saigon parade site : 250 troops (2 American colonels and 2 lieutenant-colonels, 5 puppet majors and 12 non-commissioned officers) put out of action.
- November 17* : Longbinh, Bienhoa province : 3 stores (144,000 155-mm and 203-mm shells, 10,000 rockets, 3,585 kg of gunpowder), 8 trucks, 1 crane and many armoured cars destroyed, 1 battalion of the garrison heavily decimated.
- December 6* : Cadintay C.P., Kontum province : 200 G.I.'s of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division put out of action, 3 105-mm guns destroyed.
- December 10* : Longbinh, Bienhoa province : 2 stores (17,700 203-mm and 57,600 105-mm shells) and 1 truck of munitions destroyed, 50 G.I.'s wiped out.

Ongrau position occupied by Pak Jung Hi mercenaries, Quangngai province : 400 troops put out of action, 3 guns, 6 blockhouses, 8 under-grounds and 42 barracks destroyed.

December 14 : Tamky provincial capital, Quangnam province : 452 troops wiped out, 1 1,500,000-litre petrol dump, 2 munition stores, premises of the puppet administration and provincial police, 2 105-mm guns and 25 military vehicles destroyed.

December 26 : Ancuu logistic base, Hue, razed to the ground ; 2 transport companies and the battalion commanding staff put out of action and 100 military vehicles destroyed.